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Introductory Note

The papers in this volume were prepared for discussion at the One Hundred Twenty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature convened at the Anaheim Hilton and Towers, Anaheim, California, 18-21 November 1989. The papers represent, in most cases, experimental and initial work on a subject. Therefore, they should not be considered finished works but works in progress. The Society encourages this type of publication to stimulate discussion which may lead to the refinement and precision necessary in a journal article or monograph.

The Society's publication program has generated research among its members. Younger scholars and the veteran are able to prepare papers for discussion. This dispenses with time allotments for the reading of papers and permits significant debate at the Annual Meeting.

The Editor expresses appreciation to The Scriptorium, Denver, Colorado, for the able preparation of the text of this volume. The Editor also takes this opportunity to thank the chairs of all Annual Meeting program units for their assistance in developing a stimulating program.

David J. Lull, Editor
Executive Director, Society of Biblical Literature

A Proposed Reconstruction of Q 13:28-29

M. Eugene Boring
Texas Christian University

Q 13:28–29

[1]/	1 = B
[2]/ἐκεῖ ἔσται ὁ κλαυθμὸς	2 = B
καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς τῶν ὀδόντων \[2]	
/\ [3]	3 = B
(ὅταν ὄψεσθε)[4] Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαακ	4 = A
καὶ Ἰακὼβ [ ][5]	5 = B
ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ (θεοῦ)[6]	6 = A
(ὑμᾶς)[7] δὲ ( )[7]	7 = B
ἐκβ(α)[8]λ(λομένους)[8]	8 = B
( )[9] ἔξω( )[9]	9 = A
/\ [2]	

13:29 [3]/	
[( )][10],	10 = C
( )[11]	11 = B
/ἥξουσιν\ [12] ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν	12 = B
[ ][13],	13 = B
/\ [12] καὶ ἀνακλιθήσονται	
[ ][14] \[3]	14 = B
\[1]	

Matt 8:11-12	Luke 13:28-29
[1]/	[1]/
	[2]/ἐκεῖ ἔσται ὁ κλαυθμὸς
/\ [2]	καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς τῶν ὀδόντων \[2],
[3]/	

(λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι)[10]
(πολλοὶ)[11]
/\ [12] ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν
[ ][13]
/ἥξουσιν \[12] καὶ ἀνακλιθήσονται
[ ][14] \[3]
(μετὰ)[4] Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ
καὶ Ἰακὼβ [ ][5]
ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τ(ῶν οὐρανῶν)[6],
8:12 (οἱ)[7] δὲ (υἱοὶ τῆς βασιλείας)[7]
ἐκβ[ ][8]λ(ηθήσονται)[8]
(εἰς τὸ σκότος τὸ)[9] ἐξώ(τερον)[9]
[2]/ἐκεῖ ἔσται ὁ κλαυθμὸς
καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς τῶν ὀδόντων. \[2]

/\ [3]
1

/\ [3]
[ὅταν ὄψεσθε][4] Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ
καὶ Ἰακὼβ [καὶ πάντας τοὺς προφήτας][5]
ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τ[οῦ θεοῦ][6],
[ὑμᾶς][7] δὲ ( )[7]
ἐκβ[α][8]λ[λομένους][8]
( )[9] ἔξω ( )[9]

/\ [2]
13:29 [3]/
[καὶ][10]
( )[11]
/ἥξουσιν \[12] ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν
[καὶ ἀπὸ βορρᾶ καὶ νότου][13]
/\ [12] καὶ ἀνακλιθήσονται
[ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ][14]. \[3]
\[1]

Q 13:28–29[1]: Position of 13:28–29 in Q.

Luke = Q: After Q 13:27; before Q 13:30°, 13:34.

Pro: B. Weiss 1876, 97: ". . . Lk 13 uns noch eine wichtige Spruchreihe aus Q erhalten ist, die mit 13, 28f. schloss. Aber dass diese Verse in Q standen, wissen wir ja ohnehin aus Mt. 8, 11f., . . ." **Hawkins** 1899, 160: ". . . Luke gives it substantially elsewhere, and apparently in its original place (xiii, 28, 29)." **Easton** 1926, 221: "This section, in Lk's form, would have given this eschatological matter an impressive conclusion." **Bussmann** 1929, 112. **Hirsch** 1941, 89: "den Rest (Luk 13:28–30) bringt er nun hier beim Hauptmann von Kapernaum unter." **Streeter** 1936, 514: "Again, as the context (Mt. viii 11) in which the prophecy is placed makes clear (quite a different one from that which, from its position in Luke (xiii. 28), we may conclude was original in Q), . . ." **Hirsch** 1941, 129: "Es legt sich mithin die Vermutung nahe, dass der ganze Abschnitt 24–29 in Q zusammen gehangen habe und sei es von Matth, sei es von seinen Vorlagen ausgelöst und in Letzen andern Sinnzusammenhängen eingepasst worden ist." **Dupont** 1958, 97: In le transmettant au ch. 13, Luc parait lui conserver la place qu'il avait dans une tradition antérieure." **Schlosser** 1980, 614: "Une conclusion vraisemblable se dégage de ces analyses: Matthieu a remanié assez profondément le texte de la source; c'est Luc qui est resté le plus fidèle à la *Vorlage* en particulier en ce qui regarde l'ordre des éléments. S'il en est ainsi, mentionnons-le en passant, il paraît difficile d'écarter l'hypothèse que, au niveau de la source Q déjà, les vv. 28–29 ont dû être reliés aux vv. 26–27: la sentence prononcée par le juge (vv. 26–27) est exécutée immédiatement (vv. 28–29)." **Schmithals** 1980, 154: "Es wird durch das einleitende 'Dort' eng mit V. 25–27 verbunden und war vielleicht von Anfang an die Anwendung des Gleichnisses V. 25a, 27." "V. 29 (Mat. 8.11f.) gehört mit V. 30 zusammen und bildet mit ihm eine Art Nachtrag oder Anhang zu V. 24–28, der eher den Leser

als den Hörer informiert. Das Motiv stammt aus dem Alten Testament: Jes 2.1–4; 25,6–8; 59,19 und andere Stellen sprechen von der eschatologischen Völkerwallfahrt zum Zion." **Schenk** 1981, 104 includes this passage as part of Die Zwei-Wege-Rede. **Kloppenborg** 1987, 226: ". . . there is no good reason to doubt that Luke reproduces the relative order of the sayings in Q." **Sato** 1987, 42: "Nicht unmöglich ist, dass Lk 13, 23f.25–27.28f.34f par in dieser Reihenfolge eine *Spruchgruppe* (bzw. – *sammlung*) geformt haben." ". . . dass Stichwort ἔξω (Lk 13, 25 (nur Lk 13,28 par) und das Bild vom 'Essen und Trinken' (Lk 13,26 (nur Lukas)/Lk 13,29 par) knüpfen Lk 13,25-27 par und Lk 13,28f par zusammen."

Con: **Wernle** 1899, 65: "Die Schlussworte Jesu, um deretwillen die Geschichte in der Spruchsammlung stand, hat Lc versetz (13,28f.), da sie im hier verfrüht schienen." **Hoffmann** 1967, 205–6: "Die Matthäus-Parallele (811f.) zeigt, dass Lukas das Logion 13 in Q vorfand. Die Frage, ob Matthäus den Q-Zusammenhang erhalten hat, lässt sich nicht mit Sicherheit beantworten; da aber Lukas die Komposition 13:22–27 aus Einzelelementen redaktionell bildete, ist es sehr wahrscheinlich, dass er auch das Logion 13:28f. in den Zusammenhang einfügte." **Hoffmann** 1972, 5: "Kleinere Einheiten und nicht merh sicher lokalisierbare Einzelsprüche. Die Heidenvölker im Reich: Lk 13,28f/Mt 8,11f." **Chilton** 1979, 185–86: ". . . the supposition that Lk preserves a more primitive form of Q than Mt does has led several commentators to argue or assume that this discourse (give or take vv. 22.30) is pre-Lukan. Such a position does not easily explain why Justin (*Apology* 16, 11f) preserves this speech without vv. 28.29." "We are therefore left to conclude that neither Mt's nor Lk's context for our logion is traditional." **Wegner** 1980, 55,: "Da sich auch gegen die Ursprünglichkeit von Lk 13, 28f im jetzigen Lk-Kontext starke Bedenken erheben (vgl. dazu Mussner, Gleichnis, passim, bes. 136–138; Hoffmann, πάντες ἐργάται ἀδικίας, passim, bes. 205ff und Schilton [*sic*], God in strength 184–186), wird man sich wohl in Bezug auf die Frage nach der urspr. Plazierung dieses Jesuslogion mit eimen *non liquet* zufrieden geben müssen." **Schneider** 1984, 306–7: "Sie sind aber wohl erst von Lukas in Zusammenhang mit den VV 26f. gebracht worden. Aus dieser Zusammenfügung resultiert die Umstellung, die zuerst von den Verworfenen spricht (V 28 im Anschluss an VV 25–27). In der Logienquelle stand (siehe Mt) am Anfang die Ankündigung der 'Völkerwallfahrt' zur Teilnahme am eschatologischen Mahl, ehe von der Verstossung der 'Kinder des Reiches' die Rede war (Zeller 224)." **Fitzmyer** 1985, 1021: "These Lucan verses are joined to the preceding utterance only in a loose way, . . ." Reconstructions: **Luz; Polag.** *Matt = Q:* After Q 7:9 (Matt 8:10); before Q 9:57 (Matt 8:19).

Pro: **Haupt** 1913, 193. **Bussmann** 1929, 112: ". . . die Worte, die Mt jetzt im Anschluss an diese Geschichte in 811–12 bietet, auch in R an dieser Stelle gestanden haben." **Schulz** 1972, 323: "Mt dürfte die ursprüngliche Abfolge bewahrt haben, während Lk sek zwei Logien gestaltet hat. Dabei ist der Aufbau der Mt-Form bei weitem geschlossener und logischer als derjenizge bei Lk: der Aufnahme der Heiden ins Himmelreich folgt die Verwerfung Israels. Lk bietet das Logion in einer wenig stringenten Reihenfolge der Satzglieder und wiederholt einzelne Aussagen (ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ)." **Schweizer** ET 1975, 213: "Luke 13:28–29 preserves the same saying in reverse order, perhaps because there it is appended to the condemnation in 13:27. The saying presumably was often repeated, now in one form, now another." "Even before Matthew, and possibly from the very beginning, the saying belonged to our narrative. . . ." **Marshall** 1978, 564: "Matthew's linking of the saying with the story of the centurion's servant may well be original; but it is significant that the present group of sayings occurs in the same order in Mt. and Lk., and this

raises the possibility that in Matthew's source the present saying preceded the story which thus followed it as an example or confirmation of the point which is made in it." **Dupont** 1985, 571: "Si l'on admet que nous avons affaire à une sentence détachée, il semble clair qu'elle n'a pas pu se transmettre sous une forme qui débutait par l'adverbe 'là', ἐκεῖ; cet adverbe suppose un contexte antérieur, alors que la tradition ne nous en a pas conservé. Dans le passage où Luc l'emploie, l'adverbe rattache le logion aux sentences précédentes. Ce lien est imparfait, puisqu'il faut remonter jusqu'au v. 25 pour trouver l'indiction de lieu (ἔξω) sur laquelle l'ἐκεῖ du v. 28 apporte des précisions, mais il correspond bien au souci de l'évangéliste qui veut unifier littérairement son texts; il correspond aussi au point de vue topographique ou géographique si souvent adopté par Luc comme principe d'ordonnance des matériaux dont il dispose. On comprend ainsi porquoi Luc a bousculé l'ordre naturel dans lequel 6 derait se places après 5; il faut admettre que, sur ce point, Matthieu doit avoir mieux conservé la succession primitive des éléments."

Con: **B. Weiss** 1907, 97: "26f. anschliesst (13, 28), und dann erst die Weissangung der Heidenberufung (13, 29) folgt. Dagegen musste Mt. 8, 11 in seinem Zusammenhang diese voranstellen und dann erst die Ausschliessung der Söhne des Reiches bringen (8, 12), die in dieser Allgemeinheit auf eine Zeit hinweist, wo durch die Zerstörung Jerusalems bereits die Verwerfung des erstberufenen Volkes besiegelt war (bem. auch die bei Matthäus immer wiederkehrende Schilderung der Hölle durch τὸ σκότος τὸ ἐξώτερον)." **Loisy** 1907, II, 124: "la declaration relative au salut des Gentils, que le rédacteur du premier Évangile a insérée dans l'histoire du centurion de Capharnaum." **Easton** 1926, 221: "Mt has used the first part of this section [13:22–30] in Q to enrich his Sermon on the Mount, and introduced the present saying at the first convenient point afterwards. Consequently it may be presumed that Lk has followed Q here more closely than Mt. . . . This section, in Lk's form, would have given this eschatological matter an impressive conclusion." **Manson** 1937, 416: "Mt. 8:11f., which is inserted into Mt.'s account of the Centurion of Capernaum, may be derived from Q: it has considerable resemblance to Lk. 13:28–30." **Kilpatrick** 1946, 118: "In the story of the centurion's servant, viii. 5–13, the introduction from another Q context of vv. 11f., which are not in the Lucan parallel, makes the story a forecast of the conversion of the Gentiles." **Dupont** 1958, 96–97: "A la sentence d'exclusion du v. 27, les vv. 28–29 ajoutent le tableau de la détresse de ceux qui ont été rejetés et remplacée au banquet du salut par des convives appelés des quatre coins de l'universe. Le logion est inséré par Matthieu (8, 11–12) dans l'épisode du centurion de Capharnaüm. Luc, qui connaît cet épisode (7, 1–10), n'y a pas trouvé le logion qui nous occupe: l'omission serait incompréhensible de sa part. C'est probablement Matthieu qui l'y ajouté, car, placé entre deux petites formules d'introduction, le logion fait, dans ce récit, figure de pièce rapportée. In le transmettant au ch. 13, Luc parait lui conserver la place qu'il avait dans une tradition antérieure." **Dupont** 1958, 962,: "L'emplacement est excellent chez Matthieu; mais faut-il présumer qui l'évangéliste est incapable d'assigner par lui-même un contexte heureux aux sentences qu'il déplace? Une context de heureux n'est pas nécessairement primitif. L'explication qu'on nous donne des motifs qui auraient poussé Luc à opérer le déplacement est franchement insuffisante: il est difficile de prêter à Luc peu d'intérêt pour un texte parlant explicitement de l'appel des Gentiles et de leur substitution aux Juifs dans l'economie du salut. C'est précisément sur ce thème qu'il met l'accent dans tout le livre des Actes, et déjà dans le discours inaugural de Jésus à Nazareth (4, 16–30). On ne concoit guère que l'aspect menacant du logion ait retenu seul son attention, si le contexte mettait en

valeur la promesse qu'il contient à l'addresse des Gentils." **Meyer** 1967, 16, note 1: ". . . Matthew has obviously inserted the warning into the miracle story (8:5–13)." **Hoffmann** 1972, 5: "Kleinere Einheiten und nicht merh sicher lokalisierbare Einzelsprüche. Die Heidenvölker im Reich: Lk 13,28f/Mt 8,11f." **Chilton** 1979, 184: ". . . there is a particularly striking similarity between the placing of 8, 11–12 and that of 15,24.28. The redactional pedigree of the context is therefore suggested both by the concern of Mt for the place of Gentiles in the kingdom and by the Matthean method of pointing stories with logia." **Wegner** 1980, 55: "Da sich auch gegen die Ursprünglichkeit von Lk 13, 28f im jetzigen Lk-Kontext starke Bedenken erheben (vgl. dazu Mussner, Gleichnis, passim, bes. 136–138; Hoffmann, πάντες ἐργάται ἀδικίας, passim, bes. 205ff und Schilton [*sic*], God in strength 184–186), wird man sich wohl in Bezug auf die Frage nach der urspr. Plazierung dieses Jesuslogion mit eimen *non liquet* zufrieden geben müssen." **Dupont** 1985, 569–70: "Les exégètes sont à peu près unanimes pour estimer qu'il faut attribuer à l'évangéliste lui-même l'insertion du morceau à cet endroit. On observe en effet qu'il ne figure pas dans le récit parallèle que Luc donne de l'épisode du centurion (Lc 7, 1–10; voir aussi Jn 4, 46–54): si Luc avait trouvé la déclaration à cet endroit, l'omission serait inexplicable, car l'emplacement est incontestablement heureux, et il donne tout son relief à une idée chère à Luc, celle de l'appel des Gentils au salut. L'addition par Mathieu s'explique beaucoup plus facilement. D'abord parce qu'il s'agit d'un procédé qui lui est familier: Matthieu cherche à grouper les matériaux qui présentent une certaine parenté. Ensuite parce que, dans ce cas du premier païen de l'histoire évangélique (après les mages), l'insertion permettait à l'auteur de mettre en pleine valeur des thèmes auxquels it tient: importance de la foi, déchéance d'Israël, admission des Gentils dans l'économie du salut." **Kloppenborg** 1987, 225 ". . . Matthew relocated it to his version of the healing of the centurion's son."

Evaluation: MEB 12 v 89 B After 27, before 30.
The issues of (#1) "the position of 13:28–29 in Q." (#2) "the position of the clause about weeping and gnashing of teeth," and (#3) "the position of the clause about coming from different directions and reclinging" which really means the relative order of Q 13:28 and Q 13:29, are so interrelated that they must be discussed together. See below on #3 for the complete discussion.

Q 13:28–29[2]: Position of the clause about weeping and gnashing of teeth.

Luke = Q: [2]/ἐκεῖ ἔσται ὁ κλαυθμὸς καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς τῶν ὀδόντων \[2], /\ [3] [ὅταν ὄψεσθε][4] Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ. . . ( )[9] ἔξω.( )[9] /\[2].

Pro: **Polag** 1979, 68 places 13:29 after 13:27. Then follows 13:28b and 13:28a. **Gundry** 1982, 146: "Luke rather than Matthew, it is usually thought, has transposed the sayings about reclining at the messianic banquet and being excluded from it, because 'there' lacks a referent in Luke that has a natural referent to the outermost darkness in Matthew's order of sayings. But the adverb does have a referent in Luke, viz,, the 'outside' of the banquet hall in v 25. The theme of standing outside with no possibility of entrance continues till it reaches a climax in v 26: there, outside the shut door, those who hear the Lord's 'Away from me' will weep and grind their teeth. The repetition of 'outside' at the end of v 28 makes an inclusio with the first occurence. Then, as a contrast, we are told again of those who enter through the narrow door to enjoy the feast (see v 29a with v 24a), and an overall comment wraps up the section (v 30). The unity of Luke's passage looks original." **Schlosser**,

1980, 613: "Il est très plausible que dans le logion de Q aussi les "pleurs et grincements de dents" qualifiaient à l'origine non point le lieu et le destin des réprouvés comme dans la rédaction de Mt, mais une réaction humaine soudaine et profonde, traduisant l'amer regret du coupable qui se voit démasqué ou la déception du pécheur qui apprend qu'il est désavoué, les reproches qu'il se fait à lui-même quand il saisit brusquement que sa situation est sans issue." **Schweizer** ET 1984, 227: "When Luke or one of his predecessors appended vss. 28–29 to the judgment saying, their order was reversed."

Con: **Harnack** 1907, 78: The change of order in St. Luke is due to the transposition of 4 (ἐκεῖ κτλ.) to the beginning, for which the reason is not obvious." "ἐκεῖ is thus out of connection (it does not connect with xiii. 27);" **Loisy** 1907, II, 124[3]: "On ne voit pas la portée de ἐκεῖ, au commencement du v. 28; la place naturelle et primitive de 28a est à la fin du v. 29, comme on le voit par Mt. viii.11–12. . . ." **Haupt** 1913, 82: "Der Wortlaut der dann folgenden Verse Lc 13, 28.29 ist aus Mt besser zu ergehen, da v 29 bei Lc nachklappt und das ἐκεῖ v 28 keinen guten Anschluss hat." **Hoffmann** 1967, 207: "Die schlechte Verbindung der vv. 28 und 29 bei Lukas beweist noch nicht die Ursprünglichkeit dieser Gestalt des Logions. Dagegen spricht vor allem, dass der in diesem Fall beziehungslos voranstehende ἐκεῖ-Satz (v. 28a) als Einleitung eines isolierten Doppellogions stilistisch nur schwer vorstellbar ist. Da ausserdem ἐκεῖ nur durch den ὅταν-Satz weitergeführt würde, müsste es ungewöhnlicherweise temporal verstanden werden. Diese Härten werden gemildert, wenn die Umgestaltung auf Lukas zurückgeführt wird, der ein freies Logion mit der Szene 13:25–27 verbinden wollte, dabei aber – in Treue zur Überlieferung – dessen Grundelemente zu erhalten suchte. Dann lässt sich nämlich ἐκεῖ auf die Situation der vor der Tür Stehended zurückbeziehen und kann im Bildzusammenhang räumlich verstanden werden; ὅταν korrespondiert den Zeitbestimmungen in den Vorhergehenden Versen." **Dupont** 1969, 70–71: "Pour adapter ce logion au nouveau contexte de 'la porte fermée' la version de Luc en a complètement bouleversé l'ordonnance: 'Là seront le pleur et le grincement des dents, quand vous verrez. . . .' "Luc n'a pas laissé se perdre la formule qui figure en finale de la sentence chez Matthieu; en la placant au début, il lui accorde plus de relief et fait porter sur elle le poids de l'affirmation." Zeller 1971, 223: "1. Handelt es sich überhaupt um einen Spruch? Oder ist – nach dem Lk-Text zu schliessen – in Q ein Drohwort gegen die Juden (V. 28) 'ungefüg' mit einer Verheissung für die Heiden (V. 29) zusammengestellt worden? Die argumente, die die Lk Abfolge redaktionell erläutern, brauchen nur kurz wiederholt zu werden, da sie bereits überzeugend ausgeführt worden sind. a) Das nur am Schluss sinnvolle ἐκεῖ ἔσται ὁ κλαυθμὸς καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς τῶν ὀδόντων ist wohl von Lk vorgezogen worden, um eine szenische Einheit mit dem Vorhergehenden zu erreichen; er muss jetzt mit dem an 16, 23 erinnernden ὅταν ὄψεσθε künstlich einen Bezug zu V. 28bc schaffen. Damit tritt auch der Gedanke der Verwerfung an die Spitze; auf das Urteil V. 25ff folgt die Exekution. b) Verglichen mit der Mt-Fassung hat Lk 13, 28f sehr an Schärfe verloren. Das Los der Juden kontrastiert jetzt mehr mit der Seligkeit der Väter und Propheten als mit den Teilnehmern am Mahl aus allen Himmelsgegenden. c) Wenn V. 29 einmal ein selbständiges Wort gewesen sein soll, bleibt es ohne Zusammenhang farblos." **Schweizer** ET 1975, 213: "Luke 13:28–29 preserves the same saying in reverse order, perhaps because there it is appended to the condemnation in 13:27." **Vassiliadis** 1978, 66: 13:28a = 8:12b was not in Q. "Short apophthegms or sayings of a proverbial character especially those found in a different context in Matthew and Luke should be excluded as possibly due to the oral tradition." **Chilton** 1979, 186:

"In terms of their contexts, the order of the two logia admirably accords with their respective purposes." "Since the placement of both logia is redactional, the agreement of their order with the tendency of the passage in which each appears cannot be used to argue that either order is traditional." **Chilton** 1979, 187: "This partial loss of reference is the consequence of a (for us) even more significant phenomenon: without a connection-nb., without a connection which is in the event redactional-between v. 27 and ἐκεῖ this term would lack an antecedent. Its present placement is due to Lk's desire to incorporate vv.28.29 into his discourse." **Schneider** 1984, 307: "Lukas kann wegen seiner Komposition den abschliessenden Satz 'Dort wird Heulen und Zähneknirschen sein' (Mt 8, 12b) an den Anfang stellen (V 28a)." **Fitzmyer** 1985, 1021: ". . . Luke has probably inverted the order of the sayings to associate the weeping and grinding of teeth with the evil-doers of v. 27." **Kloppenborg** 1987, 226: "ἐκεῖ ἔσται ὁ κλαυθμὸς καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς τῶν ὀδόντων cannot serve as an introduction to an originally independent saying, but it is quite acceptable as its conclusion. More likely, Luke brought this phrase forward in order to form a bridge with the preceding saying, in particular, the command 'Depart from me.'" **Kloppenborg** 1988, 166: ". . . v. 28a cannot have functioned as the introduction to an originally independent saying. More probably, Luke inverted the order of the two parts of the saying and used v. 28a as a bridge connecting v. 27 ('depart from me') and vv. 28b–29." Reconstructions: **Schenk.**

Matt = Q: /\ 2 3/ (Λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι)[10] . . . (εἰς τὸ σκότος τὸ)[9] ἐξω(τερον·)[9] 2/ἐκεῖ ἔσται ὁ κλαυθμὸς καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς τῶν ὀδόντων. \2

Pro: **Harnack** 1907, 78: "The order of St. Matthew is accordingly original." **Meyer** 1967, 16[1]. **Gundry** 1982, 146: "Having worked backward, Matthew finally arives at the first in the group of sayings, the one concerning weeping and grinding of teeth (Luke 13:28a). Sufficiently severe already, the saying satisfies Matthew to the extent that he adopts it without revision and will use it without parallel several times again (see 13:42, 50; 22:13; 24:51; 25:30)."

Con: **Hawkins** 1899, 162: Matthew is responsible for the present location. **Easton** 1926, 221: "Mt has inverted the order of the clauses to gain better connection with his story of the centurion, . . . **Kilpatrick** 1946, 75: "The closing formula ἐκεῖ ἔσται ὁ κλαυθμὸς καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς τῶν ὀδόντων occurs once in Q, Matt. viii. 12 (Luke xiii.28), but is repeated at Matt. xiii. 42, 50, xxii. 13, xxiv. 51, xxv. 30 by the editor of the Gospel, apparently without warrant from the sources." **Vassiliadis** 1978, 66: 13:28a = 8:12b was not in Q. "Short apophthegms or sayings of a proverbial character especially those found in a different context in Matthew and Luke should be excluded as possibly due to the oral tradition." **Chilton** 1979,186: "In terms of their contexts, the order of the two logia admirably accords with their respective purposes." "Since the placement of both logia is redactional, the agreement of their order with the tendency of the passage in which each appears cannot be used to argue that either order is traditional." **Schenk** 1987, 321: "8,12 (=Q) folgt dann die Übernahme der die Straffolge in der Hölle beschreibenden Wendung ἐκεῖ ἔσται ὁ κλαυθμὸς καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς τῶν ὀδόντων Mt 6: Mk 0: Lk 1 + 0, die danach 13,42.50; 22,13; 24,51; 25,30 jeweils red. als Abschluss von Gerichtsallegorien multipl. ist. . . ." Reconstructions: **Zeller** 1971; **Luz; Sato.**

Evaluation: MEB 12 v 89 B The position of the clause about gnashing of teeth is represented by Luke.

The issues of (#1) "the position of 13:28–29 in Q," (#2) "the position of the clause about weeping and gnashing of teeth," and (#3) "the position of the clause about

coming from different directions and reclining" which really means the relative order of Q 13:28 and Q 13:29, are so interrelated that they must be discussed together. See below on #3 for the complete discussion.

Q 13:28–29[3]: Position of the clause about coming from different directions and reclining.

Luke = Q: /\ [3] [ὅταν ὄψεσθε][4] Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ . . . [3]/[καὶ][10] ( ) [11]/ἥξουσιν \[12] ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν [καὶ ἀπὸ βορρᾶ καὶ νότου][13] /\ [12] καὶ ἀνακλιθήσονται [ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ][14]. \[3]

Con: **Gundry** 1982, 145: "Instead of making reference first to the exclusion of unbelieving Israelites (so Jesus in Luke), he reverses the order of the sayings to gain an immediate reference to the influx of believing Gentiles into the coming kingdom."

Matt = Q: [3]/(Λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι)[10] (πολλοὶ)[11] /\ [12] ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν [ ][13] /ἥξουσιν \[12] καὶ ἀνακλιθήσονται [ ][14] \[3] . . . καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς τῶν ὀδόντων. \[2] / \[3]

Pro: Reconstructions: **Zeller** 1971; **Luz**; **Sato**.

Evaluation: MEB 12 v 89 B The position of the clause about coming from different directions and reclining is represented by Luke.

The issues of (#1) "the position of 13:28–29 in Q," (#2) "the position of the clause about weeping and gnashing of teeth." and (#3) "the position of the clause about coming from different directions and reclining" which really means the relative order of Q 13:28 and Q 13:29, are so interrelated that they must be discussed together. To make sense of the individual decisions involved, a plausible *Traditionsgeschichte* must be posited that involves decisions about the pre-Q shape of the individual saying(s), Q redaction, Matthean redaction, and Lucan redaction. All these decisions are interrelated. At least the following possibilities may be posited:

(A)

(1) 28–29 circulated independently or as a cluster.

(2) Q incorporated it into the present Lucan context.

(3) Matthew changed the context to the setting of the Healing of the Centurion's Servant, and changed the order so that the saying about "gnashing of teeth" comes at the end.

(4) Luke retains the Q context and order.

THUS: #1, Q = Lk
#2, Q = Lk

EVALUATION: This is hardly a possibility, since it calls for positing an independent saying or cluster that began with ἐκεῖ ἔσται ὁ κλαυθμὸς καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς τῶν ὀδόντων.

(B)

(1) 28–29 circulated "originally" as a part of the story of Healing the Centurion's Servant.

(2) Q incorporated the story and the saying at its conclusion.

(3) Matthew keeps the Q context, but reverses the order of the sayings in order to place the "gnashing of teeth" saying at the end.

(4) Luke places the saying in a different context, but preserves the Q order, which fit the new context.

THUS: #1, Q = Mt
#2, Q = Lk

(C)

(1) The sayings "originally" circulated as a cluster in the order 29–28.

(2) Q incorporated them into the present Lucan context.

(3) Matthew changed the context to the story of the Healing the Centurion's Servant.

(4) Luke kept the Q context, but brought v. 28 forward to make a better transition to 13:27. This is the view of Kloppenborg et al.

THUS: #1, Q = Lk
#2, Q = Mt

(C^1)

A variation of the trajectory posited in C would be that the transposition of the verses occurred in the Q redaction:

(1) The sayings "originally" circulated as a cluster in the order 29–28.

(2) Q incorporated them into the present Lucan context, but changed the order to 28–29 to make a better transition from 27.

(3) Matthew changed the context to the story of the Healing the Centurion's Servant, and changed the order from the Q order, to make a better climax for the saying in its new context.

(4) Luke kept the Q context and order of the sayings.

THUS: #1, Q = Lk
#2, Q = Lk

(D)

(1) The sayings "originally" circulated in the order 29–28.

(2) Q placed them in the context of the story of the Healing of the Centurion's Servant.

(3) Matthew retained both context and order.

(4) Luke changed the context, and then changed the order of the sayings to make a better transition from 27 to 28.

THUS: #1, Q = Mt
#2, Q = Mt.

Of these combinations, I consider C^1 the most probable, for the following reasons:

1. The old rule of thumb, "Luke's order but Matthew's wording" is by no means infallible, but in complex cases is a valid point of departure.

2. It is relatively easy to account for Matthew's insertion of this saying into his context, but difficult to explain Luke's removal of it.

3. It is difficult to find another, non-Matthean or non-Lukan, context for the sayings in Q.

4. ἐκεῖ as the beginning of an independent saying is indeed a problem. Someone must have reversed the order of the sayings to make them fit the Q context. This could have been either at the level of the Q redaction or at the level of Lucan redaction. Since the complex of sayings 24–30 is a coherent unit now, and since this seems to have been the earliest context for 28–29, there is no particular reason to

doubt that the order that came to Luke in Q was the present order. (contra Kloppenborg)

5. This point is a bit further strengthened by the fact that 29 seems to belong with 30, which requires the order 28–29. This argument, of course, depends on the view that 30 originally concluded this context. This seems likely (Schmithals), but as a floating saying its location(s) in Q.

Q 13:28–29[4]: Luke's construction "when you see" or Matthew's preposition.

Luke = Q: [ὅταν ὄψεσθε][4] Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ

Pro: **Schlosser**, 1980, 605: Il arrive au rédacteur lucanien d'introduire le verbe ὁράω dans ses sources et de l'employer de façon marquée en contexte eschatologique. Mais on peut citer aussi des textes où Luc omet ce verbe quand il le trouve dans Mc. A dire vrai, les indices apparaissent trop ténus pour autoriser quelque conclusion sur le caractère traditionnel ou rédactionnel de la clause "quand vous verrez." Cependant, le fait que ὅταν n'est pratiquement attesté chez Lc que dans des textes traditionnels invite à compter plutôt avec la provenance traditionnelle de ὅταν ὄψησθε. Un indice de style, comme on le verra plus loin, confirme cette hypothèse."

Con: **Harnack** 1907, 78: ὄψεσθε is an interpolation "(so that the thought of the passage now reminds us of the Rich Man in Hades)." "ὄψεσθε with double accusative is Lukan." **Dupont** 1958, 288: "Cadbury observe que c'est surtout dans les passages provenant de Q (double tradition) que Luc substitue la deuxième personne dans des enseignements de Jésus transmis par Matthieu sous une autre forme; mais il est bien souvent difficile en ces passages de déterminer avec une précision suffisante l'état des sources utilisées par Luc. Ils sont donc moins probants, et nour préférons ne pas nous y attarder. Il suffit d'avoir remarqué que la transposition à la deuxième personne du pluriel de sentences transmises à la troisième personne serait assez conforme à un procéde de style cher à saint Luc." **Meyer** 1967, 16, note 1: "Luke has attempted to create a literary unity, in the process adding "you will see" (Conzelmann, *St. Luke*, 116; Creed, 186). . . ." **Schulz** 1972, 323: "Auch die 2. Pers (ὄψεσθε) in Lk V 28 wird sek gegenüber der 3. Pers bei Mt sein und ist ebenfalls aus dem Kontext Vv 25–27 zu erklären. ὅταν ὄψεσθε könnte Lk eingefügt haben, um eine Verbindung zu den in Vv 25ff Angesprochenen herzustellen." **Polag** 1979, 69: The preposition was omitted by Luke. **Dupont** 1985, 571: "Après le déplacement qui lui a permis d'entraîner le v. 28 avec les versets précedents, Luc n'a pas pu reprendre simplement l'ordonnance de la déclaration de Jésus telle qu'elle lui était parvenue. On s'en apercoit déjà à l'addition du raccord 'quand vous verrez.' Ce raccord temporel n'est pas trés heureux aprés l'adverbe de lieu; il reste du moins dans la ligne des versets qui précèdent (cf. τότε au début du v. 26) et fournit, vaille que vaille, une transition qui permet de revenir au texte de base." ". . . retouches dans la version de Luc: soudure rédactionnelle 'quand vous verrez,' . . ." **Kloppenborg** 1987, 226: "The use of the second-person address is consistent with Lucan redaction elsewhere, 225 . . ." **Kloppenborg** 1987, 226[225]: "See Cadbury, *Style*, 124–25; Hoffmann, Πάντες, 207. Schmid (*Matthäus und Lukas*, 256) argues for the originality of ὄψεσθε on the grounds that Luke tends to omit or replace forms of ὁράω (e.g., in Mark 14:62//Luke 22:69). However, as Cadbury points out (*Style*, 176) this is frequently to change a Marcan statement of perception into one of fact (e.g., in Luke 3:21; 8:45; 9:30, 37; 22:69). In the present instance, as well as in 17:22 and 22:27, 'seeing' is crucial to the Lucan point." Reconstructions: **Schenk**.

Matt = Q: (μετὰ)[4] Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ

Pro: **Meyer** 1967, 16, note 1.

Con: **Gundry** 1982, 145: Matthew omits "'when you see Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and all the prophets in the kingdom of God' (so Luke)." Reconstructions: **Zeller** 1971; **Luz**; **Sato**.

Evaluation: MEB 12 v 89 B *Q=Mt*

Despite Schlosser's careful argument to the contrary, the marks of Lukan style point to the use of the second person direct address is from Luke. In addition, ὄψεσθε corresponds to the Lucan emphasis in 16:23.

Q13:28–29[5]: Luke's mention of all the prophets.

Luke=Q: καὶ Ἰακὼβ [καὶ πάντας τοὺς προφήτας][5]

Con: **Wernle**, 1899, 65: "Ihren Text hat er [Lc] dort durchaus sekundär wiedergegeben (. . . alle Propheten, . . .)." **Harnack**, 1907, 78: "Πάντας τοὺς προφήτας is also secondary;" **Loisy** 1907, II, 124: "L'évangéliste a pu ajouter de lui-même . . . les prophètes aux trois grands patriarches. . . . Peut-être a-t-il voulu presenter les patriarches et les prophètes comme étant déja en possession du bonheur éternel.2" (Note 2. "J. Weiss, 509. Cf. Lc. xvi, 23; xxiii, 43.") **Cadbury**, 1920, 115: ". . . Luke adds a general term to those already specific"; **Easton** 1926, 221: ". . . 'all the prophets' is Lk's generalization." **Manson** 1937, 417: "The patriarchs and prophets—the godly of every generation in Israel's history—and men from every quarter of the world—such as are spoken of elsewhere in Q: repentant Gentiles—sit down to the Messianic banquet in the Kingdom of God. (Cf. Is. 49:12; Mal 1:11.)" **Hoffmann** 1967, 208: "Er [Lk] hat auch καὶ πάντας τοὺς προφήτας—die Väteraussage ergänzend—hinzugefügt." **Meyer** 1967, 6, note 1: Luke's addition. **Dupont** 1969, 762: "P. Hoffmann (*ZNW* 1967, p. 209) souligne avec raison qu'en ajoutant 'tous les prophètes' aux patriarches mentionnés par la source, Luc complète la série de ceux qui constituent, dans sa théologie, les témoins de la promesse." **Schulz** 1972, 323: "πάντας τοὺς προφήτας ist sek Auggestaltung des Lk." **Chilton** 1979, 194: "'All the prophets' is a stereotyped pharase in Luke," according to I. Marshall, and three passages (11,50; 24,27; Acts 10, 43) explicitly indicate this, as does the thematic emphasis on prophetic witness in Lk-Acts." **Polag** 1979, 69: Matthew has omitted the reference. **Jeremias** 1980, 233: πάντας τοὺς προφήτας Fehlt par. Mt 8, 11 und ist lukanisch—11,50 Red S. 209;" **Schlosser** 1980, 605: "Dans leur évangile respectif, Matthieu et Luc réfèrent tous deux aux prophètes de l'AT à maintes reprises. Il est permis de penser que Matthieu n'aurait pas supprimé leur mention s'il l'avit lur dans sa source. Quant à Luc, il témoigne d'un intérêt positif pour le thème de sorte qu'on peut lui attribuer l'insertion des mots 'et tous les prophètes' en 13,28." **Dupont** 1985, 571: "Deux précisions semblent bien être des amplifications: 'tous les prophètes,' ajouté aux trois patriarches, . . ." **Fitzmyer** 1985, 1026: "Matt 8:11 does not include these OT figures; and they were most likely not part of 'Q.' The phrase is never used in Mark or John, and it appears only once in Matthew (11:13). However, it occurs several times in Lucan writings (11:50; 24:27; Acts 3:13, 24; 10:43). So Luke has added it redactionally to his source." **Kloppenborg** 1987, 226: Lucan redaction. **Kloppenborg** 1987, 226[226]: "See Jeremias, *Sprache*, 209. πάντας τοὺς προφήτας occurs, apart from Matt 11:13 (with 'Law'), only in Luke-Acts: Luke 11:50 (diff Matt); 13:28; 24:27 (*Sond:* Acts 3:18, 24; 10:43."

Matt=Q: καὶ Ἰακὼβ [ ][5]

Pro: **Schlosser** 1980, 605: "Dans leur évangile respectif, Matthieu et Luc réfèrent

tous deux aux prophètes de l'AT à maintes reprises. Il est permis de penser que Matthieu n'aurait pas supprimé leur mention s'il l'avit lur dans sa source."

Con: **Schmithals** 1980, 154: "Das 'samt allen Propheten' könnte ein Zusatz des Lukas sein, der die Frommen Israels noch betonter als die Vorlage als Erben der Gottesherrschaft einführen will." **Gundry** 1982, 145: "The dropping of 'and all the prophets' conforms to the OT, where the trio of patriarchs, without addition, is a stereotype. See 22:32. Besides, Matthew views the prophets as predictors of the kingdom more than as participants in it." Reconstructions: **Zeller** 1971; **Luz**; **Schenk**; **Sato**.

Evaluation: MEB 13 v 89 B Q=Matthew
Although Q's own interest in prophets makes the probability that the phrase "and all the prophets" is a Lucan addition less than certain, Luke's frequent redactional addition of this phrase makes it probable in the present case also. Thus it is more likely that the original wording is preserved by Matthew.

Q 13:28–29[6]: Luke's kingdom "of God" or Matthew's "of heaven."

Luke=Q: ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τ[οῦ θεοῦ][6],
Reconstructions: **Zeller** 1971; **Schenk**.
Matt=Q: ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τ(ῶν οὐρανῶν)[6],

Con: **Meyer** 1967, 161: Matthew "substituted 'kingdom of heaven' for 'kingdom of God.'" **Schulz** 1972, 324: "die βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν ist mt." **Chilton** 1979, 190–91: "the frequency of τῶν οὐρανῶν in the first Gospel is not in itself proof that it is Matthean, since Mt uses other kingdom phrases, notably ἡ Βασιλεία without qualification (six instances, of which two appear in the editorial summaries 4, 23; 9, 35). Ἡ Βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ, moreover, is a phrase which appears in Lukan editorial material from 4, 43 to the last verse of Acts. In the present case, however, we have seen that Lk divides the sentence about the 'many' by doubling ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ; this presupposes that a single mention of the kingdom stood in the tradition before Lk, since it it difficult to imagine that he introduced such a clumsy repetition de novo. Once this is granted, and the Q hypothesis applied, it is not at all difficult to imagine that Mt introduced his favorite kingdom expressions into the logion." Reconstructions **Luz** (völlig hypothetisch); **Sato**.

Evaluation: MEB 13 v 89 A Q=Luke
Matthew's preference for the phrase, plus the considerations presented by Chilton above, make it very probable that ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ stood in Q, and was retained by Luke.

Q 13:28–29[7]: Luke's pronoun or Matthew's "sons of the kingdom."

Luke=Q: [ὑμᾶς][7] δὲ ( )[7]

Pro: **Schulz** 1972, 324: "Da οἱ υἱοὶ τῆς βασιλείας nur noch in Mt 13, 38 und dort red vorkommt, wird die Wendung auch hier sek und bei Lk ursprünglich sein."

Con: **Wernle** 1899, 65: "Ihren Text hat er [Lc] dort durchaus sekundär wiedergegeben (Umstellung, ὑμᾶς statt υἱοὶ τῆς βασιλείας, . . .)." **Loisy** 1907, II, 124: "il [Lk] substitue les auditeurs de Jésus aux 'fils du royaume.'" **Hoffmann** 1967, 208: Da Lukas stets in dem Abschnitt die form der Anrede sekundär einführt, um die Logien zu einer Rede zusammenzufügen, ist ihm auch hier die Änderung des bei

Matthäus erhaltenen υἱοὶ τῆς βασιλείας in ὑμεῖς zuzuschreiben." **Meyer** 1967, 16, note 1: Luke has deleted 'the sons of the Kingdom,' contra Trilling (*Israel*, 88f.)." "Luke's editorial hand lies heavy on vs. 28, however, and could very easily have lost the phrase in shifting to the second person form of address." **Polag** 1979, 68 conjectures that the earlier reading was ὑμεῖς. Reconstructions: **Schenk; Sato.**

Matt = *Q*: (οἱ)^{7} δὲ (υἱοὶ τῆς βασιλείας)^{7}

Pro: **Haupt** 1913, 82: "Nur wird für υἱοὶ τῆς βασιλείας (Mt 8,12; cf. 13,38 aus der Feder bes Mt) nach Lc einfach ὑμᾶς zu lesen sein." **Hoffmann** 1967, 208^{70}: "Dass Matthäus dieselbe Wendung 13:38 redaktionell eingeführt hat, beweist noch nicht die matthäische Herkunft der Wendung in 8:12 Denn im Unterschied zu Mt 13:38 zeigt 8:12 einen älteren, möglicherweise vormatthäischen Sprachgebrauch, der zu Q passt: In der Gleichniserklärung werden die gerechten Glieder der Kirche den 'Söhnen des Bösen' gegenübergestellt; in Mt 8:12 dagegen die Juden als Erben des Reiches den Heidenvölkern. Letzteres dürfte das ursprüngliche Verständnis sein." **Meyer** 1967, 16^{1}: "The texts Trilling uses to show that Matthew is responsible for this phrase are unconvincing; they indicate only that the 'sons of . . .' terminology was common and Semitic (cf. *Bill*, I, 476ff.)." **Zeller** 1971, 224: "2. plur. oder οἱ υἱοὶ τῆς βασιλείας ? Auf den ersten Blick unterliegt der Ausdruck dem Verdacht, mt Bildung zu sein, denn er begegnet noch einmal Mt 13, 28 in einer redaktionellen Gleichnisdeutung. Aber während Mt 8, 12 so die Juden als Anwärter auf das Reich kennzeichnet, sind dort die zur Βασιλεία (wessen?) gehörigen Christen = οἱ δίκαιοι (V. 43) gemeint, wobei auch υἱός eine verschiedene Nuance haben mag. Da es in rabbinischer Redeweise Analogien ('Sohn der künftigen Welt') gibt, könnte die Formel in Mt 8, 12 vorgegeben sein. Freilich fügt sie sich ausgezeichne ins theologische Programm des 1. Evangelisten (vgl. nur 21, 43). Dass Βασιλεία nicht näher bestimmt ist, braucht hier nicht—wie 4, 23; 9, 35; 13, 19; 24, 14; 25,34—Indiz mt Sprachgebrauchs zu sein, weil unmittelbar am Ende des vorangehenden Verses die volle form steht. Immerhin ist absolutes Βασιλεία Lk 12, 32 in einem apokalyptischen Trostwort für eine frühe Schicht bezeugt. Sollte allerdings οἱ υἱοὶ τῆς βασιλείας ursprünglich sein, lässt sich das Wort schon aus sprachlichen Gründen schwerer direkt von Jesus herleiten. Es ist eine petitio principii, aus der direkten Anrede v. 28c die Priorität der Lk-Fassung zu folgern. Denn ob das Wort einer unmittelbaren Konfrontation mit den jüdischen Gegnern enstammt, muss erst noch die überlieferungskritische Untersuchung ergeben. Wenn sich eine allgemeine Neigung des Lk, die 3. Person in die 2. umzusetzen, auch schwer beweisen lässt, so ist die Anrede 13, 28 doch von der mahnenden Ausrichtung des ganzen Stückes V. 24ff. her naheliegend. Wie im Gleichnismaterial V. 25 und wahrscheinlich auch im Spruch V. 26f könnte erst Lk die 2. Person eingeführt haben; doch ist eine unmittelbare Adresse in der vorlage zu V. 28 nicht mit Sicherheit auszuschliessen." **Zeller** 1984, 87: "Wenn die globale Formulierung 'die Söhne des Reiches'—Lk hat dagegen die 2. Person Plural—ursprünglich sein sollte (vgl. aber die redaktionelle Stelle Mt 13, 38), ist der Gegensatz zum jüdischen Volk schon fast unüberwindlich geworden." Reconstructions: **Zeller** 1971; **Luz** (völlig hypothetisch).

Con: **Hawkins** 1899, 168: The Matthean version is a "favourite or habitual expression of the writer of it." **Schulz** 1972, 324, note 16: "Die Anrede in der 2. Person (ὑμᾶς) Lk V 28 ist ursprünglicher gegenüber den mt υἱοὶ τῆς βασιλείας; vgl dsAr 3213; der Wechsel der Person zwischen Lk V 28 und 29, den Trilling Israel 88 als Indiz für zwei ursprünglich selbständige Logien anführt, trägt diese Beweislast nicht." **Schlosser** 1980, 607: "Dans le NT l'expression est propre au premier

évangéliste. Elle se trouve dans notre texte et en Mt 13,38, dans l'interprétation de la parabole de l'ivraie (Mt 13, 36–43), péricope qui au jugement de la critique est due à Matthieu lui-même. Si l'on étend l'enquête on constate que l'emploi métaphorique de "fils" est bien représenté dans Mt, et notamment dans les couches rédactionnelles. Luc, de son côté, ne paraît pas employer de sa propre initiative cette tournure sémitisante, mais il n'hésite pas, en tout cas, à la reprendre quand il la lit dans s tradition. Au reste, la forme du dit en Mt (3e pers. du pl.) semble bien être secondaire en regard de la forme lucanienne (2e pers.), conforme, elle, au style de la menace et de l'announce du jugement, et l'emploi absolu de βασιλεία est typique de Mt. Avec nombre d'auteurs j'estime en conclusion que l'expression "fils du Royaume" vient de la rédaction matthéenne. **Gundry** 1982, 145–46: "These Jews he calls 'the sons of the kingdom,' a Semitic expression for those who belong, or by privilege should belong, to the kingdom. The same designation will appear at 13:38 in a distinctive passage. But there the sons of the kingdom are 'the righteous,'. . . By introducing the designation here, Matthew shows the parallel between Jews and Christians, between Israel and the church. Jews were the sons of the kingdom, their nation the chosen people. Now the sons of the kingdom are Jesus' disciples, and the chosen people the new nation called the church (see 16:8 with 21:43, both peculiar to Matthew)." **Dupont** 1985, 572: "Les interlocuteurs de Jésus, sur qui pèse la menace d'exclusion, sont appelés 'les fils du Royaume' par Matthieu, 'vous' par Luc. L'expression employée par Matthieu porte la marque de son style et semble refléter le jugement sévère qu'il porte sur Israël; on peut donc mettre en doute sa présence dans la source. Mais le 'vous' de Luc pourrait s'expliquer par le souci d'unification qui se manifeste dans toute cette péricope, rédigée à la deuxième personne depuis le v. 24; il est d'ailleurs lié à retouche rédactionnelle du v. 28 'quand vous verrez.' Il n'est donc pas sûr non plus que ce 'vous' soit primitif. Sur ce point, la critique littéraire ne permet pas de donner la préference à la version de Matthieu ou à celle de Luc."

Evaluation: MEB 13 v 89 B Q=Luke

The kind of arguments used by Gundry are especially persuasive. "Sons of the kingdom" is a Matthean expression; Luke likes the second person direct address (although this too is a Qism). Still, the probability is that "sons of the kingdom" is to be attributed to Matthew, and that Luke represents Q.

Q 13:28–29[8]: Luke's participle or Matthew's finite verb.

Luke = Q: ἐκβ[α]^{8}λ[λομένους]^{8}

Pro: **Marshall** 1978, 567: "the participle construction represents an Aramaic circumstantial clause and contains the main thought (Black, 82; Jeremias, *Promise*, 55 n. 185). This Aramaism shows that Luke has preserved the primitive form here over against Mt." **Jeremias** 1980[233]: **Trad:** "ἐκβαλλομένους· par. Mt 8, 12 ἐκβληθήσονται zum Pass. divinum—4, 21 Trad."

Con: **Hoffmann** 1967: "Für eine redaktionelle Bearbeitung spricht schliesslich auch die kompositorische Entsprechung von ἐκβαλλομένους ἔξω mit ἔξω ἑστάναι v. 25. Das gleiche gilt für die Partizpialform; denn im Vergleich zu der matthäischen Form ἐκβληθήσονται bringt sie einen Dauerzustand zum Ausdruck und ist dadurch dem Gesamtzusammenhang besser angepasst: Nach der Schilderung der Abeisung in den vv. 25–27 beschreibt v. 28 das Ergebnis dieses Geschehens." Reconstructions: **Schenk; Sato.**

Matt = Q: ἐκβ[ ][8]λ(ηθήσονται)[8]

Pro: **Meyer** 1976, note 1. **Polag** 1979, 68 reads conjecturally ἐκβληθήσεσθε. Reconstructions: **Zeller** 1971; Luz (völlig hypothetisch).

Con: **Gundry** 1982, 145: "From the participial phrase 'but you yourselves being thrown outside' (so the tradition, represented by Luke), Matthew makes a full-scale sentence to emphasize judgment on the mass of Jews who reject Jesus."

Evaluation: MEB 13 v 89 B Q = Luke

Matthew has found it necessary to rewrite the participial expression found in Q, in order to make a more direct and straightforward sentence of future judgment. The participial expession corresponds to the more primitive syntax (Marshall) and has been preserved by Luke.

Q 13:28–29[9]: Luke's adverb or Matthew's prepositional phrase with adjective.

Luke = Q: ( )[9] ἔξω ( )[9]

Pro: **Schlosser** 1980, 607: "Ici il n'y a pas à hésiter. La formule εἰς τὸ σκότος τό ἐξώτερον se lit uniquement en Mt et les passages qui la comprennent sont de plus fort semblables. Le simple ἔξω de Lc 13,28 mérite sans aucun doute la préférence. Reconstructions: **Zeller** 1971; **Schenk**; **Luz** (völlig hypothetisch); **Sato**.

Matt = Q: (εἰς τὸ σκότος τὸ)[9] ἐξώ(τερον)[9]

Pro: **Meyer** 1967, 16, note 1: Matthew "substituted 'outer darkness' for 'outside' (Harnack, *Sayings*, 79), . . ." **Polag** 1979, 68 prints this reading as conjectural.

Con: **Harnack** 1907, 79: "The phrase εἰς τ. σκότος τ. ἐξώτερον occurs in the New Testament only in St. Matthew, and that thrice (vide xxii. 13, xxv. 30). Here also it is inserted by the evangelist, . . ." **Easton** 1926, 221: "'The outer darkness' is Matthaean,' . . ." **Schulz** 1972, 324: "In V 12 wird Lk mit εἰς das Ursprüngliche wiedergeben, während τὸ σκότὸς τὸ ἐξώτερον von Mt stammt.[11] **Schulz** 1972, 324[11]: "τὸ σκότος τὸ ἐξώτερον 22,13; 25, 30—beidemal im Anschluss an ein Traditionsstück, beidemal folgt der Hinweis vom Heulen und Zähneknirschen." **Chilton** 1979, 193: "The regularity with which Βάλλω is used with εἰς τὸ σκότος τὸ ἐξώτερον (22,13; 25,30) in the first Gospel shows that ἐξελεύσονται here is a traditional usage. Indeed, it is so peculiar that, as we have seen, the word was replaced in the process of text transmission. The outer darkness phrase is stereotypically attached to the ἐκεῖ phrase in Mt (see the two passages cited) and so seems to enjoy its place in 8, 12 as the result of a redactional habit." **Gundry** 1982, 146: "To strengthen the horror of the judgment, Matthew expands the simple adverb 'outside' (so Luke) to the phrase 'into the outermost darkness' (so also 22:13; 25:30, both uniquely Matthean)."

Evaluation: MEB 13 v 89 A Q = Luke

The unanimous voice of the scholarly tradition that regards "outer darkness" as a Matthean phrase is persuasive, so Q is represented by Luke.

Q 13:28–29[10]: Luke's καὶ or Matthew's introductory expression "I tell you that"

Luke = Q: [καὶ][10]

Con: **Polag** 1979, 69: Luke omitted λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι. He added the και. Reconstructions: **Schenk**; **Luz**.

Matt = Q: (λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι)[10]

Pro: **Easton** 1926, 221: "Mt's λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι is in Q's style, . . ." **Polag** 1979, 68–69 considers this reading as a "possibility." Mt added the δὲ.

Con: **Meyer** 1967, 16, note 1: Not in Q. Schulz 1972, 323: "Er fand wahrscheinlich die typisch prophetische, 'auf V 10 hin gesehen, überflüssige Einleitung' mit λέγω ὑμῖν schon vor, da formgeschichtlich ein prophetisches Drohwort vorliegt." **Schlosser**, 1980, 606: "Venant immédiatement après ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν de Mt 8, 10b (par. Lc 7,9b), la formule λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν (Mt 8, 11a) fait l'effet d'une répétition superflue et gauche. La maladresse s'explique assez bien si l'on admet que le rédacteur est lié par la tradition, autrement dit si λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν (8, 11a) vient de Q et a été omis par Luc. Mais il ne faut pas oublier que les vv. 11–12 ont été insérés dans la péricope du centurion par Matthieu. Du moment que Matthieu utilise ailleurs la formule λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν de sa propre initiative et que, d'autre part, l'emploi à intervalle rapproché de deux clauses analogues ne paraît guère le gêner, il y a lieu de penser que Matthieu lui-même est à l'origine de la répétition de λέγω ὑμῖν en 8, 11a. **Gundry** 1982, 145: "For renewed emphasis on Jesus' authoritative words, Matthew characteristically inserts 'I say to you' (27,7)." **Dupont** 1985, 570: "A noter enfin, du point de vue rédactionnel, que l'introduction de la sentence à nécessité l'adjonction d'une charnière au début: λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι tandis que le v. 13 doit reprendre: 'Et Jésus dit au centurion.'" **Dupont** 1985, 572: "Dans la version de Matthieu, la formule d'introduction 'Or, je vous dis que,' est liée à l'insertion de la sentence dans un contexte auquel elle n'appartenait pas primitivement." **Wegner** 1985, 5: "Da der erste Evangelist die Einleitungswendung λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν (ὅτι) auch sonst red gebraucht, ist zu vermuten, dass sie zu Beginn der Vv 11f ebenfalls aus seiner Hand stammt." **Wegner** 59: "Vgl. Mt 17, 12 diff Mk 9, 13; 19, 9 diff Mk 10,11; ferner Mt 26, 29 (ohne ὅτι) diff Mk 14, 25." Reconstructions: **Luz**; **Sato** ("nicht sicher").

Evaluation: MEB 13 v 89 C Q=Luke

This one is almost a toss-up. The expression is found in Q and corresponds to the direct prophetic address some find in Q; it is also sometimes introduced by Matthew. The argument of Schlosser makes a Matthean addition slightly more probable than a Lucan omission.

Q 13:28–29[11]: Matthew's use of πολλοὶ

Luke=Q: ( )[11] /ἥξουσιν [12] ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν

Pro: **Schlosser** 1980, 606–7: "Luc aurait-il omis πολλοί pur harmoniser le logion avec le contexte, en particulier avec l'affirmation de 13,24 sur les πολλοί qui chercheront *en vain* à entrer dans la salle du banquet?" Mais pourquoi renforce-t-il alors la note universaliste en mentionnant les quatre points cardinaux? De plus l'hypothèse rend mal compte des faits suivants: a) Pour exprimer l'indéfini "on" l'araméen recourt entre autres moyens à la troisième personne du pluriel. Lc 13,29a y répond exactement. Or cette construction impersonnelle, fréquente en Mc, est souvent évitée en Mt et en Lc. Dès lors il est vraisemblable que Luc "n'aurait pas supprimé le sujet s'il l'avait trouvé dans sa source." b). L'adjectif πολύς-πολλοί a sa place marquée dans les principaux textes relatifs au pèlerinage eschatologique des peuples, la représentation sous-jacente au logion. Que le lien du logion avec le théme biblique ait été *explicité* moyennant l'insertion de πολλοί me paraît plus vraisemblable que l'évolution inverse, -de l'identité à la disparité. c). Dans la version de Mt il y a un contraste appuyé entre πολλοί, synonyme de à; ἔθνη ou de πάντες, et les 'fils du Royaume.' Or cette derniére expression est d'origine matthéenne comme nous le verrons. Il èn va sans doute de même de πολλοί, premier terme de l'opposition.

Tous ces faits invitent à penser que Mt est secondaire sur ce point et que Lc est plus conforme à la teneur de la source."

Con: **Cadbury** 1920, 119: "πολλυς is omitted by Luke:" **Schneider** 1984, 307: "Während in Q die 'Völkerwallfahrt' auf die mit der Parusie einsetzende Hinkehr der Heiden zu Gott bezogen war (Schulz 324–326), ist bei den Evangelisten die Bekehrung der Heiden (durch Mission) ein geschichtlicher Vorgang. Die 'Völkerwallfahrt' wird auf die beim jüngsten Gericht erfolgende Zulassung der Heiden zum eschatologischen Mahl bezogen. Zu beachten ist allerdings, dass Lukas nicht mit Q/Mt von 'vielen' spricht, die dann aus allen Himmelsrichtungen kommen, sondern einleitet: 'Es werden (welche) kommen' (V 29a)." **Fitzmyer** 1985, 1026: "Luke, however, because he has used the saying with 'many' failing to get into the kingdom in v. 24, now deletes the *polloi* here."

Matt = Q: (πολλοὶ)[11] / \[12] ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν [ ] [13] /ἥξουσιν \[12]

Pro: **Hoffmann** 1967, 209: "Die Matthäus-Parallele nennt im Gegensatz dazu ausdrücklich die 'Vielen' und meint damit die grosse Zahl der Völker und Nationen. Da der Hinweis auf sie zum prophetischen Bild der eschatologischen Völkerwallfahrt gehört, ist es wahrscheinlich, dass Matthäus das Wort schon in Q vorgefunden hat, so dass die Änderung wieder auf Lukas und nicht auf Matthäus zurückgeht. Dafür spricht auch Warnung (Lc 1324) ist deutlich ausgesprochen, dass 'viele' das Heil nicht erlangen werden. In vv. 25–28 wird diese Ankündigung entfaltet; πολλοί würde dazu in Widerspruch stehen." **Chilton** 1979, 189–90: "The unparalleled uses of πολλοί absolute are quite instructive. 27, 53 employs the term in the dative for narrative purposes to refer rather generally to those to whom the resurrected ἅγιοι appeared at the time of Jesus' rising. 7, 22 uses πολλοί in the perjorative sense, i.e., in accordance with its use in all of the paralleled instances but two. The Lukan equivalent of this saying is striking in that πολλοί is absent and the second person plural is used, and this in a logion separated by only one verse from 13, 28.29. Has Lk omitted two occurrences of πολλοί, one (13,26) in favor of direct speech, and another (vv. 29,30) so as not to contradict the ὀλίγοι of v.23? This is more likely than the alternative explanation: that Mt inserted the term into 7,22 with one meaning and into 8,11 with an entirely different connotation. Further, it is the negative meaning of πολλοί which is extended from 24,5 (which is paralleled) to three other verses in Mt's apocalyptic discourse (vv.10.11.12 all of which are unparalleled) and which is active in the uniquely Matthean 22,14. It is very unlikely that the writer who so frequently pictures Jesus as using πολλοί in this way would on his own initiative introduce it into 8,11 with the sense that it there carries. In brief, there is a sharp distinction within the πολλοί diction found in the first Gospel, and it is impossible to establish the existence of a coherent Matthean usage of which 8,11 would be representative. πολλοί here appears to be traditional, and it is reasonable to suppose that Lk excluded it." Reconstructions: **Schenk**; **Luz** (völlig hypothetisch); **Sato**.

Con: **Harnack** 1907, 79: "probably introduced πολλοί at the beginning (elsewhere it is not unusual for St. Luke to supply subjects to subjectless verbs)." **Easton** 1926, 221: "his [Mt's] 'many' is needless (W, Hk)." **Meyer** 1967, 16, note 1: "Matthew has added 'many' to the subject-less verb, . . ." **Zeller** 1971, 223: "Während Lk 13, 29 kein ausdrückliches Subjekt hat, schreibt Mt πολλοί. Da Lk sonst gern subjektlose Sätze ergänzt, scheint es zunächst auf Mt zurückzugehen, der diesselbe Tendenz hat. 'Viele' würde an sich zum Gesamtmotiv des Völkerzugs passen, aber wir dürfen der motivgeschichtlichen Wertung nicht vorgreifen. Redaktionsgeschichtliche Gesichtspunkte geben aber schliesslich den Ausschlag: das

'viele' in das Reich Gottes eingehen, würde der Komposition Lk 13, 23–30 die paränetische Spitze abbrechen. Mt hingegen scheint, was die Zahl der endgültig Geretteten angeht, ebensowenig optimistisch, so dass ihm diese Mengenangabe schwerlich zuzutrauen ist." **Schulz** 1972, 323–24: "Mt werden die πολλοὶ sein, die in der Lk-Parallele fehlen[8]." **Schulz** 1972, 324[8]: "πολύς" ist von Mt nachweislich 10mal gegen die Mk-Vorlage eingefügt worden; weiterhin sicher red 8, 1; allerdings auch ca 38mal trad." **Polag** 1979, 69: Conjectural reading. **Schlosser** 1980, 606–7: "Luc aurait-il omis πολλοί pur harmoniser le logion avec le contexte, en particulier avec l'affirmation de 13,24 sur les πολλοί qui chercheront en vain à entrer dans la salle du banquet? Mais pourquoi renforce-t-il alors la note universaliste en mentionnant les quatre points cardinaux ? De plus l'hypothèse rend mal compte des faits suivants: . . . c). Dans la version de Mt il y a un contraste appuyé entre πολλοί, synonyme de à; ἔθνη ou de πάντες, et les "fils du Royaume." Or cette derniére expression est d'origine matthéenne comme nous le verrons. Il èn va sans doute de même de πολλοί, premier terme de l'opposition. Tous ces faits invitent à penser que Mt est secondaire sur ce point et que Lc est plus conforme à la teneur de la source." **Gundry** 1982, 145: "The typical addition of 'many' (23,1) increases emphasis on the salvation of Gentiles. . . ." **Dupont** 1985, 572: "Il faut aussi voir une retouche del'évangéliste dans l'emploi d'un sujet, πολλοί, 'beaucoup,' qui permet d'éviter la tournure impersonnelle: Matthieu explicite souvent le sujet des phrases. Luc, qui évite la construction impersonnelle, n'aurait pas supprimé le sujet s'il l'avait trouvé dans sa source. Éviquer 'beaucoup' de monde, 'des multitudes,' πολλοί, allait d'ailleurs exactement dans le sens de l'amplification qui, par la citation des quatre vents, soulignait l'universalisme de la déclaration."

Evaluation: MEB 13 v 89 B Q=Luke

Despite the strong *redactionsgeschichtliche* grounds given by Zeller, it still seems more likely that Matthew added πολλοί than that Luke intentionally struck it. See the strong argument of Schlosser.

Q 13:28–29[12]: Position of ἥξουσιν

Luke=Q: [καὶ][10] ( )[11] /ἥξουσιν \ [12] ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν [καὶ ἀπὸ βορρᾶ καὶ νότου][13] /\ [12] καὶ ἀνακλιθήσονται

Matt=Q: (Λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι)[10] (πολλοὶ)[11] /\ [12] ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν [ ][13]/ἥξουσιν \ [12] καὶ ἀνακλιθήσονται

Pro: Reconstructions: **Zeller** 1971; **Schenk**; **Luz**; **Sato**.

Evaluation: MEB 13 v 89 B Q=Luke

If, as argued above, Matthew added the πολλοί, it is then also likely that he correspondingly moved ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν forward in the sentence.

Q 13:28–29[13]: Luke's mention of north and south.

Luke=Q: [καὶ ἀπὸ βορρᾶ καὶ νότου][13]

Pro: **Fitzmyer** 1985, 1026: "Umimmay [at the end of Ps 107:3] should probably be read a umiyyamin (two letters have been lost in copying), 'from the south.' Hence 'and the south' is scarcely a Lucan redactional addition, . . ."

Con: **Wernle** 1899, 65: "Ihren Text hat er [Lc] dort durchaus sekundär wiedergegeben (. . . die vier Himmelsrichtungen)." **Harnack** 1907, 79: "On the other hand, *Borras* and *Notos* certainly belong to the Hellenic evangelist." **Loisy** 1907, II, 124: "L'évangéliste a pu ajouter de lui-même 'le nord et le midi' a 'l'orient et à l'occident,' . . ." **Easton** 1926, 221: "Lk could easily have added 'and the north and the

south' (W, Hk)." **Meyer** 1967, 16, note 1: This is a Lukan addition. **Schulz** 1972, 323: "die Ergängung der Himmelsrichtungen durch καὶ ἀπὸ βορρᾶ καὶ νότου ist nicht ursprünglich5, sprachlich lässt sich eine Ergänzung durch den Evangelisten allerdings nicht beweisen." **Schulz** 1972, 3235: "Lk ergänzt den Anklang an Ps 106, 3 LXX allerdings nicht wörtlich (im Psalmtext heisst es καὶ βορρᾶ καὶ θαλάσσης). **Chilton** 1979, 195: ". . . the kinship of this phrase [καὶ ἀπὸ βορρᾶ καὶ νότου] to LXX Ps 106,3 is often noted. Lk's use of LXX terminology and his concern for Gentile mission might well have caused him to use this phrase, just as he details in Acts 2,5–13 the presence in Jerusalem of people from every point of the compass at Pentecost." **Polag** 1979, 16: This is a Lukan addition. **Jeremias** 1980, 233: "ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν: wie der Vergleich mit Mt 8, 11 erkennen lässt, was ursprünglich nur das Wortpaar ἀνατολαί/δυσαί gennant; Lukas oder seine Vorlage hat es durch die Nennung der beiden restlichen Himmelsrichtungen komplettiert." **Schlosser** 1980, 605–6: "En raison de l'extrême rareté des vocables βορρᾶς et νότος dans le NT, il n'est guère de conclusion possible à partir de l'examen du seul vocabulaire. Deux indices moins directs invitent toutefois à considérer la clause "du nord et du sud" comme une addition lucanienne. Ce sont d'un côté l'existence d'un cas comparable en Lc 17,24 diff. Mt 24,2718 et d'autre part l'influence possible de certains textes septuagintaux sur le rassemblement eschatologique des dispersés." **Schlosser** 1980, 644[18]: "Dans les deux textes (8, 11; 24, 27) Matthieu se contente d'indiquer comme points cardinaux l'est et l'ouest, ce qui n'est guère logique surtout dans le cas de l'éclair. Luc remédie à la petite incohérence en généralisant les indications: de ce point de vue les quatre points cardinaux de Lc 13, 29 correspondent à la formule vague 'd'un bout à l'autre de l'horizon' (Lc 17, 24)." **Gundry** 1982, 145: "'From east and west' stays (cf. 24:27), but 'and from north and south' (so Luke) drops out. Matthew then inserts 'with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob' (so Luke in another position) between 'will recline' and 'in the kingdom of heaven.'" **Dupont** 1985, 571: Deux précisions semblent bien être des amplifications: 'du nord et du midi' qui complète 'le levant et le couchant.' L'insertion de ces éléments de surplus s'explique plus facilement que leur omission."

Matt = Q: [ ][13]

Pro: Reconstructions: **Zeller** 1971; **Schenk; Luz; Sato.**

Evaluation: MEB 13 v 89 B Q = Matthew

The kind of general argument made by Dupont is persuasive: it is more likely that Luke added than that Matthew omitted, especially since he is supplementing in terms of filling out a biblical phrase. Fitzmyer's note answers the objection to this. Schlosser's detailed statement of the argument clinches it.

Q 13:28–29[14]: Luke's repeated mention of the kingdom of God.

Luke = Q: [ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ][14]

Pro: Reconstructions: **Schenk**

Con: **Zeller** 1971, 223: "Das zweimalige ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ deutet kaum auf Stichwortkomposition, sondern zeigt die Bruchstelle, wo Teile aus V. 28 und 29 aufeinander passen, die nun auseinandergerissen sind." **Chilton** 1979, 188: "In order to maintain his focus on those who are cast out, he must not only reverse the traditional order of vv. 28.29, he must also truncate the sentence about those who will recline at table in the kingdom so that this 'Drohwort' does not turn into a 'Jubelruf.' This truncation, and the resultant repetition of βασιλεία is, the consequence of transposing the logion into a discourse on judgement, i.e., it is the consequence of

Lk's work." **Chilton** 1979, 190–91: "In the present case, however, we have seen that Lk divides the sentence about the 'many' by doubling ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ; this presupposes that a single mention of the kingdom stood in the tradition before Lk, since it it difficult to imagine that he introduced such a clumsy repetition de novo." **Schlosser,** 1980, 614: "Les mots ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ (Lc 12,28 et 29) semblent avoir servi d'expression-crochet pour réunir deux dits que distinguent le sujet grammatical (2e pers. du pl. en 13,28; 3e pers. du pl. en 13,29) et le genre littéraire (menace en 13,28; promesse en 13,29), et qui, pour cette raison, étaient vraisemblablement indépendants à l'origine. Déjà groupés dans la source Q, que Lc suit, ces logia primitifs auront été fondus en un seul par le rédacteur matthéen." **Dupont** 1985, 571: "Remarquons surtout que la disposition adoptée par Luc l'oblige à répéter deux fois le no 4, 'dans le Royaumme de Dieu': ce doublet a peu de chances d'être primitif."

Matt = Q: [ ][14]

Pro: Reconstructions: **Zeller** 1971; **Luz; Sato.**

Evaluation: MEB 13 v 89 B Q = Matthew

The consensus of scholarly tradition is here convincing: Luke's rewriting caused him to repeat the reference to the kingdom.

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Q Bibliography: 1981-1989

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Introduction

This is a tentative, working bibliography (now 294 items) which is being produced in conjunction with the Society of Biblical Literature's Seminar on Q. The intention is to update this constantly. This edition has about 54 more items than the last bibliography published in the *SBL 1988 Seminar Papers*, an increase of more than twenty percent.

The starting date of 1981 has been determined by the coverage of F. Neirynck and F. Van Segbroeck, "Q Bibliography," *Logia/Les paroles de Jésus – The Sayings of Jesus: Mémorial Joseph Coppens* (ed. J. Delobel; BETL 59; Leuven: Peeters/Leuven: University Press, 1982), 561-86. This bibliography covers items through 1980 with a few from 1981 and 1982. These 1981 and 1982 entries are repeated here.

Items on Q published 1980 and earlier but not included in the Neirynck-Van Segbroeck bibliography are included here. These are indicated by the *siglum* + [26 such items].

Hopefully, a ten year bibliography for 1981-1990 can be published in 1991. Perhaps this project will be expanded to include the data prior to 1981, thus producing a "complete" bibliography of Q through 1990.

Beginning with the "Elenchus Bibliographicus" in *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 59 (1983) F. Neirynck has included a section entitled "Quelle." Virtually all of the items included in this section (except for a very few which do not focus on Q) are also included here (sometimes with corrections). This edition of the Q Bibliography includes data from *ETbL* 59 (1983)–64 (1988). Further, *NTA* has been utilized through 33:1.

This Q Bibliography includes items (books and reviews; articles; dissertations) which focus particularly on Q. Items which discuss gospel and synoptic studies generally are not included even though Q may be discussed (specific chapters on Q within books are included, if identified). Items on specific pericopes which come from/constitute Q material are not included unless the title indicates that the focus of the study is explicitly Q-related. Items which deal with sayings traditions in Nag Hammadi texts are listed only in my Nag Hammadi bibliographies unless they are related specifically to Q studies.

I am aware of several items on Q not included here; I have not yet been able to locate and check them personally. They should appear in subsequent bibliographies.

I have received help from James Robinson and John Kloppenborg, which is much appreciated. Other help is invited; additions and corrections should be sent to me.

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[For reviews of books published earlier than 1981, the author, brief title and publication date of the book are indicated in square brackets before the reviews are listed.]

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Luke's Economy of Knowledge

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"Everything began with history and eschatology. Luke was caught between the anvil of *redaktionsgeschichtlich* exegesis and the hammer of Bultmannian theology."[1] The Bultmannian hammer beating on Luke was first wielded by Vielhauer, Conzelmann, and Käsemann. And the message it hammered out in a Pauline staccato (one for which Luke was said to have no ear) was that "the meaning of history lies always in the [eschatological] present," in the encounter with the kerygmatic word.[2] An uncritical *privileging* of voice, presentness, and presence thus attends the birth of *Redaktionsgeschichte* in the 1950s.[3] A skeptical *interrogation* of voice and presence attends the birth in France in the 1960s of what would later be called deconstruction.[4] What did the birth of deconstruction—an ill omen as even it acknowledged, darkly styling itself a "formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity"[5]—portend for the future of redaction criticism? No one thought to ask at the time.

Fear of Writing

> For I did not suppose that information from books would help me so much as the word of a living and surviving voice.
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> —Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*

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[1] Francois Bovon, *Luke the Theologian: Thirty-Three Years of Research (1950-1983)*, trans. Ken McKinney (Allison Park, PA: Pickwick Publications, 1987), 9.

[2] Rudolf Bultmann, *History and Eschatology: The Presence of Eternity* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 155.

[3] Preeminently in the Lukan field; yet even Marxsen gives Paul the last word: "It is important to see that Mark takes up the Pauline fundamentals." Willi Marxsen, *Mark the Evangelist: Studies in the Redaction History of the Gospel*, trans. James Boyce et al. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1959), 214-15.

[4] A birth lustily announced by the 1967 appearance of three books by Jacques Derrida; see *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); *Speech and Phenomena*, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973); and *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). Further on Derrida and deconstruction see my *Literary Criticism and the Gospels: The Theoretical Challenge* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 8.

[5] Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 293.

> Everything we believe, we believe either through sight or through hearing. Sight is often deceived, hearing serves as guarantee.
>
> —Ambrose of Milan, *Commentary on St. Luke*

The constant critical erosion of Conzelmann's 1954 landmark, *Die Mitte der Zeit*, has yet to touch the phonocentrism at its core. Indeed, certain books, which, implicitly or explicitly, define themselves in opposition to Conzelmann, have contrived to be no less phoncentric. A remarkable case in point is Richard J. Dillon's exemplary study in Lukan redaction criticism, *From Eye-Witnesses to Ministers of the Word*.[6]

Derrida's best known gesture has been to read certain texts (e.g., Plato's *Phaedrus*, Rousseau's *Essay on the Origin of Languages*, Saussure's *Course in General Linguistics*) as symptomatic of a pathological fear of writing buried deep in the Western psyche. To my mind, the Conzelmannian tradition *and* its discontents seems to beg analysis of this kind. Poised on the threshold of a more systematic survey, this opening section will read Dillon (reading Conzelmann) reading Luke, and let Luke read Dillon (and Conzelmann) in return. The next two sections will shift the angle of vision somewhat, examining other areas that the opening discussion will bring into view.

Dillon distills Conzelmann as follows: "In that he allegedly stresses Jesus' deeds as objective historical verification of the divine action in him, Lk is judged [by Conzelmann] to depart from the vital center of NT thought and deprive the Christian gospel of its *skandalon*."[7] Dillon disagrees. His reading of Luke 24 precludes "attributing to the evangelist any conviction of the transparency of historical facts and deeds."[8] First, the discovery of the empty tomb (Luke 23:55-24:12) serves no evidential purpose. Instead the tomb depicts the tension "between *Easter phenomena and Easter faith*."[9] It concludes "an observation of all the material *facta paschalia*, but after it faith is yet to be born."[10] The dialectic is one of complete observation coupled with complete misrecognition. "Peter's wonderment [if 24:12 is original] . . . is the 'last word' of the tomb story. . . . Standing up front at the breach between human experience and the transcendent reality of Easter . . . Peter will be the first summoned to cross it . . . (v. 34)."[11] How will that breach be crossed? Not by sight, seemingly. It is interesting to compare Dillon to Walter Ong, who voices similar misgivings about sight: "Vision . . . of itself manifests only surfaces, superficies, outsides."[12] For Dillon the breach can be crossed "only under *the self-disclosing word of the risen Lord*."[13] For Ong the word in general, paradigmatic of sound for the human being, "*is a special sensory key to interiority*. Sound has to do with interiors . . . which means with interiors as manifesting themselves."[14]

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[6] Richard J. Dillon, *From Eye-Witnesses to Ministers of the Word: Tradition and Composition in Luke 24* (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1978).

[7] Ibid., 127, n. 171.

[8] Ibid., 127.

[9] Ibid., 26.

[10] Ibid., 18.

[11] Ibid., 66.

[12] Walter J. Ong, *The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 146.

[13] *Eye-Witnesses*, 32, emphasis mine.

[14] *Presence*, 117.

Loud acclamations of sound and hearing have echoed down through Western thought since Plato. The hierarchy of the senses that such thinking establishes is nowhere more evident than in Hegel. Derrida offers us a précis of Hegel's elaborate thesis:

> Ideal objectivity maintains its . . . integrity . . . in [not] depending on an empirical sensuous exteriority. [T]he combination of . . . two criteria [objectivity and interiority] permits . . . the elimination of touch (which is concerned only with a material exteriority . . .), taste (a consummation which dissolves the object in the interiority), and smell (which permits the object to dissociate itself into evaporation). . . . Sight is imperfectly . . . ideal (it lets the objectivity of the object be, but cannot interiorize its sensuous and spatial opaqueness). According to a metaphor well coordinated with the entire system of metaphysics, only hearing which preserves both objectivity *and* interiority, can be called fully ideal.[15]

The materiality, exteriority and muteness that Plato, Rousseau, Hegel, and a host of others decry in writing as the vitiation of speech ("Though serviceable and enriching beyond all measure, nevertheless, by comparison with the oral medium, writing and print are permanently decadent")[16] are, for Dillon, monumentalized in *the empty tomb*. To the breathless silence of the tomb as a sign of absence, Dillon opposes "the word of the risen Lord, alive and fully present."[17] Two theories of language square off in Dillon's opposition. According to the first (whose emblem is the word of the risen Lord or idealized speech), the outward acoustic or visual material of language (its signifier) is ideally transparent on its inward meaning (its signified). This theory says: "My words are 'alive' because they seem not to leave me: not to fall outside me, outside my breath, at a visible distance; not to cease to belong to me."[18] According to the second theory (whose emblem is the empty tomb but also writing), the relationship between the signifier (here, breathless stone) and the signified (Jesus' resurrection) is *arbitrary*.[19] No mimetic or analogical, necessary or natural relationship obtains between the tomb and what it signifies, between the signifier and the signified. The illusion of transparency endemic to the idealization of speech shatters on the opacity of "writing."

The fear of writing is the fear of language's otherness. It bespeaks the ultimate human fear, loss of individual selfhood. Language, filling up the gorges and defiles of my unconscious (fissures that are themselves but recesses in language)[20] has its

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[15] Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 93, n. 21. For the Hegelian original, see G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on Aesthetics*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 15.6II:622. In *Presence*, 117-18, Ong ventures a less exquisite hierarchy of the senses.

[16] *Presence*, 138; cf. 321-22.

[17] *Eye-Witnesses*, 67.

[18] Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 76, parodying Husserl.

[19] An arbitrariness endemic to language. Depending on the given language, entirely different sounds (tree, arbre, Baum, dendron, etc.) signify the same concept.

[20] In Lacan's celebrated formula, "the unconscious is structured like a language." More precisely, "what the psychoanalytic experience discovers in the unconscious is the whole structure of language." Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977), 147.

untraceable wellsprings outside of me. Language's alterity, ever threatening to dispossess me of my self, finds its symbol in the exteriority of writing. This exteriority gives my writing a life independent of me, causing me to fade behind it and slip beneath it.

The otherness of language is repressed in Dillon's reading. Cold stone offers too-cold comfort. The tomb, like writing, is seen as a dead letter. Moreover, it is a cryptic, not to say indecipherable, letter, a hieroglyph etched in stone: "the women's experience at the tomb . . . await[s] the . . . interpretive word of the risen Lord, without which it remains productive only of confusion."[21] Breathlessly, the tomb awaits the authoritative interpretation without which there are only interpretations, and hence confusion. More than a dead letter, the crypt is a dead-letter office, the cold repository of a message that might never reach its addressees.

Yet the stony silence of the tomb *is* broken by speech, not the "self-disclosing word," "alive and fully present" but a word that is neither self-disclosing nor fully present: "Why do you seek the living among the dead? . . . Remember how he told you, while he was still in Galilee, that the Son of man must be delivered into the hands of sinful men, and be crucified, and on the third day rise" (24:5-7). The tomb (*to mnēma*) is the place of remembrance (*mnēsthēte. . . .*), its silence broken by echoes. Two men (*andres duo*) speak echoing words that awaken memory of other words ("Remember how he told you. . . .") that themselves point away to the written ("Behold, we are going up to Jerusalem, and everything that is written of the Son of man . . . will be accomplished" [18:31]). Like the linguistic signifier of which it is an emblem, the sepulchre in and of itself is shrouded in silence, unable to speak for itself. It can speak or mean only by virtue of its position in a differential weave of signifiers,[22] that is, by its position in a *text*. And every text writes the epitaph of the full, simple present. In a text, the present is ghostly presence in a tomb or echo chamber. In the crypt, two commentators speak in echoes of a cryptic text (the words of Jesus and those of scripture). And in that scriptural text, the crypt itself is underscored as the crucial signifier to be deciphered ("everything that is written of the Son of man . . . will be accomplished. . . . [T]hey will scourge him and kill him, *and on the third day he will rise*"). In Luke's resurrection lithograph, therefore, tomb and text devour each other interminably. Nothing remains that could nourish a self-disclosing, self-present word. "Why do you seek the living among the dead?" Resisting full penetration and possession, the crypt keeps the necessity of interpretation(s)—and hence of faith—alive. Not surprisingly, this unmasterable sign of a tomb (womb), carried by women, is greeted as so much *lēros* (humbug, nonsense, women's chatter) by the eleven apostles. The disputed v.12 has Peter rising and rushing at the tomb in an effort to penetrate and comprehend it.

Dillon's readings of the resurrection encounter on the Emmaus road (24:13-35) and the appearance to the assembled disciples (24:36-53) are of the same weave as

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[21] *Eye-Witnesses*, 27.

[22] "[I]n language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences *without positive terms*. . . . The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it" (Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. Wade Baskin [New York: Philosophical Library, 1959], 120). The importance of this statement for structuralism and poststructuralism cannot be overestimated.

his reading of the tomb. "[I]n the recital of empirical paschal events by Cleopas . . . the totality of empirical observation by the travelers acts as a foil to the actual inception of their Easter faith *in verbo Domini*."[23] Similarly, with seeming inconsistency, Luke depicts the disciples in the next episode "as quite undisposed to recognize the Risen One on his coming into their midst. The self-same dialectic of material fact *vs.* revealed truth" thereby unfolds, "dividing [the] exhaustive but fruitless demonstration of the Master's physical reality" from "the decisive utterance of the *revealing word* [24:44ff.]."[24] Dillon's reading encounters formidable obstacles. Although the travelers' hearts "burn" during the stranger's scriptural exposition, for example, it is only in the breaking of bread that recognition occurs. Dillon is forced to construct an elaborate argument for regarding the breaking of bread in Luke(-Acts) as "the normal and necessary accompaniment of . . . passion instruction [the word of revelation], so that the two are really a *single act*."[25]

> As risen Lord, present in word and sacrament, he . . . imparts to his followers that ministry of the word which continues to unlock the secret otherwise hidden away in the sacred pages. *His voice* is what continues to be heard in that ministry of the word. . . .for it is only *in personal encounter with him* . . . that the whole mystery of God's plan of salvation is opened to the eye of faith. That is . . . the teaching of the Emmaus story. *It precisely forbids any ironclad separation of the time of Jesus from the time of the Church* [pace Conzelmann], as if the latter saw only an institutionalizing of what could no longer be a real presence or a living word![26]

Dillon's reading fails to convince. The breaking and distribution of the bread (*klasas epedidou*) does appear to elicit the recognition that scriptural exposition alone failed to elicit. Voice is subordinated to gesture in the Emmaus episode. According to Ong, "Gesture is apprehended visually, with a large admixture of tactile and kinesthetic awareness."[27] In the breaking of bread in our scene, hearing plays a supporting role (*labōn ton arton eulogēsen*), while taste is at least implied (it is not stated that the disciples ingest the bread, but neither is that stated at the passover meal [Luke 22:19] where we are surely to suppose that it occurred [cf. Acts 27:35-36]).

Dillon's reading of the Emmaus incident represses another feature endemic to language, its *iterability*, which also finds its emblem in writing:

> For the written to be the written, it must continue to "act" and to be legible even if what is called the author of the writing no longer answers for what he has written, for what he seems to have signed, whether he is provisionally absent, or if he is dead, or if in general he does not support, with his absolutely current and present intention or attention, the plenitude of his meaning, of that very thing which seems to be written "in his name."[28]

Promiscuously capable of performing textual acts for anyone and everyone, writing *belongs* to no one (nor does speech).

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[23] *Eye-witnesses*, 47.
[24] Ibid., 103, 197.
[25] Ibid., 154; see 105-8 for the argument.
[26] Ibid., 155.
[27] *Presence*, 147.
[28] Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 316.

Now, to read the eucharist as "an institutionalizing of what could no longer be a real presence or a living word" is to read it as an *iterable* act, an instance of (gestural) writing. Dillon resists this reading but it cleverly slips through his defenses. On the one hand, Dillon subordinates the breaking of bread to voice, presence, and personal encounter, as we have seen. On the other hand, he styles the breaking of bread in Luke-Acts "the sacramental *signature* of Jesus' bequest of his . . . mission and destiny to his followers."[29] The gestural writing Jesus bequeaths is certainly a signature. But does a signature mark a presence or an absence? "By definition, a written signature implies the . . . empirical nonpresence of the signer. . . . In order to function . . . a signature must have a repeatable . . . imitable form; it must be able to detach itself from the present . . . of its production."[30] Luke's Jesus is indeed recognized (*epegnōsan auton* [24:31]) in his signature, though only as an absent presence. The text, with impeccable logic, has him "vanish out of their sight" (*aphantos egeneto ap' autōn*) in the very act of signing, before the ink has had time to dry.

Dillon's reading of the appearance to the assembled disciples further subordinates vision and taste to hearing.

> The invitation to physical verification in v. 39—especially if the actual display in v. 40 is genuine—amounts to only a frustrated momenturm in the narrative, put in check by the witnesses' reaction: *epi de apistountōn autōn ktl.* (v. 41). Nor is it correct to say that v. 41 makes the doubt persist only as a heightened threshhold for the risen One's *manducatio,* intended to be the conclusive *Identitätsbeweis*. . . . The widespread assumption that the eating is intended as apologetic proof *ne plus ultra* . . . causes many to overlook the absence of an explicit affirmation that the disbelieving disciples were finally convinced by it. . . . Inevitably we are told that the moment of faith can be assumed after 24, 43, though Lk leaves it unspoken.[31]

But neither is "he opened [*dianoigō*] their minds to understand the scriptures" (24:45) accompanied by an explicit notice of recognition. Why suppose that this penetration of the disciples' minds induces climactic recognition of the Risen One (so Dillon) given that the parallel "opening" on the Emmaus road ("he opened [*dianoigō*] to us the scriptures"), while it does cause hearts to "burn," induces no such recognition, which must wait instead for the eucharistic signature?

The self-present, self-disclosing word of the risen Lord plays a remarkably modest role in Luke's economy of knowledge. This becomes particularly apparent when one considers what Jesus's vocal self-disclosure amounts to. Jesus's word is unintelligible (see 9:45; 18:34) until it assumes its position in a text: "These are my words that I spoke to you, while I was still with you, that everything written about me in the law of Moses and the prophets and the psalms must be fulfilled. Then he opened their minds to understand the scriptures" (24:44-45; cf. 24:25-27). Jesus opens his disciples' minds, not to the self-evidence of his word, but to its intratextuality. His word, far from being self-present or self-disclosing (unmediated, that is, or self-sufficient), can signify only in circulating through the veins and arteries of a written corpus, a body in which it must run a constant risk of death, as Acts amply attests (see, e.g., Acts 28:23-28).

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[29] *Eye-Witnesses,* 154, emphasis mine.

[30] Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy,* 328.

[31] *Eye-Witnesses,* 166; the latter part of the quotation is from the footnote on the same page.

Moreover, Jesus's eating of the broiled fish does appear to function in our scene as the evidential proof *ne plus ultra*. The spectacle of the unmistakably tangible food disappearing down the gullet of the risen Lord provides the ultimate reassurance. The tactile ("handle me") and the gustatory ("he . . . ate before them") achieve what the visual ("frightened, [they] supposed they saw a spirit") and the auditory ("he said . . . 'Why are you troubled?'") could not achieve—Dillon's protest notwithstanding: "the determining factor [in this scene] is *not* what human sense could perceive, but the . . . *complete self-disclosure* of the risen One: *living presence, illuminating word*!"[32]

The post-Bultmannian tradition of Lukan interpretation is, to my knowledge, nowhere better or more curiously exemplified than by *Eye-Witnesses and Ministers of the Word*, written as it is by a Roman Catholic priest and published by the Pontifical Biblical Institute. The privileging of voice that Dillon sees everywhere in Luke(-Acts) simply inverts, which is to say, mirrors, the post-Bultmannian image of Luke-Acts as a work that deprivileges the eschatological voice of the kerygma. Both interpretations attempt to measure against a Western metaphysics of voice and presence a text that, subtly or utterly, is other to such categories.

What does it mean for Christian theology that "Jesus' bequest of his . . . mission and destiny"[33] (and not only in Luke) is written in a *gustatory* as well as a gestural medium: "I have earnestly desired to *eat* this passover with you" (Luke 22:15)? In certain Christian traditions (e.g., Roman Catholicism), the privileged site of encounter between Jesus and the believer has not been the ear (as in most Reformed traditions) so much as the palate. Christian theology, however, Roman Catholic theology included, has established itself by excluding the sense of taste, along with the other proximate senses. A giant step in the capacity to think in abstractions supervenes between New Testament and modern theology. "[F]or abstract thinking," as Ong notes, "the proximity senses—smell, taste, and . . . touch . . . —must be minimized in favor of the more abstract hearing and sight."[34] But as abstract thinking is elevated, presence is elevated with it. For Ong as for innumerable others, "sound and hearing have a special relationship to our sense of presence."[35] Tellingly, Derrida's interrogation of the metaphysics of presence is coupled with an interrogation of the abstracting senses. His aim in such texts as *Glas* has been to shift the ratio in the sensorium, effecting a new balance of knowledge (and hence of power) in which the excluded, proximate senses of taste, touch, and smell, posed as alternative models for thinking, reading, and writing, are not hopelessly outweighed by the distancing senses of sight and hearing.[36] It can thus be argued (without having Derrida play unlikely publican to a post-Bultmannian Pharisee) that the subtle body (of) knowledge Derrida feels for is more in touch with Luke(-Acts)' epistemic accommodation of touch and taste than the idealization of hearing, which, reverberating

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[32] Ibid., 200.

[33] Ibid., 154.

[34] *Presence*, 6.

[35] Ibid., 130.

[36] For a useful introduction to this aspect of Derrida's project, an aspect that goes beyond deconstruction, see Gregory L. Ulmer, *Applied Grammatology: Post(e)-Pedagogy from Jacques Derrida to Joseph Beuys* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 3-153.

from Bultmann, has resounded, deafeningly at times, in Lukan studies of the past four decades. But Luke is still more accommodating of the *look*, as we will see.

However much one makes of the voice in Luke, it is the look that gets the final say. Take, for example, the disciples' apprehension of Jesus's voice. Luke's sensorium regularly narrows to hearing and sight to symbolize comprehension or its opposite,[37] and so the disciples' recognition or misrecognition of Jesus is couched in auditory and visual verbs. Significantly, however, the disciples' response to the strongly auditory second passion prediction ("Let these words sink into your ears. . . ." [*thesthe humeis eis ta ōta humōn tous logous toutous*. . . .]) is couched in *optical* terms: "this saying [*rēma*] . . . was concealed [*parakaluptomai*] from them, that they should not perceive [*aisthanomai*] it" (9:44-45). Sound is similarly rendered as sight in their response to the third passion prediction: "this saying [*rēma*] was hid [*kruptō*] from them" (18:34). Finally, the moment Dillon and others would claim is the climactic moment of Jesus' self-disclosure in Luke—a *verbal* disclosure—is relayed by a *visual* metaphor: "Then he opened their minds [*dienoixen autōn ton noun*] to understand the scriptures" (24:45; cf. 24:32). The image is of the mind as an eye that has been blind (cf. 24:31: "and their eyes were opened [*dianoigō*]; also Acts 26:18). Here understanding is seen as vision.

Look-Acts: Seeing Is Believing

> [T]heoretical thought . . . lovingly springing toward the solar source of representation, the light that enables us to see.
>
> —Julia Kristeva, *Tales of Love*

On Lukan theology, christology, pneumatology, soteriology, and ecclesiology much has been written. Lukan epistemology, by comparison, is a virginal sheet. Is this an "-ology" of which Luke is innocent? Or does Luke-Acts also contain a discourse on knowledge about knowledge, an epistemology or theory of knowledge? In Luke-Acts, knowledge *is* a theoretical matter. Theory stems from the verb *theōreō*, as Heidegger and others remind us, in which *thea* and *horaō* have combined." *Thea* (cf. Theatre) is the outward look, the aspect, in which something shows itself. . . . To have seen this aspect, *eidenai*, is to know." *Horaō*, the second root, means "to look at something attentively, to look it over, to view it closely."[38] Theory is looking (so as) to know. Let theory denote a certain look that is also (a) certain knowledge, and we are ready to look at Luke(-Acts).

The kernel scenes of seeing/knowing in Luke can itemized as follows: (1) Following the appearance of the angels the shepherds in the nativity scene say to one another, "Let us go . . . and see [*horaō*] this thing that has happened. . . . And when they saw [*horaō*] it they made known the saying which had been told them" (2:15, 17).

(2) It has been revealed to Simeon that he should not see death before he has seen [*horaō*] the Lord's Christ. On seeing Jesus he declares: "Lord, now lettest thou thy

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[37] Critical language is, of course, subject to the same analysis. The term comprehension, for example (frequent in my own text), issues from *prehendere* (Lat.), to grasp, thereby narrowing the sensorium to (metaphorical) touch, sight being relegated an auxilary role.

[38] Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 164.

servant depart in peace . . . for mine eyes have seen [*horaō*] thy salvation" (2:26, 29-30).

(3) The call of the first disciples pivots on Peter's moment of (in)sight: "But when Simon Peter saw [*horaō*] it [the catch of fish], he fell down at Jesus' knees, saying, 'Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord.'" (5:8).

(4) Many of the parables peculiar to Luke turn similarly on a moment of recognition. The parable of the Two Debtors (7:41-42), followed by Jesus's "Do you see [*blepō*] this woman?," shows the Pharisee that he has not really seen "who and what sort of woman is touching [Jesus]."

(5) The parable of the Good Samaritan (10:30-36) is also a story of blindness and insight. The blindness of those who "pass by" ("a priest was going down . . . and when he saw [*horaō*] him he passed by. . . . [L]ikewise a Levite, when he . . . saw [*horaō*] him, passed by") contrasts with the perspicacity of the Samaritan who sees the victim for neighbor that he is ("and when he saw [*horaō*] him, he had compassion [*splagchnizomai*; cf. 7:13]").

(6) In the parable of the Prodigal Son (15:11-32) the self-exiled prodigal "comes to himself" (*eis heauton elthōn*), achieves the insight that induces repentence. As he returns home, his father sees (*horaō*) him and has compassion (*splagchnizomai*), like the Samaritan.

(7) In 8:10 Jesus says to his disciples: "To you it has been given to know [*ginoskō*] the secrets of the kingdom . . . but for others they are in parables, so that seeing [*blepō*] they may not see, and hearing they may not understand" (cf. Acts 28:26-27).

(8) At the return of the seventy (or seventy-two), Jesus again declares privately to his disciples, "Blessed are the eyes which see [*blepō*] what you see [*blepō*]! For I tell you that many prophets and kings desired to see [*horaō*] what you see [*blepō*], and did not see [*horaō*] it" (10:23-24).

(9) Following the second threefold statement of the disciples' incomprehension (18:34; cf. 9:45)) is the healing of a blind man: "Jesus said to him, 'Receive your sight [*anablepson*, only in Luke]. . . .' And immediately he received his sight and followed him, glorifying God" (18:42-43). Arguably, blindness and incomprehension, sight and insight are here juxtaposed such that the blind man becomes a foil to the Twelve.[39]

(10) The next pericope has Zacchaeus seeking, not simply to see Jesus, but to "see who Jesus was/is [*ezētei idein ton Iēsoun tis estin*]" (19:3). To *see* Jesus is to *know* who he is and what he demands. Recognition is again accompanied by repentence: "half of my goods I give to the poor; and if I have defrauded anyone of anything, I restore it fourfold" (19:8).

(11) In 19:41-44 Jesus laments the blindness of the unrepentent city: "the things that make for peace . . . are hid from your eyes [*ekrubē apo ophthalmōn sou*]." Blindness is again the privileged metaphor for ignorance: "you did not know [*ginoskō*] the time of your visitation."

(12) In the passion narrative, Pilate sends Jesus over to Herod. "When Herod saw [*horaō*] Jesus, he was very glad, for he had long desired to see [*horaō*] him [cf. 9:9] . . . and he was hoping to see [*horaō*] some sign done by him" (23:7-8). Here, however, seeing elicits no recognition, only a blindly ironic response: "they arrayed him in gorgeous apparel" (23:11).

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[39] So Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel according to Luke X-XXIV* (New York: Doubleday, 1985), 1214.

(13) Juxtaposed to Herod's blindness is the cognizant seeing of the centurion ("Now when the centurion saw [*horaō*] what had taken place, he praised God, and said, 'Certainly this man was innocent!'" [23:47]), a neat juxtaposition indeed if Herod's arraying of Jesus is read as mocking his guiltlessness: the Jewish tetrarch mocks the Innocent/Righteous One (*ho . . . dikaios*), the Gentile centurion confesses him.

(14) "[T]he people stood by, watching [*theōreō*]; but the rulers scoffed at him" (23:35). At Jesus' expiration, "all the multitudes who assembled to see the sight [*theōria*], when they saw [*theōreō*] what had taken place, returned home beating their breasts," repentence (or its inception) once again following on insight. "And his acquaintances and the women . . . saw [*horaō*] these things" (23:47-49).

(15) The recognition on the Emmaus road is rendered with a visual metaphor, as we saw: "And their eyes were opened and they recognized him [*autōn de dienoichthēsan hoi opthalmoi, kai epegnōsan auton*]" (24:31).

Luke is clearly fascinated by the "dialectic of men's ignorance and knowledge, of their blindness and the moment of recognition."[40] Let us peer more closely at some of these examples.

The shepherds set out to "see [*horaō*] this thing that has happened" (2:15). What they see sounds unremarkable—a "babe lying in a manger" (2:16)—but it has been interpreted for them—and brilliantly at that ("the glory of the Lord shone around them")—by an inerrant exegete: "this will be a sign [*sēmeion*] for you: you will find a babe. . . ." (2:12). As with the cryptic signifier of the tomb, the beswaddled signifier in the crib is illegible in and of itself. "Meaning is only ever erected," writes Jacqueline Rose.[41] The crypt means only as it is thrust into a textual matrix. But the nativity underscores a subclause in this law of the signifier. What makes meaning erect is an act of authority, here a decree by an angelic representative of Authority itself (or of the author himself, depending on how you look at it). And what is decreed, in part, is that the unremarkable signifier in the manger be read for what it manifestly is not.

By way of a system of subterranean tunnels, Luke's semiology here links up with that of Plato. *Thea*, it will be remembered, "is the outward look, the aspect, in which something shows itself." Now, "Plato names this aspect in which what presences shows what it is, *eidos*. To have seen this aspect, *eidenai*, is to know."[42] *Eidos* as outward look in our scene (the aspect of the infant) is declared transparent on *eidos* as idea or concept (whatever the shepherds see that emboldens them to announce what they know [2:17]). Luke's Semitic *sēmeion* (cf. Exod 3:12; 2 Kgs 20:9; Isa 38:7; etc.) can thus be read as an allegorization of Plato's boldest gesture:[43] "We, late born, are no longer in a position to appreciate the significance of Plato's daring. . . . For *eidos*, in the common speech, meant the outward aspect that a visible thing offers to the

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[40] Geoffrey F. Nuttall, *The Moment of Recognition: Luke as Story-Teller* (London: University of London Athlone Press, 1978), 13.

[41] Jacqueline Rose, "Introduction—II," in Jacques Lacan and the *école freudienne*, *Feminine Sexuality*, ed. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose, trans. Jacqueline Rose (New York: Norton, 1982), 43.

[42] Heidegger, *Question Concerning Technology*, 164.

[43] Did Luke *intend* it to be so read? Hardly; but what was in Luke's mind is of less interest to me here that what is in his text (which I suspect has a mind of its own).

physical eye. Plato exacts of this word, however, something utterly extraordinary: that it name what precisely is not and never will be perceivable with physical eyes. For *idea* names . . . the nonsensuous aspect of what is physically visible."[44] Luke's nativity vignette is thus a metaphysical ideogram: the Savior, Christ the Lord (2:11), is (present in) the mundane infant; *eidos* as outward aspect (*physikos*) signals beyond (*meta*) to *eidos* as idea; the senses are displaced by the sense; and signifier and signified are declared one.

In Luke's *sēmeion* of the newborn, moreover, signifier, signified and *referent* are declared one. In Saussure's semiology, the signified is not the referent (an actual tree, for example) but the mental image or idea that the signifier ("tree") conjures up. Saussure bracketed the referent. Now, Luke's semiology, while pre-Saussurian, that is, pre-structuralist, Saussure being the "father" of structuralism, is also *post*-structuralist. On the one hand, Jesus's birth is attended by a *sēmeion* in which signifier and referent are declared consubstantial: "When the angels went away from them into heaven, the shepherds said to one another, 'Let us go over to Bethlehem and see this *rēma* [word, thing, matter, deed [cf. 1:37-38], after Hebrew *dābār* via the LXX] that has happened.'" Into the hole that yawns between language and the real a word-thing, by divine fiat, is inserted. On the other hand, Jesus's resurrection is attended by a *semioclasty* (a splitting of the sign), which surpasses Saussure in the direction of poststructuralism: the signifier (the empty tomb) can signify as it is supposed to only as long as its signified and referent (the dead body) are missing and *stay* missing. (For Saussure, in contrast, the signified was never more than a breath away from the signifier.) And whereas the phallic word-thing of the nativity scene is venerated by *ideal* interpreters (the shepherds, given privileged access to the idea designated by this corporeal signifier), the crypt is attended only by common or garden interpreters: the women and, perhaps, Peter (appropriately, the verse announcing Peter's puzzlement [24:12] is itself a textual enigma).

The presentation of Jesus in the temple pivots similarly on sight and knowledge. And again the master signifier (Jesus) is erected by a word of authority, here the Holy Spirit's disclosure to Simeon "that he should not see [*horaō*] death before he [has] seen [*horaō*] the Lord's Christ" (2:26). Immediately on seeing the Christ, however, Simeon *is* ready to see death: "Now you may release [*apolyō*] your slave, Master . . . for mine eyes have seen [*horaō*] thy salvation" (2:29-30). (In the LXX, *apolyō* is euphemistic for release in death, e.g., Gen 15:2; Num 20:29; Tob 3:6.) But what *exactly* does Simeon see that effects release?

Let Lacan take Simeon aside for a moment. Meanwhile, a recital of the Lacanian myth of origins will be necessary.[45] For Lacan, cutting into the Freudian corpus with

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[44] Heidegger, *Question Concerning Technology*, 20.

[45] Lacan himself disdained such recitals. The subtlety of his thought always returns to subvert such summaries (even as it necessitates them), as becomes apparent when one moves from the attempts at a Lacanian systematics (preeminently, Anika Lemaire, *Jacques Lacan*, trans. David Macey [New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977]; see also John P. Muller and William J. Richardson, *Lacan and Language: A Reader's Guide to Écrits* [New York: International Universities Press, 1982]) to more sophisticated engagements with his texts (e.g., Shoshana Felman, *Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight: Psychoanalysis in Contemporary Culture* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987]; Jane Gallop, *Reading Lacan* [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985]).

instruments forged by Saussure, Levi-Strauss, and others, the human subject is irremediably split, barred from unmediated union with the mother through its insertion into a "symbolic" (roughly, sociolinguistic) order whose first commandment is the prohibition of such union. Henceforth the subject's primary desire (to be the exclusive desire of the mother) will be deflected through an interminable chain of ephemeral substitutions, none of which will satisfy that unstoppable lack. This hole in being Lacan terms castration after Freud—not a threatening Damocles' sword but the constitutive condition of every subject, female *or* male, who has acceded to the symbolic order—and the agent of castration he terms *the-Name-of-the-Father*, the figurative locus of the Law's emphatic No (*non/nom du père*).

Now, in the myth of Jesus's origins à la Luke, Jesus' initial subjection to the Law of the Father (cf. 2:49) is announced by a symbolic castration ("at the end of eight days . . . he was circumcised") and completed by his consecration in the temple "according to the custom of the law [of the Lord]" (2:21, 27; cf. 2:22-24, 39). Jesus is a *subject*, then, but is he more? His accession to the Law coincides with Simeon's release: "Now you may release your slave, Master." How is this release to be read? As a release from *desire*, Simeon's desire regaining in a look ("mine eyes have *seen* thy salvation") the object that has always eluded it ("this man was righteous and devout, looking for [*prosdechomai*] the consolation of Israel")? Does the look in Luke repair the lack, Lac(k)an notwithstanding? What if the object of the look *himself* lacks being, requiring injections of meaning from some outside supplier (an angel, the Holy Spirit, etc.), being himself subject to another's desire ("Father, if thou art willing. . . . [*ei boulei*]" [22:42; cf. 2:49, etc.]), being himself subject to his own desire ("I came to cast fire upon the earth; and would [*ti thelō*] that it were already kindled! I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how I am constrained [*sunechomai*] until it is accomplished!" [12:49])? And how could a *look* repair the lack, in any case, some distance between subject and object being the prerequisite of any look, and lack being the offspring of distance? Lack, for Lacan, is the wound left open in the subject when s/he is cut free of the mother with the blade of language. Even were it possible to suture the wound, each stitch would unravel the subject, whose identity depends on the wound being kept open—as our text backhandedly concedes in signalling Simeon's "death drive": "now you may release [unto death] your slave, Master" (2:29). But what counts for the text is not that Jesus actually *be* self-sufficient and complete, the focus of desire only and not its subject, but simply that he be capable of *assuming* that role, of being erected, that is, by acts of authority (cf. 2:47; 4:36) and by order of the Father to the position of master of the house and overseer of the Father's interests: "Did you not know that I must be in my Father's house/about my Father's business [*en tois tou patros mou*]?" (Significantly, it is Luke's leading female character who is the principal recipient of this lesson in domestic economy.)

Simon Peter's "cure" in Luke-Acts contrasts interestingly with Simeon's experience. Lacan writes: "When I speak to you of the unconscious . . . you may picture it to yourselves as a *hoop net* . . . at the bottom of which the catch of fish will be found."[46] The scene of (self-)recognition centered on the marvelous catch of fish in Luke 5:1-11 encapsulates the scene of analysis. At Jesus' bidding, Simon obediently "put[s] out into the deep [*epanagō eis to bathos*] and let[s] down [his] nets for a catch." The result is traumatic: "And when they had done this, they enclosed a great shoal

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[46] Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1981), 143-44.

of fish; and as their nets were breaking, they beckoned to their partners in the other boat to come and help them. And they came and filled both the boats, so that they began to sink. But when Simon Peter saw [*horaō*] it, he fell down at Jesus' knees, saying, 'Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord.'" Faced with the subaqueous representatives of his unconscious writ(h)ing grotesquely in the analytic net, Simon comes clean with the master analyst ("thoughts out of many hearts [will] be revealed" [2:35]), and begs for surcease. "[H]enceforth you will be taking human beings alive [*zōgreō*]," Jesus tells him. Later in Acts the therapy continues. Peter is required to decipher another example of unconscious writ(h)ing: "a great sheet [and in] it . . . all kinds of animals and reptiles and birds of the air" (10:11-12). His cure is effected only as he accepts the "unclean thing" ("And I heard a voice saying to me, 'Rise, Peter; kill and eat.' But I said, 'No, Lord; for nothing . . . unclean [*akatharton*] has ever entered my mouth'"), that is, uncircumcision (cf. 11:3), the obverse of that arbitrary yet obligatory cut—again, the power of fiat—that constitutes the basis of his self-identity. To accept that the other is *not*-cut, or that he (or she) is cut differently is to accept the relativity of his own cut. Only then is he in a position to "take [the other] alive," to let him or her be in his or her difference.

But let us return to Simeon's fantasmatic scene of recognition and to Jesus's parents, who, lacking the (in)sight able to pierce the body of the sign ("this child is set for . . . a sign [*sēmeion*]"—note that s/he who is unable to pierce the sign will be pierced by it [2:34-35]), look on in amazement. In contrast, Anna, herself a longtime devotee of desire ("She did not depart from the temple, worshiping with fasting and prayer night and day"), "coming up at that very hour," sees whatever it is that Simeon has seen: "she gave thanks to God, and spoke of him to all who were looking for the redemption of Jerusalem" (2:36-38). Two kinds of readers are contrasted here. Mary and Joseph, though eager for what "is written in the law of the Lord" (2:23), are unable to read the corporeal script that is their son. Literal readers, they skid on the surface of language. They are foils to Simeon and Anna, ironic readers to whom the material signifier is immaterial since it is transparent on a luminous signified ("a light for revelation to the Gentiles"). To see (*theōrein/idein*) and to know (*eidenai/gnōnai*) is to read (*anagnōnai*) as prescribed. Such is Luke's theory of reading. But there is more.

To read Luke(-Acts) is to interpret a sequence of (represented) events. To this extent, the reader's performance mirrors that of the story participants, including those who "know how to interpret [*dokimazō*] the appearance of earth and sky" but "not . . . how to interpret the present time" (12:56). Interpretation of that crucial time (the time of the cross) is the common, *critical* role that character and reader share and that binds them together across the ontological divide that otherwise separates them, that bridges the time of crisis and the time of criticism, transferring a crucial urgency to the critical task. Luke's theory/epistemology of reading (reading as *theōrein/eidenai*) is meant to have grave practical consequences. Correct and incorrect reading in Luke(-Acts) is a matter of life and death. Luke's privileged signifier, the "sign that is spoken against" or misread "is set for the fall and rising of many."

Now, if the Lukan characters (the disciples, say) are not readers in the literal sense but metaphorical readers only, neither is *the* reader, obliged to accompany Jesus from scene to scene, from Nazareth to Jerusalem and beyond, a follower in the literal sense but a metaphorical follower only. An intriguing chiasmus emerges of readers obliged to be "followers" and followers obliged to be "readers." Its function, seemingly, is to make the reader a true follower (to erase the quotation marks) even as the disciples are made true, or competent, readers. Now, chiasmus is a derivation

of *chiazein*, "to mark with a *chi* (χ)," and a cognate of *chiasma*, which can mean "cross." χ thus marks the spot to which the Lukan reader must come to become a true follower ("If anyone would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his *cross* daily and follow me" [9:23]) and to which the disciple must come to become a competent reader ("'Was it not necessary that the Christ should *suffer* . . .?' And . . . he interpreted to them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself" [24:27]). More precisely, Christos (Χρ) himself marks the spot in Luke(-Acts) where reader and disciple cross-dress, reader becoming disciple, disciple becoming reader. As chiasmus, χ is the cross through which the submissive reader is nailed to Luke (-Acts). But as a cross erected for an unspecifiable body of readers, χ is also the sign of the unknown quantity, the signature that can be appropriated by anyone, and the sign of multiplication.

From his earliest appearances in Luke, Jesus is the object of blindness or insight, reading or misreading (2:18, 33, 47-50, etc.). Small wonder, then, that he should inaugurate his ministry with a self-reading. In the Nazareth synagogue (4:16ff.) he assumes not only the role of a reader (literally: "he stood up to read") but that of an *ideal* reader, and in a double sense: (1) his performance here is quite simply that of an ideal or model reader of scripture (his earthly ministry will culminate with him reassuming this role [24:27, 32, 45]); (2) by an act of reading he gestures to that extrasensory *eidos* (ideal reality), which "is not and never will be perceivable with physical eyes,"[47] his own identity as the all but illegible sign that effects release from captivity, blindness, and oppression (4:18). The congregation's initial response is to "gaze" (*atenizō*) uncomprehendingly at him, speaking blind words of approval. (Cf. Acts 2:12, where *atenizō* ["to gawk"] similarly connotes misrecognition.) Now, Jesus's ideal reading of scripture consists in allowing scripture to read him: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me. . . . Today this scripture has been fulfilled in your hearing." His pre-scribed role is precisely what the congregation are unable, or unwilling, to read. But in refusing the ideal reading they assume their own part in the script.

What makes seeing/reading possible in Luke? In 9:28ff., Peter, John and James see (*horaō*) Jesus's glory (*doxa*) on the mountain: "the appearance of his countenance was altered, and his raiment became dazzling white." Sight and reading are impossible without *light*. Derrida writes: "[T]he metaphor of darkness and light (of . . . revelation and concealment) [is] the founding metaphor of Western philosophy as metaphysics . . . [I]n this respect the entire history of our philosophy is a photology, a name given to a history of, or treatise on, light."[48] And elsewhere: "Everything . . . that passes through . . . *eidos* . . . is articulated with the analogy between . . . the intelligible . . . and the visible sun."[49] Now, whereas the transfiguration is *implicitly* articulated with the analogy between the intelligible and the visible sun, it is *explicitly* articulated with the analogy between the intelligible and the visible *Son*: "This is my Son . . . listen to him!" But the light is too bright for Peter to see or read by. Teetering on the edge of sleep in this dreamscape ("[they] were heavy with sleep [*ēsan bebarēmenoi hypnō*]"), Peter and his companions are able to look on the privileged signifier, now unveiled in all its naked glory, only by diffusing its brightness in a misreading ("'Master, it is well that we are here; let us make three booths . . .'—not

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[47] Heidegger, *Question Concerning Technology*, 20 (see above).

[48] Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 27.

[49] Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 253-54.

knowing what he said"). Lacan may be right: "[the phallus] can play its role only when veiled."[50] But our text already knows that. It says: "this *rēma* was veiled [*parakaluptomai*] from them" (9:45; cf. 18:34)—veiled, that is, by the Father. In Luke-Acts (as in Lacan) the paternal *dei* bars the subject from ever possessing the phallus completely. The *dei* in Luke-Acts (40 occurrences) is inerasably inscribed in its *deity*, and so the LACK in LuKe-ACts is literally irremovable. Thus "the phallus . . . always slips through your fingers,"[51] especially when you try to seize it: "passing through the midst of them he went away" (4:30) It *can* erupt "in sudden manifestations . . . in a flash,"[52] as here on the mount of transfiguration (also a mount of phallophany). But it permits these titillating glimpses of itself only to disappear again, thereby luring you on: "they recognized him; and he vanished out of their sight" (24:31; cf. Acts 1:9). It always slips away, and sometimes you can't even be sure that it has come: "Are you he who is to come, or shall we look for another?" (7:18).

By a happy stroke of chance, the term commonly translated "appearance" in the phrase "the appearance of his countenance was altered" is *eidos*, whose tracks we picked up in earlier scenes and which we now come upon in broad daylight, the enhanced daylight of the transfiguration. More than any other, the term *eidos* connotes the subsumption of visibility in intelligibility, signifier in signified, as we have seen. Everything in Luke(-Acts) which comes through *eidos-idein-eidenai* is articulated with the analogy between the intelligible and the visible sun/Son, and never more brilliantly than here.

Look-Ax: Luke's Cutting Glance

> [C]easelessly Thou didst hit the weakness of my sight with the violence of Thy light-rays upon me, and I trembled with love and horror.
>
> —St. Augustine, *The Confessions*

> Visibility is a trap.
>
> —Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*

The sense of sight has come in for a good deal of suspicion in our time. Its dissociative, distancing quality disturbs. "Sight registers surfaces, which means that of itself it encourages one to consider even persons not as interiors but from the

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[50] Lacan, *Écrits*, 288. The Lacanian phallus is not the penis; rather, it is the signifier of the unconscious lack in every subject that holds desire wide open, "the signifier which has no signified" (Lacan, *Feminine Sexuality*, 152). For Lacan, "[t]he phallus is the privileged signifier" (*Écrits*, 287). Debate still rages among feminists as to whether the Lacanian conception of the phallus connotes mystified complicity with, or a demystifying critique of, the phallocratic social order. To my mind, however, the very questionability of the phallus as the privileged signifier (a secular scandal of particularity) enhances its suggestiveness in the Lukan context: Jesus's authority, like that of the phallus, issues from the authority of the Father (e.g., "This is my Son, my Chosen, listen to him!").

[51] Jacques Lacan, "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in *Hamlet*," ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. James Hulbert, in *Literature and Psychoanalysis. The Question of Reading: Otherwise*, ed. Shoshana Felman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 52.

[52] Ibid., 48.

outside. Thus persons, too, tend to be thought of somehow as objects."[53] Freud associated the act of seeing with anal activity, with control and the desire for mastery.[54] However, it is feminists who have expressed the most discomfort with (or under) the (male) gaze. "[T]he *gaze* enacts the voyeur's desire for sadistic power," writes Toril Moi, "in which the object of the gaze is cast as its passive, masochistic, feminine victim."[55] And Luce Irigaray writes: "*Seeing remains the special prerogative of the Father.* It is in his gaze that everything comes into being."[56] "As for the mother, let there be no mistake about it, *she has no eyes* . . . no gaze. . . . And if one were to turn back toward her, in order to re-enter . . . [t]he danger would . . . be of losing one's bearings. . . . Of falling into a dark hole where lucidity may founder."[57]

Within the optical economy of Luke's epistemology the primary focus of the look, Jesus, is not an object of the gaze in Moi's sense. The look commended in Luke is the look that does *not* register surfaces (e.g., that of the shepherds, Simeon, or the centurion at the crucifixion scene). Even when Jesus is seen as a mere surface, he can hardly be said to be a victim of the gaze. Rather, those who do the gazing (e.g., the *atenizontes* in Luke 4:20) are themselves cast as victims of blindness. The fundamental law of Luke's scopic economy is that sight be ever capable of being converted into insight.

This is not to say that Luke's economy is innocent of the imperial eye/I. Luke's panoptic narrator is omniscient and omnipresent. His supervisory gaze is able to expose and penetrate everyone and everything in the story-world. (Flirting precariously with the language of conjugal rights and sexual technique, Wayne Booth writes of a narrator's "most important privilege" being "that of obtaining an inside view of [a] character," and of narrators who provide inside views differing "in the depth and the axis of their plunge.")[58] But if the narrator is permitted to penetrate Jesus (e.g., in Luke 22:44, the most exposive handling of any Lukan character) it is not because the narrator is superior to Jesus. The Son is at the center of Luke's photological economy. In the Son's light there can only be (in)sight or blindness, brightness or deep shadow. The narrator too is subject to the Son, for he writes by the light of the Son. The narrator circles endlessly around Jesus, as does everything in the Lukan cosmos. Luke's system of knowledge is a solar system. The centrality of the Son is Luke's first law of (meta)physics.

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[53] Ong, *Presence*, 228.

[54] See "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. 14, trans. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1955), esp. 129. See also Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts*, 67-119. For Lacan as for Foucault (though for different reasons), "[i]n this matter of the visible, everything is a trap" (ibid., 93). See Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 195-228, on "panopticism." In addition, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Bataille, and Derrida (to name but a few) have each had something unique to say about sight.

[55] Toril Moi, *Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory* (New York: Methuen, 1985), 180, n. 8. Cf. Ong, *Presence*, 159: "vision is at its optimum when its object is quiescent."

[56] Luce Irigaray, *Speculum of the Other Woman*, trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 323.

[57] Ibid., 340.

[58] Wayne C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 160, 77, emphasis mine.

Administering Luke's Economy: The Elimination of Waste

> The author is the principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning.
> —Michel Foucault, "What is an Author?"

Luke's system is also an economic system, and a capitalist system at that. "Capitalism (from *caput,* head) can be understood as an ontotheological political economy," writes Mark C. Taylor. Its guiding principle "is fundamentalist belief—belief in the fundaments named identity and unity. This oneness is the principle that founds the united state(s)."[59] Capitalism's basic token of exchange, the dollar bill, depicts a decapitated pyramid surmounted by an eye in a triangle radiating sunlight. "The image of the eye within a triangle surrounded by rays of the sun is a common symbol for the all-seeing, panoptical, penal, eagle eye of God."[60] The dazzling light of the Son in Luke(-Acts), at noonday strength in Jesus's transfiguration (Luke 9:29; cf. 17:24; Acts 9:3; 22:6, 9, 11; 26:13),[61] reflects a still greater light, that of God. (The irradiated Jesus may be looked at head on, but a protective filter, an overshadowing cloud, for example [Luke 9:34-35], is needed to face his Father.) Analogously, the all-exposing gaze of the Lukan *narrator* is but a reflection of the blinding intelligence that supervises the Lukan story world, namely, *the Implied Author,* the Prime Mover of the plot, whose divine function mirror-reflects that of his character, God.

The following homology emerges. God is the *internal* overseer of the Lukan story-world. His cryptic will is inscribed in a body of writing, which can be deciphered only by Jesus (Luke 18:31-24; 22:37; 24:25-27, 44-47). The implied author (to whom tradition gives the name Luke) is the *external* overseer of the story-world. Luke's cryptic intentions are also inscribed in a body of writing, but which can be deciphered only by *the scholar.* The scholar is Jesus's mirror-image, just as Luke is the mirror-image of God. Just as Jesus has authority to unveil God's hidden purpose for those within the story-world who struggle with it, so too does the scholar have authority to unveil Luke-Acts' hidden purpose for those within the church or the academy who struggle with it. Like Jesus too, the critic feels it necessary to discriminate (*krinein*) between those who see or read correctly and those who do not. To the select audiences of Jesus and the scholar it is "given to know the secrets of the kingdom of God," while "for others they are in parables, so that seeing they may not see, and hearing they may not understand" (Luke 8:10; cf. Acts 28:26-27). Like the internal economy of Luke-Acts, the economy of biblical studies is predicated on the controlled exchange of deciphered meanings. And since the Author regulates that exchange, its currency bears his paternal profile: "father . . . chief, capital, and good(s). . . . *Patēr* in Greek means all that at once."[62]

The place of absolute intelligibility in Luke-Acts is occupied by the character God. Within the economy of Lukan studies, the corresponding slot is occupied by Luke.

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[59] Mark C. Taylor, *Altarity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 256.

[60] Ibid., 257.

[61] Note that Paul's blinding exposure to the full light of the Son occurs at noon (*peri mesēmbrian* [Acts 22:6]; *hēmeras mesēs* [26:13]).

[62] Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination,* trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 81.

For several decades now, the intelligibility of Luke-Acts has been predicated on the conscious intentionality of its maker. Luke's intentionality is the prelapsarian place of origin to which scholars have labored to return. "'[T]hings are more precious and essential at the moment of birth,'" writes Foucault. "We tend to think that this is the moment of their greatest perfection, when they emerge dazzlingly from the hand of a creator. The origin . . . is associated with the gods, and its story is always sung as a theogony."[63] Contemporary Lukan studies, and biblical studies generally, are founded on a neo-Gnostic dream of return. But they are also founded on a much more recent myth, that of the Protestant work ethic.

The aim of intention-centered exegesis, like that of the capitalist economies in which it thrives, is the elimination of waste. It is sustained by a belief in omnivorous authorial intentionalities with iron constitutions, capable (at least in principle) of digesting textual matter in toto. Should such scholarship ever complete its enzymatic labors, there would be no waste paper, no recalcitrant words, sentences, or passages, left undigested in the biblical authors' systems. (In a *canonical* body there can be no posterior opening. All textual matter must be held inside. In such a body, total digestion is the only permissible means of elimination, necessitating absolute anal-retention, and hence absolute control.)

The biblical-critical calling closely mirrors the Protestant calling, which, as Max Weber showed in *The Protestant Ethic*, produces "iron cage" economic orders. Such utilitarian economies set themselves up against "the naturally errant . . . impulse to *waste* time (and money)," while "[b]ehind and above this austere work ethic hovers the absolutely hidden, inscrutable, and supervisory Calvinist God . . . who with 'His quite incomprehensible decrees has decided the fate of every individual and regulated the tiniest details of the cosmos from eternity.'"[64] This Calvinist God is patently a descendent of no less inscrutable forbears (Luke-Acts' deity, with his impenetrable *dei* [Luke 9:22; 22:37; 24:26, 44, etc.], among them), and the fantasy on which so much contemporary biblical scholarship is erected, that of subordinating the smaller details of the biblical texts to their authors' masterful intentionalities, amounts in turn to a displacement of this stern God's regulatory function.

What iron hand rattling the dice-box of chance has determined that current gospel studies in the United States be even less tolerant of waste matter (more holistic, that is) than its counterpart on the other continents; or that narrative criticism (that superholistic variation of *Redaktionsgeschichte*) be principally an American product? What does it mean that the goal *and* locus of holistic gospel scholarship is the united state(s)?

Strict *sexual* mores are also ascribed to the penurious, property-conscious biblical authors implicit in so much scholarship. The biblical texts are commonly held to embody their authors' intentions. So conceived they are indeed so many *bodies* to which the scholar must relate in accordance with strict rules of propriety.[65] In

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[63] Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 143.

[64] William V. Spanos, *Repetitions: The Postmodern Occasion in Literature and Culture* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), 178-79 (the internal quotation is from Weber).

[65] "The notions of integrity and closure in a text are like that of virginity in a

playing fast and loose with an author's intention do we then run the risk of fondling an author's body? Victorian scruples regulate our reading habits. We need to rendezvous with the texts in the wild occasionally, away from the cloying niceties of the drawing-room. As Jane Gallop observes, "once one starts attending to the odd truths revealed in the accidental material of language, one is led into a different kind of reading, no longer a sublimated relation to the spirit of the text, but an intercourse with its body."[66]

Luke-Acts repels and fascinates. It seeks to arouse us from our Platonic fixation with its ideal body to have us explore, in graphic detail(s), its sensuous materiality. It favors the missionary position, naturally, and likes to be on top. The largest body of writing in the New Testament is luking and acting seductively. It beckons, but we, prim Victor-ians, bent on (self-)mastery, writ(h)e dryly, shrinking from its touch. Are we so unable to come?

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body." Jane Gallop, *The Daughter's Seduction: Feminism and Psychoanalysis* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), xiii.

[66] Ibid., 29. Such intercourse would "not [be] based upon the myth of the book's or the self's or the body's virginal wholeness" (ibid., xiii). It would also bring a variety of organs into play, the mouth for example: "The interpreter lives by eating; he [sic] sinks his teeth into the text in order to inwardize the outward" (Mark C. Taylor, "Text as Victim," in Thomas J. J. Altizer et al., *Deconstruction and Theology* [New York: Crossroad, 1982], 65). Alternatively: "I was eating the texts, I was sucking, licking, kissing them" (Hélène Cixous, Annie Leclerc, and Madeleine Gagnon, *La venue a l'écriture* [Paris: UGE, 1977], 19). Or again: "I cleave to you, o double-breasted book" (Geoffrey H. Hartman, *The Fate of Reading and Other Essays* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975], 19). See also Jacques Derrida, *Glas* (Paris: Galilée, 1974), 135, 229.

Balaam: Prophet, Diviner, and Priest In Selected Ancient Israelite and Hellenistic Jewish Sources

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> ". . . it is not necessary for the written word into which living tradition is translated to become a dead letter. This written word carries within it a germ of spiritual energy capable of generating a new living tradition, which in its turn, should breathe new life into the word."
>
> G. Vermes[1]

Introduction

In deuteronomistic circles,[2] all known or acknowledged oracles were made to "pass in review" as it were. Deuteronomy 18:21ff. holds "How may we know the word which the Lord has not spoken?"—When a prophet speaks in the name of the Lord, if the word does not come to pass or come true, that is a word which the Lord has not spoken; the prophet has spoken it presumptuously, you need not be afraid of him." As to the nature of a bona fide oracle spoken by Yahweh, the Deuteronomist identified certain terminology which had to be present when one spoke of or retailed an oracular experience. The *shoresh* or "root" for these technical terms follows. The *dbr* or "word" "comes" (*bw'*, cf. 1 Sam. 9:6; Jer. 15:15); "comes to pass" (*hyh*, cf. Deut. 18:22a); is "done" ('*sh*, cf. Num. 23:19); is "fulfilled" (*ml'*, cf. 2 Chron. 36:21); and because of its efficacy, the *dbr* does not "fall" to the ground (*nfl*, cf. 1 Kgs. 8:56; 2 Kgs. 10:10), but is, rather, "established," "brought to fruition" (*qwm*, cf. Isa. 44:26; 2 Sam. 7:25), and does not suffer the fate of returning to Yahweh "unrealized" and "unfulfilled" (*l' yshwv*, cf. Isa. 45:23; 55:11). These characteristics are enshrined in the words placed in the mouth of the nebulous figure

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[1] Geza Vermes, *Scripture and Tradition in Judaism*, Studia Post-Biblica, Volumen Quartum (Haggadic Studies), (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), pp. 127-177.

[2] The deuteronomistic circle is reputed to be a prophetic group responsible for editing the block of material found in the Hebrew-written Bible embracing Deuteronomy through the end of 2 Kings plus the prophetic book of Jeremiah. This material is noted for its distinctive world-view crafted against the backdrop of the Mosaic covenant. In essence, "Israel's" ups and downs historically are explained as success (ups) when the stipulations of the Covenant are kept, and failure/punishment (downs) when they are not. A serpentine up-down, up-down scheme pervades and thus joins all of the above-mentioned material.

Balaam ben Beor. Addressing Balak, his employer, the King of Moab, in Num. 23:19-20, he asks of Yahweh: "Would he speak and not act (*y'sh*), promise and not fulfill (*dbr wl' yqymynh*)? Truly, my message was to bless: and when he blesses, I cannot reverse it (*wl' 'sybynh*).[3]

Immediately, then, one notices that a deuteronomic programmatic appears to exist here. The Balaam cycle of oracles at Numbers 22-24 appears to be a part of that programmatic. Further, Balaam—at least here—is touting the party line. A mantic personality, and an outsider to boot!, is depicted as uttering oracles in the name of the insider deity, Yahweh. Adjusting our focus to pan the producer of this Balaam cycle of texts, one sees that the programmatic is framed by the activity of those engaged in mantological exegesis (or perhaps eisegesis). Mantology and its concerns at a specific time in the life of ancient Judah is reflected in the cycle of texts.

As one reads Philo[4] and Josephus,[5] one notices that in the Hellenistic period, the mantological concerns for the Balaam cycle are again evident.[6] Exegesis of an exegesis, or eisegesis of an eisegesis, or even a combination thereof, should be suspected and sought. The systematic exposition of the evidence should accomplish two tasks: (1) provide a defensible view of mantology and its use in ancient Judah at the time of those who produced the form of the Balaam cycle in Hebrew which is available in the Massoretic text, and (2) allow one to compare and/or contrast that evidence gained with the mantological concerns of the middle Platonic period, as presented in the writings of two literarily-active, Hellenistic Jews, Philo and Josephus.

Recently, a series of texts concerning Balaam has been discovered at a site in present-day Jordan known as Deir 'Alla.[7] These texts are significant because they are extra-biblical and are written in a dialect known not to have been spoken or written by the Judean *literati*.[8] The Deir 'Alla texts, therefore, provide (1) another vantage point from which to view the Balaam figure; (2) another tradition about Balaam and his mantic significance for this non-Hebrew writer (and perhaps his/her circle); and (3) chronologically interstitial material on the Balaam cycle as exe-eisegeted by biblical mantological groups and the Hellenistic exe-eisegetes.

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[3] These terms and their significance for the Balaam text are derived from Michael Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 468.

[4] *De Cherubim*, xxxii and passim; *Vita Mosis*, xlviii.

[5] *J.A.*, iv.

[6] "Mantological" could be debated by some as the terminus technicus of the middle Platonic period which should be applied to the Balaam figure. See the discussion below concerning notes 168 and 179.

[7] Cf. A. Lemaire, "Fragments From the Book of Balaam at Deir 'Alla," *BAR* Sept./Oct. 1985: 26-39; Baruch Levine, "The Deir 'Alla Plaster Inscriptions," *JAOS* 101 (1981): 195-205; Jacob Hoftizer and Gerrit van der Kooij, *Aramaic Texts From Deir 'Alla*, (Leiden: Brill, 1976); Jo Ann Hackett, *The Balaam Text From Deir 'Alla*, (Chico: Scholars Press, 1980). See below in the section on Deir 'Alla for additional works.

[8] Cf. Lemaire and Hackett on debates concerning the type of language in which the texts were written. Some argue Ammonite, others argue Amorite or Aramaic script and vocabulary and engender debates as to the position of the language enshrined in the texts within the Northwest Semitic family.

This work has the limited purpose of being an exegetical essay in its own right on the meaning of the Balaam cycle for the circle which produced it; to describe and analyze that database; and what happened to it as it survived later mantic traditions and interpretations of them in ancient "Israel" until the Hellenistic period. It has the further purpose of introducing a new series of data which provide meanings and uses for the Balaam cycle by certain priestly groups in (especially) Judah, and there, primarily in Jerusalem. To my knowledge, meanings have not been proposed or presented which state how the Balaam cycle functioned within the inter- and intra-priestly circles' polemical debates.

The Text

The Massoretic Text of the Balaam cycle presents a nightmare to those who would analyze it critically. Of the many pitfalls, words make no sense (*bny ʿmw*, i.e., sons of his people) at 22:5; phrases appear gratuitously ("And Moab said to the elders of Midian," at 22:4) which appear to be unexplainable intrusions; elders from Moab and Midian depart to visit a diviner with divinations in their hands! (22:7-14); these elders do not appear to be quite certain of their destination (i.e., whether it is in Ammon or in Aram); Yahweh allows Balaam to accompany the messengers of Balak (elders once [2:7-14] and princes another time [22:15-21], and then is angry (22:20) because he goes (22:22). But it takes a *mal'ach*, a "messenger" of Yahweh to finally let him go (22:35), that is, he is given permission to go twice! Balaam speaks of himself in the third person (24:3; 15); and oracles dangle like marionettes at the end of this cycle as it presently exists. And then the prophet, priest, sorcerer, diviner, seer, gazer just leaves; he goes home and leaves Balak's life in a shambles! Seen this way, the Massoretic text paints two portraits of Balaam: (1) He is a known territory-wide mercenary, diviner/sorcerer, mantic hit man, or (2) he is a prophet plus who, though an outsider, exhibits the traits of one on whose head the ominous hand of Yahweh rests. The reason for this quandary is the nature of the text before the reader. One critical reading suggests the existence of a text mosaic.

Debates about, and learned opinions concerning the state of the text are legion. Sandwiched between the 1773 study by Verschuir, *Dissertatio de oraculis Bileami*, and von Gall's *Zusammensetzung und Herkunft der Bileam-Perikope* of 1900 are a number of studies which have grappled with the text.[9] Since 1900 numerous studies have also appeared. Among the most stimulating and probing are found the works of Neile (1932);[10] Cazelles (1958);[11] Vermes (1961);[12] Sturdy (1976);[13] Leibowitz (1980);[14] and Fishbane (1985).[15] It is therefore somewhat surprising that Von Rad

[9] Cf. "Literature" in G. Gray, *Numbers: A Critical and Exegetical Commentary*, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1965 c. 1903), p. 307.

[10] A. H. McNeile, *The Book of Numbers*, (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1931).

[11] H. Cazelles, *La Sainte Bible: Les Nombres*, Rev. 2d. Ed. (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1958).

[12] G. Vermes, *Scripture and Tradition in Judaism*, pp. 127-177.

[13] John Sturdy, *The Cambridge Bible Commentary, Numbers*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

[14] Nehama Leibowitz, *Studies in Bamidbar (Numbers)*, (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, 1982 c. 1980).

[15] M. Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985).

in *The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays*[16] devotes space to the text on only two pages. Of the first (p. 7) he writes: "Here . . . we have . . . the major features of the story of redemption, from the patriarchs to the entry into the promised land. The minor accretions—details concerning . . . the meeting with Balaam and so on . . ." shows this cycle to be a minor issue for him. Of the second he writes: "A second major complex of tradition which the Yahwist found more or less ready-made is to be seen in the Balaam story, . . . " and then sees the writer/editor's problem as being merely one of fitting it into a certain scheme (p. 52).

The most common learned opinions as to why the text exhibits its particular characteristics find it having been compiled from two hypothesized documents, J (Yahwist) and E (Elohist).[17] According to one scholar,[18] the J document may be traced to the courtly circle of the Judean Kingdom, while the E document's origin is said to be the circle of Mushite priests at the cultic center Shiloh in the Kingdom of Israel. Various times are offered for the appearance of both hypothesized documents and, again, it is evident that interpretive battle rages on.[19] Thus, R. F. Johnson writes: "The two poems in Numbers 23, usually attributed to E, are obviously acquainted with the story of Balaam in the employ of the King of Moab, while the J poems in ch. 24 could have originated apart from this particular tradition about Balaam."[20] Likewise, Gray[21] maintains that "It is true, however, that the characteristics of E are more apparent than those of J." Without providing a rationale for why one passage or another is either a part of the J or E strand, McNeile[22] merely labels each verse as belonging to one or the other throughout his entire commentary.

Backing away from the importance of assigning the J or E designation to the text of Numbers as a whole), Sturdy[23] states: ". . . material has traditionally been divided between two early sources, which have been called J and E. It is not however necessary to assign passages between J and E in this commentary." Friedman[24] assigns the entire pericope to E. And neither Vermes[25] nor Leibowitz[26] considers the Documentary Hypothesis at all.

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[16] G. von Rad, *The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays,* (Edinburgh: Oliver & Body, Ltd., 1966 c. 1958).

[17] Cf. the excellent work of Artur Weiser, *The Old Testament: Its Formation and Development,* (New York: Association Press, 1961), p. 75; Cuthbert A. Simpson, *The Early Traditions of Israel,* (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 48-49; Robert Pfeiffer, *Introduction to the Old Testament,* (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 159-167; Otto Eissfeldt, *The Old Testament: An Introduction,* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 191-199; H. Gunkel, *The Legends of Genesis,* (N.Y.: Schocken Books, 1964); E. Nielsen, *Oral Traditions,* (London: SCM Press, 1954).

[18] R. E. Friedman, *Who Wrote The Bible?,* (N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1987).

[19] Some scholars argue a date of ca. 950, 850, 650, and 550 BCE respectively for J, E, D, and P. But cf. Friedman, *Who Wrote The Bible?,* pp.86-87 (J,E) and *passim* for a more recent argument.

[20] R. F. Johnson, "Balaam," *IDB,* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1962), pp. 341-342.

[21] G. B. Gray, *Numbers,* ICC, p. 310.

[22] A. H. McNeile, *The Book of Numbers,* and *passim.*

[23] John Sturdy, *The Cambridge Bible Commentary,* pp. 4, 157.

[24] R. E. Friedman, *Who Wrote The Bible?* See the chart he provides on p. 253.

[25] G. Vermes, *Scripture and Tradition in Judaism,* pp. 127-177.

[26] Leibowitz, *Studies in Bamidbar, et passim.*

In all, one may state with some certainty that the text is readable. It exhibits clear signs of being a literary mosaic. Whether pieces making up the text come from a P (priestly) source[27], a J source or an E source learned opinions differ widely, and there appears to be no unanimity of opinion looming on the near horizon. Source conflation is obvious, but whether that conflation is to be sought in various hypothesized P, J, and E documents remains to be cogently argued by others. It is perhaps an exhibition of wisdom which heretofore has been given little credit when we repeat the words of Von Rad quoted earlier: "A second major complex of tradition which the Yahwist (i.e., J) found more or less ready-made is to be seen in the Balaam story"[28] The story seems to appear in material characteristic of J, but J is depicted as merely carring a story forward which was already the result of a conflation of earlier separate stories.

Linguistic Analysis

For the Balaam text to be intelligible, analysis of the key terms is necessary. When this is performed, several layers of the text are exposed. This once again points to the text's mosaic character, and puts us in a better position to understand the text and its purpose in the hands of those who produced it in the present form.

Although a more thorough discussion will follow in the section devoted to the literary form(s) of this cycle below, linguistic analysis will be approached by dividing the cycle into (1) narrative framework, (2) fable, and (3) poems.

(1) Narrative Framework

One raised on the Documentary Hypothesis will naturally attempt to unravel a text such as the Balaam cycle by recourse to searching for the presence of divine appellations, in the text and then grouping certain literary characteristics around them.[29] Doing so, one finds that *yhwh* (Yahweh) occurs 29 times; [*h*]*'elohim* ([the] deity) 9 times (and twice with a suffix); *'l* (El, i.e., deity) 8 times; *shdy* (Shaddai, i.e., mighty one) twice; and appearing only once is the term *'lywn* (Elyon, i.e., the eternal one). One bears in mind, however, that the Massoretic text is a 7th to 9th century of this era product; it is a very late text.[30] Comparing the divine name occurrences of the Massoretic text (henceforth MT) with their counterparts in the other major codices, i.e., the Septuagint(s); the Samaritan recension of a Hebrew text; the standard Jewish recension of a Hebrew text (unvocalized); the Syriac (Peshitto)

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[27] Cf. John Marsh and Albert George Butzer, *The Book of Numbers,* The Interpreter's Bible, Volume II, (New York: Abingdon = Cokesbury Press, 1953), p. 247, wherein Butzer writes: "The plains of Moab is a term confined to P, . . ."

[28] Cf. Sturdy, *Cambridge Bible,* p. 157.

[29] These names of deity, Yahweh and Elohim, were the first clues noticed as early as 1753 by the French court physician Jean Astruc. An entire constellation of other characteristic data surround these two names of deity, however, to produce a plausible argument for more than one "document" in use as well as evident in this material.

[30] See H. Keith Beebe, *The Old Testament: An Introduction To Its Literary, Historical, And Religious Traditions,* (Belmont, California: Dickenson Publishing Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 9-10.

Version; the early Aramaic Versions or Targums; and the Vulgate, one notices numerous variant readings, and thereby occurrences, of the divine names. The history of why this is so need not detain us here.[31] The Qumran, the Peshitto and Septuagint codices preserve a text earlier than that in hand (i.e., the consonantal text) underlying the MT.[32] All of this suggests strongly that conventional methods of approaching this text will not suffice here. All of these texts and versions do not read the same. This must certainly be borne in mind when we consider the text before Philo and Josephus.

Most disconcerting is the presence of the term *mshl* (*mashal*) at Numbers 23:6 (here *meshalo*, i.e., his *mashal*). Proverbs, the biblical anthology, is called *mishle shlomo* or the *mishle* of Solomon (plural *smihut* of *mashal*). As one reads them in Hebrew it becomes clear that they were composed using *parallelismus membrorum*, and that one is working with a literary type which implies more than its surface or "obvious" meaning. One is in the presence of a wisdom saying, a gnome, an aphorism.[33] *Mashal*, therefore, may be rendered as "discourse," "parable," and "proverb." *Caveat emptor!*

The translator of this cycle is also confronted with the possibility that the name of the main character might be nothing more than a play on words (or a word). The problem alerts itself in two ways. (1) In Genesis 36:32 one reads about a King Bela, (*bl'*) the son of one Beor who was king of Edom in the 12th or 11th century BCE.(2) Balaam (*bl'm*) at Numbers 22:5 is also said to be the son of Beor. The only morphological difference is the final mem (i.e., /m/) on *bl'* producing *bl'(m)*.[34]

Here one also becomes aware of a problem similar to the one encountered in Deuteronomy 26:5-10. There the MT states: "An Aramean about to perish, or a perishing Aramean . . . ." Many English interpretations/translations render this: "A wandering Aramean . . . ," since it is reasoned that this cultic recitation refers to Jacob, and Jacob is depicted in biblical literature as a seminomadic sojourner. The challenge presented by the MT is the word *'bd* (perish). Most translators/interpreters intuit a scribal error and read *'br* (cross over, wander[with a purpose]). The printed Hebrew letters for /d/ and /r/ are very similar and may be easily misread by a scribe working in haste. The same is true for the old Hebrew alphabet where /d/ is rendered by ∆ and /r/ is rendered by ∧ . It is an easy error to make. It remains to be demonstrated by cogent argument, however, that a mistake was made in the text.

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[31] Excellent works which discuss these versions and their production are Frank Moore Cross, Jr., *The Ancient Library of Qumran and Modern Biblical Studies*, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1961); and Ernst Wuerthwein, *The Text of the Old Testament*, (London: Basil Blackwell, 1957).

[32] Ibid.

[33] The biblical books of Job, Proverbs and Ecclesiastes are characterized by the presence of such wise sayings. There were also famous communities in ancient Israel where scholars who produced wise sayings lived. The most famous is called by two names, *Kiriath-sepher* (literally village of the book, or book- town) and later, *Debir* (i.e., oracle or wise saying). Cf. Joshua 15:16 and Proverbs 25:1.

[34] This addition of an \m\ here, or other letters to Semitic stems, is one method of overworking a text by later writers who used it for other purposes, especially those of a polemical nature. Cf. below in the section discussing the meaning of the Balaam cycle by the writer called P or Priestly Writer.

This same possibility of error exists in relation to the name of the supposed homeland of Balaam. It centers on the names Edom and Aram. Balak, in which ever version (both having been combined in the Numbers account), sends embassies to Balaam to request his divining services. Words such as "Pethor," "the River," and "Amaw" in the present version have led many to suppose that Balaam's homeland was somewhere in present-day Syria near the western bank of the Euphrates.[35] We are presented with a case similar to the crossing/wandering perishing, for *'dm* and *'rm* demonstrate once again just how much difficulty some ancient scribe might have had with ד and ר. The orthographic difference betweeen "Aram" and "Edom" in either old or Massoretic Hebrew is a ד or an ר! But elaborate explanations have been offered by numerous scholars to demonstrate that Balaam's home was in Syria (Aram) somewhere near the Euphrates; all on the assumption that the MT is flawless.[36] The area of the would be confrontation between "Israel" and the Balak coalition is depicted as being south (Edom), southeast (Moab), and possibly southwest (Amalek) of Judah. A donkey ride by an embassy to Syria would be ridiculous, especially in light of the simple morphological clarification and its attending concluding possibilities. Whether it was a donkey ride by elders or by princes really doesn't matter. Edom, not some territory near the Euphrates, appears to be a more sensible location for the geographical setting for this cycle.

Shedding more light on this problem is a recent work which studies communication techniques in the ancient Near East.[37] It demonstrates that Balak's message to Balaam is cast in the form of one equal communicating with another, that is, with another king! This supports the earlier discussion concerning the *bl'-bl'm* identification. At Genesis 36:32 Bela or Bala (*bl'*) is named as one of the kings (i.e., equals! to Balak) of Edom, a near neighbor of Moab and Amalek. Priest/kings are nothing new to the ancient Near East.[38] Some of them have been extolled for their wisdom (cf. Solomon), their sense of law (cf. Hammurabi), their manual skills (cf. Hiram of Tyre), and their musical abilities (cf. David). It seems likely that underlying this cycle before us was a monarch who was famous for his abilities as a diviner—who, like the others, became a legend.

The narrative section frames the meshalim by providing a geographical backdrop. From (as I argue above) Edom, Balaam makes a journey to "the (nebulous) city of Moab (*'ir moab* [= the capital?]), then on to a cultic site, *Kiriath-huzot*, where what appears to be a state banquet was held (22:40). The next day the scene unfolds at *Bamot-ba'al*. After the *mashal* delivered there, the group moves to the field of *Zophim*, to the top of *Pisgah* (23:14a). *Peor* which overlooks the desert (or

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[35] Again, I call attention to the rationale for the presence of many seeming anomalies in this cycle. Attention is directed to the Meaning(s) section of the present work where I discuss the reason why Balaam seems to have two different homelands. See also A. S. Yahuda, "The Name of Balaam's Homeland," *JBL*, LXIV (1945): 547-551.

[36] Cf. Yahuda, "The Name of Balaam's Homeland," and R. F. Johnson, "Balaam" in *Interpreters Dictionary of the Bible*, pp. 341-342.

[37] John T. Greene, *The Role of the Messenger and Message in the Ancient Near East*, (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), pp. 81-83.

[38] For quick reference to kings serving as priests also, see 1 Samuel 6:12-20; 1 Kings 8:5-63; as well as Psalm 110:4 where many scholars argue that this is in reference to David.

Jeshimon)[39] at 23:28 is the next locus. It is the scene of several, among which is the final, *meshalim.* Then, according to this narrative framework, having accomplished Yahweh's, not Balak's, work, Balaam departs for home.

Kiriath-husot means City of Streets. It appears only in this cycle, and the site is unknown.[40] *Bamoth-ba'al,* the raised mounds or altars (dedicated to) Ba'al (of the region) designates a well-known shrine. It lay near Dibon (present-day Diban in Jordan) where the Deir 'Alla texts concerning Balaam were discovered.[41] The field of *Zophim,* that is the field of gazers (*zophim* [and even *hozim*])[42] adds to the significance of what Balaam was understood to be and to do. *Pisgah,* which means peak, summit or branch, is the height from which gazers delivered their utterances. It was located north of the Arnon River. *Peor,* like *Ba'al, Nebo,* and *Pisgah,* is also the name of a deity of the region,[43] and identified as well another "summit" in the region. The writer of this cycle has provided the careful reader with at least one part of the overall thesis of the work; Yahweh is able to enable Israel even at sites known or reputed to be the haunts of other deities, generally of the agricultural, fertility cult variety. It depicts a higher purpose on Yahweh's part; the casting down of high places.

(2) Fable

Numbers 22:21 is the end of a section which tells of Balaam agreeing to accompany Balak's embassy. The preceding verse 20 has explained why he is undertaking the journey. Thus, the first part of verse 22's contents are quite the *non sequitur,* especially if one were to argue that this work is seamless wholecloth.[44] It does provide a literary bridge across which one may travel into pious fableland. Numbers 22:22b through 35 contains the fable which has been augmented by more narrative material.

The important terms here are *stn* (22:22 & 22:32b), *pth* (22:31), *yrt* (22::32b), and *ht'* (22:34) and *glh* (22:31). *stn* is translated "adversary" and not the personalized

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[39] Cf. The *Revised Standard Version* of this cycle in the note at the bottom of page 167 of Thomas Nelson and Sons. Cf. also Gray, *Numbers,* p. 358.

[40] I suspect that this is a cryptic reference to Nineveh or some other principal city in Assyria during the seventh century. My rationale for this is the discussion of the place of Assyria in the writing of P's version of the Balaam cycle. See, therefore, that discussion under Meaning(s) below.

[41] Cf. note number 7 above for references.

[42] Mt. Scopus in Jerusalem to this day bears the name with the same significance. At one time it must have served as a height from which certain "Gazers" uttered their oracles. The more within the "scope" of the gazer, the greater was the extent of his/her power. Cf. the significance of going from higher to higher locales in the narrative framework of the discourses in the Balaam cycle.

[43] Cf. Gray, *Numbers,* p. 341.

[44] Cf. Sturdy, *Numbers,* p. 4 where he writes: "It is not however necessary to assign passages between J and E in this commentary." Later, on this same page, he writes: "This is the view taken by the writer of this commentary . . . it is simply more sensible to write in terms of 'the older material' without attempting such an uncertain division of the text."

Satan.[45] This term appears elsewhere in biblical literature[46] with the same meaning as that in the book of Job (1:6).

pṯḥ is here employed in a standard phrase used to show that a person (usually a prophet) is speaking a *dbr-yhwh*, that is, a Yahweh-word.[47] It is translated "open," with Yahweh doing the opening.

The *hapax legomenon yrt* presents a problem. Much ink has been employed in attempts to explain it. Arabic *wrt*, "to throw, cast headlong" is generally preferred as a possible cognate, suggesting a translation such as "to rush headlong (into something)." More research is needed before the meaning of this term becomes clear.

"To rebel" is probably the best way to render *ht'*. It is a common term used in language relating to a covenantal understanding, or a world view at the center of which is understood to be a covenant. *ht'* is an acknowledgment by one covenant member to another that that member has abrogated covenant responsibilities agreed to at the making of that covenant. It is therefore a legal term, and is so used here. The only reason, however, that Balaam has come to understand what is going on is because his eyes have been opened. The Hebrew expression is *glh 'ynym*, "to uncover the eyes." Only then does the person who is paid to gaze see with an inner eye as it were. Balaam is repeatedly cast as the bungler whose long-standing reputation is repeatedly castigated until he is humbled into the dust of derision. A reputation as diviner, mantic, gazer, magician, and seer has not impressed the compiler and editor of this narrative material. These, like sending one on a trek through (let us utilize the standard term) the "wilderness" and leaving such a one to his/her own devices, are only sufficiently pliable, nay, malleable to serve as instruments/partners (by way of covenant [always lurking in the background in this material]) for Yahweh's expressed *telos*. This fable casts Yahweh as the master teleologist.

These five terms summarize the fable. An adversary opposes Balaam; opens the mouth of an (empowered to be wise) ass to impart otherworldly wisdom to a reputedly wise man who is; rushing headlong foolishly against the superior adversary; only to force the reputedly wise man to admit that he has rebelled, that is, abrogated his part of a sworn to agreement. We as readers have not been given text which depicts the making of the covenant between Balaam and Yahweh, but *ht'* certainly implies such an understanding on the part of the writer who crafted this cycle. The only way that the reputation of Balaam can be salvaged is through the medium of divine intervention. The reputed wise one is enabled to be wise by the omniscient Yahweh, and then becomes an instrument/channel for that greater wisdom.

(3) Poems

Two mashal poems appear in Chapter 23, with the remaining five being imbedded in Chapter 24. In the first, Balaam is certainly cast as a gazer, a *ḥozeh*, for from the tops of the mountains, from the hills (in parallelismus membrorum) he observes

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[45] The term "adversary" appears to signal some covenantal concern. Advocates and those who "stand in the breech" (cf. Ezek. 22:30; Ps. 106:23) comprise one body in a controversy, while the adversary speaks for the other. Oftentimes, the adversary's services (within this covenant framework) are solicited by a deity, as in the case of the Book of Job, and vouchsafed considerable power.

[46] Cf. 2 Samuel 19:23 and 1 Kings 5:18.

[47] Cf. Greene, *Messenger*, pp.191-204.

"Israel." The presence of Jacob and Israel suggests that this poem has a northern provenance. Verse 10's "Let me die the death of the righteous (*yshr*) puts one again in the midst of covenant language. "Upright" means having the ability to hold one's head up before the law to which one has adhered unswervingly. The poem opens with the statement that the speaker is from Aram. It is well to keep in mind that Balak in the first colon is in synonymous parallelism with "the king of Moab" in the second colon. There is no emphasis on Aram, thus our earlier arguments concerning Balak's homeland in the narrative discussions still hold.

The second *mashal* of Chapter 23 presents no linguistic problems. There is in the doublet at verse 23 the appearance of *nhsh* in the first colon which is balanced by *qsm* in the second. They are terms which refer to the practice of magic and divination. *nhsh* is translated elsewhere (cf. Genesis 3:1 and Numbers 21:6) as serpent. Then in Numbers 21:9 and following one reads that Moses must fashion a bronze serpent to eradicate the menace of the serpents which are plaguing Israelites. The term, a play on words, is *nhsh nhshym*. Both serpent and bronze have the same root. This bronze serpent was used for cures and was reputed long after the time of Moses to have curative powers. It was destroyed during the reign and reformation of King Josiah ca. 639-609 BCE.

qsm may be rendered as (1) one who divines by the use of a rod (noun); one who reveals (noun), cut (i.e., cut wood into pieces for the purpose of making lots), and magical conjuration. Much of this is based on the Syriac *qsm* which means to exorcise or to swear, or Arabic *qsm* in its second and fourth forms meaning an oath.[48]

shtm, 24:3's "man of opened eye(s)," presents the reader with another term of nebulous meaning in Hebrew. It may also be rendered "closed" or even "perfect." Its sense is wholeness, completeness with reference to understanding the workings of deity. Once this man has been enabled by Yahweh to see, it denotes a person whose eyes therefore have been *glh*, "uncovered," or "revealed" (to). In addition, this person has *shm'*, "heard" with an inner ear as it were. These terms denote prophetic activity of the type and caliber in which an Isaiah, a Jeremiah, and a Micah, to name just three, would have been engaged. Here Balaam is so cast.

The fourth *mashal* essentially introduces Balaam in the same way. There is an extended version of the lead in which adds the expression *d't 'lywn*, "knowledge of the eternal one." Once again, it denotes covenant language (cf. Hosea 4:1b), and implies that the speaker is a party to a covenant which is still in force. This *mashal* ends at 24:19.

The remaining three *meshalim* occupy 24:20-25. Only the final one contains an expression worthy of some discussion. The first portion of verse 24 contains the word *Kittim*. Oftentimes it is written *ktyym*, and is derived from *kty* (in Greek, *Kition*), a town on Cyprus. At least this is the apparent sense of Isaiah 23:1; 12. But *Kittim* is a pregnant concept in the Hebrew mind, and the term takes on a number of nuances as the history of Israel develops. Progressively in the literature, *ktym* will come to mean the Western seagoing peoples (Jer. 2:10; Ezek. 27:6), the Romans (Dan. 11:30), and to the Greeks (1 Mac. 1:1; 8:5). *Kittim*, then, in biblical literature, depending on which historical period, essentially means (seagoing [but not exclusively]) Westerners.

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[48] Cf. T. Witton Davies, *Magic, Divination, and Demonology Among the Hebrews and Their Neighbors*, (New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1960 c. 1898), p. 78. This is a dated work, but much of its contents are still of great value.

The preceding approximately thirty five terms were isolated because it is impossible to understand the cycle as it has been preserved in the Massoretic text without some discussion of them. Some researchers might have chosen more, some less, and their works would have reflected the fruit of that choice. We have elaborated the essential terms necessary to continue a serious discussion of the Balaam cycle, and we may now proceed.

The Literary Form(s)

Above we alluded to enough information about literary form to enable us to engage in analysis of the important linguistic phenomena. Normally the present concern can be cast in the form of a simple question, Is the text prose or poetry? Again, through linguistic analysis it is clear that the question is far more complicated; How many literary forms are evident in the text? appears to be a more precise question in light of that analysis. A reading with an eye for terminology has revealed three major literary forms comprising the text. These forms have helped delineate the text as well. The forms are narrative (which provides the overall framework of the Balaam cycle, a fable (which depicts an ass imparting otherworldly wisdom to one who is reputed to be this-worldly wise using human speech), and a series of poetic *meshalim* of varying lengths and contents.

(1) The Narrative Framework

The narrative framework directs both the fable and the poetic *meshalim* in a specific direction. Otherwise one would have nothing more than a fable and a series of individual *meshalim* with no apparent connection between them. It is in the framework, therefore, that one finds whatever purpose the compiler/author/editor of this cycle had in engaging in this enterprise.

The cycle is part of a much larger story. This larger story wants to tell how Israel under the leadership of first Moses, then Joshua, succeeds in moving ultimately from Egypt to the land of the Canaanites. It wants to explain, however, a number of vicissitudes, institutions, challenges to both Moses as a leader, and to Israel as a people, engagements with peoples who occupied territories along the route from the mountain of Yahweh to their final destination, the land promised to Abraham and his progeny, and their successes both en route and in that land which had been promised.

Following a route itinerary which would make sense to only a priest, Israel is depicted as moving from locale to specific locale. Shortly before the text of Numbers arrives at our cycle, locales such as Kadesh(-barnea) (Num. 20:1); Edom (20:14); Mount Hor on the border of Edom (20:22); (by way of the Red Sea to) Oboth; Iyeabarim east of Moab; the valley of Zered; and then settled for a time north of the Arnon River which, according to 21:13b, "is the boundary between Moab and the Amorites." Curiously, at this point, if the object of all this movement had been to occupy the land of the Canaanites, all Israel would have had to do was move due westward! Instead, 21:20 names two places where Israel dwells for some time; Bamoth and the top of Pisgah which looks down upon the desert. In the narrative as it continues, these are two places from which Balaam will deliver *meshalim* (22:41 and 23:14). Here, the Moses host desires to travel northward through the land of the Amorites, is denied access, fights against them and defeats them, occupying the land between the Arnon in the south and the Jabbok in the north. The story does

have a point to which it is rapidly moving; the land bounded on the north by the Arnon and how the Arnon came to be the northern boundary of that land; Moab over which Balak now rules. That sets the stage for the present cycle of texts. A clue as to the device utilized by the narrative writer is found in 21:14a. It would appear that at the heart of his narrative framework is the Book of the Wars of Yahweh. The itinerary which one has been following was probably provided by sites named in an extended poem (or series of poems) with this title.[49]

(2) The Fable

Aesop readily leaps to the Western mind when one begins to speak of fables, and this is understandable. But students of the MT and its variants think first of the *nhas* (serpent) in the second creation story (Gen. 3:1 ff.), and the ass in the cycle under discussion. The presence of the fable (*mashal* also) is not by accident; it belongs with the other *meshalim* which are in poetic form, for all have the same purpose of teaching an important point in the crafting scheme of the editor/writer. The fable/*mashal* sets the tone, then, for the following *meshalim* and anticipates them. The difference between the ass fable and the serpent fable is also instructive. The serpent speaks of his own accord and is characterized in the material as the most shrewd (*ʿrwm*) of all the animals made by Yahweh. The ass must have her mouth opened by Yahweh. It is therefore a *mshl-yhwh*, a Yahweh discourse, with the ass being merely the medium for non-human thought and instruction. This is an important difference, and once again gives evidence of why it was appropriated by the editor/writer for his/her purposes.

(3) The Poems (in the form of meshalim)

The *meshalim* form a major part of the cycle. Their purpose here is to drive home (almost rub one's nose in the dust!) the point that Yahweh (as invincible divine warrior [following the earlier clue from the Book of the Wars of Yahweh])[50] accomplishes complete victory and hegemony over his adversaries by not only warfare, but also by wisdom. Yahweh is both physically and intellectually superior to all who would oppose his divine purposes; especially where Israel fits into those plans. Let us approach each mashal individually and observe its particular characteristics.

(a) mashal 1

mashal 1 is contained between 23:7a-10. It is written in poetry in the first person. The locus is a "bare height" which is known as Bamot Baʿal = altar or raised site to Baʿal, that is a cultic center dedicated to the local manifestation of the agricultural/fertility deity of the Canaanites Baʿal. According to this *mshl*, Balaam has been recruited from the district of Aram. Although one would like to make more of this can be demonstrated, all boundaries of political entities of the ancient Near East were always fluid. Today their boundaries could be measured this. Tomorrow, in light of a new political development, the boundary could be measured that. Such was the nature of political influence tied to and dependent on happenstance in the ancient Near East (henceforth ANE). The exact boundaries of Aram are therefore

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[49] Cf. Numbers 21:14 where a portion of this poem may be read.
[50] Ibid.

undeterminable regardless of time period. What the *mshl* does mediate to the reader is that:

> At a Ba'al cultic center, a foreigner acknowledges that the "righteous" experience the most rewarding end of existence. Since there is no Ba'al activity depicted in the mshl, the site has been transformed (for the editor/author's purposes) into a site for Yahweh's use. A decontamination of the site appears to be the purpose of this discourse.

All of "Israel" was supposed to have been cursed at this locale.

(b) mshl 2

Numbers 23:18b-24 is also a mshhl cast in the first person. Here the locus is the "Field of Zophim, atop Mt. Pisgah. The major theme is anti-divination, representing a time when the author/editor is an exponent of a radically different view of the expected efficacy of spells and curses. The *mshl* praises the existence of "Israel" and argues for its inviolability. References to the "lioness" and to the "lion" may be a plug for Judah (and its totem), and may signal one of the contributing parties to the JE material. Cursing the small didn't work any better than cursing the large.

(c) mshl 3

24:3b-9 contains *mshl* 3. It refers to Balaam in the third person. Its locus is the top of Peor. It would appear that two separate poems have been brought together, one which aggrandizes Jacob/Israel, reflecting a northern concern, and one which expresses the southern importance, since the lion and lioness are placed in prominent position in the second half of the poem(s). This would appear to signal Judah's importance (through its totem). In essence, the form betrays a poem/*mshl* about, not by, a Balaam.

(d) mshl 4

Another third person cast *mshl* whose locus is at the top of Peor is located at 24:15b-19. An (from the literary frame) unsolicited (= freebie) oracle (damnation type) projected to be fulfilled in the future, i.e., the latter days (= those of the apocalyptic writer interpreting his own times) appears here. The beginning of the oracle is the same as that of the previous, solicited oracle. Added to the introductory of the oracle is the idea that now Balaam reflects *d't ybwh.*[51] Covenant terminology is again evident here.

(e) mshl 5

According to the narrative framework, the locus of the *mshl* located at 24:20b is also Peor. This *mshl* departs from the preceding poetically-written ones in that it exibits the characteristics of lyrical prose.[52] It is cast as a separate pronouncement

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[51] Cf. Numbers 24:16; Proverbs 2:5; 9:10; 30:3; Ecclesiastes 11:9; and Hosea 4:1; 6:6; where this prophet complains that those (i.e., priests) who are responsible for teaching the knowledge of Yahweh have abrogated their responsibilities.

[52] There is an interstitial category in biblical Hebrew referred to as lyrical prose when that literature does not participate fully in all of the characteristics of pure poetry (i.e, *parallelismus membrorum, chiasmus, bi* and *tri cola,* meter, stress, etc.), or prose. An excellent example in Hebrew is found in Genesis 2:23. To appreciate the problem, cf. James Kugel, *The Idea of Biblical Poetry: Parallelism and its History,* (New

against Amalek. According to Exodus 17:8-16, "The Lord will have war with Amalek from generation to generation." The *mshl* appears to have had a separate existence as perhaps an oracle fragment.

(f) mshl 6

The contents of 24:21b-22 are also cast as having delivered at Peor. This *mshl,* also written in lyrical prose, is a separate pronouncement against the Kenites. There is reference to them as a mountain/hill-dwelling people.[53] Assyria, which flexes its muscles ca. 850-600 BCE, is to be their undoing.

(g) mshl 7

The final of the *meshalim* is located at 24:23b-24. The locus, according to the narrative framework, is the same. The lyrical prose-written piece is a pronouncement against Asshur and Eber who will meet destruction at the hands of the ship-traveling *Kittim.* Thus, the agent of Yahweh's punishment (Asshur) in the previous *mshl* becomes in turn punished by another of Yahweh's later agents, the Kittim.[54]

The seven *meshalim,* the fable, and the narrative framework which shapes and provides direction for the wise sayings occupying Chapters 22-24 of Numbers offer a variety of literary forms in so short a space. The reader notices a masterful blending and choreographing of separate wisdom pieces (the fable is also an example of the *mshl*) all of which point beyond themselves to a member of the *literati* of ancient Israel (here employed in the broadest sense of that term) who knows how to do theology, battle, and polemics through storytelling.

The Setting

Ascertaining the setting of the author/editor of this cycle is necessarily and understandably an involved exercise. As to the date and culture context of the completed cycle, both narrative framework and the *meshalim* provide clues. Clues may be read in numerous ways, however, so differences in informed opinion abound in such an exercise as well.

(A) J, E, JE, and Balaam

(1) Narrative

Since there are arguments for J and E strands,[55] and even arguments for P being

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Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 76-84. Cf. especially p. 76 where, bracketing the concerns of G. B. Gray's *Forms of Hebrew Poetry,* he writes: "Had then the ancient Hebrew three forms of composition-metrical poetry and plain prose, and an intermediate type differing from poetry by the absence of metre, and from prose by obedience to certain laws governing the mutual relations between its clauses-a type for which we might as makeshifts employ the terms unmetrical poetry or parallelistic prose?"

[53] See Theophile J. Meek, *Hebrew Origins,* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), pp. 93-98 wherein he discusses the relationship of the Kenites to other Yahwistic groups.

[54] Gray, *Numbers,* pp. 377-378.

[55] McNeile, *Numbers, et passim;* Gray, *Numbers,* pp. 307-322, *et passim;* Cazelles,

present as well in this cycle,[56] one would begin to search for the probable setting in Judah, and then, some time after 722 BCE. Strong arguments suggest that the narrative exhibits the traits of JE.[57] The major characteristics of this combined North/South document is its conciliatory tone and tenor. The Shiloh (Mushite) priests of the North and the Judaean (Aaronid) priests of the South, former adversaries, ceased their mutual antagonisms, and joined forces to heal the politico-religious rift between themselves.[58] JE is thought to have done just that. In this case, then, it would seem that the setting for the writer/editor of the present Balaam cycle would be the Judaean priestly circle dominated by the conciliatory Aaronid/Mushite faction, and is part of the post-722 BCE presentation of the traditions of surviving religious "Israel."

Since the reader is aware that at least two separate stories about Balaam have been woven together, it is reasonable to state that traditional material about a Balaam lies at base of both the separate J and E accounts. This material, because of the *locus* of its concerns, appears to have as its traditional homeland the region northeast of the Jordan, and east and southeast of the Dead Sea.[59] That is, influences on the author/editor's work are from non-Israelite as well as Israelite sources. It is quite possible that the (not available to us) complete northern (E) version would have had a northern homeland for Balaam. A pastoral scene near "the River," as it were, is in keeping with the northern Israelite writer's (geographical) setting.[60] In keeping with the southern version (J), the context clues of *bene 'ammo(n)*, i.e., the inhabitants of Ammon), and "Edom" (which for northern use could have very easily been altered to "Aram" [as shown in the linguistic analysis above]) keep the *locus* in the South. Portions of J and E, then, reflect some altering of non-Israelite traditional material which has been (pre-722 BCE) recast for use by northern and southern writers.

The J document contained a story about a Balaam ben Beor who was reputed to have been an effective prophet, priest and diviner. (Let us combine portions of each title and produce [in good Jewish fashion] the word "*propriediv*" to refer to all three functions simultaneously).[61] But J has recast the eastern traditional non-Israelite material to tell a different story for his/her[62] purposes. The J version made use of the Balaam figure some time after 843 BCE.[63]

Les Nombres ("*Les* ch. 22-24 *melent en un seul recit les elements, parfois discordants, provenant deux traditions, la* « yahviste » et l'« elohiste », p. 105); and Sturdy, *Numbers*, pp. 1-9.

[56] Cf. Butzer, *Numbers*, The Interpreter's Bible, p. 247, where Numbers 22:1 is attributed to P, with the rationale: "The plains of Moab is a term confined to P, and refers to the high steppes to the north of the Dead Sea and on the east of the Jordan. The position reported is opposite Jericho."

[57] Cf. note 55.

[58] Friedman, *Who Wrote?*, pp. 87-88.

[59] A. S. Yahuda, "Balaam's Homeland," 547-51.

[60] But cf. below (Meaning(s)) for another, and more specific rationale as to why.

[61] *Propriediv* is coined in the spirit of words such as Rambam, Rashbam, Ramban, Rashi, etc., where, instead of names, titles or professions are used.

[62] Friedman, *Who Wrote*, p. 86 holds that J could possibly have been written by a woman.

[63] Ibid., p. 87.

Likewise, the E writer made use of some existing tradition about a Balaam also. His[64] Balaam appears also to have been a "*propriediv*." This Balaam figure served the needs of a Shiloh priestly group prior to 722 BCE. As to assigning a more precise date, more recent scholarship is less adventurous than earlier students of the Documentary Hypothesis.[65]

In essence, readers of the MT have before them at least two recastings of an older, non-Israelite tradition about a Balaam (ben Beor). Like an old wine skin, the Balaam figure—and the tradition about him—has been refilled with two different vintages of new wine, one from northern (literary) vineyards and one from corresponding southern vineyards, first as separate vintages, then blended after 722 BCE by cooperating vintners in the South to produce a new vintage which (following this analogy) we may call "*Propriediv Nouveau!*"

J and E, as well as JE, reflect three phases of mantological exegesis at three different times, but in only two locations. A *propriediv* subject would certainly have been of interest for the Aaronid and Mushite priestly/prophetic groups performing exegeses of outside traditions. The issue of when all three phases could have taken place, and a plausible rationale for each will be taken up and offered below.

(2) meshalim

Before discussing the setting for each phase and providing the rationale for it, some attention must be paid (here in a general way) to possible context clues to the various writers' settings which may be provided by the poetic and lyrical prose sections of the present MT cycle.

MT poetic texts—and the Psalms are the best examples of this—are the most unreliable texts out of which to tease a plausible date.[66] Yet, one cannot just cease to probe, give up, pack up, and go home.

(a) There are no reliable clues provided by the first *mshl* as to the time it was produced in this form.[67]

(b) What is present in the second *mshl*, that is, "Jacob," "Israel," and "king . . . among them," all suggest strongly the existence of the kingdom of Israel. So long a period of possible setting (922-722 BCE) also provides too wide a historical window through which to allow the viewer to see anything safe to use.[68]

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[64] Ibid., p. 85.

[65] Pages 85-87 of Friedman certainly deviate from the traditional view of the growth of the Pentateuch which is provided in graph form by C. R. North, "Pentateuchal Criticism," in H. H. Rowley, ed. *The Old Testament and Modern Study*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

[66] Cf. Beebe, *Introduction*, pp. 92-95; Mitchell Dahood, S.J., *Psalms I*, 1-50, The Anchor Bible, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1964), pp. xxix-xxx; and James Kugel, *The Idea of Biblical Poetry: Parallelism and Its History*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

[67] This *mshl* displays most of the characteristics treated in the above works which discuss Semitic poetry, and Hebrew in particular, and how this poetry provides so few to no clues about the time in which it was written, or even where.

[68] It is plausible that the first half of this *mshl* could have a northern provenance, but, again, it is poetry, and the presence of the word "Israel," even when it is in parallelism with "Jacob," may mean the kingdom of Israel, or Israel the people of Yahweh. See R. F. Johnson, *Interpreters Dictionary of the Bible*, p. 341, who writes:

(c) mshl number three mentions Israel's tents/tabernacles, seeming to point to Confederated, tribal Israel (ca. 1250-1050 BCE).[69] Also mentioned is a king who shall be higher than Agag, which seems, once again, to presuppose a monarchy. Since no specific monarch is named, however, this *mshl*, too, allows one to make no defensible statements about its usefulness in ascertaining the historical setting of its author.

(d) The contents of the fourth *mshl* also appear to assume a northern monarchy. It goes even further and assumes that Moab has been defeated by a northern monarch who would also have subdued the children of Sheth, Edom (which clashes greatly with studies concerning Balaam's homeland and position in it),[70] and Seir.[71]

(e) If one can verify a total defeat of the Amalekites, *mshl* number five will have been the most helpful thus far in providing the date(s) for the setting of the writer of this piece.[72]

(f) Likewise, if one can document a time when Assyria vanquished the height-dwelling Kenites, a reliable *datum* would be provided the researcher in the case of this *mshl* as well.[73]

(g) The final *mshl*, which refers to *Asshur, Eber* and the *Kittim*, provides the same possibilities and challenges as the preceding two *meshalim*.[74]

Of the *meshalim*, terms such as "Israel's tents," a king, Agag, (3); king, Moab, Sheth, Edom (4); defeat of the Amalekites (5); Assyria-vanquished Kenites (6); and *Kittim*-vanquished *Asshur* and *Eber* (7) are all that provide any material which alludes (regardless of how nebulously) to possible historical occurrences, thus suggesting a possible setting for the writer of each.

When the context clues provided by the narrative (includiing that which cements the fable to the overall cycle) and the sum of that provided by the *meshalim* are viewed as a completed mosaic, the following picture of a time slowly begins to develop clearer outlines.

"The two poems in Num. 23, usually attributed to E, are obviously acquainted with the story of Balaam in the employ of the king of Moab, while the J poems in ch. 24 could have originated apart from this particular tradition about Balaam."

[69] But cf. Friedman, *Who Wrote*, pp. 174-187, and his discussion of the Tabernacle and its relation to the P source stratum of the Pentateuch. For the most comprehensive work on Confederated Israel, see Norman K. Gottwald, *The Tribes of Yahweh: A Sociology of the Religion of Liberated Israel, 1250-1050 B.C.E.*, (Orbis Books, 1979).

[70] A. S. Yahuda, "Balaam's Homeland,": 547-551.

[71] There is also speculation that the poem reflects the situation in Judah during the period of David's conquests of his eastern and southeastern neighbors, i.e., 10th century BCE. See e.g. Gray, *Numbers*, p. 370.

[72] Strong evidence suggests that this was accomplished in the 10th century by David. See 2 Samuel 1:1.

[73] Assyria, under Sennacherib, conquered Judah in the campaign of 701 BCE. Moab, Edom, Ammon, Ashdod were among others affected. It is possible that the Kenites who also lived in this region south of Judah were willing to fight for independence. See Meek, *Hebrew Origins*, pp. 92-98.

[74] Harry Orlinsky, *Ancient Israel*, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960); Martin Noth, *The History of Israel*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1960); Herbert G. May, ed., *Oxford Bible Atlas*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); John Bright,

From historical sources[75] which focus on the region of Syria-Palestine, one learns that most of this region, by 966 BCE, was under the control of Emperor David, and from 960 to 922 BCE would also be under the control of Emperor Solomon. The region from the Euphrates in the North (i.e., Syria) to the River of Egypt in the South (i.e., the *Wadi Maghara*) was under the control of these two rulers. That included the region which provides the geographical setting for the MT Balaam cycle. The recently new priesthood of the United Monarchy (ca. 1000-922 BCE) would have taken an ardent interest in existing traditions about other and, especially legendary homines religiosi, such as the propriediv Balaam of Transjordania.[76] The very fact that traditions about this outsider were first preserved by priestly circles within "Israel," then transformed by these circles to depict him as performing the duties of an exponent of the now national deity, Yahweh, signals a formidable threat by this mantic personality, and official attempts to bring his legendary character and reputed efficacious skill "to heel." Phase one, then, the J phase,[77] has an understandable politico-religious urgency about it, and existed to defang a powerful legendary, then depict him as a faithful convert to state Yahwism.[78] Like the law during this period, the Balaam legend might have served the official purpose of being a propaganda piece for converting regional priests to the priesthood of state Yahwism. This is an issue which has received little attention.[79]

Israel the kingdom also dominated portions of Transjordania between 922 and 722 BCE.[80] Since it has been shown that E was opposed to, and criticized both the producers of J and the official priesthood of Israel, it is difficult to determine whether E's source(s) about the legendary Balaam was/were borrowed from the southerners who produced J, or came from the same source(s) as that/those tapped earlier by

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A History of Israel, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959); and Yohannan Aharoni and Michael Avi-Yonah, *The Macmillan Bible Atlas*, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968) all continue to be first rate and reliable historical sources.

[76] The responsibilities of the two co-High Priests, Zadok and Abiathar, under David would have been great, for it would have fallen to them as to how best to reorganize the priests of the lands conquered by David, and to absorb their traditions into the emerging national Yahwistic cult centered on Jerusalem. We get no picture of a national (or imperial!) policy of destroying other religious centers during the United Monarchy period. For example, Absalom fulfils a vow at Hebron, while Solomon has religious shrines built for all of his foreign wives, as a result of state marriages.

[77] But the urgency was the result of a rapidly growing empire which was built mainly on military defeat. The Balaam figure, by its very inclusion in J material—the earliest of the source *strata*—shows a "defeat" in reverse, a legend-tradition victory over the conquerers.

[78] This would have been accomplished partially by what are called the J poems in Chapter 24 of Numbers.

[79] Cf. the discussion on law and empire in Beebe, *Introduction*, pp. 105-106. Law, then, is only one side of the priestly function within an expanding empire. How priests of the conquering group related to priests of the conquered groups is still an area worthy of further study.

[80] Omri (876-869) made Moab a vassal state from which sheep and cereal grains came into Israel in large supply. His son, Ahab, (869-850) continued that control over Moab. After his death, however, Moab rebelled, and at least two of his successors, sons Ahaziah and Jehoram, were unable to dominate the country again.

the J circle.[81] Since JE depicts the two strands as having been woven together and brought into harmony, it is very difficult to determine from the existing MT form just what use an independent Shiloh-oriented E document would have made of the non-Israelite Balaam traditions(s), for E was an independent tradition, not a state-controlled, state-oriented apology.[82]

JE, like J, has a southern provenance,[83] and what one argues is E material about Balaam is only encountered in that anthology, the tone of which, we repeat, is conciliatory. It has been suggested above that one possible use of the Balaam tradition and its reshaping by the J circle was in the service of the state, specifically in retooling state priests of conquered (now) vassal states for service as priests of the imperial Yahwistic state religion, and that prior to the beginning of the Divided Monarchy.

The post-722 BCE situation for priests in the territory of the former kingdom of Israel whether the Shiloh-oriented Mushites or the remainder of the former Israelite state priests (now unemployed) would, if my suggestion is correct, have provided a second use of the Balaam tradition as reworked by J. It would now serve as a device for "repatriating" such priests and reabsorbing them into the surviving Judaite state priesthood's service.[84] The lyrical prose *meshalim* (6 & 7) which mention Assyria (*Asshur*) would certainly point to such a time as the possible setting for their having been written.[85]

The second and third *meshalim*, at least in part, glorify Israel and her king. Since the Shiloh priesthood was anti king of Israel[86] and anti Israelite state priesthood, these two may be traced to either (1) Israel during the United Monarchy (especially since Judah seems to be given equal though second serial status), or (2) from Israel

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[81] Even a reconstruction of the constituent parts of the four source Documentary Hypothesis by Friedman includes almost all of the Balaam cycle within the E *stratum* (p. 253). Numbers 22:1 he assigns to the Redactor of the Pentateuch. Friedman, *Who Wrote the Bible.*

[82] The Shiloh-oriented priests who produced E were anti-Israelite religious practices, but they did not (as their work demonstrates) oppose the Israelite monarchy. As priests, they could have opposed all priests who threatened their position as the premier priests of Israel and Judah. Since the J *stratum* is critiqued by the later E *stratum*, E's (now very nebulous at best) treatment of Balaam might have served a specific E-programmatic polemic which can no longer be recovered.

[83] The fate of E after 722 BCE is discussed by Flanders, Crapps, and Smith, *People of the Covenant*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 76-77. There JE is simply referred to as the "E narrative which is partially preserved in the Torah." Cf. also, Friedman, *Who Wrote*, pp. 87-88; and 207-208.

[84] Apparently, after 722 BCE, Judah had no choice but to absorb numerous refugees from the north which had been defeated by the Assyrians. Since the Aaronid/Zadokites heading the state priestly office in Jerusalem would have also been overrun with out of work priests from the Israelite state shrines, as well as from Shiloh, the purpose of the reworked Balaam tradition in J might have been reworked once more for a similar purpose.

[85] Anytime from Asshurnasirpal II (883-859) to Sargon II (722-705) BCE for Israel; and continuing until Sin-shariskun 629-612 BCE for Judah.

[86] Or at least against the state appointed priesthood of the north, as well as against the kings of the north in their roles as "Highest" Priests.

state religion traditions preserved by the Israel state priests who have also come to the South.

Although Moab, Sheth, and Edom lie east and southeast of Judah, *mshl* 4 depicts a northern monarch as having conquered them. This, too, would be the contribution of Israelite traditions.[87]

In all, then, three of the seven *meshalim* plausibly come from the North. Their probable historical settings range over a period which covers the periods of the United and Divided monarchies up to the destruction of Israel of the North. Another two of the *meshalim* (6 & 7) have a post-722 BCE setting and appear to reflect southern concerns. Finally, *mshl* 5 reflects a southern setting, a southern oncern with a traditionally southern antagonist. When is impossible to say.

Having examined the possible settings for the individual *meshalim* and possible purposes for each source stratum's existence, all that may be safely said is that the author/editor's historical setting is post-722 BCE Judah at a time when the Assyrians rule the majority of the Levant. In addition, and to consolidate our gains, the conflated JE anthology places the setting of the writer at a post-722 BCE date. Again, recent research has dictated that an attempt at providing a more precise (and unnecessarily forced) date is imprudent.[88]

The argument that Balaam appears to have been (1) a king of legendary mantic fame,[89] (thus providing a possible clarification of the seeming problem of identifying Bela, king of Edom and Balaam [both named "the son of Beor"]), (2) the connecting of the deuteronomic circle's programmatic to an intensified interest in directing the course of official priesthood and prophecy (and why such a programmatic would have been interested in a Balaam-type character),[90] and (3) the suggested uses for the J and JE Balaam tradition(s) in the hands of the Jerusalem based, Aaronid priesthood during the United Monarchy and post-destruction of Israel (the kingdom) periods[91] all deviate from usual treatments of the Balaam cycle. They are the results of the cycle being critically revisited. They augment previous research and clarify various internal problems occurring in individual *meshalim* or the narrative framework, but all this is understood to fine tune an essentially JE cycle. From the beginning of this essay to the present line, however, only the "first shoe" has been allowed to drop.

(B) P and Balaam

The "second shoe" begins to drop when one reconsiders the Documentary Hypothesis. Richard Friedman[92] has stated that Eduard Reuss's insistence that the Prophets section of the *TaNaK* was not quoted in the Law section was a mistake which precipitated misunderstandings about the thesis and time of writing of the document called P or the Priestly Document. Even today, the preponderance of Old

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[87] Cf. note 80 above. It is less certain when a northern king would have controlled Edom. Sheth is another name for Moab.

[88] Friedman, p. 88.

[89] Cf. the discussion above in the Linguistic Analysis.

[90] Cf. Introduction above, and the discussion to follow Meaning(s) below.

[91] See above the material accompanying notes 77, and 84.

[92] Friedman, *Who Wrote the Bible*, pp. 162-163.

Testament/Hebrew Scriptures scholars hold that the four "documents" which comprise the first five biblical books were produced in the order J, E, D, and P. Most would further assign the dates ca. 950, 850, 650, and 550 BCE respectively to them.[93] These dates suggest strongly that P is a post-exilic document and that it contains a literary constellation of concerns and issues designed to buttress Zadokite priestly claims to head the theocratic government in Jerusalem.[94] This has been the prevailing picture for some time. Friedman's study takes this picture and the scholarship which produced it to task. In Chapter 11 of his work he writes, under the heading An Alternative Version,: "P was written as an alternative to JE."[95] In Chapter 12 Friedman argues convincingly that this alternative to and polemical work against JE was produced during the reign, and at the court of King Hezekiah (ca. 715-687).[96]

It is known and acknowledged that ultimately P incorporated much of the J, E and JE material into his "document,"[97] and that P is the largest of the four documents. It was assumed, however, that this incorporation took place after 550 BCE. Friedman argues that "P was produced after 722 and before 609 B.C."[98] The upshot of all this is that J, E, JE, P, and, as he argues in Chapters 5 and 6, D1[99] were all produced prior to 609 BCE. They are all pre-exilic. Exit an old theory that had been around in one form since Reuss, Graf, Wellhausen and their *epigoni*, and enter the new, more plausible theory of Who Wrote The Bible?[100] The "second shoe" has finally dropped.

This "second shoe" situation calls for a corresponding rethinking of the setting of the writer of the Balaam cycle, and the purpose for including it into his cycle. It is to P one must turn to ascertain toward what use the Balaam strands woven together into JE were directed in the author/editor's programmatic prior to 609 BCE.

E had challenged J on the issue of legitimate priesthood (especially, but not exclusively in the South). The legitimacy issue was actually a canopy under which were sheltered a *plethora* of subissues in a priestly polemical duel. E had cast serious

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[93] Cf. discussion in Flanders, Crapps, and Smith, *The People of the Covenant*, p. 75.

[94] It was believed that P did not reflect anything pre-exilic. True, it reflected a great concern for centralization of the cult, but that was at a time, according to the history of the post-exilic era, when priests would most certainly have been preoccupied with consolidating the national cult, and that during a theocratic form of government. Such did not occur, it was believed on the basis of that understanding of history, until the coming of Zerubabbel and Joshua (Ezra 3:1 ff.). This traditional view has been challenged successfully by Friedman in his overall treatment of the Documentary Hypothesis reappraised.

[95] Ibid., p. 190.

[96] Ibid., pp. 207-216.

[97] Ibid., pp. 89-192.

[98] Ibid., p. 210.

[99] This is essentially the main argument of Friedman's thesis. When all of the source strata were written before the exile, many heretofore prevailing arguments must be rethought in light of the arguments presented in *Who Wrote the Bible* and elsewhere in Friedman's writings, and those of his colleagues mentioned throughout his book as well.

[100] Friedman, *Who Wrote the Bible, et passim.*

aspersions on the ancestor (Aaron) of the ruling Jerusalem priesthood;[101] had elevated the figure of Moses (to whom he traced his ancestry) to a position of priestly preeminence; and had given priests other than those from Shiloh and its associates[102] a bad name and reputation by questioning the pedigree of the Aaronid priesthood.

And then, the J circle after 722 BCE had collaborated with the E circle (its former detractors!), and by producing the JE anthology had given the appearance that at least some of what the E circle had maintained was still correct.

In either case, J or JE, the Balaam tradition was an important segment of either document's mantology, but that mantology was used to convert foreigners to the state priesthood controlled from Jerusalem. In either case, aspersions cast on the figure of Aaron had not been retracted by the time of the writing of P prior to 609 BCE. An Aaronid long-standing grievance still needed to be addressed, if not adjudicated.

P, chaffing from all this, took JE to task. P also took thereby JE's Balaam cycle to task. By scholars having focused on a JE Balaam cycle as the finished product, P's influence on and use of this cycle has either been overlooked, ruled nonexistent, or ignored. This has been due to the heretofore held J, E, D, P chronology, and the history of Israel reconstructed from these documents.[103]

It becomes clear that one of the reasons scholars have had so much difficulty separating E from J material in the Balaam cycle, and assigning only snippets such as Numbers 22:1[104] to P in this three chapter work, or not knowing what to do when suspected "J material" appeared in the middle of suspected "E material" (for all the categories and context clues appeared to have been scrambled), is because solid P material mirroring a pre 609 BCE situation and polemic was also present but undetected.[105]

As an Aaronid priest during the reign of Hezekiah, P would have had motives and opportunities to engage in mantic exegesis, and to use the Balaam material(s) in that exercise. Centralization, in a word, characterized the rule of Hezekiah. Centralization of the state cultus was the concern of P.[106] If the Balaam traditions

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[101] Ibid., pp. 188-191.

[102] Those priests who traced their ancestry to Moses had been excluded from important urban (i.e., capital city) priestly functions, and a share in any kind of power in directing the course of state Yahwism in either its Jerusalem version (lost after Abiathar was ousted ca. 966 BCE in a failed attempt to have Prince Adonijah succeed David), or its Tirzah/Samaria/Bethel/Dan version (here, too, the Shilonites had assisted Jeroboam in his bid for kingship, but were then rejected in favor of another state-appointed priesthood). These Mushite priests waged polemical warfare against rival (as they understood them) state priesthoods on two fronts. Essentially, P opposed their opposition of P's group.

[103] See above, note 74.

[104] Cf. Marsh and Butzer, *The Book of Numbers*, The Interpreter's Bible, Vol II, p. 247.

[105] This, of course, being due to the conclusions long held to be true and accurate as a result of Documentary Hypothesis studies until very recently.

[106] Understanding the history of the Aaronid/Zadokite priesthood within the history of Judah leads one to understand the situation of that priesthood during the reign of Hezekiah, and that in light of the Assyrian bid for power and conquest.

transformed and preserved by J and JE had functioned to integrate non state priests into the official state priesthood centered on Jerusalem, making all priests legal, equal and able to offer sacrifices on behalf of the state at all official cultic centers, then P was committed to bring about the antithesis of that situation.[107]

C. P in the Balaam Cycle

Any clue(s) to identifying P's "thumb print" in the Balaam cycle must be sought carefully in material of a polemical nature, a nature which supports centralization of priestly control, especially sacrifices, and which makes the opposition look ridiculous. If J and JE had an official purpose regarding priests, it had been to legitimize them where they functioned within or without Jerusalem. The specific mentioning of specific religious centers dedicated to three of the major competitors of Yahweh in the narrative framework is designed to neutralize them. It is a form of exorcising a site of any former religious significance, and then rendering any further activity there an ignorant, empty act.[108] This was site exorcism and assassination.

Indissolubly linked to these sites is the practice of offering sacrifices. Major sacrificial animals such as oxen and sheep (22:40); bullocks and rams (23:4; 14; 29; 30); high places of Ba'al (22:41); (7)altars (23:1; 4; 14; 29); catchwords such as every altar (23:2; 4; 14; 30); burnt sacrifice (23:6); and burnt offering (23:15) mirror priestly concerns used (contextually) polemically. In addition, anti purity laws are expressed in 23:14. All this was sacrifice assassination.

There appear to be no context clues to priestly concerns in the fable material at first reading. No sacrifices or sacrificial animals are mentioned. Nothing is said about centralizing anything. But a "thumb print" is detectable nonetheless. To "lift it," attention must be directed to what Friedman has convincingly shown are additions to the story of the rebellion against Moses in Numbers 16[109]. P augments what is essentially a J text. Studding the P literary style in the reworking of the J text are the expressions[110]

(a) "princes of the congregation . . ." (16:2)
(b) "And he fell on his face . . ." (16:4)
(c) "And they fell on their faces . . ." (16:22)
(d) "In the morning Yahweh will make known who is his . . ." (16:5)
(e) (Gives orders) "Do this: Take incense burners . . ." (16:6)

Of the above expressions, Numbers 22:8b's "and the priests of Moab abode with Balaam"; inclusions of princes at 22:13; 14; 15; 21; 35b; 40b; 23:6; and 17 combine

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Priesthoods battled for power in a manner similar to corporations taking over other corporations today. One should not underestimate the urgency with which P worked.

[107] A reading of what is considered traditional P material reflects this concern. P is interested in nothing less than a sacerdotal monopoly for the Aaronids.

[108] By doing so, P sent a strong signal that all priestly activities other than those now being conducted and supervised by Aaronids, and those at Jerusalem!, were illegal.

[109] Friedman, pp. 193-195.

[110] Cf. also Friedman, pp. 199-200; 202-203 for more examples of P's reworking of JE.

with (a) above to show P's preoccupation with princes.[111] Expressions (b) and (c) above reappear in similar form at Numbers 22:31b. The "morning after" concern of (d) above surfaces also at Numbers 22:8 (first part) and 13 (conclusion); 19 (first part) and 21 (conclusion); and 41. Finally, like (e) above, orders (i.e., directions in the imperative) are given by Balaam at Numbers 23:1; 3; 15 and 29. Of these "thumb prints" characteristic of P, b) also appears in the narrative material which is associated with the fable. Plausible evidence has been presented, then, to argue forcefully for the presence of P in the Balaam cycle as well as JE material.[112]

To summarize the evidence from the setting analysis, it may be stated with some confidence that the date of the Balaam cycle in its present form is between 715 and 687 BCE during the reign of Hezekiah, king of Judah. Looming large in the background, and insinuating itself into the politico-religious affairs of the smaller, formerly independent states of the Levant was neo-Assyria, bent on empire building. During this period, major cities of Judah had been subjugated to Assyrian military supremacy, and Jerusalem herself, to which siege had been laid in 701 BCE under Sennacherib, had experienced Assyria's pulse-quickening presence firsthand.[113] Internal disruptions within a neo-Assyria experiencing the alternating contractions and periods of calm associated with giving birth to a new empire, had periodically given a false sense of hope of continued autonomy to the small kingdoms of the ANE which thought that an abortion would result instead. During one such period of Assyrian withdrawl, Hezekiah had sued for independence and had launched his reform. Within that reform, P had launched a corresponding one, and the Balaam cycle played a part in that reform. Complementing Hezekiah's political/religious efforts,[114] were the priestly/polemical efforts of P. If the JE material of the Balaam tradition had reflected a liberality toward the priestly office in former times, in the hands of P it championed conservatism, exclusivity of Aaronid priestly prerogatives, and the reforming efforts of the "second Solomon."[115] The outsider, Balaam, who had been made to deport himself like an (earlier) insider, now looked like a dupe.

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[111] "Princes" appears to have been included as some sort of literary prosthesis. Where it appears, it is really not necessary to tell the "main tree trunk" story. Eight such occurrences send to the critical reader a signal that "princes" are important to one of the contributors to the narrative framework of this cycle. Why, must be sought against the historical backdrop of the overall cycle.

[112] Cf. Friedman's research and results on the overworkings of P above note 110, and the same "thumb prints" in this cycle.

[113] In addition to the "thumb prints," when Assyrian political ambitions are factored into the equation, a picture emerges which would have presented numerous reasons why a, perhaps, dormant Balaam tradition, formerly employed by earlier Aaronids for a, then, relevant, reason, would, during Hezekiah's = neo-Assyria's time, have been pulled out, dusted off, and recast by this later Aaronid for yet one more example of what the position of the foreign priest, prophet, diviner should now be.

[114] The Deuteronomist appreciated Hezekiah's efforts at both political and religious independence as well. He wrote at a later time, and was extolling the virtues of Hezekiah for another reason, however. He had a different hero, but one who was certainly related to Hezekiah. See below, note 137, for the identification of this writer and his connection with Hezekiah.

[115] Cf. Friedman, 211.

All priestly functions performed by Balaam (and Balak, for that matter), and *sacerdotal* machinations engaged in by him were shown to be impotent.

P, and the Balaam figure within it, has an urgency about it. Not all of this can be explained between 715 and 687 as a serious reaction to JE or JE's paradigmatic figure. Balaam the foreign *propriediv* now represents the foreign Assyrian *propriedivs!* And they are the greatest threat to an Aaronid priesthood if Assyria's might asserts itself in Jerusalem. The reign of Hezekiah's successor, Manasseh, demonstrates that P had not been a paranoic or over-reactionary. He deserves more credit than he has heretofore been given. This, then, was the general setting of the more recent writer/editor of the Balaam cycle. Below, a more detailed recapitulation of immediate events surrounding P's times will be provided for the reader.

Meaning(s)

A.

The Balaam cycle contained in Numbers 22-24 of the MT was used several times by several circles. It is a patchwork of fable, *meshalim* (written at various times, and in various regions), and narrative (which serves to cement all three constituent parts together). The narrative shows signs of having been reworked be JE and P most recently, although J and E had produced traditions about Balaam some time earlier. In its present form, the Balaam cycle is an overworked (i.e., *überarbeitete* tradition stemming, it would appear, from P.

Approaching the Balaam cycle within the framework of recent studies on the Documentary Hypothesis, it became apparent that the language of the cycle accommodated already known characteristics of J, E, and therefore JE "thumb prints." Studies from Astruc (1753)[116] to present had added more language clues to help identify J or E more readily. *yhwh* and *'elohim* were viewed as reliable indicators, when present in a Pentateuchal text, of J and E material respectively. Or so it was thought with reference to the Balaam text. This can no longer be thought the case, especially where *'elohim* occurs, for instance.

The linguistic analysis of the present cycle yielded a goodly amount of material to help clarify certain problem-causing peculiarities. Among these were Balaam's homeland, his social position, his probable identity, the location of various locales in Transjordania which are prominent in the cycle; all in the narrative material.

In the fable a number of terms reflected covenantal concerns, a *hapax legomenon*, *yrt* (=rushing headlong into something?), provided as much a stumbling block to linguistic analysis as the *ml' yhwh* who impeded Balaam's advance in this fable. Unlike Balaam's ass, however, the researcher had no clarifying data which "spoke" so clearly as to bring enlightenment concerning the meaning of this term.

In the various meshalim contained in Chapters 23 and 24, the language analysis produced nothing solid in each *mashal* as it appeared which provided a clear route toward ascertaining meaning of the cycle. When combined, however, *yshr* (upright), *nhsh nhshym* (bronze serpent) and *qsm* (divining by rod or staff; and one who

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[116] Astruc, and some time earlier a German pastor in Hildesheim named Witter (1711), identified not only one source using the name Yahweh, and one using the name Elohim, but ten other sources which he claimed had been collected and included by Moses as he had composed Genesis.

reveals), *sbtm* (one of opened eyes) and *glh* (uncovered, revealed), *d't 'lywn* (knowledge of the eternal one), and finally *ktyym* (Westerners [i.e., west of Syria-Palestine]) reveal the concerns of some whose thoughts were always framed within a covenantal Weltanschauung. The combined *meshalim* could be crafted to state the following. When one is a covenant member, one has been exposed to *d't 'lywn*, which requires one to live the life of the *yshr. nhshym* wielded by a *qsm*, while at one time charactizing Moses, are no longer necessary, for the *yshr* has the status of *glh* and *sbtm* and will therefore live and die the death of the righteous. For all who break Yahweh's covenant, there is the rod of his wrath, the agent whereby Yahweh redresses his grievance as injured second party in the covenant. Here the *Kittim* represent this (in the history of Israel) changeable agent.[117] It is the whole covenant (as presented in the literary anthology known as the *TaNaK*) story in miniature.[118]

The exegetical method holds that the end of the four previous analyses (i.e., text, linguistic, literary form(s), and setting(s) of the writer(s)/editor) is to state the meaning of the text. One necessary step in arriving at that "meaning" is (1) asking what the words meant, and (2) asking what the text as a whole meant to the author and/or redactor who put it into its final form. By bringing the key terms of the narrative together, we actually get three different programs.

(1) Narrative — A famous monarch is invited to participate in a special coalition with other monarchs from Moab and Midian to halt the advance of a potentially (and demonstrably) dangerous, and bellicose foe. By the means of prophecy, priestly cultic activity, and divination skills, all combined in *propriediv* fashion at specific and holy spots of demonstrated/designated efficaciousness, Yahweh, through Yahweh/Holy War,[119] and through this mantic medium as human instrument, realized his desired ends.

(2) Fable — A famous mantic personality (here cast as a member of a covenant community, and held responsible for that membership) is shown "rebelling" (misunderstood to be sinning!) against the one who empowers him. Moreover, this mantic personality, on his way to serve as facilitator between Yahweh and his (i.e., the *propriediv*'s) client, is unable to perceive Yahweh! Serious aspersions are therefore cast on this seer's ability to see.

meshalim — *sbtm* and *glh* are the outstanding terms which sustain the theme carried through in all of the *meshalim*. The "open eyed one" to whom wisdom, or better *d't 'lywn* has been revealed, is the antithesis of the closed eyed "bungler" of the fable. In fact, the fable may now be understood to precurse the contents of the following *meshalim* (individually and/or collectively). The invisible

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[117] Cf. the discussion by Gray, *Numbers*, pp. 377-378, and that in A. Dupont-Sommer, *The Essene Writings from Qumran*, (N.Y.: The World Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 339-351.

[118] Cf. Gerhard von Rad, *The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 3-4 where he argues that Deuteronomy 26:5b-9 contains in a terse form the same story contained in Genesis through Deuteronomy. The passage is therefore the Hexateuch in miniature.

[119] Cf. Gwilym Jones, "Holy-war" or "Yahweh-war?" *Vetus Testamentum*. Vol. XXV (1975): 642-650.

watchman behind all this is the covenant understanding, determined to maintain itself against all who would storm its citadel.

Seen in this light, asking what the (important) words meant still leaves us with a tripartite division which comprises this cycle. We are somewhat enlightened about perhaps heretofore nebulous characteristics of each section, but the fact that each of the three sections has existed has not escaped any critical reader.

What that text (cycle) as a whole meant to the author/editor who put it into its final form (as we have it in the MT) should indubitably bear more fruit.

B.

This cycle of texts has dictated just how it must be approached if anything useful is going to come out of it. Narrative, or fable, or *mashal* alone would present any researcher with enough of a challenge to plumbing the depths of its literary form and teasing out a plausible meaning. We have observed with this cycle that three major *strata* constitute it, and that each had a separate life. Because of this, we resorted to the archaeological method, superimposed it upon this cycle, and set about a stratum by stratum investigation, seeing each literary *locus in situ*, as it were, against the backdrop of its time and probable use.

B. The linguistic analysis and analysis of the literary form notwithstanding, it is the setting of the writer/editor of the Balaam cycle which provides the most reliable data as to one possible meaning of this cycle. The reign of King Hezekiah of Judah is the kernel around which everything else grows. A brief summary of the events leading up to Hezekiah's bold actions during the period from the death of Ahaz (715 BCE) to the death of Hezekiah (686 BCE) will be helpful.

The prophet Isaiah (of Jerusalem) shows marvelous understanding of the political machinations of Hamath (North of Israel) and Egypt (southwest of Judah) as they engaged in the political science of the day. Both fomented insurrections among the smaller states of the region. Egypt was particularly eager to establish the smaller states which made up Syria-Palestine as a buffer between itself and the Assyrians. To this end a deputation from Egypt arrived at the court of Ahaz (Isa. 18:1-2) armed with convincing arguments why Ahaz should throw its lot in with that of Egypt. The prophet diplomatically rebuffed this overture, then stated that Egypt herself would meet defeat (18:3-7). Ahaz eventually rejected the Egyptian offer. But that was only one possibe crises averted.

Around 722 BCE Shalmaneser V (727-722 BCE) of Assyria died while Assyria's western armies were besieging Samaria, the capital of Israel. His successor, who would eventually assume the throne name Sargon II, defeated Israel, but then returned to Assyria in order to consolidate his empire. That was to take some time. While this process of consolidation was taking place in the East, small states in the West looked upon the lack of a menacing Assyrian military presence there to foment rebellion against Assyria. One of the first was Philistia which, by 714 BCE, withheld its tribute money. Both Isaiah of Jerusalem and Sargon II mark this withholding. In Isaiah 14:28-32, the oracle against Philistia, he states: ". . . and the first born of the poor will feed, and the needy lie down in safety (showing that Assyria will not redress this breach of covenant immediately, and thus give Philistia a false sense of success, but that once consolidation was complete) "For smoke comes out of the north, and there is no straggler in his ranks." One of Sargon's annals states that: "Azuri, king of Ashdod, had schemes not to deliver tribute [any more] and sent

messengers [full] of hostilities against Assyria to the kings [living] in his neighborhood."[120] This king was deposed, another placed in his stead, who was also deposed by the Philistines, who elevated a pretender to the throne named Iamani, who ruled for about three years.

Hezekiah was a nationalist and a Yahwist. Ahaz, his father, had scouted Isaiah's advice, and had voluntarily become the vassal of the king of Assyria (then Tiglath-pileser III). Hezekiah, viewing the machinations of Ashdod, also examined possible ways of divesting himself of his inherited vassalhood. A Philistine embassy sent from Iamani, the anti-Assyrian party in Jerusalem, and the revolt my Moab and Philistia against Assyria, combined to bring a lot of pressure to bear on Hezekiah and his own personal ambitions. 713-711 BCE therefore had been crucial years in the early reign of Hezekiah. He had seen what could befall one (and one's country) who tried the might of Assyria. Whatever the reason (maybe the constant tauntings of the prophet Isaiah of Jerusalem counseling him not to do anything rash), Hezekiah watched developments of the time, and refrained from committing himself or his resources to either the Moabite or Philistine rebellions. About ten years of peace for Judah was the result.

But to lead directly to the issue at hand now that some recapitulation of major events leading up to the setting, the words of one writer admirably sum up the immediate background to the meaning of the Balaam cycle for P.

> Isaiah unquestionably approved of Hezekiah's reforms which consisted of regulating religious practices in the villages and in the Temple itself. He destroyed cult centers where Yahwism and fertility goddesses were worshipped side by side. He stripped the sacred serpent, reputedly made by Moses himself, from the Temple (2 Kings 18:1-8; cf. Num. 21:5-9). These reforms were undertaken guardedly at first in order to see what reaction Assyrian political agents in Jerusalem might have. Since no reaction set in, Hezekiah continually pushed the nationalization of religion and politics until at the death of Sargon II in 705 B.C., he was ready to announce his independence. He refused tribute money to Assyria and simultaneously attacked her Philistine provinces in a bid to expand his territory and to collect revenue from the rich harvests in the Shephelah.[121]

Sargon was killed on a campaign to Elam. He was succeeded by Sennacherib (705-681 BCE), an equally aggressive ruler. During this time many former vassals of Assyria revolted. Among them was Marduk-ipal-iddina (the biblical Merodach-baladan), king of Babylon, who sent an embassy to Hezekiah, entreating him to join a coalition against the new Assyrian ruler. Where Ashdod and Hamath, as well as Moab had been unsuccessful some decade earlier, the Babylonian ruler triumphed. Egypt, too, (Isaiah 30:1-7; 31: 1-3) participated in the machinations, and promised a military contingent. Isaiah the prophet of Jerusalem, our main literary source here, was not impressed with these maneuvers. (31:3).

Sennacherib defeated in rapid succession, and to the surprise of especially the Babylonian who thought that he would first campaign in the West against the smaller states and exhaust himself and his forces, Babylon, then all of the states in

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[120] James B. Pritchard, ed., *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament* (rev. ed., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 286.

[121] Cf. Beebe, *Introduction*, p. 252.

the west. He did not have to effect a military defeat everywhere, however, for many merely offered tribute and capitulated out of their own instinct for survival. Assyrian political agents in Jerusalem, however, had apprised Sennacherib of Judah's and Hezekiah's involvement. In 701 BCE, therefore, Sennacherib and his forces were wreaking havoc all over the countryside of Judah. In the same year his chief military officer, the Rabshakeh with a large Assyrian force, was standing before the walls of Hezekiah's Jerusalem. After listening to Hezekiah's officers who made counter proposals as to why they should not capitulate, the Rabshakeh was prepared to accept nothing short of total surrender. Yet at the very moment when Jerusalem seemed to be facing utter defeat, the Assytians retreated, they left off what was to have been the certain siege of Jerusalem. Whatever the reason, the Jerusalemites interpreted it by refracting current events through the prism of their own hermeneutic of the time. Jerusalem was saved miraculously, and obviously Yahweh was directing events. This encouraged many observers of the times, and is probably responsible for creating the idea of the inviolability.

Against this backdrop, then, an Aaronid priest apparently started his own minor reformation, which corresponded to, and probably was an integral part of the national reformation. The religious side of that reformation saw priests who officiated at cultic centers outside of Jerusalem disenfranchised. At most of these centers, a sort of syncretistic religion was practiced which included elements from national Yahwism, fertility religions of various varieties, and traditional religious practices associated with individual sites. Officiating at many of these centers were the descendants of priests from Israelite national religion, as well as contingents of Shiloh priests. Many of these centers were simply destroyed. The aftermath of 722 BCE had witnessed scores of priest/refugees from the north arriving at Jerusalem and other religious centers in the south. Where else could they have gone? The document JE was the eventual literary outgrowth of this post–722 crossfertilization of J and E. Reading it one sees that "Zadok" and "Abiathar" had been reunited.[122] In the opinion of P, "Abiathar" had, since 722, not only been returned to a position of favor at court, he had also garnered a considerable amount of sacerdotal power in the meantime as well. Recent events, however, which had been brought about by the spirit of nationalism, religious and political, had produced a King Hezekiah who would set things right, for centralization, the keystone of the king's plan, also meant centralization of the priesthood at Jerusalem. That office, since the year 966, had been firmly in the hands of the Aaronid Zadokite priesthood until its dilution

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[122] In ca. 966 BCE, as David had withdrawn from public life, but was still the king/emperor, two of his sons, Adonijah, and Jedidiah (=Solomon), struggled with each other to succeed him, for he had not named his official successor. Religious, and military personnel supported each candidate. One of the co-High Priests, Abiathar (a Mushite), supported Adonijah, the other, Zadok (an Aaronid), supported Solomon. Solomon eventually succeeded David some six years later. He banished Abiathar to internal exile in the Aaronid priestly town of Anathoth, leaving the reins of priestly power solely in the hands of the sole High Priest, Zadok and his party. From then onward, Mushites played minor roles in state religious politics. The view of P grew out of this long debate between the two factions. See the discussions in Roger N. Whybray, *The Succession Narrative: A Study of II Samuel 9-20; I Kings 1 and 2,* (Alec R. Allenson, 1968); and Von Rad, *Hexateuch,* pp. 176-189.

by refugee priests from the north. E elevated the Shiloh priesthood over both the Jerusalem and Samaria/Bethel/Dan priesthoods, and tauted the Mushite party line. JE did not back away from this line either. Now events made it possible for an Aaronid priest to "set the record straight."

Friedman has demonstrated that the JE document was overworked by P.[123] In this overworking, Aaron, not Moses, is cast as the central figure. All E "insults" to Aaron have been overturned. P refers to non Aaronids throughout his overworking as Levites, and to the Aaronids as priests. This literature reflects a corresponding politico-religious situation at the court of Hezekiah. It had been Solomon in his role as regent who had banished the co-High Priest, Abiathar, to Anathoth, there to remain under the watchful eyes of the Aaronid priests there. That action had elevated Zadok, the remaining (and loyal) co-High Priest, to the position of undisputed High Priest. This Aaronid, Zadokite priesthood became the national, hereditary priesthood, and Solomon was remembered by subsequent generations of Zadokites who continued to enjoy this sacerdotal hegemony for several centuries, as their enfranchising patron. The conditions of the setting, and the contents of P suggest strongly that Hezekiah, through his policy of centralization, had reinfranchised the Aaronids. P's denigration of Moses (as, among other things, a "bungler"[124]), and elevation of Aaron makes it clear who is his champion. P reflects, thereby, the setting wherein the Aaronids are again the premier priests of the national religion. Hezekiah had done for them again what their first royal patron, Solomon, had done over two centuries earlier.

Having identified P's setting, and a more specific sacerdotal program within that setting, and within Hezekiah's reforming program, one would search the literature for signs of priestly concerns. This would isolate much literature which comprises the Pentateuch as well as other documents of the *TaNaK*. But narrative literature responds to given times, and the times generally dictate specific responses, even when a piece of literary tradition is reworked or overworked several times.

The important question is what did the Balaam cycle mean to P who shows signs of having overworked it during the backdrop of Assyrian expansion? Continental reformers like Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli had been bothered by much contained in the Old Testament, and had chafed under the rules of conduct traced to the laws therein. As reform leaders on the european continent, they had had the power to abolish the Old Testament in order to present no opposing or competing anthology of scripture to that of the New Testament.[125] They could have, but they didn't. Their rationales for not doing so would fill numerous tomes. What is important is that they included what at first was understood to be competitive material from another scriptural anthology in their anthology within which was granted honored place to the New Testament. P likewise included rival traditions in his document as well. He, too, had the option of jettisoning such material as JE, but, like the sixteenth-century reformers, he chose to keep it and overwork it. The result is the Balaam cycle of P.

Realizing that P is an important contributor to the already- existing Balaam

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[123] Friedman, pp. 188-206.

[124] Ibid., pp. 197-198.

[125] Cf. the discussion of events which led to this possible attitude toward jettisoning the Old Testament in Harold J. Grimm, *The Reformation Era-1500-1650*, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), pp. 52-72.

written traditions, it is tempting to attempt a total reconstruction of the cycle, and to raise in bold relief the P traditions thereto. Here, we need not yield to this temptation. Above we have provided enough of P's "thumb print" to convince the reader that P's program is also present in the Balaam cycle. Since the Balaam material was kept, we must look for the meaning of Balaam for P the priesthood reformer.

P's overworking of the Balaam cycle employs the figure of Balaam, the *propriediv*, as the archetypical adversary to his priestly reformation. Prophets had attacked the Aaronid, Zadokite priesthood to which he belonged on several occasions. One need only recall the words of a Micah of Moresheth, an Amos (in his oracles against the nations), or, in his own time, his fellow priest/prophet, Isaiah of Jerusalem. There were no doubt others who spoke out against the Jerusalem priesthood. We are bereft of their recorded words, however. Prophets, some of whom came from priestly ranks, presented a formidable challenge to the programs of the state priesthood. There is nothing worse, some say, than to be criticized by one who was formerly a colleague, and who now has become a public advocate. There is evidence to support a claim that Amos, Micah, and most certainly Isaiah of Jerusalem were priests.[126] Other priests, who did not display the tendency toward prophethood also threatened to dilute the ranks of the priestly courses in Jerusalem. These were the priests who had come from the north on the one hand, (both from Shiloh and from the state priesthood[s]), and others who had been long before legitimized when J was first employed in the service of incorporating other, former foreign priests into the service of the empire, then later in service to the Kingdom of Judah after the death of Solomon. Since P worked and reformed within the reform of Hezekiah, it is quite possible that on many issues raised by the social activist prophets he was in agreement, but these prophets delivered oracles with such sweep and broad stroke, it was impossible for the conscientious state priest in Jerusalem of the eighth century BCE to not feel having been indicted along with those who were demonstrably corrupt. Once the legitimate state priesthood had to accept other priests into its ranks. Under Hezekiah's reform, there would hardly be a need for most non-Aaronids; they had become supernumeraries.

The Balaam cycle does not pullulate with the word *qsm* (*qesem*), or diviner. Nor are the terms *me'onen* and *mekashef* (found especially at Deut. 18:10 before which *qsm* stands) which also are translated diviner to be found there. When *qsm* is found in the Balaam cycle (cf. Num. 22:7 and 23:23) the first occurrence is in what might

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[126] Cf. H. Graf Reventlow, *Das Amt des Propheten bei Amos, Forschung zur Religion und Literature des Alten und Neuen Testaments*, 80 (Goettingen, West Germany: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962); Walter Brueggemann, "Amos IV. 4-13 and Israel's Covenant Worship," *VT*, XV (1965), pp. 1-15; and J. D. W. Watts, *Vision and Prophecy in Amos*, (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 1958).

Evidence seems to point to Micah having been a priest in the small rural town of Moresheth. His concern was with corruption in big cities, especially Jerusalem and Samaria, and he critiques the priests in those cities for not providing proper leadership. Moreover, his language reflects priestly concerns. See Micah 1:2-5 and 4:1-3.

Isaiah of Jerusalem (i.e., Isa. 1-23; 28-39) wrote that he had visions within the very walls of the Jerusalem Temple (building). Only a priest was allowed therein. See Isa. 6:1-9.

be seen as a corrupt text, the result of trying to weave J and E together.[127] The other occurs within one of the *meshalim* where the writer of the *mshl* holds that there will be "no divination against Israel." If we look further afield literature wise, but remain within the historical setting, one finds other eighth century writers concerned with *qsm* as well. Isaiah of Jerusalem talks about a diviner (3:2) and diviners (2:6). Micah mentions divination at 3:6; to divine at 3:11; and diviners at 3:7.[128] It is the isaianic passage (2:6) which may contain the clue[129] as to why diviners are a topic of concern in the eighth century, and therefore in the P Balaam cycle. That passage refers to diviners from the east, most probably from Assyria.[130] P would have every reason to be concerned with such people, given the spirit of the times, for it was known that if Judah became a vassal of the Assyrians (as she had already been under Ahaz, and would be again under Manasseh), Assyrian overlordship included religious overlordship to varying extents. In fact, some of these Assyrian diviners and possible enthusiastic Judaean disciples would have also been present in P's Jerusalem certainly before Hezekiah's reformation, but during as well.[131]

The already legendary figure of the *propriediv*, Balaam, suited P's needs perfectly. He attacked all those who did not conform to his view of legitimate mantis with this figure. That included prophets, priests and foreign priests, especially from Assyria. For P Balaam was his foil. He was cast as a foreigner. P made him appear as a foreigner from the region near Assyria ("at Pethor, which is near the River, in the land of Amaw . . ." (22:5). He was cast as a priest ("and Balak and Balaam offered on each altar a bull and a ram"(23:2). He was cast as a prophet (all seven *meshalim* plus "and I will bring back word to you, as the Lord speaks to me," (22:8); "that I may know what more the Lord will say to me." (22:19); "The word that God puts in my mouth, that must I speak" (22:38); "and the Lord put a word in Balaam's mouth" (23:5); "must I not take heed to speak what the Lord puts in my mouth?" (23:12); "and the Lord . . . put a word in his mouth," (23:16). He was cast as a diviner from the East ("And God met Balaam; and Balaam said to him, I have prepared the seven altars, and I have offered upon each altar a bull and a ram." (23:4)) The sacrifices serve a different function in the mind of P than they serve in this cycle. He casts Balaam performing sacrifices or directing the sacrifices of Balak in order to open some mysterious portal through which Yahweh communicates directly with him at some specific spot some distance away from the spot of sacrifice. For P, however, there can be no legitimate place for sacrifice than on the altar before

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[127] Cf. the (apparently) odd reading at Numbers 22:7: "with divinations in their hand."

[128] Divining, per se, does not appear to have been considered a negative activity engaged in by prophets. It is, rather, the result(s) of the divining which is/are questioned. Cf. Micah 3:5-8.

[129] The "diviners from the east" most probably points to the presence of Assyrian priests, as well as those from Assyria who had come to Jerusalem through Philistia (which was off and on a vassal of the Assyrians, or were, along with Judah and Moab, co-conspirators against the Assyrians).

[130] The first major concentrated interest in divination in ancient Israel occurs in the eighth century. Afterwards, it remains an abiding issue until the end of the prophetic period.

[131] Cf. Beebe, *Introduction*, p. 252, under The Third Crisis: "These reforms were undertaken guardedly at first in order to see what reaction Assyrian political agents in Jerusalem might have." The emphases are mine.

the Tabernacle.[132] Moreover, only an Aaronid priest can perform a sacrifice.[133] P therefore renders the sacrifices unnecessary which are performed by Balak or Balaam, for there is no necessary connection between the sacrificial act and the "word" of Yahweh in the cycle. Prophet, priest (local Israelite variety and Assyrian) and diviner—a term used here in a derogatory sense to serve as a boundary marker between insider priest and outsider priest although there is no such inherent difference deriving from the use of the word *qsm* in biblical literature—are all attacked in the P overworking of this text.

There is more in the cycle which appears to serve P's purposes, and as far as I know, no one has made the connection. Above (C. P in the Balaam Cycle), I made reference to five charactertistic concerns and/or expressions which characterize P's writing style, the so-called "thumb prints." The first (a) was the expression "princes of the congregation . . ." In noted P material[134] such as Numbers 20:2-13 (compare with Exodus 17:2-7 which is written by E, but also covers the same topic, Water from the Rock), the words congregation and community occur eight times in thirteen verses. Likewise, in the Heresy at Peor story (Num. 25), verses 6-16 belong to P[135]. Therein "congregation" occurs twice. The Rebellion of Numbers 16:1-35 also contains P material[136]. Congregation occurs in verses 2 (also assembly); 3; 5; 6; 9; 11; 16; 19 (twice); 21; 22; 24; and 26. "Princes of the congregation" also occurs specifically in this passage at verse 2. Congregation, for P, refers to the entire citizenry of "Israel." It means nothing less than the sum of the subjects of the ruler of Jerusalem. Kings ruled with the assistance of princes (those exalted in the community, as well as the sons of a given king), and counselors.[137] A careful reading of the MT where the word princes occurs eight times throughout the Balaam cycle, reveals that the word always appears to have been brought in gratuitously. The implication is that certain "princes" did not enjoy the favor of P, and during P's lifetime. These princes are culpable along with Balaam and Balak for attempting to manipulate Yahweh through divination. Balaam is depicted having gained enlightenment (=*d't 'lywn*, or *d't ybwh*). Once this occurred, "he did not go, as at other times, to meet [Yahweh] with omens, but set his face toward the wilderness." (Num. 24:1) This verse serves as a value judgment of the sum of Balaam's mantic activities, then delivers the death knell to them. They are overturned. After depicting this, P employs another one of his characteristic "thumb prints," the Spirit of God (i.e., *ruah 'lhym* [cf. Gen. 1:2 *et passim* in P]) to show how one must qualify to be in proper communion with Elohim; one must be chosen by deity or by deity's authorized representative. The Aaronid priesthood in Jerusalem had been so chosen by deity's

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[132] Friedman, p. 210.

[133] Ibid., p. 210.

[134] Ibid., pp. 193-203.

[135] Ibid., pp. 202-203.

[136] Ibid., pp. 193-195.

[137] Thus, when Friedman writes (Ibid., p. 204): "We can explain this (i.e., P's additions and subtractions to/from JE) partly in recognizing that the person who fashioned P rejected the angels, dreams, talking animals, and anthropomorphisms of JE," I find cause for the first time to disagree with his conclusion. The same "thumb prints" he ascribes to P with great accuracy are also evident in the Balaam cycle which does include a *ml'k* (=messenger/angel), and most certainly a talking animal.

representative (and son by adoption!), Hezekiah, King of Judah as far as P was concerned.

One last expression then I'll drop my "third shoe" to demonstrate what I think is the full meaning of the Balaam cycle for P. The expression is "If Balak should give me his house full of silver and gold,". It occurs at Num. 22:18; and 24:13. The expression recalls the most valuable objects in a typical temple in the ancient Middle East[138] which one sent to another asking for services. These two occurrences of this expression, coupled with the evidence presented in the foregoing analysis, supply the reader with the meaning of the Balaam cycle for P.

P was an Aaronid priest who was active during the administration of Hezekiah. We need not assume that he began his priestly activities at the same time that Hezekiah assumed his kingly (i.e., messianic) activities as Ahaz's successor. In fact, P shows signs of having served as a priest long before Hezekiah assumed office. The P overlays alluded to throughout this analysis of the P material, reveal a man concerned with the full reestablishment or restoration of the Aaronid/Zadokite priesthood to the enjoyment of its full sacerdotal status. That status had been endangered each time that Judah had been conquered, for each time that had occurred, sacerdotal elements from the suzerain appeared at Jerusalem to oversee certain priestly functions, the major public exercise of which were the daily sacrifices. Whatever the number of such sacrifices in a given ancient Middle Eastern country, several more were added when that country became the vassal country of a more powerful ruler. Daily (or at least specified periodic) sacrifices were offered by the vassal king (or his representative) on behalf of the suzerain. Certain representatives of the suzerain were on hand to make certain that the vassal's sacrifice was offered in the prescribed manner to make it efficacious.[139] Isaiah 7:1-9 tells of a time when Israel, Syria and Edom formed a coalition against Assyria as well as against Judah, ruled at that time by Ahaz. Ahaz, against the advice of Isaiah, voluntarily became the vassal of the king of Assyria. By so doing, Assyrian priests, among other representatives from Assyria, would have appeared presently in Jerusalem. Their assignments would have been to assist the new vassal to adjust to the new order of "business" as a vassal. P contains, as we have demonstrated, material which is concerned with Assyria as the place (or at least direction if we understand the presence of "Aram" in the first *mshl* at Num. 23:7) from whence "Balaam" had come. But when would the sensibilities of an Aaronid have been so taxed? Anytime during the immediate period before Hezekiah succeeded Ahaz. P was reacting to actual Assyrian agents headquartered in Jerusalem. He was not reacting to a phantom.

It is difficult, therefore, not to look for correspondences between figures in the Balaam cycle and figures during the time of P. Here is my attempt at a reconstruction. For P, Balak recalled Ahaz. Balaam recalled all of the mantics whom P saw threatening the Aaronids. Sacrifices of rams and bulls by Balak, and by Balak and Balaam on another occasion recalled the sacrifices that Ahaz would have offered on behalf of the Assyrian monarch on the one hand, and perhaps some joint sacrifice by Ahaz and an Assyrian agent respectively. Since the princes of Moab labor under

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[138] Cf. Neil Q. Hamilton, "Temple Cleansing and Temple Bank," *JBL* LXXXIII (Dec. 1964), Pt. IV: 365-372, for a study of temples, what they contained, and their place in the economic systems of the countries in which they were located in the ancient Near East and in the Mediterranean world.

[139] Cf. note 131 above.

P's indictment also, these recall the political support Ahaz would have had to have in order to "send all the gold and silver" to Assyria. 2 Chronicles 28:16-27 sums up the events which brought Assyria to Judah, as well as Hezekiah's inherited duties as a result thereof. Chronicles is also a work written by a priest.[140]

Under the patronage of the antithesis of Ahaz, Hezekiah, P told a story which held that "Israel," (the cryptic threat) here meaning Israel, Syria, and Edom, had encamped (i.e., laid siege during the Syro-Ephriamitic War) before Moab (for P, Jerusalem). The king of "Moab" (i.e., Ahaz) had sent for the mantic "hit man" from "Pethor-in-the-land-of-Amaw-which-is-near-the-River" (i.e., Assyria) to come and "curse" (i.e., defeat) these people for him, for he knew that whomever he (i.e., the king of Assyria) "blessed" (i.e., favored by his protection) was "blessed," and whomever he cursed was "cursed." This desire to have "Israel" cursed had to be paid for by all the gold and silver in the king of "Moab"'s house. The king of "Moab," having done all this, still had no guarantee that services paid for would, or could be rendered by "Balaam." Why? Because "Balaam" was an outsider/instrument of Yahweh's will, and plans for "Israel" (i.e., Judah), and as such could do only what Yahweh allowed his instrument to do. "Balaam" had indeed responded to "Balak"'s call, yet "Israel" had not been "cursed." but "blessed." Hezekiah and his reformation were proof of that for P. P alludes to this king at 23:21, 24:7b, and 24:17. All the gold and silver that Ahaz sent to the king of Assyria was of no avail, for Hezekiah wrenched freedom from vassalhood from that suzerain. It is as if the money had not been paid. On this point P makes an interesting, and in light of these developments, important ememdation in the existing text tradition before him (i.e., JE). To show his great disdain for Ahaz's move toward vassalhood, P has the king of "Moab"'s messengers depart for "Balaam"'s homeland, not with, as one would expect, the fees for "Balaam"'s divination (i.e., the temple treasures) services in their hand(s), but makes it obvious that they already have been bribed into having earned a part of this money for their own services![141]

P writes of the futility of Israel, Aram, Edom, and Assyria in their attempts to control Judah. Although scattered throughout the Balaam cycle, he alludes to all of them. *mshl* 1 identifies "Balaam" as coming from Aram. Numbers 24:18 holds that "Edom shall be dispossessed." And although Asshur (i.e., Assyria) oppressed "Kenites," in the end, the *Kittim* would be Yahweh's instrument of justice for Judah. It is far more difficult to tease out of this material just when Israel the kingdom is alluded to. There might have been less urgency concerning this Israel, because since P challenges the contents of JE, a post-722 BCE document, Israel would not have existed any longer. It is significant, therefore, that P's overworking of the Balaam cycle ends on a high note. "Balaam" returns to his home (which is located in the east), but will suffer distress in the future at the hands of the *Kittim*. At the time of P's writing, Assyria was indeed involved in internal affairs, and had ceased to actively direct the course of affairs in the west. It reflects P's optimism during the

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[140] The Chronicles work as it presently stands, whether a part of a larger work termed Chronicles-Ezra-Nehemiah or not, is certainly concerned with its version of the Jerusalem priesthood's history to the time of its having been written.

[141] Thus, my rationale for why there need be no attempt to further emend the text to harmonize J and E material as it presently stands. The intended emendation of this text has already been accomplished by P. That emendation served an eighth century BCE function during Hezekiah's reign. See also note 127 above.

Hezekian administration. This is understandable. What had happened to Philistia and Moab had happened because they were not under the protection of his Yahweh. Let us hope that P, after exercising himself so brilliantly in his overworking of the Balaam cycle was "sleeping with his fathers" when Hezekiah was succeeded by Manasseh, for he would more than likely have never gotten over the shock to his system.

Balaam in the Hebrew Scriptures Subsequent to the Balaam Cycle Overworked by P: Some Considerations

Independent of the Balaam cycle, the Balaam figure appears elsewhere in the books of Numbers (31:8; 31:16); Micah (6:5); Deuteronomy (23:4-MT 23:5); Joshua (13:2; 24:9; 24:10); and Nehemiah (13:2). Moreover, New Testament references to Balaam are contained in Revelation 2:14 and II Peter 2:15. These works of the New Testament are so late, however, that they are of no relevance to my study of mantological exegesis in ancient Israel. In this section, only those works belonging to the Hebrew Scriptures will be treated, and then, in the above-given order.

Numbers 31:8; 31:16

The account at Numbers 31:8 states that five Midianite kings, and Balaam ben Beor, were all killed in a war between Israel and the Midianites. The reader is not told how Balaam came to be there after he had supposedly returned to his (once again) nebulous homeland (Num. 24:25). What is certain about this account is that the Balaam figure is viewed as one deserving of death along with other enemies of Israel. This is not the view of Balaam in any of the proposed uses of the Balaam cycle. Its presence here in Numbers material demonstrates the composite nature of the Numbers program. Balaam's name appears to have been a gratuitous addition here, for the text reads sensibly without it.

P's "thumb print" appears briefly in the Numbers 31:16 passage. His concern with the "leaders of the congregation," (31:13); "people of Israel," (31:16); and the "congregation of the Lord." (31:16) is a now-known characteristic trait of his writing style. Here, and certainly going against the contents of the Balaam cycle material, Balaam is depicted as having given counsel which in addition to not having been wise, had also disadvantaged Israel to the point that great taking of male and female adult lives was viewed as imperative in order to rectify the "matter of Peor." One should keep in mind that P's Numbers responds to a situation during the days of Hezekiah. Within the Balaam cycle as well as outside that specific material within this Numbers account, "Balaam" must not be accepted uncritically as any specific, historical figure. Rather, he is best understood as a type of mantis who is viewed by P's circle as the antithesis of all P's priestly reform stands for. "Balaam" is the outsider. He is a boundary marker between outsider and insider. It has also been demonstrated that the Balaam figure of the cycle is treated negatively as well. Thus, in the hands of P, all of the treatment of Balaam in Numbers as overworked by P is designed to discredit non Aaronids.[142]

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[142] That the Balaam of the cycle goes home, while in the other two Numbers passages he is brought in gratuitously, and shown (in reverse) to have given ineffi-

Micah 6:5

Another eighth century BCE priest alluded to Balaam. This is probably the only non negative allusion in the extra Balaam cycle material. It is contained within what is known as a covenant lawsuit or *rib.*[143] The *rib* has as its starting point an agreement (i.e., a written, legal document supported, duly witnessed entering into partnership between two parties—either equals, or suzerain and vassal) spelled out for both parties. Balaam is here mentioned within a rehearsal of several mighty acts of the god Yahweh. Here Balaam keeps company with Moses, Aaron and Miriam[144] as figures through whom Yahweh worked on behalf of Israel. The Mican material recalls the use of the Balaam figure by the J source or by JE. This use and understanding of Baalam is non-hostile. These two eighth century views of Balaam as a figure by two priests, one at Hezekiah's court, and one in a smaller town southwest of Jerusalem give important clues to how mantological exegesis was being conducted in that century by members of the urban (Jerusalem) and rural (Moresheth) *literati.* They insinuate that "Balaam," among priests, was a "mantis for all seasons."

Deuteronomy 23:4-MT 23:5

The Deuteronomist, like P, praised the reforming efforts of Hezekiah. P's hero-king was Hezekiah, and he wrote during the reformation of Hezekiah, and at his court. And Aaron, not Moses, was his sacerdotal *Vorbild.*[145] The Deuteronomist worked and wrote during the reign of Hezekiah's great grandson, Josiah. Whereas P's overall work responded to JE negatively,[146] for reasons given above, the Deuteronomist responded negatively to much of P's world-view. P was pro Aaronid priesthood over against all others within or without Jerusalem. The Deuteronomist (henceforth referred to as D) wrote from the perspective of the Shiloh priests, that is, from the perspective of those who had produced E, and who had influenced the character of JE. D's hero-king, Josiah, had placed certain Shiloh priests in a far more favorable position than had been their lot under Hezekiah. Friedman assigns authorship of D to the Shiloh-oriented, priest-prophet Jeremiah.[147]

One thing is certain as one reads this Deuteronomy passage, by the time of the Josianic reform, "Balaam" has certainly come to be understood as having been a

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cacious counsel, and later to have deserved and received punishment by death, goes a long way toward revealing the purpose of the "Balaam" figure for P. "Balaam" recalled for P what Judas, Brutus, Benedict Arnold, Quisling, and Vichy recall for westerners over forty five today. But this was not all. "Balaam" was far more complex because his threat was viewed by P as far more complex.

[143] Cf. J. Harvey, "Le 'Rib-Pattern' requistoire prophétique sur la rupture de l'alliance," *Biblica* 43 (1962): 172-196; Franz Hesse, "Wurzelt die prophetische Gerichtsrede im Israelitischen Kult?" *ZAW 65* (1953): 45-53; and H. Huffmon, "The Covenant Lawsuit in the Prophets," *JBL* 78 (1959): 285-295.

[144] Note here that Moses receives (unlike in P) top billing, with Aaron and Miriam as supporting figures, but all being portrayed positively. One may therefore rule out P material or influence here, as well as E material. Cf. Friedman, pp. 70-74; 76-79; but on Moses 79-80.

[145] Friedman, pp. 197-198.

[146] Ibid., pp. 197-198.

[147] Ibid., pp. 125-149.

Mesopotamian. I would venture that this represents an acceptance of P's influence at the earlier Jerusalem court concerning the homeland of Balaam. We have already given our rationale for this above. Mesopotamia, in the sixth century, was just as much a threat to Judah as it had been in the eighth century of Hezekiah. What had changed in Jerusalem, however, is that the heretofore Shiloh-oriented priesthood appears to have been enfranchised under Josiah in a way which it had not been under Hezekiah. D does against P what P does against JE.

The framework for this chapter is a series of stringent criteria for membership in "the assembly of the Lord."(23:1) Like P, D abhorred foreigners having any sacerdotal influence or functions anywhere within the orbit of Josianic influence. D, too, was a priest like P. He had Moses as his *Vorbild.* He and P utilized the traditions about "Balaam." But here the similarity stopped. P and D were necessary adversaries, but the Balaam figure did not figure into that adversarial stance. P had been concerned to discredit both the priestly and diviner angles of the Balaam "straw man." Writing later, and with a different reforming program, D focused more on the prophet and diviner angles of the "straw man for all seasons." Insider versus outsider boundaries are being cemented into place in Deuteronomy 24. Whereas P was concerned with what constituted an efficacious sacrifice and the procedures for such, D was concerned with the legal side of the same issue. For D, the oracles which accompanied the sacrificing and divining were deserving of equal critique. It focuses on the word more than on the deed. Thus, D's overworking of the Balaam cycle would, would have focused on the word as the means of whatever efficacious deed. "Balaam" would have to have been depicted touting the party line of those who relied solely on the *dbr-yhwh,* the word of Yahweh. We have shown above in the Introduction that a deuteronomic programmatic was apparent in the Balaam cycle. Since D was also a priest, he would not have had anything P had overworked in the Balaam cycle to take to task. An overlay reflecting his Zeitgeist is all that D would have needed to have the Balaam cycle be of use for him as well. Instead of making a bold literary "thumb print" as P had been compelled to do, D's Balaam "straw man" is merely depicted living up to all of the characteristics of the prophetic vehicle through whom Yahweh word, as opposed to some other kind of word, comes. Accordingly, D framed the mantic activities of Balaam throughout his entire Deuteronomistic History. Balaam's *meshalim* pass deuteronomistic programmatic muster, but only when read against the backdrop of the total deuteronomistic scheme. Just as P had "Balaam" functioning as a paradigmatic outsider, D has him speak the words of a paradigmatic insider. Joshua 13:22; 24:9; 24:10.

Within the holy war fought to possess the land of the Canaanites, Joshua 13:22 mentions that the people of Israel slew Balaam with a sword. He is here mentioned along with others in the region of southern Transjordania (as in one of the versions of the cycle) as an enemy of Israel. In 24:9-10, however, the deuteronomistic interest comes to the fore again. He is now the person through whom Yahweh demonstrates to Israel the efficacy of his word.[148]

Nehemiah 13:2

This passage essentially quotes Deuteronomy 23:4, but states specifically that as a result of the blessings mediated through Balaam's favorable "word," Israel knew

[148] And demonstrates the mileage priestly/prophetic circles over the years of social and religious protest got out of the figure and traditions ascribed to him.

that insiders should be kept in and that outsiders should be kept out. It reflects further a post-exilic concern over the issue of insider-outsider. Balaam is here depicted as the conduit for Yahweh's blessings to Israel (timelessly).[149]

The above extra-Balaam cycle passages which range from the eighth century of Micah to the exilic/post-exilic period of the production of Chronicles-Ezra-Nehemiah demonstrate just how important a legendary figure such as Balaam ben Beor remained in the literary circles of Israel and Judah. Whoever Balaam ben Beor actually was, he had a history that is now seemingly lost, or at least shrouded, in the antiquity of ancient Syria-Palestine. If we are permitted an analogy to make this clearer to the reader, it is the contents of the work by Dr. Albert Schweitzer entitled, in English, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus.*[150] Schweitzer's work is a study of scholarly treatments of attempts to write a definitive biography of Jesus of Galilee from Hermann Samuel Reimarus to Wilhelm Wrede, thus its German title, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede.* Schweitzer noted correctly that although good, each attempt at a biography had resulted in "Jesus" being cast as the individual each of the scholar/biographers had wanted or even needed Jesus to be. "Jesus," as these biographies" demonstrate, was made into a "Jesus" for all seasons. As the selected Israelite literature surveyed from the eighth century to the exilic/post-exilic period demonstrates, the earlier "Balaam" shared a similar fate to that of "Jesus" at the hands of those engaged in mantological exegesis. When the facts conflict with the legend, humankind appears to have always preferred the legend.

Qumran and Balaam

Cave IV near the Wadi Qumran yielded a Herodian scroll of Numbers designated 4QNumb. Cross[151] states that this scroll belongs to: "a textual tradition closely allied to the Samaritan, a Palestinian text-form characterized by wide-spread glosses, expansions from parallel passages, and like editorial activity." This, in essence, describes most of the material harvested from Qumran.

Scrolls of Numbers were also found in other caves. Some were written in paleo-Hebrew script. A Septuagintal Greek text of Numbers designated 4QLXX Numb was also discovered at Qumran.

In addition to these Numbers scrolls, other texts discovered at Qumran quote portions of biblical books, or contain biblical parallels. This practice is true for every book of the Hebrew Scriptures, with the scroll of Esther being the notable exception. Three passages from the Balaam cycle are quoted in one such text known as the War Scroll (1QM): Numbers 24:8 (1QM 12:11); 24:17 (1QM 7:19-20; 11:6-7); and 24:18 (1QM 11:6-7)[152] That three passages from the Balaam cycle are

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[149] Cf. O. Eissfeldt, *The Old Testament: An Introduction,* (New York: Harper, 1965), pp. 530-540 wherein (p. 530) he states that Chronicles-Ezra-Nehemiah is one unit. Agreeing with Eissfeldt is J. K. West, *Introduction to the Old Testament,* (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1981), p. 484 where he states: ". . . , the books are but part of a single work, . . ." And Beebe, *Introduction,* p. 441 also casts no dissenting opinion.

[150] Albert Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus,* (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1968).

[151] Cf. Frank Cross and Shemaryahu Talmon, eds., *Qumran and the History of the Biblical Text,* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 280.

[152] Cf. T. H. Gaster, *The Dead Sea Scriptures,* (Garden City, N.Y.:Doubleday and Co., 1956), p. 413.

quoted in the War Scroll should not be surprising. It should be remembered that the Balaam cycle itself in the MT is located within what is essentially another war scroll: the Book of the Wars of Yahweh.[153] The difference is that the Qumran War Scroll depicts a futuristic (thus apocalyptic) war between the sons of light and the sons of darkness, an image borrowed from Zoroastrianism.[154]

One excerpt from the Balaam cycle within 1QM (Numbers 24:17- 18 which deals with the Star and Scepter oracle) follows a quote from Deuteronomy 18:18 and precedes a quote from Deuteronomy 33:8-11. According to Black,[155] the Numbers passage and Deuteronomy 33:8-11: "have been taken to refer to the Messiah of the sect and the eschatological High Priest (the priestly Messiah)."

Numbers 24:8, like 24:17-18, is excerpted from a poetically-written *mshl* (24:3b-9). In neither case, however, does Balaam figure prominently. The excerpted passages have been directed toward a completely different purpose. Given this, we may state that the only important connection between Balaam (through excerpts of *meshalim* ascribed to him) and Qumran lies in the fact that those who produced 1QM were Zadokite priests like P. Although D and R[156] follow P's work chronologically, P's *Euberarbeitung* shows no signs of having been subjected to tampering by either. R was an Aaronid like P, and the Aaronid/Zadokites at Qumran were descendants of that same priestly dynasty, some members of which had fallen on hard times. P's *torah*, which included the Balaam cycle, would have been a natural part of Zadokite literary traditions passed on, especially after the time of Ezra.

At any rate, "Balaam" in no form appears to have been important to the Qumran framers of 1QM. For them, detached oracle snippets were imbedded in literature utilizing proof-texts from a number of Pentateuchal sources to undergird their vision of a new and future Yahweh War. Sayings ascribed to "Balaam," therefore are located in the Book of the Wars of Yahweh, and in the Book of the Coming Wars of Yahweh.[157]

The Balaam of Deir 'Alla

More material concerning the Balaam figure was discovered in March of 1967 in Jordan. The site is debated as being either biblical Succoth or Penuel. Both sites are associated with the patriarch Jacob. At the first he remained for some time, at the other he wrestled with a night demon, after which he was given the name Israel (Genesis 33:17 and 32:25-32 respectively). The site is located between the Sea of Galilee and the Dead Sea approximately one mile north of the Jabbok River, a

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[153] Cf. above, note 119.

[154] The prophet Zarathustra promised four epochs of three thousand years each. During these epochs, Ahura-Mazda and Ahriman would rule alternately. In the "eleventh hour," so to speak, the forces of Light (i.e., Ahura-Mazda) would ultimately defeat the forces of evil (i.e., Ahriman) everywhere. Thus, evil would cease to exist.

[155] Matthew Black, *The Scrolls and Christian Origins*, (N.Y.: Scribners, 1961), pp. 157-8.

[156] Cf. Friedman, *Who Wrote the Bible*, pp. 217-233, where he argues that Ezra the Scribe and Aaronid priest is the R(edactor) of the four hypothesized documents J,E,D, and P.

[157] Cf. Charles Pfeiffer, *The Dead Sea Scrolls*, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 1962), pp. 73-74 for one discussion of the time involved in fighting this war.

tributary of the Jordan. From the size of the tell one may state that the city was important. What concerns the reader, however, is one wall, (designated wall 36) in one room of a building complex. On the northeastern portion of wall 36 were four plaster columns, two of which contained texts. The texts were painted onto the plaster by a scribe who used two colors. Red was used to provide the outline of the four columns, the title of the texts contained in those columns, and also to highlight important words. The remainder of the text was written using black letters.

Much contemporary scholarly ink has been spilled in analyzing these texts,[158] yet there is no consensus as to date, or even the classification of the language enshrined in the proto-Aramaic/Hebrew script.[159] There is also no consensus as to how the texts should be read. While debates over linguistic *minutiae* must necessarily rage in order to ascertain the exact classification within the Northwest Semitic family, the *in situ* condition of the texts presents the more understandable problem of how they are to be read.

One must envision a wall containing inscriptions. Then one must envision the wall breaking asunder as a result of some violence done to it. Such havoc was wreaked upon the wall that one portion fell in one direction and another portion fell in the opposite direction. The result was that one portion of the text inscribed on the wall fell in one direction, while another portion fell in the opposite direction also. Wall and text met necessarily the same fate. As a result, two groups of texts, both badly damaged as a result of the wall collapse, have been the subject of reconstructions. Researchers have designated them Combination I and Combination II.[160]

Relevant to the present discussion are the contents of Combination II, the title of which (though damaged) has been reconstructed to read *SPR [B]L'M [.BR B']R. 'S.ḤZH. 'LHN*, that is, "Inscription/text/book of [Ba]laam [son of Beo]r, the man who was a seer of the gods."[161] Although this line is a reconstruction, a recognizeable portion of the name appears also in lines 2 (". . . m son of Beor");3 ("Balaam"); and 4 ("Balaam son of Beor") so there is no doubt that this is a text about him. Combination I is a text which dealt with a different subject.

In the text, Balaam is depicted as a seer who has a dream vision at night. He is frightened by its contents, for his people are to be chastised by fire as punishment for rebelling against the gods. This so unnerved the seer that on the day he arose from his sleep he was unable to partake of food and drink, and spent much time weeping. After describing the nature of the coming punishment, he also states that

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[158] Cf. *infra*, note 7, and the bibliography accompanying Lemaire's article "Fragments from the Book of Balaam Found at Deir 'Alla," *Biblical Archaeology Review* (Sept.-Oct. 1985) Vol. XI No. 5, p. 39.

[159] Cf. Lemaire, "Fragments," p. 35 who writes: "This inscription, as we have reconstructed it, provides us with what is probably the best example we have of the appearance of an eighth-century B.C. northwest Semitic manuscript in Aramaic, Phoenician or Hebrew. At that time, the differences among these three scripts were minimal. . . ."

[160] Ibid., p. 29, and P. Kyle McCarter, Jr., "The Balaam Texts from Deir 'Alla: The First Combination," *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*, 239 (1980), pp. 49-60.

[161] Lemaire, "Fragments," p. 35.

it will be meted out on a specific date. The sun god, Shasmash, will shut the skies with a cloud bringing on utter darkness. Mindless terror will result, his people will be thrown into derision, and a plethora of saurians will fill the sky. At this point, the text becomes unreadable. Speculating on what possibly followed in the severely damaged text, one scholar states: "Perhaps by execrations or other forms of magic, Balaam attempted to avert the disaster."[162]

There are several points of similarity between the Numbers account of Balaam and the Deir 'Alla text. The deity or deities come to Balaam at night. The Numbers account has the deity meeting Balaam during the day as well (cf. 23:4 and 23:16). It is "in the morning" that Balaam retails the contents of his dream vision, while Numbers 22:13 tells the reader that "Balaam rose in the morning" to give messenger/envoys answers to questions posed the previous day.

In the linguistic analysis above, I presented a rationale for understanding Balaam to have been a monarch with the reputation as a seer. In Lemaire's reconstruction/translation of the Deir 'Alla text, line 4 reads "Intensely and his people came to him. . . ."[163] This line also seems to suggest that Balaam was a monarch.

Tell Deir 'Alla's city is dated by archaeologists to the eighth century at a time when the Hebrew prophets Isaiah of Jerusalem, Micah of Moresheth, Amos of Tekoa, and Hosea of Israel all were active. More specifically a date of circa 750 BCE, which corresponds to a known earthquake having occurred during the reigns of Uzziah of Judah and Jeroboam II of Israel, has also been suggested.[164] That earthquake may have caused the eighth century wall at Deir 'Alla to collapse producing the two piles of crumbled plaster labeled Combinations I and II.

Although the Deir 'Alla text of Balaam dates to the eighth century, it is argued that this is merely a copy of a text which was considerably older.[165] The various recensions of the Numbers Balaam cycle as analyzed and discussed above also cluster around the eighth century. P, the latest hand in providing a recension, responded to the eighth century neo-Assyrian movement, and used the Balaam figure to further his nationalistic aims revolving around a priestly (i.e., Aaronid/Zadokite) reformation.

Thus, whether the text about Balaam is derived from ancient Israelite sources (i.e., Hebrew Scriptures, Qumran, and other text traditions [see Cross and Talmon]), or non-Israelite sources such as the text from Deir 'Alla, one fact is clear. Both sources utilize a "Balaam" who is larger than life, and therefore a "Balaam" who serves as a *Vorbild* for the *propriediv par excellence!* The Deir 'Alla text and P's recension of a Balaam cycle of texts both strongly suggest that this figure, however presented, (i.e., as a polytheist in Transjordania; as a cathenotheist in Numbers [for there the Moses Host is not presented as monotheists anyway]) was important and relevant during the eighth century on both sides of the Jordan. Moreover, the producers of both sets of texts had inherited an even older tradition about a famous *propriediv* who must have been considered a phenomenon to his contemporaries and beyond.

We quoted Vermes at the beginning of our work as stating that it was not necessary for the written word which subsequently become tradition to suffer the fate of being forgotten through disuse. On the contrary, it could become infused

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[162] Ibid., p. 37.
[163] Ibid., p. 34.
[164] Cf. Amos 1:1 which reflects a time of prosperity in both kingdoms.
[165] Lemaire, "Texts," p. 38.

with new life, which in turn, was capable of producing a completely new word-tradition by causing "old bones" to become reassembled, reinvigorated, and redirected. The Balaam texts as we have analyzed and presented them herein within the framework of mantic exegesis certainly live up to this view and use.

Toward a Transition to Hellenistic Times

Balaam ben Beor was a name in ancient Israel which kept company with other names such as Ruth, Rahab, Melchizedek, Jezebel, and (Pharaoh) Neco of 2 Chronicles 35:20-22. By Israelite standards all of these people were outsiders, but they were outsiders who could not be ignored, for they either acknowledged Yahweh openly, or threatened his covenant with Israel. They fall into two groups.

Group 1	*Group 2*
Ruth	Melchizedek
Rahab	Neco
Jezebel	Balaam

Ruth the Moabitess, a woman reflecting harlot-like qualities (cf. Boaz at the threshing floor [Ruth 3:6 ff.]), accepted the deity of her mother-in-law. This display of courage and zeal earned for her the respect of the insiders, for from her came ultimately a great king (Ruth 4:17).

Rahab, a professional harlot at Jericho, facilitated Yahweh's holy war against the inhabitants of that city, an action for which she and her household were not subjected to the *ḥerem* (i.e., the ban).

Jezebel, another "harlot" (but only in the eyes of the anti-Baalists in Israel), was a priestess in the religion of the Tyrian Melkart. She acknowledged Yahweh by waging war against his prophets.

If all three female outsiders were viewed as licentious (necessary or not) by insiders, the three male outsiders also shared a common trait; they were all monarchs!

Melchizedek, the nebulous priest-king of Salem, participated in a religious order which became paradigmatic for the Judaean monarchs (Psalm 110:4).

Pharaoh Neco (only in the 2 Chronicles account) acknowledged Yahweh as he announced to King Josiah his gross error.

The third monarch (on the basis of messenger vocabulary studies, and the language of Combination II from Deir 'Alla), Balaam, appears to have been considered the most fascinating and challenging of the outsiders. Along with Ruth and Melchizedek, Balaam survives to be mentioned even in the New Testament anthology (2 Peter 2:15; Rev. 2:14; and Jude 11).

All of these outsiders are depicted as somehow being instruments of Yahweh's punishment, or protection, reward, and restoration.

Complementing this outsider/insider scheme is the "otherwhereness" which is emphasized. Moab, Egypt, Salem, Tyre, Jericho (and perhaps Edom) loom large in the texts to send a message of "otherwhereness" also. Clearly, boundary markers are in place; boundaries set by being the people in covenant relationship with Yahweh. But the boundaries may be stepped over in both directions. The concept which allows this is *ḥesed*, oftentimes rendered grace, or covenant love.[166] And it worked

[166] This term appears some 83 times in the MT, with most occurrences being

both ways. Neco and Jezebel were examples of *ḥesed* denied; Ruth, Melchizedek, Rahab and Balaam were examples of *ḥesed* in force.

Balaam was subjected to mantological exegesis in ancient Israel to an extent that none of the others were, not that all of these outsiders were considered in the smallest way mantics. It is the ancient exegetical methods which are under discussion here. These outsiders are mentioned because they served some specific function for those insiders who included them in their works. Two points become therefore clear:

(1) Balaam's *meshalim*, when compared with the insider use of oracles in general, re-opened, or prolonged confidence in an oracle's contents (as demonstrated herein by successive uses of them by J,(E), JE, and certainly P), and

(2) they (and especially later excerpted quotations from them), established the closure of a given oracle, or set of oracles. Such exegesis, then, had the task of demonstrating how the contents of an oracle or *mshl* had been, or would be brought to fruition. As Fishbane[167] argues, oracles were understood to have self-evident contents. With that in place, the major question for those who engaged in mantological exegesis became "Will the divine word (*dbr*), on which so much is based, be fulfilled?" In the introduction to our work, we framed it with this same concern. In one specific case, then, the answer "yes" was once framed in the following way.

Setting: Moab beyond the Jordan = otherwhere (whether in Numbers, or in the Deir 'Alla material).

Locus of writer/editor(s): "Thiswhere" (Judah) and later (eighth century).

Time: Concept of twelve (or more) tribal Israel projected onto the past.

Purposes: To demonstrate (several times by several authors/editors) that the divine *dbr* would be fulfilled. Each fulfillment of course was accompanied by a constellation of specific results for J, E, JE, and P.

The Balaam figure loomed larger than life, too large to be (as an outsider) expunged, but not too powerful at the time of various priestly editors to be manipulated. "Balaam," like "Sir Thomas More," loomed large, but many couldn't quite remember what exactly he had done. Thus, he could be depicted as fulfilling Yahweh's *dbr* as well as the *dbr* of the deities of Deir 'Alla. By the time of the texts studied herein, he was a truly malleable figure. This malleability as a mantic figure survived to the time of Philo and Josephus. With the overlay of Hellenistic thought being brought to bear on various forms of Jewish outlook and need, mantological exegeses, now within the framework of Middle Platonism, and the rhetorical *Weltanschauungen* growing out of them, took on a decidedly different form. They overlayed what we have revealed herein with the next *stratum* of interpretive grid(s),

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in the Psalter. Within a covenant understanding, it means an act of kindness above and beyond any responsibilities agreed to in the "Stipulations" portion of a given covenant performed by either party to the covenant. This "extra" act is performed by Yahweh in the MT material where Yahweh and Israel are in covenant relationship.

[167] Cf. Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation*, p. 468, but the entire discussion of mantological exegesis is well worth reading (pp. 443-524).

which responded to new challenges to the traditions of ancient Israel. "Balaam," like so many Soviet leaders whose tombs are now located in the Kremlin, after many years was taken out of the mausoleum, retouched where decay was becoming evident to those who would view such remains, and placed once more on display, having been made useful to a later time, audience, and exegete, all of whom had different needs brought on by the challenges of a new age.

Balaam for the Hellenistic Period: Breathing More New Life into the Word

In a chapter entitled The Jewish Exegetical Context, George Brooke[168] sensitizes his readers to a number of controversies concerning the myth of the separateness of Hellenistic exegetical methods and Palestinian exegetical methods.[169] He warns specifically that the lines of demarcation don't really exist, and that maintenance of a rigid two-camp theory leads to gross error. His work is important, because in studying the document from Qumran known as 4QFlorilegium in its Jewish Context, he paints an involved and intricate picture of just what evidence must be in place before taking on the task of making a transition from what one could term pre-Hellenistic exegesis of the Hebrew Scriptures (and thereby certain figures such as the object of the present study), and exegesis of these documents during the Hellenistic Period (whether or not by Jews).

Earlier, we wrote of one major instance where certain words attributed to Balaam in the Balaam cycle had been excerpted in documents from the caves of Qumran (4QM). There, the Balaam figure was seen to be not as important as wording which to these later Aaronid/Zadokites pointed to, and assisted them in articulating their view of messianism(s).[170] But would one normally assign the type of mantic exegesis evident at Qumran to the category of Hellenistic exegesis? Before one attempted to respond to that question, they should also have been made aware of the fact that Greek-written documents, and among them Numbers, were also discovered at, and evidently employed by the members of, Qumran[171] Adding thereto the fact that the Qumran community was active there until its destruction ca. 68 CE, the issue of what constitutes Hellenistic exegesis takes on a truly complex character.[172]

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[168] George J. Brooke, *Exegesis at Qumran: 4QFlorilegium in its Jewish Context*, (Sheffield, England: Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Press, Supplement Series, 29 1985), pp. 1-79.

[169] Ibid., pp. 17-19.

[170] These would include the documents studied by Chaim Rabin, *The Zadokite Documents*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953); L. Rost, ed., *Die Damaskusschrift. Kleine Texte fuer Vorlesungen und Uebungen*, ed. Hans Lietzmann, No. 167, (Berlin: 1933); S. Zeitlin, ed., *The Zadokite Fragments*, Jewish Quarterly Review Monograph Series, No. 1 (Philadelphia: The Dropsie College, 1952); E. L. Sukenik, ed., *The Dead Sea Scrolls of the Hebrew University* (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1955), Plates xvi-xxxiv.; and Y. Yadin, *Megillath Milhamath Bne Or bi-Bne Hoshech*, (Jerusalem: The Bialik Institute, 1956).

[171] Cf. P. W. Skehan's list in "The Biblical Scrolls from Qumran and the Text of the Old Testament," p. 265 in Cross and Talmon, eds., *Qumran and the History of the Biblical Text*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 264-277.

[172] Brooke, *Exegesis*, pp. 6-79.

A similar problem is presented by John Bowman,[173] working with Samaritan texts. Familiarity with the history of the Macccabee/Hasmoneans will inform the researcher of a family which began as conservative and anti-Hellenistic, that is specifically, anti the Hellenization policy of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, and which ended up hellenized![174] During this Maccabee/Hasmonean period, a period of Hellenization in Palestine, the Samaritan community was exegetically active just as the Qumranites, their contemporaries, were. Concerning the Balaam cycle, or the Balaam figure among Samaritan documents, one notices that Chapters 3-4 of the Samaritan Book of Joshua deal with Balaam and the Moabites.[175] In another work entitled the Discourse Concerning the Angels,[176] Numbers 22:31 is quoted. The Samaritans also believed that Balaam and Jethro knew of a Book of Signs which was reputed to have been one of a number of books which had been inscribed on the rod which Adam had taken out of paradise.[177] These texts further exacerbate the issue of what constitutes Hellenistic exegesis while simultaneously showing that the Balaam cycle and the Balaam figure continued to play an important role (and with Balaam, an important *Vorbild*) as Israelite literature continued to generate new living traditions.

The present work has demonstrated thus far that it is simpler to research the Balaam figure and various uses of the Balaam cycle in the ancient Israelite materials than in later materials. The eighth century was shown to have been a watershed century for materials about Balaam either from Israel/Judah or from Deir 'Alla. Although the Deir 'Alla material was badly damaged, we were still able to get a picture of some continuity between the traditions about Balaam whether they were formed west or east of the Jordan River in the eighth century. With the Qumran and Samaritan materials, however, the picture is not quite so clear. It becomes even less clear when one attempts to figure out just what type of exegesis to assign, say, to Philo's treatment of a given biblical book. This saves one the trouble of making the error of attempting to assign the same pan-exegetical approach to all of the works of Philo. Concerning this issue, Brooke has written:

> B.(urton) L. Mack has proposed a thorough examination of the Philonic corpus with the supposition that "Philo used traditional exegetical methods and materials. These materials are diverse and may reflect stages of exegetical history or 'schools' of exegesis which are in debate with one another. Philo employed these traditions with degrees of acceptance and he reworked them with varying degrees of consistency."79 R.D. Hecht and H. Moehring are amongst those who have tried to work out the implications of Mack's program. Hecht has attempted to analyse Philo's use of scripture in De

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[173] John Bowman, *Samaritan Documents Relating to their History, Religion and Life*, (Pittsburgh: The Pickwick Press, 1977).

[174] Cf. "Hasmoneans," *IDB*, E-J, pp. 529-535, for a summary of rules from Simon to Aristobulus II; M. Noth, *The History of Israel*, 2d. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), pp. 346-401 for period from Alexander the Great to the activity of Pompey at Jerusalem; and Elias Bickerman, *From Ezra to the Last of the Maccabees*, (New York: Schocken Books, Inc., 1962).

[175] Bowman, *Samaritan Documents*, pp. 63; 291.

[176] Ibid., pp. 248-251.

[177] Ibid., p. 291.

Specialibus Legibus; 80 Moehring has considered arithmology as an exegetical tool.81[178]

What this points away from is the simple minded approach to Philo as an allegorist, and points toward not only one exegete, but to an era (however one wants to delimit it) which need to be understood far better than he/it are understood at present. Once that precondition has been met, scholars will be in a much better position to fathom the implications of Philo's treatment of Balaam.[179]

Conclusion

The question of prophecy and divination in Philonic material, and specifically the issue of how Balaam the son of Beor is treated in that material, has been the point toward which I have been sailing in this essay. I have employed one simple rule: In order to know to where it is one is travelling, it is best to know where one has been, as well as to know one's present position. Thus, with the Balaam figure, it was decided to conduct a restudy in light of recent studies in the Documentery Hypothesis by Friedman[180] whose work has certainly thrown new light on an old problem. With that in place, it suggested to the present writer that the study required a rethinking of the Balaam cycle, an integral part of the overall Pentateuchal problem. We were correct in this rethinking, for it produced a required stratigraphical approach to mantalogical exegesis in ancient Israel of the Balaam material, especially that material contained in the cycle Numbers 22-24. The Balaam figure demanded the attention of mantics in ancient Israel in the same way that a pesky summer fly will not leave one alone. There was no way of avoiding him. He appears to have insinuated himself into mantic deliberations at every turn. How else can one explain the sustained interest in such a character? "Balaam," for we did not delude ourselves into thinking that we were working with the "original" Balaam in any of our written sources, was depicted as a mantic exemplar with wholistic features, not totally in, not totally out, thus perfectly nebulous and thereby malleable to be shaped by the mantic, exegeting artificer as the mantic for all seasons. As was stated above, Balaam is the only famous outsider in ancient Israelite material who receives such press, although other outsiders were impressive. Somehow he (as a figure, type) became the object of an abiding interest even after the Hellenistic period as well. Both the New Testament and later Islamic material still expressed the need to acknowledge this figure.[181]

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[178] Brooke, *Exegesis*, pp. 18-19.

[179] Brooke's work makes it impossible for one to maintain the rigid views of scholarship on exegesis during the Hellenistic period as had been maintained by exponents of *die Wissenschaft des Judentums* on the one hand, and by many Christian scholars touting a particular scholarly party line on the other. A pure, hermetically-sealed, Palestinian Jewish thought-world was as impossible as was an hypothesized Hellenistic counterpart, with neither the twain meeting.

[180] Friedman, *Who Wrote the Bible, et passim.*

[181] The New Testament material has already been mentioned above. For Islamic material cf. W. M. Thackston, Jr., *The Tales of the Prophets of al-Kisa'i*, Library of Classical Arabic Literature (Boston: Twayne Publishers for G.K. Hall & Co., 1978), 244-245. Although many of the features of this story are contained in the Balaam cycle of MT Numbers, such as Balak's embassy; the she-ass; the angel blocking the

This is an enormous subject when one considers from whence we have come, and how much must be considered before embarking on an attempt to study the Philonic Balaam, understanding now that there are even greater and challenging exegetical studies which await us after we have done justice to Hellenistic Jewish mantic exegesis[182]. Questions must still be raised and responded to concerning the nature of the text(s) in Hebrew and Greek from which Philo worked. An intricate text history must therefore be worked out concerning the Balaam text history. One may need to do this within the framework of the overall text history study of various Numbers traditions, or perhaps by isolating a given text tradition such as the Balaam cycle, and approaching the problem with less broad strokes which omit finer detail. Since the eighth century BCE provides the researcher with a watershed date, a *terminus a quo*, to a *terminus ad quem* yet to be determined, but long after the seventh century in the Islamic world, a *lacuna* of learned detail exists into which the works of Philo, and to a lesser extent, but no less important, Josephus are located. We may not be guilty of straining the subject if we relegated the Philonic exegesis of the Balaam cycle and figure to the category of interstitial mantological exegetical works on Balaam. It is this interstitial material, texts, text histories, text families, mantic interpreters, exegetical methods, location in time and space, and *Zeitgeist* to which the production of all of the preceding belong, that must be the next phase in the research which responds to the question of one of the reasons why the Balaam material still figured prominently in Philo's work on prophecy and divination. For now, we must consolidate our gains of its past uses, for whatever future uses it may be demonstrated to have had, none of it is intelligible unless looked at in light of those pat meanings and uses.

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way; and a desire to have the Moses host cursed, there are many other features mentioned in the Tales which do not appear in the cycle of Numbers 22-24. Among these are Balaam's wife (who, after Balaam is refused permission to go the first time, persuades him to ask for permission again); viziers (as opposed to simple messengers, or even princes); a winged angel whose wings block the East and the West; gifts for Balaam's wife; Iblis interpreting the significance of the angel's sudden departure, allowing Balaam to continue his journey; combined stories of how Balaam's counsel included using the Moabite women as bait for the Moses host (stories which, in the Numbers book, are spread over more material than chapters 22-24); a "certain book" which the "children of Israel" read, the precepts of which if not followed, will cause calamity to befall them; Balak will be established because "Israel" will rebel against the deity; a man of Simeon having sexual congress with an especially beautiful Moabitess, both of whom were impaled together on a spear wielded by a faithful man of Judah; the routing of Balak's army, and his and Balaam's subsequent death. The version ends with: "O Moses, pray unto thy Lord therefore for us, that he would produce for us of that which the earth bringeth forth, herbs and cucumbers, and garlick, and lentils and onions" (2.61).

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Arcana Mundi between Balaam and Hecate: Prophecy, Divination, and Magic in Later Platonism

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Introduction

The historian of later ancient philosophy will never stop meditating on Balaam and Hecate. If an ass had pleased Philo, Clement, and Origen as hips pleased Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus, ancient Mediterranean men and women would have been allowed to go on collecting prophetic, divinatory, and magical knowledge from seance and seminar. We would have fewer books on Philo and Origen but even more books on Julian and Iamblichus. But Greek speaking Jews and Christians, not Greek speaking Hellenes, brought to late antiquity the seeds of the triumph of Moses and Jesus over Balaam and Hecate. We must face the facts.

This paper proposes the thesis that later Platonic theory symbolizing intimately reflects the symbolizing structures of later Roman society. The test of this proposition rests upon an examination of the ass of a prophet and the hips of a goddess. From studies in prophetic anatomy we gain insights into the relationship between belief systems and kinship systems in later Platonism.

This essay is concerned with the point of intersection of two interests—the various connections between symbolically structured systems of belief and the social experience they yield. Later Platonism had an ecological setting—later Roman society. Therefore it is possible to study the relationship betweem belief complexes and kinship systems. This shall be done by examining later Platonic prophecy, divination, and magic from the perspectives of Balaam and Hecate. For it is through an ass and a pair of thighs that oracles are transmitted from gods to humans and a correlation between divine and human societies are established.

Later Platonism and Roman Society

I

It is an anachronism common among historians of religion and philosophy to view concepts in isolation from social context and to endow ideas with far greater potency in directing human behaviour than is warranted.[1] Suffice to say we have detailed evidence from late antiquity of how concepts take on very tangible social forms.[2]

[1] See the studies of Dodds, [1951] especially, 283-314; [1965], especially 92-125; 156-210.

[2] See the cultural functionalist studies of Vermeule [1961]; Millar [1969]; P. Brown, [1974]; MacMullen [1982]; and Gallagher [1982].

Thus, later Platonic prophecy, divination, and magic could be placed in a context that has long attracted social scientists—that is, the various connections between symbolically structured systems of belief and the social experiences they yield.

The proposition that cognitive facts are social facts was initially asserted by Durkheim and Fleck. Durkheim's work has to an extent been neglected because it often invoked a superorganic group mind. Institutions clearly are not minds capable of reasoning, classifying, or remembering in the same way that humans carry out cognitive processes.

However, while Durkheim is strong on the different types of social organization that produces certain kinds of facts, Fleck is strong on that most subtle and powerful form of fact-generating activity of the species, namely philosophical and scientific knowledge.

By aligning Durkheim with Fleck it is possible to deal directly with knowledge and the role of cognition in building social solidarity.[3] The hypothesis is that knowledge processes and practices underpin institutions. In a sense according to Fleck all institutions are thought communities.

This alliance between Durkheim and Fleck requires drawing on an array of natural scientific, anthropological sociological, psychological, and philosophical methods for the study of later Platonism.[4] Indeed, to analyze and interpret later Platonism not only as ideational complexes, but also as a cultural system requires the utilization of several methodological approaches. One involves the insights of cultural ecology.[5] The other uses the perspectives of cultural selectionism.[6] Each approach permits the tracing out the symbolic forms of later ancient Platonism and their institutionalization in later Roman society.[7]

This argument permits the assertion that there stands definable relationships between individual minds and social institutions. This assertion allows for the claim that a taxonomy can be constructed from the heritable traits of cognitive and social systems.

Such a taxonomy yields intellectual and cultural traits that permit a definition of later Platonism on the basis of structural analogies it shares with later Roman society. Knowledge and institutions get shaped together. Therefore, it should be possible to define the chronological, intellectual, and cultural limits of later Platonism on the basis of relationships between belief complexes and kinship

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[3] See Douglas, [1985]. Review, Pinch, *Isis* 79.297.1988, 314-315.

[4] Douglas, [1985] has proposed a similar alliance.

[5] Kessing [1974] notes that cultural ecology has dominated much of modern anthropological and archaeological inquiry. While the differences found within this approach are vast certain basic premises are accepted: 1) the relation of cultures to their immediate ecological settings; 2) cultural change is a process of adaptation to changing conditions; 3) Production, technology, and are the major foci of cultural adaptation; and 4) symbols and actions are significant because of their adaptive function in material processes such as economic production or population regulation.

[6] Rindos states that cultural selectionists base the capacity for culture on learned not genetic inheritance. Unlike sociobiologists they claim the independent inheritance of cultural and genetic information. Thus they look for the transmission of symbolically structured systems in the social and psychological modeling of human behaviour. cf. Rindos [1986], 315-316.

[7] This approach reflects the influence of Geertz, [1973a]; [1973b]; [1973c]; [1973d].

systems. Consequently, later ancient philosophers share the categories of their thought for their knowledge is essentially social. Key activities of later Platonic thinking are shaped by the institutional context in which they occur.[8]

The theory that cognitive facts are social facts, and that the fact-generating activity of cognition lies at the very center of the building of social solidarity, leads to the proposition that knowledge processes and practices underpin institutions. In a sense all social institutions are thought communities.[9] Thus, to constitute a version of reality is at the same time to construct a model for society.[10]

To comment on these approaches briefly: All human cultures are symbolizing cultures. Since everything in a culture is functionally interrelated, one can strategically focus in on the description of selected parts that simultaneously evoke the whole. These parts are built around key institutions such as philosophical schools or privileged structures such as kinship systems and belief complexes.

By structures is meant an understanding of the relationships between elements of social organization. It is assumed that cultural systems relate human communities to their immediate ecological settings. Since structural change is primarily a process of adaptation to changing enviromental conditions, humans create symbolically structured systems of belief and action to adjust to enviromental transition. These ideational and symbolic aspects of culture fit human behaviour to the exegencies of the natural world. They are "man's adaptive dimension."[11] Since philosophical cultures are rooted in their environments, they are only comprehensible within their social settings and contexts.

This paper takes this premise as its starting point: later Platonism is a transmission system reflective of a cultural inheritance system.[12] Moreover, since later Platonism is a symbolic system that can be treated as a function of social behaviour, it is assumed that later Platonic symbolizing is intimately linked to an ecological niche—later Roman society. Later Platonic symbolizing carries within it the heritable traits of the later Roman cultural system.[13]

Later Platonic symbolizing, therefore, functions primarily as a type of inherited symbolic behaviour which is constantly adapted to a shifting social environment. The process is not overt but covert. Those traits which fit best with other traits in the social environment have the greatest probability of being taught, learned, and over time, thus, passed on to succeeding generations of learners and teachers.[14]

Philosophical theory and social fact find reification in the figures of the prophet and the theurgist. Divinely inspired men and women function as patrons for a wide-ranging client class. They stand at the head of a set of personal relationships that

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[8] The proposition that facts are social facts is asserted by Durkheim, [1964], 1-19.

[9] See Fleck, [1952], 7-31. While Durkheim is strong on the different types of social organization that produce different types of facts, Fleck is strong on that most subtle and powerful form of fact-generating activity humanity has yet known, scientific knowledge.

[10] See Douglas, [1985], i-xi.

[11] See, Montagu [1968], 22-43.

[12] For the relationship between heritable traits and culture traits see, Rindos [1988], 32-55.

[13] On heritable traits and the evolution of the capacity for culture see, Rindos [1986], 315-332.

[14] Ibid., 52.

reach from the intelligible to the sensible world. Patronal power rests on an ability to perceive the meaning of scripture, to see the divine in the cosmos and the arts.

Later Platonic conceptions of the prophet and prophecy, the theurgist and theurgy are not natural or given facts but are culturally constructed and relative facts. As blueprints for ordering social worlds, later Platonic theory formation and later Roman social structure, are elements in the way ancient Mediterranean men and women conceptualize human relationships and explain functions of situations of misfortune.[15]

As Douglas puts it:

> Individuals, as they pick and choose among the analogies from nature those they will give credence to, are also picking and choosing at the same time their allies and opponents and patterns of their future relations.[16]

Since symbols and structures are integrated and ideas are inseparable from social action, direct concern is with the "native" point of view.

Later Platonists elevate the epistemological value of sense-perception and the imagination. Once activated by the divine intellect human perception imaginatively grasps eternal verities. The aesthetic act permits the soul to behold her noetic source, purify herself, and ascend from sensibility to intelligibility. This insight and elevation brings with it an awareness of divine love and cosmic sympathy. This results in a knowledge and capacity to use the divine power which orders and regulates all things in the universe.

In terms of this approach later Platonic theories of perception [*aesthesis*], imagination [*phantasia*], the intellect [*noesis*], love [*eros*], power [*dynamis*], sympathy [*sympatheia*], the soul [*psyche*] and the vehicle of the soul [*ochema*] are intimately linked to such later Roman cultural ideals as love [*eros*] and friendship [*philia*], salvation [*sotereia*], and protection [*prostateia*].

In such a context social bonding takes on powerful aesthetic patterns. For later Platonists not only are gods visibly accessible through oracles and in statuary but humans attach themselves to patrons who can effect perceptive contact and understanding between divinity and humanity. Such bonding effects a reversal of a situation of misfortune, the soul's embodiment in matter. Those who perceive the gods through their oracles, symbols and tokens become divine-like patrons and mediators of divine love and friendship to a human world.

Ontological and psychological relocation is achieved through relationships that pullulate with imaginative divine, cosmic, and human symbols that reflect social structures. Therefore, any social explanation of later Platonic symbolizing takes into account the cultural context of symbolic activity.[17]

Since symbolism is a shared system of cultural bonding, social behaviour is envoked to explain the meaning and function of symbolic activity. Thus, in examining an image or symbol such as Balaam's ass or Hecate's thighs, the historian uncovers and defines recognizable patterns in later Roman cultural thought such as

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[15] P. Brown [1974], 129-143 in his analysis of Lucian working off the insights of Evans-Pritchard [1936 (1976)] noted a similar connection between later Roman symbolic behavior and social function.

[16] Douglas, [1985], 63.

[17] As Sahlins [1976], 142. notes: "men begin as men, in distinction to other animals, precisely when they experience the world as a concept [symbolically]."

love, friendship, protection, and salvation in the figures of the prophet and theurgist.[18]

The results of this study may pose a challenge to those committed to rational choice theory, and its assumption that individuals act as rational autonomous calculators. The central premise here is that philosophers share the categories of their thought and that philosophical and religious knowledge is essentially social and natural knowledge.

Nonetheless, its results gained will permit us to draw some general observations about later Platonic aesthetic theory, to define the heritable traits implicit in later Platonic prophetic, divinatory, and magical symbol building, and to propose some specific conclusions about the cultural ecology of later Platonism and Roman society.

II

The Roman age saw an intellectual and social event of the first order. The general picture is clear. Even the details are well known. Moses and Jesus emerged more or less at the same time as Zoroaster and Hecate. Eventually each became a respected figure among Roman Platonists.[19]

This search for religious guides and cultural heroes was not confined to Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and Chaldaeans alone. Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus tell us similar activities were already embraced by Brahmans, Magi, Egyptians, and Druids at the beginning of the Roman era.[20] Augustine bears witness that everyone was translating divine wisdom into philosophy while Huns, Vandals, and Goths laid seige to two eternal cities—one on the Tiber; the other on the Bosporus.[21]

Though Plato never made it explicit that Moses, was the first philosopher, or that Jesus was the Logos, or that Hecate was something more than a chthonic deity, these identifications are stated by later Platonists.[22] In the case of each philosophers played their parts not only in carrying alien wisdoms into the Roman world but also in translating them into symbolic systems and structures wholly comprehensible to later Roman men and women.[23]

The tacit assumption in Alexandria and Athens, just as in Rome, Hippo, and Tyre, was that there was an association between divine and human worlds.[24] This was complemented by the claim that a correspondence existed between divine and human society.[25] In these new religious systems there was a profound need for a

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[18] Geertz [1973d] proposes that social activities can be read for their meanings just as written and spoken materials are.

[19] On this phenomenon see, Momigliano, [1975], 123-150.

[20] Diog. Laert., *Vit. Phil.*, proem., 1ff.; Stob., *Proem.*, 6, p. 20 [Wachsmuth] + Aristoxenus fr. 23 Wehrli; Diodorus, 1.16.

[21] *Civ. dei*, 8.9.

[22] The evidence for this is largely extant in the writings of Philo, Clement, Origen, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus. Consequently these figures stand at the center of this study.

[23] See the pivotal studies by MacMullen [1966], P. Brown [1974] and Gallagher [1982] on the social aspects of such activities.

[24] Nock [1972] comments extensively on this phenomenon.

[25] Dodds [1965], 283-314; and [1973], 156-210, provides a set of psychological propositions to explain this relationship.

correspondence theory between divine truth, intellectual theory, and social fact. Jewish, Christian, and Hellenic philosophers introduced a more universal explanation of things. New models of reality, prophetically and theurgically apprehended, were propounded.[26]

Yet the intellectual and cultural influence of these new gods with their prophets, apostles, and theurgists could only be felt in the Hellenistic and Roman worlds to the extent to which they were capable of expressing themselves in Greek.[27] No Greek or Roman read the Avesta, Gathas, and Bible unless it was made available in their language.

Jews, Christians, and Chaldaeans made their sacred scriptures available to Romans in that language.[28] Their contents were translated into a philosophical system by later Platonists. This translation activity constitutes a nodal point in ancient Mediterranean history.

Ancient Romans eventually became culturally conditioned by a triangle now encompassing Greece, Rome, and Judea. The consequences were that Moses,[29] Jesus,[30] and Hecate,[31] along with their prophets, apostles, and theurgists became respected figures. Philosophers proposed doctrines on behalf of their gods and holy men concerning the operations of nature and society.[32]

Later Platonism remained Hellenistic in language, customs, and above all in self-consciousness. What has been found is interdependence, but no uniformity in later Platonic understandings of Moses and Jesus, Balaam and Hecate. What needs to be further ascertained, then, is how later Platonists came to evaluate their prophets, diviners, and magicians and transmit this knowledge in relation to their own society. For this we begin in neither Greece, Rome, or Judea, but in Alexandria with Philo Judaeus.

I
Prophecy, Divination, and Magic in Middle Platonism

Aesthetic Pattern

Philo of Alexandria

Winston notes that the symbolic system of Philo is firmly rooted in his overpowering conception of God as the supremely transcendent reality whose pervasive immanence controls and directs every aspect of cosmic activity.[33] To this we may add every aspect of prophetic and divinatory activity as well.[34]

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[26] See, Luck, [1985], 3-60; 229-260.

[27] On Greek views of Jews see, Momigliano, [1975], 74-122. On Roman views of Christians see, MacMullen [1966]; Wilken [1985].

[28] On the Septuagint translations and its impact on the Hellenistic world see, Brock, [1972], 11-36.

[29] Gager, [1972]. cf. rev. Stern. [1973], 94-98.

[30] Courcelle, 151-192 in Momigliano [1963]; Also Gallagher, [1982].

[31] Lewy, [1975].

[32] Berchman, [1984].

[33] Winston, [1984], 372.

[34] Winston, [1988]; also Berchman, [1987]; [1988].

The human intellect is part of the divine intellect and humanity has access to the divine when the intellect is properly utilized.[35] Philo also indicates that a special kind of perception, the prophetic vision, escorts the soul to the upper most vault of the intelligible world or Logos.[36] This vision depends on divine inititive.[37]

Humanity also has autonomous powers of reason. These too are linked to the divine intellect and they play an important role in his theories of prophecy and knowledge.[38] Philo's theory of perception stands in light of this double perspective.[39] Knowledge of the visible world is the starting point to higher knowledge of the intelligibles and the Logos.[40] It is to his understandings of perception we now turn for it forms the backdrop to his vision of Balaam and gentile prophecy.

Perception

Sense perception played a regular and significant role in the writings of Philo of Alexandria.[41] For the most part knowledge [*episteme*] denotes a preconception [*katalepsis*]. Philo asserts that the criterion of human knowledge arises from sense-perception [*kataleptike phantasia*].[42] Thus, sense-perception provides the standards upon which all knowledge of the physical universe rests.

The formation of perceptions gives rise to knowledge, and knowledge comes to form a fixed system of conceptions. This assumption has wide-ranging ramifications. Philo associates sensation, mind, and reason and assumes that perceptions and the conclusions based upon them are related to one another.[43]

This postulate permits Philo to claim that the visible world is the starting point towards knowledge of the intelligible world.[44] Moreover, since God directs the activities of the human mind, perceptions based on conceptions present truth criteria not only of sensible things but potentially intelligible things as well.[45]

Sensible and intelligible knowledge comes from God, and the human mind guided by reason possesses a *logos* character. Cognitive assent, therefore, compels us to regard perceptions based on conceptions as true because of the ground of their criterion of certainty.[46]

For Philo man is placed by nature midway between deity, who is the essence and source of pure intellect and material substance, the essence and source of sensible

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[35] *Det.*, 90; cf. *Op. Mun.*, 46.

[36] *Op. Mun.*, 70; cf. *Leg. Alleg.*, 3.82; *Ebr.*, 147ff.; *Fuga*, 166; *Praem.*, 122; *Cont.*, 85; *Prob.*, 13; *Quest. in Gen.*, 2.68; *Quest. in Ex.*, 2.15. On the background to this see, Winston, [1984], 375 n. 12.

[37] *Somn.*, 1.71; cf. *Fuga*, 168.

[38] As noted by Winston, [1984], 372-377. Winston argues there is no contradiction between these two types of human knowing.

[39] *Praem.*, 5.28; *Conf.*, 26.133; *Leg. Alleg.*, 1.11.29; 2.7.23, 8.24; *Congr.*, 141.

[40] *Somn.*, 1.32, 187-188; *Virt.*, 3.12; *Leg. Alleg.*, 3.33, 100. Nonetheless perception [*aisthesis*] yields opinion [*doxa*]. cf. *Praem.*, 5.28.

[41] On perception in the writings of Philo see, Dillon, [1977], 145-146; 174-182; Berchman [1984], 170-176.

[42] *Cong.*, 141. cf. *Immut.*, 41-44; *Quest. Gen.*, 3.3].

[43] *Leg. Alleg.*, 1.11.29; 2.7.23; 2.8.24; *Conf.*, 26.133; *Praem.*, 5.28.

[44] *Somn.*, 1.32, 187-188.

[45] *Leg. Alleg.*, 1.13.40; 2.13.44-46.

[46] Philo's theory of sensible knowledge presupposes a Stoic theory of the certainty of sensible knowing. cf. *SVF* 1.68. Also see, Dillon, [1977], 141.

knowing. Man is linked to the world of intellect by reason and to the physical world by sensation. All knowledge reasonable or sensible, then, is tested by the knowledge of God as proclaimed in scripture. This wisdom is the final arbitrer and standard by which the truth of human notions are ultimately tested.[47]

All higher knowledge, thus, comes ultimately from God for he not only directs the activities of the human mind but also provides the human mind with knowledge of intelligible things.[48] This knowledge, the content of sensation [*aisthesis*] and reason [*logismos*], the synthesis of scientific knowledge [*episteme*] and propositions [*theoremasi*] yields both opinion [*doxa*] and truth [*aletheia*].[49]

For Philo, then, all logical truth and certainty are based upon the human mind's participation in the divine mind. God's Logos is the ground and source of all understanding.[50] Philo calls such higher knowledge prophetic or unmixed knowledge[51] Moreover, this divine knowledge arises independently of sensible-knowledge. It is placed by deity on his own inititive in the souls of certain favored men and women.[52]

Therefore, the human mind can only know nature and reality through intelligible extension, by relating all its knowledge to God who is the source of the ideas which are the basis of all true knowledge.[53] All truth and certainty are based on ideational participation. The light that illuminates the path of knowledge emanates from God. Significantly however, it also arises from prophecies articulated through selected prophets.[54]

Philo associates this type of human knowledge with *logos* knowledge. Access to divine knowledge, then, is available through scripture. Divine wisdom has been breathed into human souls as the breath of God was breathed into Adam and Moses.[55] Only the prophet is capable of transmitting divine knowledge to humanity. Only the interpreter of prophecy is capable of translating prophetic knowledge to humanity.[56]

Philo pursues this notion by giving a broader meaning to perception that previously supposed. There exists not only sensible-perception but also prophetic perception.[57] This type of perception is associated with ecstasy and it transports the human mind into the divine mind itself.[58]

Perception and Prophecy

According to Philo the organ of prophecy is the spirit [*pneuma*], the purest and most divine essence [*ousia*].[59] The prophetic soul receives pneumatic messages

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[47] *Quest. Gen.*, 4.140; *Post.*, 43.143; *Fuga*, 13.66; *Vit. Mos.*, 2.8, 48.
[48] *Leg. Alleg.*, 2.13.4-46; *Virt.*, 3.12.
[49] *Leg. Alleg.*, 3.33, 100; *Mut.*, 1.4-5; *Praem.*, 5.28.
[50] *Quest. Gen.*, 3.9; *Virt.*, 39.21.
[51] *Fuga*, 5.2.
[52] *Spec. Leg.*, 4.8.49; *Virt.*, 39.217; *Heres*, 53.265.
[53] *Leg. Alleg.*, 3.33.100; *Abr.*, 24.122.
[54] *Somn.*, 1.2; *Abr.*, 102; *Fuga*, 108.
[55] *Fuga*, 33.186; *Vita Mos.*, 1.277.
[56] *Gig.*, 5.22; *Immut.*, 1.33.190; *Mut.*, 31.169; *Somn.*, 1.33.
[57] *Leg. Alleg.*, 4.8.89; *Virt.*, 39.217; *Heres*, 53.265.
[58] *Quest. Gen.*, 3.90; 4.90.
[59] *Vit. Mos.*, 1.277; *Fuga*, 33.

through its faculties of intellection, hearing, and sight. A prophetic or rational soul is fully capable of apprehending divine sights, sounds, and ideas.[60] Through the rational part of the soul the prophet apprehends the divine ideas and achieves union with the divine intellect.[61]

In prophecy the soul has a conscious perception of divine wisdom and articulates it through the divine word for she moves in unison with the mind of the universe.[62] Once this occurs the human mind becomes a prophetic spirit [*prophetikon pneuma*][63] or a divine and prophetic spirit [*to theion kai prophetikon pneuma*].[64]

For Philo this coupling of the rational soul with the divine intellect means that the human mind moves out of itself in prophecy towards union with the divine mind and receives knowledge and foreknowledge of divine things.[65] This type of knowledge is apprehensible because through oracles divine ideas are transmitted to the human intellect. The crucial step lies in the identification of the prophetic spirit or detachable self with the mind of the universe upon reception of an oracle.[66] Consequently, when the soul hears the divine voice or perceives a divine image she acquires a transcendent, rational self. Philo's prophetic epistemology has close associations with his theory of ideas.[67]

The highest kind of knowledge is knowledge of the ideas. But in a momentous step Philo substitutes the term prophecy for the Platonic term recollection [*anamnesis*]. Furthermore prophecy is defined as divine possession and corybantic frenzy. It is something suprarational.[68] Therefore, Philo generally introduces oracular speech through the formula *thespizei tade*.[69]

Philo regards everything in the Pentateuch as oracular and thus capable of prophetic understanding. Significantly, the faculties of sight and hearing are of central importance for Philo's conception of prophecy, psychological regeneration and ascent. The divine words are seen as light or as the power of sight residing in the soul.[70] Prophetic speech consists primarily of a narration of vision and voice experiences which when understood allegorically result in the soul purifying and raising herself toward God.

In coupling the rational soul with the divine intellect Philo assumes that the mind moves out of itself in prophecy and that the sounds and sights she receives from deity are not only efficacious but are also capable of presenting the criterion of human knowledge and foreknowledge of divine things. Accordingly, Moses experienced prophetic possession. Balaam did not. He was merely a magician, soothsayer, seer, and diviner.

This distinction between Moses and Balaam is not without significance. It points

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[60] *Somn.*, 1.2; 2.1.
[61] *Vit. Mos.*, 2.188-191; cf. *Gig.*, 19; 28; *Spec. Leg.*, 49.
[62] *Vit. Mos.*, 2.74-76.
[63] Ibid., 2.277.
[64] *Fuga*, 188.
[65] *Vit. Mos.*, 2.74-76.
[66] *Gig.*, 22; *Spec. Leg.*, 49; *Virt.*, 219.
[67] For a recent study of Philo's theory of ideas see, Dillon [1977], 155-162.
[68] *Abr.*, 35; *Cher.*, 27.
[69] See, *Vit. Mos.*, 1.201.
[70] *Abr.*, 35; 47-49; *Vit. Mos.*, 1.66.

toward Philo's attitude concerning the question of human self-identity.[71] It is man's intuitive intellect alone which escapes the flux and uncertainty of the created order. Unmediated intellection affords humanity a glimpse of the eternally and truly real.[72]

> Our great Moses likened the form of the reasonable soul to no created thing, but averred it to be a genuine coinage of that divine and invisible breath, signed and impressed by the seal of God, the stamp of which is the eternal Logos.[73]

The Descended Soul and the Divine Intellect

For Philo, then, the rational mind is an inseparable portion of the divine and blessed soul—an extension of the divine intellect.[74] Philo's assurance in the higher aspects of human self-identity rests on the postulate that the human intellect [*logos*] is an imprint [*ekmageion*], fragment [*apospasma*], or effulgence [*apaugasma*] of the divine intellect [*Logos*].[75] The mind in each of us is an indirect expression of the Maker. Between human mind and divine maker is the Logos, who is the image of God and the paradigm of our reason.[76]

Significantly Moses is the faithful cast [*ekmageion empheres*] and an impression and stamp [*typon tina kai charaktera*] of the divine image.[77] In his allegory of the Tabernacle when Moses as high-priest offers prayers and sacrifices the whole rational universe enters with him. His oracular breast-piece is an image of the reason which holds the universe together and administers all things.[78]

However, for Philo most humans are not such faithful casts, impressions, and stamps of the divine image like Moses. Rather many resemble Balaam. They are lovers of the body [*philosomatoi*], unable to bear satiety [*koron*] of divine goods.[79] Their souls enter into mortal bodies according to certain fixed periods or are selected for return according to the number and periods determined by nature.[80]

Although it is difficult to determine if Philo thought the reason for the soul's descent into corporeality is due to wantonness and/or necessary for the completion of the universe, it is clear that the fall of the soul is a function of a situation of misfortune. It is the central thrust and fundamental aim of his biblical commentaries to return the rational soul to its native home through means of allegorical interpretation. Initially taught by Moses the allegorical method is a way to reverse the tragedy of the fall of the soul.[81]

Philo sees the soul as entombed in the body. Her journey in the body is taken as a period of exile. Her return to the Logos is a story of intelligible regeneration.[82]

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[71] Philo's theory of the soul is excellently presented by Winston [1985], 27-42. His analysis guides all others.

[72] *Praem.*, 28-30; *Heres*, 98.

[73] *Plant.*, 18; cf. *Spec. Leg.*, 3.207; *Heres*, 57.

[74] *Gig.*, 27.

[75] *Op. Mun.*, 146; *Praem.*, 163.

[76] *Heres*, 231; *Leg. Alleg.*, 3.96.

[77] *Mut.*, 223; *Det.*, 83.

[78] *Vit. Mos.*, 2.133-134. cf. *Spec. Leg.*, 1.96.

[79] *Somn.*, 1.138; *Heres*, 240.

[80] *Somn.*, 1.138; *Plant.*, 14.

[81] *Plant.*, 36; *Abr.*, 147; 236; *Conf.*, 190.

[82] This motif is succinctly presented in *Mig.*, 1-4; 7-12.

Assuming a hierarchy of living beings dwelling in different regions of the universe in ascending order of perfection, Philo envisions for most souls an ascent to the wonderful and divine essence of the upper air.[83] For special souls like the sage ascent culminates at the realm of the archetypal ideas.[84] Isaac and Enoch find their terminus in the place of the incorpoeral ideas.[85] Moses is advanced even higher and finds his home beyond genus and species beside God himself.[86]

This gift of psychological regeneration and the attainment of grades of immortality is dependent on the extent to which the soul pursues of a life of perfect virtue.[87] The prophets of the Pentateuch serve as role models for the soul in her pursuit of virtue.[88]

Moses, who symbolizes a fully rational human soul functions as the model and patron *par excellence* of the ascent of the soul to her six cities of refuge. If the soul follows Moses perfectly, then she arrives at the best and most venerable of abodes, the divine Logos.[89] Philo allegory associates each of the cities with geographical regions. It is clear that during ascent and in her final abode each soul attains some degree of happiness.[90]

Prophecy and Salvation

For Philo the noetic assertion that man was created after the image [*kat' eikona*][91] carries with it the possibility for the overcoming of psychological misfortune. Prophecy, provides the conditions for the reversal of psychological tragedy. The prophets symbolize virtuous thought and action and function as models for the attainment of psychological happiness.

Unlike many later Platonists, Philo is reticent to deify the world. Although careful to point out that Moses confirmed the Chaldaean doctrine of cosmic sympathy, he also rejected their divinization of the cosmos. This means that divine assistance is not accessible through the world and the practice of cosmic religion.[92]

Divine help is only available in prophecy and through the teachings of his prophets. This judgement carries with it profound consequences—the reification of the *logos* character of prophecy and the *logos* nature of the prophet. Both consequences find their nexus in the reification of certain types of sensible knowledge. Such ideas will be developed further by Clement and Origen of Alexandria.

Clement of Alexandria

The Reification of Perception

The word perception [*aisthesis*] had penetrated deeply into the linguistic

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[83] *Quest. Gen.*, 3.10; 4.8; *Heres*, 283;
[84] *Quest. Gen.*, 3.11.
[85] *Sac.*, 7; *Quest. Gen.*, 1.86.
[86] *Sac.*, 8-10; *Ebr.*, 94.
[87] *Quest. Gen.*, 1.151; *Op. Mun.*, 154; *Conf.*, 149.
[88] *Fuga*, 94-105.
[89] Ibid.
[90] *Somn.*, 2.234-235; *Fuga*, 213.
[91] *Op. Mun.*, 69.
[92] *Migr.*, 178; *Decal.*, 52-53; *Cont.*, 3; *Conf.*, 173.

consciousness of the Christian Platonists of Alexandria.[93] For Clement knowledge begins as the product of the combined activities of sensation [*aisthesis*] and mind [*logos*].[94] Such activity yields presentations [*prolepseis*] that are trustworthy because of the assent of the mind [*sygkatathesis*] to the undemonstrable, yet unshakable, *logos* character of all sense-perception.[95]

Clement calls assent to the inherent veracity of sense-perception belief [*pistis*].[96] Perception is believable because of its demonstrable character.[97] Thus, with Clement a link exists between sense-knowledge and intelligible-knowledge.[98] There exist two kinds of faith and demonstration: the scientific [*epistemonike pistis*];[99] and the opinable [*doxastike pistis*].[100] Scientific knowledge is associated with divine wisdom [*gnosis*].[101]

For Clement knowledge begins in opinion, ascends to knowledge, and culminates in wisdom. Not only is each type of knowledge logically demonstrable. The criterion of all knowledge rests upon the statements [*lemmata*] and axioms [*axiomata*] of biblical scripture.[102] This leads to the claim that the final arbiter of human knowledge is the divine word [*logos*] reasonably revealed in scripture.

Since Clement sees the ground of all knowledge and reality in God, and the sacred scriptures which contain his wisdom, both perception [*aisthesis*] and the natural world [*kosmos aisthesis*] are reified. The truth conditions of human knowledge rest upon the perceptions the mind finds in sensibles [*ta aistheta*], in intelligibles [*ta noeta*], and in the words [*logoi*] of revealed wisdom [*gnosis*] instantiated in the statements [*lemmata*] and propositions [*axiomata*] of biblical scripture.

The validity, the value, and the certainty of fundamental perceptions, concepts, and ideas are placed beyond doubt by the active participation of God in the world. Knowledge is predicated on such participation. The light [*phos*] of human understanding points towards the light [*phos*] of the divine intellect [*logos*].[103]

This reification of sense-perception also implies a reifying of the natural world.[104] A divine presence in the world permits Clement to claim that the human mind apprehends universals in the particulars. By stripping perceptions of all material content, the mind grasps the forms, and perhaps, the divine form itself.

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[93] On perception in the epistemologies of Clement and Origen see, Lilla [1971], 118-131; Berchman, [1984], 176-200.

[94] *Strom.*, 2.8.4. {Staehlin}.

[95] Ibid., *prolepseis:* 8.6.7-7.2; 8.14.3; 4.156.1; 6.2.2; 7.13.2; *sygkatathesis:* 2.8.42.54.5-55.1.

[96] Ibid., *pistis:* 2.8.4; 2.54.5-55.1.

[97] Ibid., *apodeiktikos:* 8.5.1-3; 8.7.6.

[98] This association is not novel with Clement. It has its origin in Antiochus, ap. Cicero, *Ac.Pr.*, 2.37-39; *De Fin.*, 4.9, and Philo Judaeus, *Leg. Alleg.*, 1.11.29; 2.8.24; 2.7.23; *Conf.*, 133; *Praem.*, 5.28. cf. Dillon [1977], 91-105; 174-183; Berchman, [1984], 167-176.

[99] *Strom.*, 2.1.5; 2.48.1.

[100] Ibid., 5.2-3; 8.7.8.

[101] Ibid., 2.49.3.

[102] Ibid., 8.7.3; 5.35.5.

[103] Ibid., 1.97.2; 2.45.7; 5.12.3; 7.2.2; 7.13.2; 7.16.6.

[104] The reification of nature is explicit in Clement's demiurgic theology and cosmology, cf. *Strom.*, 5.16.5; 5.94.1-5; 5.38.7; 6.58.1; 4.155.2. E.g.,, Berchman [1984], 72-81.

Through demonstration [*apodeixis*], the mind perceives and then knows the derivative order of nature, the subsisting order of the ideas, and the essential order of deity.[105] The mind [*nous*], then, relates the accidental to the necessary, the factual to the rational, the temporal to the eternal.

Perception and Allegory

Clement consciously links perception with reasoned revelation. The reading of scripture presented to the mind pictures of Father and Son acting out a divine drama in perceptively vivid terms. This raised a question—whether the data of sense-perception culled from the Bible are to be taken literally or allegorically.

As Clement illustrates early Christians were divided from the beginning. His solution is to propose degrees of belief [*pistis*], commencing with opinable belief [*doxastike pistis*] linked to sense-perception [*aisthesis*]; and scientfic belief [*epistemonike pistis*] linked to intellection [*noesis*].[106] He argued that the senses concealed the allegorical truths of scripture.

Taking the creation account in *Genesis* he cleared the literalists out of the way and was able to offer an allegorical reading of all scripture.[107] No longer was it necessary to treat the Biblical account of perception or nature literally. One interpreted sensible knowledge and the sensible world allegorically according to the principles of science.

From the second century on Christian Platonists gained confidence in the rationality of their scriptures and intellectual freedom in the truth veracity of scriptural perception. It was a vision that set about turning Greek philosophy and natural science to the service of Christianity. Plato's metaphysics and Aristotle's epistemology and psychology were allegorically linked to their Bible.

For those who know how to tap it Clement believed that a divine power was present in scripture and nature. Allegory was the instrument of discovery. Hidden relationships could not be explained by a literal reading of revelation and creation. Allegory connects the human mind with a divine object and permits the species to share in the nature of the divine.

Origen of Alexandria

Perception and Allegory

Preoccupied as he was with allegory, Clement's successor Origen built upon his insights, and went far beyond them. The task of the Christian Platonist was to expound these biblical allegories and make their rich and complex aesthetic message plain to all.[108]

Animals, plants, planets, precious stones, geometrical figures, numerical ratios: every allusion had a hidden significance which the serious student struggles to demonstrate. Moreover, any instrument which could assist this task was justified, even the incomplete learning of the pagans. Philosophical knowledge was now turned to worthy purposes, an interest in knowledge, the soul, and reality was no

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[105] *Strom.*, 8.5.1-3.

[106] Ibid., 2.8.4; 2.54.5-55.1.

[107] Ibid., 5.93.4; 5.95.1-5; esp. 5.16.5. cf. Lilla [1971], 191ff.

[108] For a discussion of the linkage between Origen's metaphysic, epistemology, and dialectic see, Berchman [1984], 113-166; 187-200; 210-297.

longer a stumbling block between the Christian and salvation.[109]

Origen was careful to explain the divine presence in nature through allegory. Moreover, perception played an important role in assessing and solving a wide-ranging metaphysical drama for Origen: the descent and ascent of the soul.

Divine and Human Perception

The Alexandrian maintained an epistemology strikingly similar to those of Antiochus, Philo, and Clement.[110] Human knowledge begins in perception [*aisthesis*] and intellection [*noesis*][111] and ends in divine wisdom [*gnosis*].[112] The transition from perception to intellection is divinely assisted.[113] It culminates in "gazing face to face" with deity himself.[114] Indeed, even divine knowledge presents itself to the human mind through a divine perception [*theia aisthesis*] that activates the human intellect.[115]

This activation of the human intellect by the divine intellect occurs perceptively. Moreover, it is through perception [*aisthesis*] that knowledge of the eternal verities are transmitted to the human soul.[116]

This assumption carries with it profound implications for later Platonic aesthetics. The soul is fallen, cut-off from her divine source.[117] It is through perception [*aisthesis*] that the soul begins its ascent back to its divine source [*archē*].

The initial conjunction of the human and divine intellects occurs with perception [*aisthesis*] and intellection [*noesis*]. The final conjunction occurs with wisdom [*gnosis*].[118] Indeed, through perception the fallen soul comes to a divine perception of reality.[119]

The potential intellect is activated from without by divine perception, by the Logos giving to the soul a knowledge of truth on the pistic levels of opinion, knowledge, and wisdom. In its ascent from the material to the divine realm the human mind perceives deity: first, in the material world; next in the intelligible world; and, finally, face to face.

For example, Origen uses the term common notions [*koinai ennoiai*] to define

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[109] See, Chadwick [1966]; Trigg [1983].

[110] See, Koch [1932], 248ff.; Berchman [1984], 188ff.

[111] *De Princ.*, 4.1.1; 1.1.7; *C. Cels.*, 1.9-11 {Koetschau}.

[112] *De Princ.*, 3.1.1; 4.3.1; But it has limitations, cf. *C. Cels.*, 8.46.

[113] *De Princ.*, 2.11.6.

[114] *De Princ.*, 2.11.7.

[115] *Com. in Jh.*, 20.43,386. {Koetschau}.

[116] For a complete discussion of Origen's theory of divine perception [*theia aisthesis*] see, Berchman [1984], 190-200. Origen's doctrine has close connections with those of Aristotle, *De An.*, 3.5, and Alexander, *De Anima Liber*, 89,21ff; *De Intel.*, 106,20-23. Philo Judaeus holds a similar theory which is closely tied to his theories of perception and the divine intellect, cf. *De Somn.*, 2.2-3; 1.127-128; 1.133-134. See Berchman [1987], 423-426. Origen's formulation is difficult to reconstruct. Nonetheless, Origen is aware of the elements of this theory. cf. *Com. in Jh.*, 20.43,386; 1.26.39f.; 6.30,140; *De Princ.*, 1.1.7; 1.1.8; 1.1.9; 4.4.7; *C. Cels.*, 1.9-11.

[117] On Origen's psychology see, Tripolitis [1978].

[118] *C. Cels.*, 7.34; *Com. in Jh.*, 1.26.39; *De Princ.*, 2.11.7.

[119] *De Princ.*, 2.11.7.

perceptions. These correspond to the material notions [*physikai ennoiai*] of God.[120] Similarly human ideas [*eide-noeta*] correspond to divine forms [*logoi-ideai*].[121] This is only possible because of the conjunction of the human and divine intellects.[122]

The Descended Soul and Divine Causality

It is through this informing process that the misfortune of the soul's embodiment is reversed. She receives in mental images and words what the Logos eternally beholds and begins her ascent from perfidity to beatitude.

Origen's position is straightforward: ". . . souls are bound in this body as in a prison."[123]

Working off the word "frame" [*demas*], Origen says the soul is bound [*dedesthai*] within the body. The reason for the soul's embodiment is her primeval revolt against God. Thereby she fell from a purely rational state and:

> . . . God, therefore, made the present world and bound the soul to the body as a punishment.[124]

Separated from God the soul is turned over to a fallen world. Bound to a body in a fallen hierarchy of being she rests in an ontological status below daemons, angels, and archangels.

Incapable of saving herself, she is only saved by an act of divine grace.[125] Deity gives [*didomai*] to the soul a means to erase her inherited ontological status.[126] The soul in an act of faith assents to a divine causality that presents itself perceptively in scripture. Endowed with a new, acquired epistemological status, the soul begins her ascent from sensibility to intelligibility, from damnation to salvation.[127]

For Origen the soul communes with the divine through the study of scripture. By initiating and participating in the divine *logos* the soul purifies herself of the impurities of sin. Depending on her degree of pistic purification – doxatic, epistemic, or gnostic – she ascends from the lower regions of the sensible world.

Through perception the soul escapes the misfortune of embodiment and attains noetic, and perhaps for some, even gnostic enlightenment. Liberated she escapes eternal damnation, daemonic affliction to gain angelic, indeed divine protection. For even mere faith endows the Christian soul with access to salvation.

Philo, Clement, and Origen, however, were no mere popularizers. They were accomplished philosophers. For them prophets and magicians were a protean figures roaming through a metaphysical landscape. For them their prophetic and magical natures and the quality of their prophecies and divinations could be tested scien-

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[120] *C. Cels.*, 4.14; 4.32.

[121] *De Princ.*, 4.4.1.

[122] *Com. in Jb.*, 6.30,140; 10.34,209.

[123] *De Princ.*, 1.8.1 = Epiph. *Adv. Haer.*, 64.4.

[124] Ibid. 1.8.1.

[125] Ibid., 1.7.1-2.

[126] The term *didomai* refers to both efficient and teleological cause. God gives the soul her inherited ontological status in terms of efficient cause and her acquired epistemological status in terms of teleological cause. cf. A. Smith [1974], 100-110 who analyzes the use of this term in Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus.

[127] See Koch [1932], pt. 1 on the relationship between *pronoia* and *paideusis* in Origen.

tifically. Consequently, classificatory markers were used to distinguish prophecy, divination, and magic. Moreover, as we have seen these markers were defined on metaphysical grounds.

Prophetic Pattern

Philo of Alexandria

The prophets, diviners, and magicians of the Septuagint Philo considered great and exemplary were already considered great and exemplary by contemporary Jewish writers.[128] Balaam owes preservation to his reputation; though, of course, not all his interpreters thought his oracles reputable.[129] Foremost among these was Philo.[130]

Thus in assessing the relationship of Philo's ideas to Hellenistic social structures one is compelled to ask—how many meanings are implied in the simple Greek word *prophetes*?[131] The occasion is famous, the protagonist is distinguished, and Philo is suitably present and ready to elicit the correct interpretation.

Balaam is summoned by Balak, king of Moab, to curse the invading Israelites. At first Balaam is forbidden by God to fulfill Balak's request, for the people of Israel are not cursed but blessed. At night, however, God speaks to Balaam and gives permission for him to travel to Moab. Later, however, God reconsiders his decision and becomes angry at Balaam for departing.

Expressing his displeasure, God sends an angel to block Balaam's path. Initially the messenger is visible only to Balaam's ass who moves off the path to avoid him. Balaam reproaches the ass. The animal answers and suddenly Balaam sees the angel. Falling on his face before the divine messenger, Balaam offers to return home. The angel allows him to continue on his way with an oracle on his lips from God.

Arriving in Moab Balaam tells Balak he can only tell him God's word. The next morning Balaam and Balak begin a process of divination. Thrice Balaam moves to a mountain top and receives God's word and three times he blesses the children of Israel. Faced with the king's anger the messenger reminds Balak that he can only speak what the Lord spoke to him. Then in a fourth blessing of Israel Balaam describes the destruction Israel would bring upon Moab and other nations in the end of days. Here the narrative concludes with Balaam and Balak returning to their separate lands.

Two later references ascribed to the Deuteronomic writer come to color the story.[132] These additions fuel negative interpretations of Balaam's blessings of Israel. We are told Balaam was motivated by gain in desiring to curse Israel and actually anathematized the nation.[133] We are also reminded that it took divine agency to

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[128] For example see Feldman [1988], 424-441, on Josephus.

[129] The exegetical history of the Balaam of Numbers 22-24 has been compiled by Vermes [1961] and Braverman [1974], 41-50. cf. Kirschbaum [1954], 129-171.

[130] For a recent study of Balaam in Philo see, Baskin [1983], 75-114.

[131] This question has been partially answered in many earlier works. For an interpretion of prophecy in Philo see, Winston [1988], 442-455. cf. Berchman [1987], 403-428; [1988], 385-423.

[132] Following Vermes, [1961], 175; and Rofe, [1979], 45-49.

[133] *Num.*, 23:5-6.

rescue Israel from the evil intentions of Balaam.[134] Here Balaam is transfigured from prophet to magician. God becomes the source of the blessings Balaam pronounces as well as the deliverer of Israel from Balaam's evil hand.[135]

In the Septuagint Balaam's transformation from prophet to wizard is trenchantly cast. All his blessings are of divine origin and Israel is saved from the magician's malevolent designs. Balaam's interpretive fate is sealed. Accused of immorality and idolatry, he is principally viewed as an advisor to Israel's enemies, and judged an unworthy prophet.[136]

Following the Septuagint rendering, Philo questions whether this foreign seer could have served as a spokesman for God.[137] His answer is unequivocal. Balaam is a sorcerer [*mantike*].[138] He says:

> To some he had foretold rainstorms in summer, to others drought and great heat in mid-winter, to some barrenness to follow fertility, or again plenty to follow dearth, to some rivers full or empty, ways of dealing with pestilences, and others things without number.[139]

Balaam has dreams [*oneirata*] which cause powerful visions [*enargeia phantasiais*]. They eventaully compel him to take the road to Moab.[140] However, Philo is careful to tell us Balaam's visions [*chresmon*] are not God-sent dreams. Cleverly posing [*asteizomenos*] we are informed Balaam invented them. For Philo this stands as evidence of Balaam's deceit and greed.[141]

It is only on the road to Moab that a true vision [*semion aridelon*]. This was the appearance of the angel of God. But even here Balaam was bested by the insight of his ass:

> For the unreasoning animal [*alogou zoou*] showed a superior power of sight [*pareuemereito tas opseis*] to him who claimed to see [*horan*] not only the world but the world's maker [*ton kosmopoion*].[142]

Recognizing his error committed in ignorance [*agnoias*] he asks the angel if he can continue his journey. The divine messenger consents disgusted that Balaam would need to ask about a matter so evident which in itself provides its own demonstration [*apodeixis*] and needs no confirmation from the belief of speech [*ek logon pisteos*] as if ears could be more truthful than eyes or speech than facts [*ara ophthalmon ota alethestera kai pragmaton remata*].[143]

The angel tells Balaam he will prompt the needful words without his mind's consent and direct his organs of speech although he will be incapable of understanding the meaning of his prophetic utterances.[144]

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[134] Joshua, 24:9-10.
[135] Rofe, [1979], 47-49.
[136] This is nicely summarized by Baskin, [1983], 75-77.
[137] *Vit. Mos.*, 1.263-294..
[138] Ibid., 1.285.
[139] Ibid., 1.266-267.
[140] Ibid., 1.268.
[141] Ibid., 1.266-267.
[142] Ibid., 1.272.
[143] Ibid., 1.274.
[144] Ibid., 1.275.

Arriving in Moab Balaam attempts to curse Israel from a high hill honoring a pillar deity. But the magi [*to mago*] is immediately invaded by the divine spirit.

> He advanced outside, and immediately became possessed [*peusomai tou theou*] and there fell upon him the truly prophetic spirit [*prophetikou pneumatos*] which banished utterly from his soul his art of wizardry [*ho pasan autou ten entechnon mantiken hyperorion tes psyches elase*]. For the craft of the sorcerer and the inspiration of the holiest might not live together [*ouk en hieratate katokoche syndiaitasthai magiken sophisteian*].[145]

Then Balaam speaks the oracles [*thespizei*] placed in his mouth by God. But for Philo God speaks through Balaam only to save Israel. Indeed, Balaam is so dissolute he cannot even profit from his divine visitation. He thinks his own oracles are more powerful than divine ones. Moreover, even after becoming divinely possessed Balaam again attempts to curse Israel and thereby loses any special powers he may have had.[146]

Philo interprets the name Balaam to mean "foolish people." Balaam symbolizes the species unpurified in its vanity, devoted to mercenary gain; his ass symbolizes the unreasoning rule of life ridden by every fool.[147]

> We may well think the great contriver, that knowing the madness of folly [*ten aphrosynes lutan*], he did not put into its hands, as into the hands of a madman, the sword of the power of words [*dynamin logon*], to wreck widespread and unrighteous carnage among all who came his way. And this angry cry of Balaam is ever the cry of each of the unpurified in his vanity . . . .[148]

For Philo Balaam is no prophet. He is a magician. His oracles rarely carry prophetic truth. Rather they carry falsehoods endemic to magic. Balaam is a:

> False slanderer . . . Behold the armed angel, the reason of God [*theou logon*], standing in the way against you, the source through whom both good and ill come to fulfillment. See where he stands . . . the tests you use are false and your impatience is without reason [*alogos*]. If you had learned from the first that it is not your life-pursuits which bring your share in good or ill, but the divine reason [*logos theios*], the ruler and statesman of all [*ho diopos kai kubernetes tou pantos*] you would bear with more patience what befalls you . . . .[149]

Clement and Origen of Alexandria

Early Christians saw in Balaam both legitimate prophet and illegitimate sorcerer. His prediction of the star which would rise from Jacob was understood as a foretelling of the incarnation. It also established him as the founder of the Magi. However,

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[145] Ibid., 1.277.

[146] This is also made clear in Ps-Philo, *Bib. Ant.*, 18.4. See the James and Feldman edition [1971], esp. Proleg., ix.

[147] *Cher.*, 32.

[148] Ibid., 32-33.

[149] Ibid., 36.

his recorded transgressions also raised questions about the legitimacy of this prophet and his prophecy.[150]

Clement of Alexandria saw Balaam's prediction that a star would rise from Jacob as a proof-text that showed that the prophecies of scripture had been fulfilled in Jesus Christ. Anxious to establish the antiquity of the Christian tradition, Clement used such messianic texts to challenge Hellenic and Jewish criticisms against the claims of Christianity.[151] The words of this gentile prophet was understood to have made Christ known to the gentile peoples. Thus his prophecy was understood to be particularly apt and legitimate.

Balaam was also accepted as the founder of the order of Magi, a group of magicians and seers whose representatives came to worship the infant Jesus.[152] The magi were seen as disciples of Balaam the prophet not the magician. One who pronounced blessings on Israel and foretold the coming of the Christ.

These Christian views of Balaam the prophet are perhaps best exemplified in the writings of Origen of Alexandria. He was especially fond of a type of oracle that predicted the coming of a certain saviour who was to come to live among mankind. He assumed Balaam's prophecy to be among this type of oracle.[153]

Unlike Philo, Origen rejected a suprarational or ecstatic view of prophecy. Philo's proposition that only Moses was capable of rational prophecy was also challenged. Origen claims that prophecy is largely rational inspiration and advocates that not only the few but also the many were capable of such prophetic inspiration.

When the prophets spoke under the control of the Logos they were not in ecstasy:

> . . . voluntarily and consciously they collaborated with the word that came to them.[154]

Origen rejects the suggestion that prophetic inspiration removes or paralyzes the prophet's control of the rational faculties.[155] He maintained that reason is at the forefront of any prophetic relationship between prophet and deity.[156] Consequently, a prophet's consciousness and identity are preserved even when inspired.

Not only do legitimate prophets rationally participate in their prophecies, each of their oracles have three references. They speak to the present, the future, and to the coming of the Christ. As noted Balaam's prophecies meet all three criteria of legitimacy.

Origen establishes the natures of Balaam and his prophetic utterances by examining Balaam's claims, their meanings, and then decides whether or not Balaam was a prophet.[157] Although he cannot fully demonstrate that Balaam was a legitimate

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[150] See, Kirschbaum, [1954], 129-171.

[151] Hanson, [1959], 73.

[152] See, Bidez and Cumont, [1938], 1.47-48. The authors note early associations made by Christians between Zoroaster and Balaam. Danielou, [1964], 115-118 mentions possible connections between Balaam's star prophecy and the astrology practiced by the Essenes and the followers of Simon Magus. cf. Schoeps, [1949], 249-254; van Groningen [1967], 128-164; Baskin [1983], 161-162.

[153] See, Num. 24:17. cf. *Comm. in Jh.*, 13.26 = *PG* 14 col. 443. Also see, Hanson [1959], 196.

[154] *Hom. in Ezek.*, 6.1 = *PG* 13. col. 709.

[155] Ibid., cf. 1 Cor. 14:30; Num. 22:35; and Jonah 1 are Origen's proof-texts.

[156] Hanson, [1959], 196.

[157] This is largely preserved in his *Homilies on Numbers.*

prophet on the literal level, he can prove the efficacy of Balaam's prophecies on the allegorical level. The Balaam story unfolds for Origen on the allegorical level.[158]

Origen assumed that scripture expressed through allegory revealed the primeval causes and disorder in the universe and explained the processes by which they could be reestablished. Viewing Balaam as a sorcerer and diviner in touch with malevolent spirits, he interprets the contest between Balaam and Israel as a microcosm of the macrocosmic struggle between good and evil.[159]

Origen's Balaam fights for the forces of evil against the powers of goodness. His goal, and those of his mentors, is to deceive the God-fearers. God wanted to hinder Balaam on his journey but did not because he was concerned to prevent greater misfortunes that would befall Israel if he did not journey to Moab and offer to Balak his daemonic advice.[160] Origen casts Balaam in magical and malevalent hues:

> This Balaam was most famous in the magic arts and foremost in harmful incantations. He did not truly have power to bless but rather to curse. Daemons, indeed were invoked for cursing, not for blessing. And therefore he was well known in such things according to all who were in the East.[161]

Nonetheless, Origen argues, God saw in Balaam's occult capacities a way to bring the many to worship and knowledge of the true God. His sorcery and divination made him a vehicle for God's word. He was choosen to prophesy, however briefly, to turn people towards the worship of God.

> Balaam was accustomed by these sacrifices to invoke daemons. Indeed, in this way sacrifices are offered in the daemon world. Thus, God instituted from the first the offering of sacrifices for the people, so that, they in offering to God, would cease offering to daemons.[162]

Thus, according to Origen:

> Balaam is the symbol of the people of the nations who follow augeries, but seeing that God does not fulfill these, cease.[163]

Then in a remarkable play on the Philonic exegesis of the symbolics of Balaam's ass, Origen argues that Balaam is the adversary who has imprisoned his ass, understood as the gentile peoples, in false worship.[164] He is associated with the scribes and Pharisees who oppress and bind humanity.[165] Finally, when Christ sends his disciples, the ass is liberated, clothed in the vestments of the evangelical virtues, and allowed to enter the holy city.[166]

Balaam represents false beliefs and hypocrisy. His ass symbolizes false belief converted to Christian belief. Balaam and his ass become metaphors for pagan enslavement and Christian liberation. Moreover, Balaam's oracles symbolize a messianic

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158 Smalley, [1970], 13.
159 *Hom. in Num.*, 15.4 = *PG* 12. col. 672. cf. *Sel. in Numeros* = *PG* 12 col. 578.
160 *Hom. in Num.*, 13.6 = *PG* 12. col. 674.
161 Ibid., 15.4 = *PG* 12. col. 671.
162 *Sel. in Num.* = *PG* 12. col. 579.
163 Ibid., *PG* 12. col 579.
164 Ibid.
165 *Hom. in Num.*, 14.4 = *PG* 12. col. 682-683.
166 Ibid., col. 683. cf. col. 683b; *Com. in Jh.*, 28.12, 13 = *PG* 14. cols. 705, 713.

message directed towards Jews and gentiles that they all may share in the glorious knowledge of the coming of the Christ.[167]

> When the word of God is placed in his mouth, then the Spirit of God overcomes him, then he prophesies the Christ, the he makes known to the Jews and to the nations the future mystery of the coming of Christ, then in place of curses he bestows blessings on the people, and extolls the name of Israel for great glory with mystical utterances.[168]

Origen, thus elevates Balaam to the level of an ambiguous figure—one who is a malevolent sorcerer and a divine prophet.[169] Nonetheless, however divinely inspired Balaam is not a true prophet for his divine possession is unwanted and short-lived.[170] He may prophesy but this does not make him a genuine prophet.[171]

Balaam's prophecy is flawed because the word of God is not in him. He is used by deity as a vessel for greater ends. Why? Like Philo, Origen assumes he was devoid of rationality and rational virtues:

> If Balaam had been worthy, the word of God would not have been in his mouth but in his heart. Since, however, his heart was filled with greed for wealth and money, God's word could only be placed within his mouth.[172]

The sorcerer's message not the sorcerer carries value. Through his message the nations hear the word of God. However, they also move beyond him, to more important beliefs. They await those righteous men who speak with their hearts as well as their mouths. Salvation would be found through Balaam's descendents, the Magi, who symbolize the first representatives of the nations who recognized and worshiped the infant Jesus.[173]

Nonetheless, because Balaam's oracles and their fulfillment he finds a measure of salvation. Through the Magi he finds forgiveness for his irrational excesses. Ambiguity dissolves before redemption. Conjuring deamons and casting curses he deserves damnation. Choosen to deliver a prophecy of the Christ and to be a seed for the coming of the Magi and the Christ, Balaam comes to symbolize a lesson in redemption and gentile salvation.

> From the fact that Balaam says: "Let my seed be the seed of the righteous," we can discern that these Magi who came from the East to be the first to adore Jesus are seen to be from his seed, whether through the succession of his seed, or through the disciples of his tradition. It is evident from the fact that these recognized the star which Balaam foretold would rise in Israel . . . Nor are we only speaking only of these but all of those nations who believed in Christ are saved. From which it is clear, as the apostle said, "For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is of any avail, but faith working through love."[174]

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[167] *Hom. in Num.*, 15.1 = *PG* 12. cols. 683, 684.
[168] Ibid., 15.1 = *PG* 12. cols. 683-684.
[169] Ibid., 15.1 = *PG* 12. col. 683, 684.
[170] *Com. in Jh.*, 28.12 = *PG* 14 col. 707.
[171] *Hom. in Num.*, 14.4 = *PG* 12. col 683.
[172] Ibid., 14.3 = *PG* 12. col. 681.
[173] Ibid., 15.4 = *PG* 12. cols. 689-690.
[174] Ibid., 15.4 = *PG* 12. cols. 689-690.

Culture Pattern

Philo of Alexandria

Balaam has been interpreted by Philo as a symbol for the gentile prophet. His prophecy stands as an exemplar of the irrationality of the gentile oracle. His idolatrous and immoral character was the cause of the Alexandrian's antipathy towards him.[175] Accordingly, an enemy of God and Israel, Balaam becomes the model for the irrational sorcerer in the *corpus Philonicum.* In effect, what Philo opposed or saw as a threat to the *logos* character of the prophet and prophecy, was said to represent the magician and sorcery.

Philo found the biblical soothsayer Balaam an ideal symbol of the evils of immorality, idolatry, and wizardry. When his oracular powers are legitimate, they are so only because he is the medium of God's word not its authentic carrier. Indeed, Balaam's prophetic powers are always unfavorably compared with those of Moses. Moses has inherited powers that Balaam lacks, his relationship to divine and human reason is quite different in nature from that of Moses. Balaam is a menial whose abilities gave him limited powers. Only Moses knew God face to face in a unique reciprocal relationship.

This distinction permits Philo to catalogue the differences between the prophets of Israel and those of the nations in terms of God's attitudes towards them. Deity communicates with Balaam indirectly in sleep and wakefulness. God communes with Moses directly both onarically and hyparically, in dreams and in waking visions. Balaam is an irrational soul incapable of a divine relationship. Moses is a rational soul who possesses a unique relationship with the divine.

For Philo Moses and Balaam mirror wide-ranging patterns and truths. Balaam is an exemplar of one guided by lower psychic impulses and material values. Moses is one guided by intellect and higher noetic virtues. Balaam is not linked to the world of intellect by reason but is one connected to the world of sensibility through desire. Moses is not linked to the sensible world by the lower portion of the soul and body but is one connected to the world of intelligibility through reason.

The first descends into the earthly passions. The second ascends towards his heavenly origins. Each becomes a didactic paradigm. Balaam is an example of why one should abandon lower passions and the instincts. Moses of why one should cultivate higher reason and the virtues.

The model the species follows depends not only on human choice but also on divine grace. In Philo's view neither sensible perception or logical reasoning are of help in actually apprehending God. Such knowledge is often intuitive and comes to the mind spontaenously. Furthermore, at most the individual can only prepare as far as possible for the reception of divine favor. Its appearance is an act of divine grace.

> No pronouncement of a prophet is ever his own; he is an interpreter prompted by another in all his utterances, when knowing not what he does, he is filled with inspiration, as the reason withdraws and surrenders the citadel of the soul to a new visitor and tenant, the divine spirit, which plays upon the vocal organism and raises sounds from it which clearly express its prophetic message.[176]

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[175] See, Baskin, [1983], 93-96.

[176] *Spec. Leg.*, 4.49.

For Philo prophecy is a sign of divine favor. Prophetic possession is prepared for through study and the attainment of wisdom. Someone like Moses is favored. Balaam is not. How could someone full of evil intentions and base desires be a prophet? It is not possible. Balaam, who never enjoyed divine favor, could never be a prophet. Rather he is a magician, at best renowned for his divinatory abilities.

Prophetic pattern meets culture pattern in the following ways. Balaam and Moses symbolize for Philo belief patterns which revolve around desire and irrationality, reason and rationality; and kinship patterns that circle around divine and daemonic patronage. Philo affirms for us the very limits of rational choice theory. The species cannot cope with the large scale metaphysical and social arrangements predetermined by God. Only deity knows how human behaviour, knowledge, and institutions get shaped together.

We know, however, that as individuals, we pick and choose among the analogies from nature and society those they give credence to. Moreover, we also know that at the same time we choose allies, opponents, and the patterns of their future relations. To constitute a version of nature and reality is at the same time to constitute a society.[177]

There are institutional constraints on definitions of legitimate prophecy or divination, and illegitimate sorcery and magic in later antiquity.[178] Every time Philo advocates a Platonic theory he reinforces an institutional arrangement. This leads Philo to affirm a prophetic classification system in accordance with Platonic understandings of degrees of reality, kinds of humanity, types of knowledge, and parts of the soul; and Roman patron-client structures.

Classificatory schemes, however, are not merely ways in which things are sorted out and named. In Needham's words, they represent speculative theories of a metaphysical kind which provide for interpretations of the character of things in the world and the connections among them. Symbolic classification encapsulates a philosophy.[179]

Such interpretive grids are made, unmade, and remade incessantly. The symbolic worlds they reflect are never unitary and fixed. They reflect social systems adapting categories of classification as products of social action with specific social contexts.[180]

Thus, Philo's views of prophecy, divination, and magic correlate to a hierarchical classificatory scheme of the divine, the daemonic, and the human. Candidates for prophetic status such as Balaam provoke an identity crisis. Philo who holds some stake in the answer becomes involved in the process of definition. He struggles to define the category prophet so that the candidate in question can be located outside a legitimate taxon—prophet, and within an illegitimate taxon—magician.[181]

In the case of Balaam it is not so much the category prophet which is manipulated as its salient defining characteristics. Although it appears a field of terminal categories remains relatively constant, this is not the case. Through accusation and praise, rumor and innuendo, propaganda and apologetics this partisan of Moses and detractor of Balaam defines the categories of prophetic definition and thus he controls the process of classification.

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[177] Douglas, [1985], 62.
[178] P. Brown, [1974], 129-143.
[179] Needham, [1979], 3, 17, 19.
[180] See, Montagu, [1968].
[181] See, Gallagher, [1982], 1-37.

Human implications stand at the center of this process. To have one's own candidate acclaimed as a prophet and another's candidate as a magician gives meaning and direction to the follower's life and actions. When, for example, Balaam's character and actions conflict with Philo's convictions about what is proper for the prophetic taxon the outlines for the criteria of the category prophet become clearer.

Theories of reality, knowledge, and the soul are collected from the structure of Platonic symbolizing and connected to the structure of Jewish symbolizing.[182] Moses represents the *logos* character of the Jewish prophet while Balaam signifies the *alogos* character of the prophet from the nations.

Next, prophecy is treated as a function of personal relations and as a function of a situation of misfortune.[183] For Philo Moses and Balaam become elements in the way in which men and women conceptualize their social relationships and relate themselves to the problem of evil.

For Philo the relationship of human soul to divine intellect is cast in terms of divine giving. The Alexandrian treasured divine patronage. Prophecy and the prophet, therefore, transmute psychological and ontological distance into the deep joy of proximity to the rational self and to a rational God. They contribute to a network of interpersonal and communal acts that carry the full overtones of the later Hellenistic cultural traits of love, grace, power, sympathy, patronage, and salvation. Both function as one of the cements of Philo's social world.

In this *demi-monde* the hopeful promises given to Israel by its God were confirmed prophetically. Moses and Balaam serve as visible gestures either of divine patronage and protection or divine displeasure and enmity. Their Pentateuchal histories represent a replication of interpersonal relations between humanity and divinity.

Clement and Origen of Alexandria

For Clement and Origen also Balaam comes to symbolize a constellation of belief complexes and kinship systems.[184] That Balaam's oracles depict the species as poised uncertainly between damnation and salvation, oracular prediction and messianic fulfillment is an arresting notion. It suggests that no firm boundaries existed or unbreachable barriers were erected in late antiquity. The categories of prophecy, divination, and magic are part of a fluid, adaptive, ever-changing classificatory scheme.[185]

The permeability of prophetic boundaries, the fluidity of prophetic identity, and the possibility of prophetic transformation are what Clement and Origen chase in their interpretations. Through demarcating, separating, and tidying these categories, Clement and Origen fashion a social world. Balaam functions to impose order on an inherently untidy experience—the nature of a type of gentile prophet and the efficacy of a kind of messianic prophecy.[186]

Knowledge and institutions get shaped together.[187] For not only are key activities of thinking such as the conferring of identity, the positing of similarity relationships,

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[182] See, Baskin, [1983], 93-94.

[183] See, Evans-Pritchard, [1936 {1976}], 67ff.; Brown, [1974], 129ff.

[184] For an overview of Patristic interpretations of Balaam see, Baskin, [1983], 101-113.

[185] See, Rindos, [1986], 32ff.

[186] See, Douglas, [1966], iff.

[187] Ibid., [1985].

and the classification of types and kinds shaped by the institutional context in which they occur. Cognition also functions to build cultural solidarity. Knowledge processes and practices underpin social institutions. Clement and Origen, then, as they pick and choose among prophetic, divinatory, and magical analogies they will give credence to, pick and choose at the same time allies, opponents, and patterns of future relations.[188]

Origen does not remove the control the prophet has over his noetic faculties. The prophet's individual character and consciousness are preserved, even when inspired. Consistent with this admission, Origen further maintains that each prophecy has past, future, and messianic reference.[189]

Consequently, Origen proposes a three-fold way to interpret prophecy: what the prophet predicted to past contemporaries; what the prophet predicts for future contemporaries; and what the prophet predicted concerning a saviour who was to come and live among mankind. From this rationalization and classification of prophecy Origen proposes a blueprint for interpreting the nature of the prophet Balaam and the function of Balaam's prophetic utterances.

Before, Origen can accomplish this, however, proposes two theses. First, that the universe is engaged in a struggle between good and evil. Second, that scripture presents an account of this struggle.[190] This conflict is allegorically portrayed in scripture through the battle between Israel and Balaam:

> [And Moab said to the elders of Midian] "This horde will now lick up all that is round about us, as the ox licks up the grass of the field" [Num. 22:4]. He uses this example for just as a bull licks up the field with his mouth, so the holy people fight with their lips: they have their defenses in their mouths through prayers. Thus since Balak knew that in previous wars this obviously had happened, he too wished to enter a fight with the force of lips and he called upon Balaam who had the arms of the contrary power in his lips, namely his curses. The holy angels came to the aid of the just to do good works of salvation; devils came to the support of the evil to do evil works which endanger the salvation of men. The holy, of course, fight by words of prayer, the impious and sinners by magical incantations.[191]

Origen sees the battle between Balaam and Israel as a microcosm of the battle in the macrocosm between unrighteousness and righteousness.[192] Balaam is portrayed as a magician, not a prophet. He is classified among those warriors of words in the service of evil, not in the service of good. From this classificatory scheme, Origen establishes two distinct patron-client systems. Again one is divine, the other is daemonic.

Balaam fits within both systems. He is the magician of daemons. He builds altars and sacrifices to daemons. He gives daemonic council to Moab and Balak. However, he also prophesies to the nations. He turns the nations from false necromancy to

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[188] Ibid., 62.

[189] See, Hanson, [1959], 196ff.

[190] Smalley, [1970], 13.

[191] *Sel. in Num.* = *PG* 12. col. 578. cf. *Hom. in Num.*, 15.4 = *PG* 12. col. 672.

[192] On conflict theory and classificatory schemes see, Gallagher, [1982].

true worship. He proclaims an oracle that heralds the coming of a messiah and the victory of good over evil.

> When the word of God is placed in his mouth, then the spirit of God overcomes him, then he prophesies the Christ, then he makes known to Jews and to the nations the future mystery of the coming of Christ, then in place of curses he bestows blessings on the people, and extols the name of Israel for great glory.[193]

For Origen, Balaam comes to symbolize a taxonomic shift of immense proportions concerning gentile prophecy. The sorcerer Balaam represents false pagan beliefs and is a metaphor for the enslavement of humanity. The prophet Balaam proclaims a messianic message which heralds the liberation of humanity. Moreover, Origen's taxonomic shift concerning gentile prophecy also points to a new classification of channels of divine patronage. He associates Balaam's ass with the nations and the church. First carrying false belief, they now have the opportunity to carry Christ.[194]

Origen's reformulations, then, provide social explanations for prophetic symbolizing. Since symbols offer a shared system of cultural bonding, Balaam's prophetic behaviour is envoked to explain the meaning and function gentile prophecy. Through Balaam a new kinship system is revealed that unites the nations and Israel through the Christ.

The results Origen gains from symbolizing permits him to draw some general conclusions about the cultural ecology of Balaam as prophet to the nations. Origen has little reason to look kindly on Philonic interpretations of Balaam. The exemplar of the nations no longer takes on sinister form. Not merely a sinister villain, Balaam comes to symbolize a variety of Christian perceptions about the world.

The biblical soothsayer Balaam remains a symbol of the perceived evils of immorality, idolatry, and sorcery. But Balaam also becomes a symbol of the first of the gentile prophets. After him the nations have the possibility for greatness. The election of Israel and divine preference has been transferred to the nations.

Now open is the possibility for a privileged relationship with deity and a unique place in God's affections. Later, when the nations become the church, they demonstrate their superiority to the descendants of Jacob. Reversing Philo's judgement Origen argues that the nations forfeited divine approbation by ultimately accepting the Christ. To deny this would have been, Origen argues, to ignore copius biblical evidence that other gentiles such as Enoch, Noah, Melchizedek, and Job had been privileged to communicate directly with God. According to Origen, prophecy among the gentiles is a legitimate phenomenon. By not accepting it, the Jews forfeited their exclusive right to divine indulgence.

Although Balaam's fitness to be called a true prophet is rejected by Origen, his worthiness to be a prophet was not the major issue. There is irrefutable evidence that God spoke with and used Balaam. Certainly, Balaam's wickedness is acknowledged. Balaam lost his prophetic powers as a result of his attempt to harm Israel. The punishment fits the crime.

Initially consumed by idolatry, immorality, sorcery, and the worship of false deities Balaam is vilified. However, Origen reminds his audience, it is through

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[193] *Hom. in Num.*, 15.1 = *PG* 12. col. 683-684.

[194] This is nicely summarized by Baskin, [1983], 103-109.

Balaam that the nations are called to deity. Balaam is a miscreant granted momentary prophecy. His continual divination and avarice renders his prophecy flawed. His character and behaviour show that the word of God was not truly in him.

However, Origen argues, it is not the prophet but his prophecy that is important:

> He was propelled by miracles and with great charge since the words of the prophets, which were contained within the confines of Israel, could not reach the nations. It would be through Balaam, in whom all nations had faith, that the secret mystery of the Christ might become known, and the great treasure be offered to the people, even though carried, not through the heart and senses, but through the mouth and by discussion.[195]

Through Balaam the nations would have their hearts and senses opened. Moreover, they would move beyond him, to more worthy and profound beliefs, and into a new patronage and kinship system proclaimed by Balaam's representatives—the Magi.

Origen's Balaam is no longer contradictory. Balaam symbolizes the nations themselves. Although personally warranting shame, his social function makes him worthy of honor. He delivers a prophecy of the Christ which brings the nations from shame to honor. Although collectively warranting shame, the nations acceptance of the Christ makes them worthy of honor.

But for everyone who found this turn of events attractive; others were threatened. In instances of popular category reformulation one's prophet remains another's magician; one's prophecy another's sorcery. Such differences depend on the observer's perception.

This is an important fact. Despite popular attempts to distinguish prophecy from magic, boundaries remained fluid, and classifications rested soley on polemical grounds. Consequently, no stable set of categories and classes, no unchanging persistence of a single typology emerged on the popular level. There existed only a conscious manipulation of categories and criteria arising from instances of ideological conflict.[196]

Aesthetic Symbols and the Arts

Although Philo, Clement, and Origen effect a *detente* with aspects of Platonic aesthetic theory in this period, they say very little that is positive about either the aesthetic imagination or the plastic arts. Since a revaluation of the imagination is a necessary ingredient to an assessment of the intelligible value of the plastic arts, the ancient Mediterranean world had to await Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus, for paradigm shifts in later Platonic aesthetic theory. Such reformulations require examination for they undergird later Platonic views of Hecate and her patron—the theurgist.

Philo, Clement, and Origen have little positive to say about the phantasia.[197] Any knowledge linked to the activity of the imagination is judged recollective and thus, in a Platonic sense—imaginary. With Plotinus a different attitude towards the imagination and plastic arts emerges that becomes normative for all Platonists who follow upon him.

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[195] Ibid., 13.4=*PG* 12. col. 681-682.

[196] See, Gallagher, [1982].

[197] *De Princ.*, 2.3.6

Nonetheless, since innate concepts [*koinai ennoi*] are impressed upon the mind by its divine maker Philo, Clement, and Origen reflect changing Platonic views concerning the epistemic value of sense-perception [*aisthesis*].[198] This transitional moment is not without profound significance for late antiquity.

Philo and Clement's reification of the senses, and Origen's divinization of perception may serve allegorical and soteriological ends but, nonetheless, both formulations are conducting paths for establishing divine correspondences between humanity and divinity.

Philo, Clement, and Origen believed a divine power pullulated through their scriptures. Origen, for example, proposed that it was aesthetically graspable because of a conjoinal communion between human and divine perception. But before he could assimilate such notions cogently, he fell prey to charges of daemonic manipulation[199] and had to defend his savior from similar slanders.[200]

These aesthetic patterns have their culture patterns. Jews and Christians carried their Bibles with them to ensure divine contact and protection.[201] Later, rabbis, priests and bishops would take on the ambivalent halo of *magi* because of their divine knowledge.[202] Knowers of the reified *logoi* of scripture they could establish contact with their God. With them the divine writings were not merely symbols [*symbola*] or tokens [*synthemata*] of divine power. Because of its *logos* character scripture was considered the instantiation of the holy.

Later, Jews and Christians would become famous not only for knowing divine scripture, but also for conjuring up the divine itself. For example, Psellus describes a theurgical ceremony which took place in 1059 C.E. wholly in a Christian context. Although the event is late, nonetheless, it is instructive. For it led to a formal accusation of the Patriarch Michael Cerularius and his proteges, the monks of Chios.[203]

Dositheа, a medium, after singing, physical exercise, and the ingestion and inhaling of narcotics, began to speak softly; she trembled, and then levitated. First, she spoke of cosmic subjects. Next, Christian prophets, martyrs and saints appeared before the congregation. Finally, the Virgin Mary and the Trinity appeared, speaking through the medium. They said "hello," asked those assembled "to blow twice into your cup," and "I am glad to see you after having seen the moon."

To grasp the significance of this event requires a finely tuned aesthetic imagination. To understand the conditions for the possibility of such an imagination requires that we, like Michael Psellus, comment on extant works and summarize lost texts, and thereby go beyond the aesthetic theories of Philo, Clement, and Origen to those of Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus. This allows entrance into the theurgic world of Julian the Theurgist, Michael Cerularius, Dositheа, and the monks of Chios.

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[198] See Koch [1932], 83; 248.

[199] On Origen and magic see, Bardy [1928], 126-142.

[200] Especially in the *C. Cels.* See Gallagher's sensitive study [1982].

[201] On this phenomenon see, Brox [1974], 157-180.

[202] See, P. Brown [1974], 129-143.

[203] *Scrip. Min.*, 1.232ff. K-D.

II
Prophecy, Divination and Magic in Hellenic Neoplatonism

Prophetic Pattern

Hellenic Neoplatonists were especially fond of the didactic oracle, particularly if the oracle focused on a theological, philosophical, or moral issue.[204] In late antiquity many oracles of this type emanated from the oracle sanctuaries at Claros and Didyma.[205] The surviving fragments of the Chaldaean Oracles written towards the end of the second century C.E. by Julianus the Chaldaean, are prime examples of this type of oracle.[206] Composed by Julianus and dictated by various divinities including Hecate, these oracles represent a mixture of Platonism and popular religious and magical views held by all Middle Platonists.[207] They would be accepted by Neoplatonists as divine revelation.[208]

Aesthetic Pattern as Symbolic Pattern

What is implied in the simple Greek word *lagon*, hip? Historians of Neoplatonism can be trusted to ask such questions. The occasion is famous, the figure celebrated. Hecate's hip pours forth a divine oracle; Porphyry and Proclus are suitably present ready to give the correct interpretation:

> About the cavity of the right hip is poured forth in abundance the plenteous liquid of the primordially generated soul who entirely ensouls the light, the fire, the ether of the worlds. In Hecate's left hip exists the source of virtue which remains wholly within and does not give away its virginity.[209]

If it is possible to imagine such hips you have entered the world of Neoplatonic aesthetics. For by *lagon* Proclus means that Hecate's flanks symbolize cosmic order and virtue. One hip contains the signs [*symbola*] of the natural order and the other is the source of the sublunary virtues [*aretai*] the goddess dominates.

Clearly Hecate possesses hips worthy to be remembered. Yet what makes them so memorable? The answer is that for these later Platonists a statue of Hecate visibly embodies ideal being. Her hips noetically symbolize universals—the right cosmic order and the left the source of virtue.

To appreciate the boldness of this later Platonic proposition we need only to contrast it with the earlier Platonic one.[210] For the early Platonist a statue of Hecate visibly imitates transient becoming. Consequently, her hips aesthetically symbolize particulars—they are mere icons of cosmic order and virtue.[211]

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[204] See Nock, [1972], 280-290.

[205] The fragments are collected by Wolff, [1856].

[206] Suida, s.v. Ioulianos; cf. Lewy, [1956], 5; de Places, [1971], 7.

[207] Dodds, [1951], 284; MacMullen, [1966], 106-107.

[208] See, des Places [1971], 11-18.

[209] Porphyry, *Phil Orac.*, 1.152.7; Proclus, *Remp.*, 2.201.10ff.

[210] Cf. *Laws* 10.888e; *Phaedrus*, 249c; *Ep.* 7.341c. Also see *Sym.*, 210e. However this figure is not the craftsman of the plastic arts who is an imitative artist, cf. *Gorg.*, 450c. For Plato on art see, Friedlaender [1964], 59-84; Oates [1972], 28ff.; esp. 48-62.

[211] For Plato the arts are a mere imitation of nature which is but an imitation of being. cf. Friedlaender [1964], 60ff. Plato, consequently, places the imitative artist

Aesthetic Pattern

The notion that *aisthesis* deals only with particulars, while *noesis* only refers to universals, is called into question by this imaginative, Neoplatonic perception of Hecate's hips. For the Neoplatonist *aisthesis* provides entrance into an imaginative apparition of the fixed, noetic order of the intelligibles, even of the divine forms themselves. This understanding of the relation between perception and intellection is unknown in the early Academy. For the Platonist *aisthesis* yields an opinable reflection of the transient, physical arrangement of the sensibles, not a true perception of the ideas or the symbols of the gods.

Neoplatonists claim that sense perception imaginatively grasps universals. The notion that the mind perceptively imagines being erases a divided line which linked perception with particulars and intellection with universals. This is a subtle distinction to be sure, but nonetheless, it is a significant one. For Neoplatonic aesthetics represents an overturning of Platonic aesthetics. Neoplatonists assume that sensible particulars embody universals. The notion that a symbol instantiates being marks an inversion of an older mimetic paradigm which claims that a symbol imitates being.

This Neoplatonic reformulation signals a metaphysical, axiological, and cultural shift of immense proportions. The phases of the moon shimmer differently in this later Platonic perception of a goddesses' thighs. These different perceptions of Hecate's thighs, therefore, are not without social significance. If Hecate's hips had captivated Porphyry and Proclus merely in the manner they pleased Plato, we would not be reflecting on her statuesque anatomy in the manner of the two Romes, the old one on the Tiber and the new one on the Bosporus—but in the manner of classical Athens, and this study would not be possible.

Plotinus

Perception and Intellection

Plotinus stolidly maintained the priority and superiority of intellection over perception as laying the foundations for physics, and subsequently for psychology and epistemology.[212] Nonetheless, his view of the plastic arts is decidedly novel.[213] First, he claims that art is a visible expression of ideal beauty.[214] Second, he asserts that the ideas of beauty exist in the human soul.[215] Third, he claims that the imagination is the mental faculty through which the soul gains initial awareness of ideal beauty.[216] Fourth, this aesthetic awareness leads, eventually, to knowledge of the ideas of beauty, if not the beautiful itself.[217] Fifth, and perhaps most

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in class vi of viii classes among knowers of the ideas, cf. *Rep.* 7.522b; and the plastic arts among the lowest of the imitative arts, cf. *Rep.* 3.401ab.

[212] On Plotinus' psychology and epistemology there are many works. For recent studies see, Blumenthal [1971], 8-66; 67-133; Rist [1967], 410-422; O'Daly [1973], 20-81.

[213] *Enn.*, 5.8.1; cf. 1.6.2,3,5. For Plotinus' philosophy of art, see de Keyser [1955], 29-52.

[214] *Enn.*, 5.8.1.

[215] Ibid., 1.6.2.

[216] Ibid., 1.6.3.

[217] Ibid., 1.6.5.

importantly, he claims that the arts are a means for the soul to reverse a situation of misfortune—her descent into corporeality. For through the arts and the aesthetic imagination the soul regains her awareness of her intelligible origins and, consequently, begins her ascent from sensibility to intelligibility.[218]

Yet Plotinus' powerful defense of aesthetics is, accordingly, based on something far more profound than a reappraisal of the value of the plastic arts themselves. For the origin of all symbolic activity, including artistic activity, emerges from the fact of the soul's descent and its ignorance of its authentic undescended state.[219] Even though the higher soul remains in the intelligible world the lower soul is unconscious of this fact.[220]

The Undescended Soul and the Active Intellect

Plotinus advocated the theory of the "undescended soul."[221] Its metaphysical setting is familiar.[222] The soul has two aspects.[223] Its native world is the unchanging, intelligible, eternal.[224] Its hypostatic world is the changing, sensible, transient.[225] While transcendent the soul revels in the realm of the forms and, hence, contemplates reality directly. While embodied the soul is consigned to the realm of the senses and, hence a symbolic, indeed imaginative, interpretation of reality.[226]

Philoponus explains Plotinus' version of this doctrine by noting that he employed the Aristotelian doctrine of the active intellect.[227] The commentator contends that Plotinus not only placed the potential intellect which is sometimes thinking in the soul but also the active intellect. Therefore, the soul, always in movement and activity, is constantly engaged in thought. The soul is not always perceptive of this because of the tumult of the body.

Philoponus is not far off the mark in seeing a connection in Plotinus between the superior part of the soul always engaged in intellection and the active intellect.

Plotinus maintains that:

> . . . even our soul has not sunk entirely but there is always something of it in the intelligible realm [*kosmos noetos*].[228]

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[218] Ibid., 4.8.4,28-31; cf. 1.6.3, 5.

[219] On the theory of the undescended soul in Plotinus, cf. Rist [1967], 410-422; Steel [1978], 34-38; Blumenthal [1986], 315-335. The important passages from Plotinus on this subject are *Enn.*, 4.3.12; 5.1.2; 6.4.14.

[220] Ibid., 5.1.12.

[221] On this theory in Plotinus see, Rist [1967], 410-422; Steel [1978], 34-38.

[222] On Plotinus' psychology see, Blumenthal [1971], 8-19; O'Daly, 20-51.

[223] Ibid., 5.1.10,12.

[224] The undescended soul is one of the *theia*, cf. *Enn.*, 5.1.7,49, is *nous*, 4.7.1.

[225] The embodied soul is individual, called by Plotinus an eidolon. cf. e.g., *Enn.*, 4.3.27,8ff.

[226] In both cases the soul is called nous, cf. 1.1.8,1; 5.1.10,12; 3.2,14.

[227] For Philoponus' interpretation of Plotinus' doctrine see, *De Intel.*, 45.39; 47.96; *Ps-De Intel.*, 535.8-13; 19-21; 528.25-31. His criticism is presented in 536.15-537.7; 538.33-539.1. See, Steel [1978], 36-37; Blumenthal [1986], 315-335.

[228] *Enn.*, 4.8.8.

For:

> The soul has never entirely withdrawn but there is something of it that has not come down.[229]

Therefore:

> The souls of men have entered the visible realm in a leap downward from the supreme; yet even they are not cut off from their origin, from the divine intellect. It is not that they have come bringing the intellective principle down in their fall; it is that though they have descended even to earth, yet their higher part holds forever above the heavens.[230]

The higher soul is undescended and in continual contact with the divine:

> . . . let a man purify himself and observe: he will not doubt his immortality when he sees himself thus entered into the pure, the intellectual. For what he sees [looking on himself] is an intellectual principle looking on nothing of sense, nothing of this mortality, but by its own eternity having intellection [*noesis*] of the eternal. He will see all things in this. Intellectual substance [*ousia*] himself having become an intellectual cosmos [*kosmos noetos*] and full of light, illuminated by the light streaming from the Good which radiates truth upon all that stands within the realm of the divine. Thus he will always feel the beauty of that word: "farewell I am to you an immortal God," for he has ascended to the supreme and is all one strain to enter into likeness [*homiotes*] with it.[231]

For Plotinus the motive for the soul's descent is inherited from Plato himself.[232] Thus he assumes Plato blamed the soul for its descent and thought the master saw descent as necessary for the completion of the universe.[233] His later synthesis is to argue the soul enters matter spontaneously. Thus descent is instinctive or biological.[234] Nonetheless a part of the soul is culpable for the descent. Hence the notion of sin [*tolma*] of narcissism dominates his exegesis.[235]

In the end, in an essay written near the close of his life, he attempts to reconcile voluntary and involuntary descent.[236] The soul's descent is merely an illumination of what is below it. What does the illuminating is the highest phase of the soul, the intuitive phase. The irrational phase of the soul or the image is the illuminated. If more than illumination occurs in this discursive phase of the soul, if the soul associates itself with the image, then descent into matter results.[237]

Yet even in this case the higher soul does not descend. This part of the soul

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[229] Ibid., 4.1.12.

[230] Ibid., 5.3.9.

[231] Ibid., 4.7.10.

[232] Plat., *Phaedrus*, 248a-249d.; *Tim.*, 42ab.

[233] *Enn.*, 4.8.1. Later Plotinus shifts his position. In his middle treatises he sees descent as both voluntary and involuntary and views a double sin in the descent. cf. 4.8.5.

[234] Ibid., 4.3.13

[235] Ibid., 4.3.12.

[236] Ibid., 1.1.12.

[237] Ibid., 2.9.2.

remains in the intelligible realm united to the divine intellect. At this stage Plotinus turns us to his theory of the active intellect, a doctrine central to his notion of the ascent of the part of the soul embedded in matter.

Plotinus says that the One is the cause and giver of love by which souls approach him.[238] Divine causality is universal, not particular, is defined as emanation [*aporre*], and is associated with light [*phos*].[239] Although this emanation of light is linked to psychological illumination,[240] Plotinus is does not think it capable of particularization. The One does not personally look down upon humanity. Divine activity universally pullulates throughout the cosmos. For Plotinus the human soul contains within herself the ability to acquire divine love. It is not directed towards her.

Whereas for Aristotle and Alexander the active intellect is always in the soul for Plotinus it comes from above as an aspect of divine giving [*didomi*].[241] This giving of intellect to the soul is an auto-noetic, perhaps even an auto-volitional act[242] that stands apart from natural sympathy [*sympatheia*], which is a necessary natural law [*physikai ananke*].[243]

The descent and ascent of the soul have a voluntary aspect. Just as souls were seduced by their own images reflected in the sensible world and rushed into them from above, through contemplation they can rediscover their higher selves and reascend to the intelligible world. Despite embodiment:

> . . . even then they are not cut off from their own principle and intellect; though they have reached to the earth, their heads remain firmly fixed above the heavens.[244]

Emanation, therefore, is an informing process by which intellect and soul become what they are. Moreover, it is a means of recreating them after their initial creation and, then, lifting them above their acquired, material status. God's love and light provide directional markers for the soul to turn towards its source, and then, through the use of its mental faculties begin an ascent to the noetic realm. For Plotinus, deity does not save the soul. She saves herself.

Nonetheless, through this act of divine giving [*didomi*] the lower soul comes to perception [*aisthesis*] of what the higher soul beholds. Becoming perceptively aware [*antilepsis*] of the forms occurs when the active intellect transmits and communicates to the imagination [*phantasia*] images of the forms.[245]

Goodness and beauty are known to the higher soul but not the lower soul. For only souls motivated by intellect and illuminated by beauty know goodness.[246] These souls are exceptional and conscious of their undescended selves.

The higher soul always remains united with intelligible being; the lower soul is unconscious of this link. Envolved in the sensible world, in the tumult of the body,

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[238] Ibid., 6.7.22,6ff.
[239] Ibid., 6.7.23,3ff.
[240] Ibid., 4.5.7,39f.
[241] Arist. *De An.*, 3.5; Alex. *De Anima Liber*, 88-89; *De Intel.*, 106 {Bruns}.
[242] *Enn.*, 4.4.32,4-9; 4.5.2,29; 4.5.1,35-38.
[243] Ibid., 4.4.33,42-45; 2.3.9,34-39.
[244] Ibid., 4.3.12. cf. Hom. *Iliad*, 4.443; Plat. *Phaedrus*, 248a.
[245] Ibid., 4.8.4.28-31.
[246] Ibid., 4.7.10.

she is unconscious of what the upper part beholds.[247] Busied with carnal desires she knows nothing of her divine link.

What of these souls, unconscious of their undescended selves, and ignorant of the eternal verities? For:

> living under a crust of evil . . . filled with injustice and desires, torn by internal strife, full of the fears of its own cowardice and the jealousy of its meanness, busied in its thoughts about the perishable and the low, the friend of vile pleasure, it lives a life of submission to bodily desires.[248]

There is away out of this situation of misfortune. Through apprehension of aesthetic symbols the soul becomes aware of the forms and begins her tenuous ascent from unconsciousness to consciousness.[249]

Visible beauty points to soul to intelligible beauty.[250] In this sense art functions to make the soul aware of her divine source. Once conscious this soul becomes aware of her eternal, intelligible link to the divine. For through the aesthetic imagination the soul unites her disparate self and begins her ascent to the eternal verities and, perhaps, eventual union with the divine.[251] Consequently, art is therapeutic. It assists in the transfiguration of the soul from unconsciousness to consciousness, from an awareness of its sensibility to a knowledge of its intelligibility.

For Plotinus, then, the psychological shift from unconsciousness to consciousness, from misfortune to fortune, involves the use of the imagination, the active intellect, and at times, the plastic arts. Art, thus, commits the soul to an upward passage, to an ascent from the lower to the highest divine beauty. Consequently, the various arts are accorded a valued place in Plotinus' system.

Logic, observation, and piety all reinforced this position. For Plotinus there was something grotesquely impious in the idea that the sense-world was devoid of the forms or that physical objects, even objects of art, could not awaken in the soul images of the eternal verities.

The Imagination and Intelligible Beauty

Plotinus' judgement is understandable, only when it is coupled to his psychology and epistemology.

Plotinus rejected Plato's tripartition of the soul. Moreover he accepted Aristotle's view that knowledge is a function of a series of psychological faculties.[252] Although Plotinus does not settle on a definite scheme of faculties, his acceptance of Aristotle's view of the imagination plays a decisive role in his aesthetics.[253] With these concessions, Platonism finally comes to terms with the insights of Aristotelianism.

Among the most important of the Aristotelian elements in Plotinus' system is the notion that an actively thinking mind is identical with its objects.[254] He also

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[247] Ibid., 5.1.2; 4.1.8.

[248] Ibid., 1.6.5.

[249] *Enn.*, 5.8.1.

[250] Ibid., 1.6.3.

[251] Ibid., 1.6.5.

[252] This is not to say that Plotinus merely adopts the Aristotelian psychology. As Blumenthal notes Plotinus goes to great lengths to preserve the soul's autonomy which he thought Peripateticism radically compromised, cf. [1971], 8-44.

[253] On the two faculties of the imagination, cf. Arist. *De An.*, 433b29; 434a5-7.

[254] See, Armstrong, [1957], 393-413; Merlan [1963], 8ff.

accepted Aristotle's view that sense-perception involved the reception of the forms of sense-objects without their matter.[255] As Alexander insisted, the absolute certainty of knowledge springs from the fact that it has its origins in perception.[256] This is the complement of Plotinus observation that the physical world is a self-contained, cogent, and certain instantiation of the noetic world.[257]

This is possible because the soul is self-moving. Always in movement she is in contact with those intelligible faculties active within her even though she is unconscious of them. The lower soul becomes conscious of her higher self when the active intellect transmits to the imagination an image of the forms. This occurs when the soul views an art form. This triggers memory of the intelligibles for the soul sees the form of beauty in the work of art.

There are two faculties of imagination. One arises in regions of the soul concerned with the body. Another emerges from the part of the soul concerned with the intellect.[258]

Plotinus says that the secondary act of imagination which is opinion in the soul is caused by disturbance and shock. Thus it is the product of the lower part of the organism. Its images are a faint opinion and unexamined mental picture.[259]

However, it is not secondary but primary imagination that is important in Plotinian aesthetics. The primary imagination has images of the forms passed on to it by the active intellect and the higher soul.[260] The *logos* deploys the thought and shows it to the imaginative faculty as though in a mirror. This presentation of thought to the imagination makes us aware of the intellection [*noesis*] which is always in progress. The imagination apprehends it and the persistence of the image is memory.

The imagination [*phantasia*] receives the products of thought [*logoi*] and sensation [*aisthesis*].[261] These products are, then, passed on to the reasoning faculty for processing.[262] Imagination is, accordingly, based on something far more profound than an awareness of physical conditions. It carries a meaning close to the idea of consciousness.[263] This means that the imagination is a power of perceptive awareness that transcends sensation. Signifantly, it refers to that mental faculty which provides knowledge of the intelligibles above and within the soul.[264]

This assures for Plotinus the possibility of memory [*anamnese*]—the becoming receptive on the part of the lower soul what the higher soul eternally beholds.[265]—for image collecting is the basis of memory.[266] Memory, in turn, plays an important role in Plotinian eschatology and psychology.

For Plotinus believed in reincarnation, and assumed the form in which the soul

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[255] See, Blumenthal [1973], 137ff.

[256] *De An.*, 85; cf. 89.21-22; 90.19-20; {Wallis}. *De In.*, 112.2-4 {Bruns}.

[257] *Enn.*, 1.6.2-3.

[258] On the dual imagination in Plotinus see, Blumenthal [1971], 92ff.

[259] *Enn.*, 3.6.4,14-23.

[260] Ibid., 4.3.30,1-5.

[261] Ibid., 4.3.30,5ff.

[262] Ibid., 5.3.2,7-9.

[263] On this see, Schwyzer [1961], 343-390.

[264] *Enn.*, 1.4.9,25ff.

[265] Ibid., 4.8.4,28-31.

[266] Ibid., 4.3.29,22-24.

is reincarnated depends on its previous life and conforms to the characteristics of that life. For example, the way the soul preserves its character between reincarnations is through memory. Memory makes the soul what it is and controls its descent.[267]

As noted Plotinus assumed that souls move from an unconscious to a conscious understanding of the intelligibles[268] and the way the transition is made is through memory.[269] For example, the imagination fired by its perception of a statue of a god remembers the form of the god and moves from an unconscious to a conscious awareness of the divine.[270] Thus art plays an important role in the way consciousness of the higher soul and the intelligibles is achieved by the lower soul.[271]

For images of the forms are transmitted to the imagination through sense objects. Accepting the Aristotelian postulate that sense-perception involves the reception of the forms of sense-objects without their matter Plotinus says:

> On what principle does the architect when he finds the house standing before him correspond with his inner ideal of a house and pronounce it beautiful? Is it not that the house before him, the stones apart, is the inner idea stamped on the mass of exterior matter, the indivisible exhibited in diversity? We call something beautiful when we see something imprinted on it that we recognize as our own, by virtue of our continuity with the Ideal world, and the immanence of that world in the object where we recognize beauty.[272]

Art objects also move the soul to imagine the form of beauty. This notion is forcefully presented in his work *On the Intelligible Beauty.*[273] Plotinus describes an intelligible world in unity with the sensible world. The capacity to grasp this synthesis leads the mind to an understanding of beauty. Next, he examines the imagination and shows how it aids the soul in its ascent from sensible to intelligible knowledge. Finally, he illustrates how the craftsman and his arts concretely instantiate in visible form the intelligible world's truth and beauty.

Plotinus describes an intelligible world whereby each member remains itself, in distinction from all others, yet simultaneously all members form a single unity. He asks us to imagine a transparent globe or sphere containing all the things of the universe. Then he asks us to correct it by imagining another sphere stripped of all magnitude and spatial differences. Next we are urged to make a synthesis wherein each is all, one undivided divine power of many facets, each sharing one existence and remaining distinct from all others.[274] This is the beautiful.

Plotinus strains to lead our minds to the higher world of the forms and argues that sensual images lead us on our ascent. To correct the conclusions we might draw from the first-level image, he asks us not to abandon imagery entirely but to imagine

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[267] Ibid., 4.3.8,5-9; cf. 3.4.2.11.

[268] On the unconscious and conscious intellect in Plotinus see, Merlan [1963], 72ff.

[269] This is illustrated by Blumenthal [1971], 94-99.

[270] *Enn.*, 1.6.3.

[271] Ibid., 5.8.1.

[272] Ibid., 1.6.3.

[273] On this treatise see, Brehier [1956], 3.17-23; Puech [1960], 161-190.

[274] *Enn.*, 5.8.9.

another sphere, one whose properties run counter to the first. The deficiencies of image-thinking are eventually corrected by bringing the sense-image to a second stage and then urging our metaphysical imaginations to leap beyond this stage as well, to the desired insight into the intelligible realm. Central to this process of ascent is not of abandoning or turning away from the sensible world but of using imagery and the faculty of imagination to the point of strain and shatter. At the moment of shatter, intelligible insight occurs.[275]

The ingredience of the higher in the lower world suggests the fecundity of Plotinian aesthetics. He illustrates this in his comparison of hieroglyphics and art. Both suggest non-discursive images of the intelligible world—the ideas are not propositional truths but reified beings [*onta*].[276]

Moreover the ideas are envisaged as *agalmata,* each bodying forth in a species of translucence the inner wealth of the intelligible world's truth and beauty. Thus the individual who has seen this world of beauty will become his true self, even in this sensible, corporeal world, a concrete embodiment, in and through which others catch the glimmerings of the transcendent splendor of the forms.[277]

For Plotinus one such an *agalma* is the artist, another the artist's creation. Thus the craftsman's task is, first, to imagine the ideal specification to which reality conforms, and then—so far as the nature of matter permits—to arrange it in conformity with its ideal specification.

A sculpture, for example, represents the creative ideas contained in the soul of the artist. With the assistance of the imagination the artist in an inward vision grasps the forms intuitively. Next the craftsman projects the intelligible beauty of the forms outwards, giving them visible form.

This understanding emerges from his interpretation of Phidias' statue of Zeus. Plotinus states that:

> . . . it goes back to the ideas from which nature itself derives and adds where nature is lacking.[278]

The craftsman's work instantiates the form of beauty. It reflects the *he kallone*—the beauty of deity itself. The sculpture, then, functions to awaken in other souls an imaginative awareness of the ideas from which all else derives.

Plotinus suggests that such awareness leads to psychological enlightenment for the soul is the immovable place or subject for the immutable truth of the higher world.[279]

> What do you feel in the beauty of souls? When you see that you yourself are beautiful within, what do you feel? What is this Dionysiac exaltation that thrills through your being, this straining upwards of all you soul, this longing to break away from the body and live sunken within the true self? These are no other than the emotion of souls under the spell of love . . . All these noble qualities are to be reverenced and loved but what entitles them to be called beautiful? . . . Anyone that sees them must admit that they have reality of being, and is not real being, really beautiful?[280]

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[275] Ibid., 6.4.5.
[276] Ibid., 6.4.5.
[277] Ibid., 5.8.11, 17-19; cf. 4.4-6, 42-44.
[278] Ibid., 5.8.1.
[279] Ibid., 4.7.
[280] Ibid., 1.6.5.

Aesthetic Symbols, the Soul, and the Arts

Note carefully that Plotinus' understanding of intellectual beauty confirms a new Roman rhythm. His terminology—imagination [*phantasia*], exaltation [*ekstasis*], love [*eros*], and emotion [*pathe*]—affirms that the intelligible world and its divine source can be grasped not only noetically, but also aesthetically. In a remarkable reversal of an older aesthetic pattern divine apperception involves *patheia* not *apatheia*. Another via sacra opens up; one which involves non-discursive, indeed imaginative and erotic ascent to the divine. Plotinus is toying with a sweeping hypothesis.[281]

Although the theme is strongly reminiscent of the Platonic Socrates, that Silenus figure which, once opened, was seen to contain the images of the gods within him, the Plotinian Phidias and that Zeus figure are strikingly distinct.[282] Plato often returned to that mysterious, youthful experience, to that encounter with the beloved which is simultaneously an encounter with a transcendent world of value that stretches beyond the concrete person involved in the encounter.[283] Plotinus reflects and expands upon this encounter and includes within the *algalmata* that permits encounter with the intelligible world factors which Plato never countenanced—the imagination, the active intellect, and the plastic arts. The forms are communicated to the soul by the active intellect through the image making faculty of the soul in reflection on the work of art.

The consequence of these assumptions propels Plotinus to propose, at least for Platonism, an unprecedented aesthetic axiology. Psychological and ontological schizophrenia are overcome aesthetically. The soul's unawareness of her higher self is reversed and her situation of misfortune overturned through imaginative, indeed, artistic perception.

Aesthetics, then, is not only theapeutic, it is also a path to salvation.[284] Art assists the soul to leave the sensible world and terrestrial pollution and gain the intelligible world and celestial bliss.

The soul's descent into matter results in the unconscious splitting of the self. Her fall from the intelligible world also signals her separation from true reality and her embodiment in symbolic reality. This leap into matter is a function of a situation of misfortune. The imagination, the active intellect, and the arts are intimately linked to the reversal of psychological and ontological misfortune. Indeed, for Plotinus the arts present to the soul one of the greatest blessings a later Roman could obtain—full possession of the self, awareness of the forms, and ascent to the divine.

Although no clear doctrine of the vehicle of the soul [*pneuma-ochema*] emerges

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[281] This interpretation might represent a conscious development of the insight of the *Phaedrus* 250d where Plato suggests that of all the forms beauty alone makes itself manifest to the sensuous perceiver.

[282] See, O'Connell [1978], 46-47.

[283] Plato develops this theme in the *Laws* where household shrines, the aged, and the stars are proposed as concrete examples of the divine, cf. 930e-931a; 899b; 966e-968a.

[284] Porphyry reports that after encountering a god at the temple in Isis at Rome, Plotinus wrote a treatise *On the Spirit That Allotted Itself to Us*, cf. *Vit. Plot.*, 10. Presumably this work served to explain how to differentiate between higher and lower gods and daemons upon their visible manifestation. Such knowledge certainly had therapeutic and soteriological dimensions for Plotinus and his followers.

from Plotinus' writings, the philosopher was aware of it.[285] He appears to subscribe to belief in such a vehicle based on his theory of *pneuma*.[286] In discussing the descent of the soul Plotinus says that when the soul leaves the noetic realm it goes:

> . . . first into heaven and receives there a body through which it continues into more earthly bodies.[287]

As the soul descends gradations of envelops of matter attach themselves to a primary body. Consequently, Plotinus proposes that the soul must be purified from these envelopes to rise to its higher self.[288] Then she lives peacefully with her purified *pneuma*.

For Plotinus, probably following his reading of Aristotle, the vehicle is important for its imaginative function.[289] Since the vehicle is an intermediary between bodily sensations and intellection sense impressions are impressed upon the vehicle and then processed by the soul.[290]

Thus, in turning to a statue or temple the imagination sees not merely a physical object but perceives an image of the forms. This, eventually, leads to an awareness of the eternal value of nature, the human soul, and the divine like nature of both. An awareness of beauty is nothing less than a recognition of the the value of the physical world and of self. Through art the ontological distance between being and becoming is overcome in an epistemological and psychological act of imaginative identification.

For Plotinus the human soul contains within herself the ability to gain salvation. She has the ability to willingly save herself through contemplation [*theoria*].[291] Art and the imaginative perception of its inner beauty is a mode of contemplation which leads the soul on her ascent to the intelligible world.

Plotinus has an acute sense of the multiplicity of reality and self and a chain of intermediaries that reached, yet further still, from self to God. Art functions to erase the distinctions between the layers of the soul, to bring the ontologically distant epistemologically present.

Aisthesis is nothing more than the lower soul becoming conscious of what the higher soul eternally beholds. *Phantasia* is nothing more than the presentation to the lower soul of an *antilepsis* which permits her to identify her empirical self with her pure, true self that transcends the sensible. Art serves to heal the disparate self. It brings that which is so noetically distant, sensibily present. It is about the joining of heaven and earth in the human soul.

Thus the dangerously long distance between being and becoming consciousness and unconsciousness is overcome through an aesthetic that stresses the possibility of unanimity between subject and object. Such identification makes the soul

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[285] Dillon shows that the doctrine was known by the second century C.E. cf. [1971], 371-372. Thus, it is probable Plotinus knew of it.

[286] On Plotinus' view of *pneuma* see, Dodds [1953], 318; Kissling [1922], 322; Verbeke [1945], 352-363; A. Smith [1974], 152-155.

[287] *Enn.*, 4.3.15.

[288] Ibid., 3.6.5,22-29.

[289] Arist., *De Gen. An.*, 744a1-5.

[290] *Enn.*, 4.3.15. His use of the term *ocheisthai* cautiously implies that Plotinus was familiar with the term *ochema*. cf. A.Smith [1974], 153.

[291] *Enn.*, 4.4.44.

conscious of her intelligible beauty. Such consciousness leads the soul upwards to divine beauty itself.

Ascent is an important component in Plotinus' philosophical system. Ecstasy [*ekstasis*] understood as "expansion" is a central aspect in accounts of the ascent of the soul.[292] Plotinus calls ecstasy an awakening of the soul from its physical nature.[293] Aesthetics, thus, is closely tied to the awakening of the soul from its physical nature, expansion of the soul to the divine ideas, and consequently, the ascent of the soul to god.

The gift of ecstasy is a rational one for Plotinus. Porphyry assumed his teacher possessed it from birth.[294] There is no evidence that Plotinus thought it could be transmitted from teacher to disciple by the laying on of hands. But an individual may become ecstatic or expansive upon entering a holy place or viewing a statue of a god.[295] This is only possible, in turn, because the philosopher has accredited sense-perception and the imagination with the capacity to grasp the forms with the aid of the active-intellect.

In the second half of the third century, we find ourselves caught up in an aesthetic transformation which is still incomplete. Plotinus fractures the foundations of earlier Platonic aesthetic theory. Bit by bit, the static framework of the noetic world, on which Platonic metaphysics rested, is dismantled. By now, the ineffaceable character of forms and gods, which earlier Platonists saw as the ultimate justification of a *mimesis* between the intelligible and sensible worlds, between intelligibility and sensibility has been dissolved aesthetically. Art—as Plotinus hints all along—no longer belongs to the sensible world alone.

This discovery has four aspects. It compels Platonists to recognize the value of perception—something they might guess but before Plotinus could not prove. Secondly, it establishes the veracity of the imagination because later Platonists have come to understand the general processes by which it works: its link to the higher soul and active-intellect provides proof of its intelligibility. Thirdly, these processes have, at every level, been of two kinds—the universal and the particular. A central equation for any philosophy of art, whether about humanity or nature, is to distinguish universal factors, operative everywhere and at all times, from conditional ones, which arise out of accident and so acquire significance only derivatively. Finally, there is the question of motivation: in philosophical culture, at any rate, paradigm shifts occur when we reconstruct for ourselves, the reasons, fears, and ambitions of humans caught up in historical events. This aesthetic shift has its grounds in Plotinus' valuation of the natural world; his concerns about the "fall" of the soul; and his desire to expand its horizons by rendering nugatory the unconsciousness of the arts.

We these four aspects in mind, we can resolve the question raised at the beginning of this study: how many meanings does the word *lagon*, hip imply? Thus we turn

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[292] *Enn.*, 6.4f. *Ekstasis* involves *ektasis*, cf. Proc. *In Platon. Alc.*, 1.92.3ff.: "The soul expands in order to get closer to god while god expands to meet the soul, without ever stepping outside, for he always remains inside himself." Although a false etymology, *ekstasis* is derived from *existasthai* and *ektasis* from *ekteinein*, it illustrates well the Neoplatonic understanding of this state.

[293] *Enn.*, 4.8.[6].1.1.

[294] Porph. *Vit. Plot.*, 10.

[295] On this belief in general in late antiquity see, Heliodorus, *Aeth.*, 2.11.

to the development of Neoplatonic aesthetics in Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus. In these figures philosophical aesthetics is carried far beyond Plotinus. Their changes build on the novel features of their master and result in fresh elements of novelty for the future to build on in turn.

Porphyry

Aesthetic Pattern

In one respect a continuity exists between the aesthetic patterns of Plotinus and Porphyry. This regards their extromissive epistemologies.[296] For both the mind acts on the perceptions received. Moreover it imaginatively empowers the senses to reach out to its objects and to convey the data extracted from sense objects to the intellect. Through the image-making faculty of the soul physical objects endowed with a divine presence energize the mind to rise above corporeal sensations and to understand their formal, indeed symbolic configurations.

The Descended Soul and Divine Causality

In another respect a sharp distinction can be drawn between their psychologies. Plotinus' theory that a part of the soul eternally remains eternally in the intelligible realm is sadly dismissed by Porphyry.[297] Although some souls are capable of operating in the intelligible world while embodied, most cannot.[298] The human soul had deviated [*parekbas*] from the intellect and, therefore, does not enjoy perpetual intellection and passivity.[299]

This judgement has its consequences. Few have the ability to know the intelligibles directly.[300] Those who do are higher, divine souls.[301] Nonetheless, even these intellects and souls are not homogeneous [*homoiomeres*].[302] For the soul exists as a separate entity from intellect. Even for the few souls capable of ascending to *nous* only a consubstantiality [*fieri*] with intellect is achieved.[303] For Porphyry the bleak fact of the soul's fall and the misfortune of her embodiment fosters the rich humus from which he builds his aesthetic theory.

Taking as his starting point the radical disassociation between the potential and active intellects, he recognizes that in almost every case, the soul's ability to imagine and to know the forms, as well as to unite itself with *nous*, depends on outside assistance. Thus the doctrine of divine giving [*doron theou*] takes on new meaning

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[296] An intromissive epistemology holds that the sense organs are passive recipients of data and neutral conduits of sensation to the mind, cf. Lindberg [1976], 9-11. Early Platonism advocates a mimetic, intromissive theory of knowledge, later Platonism a dynamic extromissive theory. This is due, most likely, to adaptations of Aristotelian and Stoic extromissive theories by Middle Platonists, cf. e.g., Berchman [1984], 167-200, and by Plotinus, cf. Blumenthal [1971], 67-79.

[297] Plot. *Enn.*, 4.1.12; 4.8.8,1-3; Porph., *De Abs.*, 1.113-118.

[298] *Sent.*, 32.21.12. Such a rare soul was Plotinus, cf. *Vit. Plot.*, 23. On Porphyry's psychology see, A. Smith [1974], 40-45. His view that Porphyry held a theory of the undescended soul has been corrected by Steel [1978], 38 n.1.

[299] *De Abs.*, 1.115,9ff.

[300] *Sent.*, 32.20.13.

[301] Ibid., 32.21.11; 32.22.12ff.

[302] Ibid., 41.40.4; cf. ap. Nemesius, *Sym. Zet.*, 135.7.

[303] *De Reg. An.*, Bidez, fr. 10 p. 37*21.

with Porphyry.[304] Deity is viewed as a helper. Divine causality is evident throughout the universe. Moreover it has a personal dimension. It can be particularized.[305] This permits Porphyry to argue for a personal, suprahuman involvement by higher powers in the world, and to propose a theory of how divine giving is made accessible to humanity.

Porphyry writes that sympathy [*sympatheia*] exists, as those can attest who:

> . . . call the gods, carry stones and herbs, tie sacred ties, open what is closed, and produce valid apparitions of the gods.[306]

Porphyry confirms the doctrine of cosmic sympathy and accepts the divinization of the world. In a bold stroke he distances himself from Philo, Clement, and Origen by affirming not only the *logos* but also the *soter* character of *physis* itself.

The Imagination and the Vehicle of the Soul

Divine giving, voluntary and evoked, is inclusive of the appearance of the gods in temples, statuary, and physical objects. Their presence energizes the imagination [*phantasia*] and transmits divine images to the soul. Sense-perception [*aisthesis*], then, provides a way for the soul to imaginatively know the forms and view the gods.

Not surprisingly, Porphyry's conception of the fall of the soul, which plays so large a part in his epistemology and ontology, profoundly colors his aesthetic theory. The philosopher was interested in theurgy, studied it, and even experimented with it.[307] Since the gods became manifest in natural objects he wanted to know more about their appearance.

Porphyry witnessed a theurgical ritual in which a statue of Apollo is bound, surrounded by lights, and assaulted by prayers and chants to compel the god to descend and reveal the truth to his worshippers.[308] He analyzed a vivication of Hecate's statue performed by Maximus in a subterranean temple at Ephesus. This resulted in the immortal oracle from the goddesses' thighs.[309]

Clearly, Porphyry does not deny that the gods appear in statuary and other natural objects. He merely criticizes the excesses such facts carry with them. They lead some to deify daemons, worshipping them in mysteries and rituals [*teletai kai thysiai*].[310] Others to interfere with the practices of rivals or to specialize in love-charms, false promises of wealth, success, and prestige and "want to be gods."[311]

Nonetheless, appearance of the gods and the ability to contact them is important for Porphyry. The angels come down to teach knowledge of these divine things.[312] There are certain things theurgy can do. It does achieve a purification of the soul.[313] Although this does not result in a return to deity or even the purification of the

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[304] This term is a combination of imagery from Plato's *Rep.*, 2.364b3f., 366cd; 10.617e. On this term in Porphyry see, A. Smith [1974], 100-110.

[305] *Ep. ad Marc.*, 283.3.

[306] *Ep. ad. An.*, fr. 24 {Parthey}.

[307] *Phil. Orac.*, 154ff. {Parthey}.

[308] Ibid., 162ff.

[309] Ibid., 130-137.

[310] ap. Theod., *Cur.*, 3.59-70.

[311] *De Reg, An.*, fr. 2 {Bidez}.

[312] ap. Aug., *Civ. Dei*, 10.26-28 = fr. 6, 7 Bidez.

[313] *De Reg. An.*, fr. 2.

spiritual part of the soul it does allow communion with the aetherial gods and for the lower soul to escape its ontological locus.[314]

Central to this theme is Porphyry's theory of the vehicle of the soul.[315] Theurgy, however, has power only over the vehicle itself. It has no power over the higher soul which separates itself from the irrational soul, its vehicle, and materiality by philosophy alone.[316]

For the many the higher soul cannot uncouple herself from the lower soul because of the constitution of her vehicle. Moreover the vehicle itself is not immortal and cannot be noetically purified. Thus created from portions of the bodies of the visible gods it can only rise to their level or perish when its portions are sloughed off.

For the few the higher soul can uncouple herself from the lower soul and the vehicle through contemplation. Since the intellect is immortal it continues to live on after its separation from the soul and vehicle with these lower parts returned to the cosmos.[317] Perhaps, she even acquires the possibility for an eventual ascent to the Father.[318]

Aesthetics, Theurgy, and the Ascent of the Soul

The view of Olympiodorus appears efficacious. Porphyry placed philosophy above theurgy.[319] For the sage theurgy has both therapeutic and soteriological significance. There are, however, higher contemplative approaches to union with the divine that should utilized.[320] For once purified through theurgy the vehicle of the soul [*pneuma-ochema*] only ascends to the highest regions of the sensible world.[321]

Thus Porphyry's theory of the vehicle of the soul contains inherent limitations regarding the possibility of the ascent of the lower soul to the Father.[322] He holds that the vehicle was made of mixtures from the celestial gods and, therefore, capable of being dissolved back into its component parts.[323] For Porphyry the vehicle and the irrational soul are made up of bits of the heavenly spheres and are mortal.[324] Their ultimate fate, therefore, is to return to the cosmos.[325]

Unlike Plotinus, who believed the soul is the same as intellect and other higher entities, Porphyry is in doubt about this. The operations of the universal soul are

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[314] Ibid., fr. 2.

[315] On this theory in Porphyry's writings see, Bidez [1913], 88-97; Kissling [1922], 322-325; Verbeke [1945], 363-373; Dodds [1953], 318-319; A. Smith [1974], 155-158.

[316] *De Reg. An.*, fr. 2 28*2-29*1; fr. 3 31*24-32; fr. 4 32*5-25; fr. 7 34*38-36.

[317] ap. Proclus, *In Tim.*, 3.234,18-26.

[318] Ibid., fr. 4 32*21. However, ascent to the Father is limited to only a small portion of the human race.

[319] *In Plat. Phaed.*, 123.3-5 {Norvin}.

[320] *De Reg. An.*, fr. 7, 11.

[321] Ibid., fr. 6 34*24.

[322] Although the evidence suggests Porphyry equivocated on the issue of the relation of soul to intellect, cf. Iambl. *De An.*, 1.365,17-19, it appears he thinks them separate. However see, A. Smith [1974], 47-48; also Dillon [1973], 41-44.

[323] ap. Iambl., *De An.*, 1.385,1-10. Iamblichus recounts Porphyry's theory here. cf. Finamore [1985], 15.

[324] ap. Proclus, *In Tim.*, 3.234,18-26. Dillon holds Proclus reports Porphyry's theory. cf. [1973], 372-373.

[325] See, A. Smith [1974], 64.

entirely separated from the particular soul because the energemata of universal and particular souls differ.[326] Thus the embodied soul does not act in accordance with intellect. This makes it unlikely that she can shed her lower activities and powers and enter the noetic realm.

Thus, through theurgy the lower soul escapes the misfortune of embodiment, thereby achieving angelic status.[327] This is not without significance. For the lower soul gains a respite from terrestrial fate, the travails of rebirth, and gains the protection of the aetherial gods.

Not surprisingly, therefore, Porphyry's view of theurgy shares some striking parallels with Roman popular religion and the *Chaldaean Oracles*. Theurgy saves the soul;[328] it helps the soul leave the flock of ordinary humanity which is subject to fate;[329] and it washes the soul from terrestrial pollution.[330]

For the masses theurgy is indispensable. Most souls have no "inherited" divine status, nor the capacity to achieve "inherited" divine status. Consequently, the fall of the soul carries with it the need to establish the therapeutic and soteriological aspects of the arts more firmly than before. As a result, Porphyry was thrown back on to the value of aesthetics more firmly than Plotinus had ever been. So Porphyry and his successors began to approach and treat sense perception and imagination as legitimate and authoritative mental faculties to an extent scarcely contemplated by Platonists in earlier centuries.

This new aestheticism treated the arts as one of the supreme mediums of daemons and gods. From now on, sense-perception would be regarded as one of the most poweful agents of divine apperception.

By the end of the third century of our era the early Platonic claim that only ideas could be intelligible are rendered nugatory, proved groundless. In later Platonic terms, through the aid of perception we understand reality not less, but more completely. Neoplatonists find permanence in perception. They even assume the presence of a fixed symbolic framework within matter as a necessary mark of its rationality.

Most Neoplatonists assumed symbolic visions [*autophaneia*] of the gods occurred and that deities took on a visible shape [*autoptoi; autoptikon theama; phasma; phantasma*] for the chosen few.[331] For these later Platonists symbols [*symbola*] and tokens [*synthemata*] animate the statues of the gods.[332] For through symbols and tokens everything in the material world is link with its spiritual principles. Concealed in statues these animates provide contact between humanity and divinity.[333]

The acceptance of theurgy is purchased at the price of a certain detachment from the world of intellection.[334] Once such a theory was established most Neoplatonists were justified in asking just how widely this symbolic and synthematic pattern is

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[326] ap. Iambl. *De Anima*, 1.365,17-19; 1.372,12-14.
[327] Ibid., fr. 2 29*6.
[328] Fr. 128 {des Places}.
[329] Ibid., fr. 102.
[330] Ibid., 196.
[331] *Chal. Orac.*, fr. 101 {des Places}. Iambl. *Myst.*, 5.23.
[332] Proc. *In Tim.*, 1.273d.
[333] On this see, Dodds [1951], 292 n. 34; Boyance [1955], 196 n. 2.
[334] This is well presented by A. Smith [1974], 100-110.

relevant and to what kinds of phenomena. They framed their answers metaphysically.

Symbols and tokens were due to the grace [*charis*] of the gods;[335] the principle of divine power [*dynamis*];[336] the assumption that a cosmic sympathy [*sympatheia*] existed between the upper world beneath the moon and the lower word thereby uniting the seemingly disparite degrees of reality;[337] the principle of sameness [*homoiotes*];[338] and the notion of the vehicle of the soul [*ochema*].[339]

The consequence of such questioning left no contrast between the neat self-contained world of ideas and the flux of the natural world; the logic of intellection and the imagination of perception. This explains why the single-minded Plotinus found theurgy an intrinsically messy subject.[340] Natural science is bad enough: there the very multiplicity of factors frustrates the theorists preference for elegant and rounded solutions.[341] But in most Neoplatonists one faces the eternal unpredictability of an imagination tied to sense perception.[342] To this extent later Platonism retains the power to spring surprises. If Plotinus and Porphyry were not immune from the eternal unpredictability of aesthetic novelty Iamblichus, accordingly, was even less so.

Iamblichus

Aesthetic Pattern

At this point, Porphyry puts his finger on the central difficulty in all attempts to elevate *aisthesis* to the level of noesis. Beyond the indirect evidence of sense perception lies the solid evidence of the intellect. Knowledge of the intelligible world and union with the divine depends on intellection of the intelligibles, not perception of the sensible world and apperception of images of intelligible forms and the gods.[343]

Perception depends on the speculative interpretation of the imagination and this evidence has to be recognized for what it is. For Porphyry, like Plotinus, the difficulty with perception is an acute one. Little more can be made of its evidence than that it yields reasonable symbolic forms. Until some solid evidence was found to indicate that perception is intellection, then Platonists could do no more than ask how intelligible forms might appear in nature and so sketch the outlines of possible

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[335] *Chal. Orac.*, fr. 142.

[336] Plotinus, *Enn.*, 4.4 [28] 32.13 and Porphyry *Ad. An.*, fr. 24 [Parthey] describe the universe as a living organism held together by divine power. This notion is a commonplace in later Platonism probably derived from Stoicism, cf. Reinhardt [1926], 401.

[337] There is an association between divine power [*dynamis*] and cosmic sympathy [*sympatheia*], cf. Luck [1985], 147ff.

[338] Iambl. *Myst.*, 3.14. cf. des Places [1964], 164ff.

[339] This is an astral body humans and gods possess. The human soul-vehicle is illuminated by a divine light which activates our imagining perception [*phantastike dynamis*]. This leads to the grasping of divine apparitions [*phantasiai*]. cf. e.g. Iambl. *Myst.*, 3.14. On this theory see, Finamore [1985], 125-164.

[340] See, Dodds [1951], 283-311.

[341] For Plotinus on *physis*, see Rist [1963], 223-231.

[342] *Enn.*, 2.9.14; 4.4.40-44. On Plotinus and magic [*goeteia*] see, Armstrong [1955], 73ff.; Merlan [1953], 341ff.

[343] *De Reg. An.*, fr. 7, 11, 2.

epiphanies. Thus even at the beginning of the Diocletian era, with the great period of ancient philosophical thought behind them, the men and women of Athens, Alexandria, and Rome knew little more than their predecessors about perception, or the remoter faculty imagination—and that was precious little.

So at the end of the third century, a vision of knowledge remained, fundamentally as Plato envisioned it. However, a way to break through the divided line had been conceived in the new extramissive epistemology. But until some principles were established to control and render nugatory arguments that perception remains opinion, until some reliable modes of inference had been worked out, by which the noetic barrier could be outflanked or overleaped—claims about the truth character of perception were necessarily speculative. For the theoretical possibilities they imagined far outran the facts available to them as evidence.

The flanking of the noetic barrier is evident from a glance at Hecate's thighs. The sheer extent of their symbols and virtues, which before the fourth century Platonists might guess but never prove, are accepted and proven afterwards.

The Descended Soul, the Vehicle of the Soul, and Divine Causality

This raises the question of motivation. Iamblichus' conception of a dynamic order of reality, its perceptive appropriation and manipulation, which played so large a part in later Platonism, was the product of two factors, each of which tended to strengthen the other. One of these was the acceptance of the theory of divine giving as the basis of ontology and epistemology:[344] the other was the adoption of the doctrine of the descent of the soul as the foundation of psychology.[345]

Taking these together, Iamblichus recognized that the state of the soul—her descent from the hypercosmic realm into generation in stages—resulted in subservience to fate.[346] The reversal of this situation of misfortune dominates Iamblichus' thought. This leads the philosopher to include a place for the vehicle of the soul in his explanation of the descent and reascent of the soul.[347]

To briefly describe Iamblichus' view of the soul's vehicle [*ochema*]: it was created by the demiurge; it is not merely generated from portions of the bodies of the visible gods; it is not fated to remain in the material realm. For the philosopher, then, the vehicle has a divine origin; it is ethereal; and it is not subject to destruction or dissolution of any kind.[348]

The descent of the soul involves demiurgic sowing; her encosmicing with vehicle into the visible gods:[349]

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[344] *De Myst.*, 43.3; 44.14. For this theory in Iamblichus see, A. Smith [1974], 100-110.

[345] The soul's descent is discussed in *De An.*, 1.377,13-380,29. cf. Festugiere [1953], 216-223; Finamore [1985], 59-124. *De An.*, 1.375,5-18; 378,19-379,10; 380,6-29. cf. *In Tim.*, fr. 87. See, Festugiere [1953], 3.69-73; Finamore [1985], 94-114.

[346] ap. Proclus, *In Tim.*, 275,26-29.

[347] Ibid., 276,5-11.

[348] Each position stands in contrast to those of Porphyry, cf. Finamore [1985], 11-27.

[349] *De An.*, 1.377.18.

> . . . the demiurgic sowing of souls will be divided around the divine creations.[350]

This sowing has a major consequence for it makes each soul fall under its own saviour and patron god:

> But they [i.e., the souls] made their first descent when they have already been sown around the visible gods in order that they might have the gods as saviours [*soteras*] of their wandering around generation and that they might call upon them as their patrons [*prostasis*].[351]

Each created thing falls into four classes: the heavenly class of gods; the winged class that traverses the air; the class that lives in water; and the terrestrial class.[352] Mortals are not joined to the gods but require intermediaries.[353] Since the sowing is not merely of human souls their vehicles and their own gods but also angels, daemons, and heroes, human souls can call upon these greater souls to aid them in their reascent.[354] Thus each soul has its own saviour god and patron powers.

Generative sowing involves the descent of the soul and its vehicle into matter.[355] This procession [*proodos*] from the mixing bowl determines each soul's cosmic rank.[356] From the place allotted to the soul in sowing, she makes her descent into generation. Embodied the soul is no longer a rational soul existing apart from its vehicle. She exists together with her vehicle in the sensible realm.[357]

According to Iamblichus each soul can project a *logos* [*logon probolai*][358] and leads a life in harmony with a god.[359] For example, projecting a solar life means the soul takes on the the logos of the physician and is connected with Asclepius or takes on the *logos* of the telestic and is associated with Apollo.

There appears to be a necessary law that requires the soul's descent.[360] Nonetheless, the soul can either assent and descend voluntarily or resist and be compelled to descend.[361]

Those who descend by choice are pure and perfect souls without passions and not deprived of intellect. They descend for the benefit of the sensible world. They remain in contact with the noetic realm and, thus, are purified from all stains and sin.[362] Some souls are so pure that their descent does not involve generation at all. Thus they enter the material realm and are not contaminated by it. These souls serve the lesser ones in the lower realm.

Souls also voluntarily descend to train and correct their characters.[363] These are souls betweeen purity and impurity, impassivity and passivity who are given the

[350] Ibid., 1.377.19-21. cf. Finamore [1985] 63 n. 8.
[351] ap. Proclus, *In Tim.*, 3.280,19-21.
[352] Ibid., 3.280,22-32.
[353] Ibid., 3.107,30-108,1.
[354] *In Parm.*, fr. 2.
[355] *De An.*, 1.377,16-17.
[356] Ibid., 1.377,23-25.
[357] Ibid., 1.377, 18-29. This is its cosmic allotment [*lexin*].
[358] *De Myst.*, 1.8.
[359] ap. Proclus, *In Tim.*, 3.279,11-30.
[360] *De An.*, 1.378,21-379,6.
[361] Ibid., 1.379,7-10.
[362] Ibid., 1.379,2; 22-25; 1.380,7-9; *In Phaed.*, fr. 5.
[363] *De An.*, 1.380,9-12.

opportunity to better themselves and become fully pure.

Those who resist descent and violate divine and cosmic law are souls who must descend for punishment and judgement of sins committed in a previous life.[364] These impure and passionate souls are sent to Hades and rehabilitated. Upon completion of their sentence they can choose their next life.

With these aspects in mind Iamblichus makes the argument that it is theurgy and not contemplation that brings salvation to the soul. He builds his thesis on two foci: that happiness is union with the gods;[365] and that liberation from fate occurs through knowledge of the gods.[366] Happiness and knowledge together is defined as wisdom [*gnosis*]. This wisdom and union [*theia henosis*], the first road to happiness, is caused by theurgy.[367]

Theurgic rites purify the soul, liberate her from fate, and permit union with the gods.[368] Purification involves the cleansing of the vehicle of the soul.[369] Once purified the soul can associate with the gods. They shine [*epilampontai*] their light upon the soul, freeing her from passions and disorderly motion. Once illuminated the soul begins its elevation to the gods.

In ascent the soul is granted gifts which include health of body, virtue of soul, and purity of intellect.[370] The entities that bring about these purifications are the visible gods.[371] These are the soul's leader gods. Thus if the soul is mecurial her purifications are done by Mercury; if heliotic her purifications are undertaken by Apollo. Once reunited with its god, the soul joins its entourage.

With ascent the soul is also liberated from fate.[372] She separates and leaves her irrational part and vehicle behind in the cosmic realm.[373] These elements are the organ's for the soul's lower functions. The irrational soul functions as appetite and desire; the vehicle as sense-perception and imagination. Useless in the higher realms they could be detrimental to the soul's existence, binding her to fate.

For Iamblichus the irrational soul and vehicle remain in the divine entourage with the rational soul but only the rational soul beholds the forms in the noetic realm. This he pictures in his interpretation of the *Phaedrus.* The charioteer with his head views the forms in the noetic realm and then descends to rejoin his lower self.[374]

The vehicle's fate is to be reunited with the ethereal vehicle of the visible god, the soul's leader-god. Once accomplished the vehicle and irrational soul are purified and liberated from all irrational activity.[375] This permits the rational soul to ascend and unite with the demiurge and, perhaps, the hypercosmic gods, if not the One.[376]

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[364] Ibid., 1.380,12-14.
[365] *De Myst.*, 10.1, 286,3-11.
[366] Ibid., 10.5, 290,16-17.
[367] Ibid., 10.5, 291,10-12.
[368] For the association with Chaldaean thought see, Lewy [1978], 178-184.
[369] *De Myst.*, 3.31.
[370] Ibid., 2.6.
[371] *De An.*, 1.455,1-4.
[372] ap. Proclus, *In Tim.*, 3.266,16.
[373] *De An.*, 1.384,26-27; 1.457,13-14.
[374] *In Tim.*, fr. 87.
[375] ap. Proclus, *In Tim.*, 3.276,19-22.
[376] *De Myst.*, 5.20; 5.22; 10.7.; *In Phaedonem*, fr. 5.

This, then, is how Iamblichus conceived of the descent and ascent of the soul. Even here, perhaps, we catch a glimpse of his defense of the faculties of perception [*aisthesis*] and imagination [*phantasia*].

The Aesthetic Imagination and Theurgy

It has been shown that the vehicle controls the functions of sense-perception and imagination, the irrational soul functions as appetite and desire. However, the vehicle which also houses the rational soul can be purified by divine light. In the theurgic act the gods illuminate:

> the ethereal and luminous vehicle that surrounds the soul. From this [i.e., illumination] divine images take hold of the imaginative power [*phantastiken dynamin*] in us, images moved by the will of the gods.[377]

The vehicle of the soul [*ochema*] is illuminated by an evocation of light [*photagogia*]. These divine apparitions [*phantasiai*] move the soul's active imagining perception [*ben en hemin phantastike dynamis*]. Thus the divine vehicles are made visible through theurgy.[378]

When the vehicle is illuminated images of the god are impressed upon it. Normal sense-perception [*aisthesis*], consciousness [*parakolouthesis*], and intuition [*epibole*] cease. In this state the vehicle's theurgic function is to be filled with divine images. Indeed by this means divination occurs.[379] For Iamblichus the imagination [*phantasia*] does not perceive mere material images or sense impressions. It grasps divine images directly. Plotinus' theory of the imagination is reinterpreted in a profound way.[380] For the soul's purification and ascent not only begins but ends in the sensible realm.

For Iamblichus it is theurgy and not contemplation that brings human salvation. Philosophy is secondary to ritual. The human soul cannot save itself but requires the help of the gods. Indeed, throughout the entire cycle of her existence, the human soul is in the hands of the gods. Sent to the earth by the gods, the soul requires their help to reascend. Thus:

> . . . it is not thinking [*ennoia*] that unites theurgists to the gods . . . what hinders those philosophizing by contemplation [*theoretikos*] from having theurgic union with the gods? But such is not the case. Rather, the efficacy of ineffable acts accomplished divinely [*theoprepos*] beyond all intellection and the power of unspeakable symbols understood only by the gods impart theurgic union.[381]

Thus bit by bit, the derivative nature of perception, a principle upon which Platonic epistemology rested for half a millennium, had been challenged. Now it would be dismantled. The eneffaceable character of intellection would be grounded in the intuitive nature of divinely given perception.

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[377] Ibid., 3.14.132,11-17.

[378] *De Myst.*, 3.14.

[379] Ibid., 3.11; 14.

[380] For Iamblichus the imagination perceives divine images directly. For Plotinus the imagination grasps only images of the forms. cf. *Enn.*, 4.8.4,28-31.

[381] *De An.*, 2.11.

This dismantling emerges with Iamblichus:

> The apparition of the gods gives us physical health and virtue of the soul, purity of mind, in short, an ascent of our whole inner existence towards its proper beginnings.[382]

The philosopher begins which the assumption that the gods are perceptible. Moreover their apparition brings to the soul a reversal of her situation of misfortune. The whole point of knowledge lay in its therapeutic and salvific content.[383] These two elements dove-tail neatly together. Divine giving manifests itself apparatively. Its symbols are physical and psychological well-being, intellectual purity, and union [*henosis*] with the gods.[384]

Other notions inherited from science, magic and ritual fit into Iamblichus' picture, like pieces in a jig-saw. Scientists in late antiquity assumed the familiar interaction of the heavens and the earth.[385] This assumption served as the basis for a system of sympathetic and homeopathic correspondences.[386] Each daemon and god was associated with particular plants, minerals, animals, and parts of the human body.[387] Therefore, Iamblichus concludes, matter is not necessarily evil.[388] Indeed, there is a kind of matter which is pure and divine and does not prevent us from communicating with the gods. It is a kind of receptacle for their manifestations on earth.

The interconnections which Stoic philosophers treated as links in a deterministic network were now transformed into channels for divine power. Every astral deity fills matter with its own power [*dynamis*]. They, in turn, interact with higher, intelligible deities, who in turn, have their source in the hierarchy of Ones which are the ground of all reality.[389] Like some great source of invisible energy, the primal One directed its influence from the recesses of the intelligible world to the physical world, along the conducting paths established by these correspondences.

It is a short step from endowing the physical universe with divine power to assuming that sense-perception [*aisthesis*] is in harmony with intellection [*noesis*]. From the humblest and most imaginative of sense-perceptions at one end, up to the highest and most complex of intellections at the other, there extended a single divine, intelligible power. Therefore, perception like intellection has a truth character.

In this way, pieces from the whole corpus of ancient science and philosophy were brought together and combined to offer evidence of the truth character of perception. For the central question in Platonism stubbornly concerned the relationship between the divine and human minds. Since the world was an organism whose continued existence was sustained by divine intellection [*noesis*] and will [*boulesis*], it seemed natural to measure the value and authenticity of all human knowledge by tracing it back to its source.

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[382] *De Myst.*, 2.6.

[383] Ibid., 10.4ff.

[384] Ibid., 1.11f.; 15; 21; 2.11.

[385] On this notion see, Nilsson [1969], 14ff.

[386] On this theory see, Berthelot-Ruelle [1888]; Harris [1961]; Luck [1985], esp. 361-366.

[387] See Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, s.v *fauna, flora* et al.

[388] *De Myst.*, 5.23.

[389] This association is explained in Olymp. *Met.*, 3.59. cf. M. W. Gundel-H. G. Gundel [1966]; W. Gundel [1969]; Luck [1985], esp. 361-366.

For Iamblichus the sense of sight became a pre-eminent means by which to acquire knowledge and divine union.[390] Every aspect of sensation has its intelligible association. Sensible knowledge, then, is the starting point of a more refined and potent intelligence. It no longer is a mere imaginative reflection of reason.

Perception and Salvation

The full consequences of this reformulation have not always been appreciated.[391] Certainly, the epistemologies of Plato and even Plotinus have been left far behind. But in their place stands a theory of knowledge that fit the reasons, fears, and ambitions of later Roman men and women.

As a rule active, immaterial properties are associated with material things. Moreover such relationships are knowable, at least initially, through sense perception. If communication is desired with the source of these properties then prayers, formulas, and *epithetai* bring the supernatural being before the invocator.[392] Moreover language and its symbols [*symbola*] and tokens [*synthemata*] represent the supernatural powers invoked.[393]

Iamblichus, therefore, distinguishes three kinds of ritual prayer: the one that brings together [*synagogon*]; the one that ties together [*syndetikon*]; and the union [*benosis*].[394] Hieratic utterances function as a path to knowledge. This idea that discourse depends on the capacity for analogy exemplifies the kind of metaphoric theory of language held by the philosopher.

Discourse accommodates purpose. Thus the uttering of the names of the gods, the invocation of ritual prayers and the use of divine symbols make the ascent of the soul possible. For such discourse results in the appearance of a daemon or god which leads, hopefully, to communion if not union with the divine.

This accommodation of language and purpose is a darling of Iamblichus. He found in this analogy the kind of metaphoric thinking knowledge requires in order to achieve the ascent of the soul. What is required are:

> . . . hieratic supplications . . . [and a] ritual which involves . . . admirable signs [for] the ineffable expresses itself in unutterable symbols . . .[395]

These symbols and signs placed in the hollow statues of the gods animate them at the right moment and bring an apparition of the deity before its supplicants.[396] An intangible and incorporeal spirit appears and surrounds, as if in a circle, those present. Initially it is not perceived or registered as it enters. Then it swishes and this noise [*roizos*], the sound of a whistling arrow, is symbolically interpreted as the divine spirit approaching the human soul.[397] This pneumatic noise has its corollary. It is also the sound made by the stars in their celestial revolutions.[398]

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[390] *De Myst.*, 2.6; 1.11f.; 15; 21; 2.11.
[391] See, Dodds [1953], esp. 287ff.
[392] See, Gardiner [1947].
[393] See, Dornseif [1925]; Preisigke [1922]; Luck [1985].
[394] *De Myst.*, 5.26.
[395] Ibid., 2.6.
[396] Cf. Des Places [1975], 29; Dodds [1953], 292.
[397] *De Myst.*, 3.2.
[398] Ibid., 3.9. cf. Des Places [1971], 109 n. 2.; 126.

Clearly, hieratic discourse represents the supernatural powers to be envoked; the statue establishes a firm and direct link between the god and his followers.[399] These pneumatic statues were channels through which humans could tap divine power thereby achieving salvation. If not that at least through such *paredroi theoi* ancient Mediterranean men and women attained protection of self, house, city, or country.[400] Although the statue of a god is a material object, Iamblichus reminds us, matter [*hyle*] is also offered by the gods for it is congenial [*symphyes*] to them. Pure and divine it is their receptacle for their manifestations on earth.[401]

Thus a new ingredient enters an ancient equation. Divine sympathy pullulating throughout the universe not only manifests itself universally but also particularly in matter. Although Plotinus accepted this notion, in theory, he saw any manipulation [*goetein*] of cosmic sympathy: "the sum of love and hatred in the universe."[402] Moreover such manipulation of natural sympathy diverts the soul from intelligible to sensible activities. Since these are intrinsically deceptive and incapable of elevating the soul to a knowledge of intelligible reality, Plotinus rejects the proposition that manipulation of natural sympathy leads the soul to the divine. Contemplation [*theoria*] is sufficient to free the soul and catapult her to the gods.[403] Porphyry also noted these facts and was wary for they led to the use and abuse of the gods.[404] Iamblichus, however had fewer reservations. Theurgy replaces and supercedes all philosophy and theology.[405]

These objections to magic and theurgy had to do with their theoretical assumptions. Beliefs about the interaction between the intelligible and sensible worlds, sensible and intelligible knowledge, however, were only the starting points. It was the ambition of magic and theurgy that kept them under a cloud. Both were suspect, as being excessively presumptuous. The theurgist was attempting to sense and manipulate what the intellect alone could know. Moreover, the theurgist aimed at power over the soul and nature of a kind reserved for the intellect and the gods.

Moreover the natural world pictured by Iamblichus, of symbols [*symbola*] and conventions [*synthemata*] which link every physical thing "here" with intelligible principles "there," was impossible.[406] Scattered throughout the material universe by the gods they were known to theurgists who used them achieve union with the gods.[407]

Yet, as Plotinus and Porphyry proposed, this axiom could not be easily reconciled with Platonic teachings on knowledge and being. The theurgists of late antiquity

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[399] These notions are also illustrated in the *Magical Papyri.* Precise directions are given for making a figure of Helios appear. A formula is uttered which causes the god to enter the statue. He begins to communicate through the icon sending dreams, curing insomnia, and exorcizing evil daemons. cf. *PGM.*, 4.88-93.

[400] Sulla, this carried an image of Apollo with him and Nero of the Dea Syria, cf. Seut. *Vit.*, 30; 56.

[401] *De Myst.*, 5.23.

[402] *Enn.*, 2.9.3.

[403] Ibid., 4.4.44.

[404] *De Reg. An.*, fr. 2

[405] *De Myst.*, 2.11.

[406] For both Plotinus and Porphyry such symbols and tokens link physical things, at best, and not sensibles with intelligibles. cf. *Enn.*, 2.9.3; *De reg. An.*, Bidez fr. 4.

[407] *De Myst.*, 5.23.

were hard pressed to match their sympathetic view of nature and the fallen soul with earlier Platonic formulations.

The compromise eventually achieved by Iamblichus depended on making the doctrine of knowledge a matter for initiation rather than reason. Plato had not really proved that sense-perception could not attain epistemic veracity.[408] Rather he had demonstrated that intellect proved to be a more credible instrument of knowledge.[409] If this were so, reason alone could not establish either. Thus, the veracity of sense-knowledge was not one to be argued out rationally but had to be decided by other means—and these Neoplatonists were fortunate, in having the question settled for them in the *Chaldaean Oracles*, collections of logia in Greek hexameter.[410] Known to the third century Platonists Porphyry and Iamblichus,[411] they became so influential that Proclus saw their source in Plato and Plotinus.[412]

Proclus

Aesthetic Pattern

The compromise eventually established by Iamblichus and Proclus was achieved only at a price. Questions about theurgy opened its assumptions to scientific and philosophical discussion. The full consequences of this fact have long been recognized but misunderstood.[413] To characterize Proclus as exhibiting an incurable weakness for the occult and his Platonism as an example of a decline in the Greek rationalist tradition would be to take too onesided, if not anachronistic view of their thought.[414]

Theurgic Neoplatonism is not so much evidence of a decline into the irrational, the triumph of supersition over reason, reflecting the general malaise of later Roman society,[415] as it was an attempt by some to expand Platonic theory beyond the frontiers of Plotinianism.[416]

It was in Hellenic Neoplatonism that the hold of theurgic tradition on men and women's minds proved most tenacious and long lasting.[417] In their minds supernatural power is inherent in the world of the phenomena that surrounds us. Divine power can be activated and theurgy is the theory and practice of divine activation.[418]

[408] *Phaedrus*, 249d-250c.

[409] *Tim.*, 27d-28e; 29b; 48e.

[410] Edited by des Places [1971], with translation and notes.

[411] By the early fourth century the *Oracles* were considered authoritative scripture by some Neoplatonists. They are quoted extensively by Porphyry in his *Phil Orac.* and *De Reg. An.*, cf. Lewy [1978], 449-456. According to the Suida Porphyry also wrote a commentary on them, cf. Bidez [1913], 52*18; 70*50. For Iamblichus see, Julian, *Epistula* in Bidez's colllection of his works [1924], 19; 73ff.; des Places [1971], 44.

[412] See, Proclus, *In Tim.*, 2.255.26ff. cf. *Enn.*, 4.9.11. On this interpretation see, Boyance [1955], 195ff.

[413] See, Dodds [1953], 283-311.

[414] See, Abel [1957]; Dodds, [1965], 19-20.

[415] See Brown's review of Dodds' *The Greeks and the Irrational* by P. Brown. cf. *EHR* [1968], 542-558.

[416] Cf. Steel [1978], 34-56.

[417] As noted Proclus went to great lengths to make Plato and Plotinus good theurgists. cf. *In Tim.*, 2.225.26ff.

[418] *Theol. Plat.*, 1.26.63.

Consequently, a vision of reality emerged, fueled by the fall of the soul, her purification, and her ascent that reconciled Platonism and the theurgic mysteries.

Porphyry and Iamblichus had taken crucial steps towards legitimizing theurgic Platonism. In his eyes theurgy was a divine phenomenon to which there was no higher counterpart. Proclus agreed and his works were the first sustained systematic attempt to complete this account of reality.

Thus by the early fourth century Platonism had solidified its interaction with theurgy. From the second half of the fourth through the late fifth century philosophical debate had replaced the Plotinian view of reality with a Proclean one that would survive another millennium.[419]

Hieratic Art and Allegorical Physics

Taken separately, few of Proclus' chief steps were entirely new. What distinguished Proclus was the cumulative weight of his whole system. He drew together into a unified whole theories that had previously developed almost randomly. His strength was that he patiently settled down to work out the actual interrelationship demanded by such metaphysical and theurgical premises. After painstaking research he concluded that theurgy:

> . . . is a power higher than all human wisdom, embracing the blessings of divination, the purifying powers of initiation, and in a word, all the operations of divine possession.[420]

How and why he reached this conclusion must be examined. Both questions involve issues central to aesthetics. They are mediated through Proclus' physics, epistemology, and psychology.

Convinced that the hieratic art leads to the union of the human soul with the One, Proclus understood theurgy as a process of deification which completes, and does not render nugatory, contemplation.[421] Indeed as the crown of contemplation, theurgy is a supremely noetic act, encompassing all the contemplative and active attributes of worship.

The hieratic art is possible to know and to practice because divine power pullulates through the universe and is inherent in the natural phenomena that surrounds humanity. This vision allowed philosophical issues a more significant place in theurgic Platonism than is generally recognized.[422] Proclus attempted to place the practice of theurgy on a theoretical plane by hard-wiring it into the first principles of natural philosophy.

He made the familiar interaction between the noetic and physical worlds the basis for a complete system of correspondences whose interconnections were understood as channels for divine power. Taking over from the ancient Ptolemaic astronomers the theory of the heavens comprised of some sixty concentric translucent spheres, the earth being at the center and the sphere of fixed stars enclosing the whole system, Proclus allegorized this picture to symbolize the degrees of reality and perfection between matter and the ineffable One.

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[419] Mediated in the Latin West through Albert and Aquinas and the Byzantine East through Ps-Dionysius.

[420] Ibid., 1.26.63. cf. Iambl. *De Myst.*, 10.4ff.

[421] On theurgy in Proclus cf. e.g.,, Festugiere [1968], 17ff.

[422] See Dodds on Proclus, cf. [1963], iff.

The poetic value of astral religion was reinforced by his Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle's "quintessence"—the imperishable substance of the heavens—exempt from the change and decay afflicting terrestrial things. With Proclus an astronomical nest of crystalline spheres became the accepted symbol for the scale of cosmic perfection. Things on earth were lowest, both in location and worth. the passage upwards through the spheres of the moon, sun, successive planets to the outermost heavens, and then through the crystalline barrier to the hypercosmic gods, represented a soul's journey from corruption to perfection.

The natural world was an organism whose continued existence was sustained by a divine noetic act, thus it seemed essential to describe and measure the channels of divine power by tracing them back to their supreme source. This became the point of a great deal of metaphysical debate which was a stimulus to novel developments in Neoplatonic epistemology, psychology, and physics.[423]

Seen against this background the intellectual preoccupations of Proclus are understandable. Neoplatonic epistemology and psychology were reinterpreted in a similar allegorical way. For his central question concerned the relationship between the divine and human intellects and the union of the human soul with the One.

Perception, Imagination, and Theurgy

Proclus, for example, came to recognize sight as the pre-eminent means by which we acquire knowledge of the supernatural power immanent in the world. He identified light as the spiritual bond linking the human intellect to its divine origin. Consequently he valued sense-perception as the mental faculty responsible for receiving, integrating, and interpreting the photogenic images and forms presented to the intellect.

To Psellus we owe a number of valuable notes and comments from Proclus on this branch of aesthetics.[424] He studied the conditions under which invocations [*kleseis*] take place and the locations where they were performed. He noted that before and during rituals the participants avoid any activity which interferes with the arrival of the gods. They also maintain absolute quiet.

Again and again he was drawn to the phenomenon of divine light, its shapes and symbols [*schemata tauta kai theia synthemata*]. Some appear to be lifeless objects, others living beings. Some are endowed with reason [*empsycha logika*], are not [*empsycha alogika*]. Statues are filled with divine light when inspired by a god or daemon and deliver oracles. When supernatural beings self-manifest [*autophaneia*] in statuary they appear in shapes and forms perceptible to the senses. Proclus reports that although divine beings are incorporeal:

> . . . bodies were attached for your [*sic.* gods] sake to the self-revealed manifestations, as you are grafted upon a corporeal nature.[425]

They may appear in symbols [*symbola*] associated with the divine being. For example, Hecate's symbol is the Iynx. She often manifests herself in a top [*sgrophalos*]. Clearly, the art object is linked *per analogiam* to the goddess. Once

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[423] The works of Steel [1978] and Finamore [1985] demonstrate that Neoplatonists were actively engaged in formulating new questions and solutions to metaphysical problems.

[424] They are collected by des Places [1971], 219ff.

[425] *Remp.*, 2.242.8.

manifest in her plastic image she has made that journey from her abode at the acme of the celestial sphere to a locus in the terrestrial sphere.

Proclus reports this is represented symbolically. A disc of the moon was located on the statue's back. Proclus tells us this symbol represents the power the goddess wields over the intramundane regions. For this heavenly sphere, called nature, is the abode of Hecate. For she is the ruler of the visible world and resides at its acme as the self-manifesting image of nature.

Proclus even clinically examined those who saw such light. They receive the divine spirit and are possessed by it [*katochoi ginontai, theoleptoi kalountai*]. The philosopher noted that this experience was always spontaneous [*aoristios*] even though with some it was continuous and with others intermittent. Some mediums are unconsciously ecstatic, others are consciously possessed. Spiritual light was thought to confer a special radiance on its possessor, which in turn could be transmitted to others.

This is what Proclus means when he says that there is a contemplative prelude to theurgy. Before one can practice theurgy one must understand its physical environment; its psychological and epistemological contexts. Moreover, these studies were no stumbling-block between the Platonist and salvation. Indeed, they were a necessary propaedeutic. Philosophy had much more to do than fetch and carry for the wisdom of the Chaldaean oracles. Theurgy, therefore, was a scientific art based on observation where the theurgist applied sensible knowledge towards a particular goal—the activation of divine power in the universe.

For Proclus theurgy has two foci: it is an activity, an operation, a technique dealing with the gods based on observable principles; it is also the worship of the gods. Consequently, it is a priestly art [*hieratike techne*].[426] Its purpose is to evoke a god [*theagogia*] by evoking its light [*photagogia*]. This evocation of light illuminates the vehicle of the soul [*ochema*]. The result is divine apparitions [*phantasiai*] move the soul's active imagining perception [*hen en hemin phantastike dynamis*] and the shiny vehicles of the gods are seen.[427]

The Descended Soul, The Vehicle of the Soul, and Divine Causality

To appreciate the weight that theurgy had upon the perceptions and imaginations of later Roman men and women requires us to return to a psychological problematic—the fall of the soul. By Proclus' time the fall of the soul had become accepted as a symbol for the individual's plight.[428] Her reascent, her journey from corruption to perfection was, for Proclus, a matter of aesthetics.

Proclus, like Porphyry and Iamblichus, maintained the theory of the descended soul. The process of descent is familiar. Proclus sees the soul's movement from the hypercosmic realm to generation as occurring in stages. First the soul is above fate and then upon embodiment becomes subservient to it.

There are a series of stages between freedom and slavery.[429] There is the first hypostasis, the distribution, the sowing, the assignment of allotments, and then the descent.[430]

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[426] *El. Theol.*, xx.

[427] See, Trouillard [1972], 186ff. cf. Iambl. *De Myst.*, 3.14.

[428] See, Finamore [1985], 59-123.

[429] *In Tim.*, 3.276,5-11..

[430] Ibid., 3.263,22-265,12.

The first hypostasis refers to the soul's hypercosmic life when it is separated from the cosmos and her vehicle.[431] The distribution is the alloting of souls under divine circulations, or the hypercosmic gods.[432] The sowing represents the establishment of the soul and her vehicle into the circulation of the soul's cosmic or visible god.[433] This represents her placement in the heavenly lexis from which the soul either rises to the noetic or descends to the sensible realm.[434] Descent entails the soul's placement of the soul into the four different classes of living things: the heavenly, the winged, the watery, and the terrestrial.[435]

The soul's initial genesis, or sowing, represents her descent from the noetic to the physical realm.[436] Allotted to a visible god the soul takes on the characteristics of her patron and chooses a life.[437] This is what Proclus means by *logon probolai.*[438] However, the soul can choose to life this life rightly or wrongly.

Since Proclus understands this sowing to occur under the young gods, it places the soul under the aegis of the earth, the moon, and other organs of time.[439] Consequently, this sowing involves the soul together with its vehicle. Together they are arranged under the circulations of the celestial gods. This effects a two-fold connection between human souls and the gods. The soul's power is encompassed by the soul's god and the soul's vehicle is filled by the god's vehicle. Thus the human soul and vehicle are filled by the god's personal nature.[440] Divine and human soul and vehicle are conjoined. Next Proclus states that the sowing occurs in each element [*stoicheion*] under the moon. This includes the four regions divided into the four elements. This explains the difference between different human souls. They are coupled to distinct comic deities.[441] Then the souls hear their fated laws.[442]

At this point the human soul is separate from the divine. Nonetheless, the demiurge:

> . . . himself generates the vehicle of the soul and every life in it, to which the young god's weave the mortal form of life.[443]

Thus, the conditions for the possibility of reascent to the noetic exist for the embodied soul and her vehicle. The rational soul and vehicle are immortal and can attain union with their creator. This will be discussed momentarily.

The reasons for the soul's descent again are familiar. For Proclus there is no part of the soul that does not descend. Descent is necessary but the soul may assent and descend or resist and be forced to descend. Assentive souls make a pure descent; dissident souls an impure descent. Pure souls are impassionate, sinless, and benefit

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[431] Ibid., 3.275,26-31.
[432] Ibid., 3.276,8-9.
[433] Ibid., 3.280,22-32.
[434] Ibid., 3.280,22-32.
[435] Ibid., 3.107,30-108,1.
[436] Ibid., 3.278,31-32.
[437] Ibid., 3.279,15.
[438] Ibid., 3.279.17-20.
[439] Ibid., 3.304,30-305,11.
[440] Ibid., 3.305,7-10.
[441] Ibid., 3.307,26-308,7.
[442] Ibid., 3.266,11-14.
[443] Ibid., 3.233,26-28.

the terrestrial realm; impure souls are passionate, sinful, and wreck havoc in the earthly world.[444]

Unlike the impure soul, the pure soul maintains a connection to the noetic realm while embodied. Purified of all stains and sin this soul serve a religious-theurgic purpose. This soul is the one which envokes the gods and makes it possible for purified souls to encounter the holy and begin an ascent through the heavenly spheres to their leader gods and eventually their maker—the hypercosmic demiurge.[445]

For Proclus a strict metaphysical hierarchy exists in which the noetic gods and the good beyond them are accessible to humans only through the intervention of heroes, deamons, and the visible gods.[446] Nonetheless, from purified human souls to the visible gods and beyond to the hypercosmic deities and the demiurge there is one continuity, one chain of being that links embodied souls with their source. This means each human soul is allotted a leader god to which it is connected by a series of higher entities—pure souls, heroes, and daemons.[447] The soul's salvation depends on these intermediary entities which can be reached only through theurgy.

From the doctrine of the soul's increasing materiality in descent, the vehicle of the soul [*ochema*] obtains its theurgic function.[448] Once the vehicle of the soul [*ochema*] is purified the soul to be able to imagine those symbols and rites presented to her by the gods. This occurs when an individual is initiated into the divine mysteries of theurgy.

Although the immortal vehicle is tied up with the irrational soul it is capable of an existence apart from it.[449] The vehicle's ultimate goal is to be reunited with the ethereal vehicle of the visible god, the soul's leader god. There the vehicle and the irrational soul remain, purified, and perhaps, the rational soul ascends even higher to the noetic realm.

Once initiated and consecrated the vehicle of the soul can be filled with divine images. They prevent any material images or sense-impressions from occurring within the vehicle, thereby blocking out any irrational activities. The rational soul can now operate on the noetic level.

> Whenever the partial [i.e., human] soul attaches itself to the whole [i.e., the divine soul], its vehicle also follows the vehicle of the divine soul, and just as the soul imitates the intellection of the divine soul, so also its body imitates the movement of the divine body.[450]

Indeed the vehicle is purified and elevated by the divine light from the soul's leader god. Thus its function is to be illuminated. This occurs through initiation.

Aesthetic Symbols and the Arts

Proclus, therefore, set out three degrees of initiation: initiation [*telete*]; consecration

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[444] See, Finamore [1985], 59-124.

[445] See, Dodds [1963], xxff.

[446] See, Wallis [1972] s.v. Proclus.

[447] *In Tim.*, 3.280,19-21. Here Proclus refers to such intermediaries as saviours [*soteras*] and patrons [*prostasis*].

[448] *El. Theol.*, prop. 209.

[449] *In Tim.*, fr. 81.

[450] *In Tim.*, 3.276,19-22.

[*myesis*]; and vision [*epopteia*].[451] Telestic and consecratic initiation constitute the purifying stages for the vehicle.

Marinus reports that Proclus was initiated into the Mysteries of the Great Nestorius by Asclepigeneia, the daughter of the theurgist and thaumaturge Plutarchus, son of Nestorius.[452] Having studied his teacher Syrianus and:

> . . . the many works of Porphyry and Iamblichus and the writings of the Chaldaeans which belong to the same order of ideas and thus, nourished by divine oracles, he rose to the highest level of the . . . theurgical virtues.[453]

For the philosopher the last initiation, vision, is a liberation of the soul effected by the gods that brings things together. It is to this image we turn.

What does this vision [*epopteia*] bring with it? This question brings us back to the symbolics of this essay. We return to the immortal symbol of Hecate's thighs:

> About the cavity of the right hip poured forth an abundance of plenteous liquid of the first generated soul, who entirely ensouls the light, the fire, the aether, and the worlds. In Hecate's left hip exists the source of virtue, which remains wholly within and does not give away its virginity.[454]

Since the goddess ensouls the sublunary world her hips symbolize the cosmic orders dominated by her. The right flank represents the potency of this cosmic soul. She is a power who ensouls the totality of the physical cosmos – its elements of light, fire, aether, and worlds. These correlate to *Aion*, the Father begotten light; *Pyr*, the Empyrian realm, *Aether*, the region of the fixed stars, and *Kosmoi*, the zone of the planets and the terrestrial world.

The orifice on Hecate's left hip does not discharge any water for it symbolizes the source of virtue. The goddess is unwilling to imperil its purity by contact with the sublunary world. Accordingly her remains within Hecate and is accessibile to those souls capable of rising to the intramundane realm where the goddess resides.

To acquire these powers and the virginal virtue associated with them the soul must approach her left thigh. Although Hecate is unwilling to reveal them on a terrestrial level, she will willingly reveal her charms to those souls who ascend to the aethereal realm. This, however, requires an ascent of the soul to the moon, to Hecate.

For Proclus, art functions as an instrument of the divine intellect. It triggers and actuates the rational soul and her vechicle. Indeed, when Hecate self-manifests in her statue in an apparition perceptible to the imagination human and divine souls and vehicles move in consort together. When the human elements grasp the activity of the divine elements they turn outward to receive the deity and discover their eternal link with the divine. Aisthesis is an antilepsis, a coming to consciousness of a higher self, and a divine source. For Proclus this is only possible through aesthetics and the symbolics of the hieratic arts.

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[451] *Theol. Plat.*, 4.16.
[452] *Vit. Proc.*, 28.
[453] Ibid., 26.
[454] *Remp.*, 2.201.10.

Culture Pattern

Aesthetic Pattern as Culture Pattern

For ancient Mediterranean men and women the pilgrimage of the soul to intellect and to deity is cast in terms of divine giving.[455] Later Roman men and women treasured the arts and aesthetic perception. The arts transmuted psychological and ontological distance into the deep joy of proximity to self and to the gods. Aesthetics contributed to a network of interpersonal acts that carried the full over-tones of the later Roman cultural traits of love, power, sympathy, patronage and salvation.[456] Perception and the arts functioned as one of the cements of their social world.

Later Platonic Symbols and Roman Culture

The remains of this aesthetic pattern pullulate through the writings of later Platonism. Its instantiation lay in the *Truemmerfeld* of temple sites and statuary that ring the Mediterranean basin. To the ancient eye these surfaces and solids reveal images of an ideal world of symmetry, harmony, and beauty for an intelligible beauty could be grasped through the narrow appertures of its temples and the formal qualities of its statues. Architecture and statuary present images of ideal being vivified. Masonry and marble symbolize needs satisfied and long distances overcome.

What does an ancient theory formation tell us about an ancient aesthetic pattern? An elusive question to ask, let alone answer. Plotinus has suggested that beauty manifested itself to the Roman in buildings dedicated to the gods; that the beautiful shimmered in the statues formed to their images. Perhaps by localizing intelligible beauty in art these Romans recognized the presence of the divine in the visible, fed on the joys of its proximity, and thereby tempered their fears of distance from self and from their gods.

The human craftsman like the cosmic demiurge fashions a world. Artistic creation makes one aware of the attainability in the visible world of an intellectual beauty whose abode is the intelligible world. Distance is overcome, the beautiful is proximate in temple and statue. The visible fact of the beautiful points to the instantiation of the eternal in the temporal, the formal in the material.

Hic locus est—is the refrain that runs through these monuments of a lost age. The intelligible is accessible aesthetically. Through art the lower self communes with the forms, gains union with the higher self, and eventually with the beautiful. For in temples and statuary beauty dwells. Temples are theomorphic sanctuaries; statuary theomorphic beings. *Loci* for gods and goddesses they become a focus for the image-making faculty of the soul, even perhaps, places where one *daimon* appears.

Clearly temples are places where souls meet daemos and gods. Porphyry tells how Amelius visited temples at the New Moon and the Feasts of the Gods happily offering sacrifices [*philothutes*].[457] He asked Plotinus to come along. The master answered: "They ought to come to me not I to them." His refusal to accompany Amelius probably means he did not expect to find any of the higher gods waiting for him in their temples, only lower gods or daemons. Thus, he refused to go. This does not mean, however, that Plotinus thought temples devoid of higher beings.

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[455] On this concept in later Platonism see, A. Smith, [1974], 100-110.

[456] Proclus explains what is at issue at *In Tim.*, 3.280.19-21.

[457] *Vit Plot.*, 10. On this encounter see, Merlan [1953], 341ff.; Armstrong [1955], 73ff. Most discussion of this passage focuses on the issue of Plotinus and magic.

Porphyry reports that Plotinus encountered a god at an Isis temple in Rome.[458] The spirit was summoned [*kletheis*] to appear [*eis autophian*]. The deity visually appears and the philosopher assesses it through his faculty of sense-perception [*aisthesis*].

Statues also are vehicles for the manifestation of the image of the form of beauty.[459] Plotinus claims that the perception of the form of beauty instantiated in the statue leads the mind to an understanding of intelligible beauty and, perhaps, to the beautiful [*he kallone*].[460] Since the beautiful is divine, statuary clearly are concrete manifestations [*algamata*] of divine beauty itself.[461]

Thus Plotinus assumes the physical presence of the divine and the beautiful in architecture and statuary. Their beauty and symmetry guarantee the presence of divinity and beauty in their midst. Most significantly, however, he maintains an aesthetic theory that makes their presence in art meaningful. The philosopher was, after all, a mind that grasped these divine and formal images; a soul aware of its undescended self; a figure who knew the intelligible world of the forms; and even succeeded in rising to the highest god four times.[462]

By the fourth century the strictly noetic way of access to the intelligible world, tied to the presence of the ideal world in the act of intellection, had come to be irreversibly modified in Platonism.[463] Indeed an aesthetic way opened up, legitimized by an axiological shift in the value of perception and imagination, and heralded by the Neoplatonic view of the instantiation of the divine forms in statues and icons, temples and churches.

The great building projects of Constantine and the rededication of temples by Julian reflect this new awareness.[464] A sense of divine grace lies at the root of the building, making, and translation of art objects by the Roman upper class.[465]

As members of an inherited elite Neoplatonists were in a strong position to encourage the translation of the arts, to appropriate and give the stamp of legitimacy to these channels of the holy. For their theories of knowledge, the soul, and reality rendered intelligible the constant presence of the divine in nature and within art.

In the *demi-monde* of Hellenic Neoplatonism the dark mood cast over the soul due to her fall and separation from the intelligible world was ameliorated aesthetically.[466] For art served as a visible gesture of divine access to the unconscious and descended soul. Aesthetic knowledge and theurgic practice represented a replication of interpersonal relations between humanity and divinity thought lost because of the tragic nature and destiny of the soul.[467]

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[458] *Vit. Plot.*, 10.

[459] *Enn.*, 5.8.1.

[460] Ibid., 1.6.5.

[461] Ibid., 1.6.3.

[462] Porph. *Vit. Plot.*, 23.

[463] See, A. Smith [1974], 123-141.

[464] See, A. H. M. Jones 1986[4], 2.1012-1024.

[465] See, P. Brown [1984].

[466] The insights of Evans-Pritchard concerning the function of magic apply as well to theurgy. It reverses a situation of misfortune. cf. Evans-Pritchard [1976] 1-55; Douglas [1975]. For the use of these models for late antiquity, cf. P. Brown [1974], 119-146.

[467] This seems to be born out in reports from Porphyry about Plotinus, cf, *Vit.*

The ceremony that surrounds the arts in later Platonism, thus, guarantees good happenings in a world cluttered by bad ones. Theurgic rites represent a carefully articulated model of the new aesthetic relationship between humanity and divinity. Art symbolized for the Neoplatonist contact with ancient gods and goddesses, aesthetic knowledge and theurgic action solidarity with their own empire-wide class.

By the fifth century the philosopher and theurgist are indistinguishable.[468] As the knower of divine wisdom and the doer of the hieratic arts, this figure becomes a supernatural extension of divine power [*dynamis*] and love [*eros*] in the universe. Thriving on the tenacious bond of aesthetic friendship [*philia*] their knowledge and activity offered a mantel of divine patronage [*prostateia*] and the possibility of divine salvation [*sotereia*] to all who fell within their orbit. Indeed, the philosophers use and transfer of divine power to their clients rendered accessibile the proprietary relationship with the gods thought lost because of the fall of the soul.[469]

The Philosopher as Cultural Symbol

Mortals are not immediately joined to the gods but require greater kinds of intermediaries ranging from the cosmic gods and their angels to heroes and sages. Philostratus, Damascius, Marinus, and Eunapius present the lives of wise men and women who effectively brokered this patron-client relationship.[470]

Asclepiodorus and Heraiscus spent long periods of their lives in temples, Damascius resided in a cave under a temple devoted to Cybele near Hierapolis. Each communed with the gods and goddesses who appeared at such places. Venturing forth they became privileged agents and administrators of divine power, love, patronage, and salvation to a wider Roman world.

Hypatia of Alexandria and Sosipatra of Pergamon were higher souls protected and guided by blessed daemons and heroes. Not only philosophers of high repute—Hypatia was the teacher of Synesius and the author of a famous treatise on numbers and Sosipatra was the instructor of countless students and wrote commentaries on the dialogues of Plato—they were practicing theurgists. Using a statue Hypatia telestically cured a man who fell in love with her while Sosipatra victim of a love-spell cast on her by Philometer had it reversed by Maximus, the pupil of Aedesius and teacher of the Emperor Julian.

Other women like Asclepigenia and Anthusa of Cilicia joined men like Plutarch and Hermias to contact, fathom, and translate the divine presence and hallowings in statues to aristocratic clients in city, town, and country throughout the Empire. The inverted magnitudes of temples and statues resided n their souls. Consequently they were able to bring to seance and seminar their condensed solidarity with the divine world.

This map of divine love and power correlates with another symbolized by divine patronage and salvation. Both coalesce around Neoplatonic aesthetic patterns and later Roman cultural patterns. It is easy to be misled by the heritable traits of later

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Plot., 10; and from Eunapius about Sosipatra, cf. *Vit. Soph.*, 466-467. Each had to counter spells cast on them by opponents or lovers. Fallen souls were under the aegis of fate. Only contact with a power higher than fate insured escape from daemonic powers, cf. P. Brown [1974], 119-146.

[468] See, Dodds [1953], 283-311.

[469] For a recent study on this phenomenon see, Gallagher [1982].

[470] Phil. *Vit. Pythag.*, Damas. *Vit. Is.*, Eunap. *Vit. Soph.*, Marin. *Vit. Proc.*

Platonic aesthetics and Roman culture.[471] So often presented as expressions of those who somnambulated in a utopian world many have lost view that this coalesence of aesthetic pattern and culture pattern functioned to enlist and register the participation of listeners [*akroates*] in the manifestation [*autophania*] of the gods in the physical world.[472]

Since matter is not evil it does not prevent communication with the gods. The statue of a god is a material object and matter [*hyle*] is offered [*didomai*] by the gods. Thus, it is congenial [*symphyes*] to them.[473] Thus to make and consecrate statues to the gods is the aesthetic way of communing with the divine:

> Create a statue, purified in the manner I shall teach you. Make the body of mountain rue [peganon agrion][474] and adorn it with little animals, with domestic lizards, and when you have crushed a mixture of myrrh, gum [sturaz], and frankincense, blend it with these creatures, go out to the open air under a waxing moon and perform the rite by saying the prayer . . .[475]

Porphyry says:

> You consecrate a statue of Hecate in the following way: Produce a certain kind of fillet; grind lizards together with fragrant essences and burn all that; say a certain prayer in the open air under a waxing moon; do all this to consecrate the statue of Hecate. The she will appear to you in your sleep.[476]

Buildings and statues, herbs and stones, incantations and formulas, gestures and dancing were included in the categories of symbols [*symbola*] and tokens [*synthemata*] that established contact between a human being and a god. Tools like the bull-roarer [*rombos-stromphalos*][477]. Marinus reports that Proclus used the rhombos wheel to communicate with the gods.[478] Syllabic utterances [*voces mysticae*] were also employed to render the gods visible.[479]

A divine light [*autophia*] often appeared with the manifestation [*autophania*] of the deity. Sometimes the mediator, the philosopher-theurgist, would radiate divine light.[480] While lecturing Proclus would project such light for he communicated with luminous apparitions of Hecate and saw the goddess herself.[481] Not only gods appear; a *parousia* of nature appears, preceded by a whole choir of daemons, angels, and spirits. They are gracious, kind, and give beneficence to the person who evoked them as well to those whom the theurgist initiates into their mysteries.[482]

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[471] Cf. e.g., Dodds [1962].

[472] Iambl. *De Myst.*, 5.23; *Oracles*, fr. 101 {des Places}.

[473] Iambl. *De Myst.*, 5.23.

[474] According to Dioscorides, 3.45-46 this is the herb molly = *ruta halepensis*.

[475] *Oracles*, fr. 224. {des Places}.

[476] *Phil Orac.*, 7.130ff. {Wolf}.

[477] This is the golden ball of Hecate enclosing a sapphire, covered with magical characters, and placed at the end of a strap made of bull's hide. See, Psellus, *Oracles*, fr. 206, 170; cf. Theocritus, 2.30.

[478] *Vit. Proc.*, 28. They hung from the ceiling of the palatial hall in Babylon. cf. Phil. *Vit. Apoll.*, 1.25.6.

[479] Psellus, *Oracles*, 221f. {des Places}.

[480] *Oracles*, fr. 147. {des Places}.

[481] Iambl. *De Myst.*, 2.4; cf. 1.12; 2.5; 3.6.

[482] Ibid., 2.4,7; Psellus, *Oracles* fr. 88. 175. {des Places}.

Through symbols and tokens the god would recognize the theurgist as a legitimate practitioner, and the theurgist the god as as a real god.[483] Scattered throughout the universe through the kindness of the gods they work without our knowledge[484] but they are known to the higher soul. Known to them they were used to achieve union with the gods.[485] Spoken or unspeakable, concealed within the statues of the gods, they assure the presence and intervention of the gods known only to the telestai.[486]

A sacred fire that shines without shape speaks to the theurgist:[487]

> For your sake, bodies have been attached to our autophanies [*autoptois; phasmasin*].[488]

The theurgist becomes a medium [*docheus*] for the presence of the divine in the world.[489]

Eunapius reports that Maximus assembled a large number of friends in the temple of Hecate and burned a grain of incense, reciting to himself the text of a hymn. The goddesses smiled, then laughed, and finally the torches she held burst into flames, into a blaze of light.[490] Wise men and women, therefore, brought a divine presence into the world and the divine power embraced their human community, reintegrating each human soul with her divine source.

Buildings, statues, natural objects, and language became the visible companions that crowded around the men and women of late antiquity. Pullulating with divine expressions of access and friendship they explain the ancient map of relations between deity and humanity in the age of the later Caesars.

Neoplatonists were convinced that gods, goddesses, daemons, and angels revealed their natures and names through those special men and women whose primordial sowing linked them eternally with the divine. Aesthetic perception and the arts enabled the imagination to project a structure of a clearly defined reality onto a known social world and to define personal relationships.

Aesthetic Symbol as Cultural Symbol

Art, in late antiquity therefore, did more than decorate a landscape with imposing temples and sublime statues. It was an expression of piety exquisitely adapted to enable ancient Mediterranean men and women to articulate and render intelligible urgent questions on the nature and destiny of the soul. Art revealed the continuity between the self and the divine, serving to establish a sense of the stability of the identity. It permits the soul to turn her back on the towering disparity between the different orders of the universe and to seek reassurance in the tight web of her imagination, in the stability of the well-known human relationships of patron and client.

Against this immemorial backdrop, later Romans turned to discover their divine, unconscious selves. Objects of art provided the soul with recognizable forms of

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[483] Psellus, *Oracles*, fr. 149, p. 184. {des Places}.
[484] Iambl., *De Myst.*, 5.23; 2.11.
[485] Proc., *Elem. Theol.*, 223 {Dodds}.
[486] Ibid., *In Tim.*, 1.273d. cf. Dodds [1963], 292 n.34; Boyance [1955], 196 n. 2.
[487] *Oracles* fr. 148, 173 {des Places}.
[488] Ibid., fr. 101.; cf. Iambl. *De Myst.*, 5.23.
[489] Psellus, 1.249 K-D.
[490] *Vit. Soph.*, 475 {Boiss}.

divine beings whose self-presentations were rendered aesthetically intelligible through theurgy.

Neoplatonic aesthetics makes clear the metaphysical structure of patronage and the solidarities that bound together the aristocratic classes of the Roman Empire, in these last pagan centuries. Aesthetic theory established the presence of divine love and power in the world, their accessibility, and, therefore, consolidated the Platonic philosopher at the acme of a divinely sanctioned *patrocinium.*

Thus, art, becomes part of a universe increasingly marked by implicit and explicit patronage. The divine has its network; holy men and women tapped into it by building patronage networks of their own. As a result the theurgist was placed at the forefront of later Roman society as the fulcrum of a wide-ranging social *patrocinium.*

As patrones divine men and women emerged to resolve the gulf between self and deity through an aesthetic therapy of proximity. The theurgist emerges as the leader of a *patrona communis* who sees the different levels of the self and the manifold levels between the self and god and resolves them.

The aesthetic pilgrimage of the soul to intellect and beyond overcomes distance and alienation. Integral to this Odyssey of the soul is the detachment of the arts from a mimetic context and its attachment to a hypostatic context. Through art the divine communes with the human. Moreover it becomes a locus of a network of "interpersonal acts" between gods and humans that carries with it the full overtones of later Platonic epistemological, psychological, and reality theories as well as later Roman understandings of generosity, inter-dependence, and solidarity.

With Plotinus' concession, Platonic aesthetics at last comes to terms with the cultural world of the later Roman Empire. As Plotinus insisted, the absolute certainty characteristic of the intelligible world manifests itself in the sensible world. The world of ideas is self-contained, cogent, and certain. It is accessible because the natural world is deliberately fashioned so that our minds can move freely and confidently within it to capture the divine essence that creates and sustains it.

Everything in the natural world may be in flux, while certainty belongs to the intelligible world. Nonetheless, Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus postulate a fixed framework within nature as a necessary mark of its rationality. The arts provide access into a clearly defined structure of reality within which everything and everyone has a lucidly defined relationship.

Earlier Platonic assumptions, that only a fixed order of being could be intelligible, are proved groundless. The divine order is aesthetically intelligible. In Neoplatonic terms, we understand the world not less, but more completely through nature and the arts. We also understand interpersonal relationships in a new way. Later Romans drew intellectual strength from these facts.

For these ancient Mediterranean men and women Hecate beckons:

> Bats are now beginning their short strutting flights against the sky. In the east the color is washing out the world, leaving room for the great copper-colored moon which will soon rise over Epirus. It is the magic hour between two unrealized states of being—the day-world expiring in its last hot tones of amber and lemon, and the night world gathering with its ink-blue shadows and silver moonlight.
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> "Watch for her," says the Count, "behind the mountains there." The air tastes faintly of damp. "She will be rising in a few moments."

> "I am thinking," says Zarian, "how nothing is ever solved finally. In every age, from every angle, we are facing the same set of natural phenomena, moonlight, death, religion, laughter, fear. We make idolatrous attempts to enclose them in a conceptual frame. And all the time they change under our very noses."
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> "To admit that," says the Count oracularly, is to admit happiness—or peace of mind, if you like. Never to imagine that any of these generalizations we make about gods or men is valid, but to cherish them because they carry in them the fallibility of our own minds."

Conclusion

Philo, Clement, Origen, Plotinus—
or Julian, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus.

The list would probably have puzzled my grandfather and his generation. It makes sense now; it symbolizes changes in our historical perspective. We can face, more or less from the same angle, thought communities which seem far apart; and we can find something in common among them through the social organizations that produced such facts.

For the most part these men did not know one another. No obvious external link connects most of them with each other. Yet all of them gave new meanings to prophecy, divination, and magic in later Platonism, and brought about profound changes in the societies to which they belonged.

We have been led to ask the philosophical and cultural questions that will interpret the teachings of the later Platonists in order to make them more socially perceptible. We have asked what conditioned the appearance of so many kindred understandings of prophecy, knowledge, reality, and the soul within relatively wide chronological limits. We have inquired how indeed were prophecy, divination, and magic interpreted in so many different ways within relatively narrow cultural limits We have examined why there is a relation between the religious and philosophical ideas of later Platonism and the social messages these thought communities conveyed.

The very nature of the questions that have come to our minds indicates the essence of our new position towards these men and women. Instead of seeing each later Platonist as representives of specific religions and schools, we now see all of them as participants in a general cultural system.

They have explained themselves to us directly by their own words. We have done our part by commenting on their words. Given the necessary knowledge of languages and texts, we may presume that at some future date we shall understand Porphyry and Proclus in the same way as we comprehend Philo and Origen. This *Achenzeit* awaits us.

Until then firm conclusions about the relation between individual minds and social institutions can be drawn only when all the evidence has been collected and analyzed. Nonetheless, it is possible, even now, to make a few preliminary observations about prophecy, divination, and magic in Later Platonism and their relation to social facts.

1. Later Platonists established a connection between divine prophecy and human knowledge. In many instances Biblical and Chaldaean texts provide them with the oracular data required by them. But in many others the link between prophecy, divination, and magic goes much wider afield into the writings of the poets, tragedians, and philosophers.

2. Later Platonists utilize the pneumatic/noetic link between oracular and scientific knowledge to resolve a series of ontological and psychological problematics endemic to their degree of reality metaphysics and the fall of the soul. This is clear from the extensive use later Platonists make of the technical terminology of ontology, epistemology, and psychology. They apply these *topoi* to a Biblical and Chaldaean context. This permits later Platonists to lift their sacred scriptures out of the *arcana mundi* to which they were consigned.

3. Later Platonic couplings of revelation and reason through allegory signals an acceptance of the *logos* character of divinely inspired prophecy, divination, and magic. This linkage underscores the ontological, epistemological, psychological, ethical, and soteriological significance of occult knowledge and practices.

4. Later Platonic understandings of prophecy, divination, and magic suggest a relationship between individual minds and social institutions. This association resolves itself in four main points:

a. Later Platonic cognitive processes reflect later ancient social arrangements. This is largely clear in the relationship between later ancient metaphysical theory and later Roman patronage and kinship systems. Knowledge reflects and builds social solidarity.

b. The proposition that philosophical facts are social facts suggests that knowledge is essentially social. Key activities of thinking such as the conferring of identity, the positing of similarity relationships, and the classification of divine and natural kinds are shaped by the cultural and institutional contexts in which they occur.

c. Later Platonic knowledge processes and practices underpin institutions. Thought communities are social institutions. The fact-generating activity of later Platonism and later ancient cultural complexes get shaped together. To constitute a version of reality is at the same time to constitute a society.

d. The thesis that knowledge acquisition and sharing shows how institutions and knowledge get shaped together effectively limits those who are committed to rational choice theory and its assumption that individuals act as autonomous rational calculators. Rational choice theory cannot fully explain the relationships between metaphysical thinking and the social arrangements it reflects. The difficulty lies in rational choice theory's neglect of the prior problem of how knowledge systems come into being.

Thus, to view later Platonic prophecy, divination, and magic between Balaam and Hecate from these perspectives is to connect it with its proper contextual world and to explain how it came into being. If this study has shed light on the relationship between knowledge and society and stimulates others to investigate these connections further, it will have more than fulfilled its purpose.

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Questions about Redactional Strata and the Social Relations Reflected in Q

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Under the astute leadership of James M. Robinson the Q Seminar has brought our understanding of the Synoptic Sayings Source Q to unprecedented levels of precision and sophistication. Highly influential in the Q Seminar's work has been the groundbreaking study by John Kloppenborg of *The Formation of Q*.[1] Just last year the Q Seminar turned its attention to the "social history" of Q, with major papers by Kloppenborg and Burton Mack.[2] Parallel to the increasingly sophisticated analysis being carried out on Q, other groups in the SBL are asking increasingly precise and complex historical-sociological questions about social relations in ancient Jewish Palestine. Pursuit of some of those questions threatens to challenge some of our preferred scholarly images of structures and key players in ancient "Jewish society."

In this paper I will presume to attempt to mediate between recent discussions in the Q Seminar and those in other SBL units. I enter as an outsider to the former, hence I will surely not understand adequately all of the presuppositions and principles and conclusion with which many of you are working. When I read the groundbreaking analysis of the formation of Q by Kloppenborg on which both his and Mack's social-historical analysis is based, however, I had some fundamental questions that must be explored before attempting to place Q in the context of a revised picture of social structures and conflicts in Jewish Palestine.

Questions about the Formation of Q

Kloppenborg assigns five complexes of Q sayings—3:7-9,16-17; 7:1-10,18-35; 11:14-26,29-32,39-52; 12:39-59 and 17:23-35—to the same secondary redactional stratum on the basis of "several common features" revealed by his analysis of the composition and redactional history of the sayings and units within these complexes.[3] The common features he has discovered involve a projected audience, form, and motifs. The *projected audience* "consists of the impenitent and the opponents of community preaching. . . . The target group of the final form of the Q woes and

[1] John S. Kloppenborg, *The Formation of Q: Trajectories in Ancient Wisdom Collections* (Studies in Antiquity and Christianity; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987).

[2] John S. Kloppenborg, "Redactional Strata and Social History in the Sayings Gospel Q," to appear in *Semeia* (1989); and Burton L. Mack, "The Kingdom that Didn't Come: The Social History of the Q Tradents," in D. J. Lull, ed., *Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers, 1988* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 608-635.

[3] *Formation of Q*, 166-170.

the five speeches as a whole . . . includes all of Israel." The *form* typical of this stratum of Q is that of chriae which criticize the response of "this generation" to the preaching of the kingdom, and which encapsulate the *prophetic judgment and apocalyptic words* typical of this stratum. Correspondingly, preponderant in this stratum are *motifs* related to the theme of judgment, such as imminence, the parousia, with Israel obstinately rejecting John, Jesus and the Q preachers while the Gentiles respond positively, thus highlighting Israel's unfaithfulness.

These same "common features" function prominently throughout Kloppenborg's analysis of particular texts as the substantive criteria according to which this all-important redactional stratum is determined. Thus Q appears to have a "polemic against Israel's lack of recognition," and "Israel is guilty of rejecting God's envoys," etc.,[4] while certain texts "speak of *actual Gentile belief*," and "the theme of Gentile response and faith occurs in Q" with "frequency," such that Q can be seen to have an "interpretation of Gentile faith as an *Unheilszeichen* for Israel."[5] Certain sayings are found to be "apocalyptic predictions" of "apocalyptic judgment" or "eschatological" events.[6] Similarly, Kloppenborg finds in this stratum of Q apocalyptic *topoi* such as "war" and the "division of families" and motifs such as "nearness of the end," the parousia, and "impending catastrophe."[7]

When one examines the actual complexes of Q sayings assigned to this redactional stratum, however, it is difficult to find the "common features" that Kloppenborg used as the substantive criteria. Little of the material in those five complexes in fact appears to be "directed at the 'outgroup'" of the impenitent and the opponents. The majority of the material in these five complexes consists of rationalizations, exhortations, and particularly sanctions directed at the "in-group" of Jesus' followers themselves (7:18-23,24-28; 12:39-46,51-53,57-59; 17:23-35) or is not particularly threatening in the first place (11:14-26). The only texts that can easily be understood as rationalizations of the rejection and persecution encountered by Q preachers are 11:29-32 and 49-51, with the possible addition of 3:7-9; and 7:31-35. But there is no reason internal to these texts to think that "this generation" refers to "Israel" as opposed to "Gentiles." The only occurrence of "Israel" is in 7:1-10. Here in this one text indeed a Gentile responds to Jesus with faith. But the point of the story is not to exemplify a mission to Gentiles,[8] but to challenge (or embarrass) Jews/Israel into fuller response. Beyond 7:1-10, moreover, there is no indication in Q of "actual Gentile belief." 11:31-32 cites the historical cases of the Queen of the South's response to Solomon's wisdom and the Ninevites' response to Jonah's preaching, respectively, as contrasts to the response of "this generation" to "something greater," but not as Gentile response to Jesus or preaching of the kingdom. 10:13-15 does not in fact "predict Gentile faith" but offers a hypothetical contrast to the lack of repentance in two particular towns (and not "Israel"). And 13:29,28 speaks of a hypothetical Gentile pilgrimage (again to challenge the "sons of the kingdom"), not "an actual Gentile mission."[9] There is simply no basis in Q for "Gentile faith" as a

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[4] *Formation of Q*, 120, 147; see also 119, 125, 127, 236-7, 238.

[5] *Formation of Q*, 236, 119-120; see also 193, 196, 226.

[6] *Formation of Q*, 102-103, 108, 128, etc.

[7] *Formation of Q, topoi*, 151; nearness of the end, 152, 155, 166; parousia, 102, 150, 152, 157, 163, 165; catastrophe, 152-153, 164.

[8] As Kloppenborg admits, 119.

[9] Cf. *Formation of Q*, 119-120, 236.

significant theme, let along its interpretation as an *Unheilszeichen* for Israel.

As for the "common feature" of form, only one of the chriae listed (11:29 + 31-32) actually criticizes the response of 'this generation' to the preaching of the kingdom. Moreover, of the sayings that these chriae "encapsulate," none of them appear to be "apocalyptic words," but are "prophetic sayings," and of the other sayings that supposedly articulate a threat, only three of the nine listed could intelligibly be interpreted that way (i.e., possibly 12:39,54-55; and 17:37b; but not 11:20,23,24-26, 33,34-36; and 12:57-58).

The failure of the "common features" to appear in Q texts becomes even more acute for the "motifs." The assumption that Q speaks of "the parousia" is probably rooted in a Pauline understanding of Christ's return. But "(the day of) the son of man" in Luke 12:40; 17:24,26,30 is merely a symbol for the judgment, and not a reference to an individual figure of redemption (see further below). Moreover, judgment is not particularly "imminent" in Q, except perhaps in the Baptist's preaching. Both 12:51-53 and 12:54-56, for example, refer to the present crisis). Finally, only in 11:29-32 and 49-51 (and not in 7:31-35; 11:19-20,24-26, 33-36; 12:57-59) does lack of response to John, Jesus, or Q preachers constitute grounds for condemnation. As with the projected audience, so with the motifs, there is little or no basis for the claim that Q has a polemic against "Israel" in contrast to the positive response of the Gentiles.

Strictly speaking, only two texts (11:29-32 and 11:49-51) actually attest the three common features used as criteria for the secondary, judgmental layer, and then not quite in the distinctive ways Kloppenborg has characterized them: i.e., they are prophetic sayings (but not apocalyptic sayings) in form, they contain the motif of rejection of Jesus' preaching as a basis for condemnation (but no apocalyptic traits), and they also focus on "this generation" (but not "Israel") as the projected audience. It hardly seems justified to assign five whole complexes of sayings to a particular "redactional stratum" on the basis of only two sayings that actually manifest the "common features" used as criteria.

Is it possible that the stated criteria of assignment of Q material into redactional strata come not so much from the texts as from the interpretive concepts of modern New Testament scholarship? It is precisely because of ever more precise and sophisticated analysis of texts such as that by Kloppenborg that we are realizing just how diverse were the communities of Jesus' followers and their interpretations of Jesus; yet we have not adjusted our conceptual apparatus to accord with that diversity. Thus it may be that we are still applying to Q material concepts which are derived from an earlier, more synthetic scholarly understanding of "early Christianity" but which may not be expressed in Q itself. An especially critical eye should be focused on scholarly concepts that have been heavily influenced by Christian theology and christology, such as "apocalyptic" or "eschatological" motifs and concepts, the parousia, and what are often taken as "christological titles," such as "the son of man." My argument is thus not with Kloppenborg, who is simply continuing the standard scholarly categories utilized in recent treatments of Q,[10] but with the conceptual apparatus of our field.

Both Kloppenborg and Mack have stressed that Q is far less "apocalyptic" than

[10] Particularly by German scholarship such as Dieter Luehrmann, *Die Redaktion der Logienquelle* (WMANT 33; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1969); and Siegfried Schultz, *Q: Spruchquelle der Evangelisten* (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1972.

previously imagined. In fact the observation that "much of the specialized vocabulary of apocalypticism and even some of its central presuppositions are absent from large portions of Q"[11] does not go nearly far enough. As noted already, in assigning certain material to the judgmental stratum, Kloppenborg finds plenty of apocalyptic elements for which he uses the stereotypical scholarly labels.[12] But it is not at all clear to the critical eye that "the catastrophic destruction of the world" by fire or flood is visualized in 3:9,17; 12:49; 17:29; and 17:27, or that "historical determinism" and "eschatological events" are implicit in 10:23-24.[13] There nothing in the text of 12:54-56 itself or in the immediate or larger context of Q that suggests "signs of the end" or "the impending catastrophe."[14] 12:54-56 refers rather to a present crisis. The division of families in 12:51-53 is not an "apocalyptic *topos*" (whatever some of the handbooks may suggest), but a prophetic motif, particularly from Micah 7:6.[15] Further, the apocalyptic sense of the "nearness of the end" (*Naherwartung*) is difficult to find in Q, particularly in 17:23-37, which stresses the suddenness, not the imminence, of the the judgment day. Only the prophetic words of the Baptist in 3:9 implies an immediacy of judgment. Finally, it should not seem surprising that in Q there is "only passing reference to the motifs of cosmic transformation," because such motifs do not in fact occur with "high frequency" in Jewish apocalypses, especially not in those prior to time of Q.[16] To state the matter more precisely, it is difficult to find much of anything in Q that is typical of Jewish apocalyptic literature—unless it is "(the day of) the son of man."

"Son of man christology" and the closely related concept of the parousia appear to have been read into Q along with a number of "apocalyptic" elements. It is confidently asserted in a variety of contexts that "Son of Man" christology was important and perhaps even distinctive to Q and the Q community.[17] "'Son of Man' is the only christological title found in Q and was both fundamental to the community's confession of Jesus and the cause of its persecution."[18] "The Son of Man christology originated, flourished, and, for the most part, died within what can be called the 'Q Community.'"[19] Ironically, just when it is being recognized that there is no basis in contemporary Jewish texts for the modern concept of "the apocalyptic Son of Man," something similar is still being read into Q texts. That is, it is still

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[11] J. S. Kloppenborg, "Symbolic Eschatology and the Apocalypticism of Q," *HTR* 80 (1987) 292.

[12] And Mack, apparently building on Kloppenborg, finds an "overbearing presence" of "apocalyptic idiom" in Q2, "The Kingdom that Didn't Come," 613.

[13] "Symbolic Eschatology," 296.

[14] *Formation of Q*, 152.

[15] "Symbolic Eschatology," 299; *Formation of Q*, 151.

[16] *Vs.* "Symbolic Eschatology," 299-300, 306.

[17] Surely influential in this connection have been H. E. Toedt, *The Son of Man in the Synoptic Tradition* (London: SCM, 1965), 232-274, esp. 269; and Paul Hoffmann, *Studien zur Logienquelle* (NTAbh 8; 2d ed.; Muenster: Aschendorff, 1975), 82-158.

[18] M. E. Boring, *Sayings of the Risen Jesus: Christian Prophecy in the Synoptic Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 141.

[19] W. O. Walker, "The Son of Man: Some Recent Developments," *CBQ* 45 (1983), 607. See further the review of Q scholarship on this subject in F. Neirynck, "Recent Developments in the Study of Q," in *LOGIA: Les Paroles Jesu* (Memorial M. Coppens; Louvain: Louvain University Press, 1982), 29-75, esp. 69-74.

assumed that the phrase "the son of man" refers a *figure* coming in eschatological judgment, and that Q texts think of that figure as the risen or exalted Jesus in his *parousia*. This image of Jesus returning as the eschatological judge is then also placed in the broader context of the twentieth century scholarly composite scenario replete with "the delay of the parousia," the "nearness of the end," and "the impending catastrophe."[20]

There appears to be little basis in Q itself either for these generalizations regarding Q's "christology" or for there being any expectation of a parousia in Q. The "son of man" sayings in Q are basically of two types. In the one type, Jesus uses the phrase to refer to himself in various connections. Whatever one's conclusion about the scholarly debate concerning whether the generic use of the phrase *bar (e)nash(a)* ("a human being" or "anyone/someone") provides a basis for a circumlocution for the speaker's self reference ("I/me"), "the son of man" would appear to be used in the latter sense in Luke 6:22; 7:34; 9:58; and 11:30. In the other type, "the son of man" is used as a symbolic reference to the judgment, most often in the stereotyped phrase "the day(s) of the son of man" (Luke 12:8-9,40; 17:24,26,30). The ultimate origin of the symbol may of course be the apocalyptic vision recounted in Dan 7, but the Q texts make no explicit reference to the Daniel text. Thus it is likely that the image used in Daniel 7 (one like a "son of man") had become a standard image for the eventual divine judgment. But there is nothing in these particular sayings or in Q as a whole to indicate that "(the day of) the son of man" referred to a particular individual agent of redemption (let alone a "messianic" one). In 12:8 "the son of man" appears to be an advocate figure at the divine court, but if so he is not an independent individual agent of redemption but simply part of a larger scenario of judgment including the (parallel) "the angels of God" in 12:9. Thus it would seem inappropriate to import into the Q texts the Christian theological overtones now resonant in the term *parousia* that Matthew substituted for "the days of."

Finally, there is no indication in Q that the one type of 'son of man' sayings is connected in any way with the other type. The key text in this respect is 11:30: if "the son of man" here had been a reference to the judgment and not a circumlocutionary self reference by Jesus, then it would have been better coordinated with its context (Luke 11:29-32) in which both the queen of the south and the men of Nineveh are mentioned as arising "at the judgment." Thus it is clear in the Q texts that when Jesus is refering to himself with "the son of man" he is not referring to the judgment, and when he uses "the son of man" as a symbol for the judgment, he is not refering to himself. And in neither case is "the son of man" a title, let alone a "christological title."

It is thus unclear how Q could be said to have either a "Son of Man christology" or an expectation of the parousia. Not only is there "no indication of a kerygmatic interpretation of Jesus' death in Q,"[21] but there are also "no indications that Q represented itself to its intended audience as oracles of the Exalted Lord."[22] Thus there would appear to be no basis whatever for positing the concept of "the parousia" in Q, let alone to believe that two whole sections of Q (12:39-59; 17:23-37) deal with it.[23]

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[20] Kloppenborg, *The Formation of Q*, esp. 152-153, 162-164.

[21] Mack, "The Kingdom that Didn't Come," 618.

[22] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 322.

[23] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 102, 150, 152, 153, 157, 163, 165.

Closely related to these scholarly concepts that have been largely imposed on Q is the scholarly distinction that has surely been the major factor in making the fundamental division into redactional strata. The field of New Testament studies has for sometime operated with the assumption of a distinction between a sapiential or wisdom tradition, on the one hand, and an apocalyptic tradition, on the other. In terms of literary genre this distinction makes considerable sense. An apocalypse has distinctive characteristics as a literary genre that makes it very different from a collection of proverbs. This is true even though the same designation, *logoi sophon* / "words of the wise" can be used for both.[24] Can we move from a distinction between genres, which is not being applied to Q, to one of different traditions of motifs, forms, thought, and hermeneutics?

A distinction between two separate traditions surely makes little sense sociologically. In a traditional agrarian society such as ancient Judea in the second Temple period the principal people who were literate and capable of or inclined to produce literature were those who worked in some capacity as scholarly "retainers" for the governing groups. One of the responsibilities of these sages-teachers-lawyers in second Temple times was apparently to cultivate and interpret the Torah as the constitution and lawcode for the temple-state ruled by the high priesthood. And the Torah had come to be understood as synonymous with wisdom. Given the imperial situation that prevailed in Hellenistic times after about 200 BCE, however, these sages-teachers-lawyers periodically came into sharp disagreement or even conflict with the rulers they ostensibly worked for. That is, insofar as the ruling high priestly families and their wealthy and powerful allies pursued policies of assimilation into Western/Hellenistic culture and politics, the "retainers" whose whole raison d'etre was to preserve and interpret the distinctive Judean scriptures would have been both threatened and alienated. It seems abundantly clear, sociologically speaking, that the people who produced apocalyptic literature such as the various sections of 1 Enoch or the book of Daniel were some of the same people who taught wisdom and Torah. The mixture of "apocalyptic" and "sapiential" materials in the same text can be observed quite clearly in 1 Enoch. What was produced depended on the times and circumstances, but both apocalyptic and wisdom literature stemmed from the same, numerically quite small, social stratum.

But does the distinction between the "apocalyptic" and "sapiential" traditions make any sense even in the discussion of the genre of Q. As Kloppenborg notes, to describe Q as a whole (without distinctions of "layers") as a genre of wisdom sayings is problematic since "in fact Q is a composite of not only wisdom sayings, but chriae, prophetic and apocalyptic words and the temptation story."[25] Koester's discernment of the formative stage of Q as a "wisdom gospel" requires the prior determination that *Gos. Thom.* is the best representative of the genre over against which Q in fimal form, with its "apocalyptic orientation" and "christology of the coming Son of Man is due to a secondary redaction."[26] Although Kloppenborg reverses Koester's procedure, attempting to determine which portions of Q "were formative from a literary-critical perspective," he reaches a parallel conclusion: what is primary and what is secondary are determined apparently from the scholarly distinction between

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[24] As originally pointed out by J. M. Robinson, "LOGOI SOPHON: On the Gattung of Q," *Trajectories Through Early Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971).

[25] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 30-31.

[26] H. Koester, "Apocryphal and Canonical Gospels," *HTR* 73 (1980) 113.

"apocalyptic" and "sapiential," with the five whole "complexes" judged secondary because of "apocalyptic" or judgmental material in them and even shorter portions of the supposedly more original "sapiential" complexes being deemed interpolations also because of their "apocalyptic" or judgmental features.

This whole approach by categorization according to "apocalyptic" and "sapiential," however, does not work on Q for two fundamental reasons. First, as just explained above, Q material assigned to the secondary stratum does not manifest "apocalyptic" features. Second, as Mack points out, the Q material left in the first redactional stratum is *not sapiential* "with respect to traditional forms of conventional wisdom," but appears "sapiential" only by comparison with the "apocalyptic" secondary layer.[27] Moreover, as Kloppenborg himself points out, the "sapiential" layer contains "some rather specialized instructions which go beyond what is usually understood as sapiential admonitions" such as sayings regarding mission, discipleship, and the Holy Spirit.[28] Even if, recognizing the inapplicability of the modern concept of "apocalyptic" to Q, we used "prophetic" instead, the whole assumption of different traditions is problematic. As Kloppenborg points out, there is fundamental unclarity in the definitions of the terms "wisdom" and "prophecy" and the Q material itself is ambiguous with regard to just such a distinction.[29] It seems that the place to start is with a critical reexamination of the whole process of categorization of material according to the scholarly concepts of "apocalyptic" (or "prophetic) *vs.* "sapiential." Robinson called some time ago for a serious "dismantling" (and reassembling?) of the categories of New Testament scholarship.

Whatever the disposition of such scholarly categories, it seems clear that it is not possible to sort out two different strata in Q according to the distinction between "apocalyptic" and "sapiential" materials. It would appear to be necessary to re-examine Q materials particularly with regard to whether there are such significant differences in form, motifs, and audience that different redactional strata are required to account for them. The following paragraphs are intended only as a few feeble steps in that direction.

As noted above, most of the material assigned to the second redactional stratum is addressed (not to an "outgroup" but) to the "in-group" of the Q community or Jesus' followers (7:18-23,24-28; 12:39-46,51-53,57-59; 17:23-35), while except for the longer harrangue specifically against the Pharisees/lawyers (11:39-52) only a few short passages (most of which expressed sharp judgment) are directed against (or might appear from the Q as a whole targeted against) outsiders of some sort (11:29-32, 49-51; 3:7-9; 7:31-35?; and possibly 12:54-56?). The same, however, could be observed about the material assigned to the first redactional stratum. That is, most of the material is addressed to the "in-group" of Jesus' followers, while a few short passages (most of which express sharp judgment) are directed against outsiders (10:13-15; 13:25-27,28-29,34-35).[30] That is, there is roughly the same

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[27] B. Mack, "The Kingdom that Didn't Come," 613.

[28] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 239-240.

[29] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 37. Nevertheless, he claims that "it is the sapiential, not the prophetic, element which comes to the fore" in the hypothetical earlier stratum, listing numerous sayings that other scholars have labelled as "prophetic" (239).

[30] I.e., the bulk of the sayings in the early, "sapiential" stratum that Kloppenborg treats as later "interpolations" because they are judgmental, "Social History in Q," 5.

amount of judgmental material directed at the outgroup in both of the hypothetical strata. (Moreover, if anything, the outgroup in the sayings from the supposedly earlier stratum consists more clearly of Jews than that in the passages from the supposedly later stratum.) So there is virtually no distinction between the hypothetical strata on the key criterion of "audience." There seems no justification for using a limited amount of judgmental material directed against outsiders as the principal basis for defining a separate stratum in some complexes of sayings while dismissing the similar material in other complexes as later "interpolations." Either those passages ought to be seen as integral in both cases or as interpolations in both cases. In any event, there is no basis for distinguishing different layers in the way Kloppenborg does on the basis of "projected audience." However, perhaps someone could probe whether the material directed at outsiders throughout Q could be understood as a redactional layer (?).

The remaining differences between the hypothesized strata would appear to be the prominence of wisdom sayings in the one and prophetic sayings in the other, and the positive admonition in the one versus the negative sanctions in the other. But the difference between admonition or instruction and sanction or threat is hardly a basis on which to distinguish different strata. We can see how they go together within certain complexes of sayings such as 12:2-9 (stratum 1) and 12:35-46 (stratum 2). Is there any good reason then to separate the sanction complex of 17:23-37 into a different redactional stratum from the positive teachings and admonitions of 6:27-45 (which have their own brief sanction in 6:46-49)?

Another "clear difference" between the "sapiential" and the "apocalyptic" strata lies in their respective "formulations of reciprocity," according to Mack.[31] Once we remind ourselves not to read into Q the modern concept of "the eschaton," however, there appears to be little difference at all between the illustrations given for the two hypothetical strata in terms of exchange between two "orders of reference," one of which is the ordinary world of human affairs in both sets of illustrative sayings. Sayings in both sets use God, the word of God, heaven, the judgment, etc. as sanctions on behavior in human affairs. Or, to focus on particular sayings: "Love your enemies; and you will be sons of God" (Luke 6:35, assigned to Q1) is parallel and similar to "He who denies me before men will be denied before the angels (of God)" (Luke 12:8-9, assigned to Q2); and it is difficult to understand why "Blessed are those who hear the word of God and keep it" (was Luke 11:28 in Q at all? let alone in Q2?) is not parallel and similar to the pattern of exhortation in 6:20-49, for which "Why do you call me 'Lord' and not do what I tell you. . . . Everyone who hears my words and does them is like. . . . " (6:46-49, assigned to Q1) is the concluding sanction.

It is suggested in the same context that in contrast to the "sapiential" stratum, Q2 focuses on the issue of acceptance or rejection of Jesus and his words. But 6:46-49 and 10:16 (and 10:22) illustrate that material assigned to Q1 can be so focused as well; while the issue is attested in Q2 only by 7:23; 11:23 and 11:30 (12:8-9 appears to be integral to its context of 12:2-7 rather than an "interpolation").

Finally, it is questionable whether there is anything in the Q texts mentioning the motif of the killing of the prophets that would lead one to a motive for the hypothesized redactional stratum (i.e., if one were not already looking for such a motive). Kloppenborg suggests that the motive for the secondary redaction of Q was

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[31] "The Kingdom that Didn't Come," 612-613.

the need for the Q people whose preaching of the kingdom had been rejected to rationalize their own failure and persecution, which they did by means of the theme of Israel's persecution and killing of the prophets. A closer and fuller consideration of this theme in Q, however, makes it difficult to accept this hypothesis about the motive for the secondary redaction of Q. We can take our lead from some of the insightful considerations offered by Kloppenborg himself.

The pertinent texts are three. Luke 6:23b is the only one that could possibly support either the hypothesis of a later redaction or that of the Q people rationalizing their own persecution. It can be understood as an interpolation into an already shaped complex of blessings and other sayings. And it makes at least a minimal connection with the Q people, using the persecution of the prophets as a consoling paradigm for their persecution. But the second text, 13:34-35a, makes no such connection, and it is impossible to discern what the complex might have been into which 13:34-35 was supposedly interpolated. (Moreover, 13:35b would appear to be an addition to 13:34-35a.)[32] The third text, Luke 11:47-51, is the key, and the compositional history of the woes against the Pharisees as analyzed by Kloppenborg is the crucial indicator. 11:49-51 "is almost unanimously regarded as an insertion," i.e., at the second redaction itself if not prior to it.[33] That means that the killing of the prophets charge, mentioned already in 11:47-48, existed at least in the tradition of the woes against the Pharisees prior to the hypothetisized Q2. But, if I understand Kloppenborg correctly, 13:34-35a, a distinctive prophetic lament also containing the motif, would also have predated the Q2 redaction, at which point it was presumably inserted into its "complex." Thus the theme of the historical rejection and killing of the prophets is not confined to and apparently did not originate with some "apocalyptic" or "judgmental" redaction of Q, but was already present in the traditioning process by which sayings were developing prior to that redaction, at the very least, in the tradition of the woes against the Pharisees.

Now whatever the ultimate origin of such sayings as 11:47-48 and 13:34-35a (pre-Christian sophia saying(s), Jesus himself, a Q prophet, etc.), the memory of the Jerusalem rulers or their representatives having killed the prophets would have been as much or more significant at the earliest stages in the development of the sayings tradition and/or community behind an eventual Q than at some late stage of secondary redaction. That is, such a memory provided the background against which the proto-Q people understood Jesus' career and death. Some of the sayings that clearly understand Jesus and John as prophets (particularly 7:18-23, 24-28, 31-35; 11:29-32) point in the same direction, i.e., that there was conflict between such prophetic figures and the establishment, hence that the persecution and killing of the prophets must have been an important theme early in the development of the traditions that are now in Q. Of course it is then conceivable that the same theme/sayings could later have functioned for Q preachers as rationalization for their own persecution. But 6:23c is the only texts to suggest such a connection. Hence it seems difficult to understand how it is justified methodologically to sort this theme out as having significance (and decisive or formative at that!) primarily at some late stage of a secondary redaction of Q.

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[32] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 228—although nothing in 13:35b suggests the it refers to "the coming of the Son of Man."

[33] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 140.

Recent attempts to distinguish major redactional strata in Q do not seem convincing. It is clear from Kloppenborg's and others' work that the material in Q underwent some development and shaping and that some passages are likely insertions into already shaped complexes of sayings. But the actual material in the various complexes gives little evidence for the existence of later, "apocalyptic" or judgmental stratum significantly different from a formative, "sapiential" stratum. Hence there does not seem to be an adequate evidentiary basis for tracing a "social history" of the Q tradents or community. Taking Q as a whole, however, it is possible to discern the social relations indicated and to place those in within the social context of Jewish Palestine that is now emerging in greater clarity.

Social Context and Social Relations Indicated in Q

It may not be possible to determine the social location and ethos of a movement simply and directly from the literary genre it utilizes. With the exception of that rare genre that originate in popular movements (is the Gospel of Mark an example?), literary genres in traditional, historical culture are the products of the literate strata, who generally are patronized by the rulers or other wealthy people. Instructional literature provides clear illustrations. A leader or "organic intellectual" in a popular movement seeking a form of literary expression might as well borrow one already generated by literate strata as create a new form. Hence genre may not necessarily be a direct indication of ethos.

Recent characterizations of (the first, "sapiential" stratum of) Q are couched in somewhat vague and general terms: a "radical ethic and lifestyle," or "visible and overt social radicalism," or "mildly countercultural lifestyle," or "countercultural and inversionary gospel," or "mildly subversive."[34] Judging from available instructional literature in general and Israelite-Jewish wisdom literature in particular, it is difficult to imagine that any sapiential literature would ever espouse "visible and overt social radicalism." Similarly, based on what we know of retainers in general and of scribes, Pharisees, and other Jewish retainers in particular, it is difficult to believe that such people who were so dependent on the system could really "imagine a radical alternative to the present system" (unless that meant a particularly oppressive imperial regime and its local collaborators, as in the Hellenizing "Reform" of 175 BCE). "Countercultural" comes closer to describing those who, like the ancient Cynics, dropped out of the system they were criticizing, but generated no vision of an alternative. Early Israelite history and perhaps some of the biblical narratives did represent alternatives to the usual ancient Near Eastern kingdom, temple-state, or empire. But even the priestly- and scribally-dominated Qumran community that was so "radically" alienated from the system apparently imagined their own exodus to the wilderness and new covenant community as a temporary situation until they could take control of the Temple-state themselves.

The principal problem with the vague characterizations of Q as "countercultural" or "mildly subversive," however, is that we must know more precisely "counter" to which culture (courtly, scribal, or popular/village) or "subversive" of which social forms (control by the tetrarchal or the Temple regime, or local village customs and

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[34] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 240; "Social History in Q," 11, 14, 15; Mack, "Kingdom that didn't Come," 611, 612, 613, 614, 624.

relations). Clearly we need a more concrete and precise sense of the historical social situation in Jewish Palestine than we have heretofore been working with in New Testament studies. Whether or not we are aware of it, of course, we are all working with some image or another of ancient social realities, even when we are doing only literary analysis. Language is by definition social and communicative, and both we and the texts we are interpreting presuppose some particular network of social relations. Thus it makes sense, when pursuing historical analysis and interpretation, to begin with a critically reconstructed view of the appropriate historical situation. (In what follows I am assuming, following Kloppenborg and Mack, that the Q tradition and Q were cultivated/written somewhere in Galilee.)

Most important in this regard surely is to realize that "society" is a modern abstraction.[35] The concept may even be of questionable application to ancient social realities. Some social scientists argue that any traditional "bureaucratic empire" consisted of several different societies, the rulers being ethnically and culturally different from most of the ruled peoples, the the latter being diverse. Obviously that applies to the Roman empire as a whole. But even if we think about such a small area as Palestine in this respect, it is significant to remember that whatever common heritage the Galileans may have shared with the ruling high priestly families and the Temple apparatus in Jerusalem, Galilee had been brought under Jerusalem rule little more than a century before Jesus by the Hasmonean High Priests. The inherent historical and structural conflict was manifested periodically in concrete events. Large numbers of Galileans resisted the imposition of Herodian rule and even larger numbers apparently burst out in rebellion when Herod died. During the lifetime of Jesus the city of Sepphoris was rebuilt as a Hellenistic city and the city of Tiberias was founded by Herod Antipas as his new capital from which men with Roman or Hellenistic names governed his tetrarchy. During the Jewish revolt against Roman and Jewish high priestly rule a generation after Jesus' death the Galilean country people were eager to attack the pro-Roman Sepphoris and the pro-Agrippa II city leaders in Tiberias.

Whatever the level of tension or hostility from time to time, Jewish Palestine was structured primarily into two semi-separate social strata: the ruling cities such as Jerusalem and Sepphoris or Tiberias, on the one hand, and numerous villages and towns where the vast majority of people lived, on the other. As long as they paid their tithes and other dues to the Temple and priesthood, their taxes to Herod or Antipas, and the tribute demanded by Rome, these villages and towns were left relatively alone as semi-independent communities. Such local communities had forms of self-government such as local assemblies and groups of elders. Indeed, what the Gospel of Mark refers to as "synagogues" appear to be just such local assemblies. (There is no archaeological or literary evidence for "synagogues" as religious *buildings* in Galilee in the first century, with the possible exception of the *proseuche* in Tiberias.)

It is not difficult to imagine what the role of the "scribes and Pharisees" was in this situation on the basis of comparative sociological studies of such traditional agrarian societies. They were the "retainers" of the rulers who carried out functions

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[35] A somewhat broader sketch of the following paragraphs along with references to ancient sources and modern cross-cultural scholarly studies will be available in *Sociology and the Jesus Movement* (New York: Crossroad, 1989 forthcoming), chs 4-5.

such as scholars, teachers, lawyers.[36] They were not so much "religious sects" like certain groups in modern European history as the official guardians, interpreters, and administrators of the Torah as the "constitution" and "lawbook" of the Temple-state. As we might expect on the face of things, Galileans had a reputation for a lack of enthusiasm about Torah observance and were apparently none too eager to pay tithes and dues to the Temple government. But that did not mean that they were ignorant of Israelite traditions. We must reckon with what anthropologists have called the "little tradition" cultivated in oral form by the ordinary people that usually parallels and interacts in some degree with the "great" or "official tradition" maintained in written form by scribal scholar and useful in the legitimation of the governing apparatus and its taxation and control of the people.

Recognition of these different levels in ancient Palestinian Jewish "society" or culture means that we can no longer assume a monolithic entity such as "Judaism" or "Jewish society," over against which some people could be "countercultural"/ "radical" or "resist conventional wisdom" or even advocate some "non-societal ethos." In ancient history the only people who ordinarily were literate and left literary remains were in the tiny scribal stratum, but it is clearly no longer justifiable method to generalize about either the ordinary people or the ruling families on the basis of the literary expression of the literate, who had their own particular roles, interests, and views within a larger situation that often involved considerable tension or conflict. The historical social-cultural situation was further complicated, moreover, with the recent establishment in lower Galilee of two urban centers of Hellenistic culture and with northern Galilee being frontier area in which Jerusalem-based tradition and officials would have been relatively less prominent midst other political and cultural influences. Thus we must seek to establish more precisely in relation to whom or what the Q material might have been "radical" or "mildly subversive."

A number of characterizations have been made about the social ethos of the Q people which have little basis in Q material. The most influential of these is surely that the sayings tradition was carried by and articulated an ethos of itinerant charismatics. Moreover, the most influential statement of that hypothesis, that of Theissen, is probably the least substantiated from the texts.[37] A certain literalism prevents him from appreciating the subtlety or nuances of some sayings, and he repeatedly applies only to his wandering charismatics a number of sayings that clearly were addressed to a broader audience (e.g., Luke 12:22-32). A number of passages he simply misconstrues. The only two texts that really support his contentions are "mission" passages, Luke 10:4 and Mark 1:16,20—to which he appeals repeatedly for successive "analytical conclusions" regarding "homelessness," "lack of family," and "lack of possessions." Itinerants there may well have been, but there is certainly little or no evidence that the movement consisted primarily of them. Even Theissen himself had to make clear that there were *communities* of "supporters," in a nod to the importance of the concrete forms of life that even highly abstract sociology must recognize. It is perhaps a telling commentary on the inadequacy of the itinerancy hypothesis that both Kloppenborg and Mack question it when they move into discussion of social context.[38]

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[36] See A. Saldarini, *Pharisees, Scribes, and Sadducees* (Wilmington: Glazier, 1989).

[37] See further the extensive and detailed critique of Theissen's sociological reconstruction in *Sociology and the Jesus Movement*, chs 1-3.

[38] Kloppenborg, "Social History in . . .Q;" and Mack, "The Kingdom that Didn't Come."

It may be a carry-over from the view that the sayings source was linked particularly with itinerants that it is still argued that Q placed a high "religious and symbolic value" on poverty, and that this poverty was voluntary.[39] The vast majority of people in any traditional agrarian society, of course, were peasants (including those who generated food primarily by fishing), most of whom would have been poor and many of whom would have been indebted or even dispossessed. So there are very few candidates in such a historical situation who would have responded to some ideal of voluntary poverty. But also the texts usually cited in support of this ideal indicate no such thing. Luke 12:13-14 (which is questionably part of Q in the first place) and 16:13 have nothing to do with poverty, let alone voluntary poverty, and Luke 12:33 articulates a typically Lucan theme not present in the Matthean parallel, which is surely closer to Q. The "poor" who are pronounced blessed in 6:20b are parallel to the hungry and mournful in the other beatitudes, and such terms indicate the general concrete condition of the people to whom the kingdom, including, finally, enough to eat, is being offered. Luke 11:3,9-13, and 12:22b-31 do not say that "the necessities of life" should "be left to divine care." Rather 11:3,9-13 articulate a petition for sufficient food (along with forgiveness of debts!) along with assurance that the Father will surely respond to such requests; 12:22-31 exhort people *not to be anxious* about food and clothing, about which they are apparently genuinely concerned and which they will surely receive if they singlemindedly "seek first the kingdom." There appears to be no saying in Q that suggests poverty as an ideal. And there is similarly no saying that suggests voluntary poverty, with the possible exception of 10:4. But besides this being specialized mission instruction, the point of the saying is not an ideal of voluntary poverty, but how the envoys of the movement are to proceed on their mission in which they would be fed and housed by receptive households.

Yet another carry-over from the image of the Q people as itinerants is the sense that discipleship for Q involved a radical "separation from family and rejection of the norms of macro-society."[40] But this requires reading Luke 9:59-60,61-62, and 14:26 more or less literally, when they are surely intended as hyperbole to convey the seriousness of the commitment required.

Instead of pursuing such aspects of the possible *ethos* of the Q people, it may take us further to examine what social relations are indicated in Q material. Although there is no evidence in Q that Israel in general is rejected, there is some indication of a rejection of the rulers or ruling institutions in Jerusalem and there is a whole series of woes against the Pharisees and lawyers who were probably the rulers' representatives in Galilee. The prophetic lament in 13:34-35a in effect pronounced judgment against Jerusalem, the seat of the high priestly rulers and Temple apparatus, precisely because it has rejected prophets such as Jesus, the climactic or final in the historical series of prophets (e.g., Luke 3:16-17; 7:24-28). The priestly aristocracy as well as the scribes, Pharisees, and other guardians of the sacred traditions, holiness codes, and "boundary definitions," i.e. the very people who would take pride in their lineage, may be the ones most implicated also in two other sharply judgmental passages, against presuming on one's position of privilege as "children of Abraham" or "sons of the kingdom," Luke 3:7-9; 13:28-29.

There can be no question whatever about the Q people's sharply critical stance

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[39] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 240-241.

[40] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 241.

toward the Pharisees and lawyers. It makes a good deal of difference in our reading of 11:39-52 if we cut through our theologically determined picture of the Pharisees as a "religious" group obsessed particularly with legalism and ritual observances, and understand them more historically as "retainers" of the hierocracy in Jerusalem. It is not surprising, if we assume that the woes in 11:39-40 (the Matthean version, 23:25-26 may better represent Q!) and 11:42 concern "the ceremonial law" and that 11:46 concerns "scribal interpretation of the Law," that there might seem to be a widening "gulf between the community and the Pharisees": i.e., from 11:39-40,42 in which the ceremonial law is not rejected, to 11:46 in which scribal interpretation is called into question, to 11:44,47-48,52 in which legal matters disappear and the very existence of the group is attacked.[41]

If, on the other hand, we understand the Pharisees (and lawyers) more concretely, with the political-economic dimensions as inseparable from the religious dimension of their social roles and relations, there appears to be no need for the hypothesis of such a widening gulf. The series of woes simply indict them for one after another of their practices. The woe in Matthew 23:25-26 / Luke 11:39-40 does indeed refer to their concerns about ritual cleanliness, but the point is condemnation of their "extortion and rapacity"—which is hardly simply a matter of ritual, but which their concerns for cleanliness apparently veils or at least distracts attention from. Tithes were hardly simply a matter of ceremonial law, but taxes. The indictment that the Pharisees were concerned even about the minor crops such as mint and herbs serves to indicate how rigorous they were about the more substantive products such as grain. And if the Pharisees, as representatives of Jerusalem, were still insisting on payment of tithes in addition to the taxes that Galilean peasants were paying to the government of Antipas or Agrippa and the tribute they were rending to Caesar, they were indeed neglecting justice and compassion! The "heavy burdens" in 11:46 / Matt 23:4, are surely not the multiplication of rules to keep by scribal interpretation, but the burdens of tithing and other dues—with the reference to not moving them with their finger probably an alusion to how such retainers or lawyers responsible for application of the Torah could help alleviate the burden through their scribal role if only they would. As for the tombs of the prophets, 11:47-48, the custodians of such memorials to dissident figures of a previous age, who had been taken up into the "great tradition," would have been precisely those whose responsibility it was to cultivate and apply that tradition. In the "popular tradition," however, those same prophets were surely remembered as sharp critics of power and privilege. The indictment in 11:43 might seem mild by compparison with the others. But for the people whose shoulders perpetually bore the "heavy burdens" it would have been particularly galling to be expected to honor and defer to the Pharisees and other retainers who helped keep those burdens squarely in place. The final woe, 11:52, is the most comprehensive regarding the role of the lawyers, scribes, or Pharisees. Shutting "the kingdom of heaven" (Matthew 23:13) and taking away "the key of knowledge" are parallel or even synonymous expressions. As in

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[41] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 140-143. The paper by Leif Vaage, "The Woes in Q (and Matthew and Luke): Deciphering the Rhetoric of Criticism," in D. J. Lull, ed., *Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers, 1988* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 582-602, similarly assumes that the issues involving the Pharisees in Luke 11:39-52 are primarily religious—with the interesting and significant exception of his treatment of 11:47-48, in which includes the more inseparable political dimension.

key biblical passages, "knowledge" must be "covenant keeping" (see, e.g., Isa 1:2-3), the possibility of which is now opened with the advent of the kingdom. But these whose role it is supposedly to foster and interpret that covenantal Torah are standing in the way, barring entrance into the kingdom. Sharpened in judgmental arrack by the insertion of 11:49-51, all of these sayings in 11:39-52 pronounce woes on Pharisees or lawyers because of some way in which they are contributing to the exploitation of the people and/or are helping legitimate the established order, including their own positions of privilege.

While standing against the sacerdotal governing city and its representatives responsible for interpretation of the Torah, the Q people do not appear to be concerned about an equivalent for either. There is no attention to priestly (ritual or purification) activities. Similarly, the Torah does not appear to function at all as sacred writ or law. There are few if any signs of Torah interpretation or exegesis. Rather aspects of its teachings can be discerned more as if it were the popular tradition underlying sayings such as those in 6:27-35. The only scriptural quotation is from Mal 3:1 in the attempt to clarify the prophetic role of John in Luke 7:27; the closest to a quotation otherwise are the allusions to Isa 35:5 and 61:1 in Luke 7:22. But that, along with all of the references to the persons of or events associated with Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, the prophets, Solomon, Noah, Jonah and the Ninevites, Lot, the queen of the south, appear to come out of common popular tradition and not learned interpretation of scripture.

However, as indicated by the abundant allusions to figures and events in Israelite historical tradition, particularly as groundings for responses to or rejection of Jesus, the Q people identify with and see themselves as the continuation, indeed the fulfilment of the hopes, of Israel. "Many prophets and kings desired to see what you see . . ." (10:24). "Israel" is being restored according to its "twelve tribes," with the disciples in the role of "liberating/establishing justice for" the people (Matt 19:28 / Luke 22:28-30). The "Israel" that is being renewed under the coming or presence of "the kingdom of God" is not concerned about maintaining boundaries over against the Gentiles, but is open to them, on the one hand. On the other hand, the "Israel" of the Q people is defined over against Jerusalem and the representatives of the government and official traditions, and participation is based not on one's proper lineage as children of Abraham but on repentance and action according to the teachings of Jesus (3:7-9; 6:46-49; etc.). In particular the Q people understand John and Jesus as the climactic figures in the line of the prophets who, almost by definition, stood over against and were rejected by the ruling institutions and their representatives (7:18-35; 11:47-51; 13:34-35).

Judging from certain Q material addressed to the in-group, the social location or setting in which the renewal of the people/Israel was taking place appears to have been local communities, probably villages and towns. It is assumed that the hearers of the sayings are involved in families and villages, with neighbors, children, and marriages on which there are pressures (11:9-13; 14:26; 16:18). They are also acquainted with very large households, with several servants and run by a steward (Luke 12:35-38,42-46). The most direct instructions in Q, however, concern local social-economic relationships among individuals or ordinary households, such as periodic mutual borrowing and assistance, the conflicts that could emerge from one person being indebted to another, the importance of mutual aid despite reluctance and tensions, and the mitigation and resolution of tensions and conflicts (6:27-31, 37-38,41-42; 17:1-2,3-4).

Movement, Leadership, and Writing

Not only may it be impossible to move directly from genre to social context. But the social relations presupposed and expressed in a writing (in this case, Q) do not necessarily indicate the social position and role of the person(s) who produced the literature.[42]

Professional scholars who deal primarily in texts in a modern world that is filled with the printed word should be cautious about how close and direct a relationship we imagine between an ancient text and the membership and ethos of a movement or community. A text may provide us access only very indirectly to a community. The letters of Paul should give us pause in this regard, particularly the Corinthian correspondence, in which we can make generalizations about the Corinthians only on the basis of what Paul seems to be arguing against. In another situation, such as the production of Q, the literate person writing a text may have been producing a document that was peripheral to the life of the community that had been cultivating much of the materials the "author" utilized and, perhaps, developed in particular ways. In a process such as the collection, development, reshaping of material, moreover, there may never have been any conscious, "authorial" decision about literary genre in a formal sense. It seems methodologically questionable to allow "the selection of a relatively learned and scribal genre" by which "to convey Jesus sayings" to become a determining factor in the quest for the social setting that the document reflects (and *perhaps* represents). In the case of Q, in fact, the hypothetical document at hand "does not show a high degree of self-conscious and studied composition" anyhow, and its supposedly most sapiential sections are not even sapiential "with respect to traditional forms of conventional wisdom."[43] Thus we are probably not looking for a number of "relatively learned and scribal" people who could possibly have comprised the community that supposedly comes to expression in Q as, supposedly, a "relatively learned and scribal genre." Rather, a few "relatively learned and scribal" leaders can have shaped blocks of sayings, and for purposes other than for more controlled communication of those sayings among the general membership of the movement, where oral communication surely still prevailed.

However, this line of analysis opens up a more precise and difficult question of the role and characteristics of the literate leaders or their auxiliaries and their relations with the rest of the movement. A glance at some of our fragmentary evidence for the kinds of persons who assumed leadership roles in various movements or events contemporaneous with the community reflected in Q may suggest a range of possibilities to inform our historical imagination. The lone oracular prophet, Jesus son of Hananiah, who repeatedly voiced a lament of doom over Jerusalem similar to that in Q/ Luke 13:34-35a, was "a crude peasant" according to Josephus (*War* 6.300). We have no information on the background of Theudas, the prophet who led his followers out to the Jordan (*Ant.* 20.97-98; Acts 5:36). But the parallel figure, the "Egyptian" prophet who led a large number of followers to encamp

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[42] In the following ruminations I do not have a clear idea even of how to shape the question, let alone move toward an appropriate answer. Perhaps this is more like exploring a hunch. So I ask your indulgence (and particularly that of John Kloppenborg, whose lead I am following while exploring an alternate route).

[43] Kloppenborg, "Social History in Q," 10, and Mack, "The Kingdom that Didn't Come," 613, respectively.

opposite the walls of Jerusalem, may well provide a case of a Jewish figure from outside Palestine leading a movement of Judean peasants (*War* 2.261-263; *Ant.* 20.169-171; Acts 21.38, confusing this with the Sicarii). Judas, the popular king who led the insurrection in Galilee in 4 BCE, was a son of Hezekiah the brigand-chief, suggesting at least some temporary displacement from the land and a background of resistance at least to Herodian rulers (*War* 2.56; *Ant.* 17.271-272). Athronges, the popular king in Judea in 4 BCE was a shepherd, but one capable of organizing and deploying whole companies of fighters (*War* 2.60-65; *Ant.* 17.278-284). Teachers, scribes, and Pharisees, i.e., literate people, of course, also provided leadership of certain movements. Both the "fourth philosophy," the movement of resistance to the Roman tribute in 6 CE, and the Sicarii, the terrorist movement during the 50's and 60's, were apparently led by such "teachers," and one has the sense that the participants of both movements came largely from the same circles as the leadership (*War* 2.118; 254-257, etc.; *Ant.*18.4-10,23-25; 20.186-187,204, 208; Acts 5.37). The Saul the Pharisee, however, provides a case of a "retainer" who pushed his way in to the leadership of a movement in the diaspora that was hardly comprised of other (former) retainers. Now both before and after his apocalyptic commissioning by Christ (Gal 1:12-16), Saul/Paul was obsessed with the Torah which he, like other Jewish teachers-retainers, had been trained to defend and apply, while whoever produced Q were virtually oblivious to it. Nevertheless, we must hold open the possibility that other literate individuals could have been involved in a Galilean (or Palestinian) movement that identified with Israel and Israelite traditions, but stood over against the professional interpreters of the Torah.

Kloppenborg suggests that a likely social location for the first, sapiential stage of the Sayings Gospel is "the petite bourgeois who formed the lower administrative classes of the cities," arguing that such a group could be found in sufficient density probably only in the capital cities of Galilee, Tiberias or Sepphoris.[44] There are a number of problems with this hypothesis. To apply categories of social class derived from modern societies such as "petite bourgeois" to ancient social relations is inappropriate. And there is no direct or indirect indication in Q itself of an urban ethos (unless it is the social relations portrayed in the parable of the "great supper," which might also fit a large town). More important, ancient "societies" were not heavily "administered" in anything close to the same way as we presuppose in modern states. As Kloppenborg himself points out, "the polis was normally not involved in village life beyond the collection of rents and tolls." Nor was a Roman client regime such as that of Herod Antipas or the Agrippas based in Sepphoris or Tiberias much engaged in the administration of village affairs. It is inherently unlikely that there would be anything that could be described as "an administrative (or bureaucratic) infrastructure" in villages "which saw to the collection and disbursement of various revenues and the administration of justice." The collection of taxes was probably handled by representatives of the regime located in district towns/toparchy capitals, with local leaders or the village as a whole being held responsible for payment of the assessment or percentage of the crops, and the administration of justice was probably handled by the local village council or "elders." But with collection of taxes being handled district by district, it is unlikely that the regime required a very large staff of administrators engaged in such tasks in the capital. And such government retainers in the capital would have been relatively remote from ordinary people in villages.

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[44] "Social History in Q," 11-12.

Since we do not need to find some sort of "density" of such lower administrators to account for the whole membership of "a voluntary association" anyhow, a possibility that Kloppenborg raised but dismissed emerges as a possibility for the background of the kind of literate leaders of a Jesus movement who might have produced Q. Even though villages and towns in Galilee were too small to have had a bureaucratic infrastructure (or simply subordinated to administrative cities such as Tiberias and Sepphoris), they did have their own non-bureaucratic local infrastructure, with village councils and certain villagers invested with particular responsibilities. Such local leaders, not being so completely dependent economically on the regime or court, would have numerous bases for identifying with local interests over against those of the regime and its representatives. Such leaders would readily have identified, for example, with the concrete indictments of the Pharisees and lawyers in Luke 11:39-52 (whereas administrators in Tiberias and Sepphoris might have been precisely such "lawyers" even if working for Antipas or Agrippa in Tiberias instead of the Temple regime in Jerusalem). And such possibly literate leaders would likely have had some basis for suspicion of or resistance to the Temple regime in Jerusalem as well as its operatives in Galilee. Thus given the actual political-economic structure in Palestine and the indicators of conflict in Q itself, local "scribes" or other literate leaders would seem more likely than urban scribes working for the official regime to have provided the sort of leadership in the Jesus movement that could underlie the production of Q.

The Formation of Q Revisited: A Response to Richard Horsley

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Richard Horsley's thoughtful response to proposals made by Burton Mack and myself on literary and social matters relating to the Sayings Gospel (Q) represents a combination of critical agreements and important challenges to clarification and reconsideration.[1] There are two quite distinct sets of issues. The first set of questions has to do with the literary composition and stratigraphy of the document while the second concerns our historical imagination of the social groupings in which various layers of Q and Q as a whole travelled and the social arrangements which were promoted by the Q people.

1. Stratigraphy

1.1 Methodological Considerations

To begin with the agreements: Horsley does not doubt that Q was not composed of whole cloth, but was the product of several stages of redaction (p. 17). This view of Q, it should be added, is not merely the idiosyncrasy of a handful of North American Q scholars (Jacobson, Koester, Kloppenborg, Sellew, Mack)[2] but has been advocated more or less independently in the European dissertations of Migaku Sato (Bern 1984)[3] and Risto Uro (Helsinki 1987)[4] and in an important essay of Dieter

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[1] Richard A. Horsley, "Questions About the Redactional Strata and the Social Relations Reflected in Q." (Cited in typescript)

[2] Arland D. Jacobson, *Wisdom Christology in Q* (Ph.D. diss., Claremont Graduate School, 1978; forthcoming from Polebridge Press); Helmut Koester, "Apocryphal and Canonical Gospel," *HTR* 73 (1980) 105-30; John S. Kloppenborg, *The Formation of Q: Trajectories in Ancient Wisdom Collections*, Studies in Antiquity and Christianity (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987); Philip Sellew, *Early Collections of Jesus' Words* (Ph.D. diss., Harvard Divinity School, 1986); Burton L. Mack, "The Kingdom that Didn't Come: The Social History of the Q Tradents," *Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers 1988*, ed. D. J. Lull (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988) 608-35.

[3] Migaku Sato, *Q und Prophetie: Studien zur Gattungs- und Traditionsgeschichte der Quelle Q*, WUNT 2/29 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1988).

[4] Risto Uro, *Sheep among the Wolves: A Study on the Mission Instructions of Q*, Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, Dissertationes Humanarum Litterarum 47 (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1987).

Zeller.[5] To be sure, the concrete results of these studies differ in some important and even fundamental respects, but it is by now clear that one can no longer discuss the composition, genre, theology or social history of Q without attending to several compositional stages. Although Horsley recognizes this at the level of literary criticism, his own suggestions regarding the social world of Q (pp. 18-34) still tend to treat the Q material as unitary.

The main issue voiced by Horsley in regard to stratigraphic analysis is that of the criteria for the delineation of strata. I have discussed this problem at greater length elsewhere,[6] but several comments are in order here. The detection of the presence of redaction in a sayings collection such as Q cannot proceed simply by cataloguing and sorting the individual Q sayings into two or three "piles" either on the basis of common form, or shared motifs, or the extent of external attestation.[7] Rather than beginning with the individual saying, it must start with the larger composed units, i.e., with the form in which the sayings are now framed. This, of course, implies, that the issue of the original order of Q is a necessarily preliminary, a fact given special attention by Jacobson, Kloppenborg and Sato.

The order in which redactional investigation is prosecuted cannot be stressed enough. It begins *at the end,* i.e., with what appears to be the final form of Q and works backwards, eventually to the individual constitutive units. An important and obvious consequence of this procedure is that one must distinguish between the possible meaning(s) and function(s) of the sayings considered as free-floating units, and the compositional effect of their juxtaposition with other sayings, and the effect that one saying exerts upon another. The way in which the combination of discrete sayings can alter the way in which they are understood is dramatically illustrated by Prov 26:4-5. The first saying offers perfectly intelligible advice: "Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest you be like him yourself" (RSV). But when this admonition is coupled with the equally prudential saying, "Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own eyes," the centre of gravity of the composed unit shifts from the concrete advice and even from the topic of fools, to the matter of the *skill* of the sage who must know when to follow the first counsel, and when to follow the second. The understanding of the composition and ethos of Proverbs must pay special attention to the compositional effect of the combination of sayings,

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[5] Dieter Zeller, "Redaktionsprozesse und wechselnder 'Sitz im Leben' beim Q-Material," *Logia: Les Paroles de Jésus – The Sayings of Jesus: Mémorial Joseph Coppens,* BETL 59 (Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters and Leuven University Press, 1982) 395-402.

[6] "Tradition and Redaction in the Synoptic Sayings Source," *CBQ* 46 (1984) 34-62; "Formative and Redactional Layers in Q" (unpublished paper presented at the One Hundred Twenty Third Annual Meeting of the SBL, Boston, December 1987).

[7] John Dominic Crossan's paper to the 1987 SBL Q Seminar ("Tradition in the Formation of Q") used precisely the criteria of external attestation, not as a demonstration of the redactional hypothesis proposed in *Formation of Q,* but as a test of that hypothesis. Helmut Koester's 1988 paper, "Q and its Relatives" examined my hypothesis of two principal stages of Q redaction with specific reference to the Q-Thomas parallels. His conclusion is significant: "Not only is there no trace of redactional feature of Q in these sayings of the *Gospel of Thomas,* they are also either core sayings of the respective sections of Q in which they occur, or they are free sayings added at a later stage of the development of Q" (p. 20).

not merely to the individual sayings themselves. The same is true with Q: it is not simply the sum of its parts.

1.2 The Framing Redaction of Q

I have argued that at the level of final form, Q is very far from a "random collection of sayings" but already displays some unifying structures.[8] It opens with John's announcement of the fiery Coming One (Q 3:16-17).[9] This title is picked up at 7:18–23 in John's question, "Are you the Coming One?" but although Q's answer seems to be in the affirmative, it does not advert to the functions of the Coming One as a fiery judge. Only in the third appearance of the title (13:35b), which I hold (along with Horsley) to be Q redaction,[10] does the element of threat return. Not only does the saying itself lament Jerusalem's killing of the prophets and pronounce the temple desolate, but the context (13:26-27, 28-29; 14:16-24) evokes the images of the exclusion of Jesus' countryfolk from God's banquet and the inclusions of Gentile, thus returning to theme announced by John in 3:7-9 that national identity is not in itself a guarantee of God's favour. The motif of judgment of Israel concludes the document (22:28-30) just as it opened it.

There are several other unifying structures which need not be detailed here; one example is sufficient to make the point that at the level of the Sayings Gospel as a redacted whole the motif of the judgment of Israel, in which both John, the Coming One (Jesus) and Jesus' followers will play key roles, represents a unifying or framing device. At this point I make the assumption that compositional clusters and individual sayings (treated *in that order*) which cohere with and reinforce the judgment motif are *from a compositional point of view* closely related to this framing redaction.[11] Compositional clusters and individual sayings which seem to have been framed differently are either earlier clusters that have been subsumed by the later redaction or, less probably, late and haphazard interpolations. (Sato inclines toward the latter for much of the material in Q 12:2–17:6). It should be stressed that the assignment of a set of sayings to the framing redaction implies nothing about their ultimate tradition-historical provenance or their authenticity; it is a literary observation.

Since it is impossible to rehearse the entire analysis of Q undertaken in *Formation of Q*, let me take one example. Q 7:1-10, 18-28, (16:16), 31-35 seems to form a block, loosely attached to the preceding sermon and the following commissioning complex by catchwords.[12] This block of material is bracketed by two pericopae which express criticism of the response of Israel to Jesus and John. In Q 7:1-10 the

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[8] *Formation*, 94-95.

[9] Texts from the Sayings Gospel are cited by their Lukan versification. Nothing is implied thereby about the originality of Luke's wording of the text. *Sondergut* texts from Matthew which may in fact derive from Q are cited as Q/Matt (e.g., Q/Matt 5:41).

[10] "Formative and Redactional Layers," 5 and the literature cited in n. 20. See also Horsley, "Questions," 16.

[11] I leave aside the problem of "late additions" to Q, detected by Jacobson, Kloppenborg, Sato and others. See "Formative and Redactional Layers."

[12] See John S. Kloppenborg, *Q Parallels: Synopsis, Critical Notes & Concordance*, Foundations and Facets (Sonoma: Polebridge Press, 1988) §§ 14-21.

obvious interest of the redactor is in the saying of Jesus, "I tell you, not in Israel have I found such faith" (7:9b) and in the way in which a Gentile's response to Jesus shames that of Jesus' countryfolk. The closing pericope in this complex, Q 7:31-35, itself a composite of three sayings, likewise criticizes the responses of "this generation" to Sophia's children, John and Jesus, and, one supposes, to the Q people who no doubt see themselves as continuing the activities of John and Jesus.

Horsley suggests that "there is no reason internal to these texts that 'this generation' refers to 'Israel' as opposed to 'Gentiles'" (p. 3). As a free-floating saying it is perhaps conceivable that 7:31-32 would not automatically be construed as critical of Israel as opposed to, say, some more general group of contemporaries, or even a particular subset of contemporaries. But this is to approach Q on form critical, not redaction critical principles. When 7:31-32 is seen as part of the complex of 7:1-10, 18-28, (16:16), 31-35 is hardly possible *not* to read "this generation" as co-extensive with Israel. Similarly, it might be possible to construe "this generation" in the isolated sayings in 11:31-32 and 11:49-51 either more broadly or more narrowly. But when these two sayings are taken in the context of criticism of Jerusalem and the proclamation of the abandonment of the temple (13:34-35), the woes against three Galilean towns (10:13-15), threats of exclusion directed against Jesus' contemporaries (13:26-27) and the counterbalancing announcement of a Gentile pilgrimage (13:28-29) and the promise to Jesus' followers that they will "judge the twelve tribes of Israel" (22:30), the phrase "this generation" is imputed the connotation of "Israel."

Since I assume (along with Horsley) that the majority of the Q people were Galilean Jews, an additional nuance is needed. When the Q redactor complains of the inferior faith and nonresponse of "Israel/this generation" what is surely at stake is a particular view of "Israel" promoted by an opposing group. However, it is important to distinguish the semantic value of certain key terms as they appear in their network of intertextual relationships and the rhetorical stance of the redactor on the one hand, and the actual social situation in which the text is being used. It would be absurd to claim that the Q redactor has in mind the perhaps two to five million inhabitants of the empire who think of themselves as belonging to Israel. The attack is most probably directed at the influential scribes and Pharisees, both representing mainly southern interests, and the vision of Israel promoted by them. However, the fact that the redactor does not limit the attack to the scribes or Pharisees but broadens it to all of "Israel" provides a telling index of the degree to which the elite scribes seem to have been successful in promoting that vision and the degree to which the Q people have not.

I am in complete agreement with Horsley when he states that the majority of materials in the blocks which I ascribe to the framing redaction (Q^2) are "rationalizations, exhortations, and particularly sanctions directed at the 'in-group' of Jesus' followers. . . ." (p. 3). Q 7:18-23 (John's question), 7:24-26 (Jesus' praise of John), 7:27 (the Malachi/Exodus quotation) and 7:28 (the greatest in the kingdom) express a variety of views of John, none of them especially threatening.[13] But this is to miss the point. Just as the juxtaposition of 7:24-26, 27, 31-35 and perhaps 16:16 beside 7:28 has a mitigating effect on the negative implications of 7:28 about John's

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[13] See the outstanding analysis of 7:18-35 by Ron Cameron, "What Have You Come Out to See? Characterizations of John and Jesus in the Gospels," forthcoming in *The Apocryphal Jesus and Christian Origins = Semeia* 51? (1990).

position, so too the framing of the entire block by sayings which express a critical view of Israel's faith has the force of aligning John with Jesus *against* "Israel." The redaction of the unit transcends the particulars of a centurion's unexpected faith, the competing estimations of John, and Jesus' complaint about his contemporaries and creates a field of discourse in which Jews are shamed by Gentiles and in which Sophia's envoys stand unheeded by Abraham's offspring but vindicated *coram Deo.*

It is in this sense that I say that the blocks of Q^2 material[14] are "directed at outsiders." To put it more accurately, these units of Q set Jesus' sayings in a context where opponents and Israel as a whole enter the horizon of discourse and where the opposites of rejection and recognition, ultimate loss and final vindication, judgment and punishment, Israel and the nations figure prominently. This is a stratum of Q that is manifestly concerned to vindicate the Q people in the face of failure or rejection. Although its actual audience is, of course, the Q people themselves, a number of sayings are framed as either direct or indirect attacks on opponent groups. Hence, I distinguished between the *actual* audience and the *projected* or ostensible audience.[15] As a rhetorical means for addressing the concerns of rationalization and self-definition among the Q people, Q^2 employs, *inter alia,* the simple device of castigating a set of opponents for not recognizing those items which the editor holds to be fundamental to group identity.

Horsley justly chastises me and others for stressing the "apocalyptic" character of this stratum of Q, an imbalance which I tried to address in a subsequent paper.[16] Horsley wishes to push Mack and me even further. I agree that the term parousia should not be imported into discussions of Q's eschatology, though it is to be noted that Matthew thought this term appropriate in his editing of Q 17:24, 26, 30. To this I would add that Conzelmann's designation of Q 17:22-37 as the "Logia Apocalypse" is not an appropriate one. I even concede that Q is far less interested in an individual agent of redemption than hitherto supposed. But to argue that "(the day of) the son of man . . . is merely a symbol for the judgment . . ." (p. 4) ignores the plain sense of Q 12:39-40, which concerns the *coming* of the son of man, not the *day* of the son of man. It also ignores the interest shown both earlier and later in the *Coming* One (3:16-17; 7:18-19; 13:35b). On the other hand, there is no reason to think that son of man language was formative for Q, as Tödt thought, or that it represents the heart of Q's christology.

The point in rejecting the characterization of various Q sayings as "apocalyptic" and designating them instead as prophetic is, I take it, part of a more general complaint with the conceptual apparatus of the guild which has tried to drive a wedge between prophecy and apocalyptic by characterizing apocalypticists as longing for a completely new (as opposed to a renewed) universe, as abandoning responsibility for history and as isolationists opposed to "dominant society" rather than one group opposed to the ruling elites.[17] Much of this is to be granted. Yet, it makes little

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[14] To the framing redaction I assign the following blocks: (a) 3:7-9, 16-17; (b) 7:1-10, 18-28, (16:16) 31-35; (c) 11:14-26, 29-36, 39b-52; (d) 12:39-46, 49, 51-59; (e) 13:26-30, 34-35; 14:15-24; (f) 17:22-24, 26-30, 34-35, 37b; 19:12-26; 22:28-30.

[15] *Formation of Q,* 167.

[16] "Symbolic Eschatology and the Apocalypticism of Q," *HTR* 80 (1987) 287-306.

[17] See Richard A. Horsley, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987) 133-45.

difference to the issue of the stratigraphy of Q. Even if we read Q 3:7-9 or 17:26-30, 34-35 not so much as announcements of a cosmic catastrophe but rather as statements of the present crisis and the bankruptcy of the current oppressive order, it is nonetheless the case the certain blocks of Q trade heavily in the prophetic motifs of judgment and complaints about the unresponsiveness of "this generation" and evoke the deuteronomistic motif of Israel's killing of the prophets, while in other blocks of material, such motifs are either completely absent or appear in highly contrived and artificial ways. It is necessary both to account for the presence of the non-prophetic blocks in Q and to give a plausible explanation of the contextual aporiae which occur, e.g., when an oracle against Galilean towns (10:13-15) is found disrupting an instruction on missionary behaviour (10:2-11, 16). Literary explanations are required, just as they are in the case of the fourth gospel.[18]

1.3 Sapiential Instructions in Q

Once it has been recognized that certain blocks of material have been framed to highlight the motif of Israel's nonresponse, and to address the problems of group self-definition and justification, the problem of the blocks of Q in which such motifs and concerns are absent or only minimally present becomes all the greater. Q 12:22-31, 33-34, for example, displays none of the features of the framing redaction. Nor does 6:20b-49, apart from the invocation of the deuteronomistic motif of the rejection of the prophets (6:23bc) which, as most (including Horsley) acknowledge, should be regarded as an interpolation. Again, it is important to emphasize that redactional investigation of Q begins with large blocks, not with individual sayings. I do not conclude that sapiential portions of Q are antecedent to the prophetic-polemical sections because of some *a priori* considerations about the relative ages and provenances of wisdom or prophecy. On the contrary, the conclusion is based on compositional observations: First, the prophetic-polemical blocks cohere most closely with the framing redaction of Q, and therefore, I presume, represent an ultimate or at least penultimate stage in redaction. Second, other blocks of material do not obviously arise from this redaction but represent other interests. This observation in itself does not help us decide whether Q 12:22-31, 33-34, for example, is anterior to the framing redaction (Kloppenborg, Zeller) or a later interpolation (thus Sato). What does help here is a third observation.

In several of the non-prophetic blocks, one finds isolated sayings which fit rather poorly with their surroundings or which have every appearance of being interpolations. I have already mentioned Q 6:23c, the allusion to persecution of the prophets. An even clearer example is provided by Q 10:13-15, the woes against the Galilean cities. As many recognize, 10:13-15 represents an interpolation into Q 10:2-11, 16, with 10:12 serving as redactional clasp.[19] If one asks about the literary-critical provenance of 10:12, 13-15, the answer seems obvious: it belongs with the other Q sayings which are critical of the nonresponse of Jesus' contemporaries, with the other prophetic sayings—we have, after all, a classic prophetic form in the woes—

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[18] The method developed for the analysis of Q in "Tradition and Redaction" owes much to Robert Fortna's *The Gospel of Signs*, SNTSMS 11 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) 1-25.

[19] See Kloppenborg, "Formative and Redactional Layers," 4+n. 17; and 25 for a tabulation of recent opinion.

and with those sayings which contrast Jewish response unfavourably with Gentile response, whether it is actual (7:1-10) or hypothetical, whether based on an inference from the past (11:31-32) or an announcement about the (near) future (13:28-29). If 10:12, 13-15 is an interpolation into a unit containing at least 10:4-11, 16, but more probably 10:2-11, 16, we have a clue to the relative ages (in a compositional sense) of the two types of material: the mission instructions existed as a block prior to the interpolation of 10:12, 13-15 and to the material from the framing redaction.[20]

It is a more complicated question whether the various materials which seem to pre-date the framing redaction were themselves grouped into a document. I have argued this case mainly on the grounds of a common structure. If the antecedent material (Q^1) were simply oral material, we might reasonably expect a better integration of it into the framing redaction, with fewer abrupt shifts of idiom, ostensible addressee, etc. I have also observed that the six Q^1 instructions manifest a similar structures:[21] four begin with a programmatic saying (6:20b-21; 9:57-58; 12:2; 13:24); the core of each instruction consists of thematically arranged admonitions, usually taking the form of the sapiential *Mahnspruch* (imperative + motive clause); and four of the instructions conclude with a warning or promise (6:47-49; 10:16; 12:33-34; 14:34-35). That this degree of structural consistency would occur by coincidence is possible, of course; but it seems more likely that it is the product of conscious framing.

Up to this point, I have tried to avoid as much as possible the term "sapiential" since it is misunderstood in relation to the thesis that I have argued. As Horsley, Mack and I have noted, the content of much of the Q^1 material is unconventional if compared to classic sapiential texts like Prov 1-9 or Sirach. However, my point in classifying the Q^1 material as "sapiential" is more formal than material: it is *framed* in the form of wisdom teachings, and the structuring of the material conforms rather impressively to the conventions in organizing wisdom materials.[22] In fact, the closest analogies to the structure of the sayings are to be found in the Near Eastern "instruction" which, incidentally, is not always the vehicle for conveying conventional wisdom, as the *Teachings of Silvanus* shows. It is argued by James Williams that Q 10:2-11, 16 is not especially sapiential.[23] If Prov 1-9 is taken as the paradigm of the wisdom instruction, this observation is apt. However, a vast body of sapiential instructions from Egypt and the Near East purvey much less exalted maxims, and are in fact rather prosaic "how to" books. In this sense, the equipment instructions fall within the purview of the instructional genre.

The sapiential character of Q^1 does, however, go beyond the purely formal, even though some of its content is quite unconventional. Let me take a single example.

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[20] Horsley ("Questions," 13) asserts that "there is roughly the same about of judgmental material . . . in both of the hypothetical strata" but ignores (except in a footnote) the fact that the prophetic materials in Q 10 (vv. 13-15) and Q 13 (vv. 27-29, 34-35) fit poorly in their contexts (from a *literary* as well as theological point of view) and are likely to be interpolations.

[21] I.e., (a) 6:20b-23b, 27-47; (b) 9:57-62; 10:2-11, 16; (c) 11:2-4, 9-13; (d) 12:2-7, 11-12; (e) 12:22-31, 33-34; (f) 13:24; 14:26-27; 17:33; 14:34-35.

[22] This is documented thoroughly in *Formation of Q*, 263-306.

[23] James G. Williams, "Parable and Chreia: From Q to Narrative Gospel," *Genre, Narrativity, and Theology = Semeia* 43 (1988) 104.

Horsley draws attention to two sanction complexes, 6:46-49 from Q^1 and 17:23-37 from Q^2 and asks whether there are any good reasons for viewing them as coming from two distinct redactional perspectives. The answer is clear: Yes. But one cannot ignore the fact that 6:46-49 concludes 6:20b-45. As Jacobson has shown, the figure of a ruined house is a typical appearance at the conclusion of wisdom collections,[24] and as I have indicated, sapiential instructions frequently conclude with treats and promises for those who hear the master's words.[25] That is, 6:46-49 functions as a typical sapiential conclusion. It would be difficult to read 17:23-37 in this way. Quite apart from the fact that it does not form the conclusion of an instruction analogous to 6:20b-49, the destruction envisaged by Q 17:23-37 is not merely the rain and wind which might destroy a single ill-constructed house but deluge and fire which *destroys everyone* (17:27b, 29b) regardless of the skills of their architects. Q^2 moves not in the realm of individual sagacity and folly, but in the realm of cosmic judgment and catastrophic destruction.

Again it is necessary to stress the methodological point. Sayings cannot be treated in isolation of their redactional context. The order of Q must be respected and it is precisely the various redactional contextualizations of Q sayings that highlights the two quite different perspectives which emerge in Q.[26]

2. The Social Context

While Horsley approaches the reconstruction of the ethos of Q from a very different perspective than that taken in my "Redactional Strata and Social History" and Mack's "The Kingdom that Didn't Come," some significant agreements emerge. Perhaps most basic is the conclusion that the description of what the Q people and their opponents were doing can no longer be restricted to "religious" matters. This follows from the recognition that neither "religion" nor economics is a discrete and separable aspect of agrarian societies. Just as recent studies have attempted to reconceptualize the Pharisees in Galilee not simply along the lines of a religious sect but as "retainers" of the ruling southern elite,[27] it is necessary to interpret Q's complaints against the Pharisees and those who "kill the prophets" as laden with social, political and probably economic import.

A second point of agreement is of direct help in locating the social position of the tradents of Q. Q displays no attempt to ground its instructions by reference to the Torah, and it does not appeal to institutions such as priesthood or Temple, or to purity, *kasruth*, or other institutions and practices which other Jews would have taken to be self-evidently appropriate points of references. Of the figures from Israel's epic history that Q chooses to mention, Moses is conspicuous by his absence; the heroes who are invoked are "the prophets," the patriarchs, Solomon and the Queen

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[24] Jacobson, *Wisdom Christology*, 110 n. 84.

[25] *Formation of Q*, 186.

[26] Horsley's comment (p. 12) regarding the fundamental unclarity in the definition of the terms "wisdom" and "prophecy" misses the point made (*Formation of Q*, 37-38). In spite of the definitional questions, *no one* would confuse Proverbs with prophecy even when Prov 1:20-33 borrows prophetic motifs, nor would anyone confuse Isaiah with wisdom even if Isaiah uses aphoristic forms.

[27] Anthony Saldarini, "Political and Social Roles of the Pharisees and Scribes in Galilee," *SBLASP* 27 (1988) 200-209.

of the South, Jonah and the Ninevites, and Noah and Lot. It is significant that these figures are aligned *against* "this generation" and that they are not associated with the keeping or interpretation of Torah or the support of the temple. Horsley is perhaps right to see these figures as heroes of the "little tradition" who are claimed by the Q people in a contest with the representatives of the ruling institutions.

Horsley and I also agree in locating the Q group relatively low on the social and economic scales. Horsley appears to opt for a locale in the towns and villages of Galilee, with the leadership emerging in the village councils, and I have suggested the lower levels of the (indigenous) scribal sector of the large towns or cities of Sepphoris or Tiberias as a possibility. The reason for the general agreement is twofold: on the one hand, Q does not show the signs of self-conscious stylization that would suggest an origin on the higher end of the scribal sector; and on the other, Q's lack of appeal to the institutions of Torah and Temple coupled with its polemic against the representatives of those institutions would make an origin among the southern scribes or within the circle of retainers rather implausible.

2.1 Town Scribes and Village Councils

The reasons for our differing suggestions on the social locale of Q are also twofold. First, Horsley seems to assume that the scribal sector was essentially monolithic and in this connections makes two problematic claims. He suggests that "urban scribes" probably worked for the "official regime" (p. 34) and remarks a propos of my literary distinction between sapiential and apocalyptic layers of Q that

> [a] distinction between the two separate traditions surely makes little sense sociologically. In a traditional agrarian society such as ancient Judea in the second temple period the principal people who were literate and capable of or inclined to produce literature were those who worked in some capacity as scholarly retainers of the governing groups. One of the responsibilities of these sages-teachers-lawyers in the second temple times was apparently to cultivate and interpret the Torah . . ." (p. 10)

Yet there is substantial epigraphical evidence from Auranitis to suggest the presence of an indigenous class of petty officials, perhaps a handful per village. In the larger towns and cities of Galilee, where the evidence is quite sparse, there must nevertheless have been scribes and petty officials engaged in activities ranging from public projects to the menial tasks of writing out bills of divorce and loans. There is no reason at all to suppose that these persons would be aligned with the interests of the hierocracy of the south, especially since there is so little evidence in the first place of a sustained presence of Pharisees and southern scribes in Galilee prior to the war. It is also dangerous to assume that a literate person in Galilee would necessarily represent the interests of the south or of Herod, or even that a scribe could not change loyalties (i.e., patrons). The example of Justus of Tiberias is instructive: Josephus reports that he was instrumental in stirring up a Tiberian crowd against Agrippa and Rome for having favoured Sepphoris over Tiberias (*Vita* 38). But later Josephus reports that Justus entered Agrippa's service as his secretary of letters (*Vita* 356).

Nor is it a reasonable assumption that the scribal sector had a more or less uniform theological disposition. While it is obviously correct that some scribes "cultivated and interpreted Torah" and while it is true that the sages who produced Daniel and Enoch combined apocalyptic and wisdom in the service of Torah, it is absurd to

suppose that all scribes cultivated or interpreted Torah in the way that the retainers of the hierocracy did, or that all scribes were inclined to appeal to apocalyptic. Only by an arbitrary restriction of the scribal sector to the small group about whom Mark, Q and Matthew complain can one arrive at such a homogeneous view of "the scribes."

2.2 Inferring Social Data from Q

Horsley is disinclined to accept my proposals about the scribal milieu of Q for a second set of reasons. He rightly observes that "it may be impossible to move directly from genre to social context" (p. 29). In principle this is quite true. However, it is also the case that virtually *all* of the other extant examples of the Near Eastern instruction given internal signs of having originated within a scribal milieu, and for use in that milieu. My analysis of not only the form of the instructional layer, but its contents suggested that Q reflects some of the key elements of a scribal milieu: concern for not only the content of wisdom but the form and mode of its transmission, concern for clarity of perceptions, good speech, careful judgment, avoidance of public scandal and close attention to natural and social processes as potentially revelatory.[28] It is possible that the instructional genre could be exploited in a non-scribal milieu; but when the document in question reflects also the ethos of the scribal sector, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it derives from that sector.

Related to this first caveat is a second: "the literate person writing a text may have been producing a document that was peripheral to the life of the community that had been cultivating much of the materials the 'author' utilized and, perhaps, developed in particular ways" (p. 30). This, I think, comes to the heart of Horsley's disagreement. Although he concedes that Q is probably composite, he does not wish to inquire into social history as it might be reflected in literary history, but instead wishes to use the Q document as a simple repository of Q tradition. What the framer(s) of Q did with the tradition, and how that tradition was arranged and construed is mostly irrelevant since, *ex hypothesi*, the document was peripheral to the life of the community. The result is that one can collapse what I have preferred to keep as separate and successive layers of tradition into a single set of data from which to reconstruct a social world.

In some ways, this approach might be imagined to work adequately, since most of the material that I assigned to Q^1 is instructional, directed at the Q people themselves, with relatively little attention paid to defining and defending social boundaries. Much of the material in Q^2 is polemical, aimed at strengthening social boundaries, and attacking the proponents of an alternate vision of "Israel." Is it then possible to treat Q^1 and Q^2 as two moments of the same phenomenon, one hortatory and inner-directed, and one concerned with social boundaries?

The answer is, I think, No. In the first place, this approach must disregard the particular way in which the "tradition" is now utilized and ascribe a hermeneutical priority to a yet more hypothetical oral utilization. And it must assume that Q's literary deployment of the tradition is not indicative of how the other tradents were using the tradition. Both assumptions are methodologically precarious since it is only through the document that the tradition is available in the first place. And the very fact that Q was redacted and copied sufficiently to come independently to

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[28] "Redactional Strata and Social History," 8-9.

Matthew and Luke suggests that is was not the peripheral musings of a Q scribe, but enjoyed a "canonical" status among the Q people. If this is so, the particular literary deployments of sayings in Q must be taken quite seriously in reconstructing the social world of the Q people.

The difficulty with Horsley's approach can be illustrated concretely. The sayings in Q 6:27-29, 32-35 and 12:4-7 envisage various types of conflict, in the first case, a range of types of local, personal interactions, and persecution or at least threats of death, in the second. What is of interest in both cases is the "tit," as Mack puts it, for the respective tats.[29] The admonitions to love one's enemies and abusers and to suffer insult and seizure without retaliation are grounded in the assertion that only actions which surpass the ordinary expectations of reciprocity are truly meritorious. And it is in stepping outside the bounds of general reciprocity that one comes to be a child of God (6:35c). In the second text (12:4-7) the admonition to fear not a persecutor is based not in an appeal to some greater reward that the martyr might receive or by raising the spectre of the eventual torment of the persecutor, but in an appeal to God's loving surveillance of creation, a surveillance which extends even to seemingly insignificant sparrows and strands of hair (12:6-7). These sayings are fraught with a sense of risk, but buoyant with trust in the divine reality which sustains human life.

The contrast between these (Q^1) pericopae and the Q^2 texts which envisage conflict, persecution and rejection is striking. In Q 11:31-32 the condemnation of this generation for rejecting Jesus' preaching is worked out with a simple and deadly calculus; the same logic is used in the woes against Chorazin and Bethsaida (10:13-14). This imagination of the workings of God is thoroughly reciprocal: rejection of God's envoys leads inescapably to punishment. The same almost prosaic pattern is found in 11:49-51 and 13:34-35.

Horsley would like to see in 13:34-35a a prophetic protest, deriving perhaps from Jesus himself,[30] against the rulers in Jerusalem. He suggests, further, that this saying is more likely to have come from "the earliest stages in the developments of the sayings tradition and/or community behind an eventual Q" than it is to have appeared at a relatively late stage (p. 17). The saying would have provided an excellent background against which to understand the roles of John and Jesus, especially their deaths. This presupposes, of course, that there was a socially generated need to come to terms with Jesus' death (in an explicit way) and to characterize his activity as prophetic. However the material which deals with conflict and the eventuality of death in Q^1 does not reflect such needs: it is enough to appeal to the generosity and surveillance of God. The point at which it would become necessary to explain that Jesus and John were like prophets and suffered prophets' deaths is not likely to be a stage at which the risk of physical abuse and death can be brushed as they are in Q 6:27-35 and 12:4-7. Rather, it became useful to characterize John and Jesus as rejected prophets once it was seen that not only the priestly city and the Pharisees, but the towns of Galilee—all of "this generation" to use Q's bleak generalization—had resisted and refused the reign of God as the Q people saw it.

In the sayings which treat conflict, the formulations of Q^1 and Q^2 differ significantly. When this observation is coupled with the literary-critical conclusion that these materials derive from different stages in composition, it becomes very

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[29] "The Kingdom that Didn't Come," 612-13.

[30] *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence,* 300-302.

problematic to use both types of sayings to construct the social setting of Q. It makes much more sense to see two different stages or two differing perspectives on conflict and persecution within the history of the Q people.

3. Conclusion

The text and its stages of composition must serve as a guide in the reconstructing of the social context(s) in which the text was composed *unless* it can be shown that the text is truly a peripheral and idiosyncratic composition. This is as true in the case of Q as it is with the Fourth Gospel.[31] Yet a major effort of historical imagination is required in assembling various bits of social, political and economic *realia* and in reconstructing social locales in which the various stages of Q may plausibly be located. To this project Horsley's work has contributed signficantly, not only substantively, but methodologically. It is no longer possible to treat the theological aspects of Q apart from a more general characterization of social, political and economic matters. But on the other hand, when treating the social relations of the Q people it cannot be forgotten that we have access to social data only through *their* text with its compositional history and distinctive rhetoric.

[31] See the various attempts of R. E. Brown, J. L. Martyn and G. Richter (among others) to reconstruct a history of the Johannine community.

The Mustard Seed and the Leaven in Q, the Synoptics, and Thomas

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All three synoptic writers record the parable of the Mustard Seed (Matt 13:31-32; Mark 4:30-32; Luke 13:18-19), but each writer presents a different version. Luke has a parable in the strict sense, a specific event narrated in the past tense, whereas Mark has a similitude, a typical event described in the present.[1] Matthew begins in the past tense like Luke (Matt 13:31), but shifts to the present in the middle of the parable (Matt 13:32). Matthew and Luke also agree against Mark in some details, most notably in describing the mustard plant as a tree and in the wording of the scripture quotation.[2] The parable of the Leaven follows the Mustard Seed in Matthew and Luke (Matt 13:33; Luke 13:20-21), but it does not appear in Mark. Both parables appear in the *Gospel of Thomas*, but they are separated (*Gos. Thom.* 20, 96). Critics commonly maintain that two versions of the Mustard Seed lie behind the synoptic accounts—a Q version and Mark's version. In Q the Mustard Seed was a parable in the strict sense as Luke presents it, and the parable of the Leaven followed it. Luke omitted Mark's Mustard Seed when he shortened Mark's Parable Discourse, but he recorded both Q parables in the Travel Narrative. Matthew fitted the two Q parables into his Parable Discourse, but he conflated the Q Mustard Seed with Mark's version.[3] Questions remain about the earliest form of the parables and whether they were originally joined as in Q or separated as in Thomas.

In this study I will reconstruct the Q text of the parables, discuss the tradition

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[1] For the distinction between a parable and a similitude, see J. Lambrecht, *Once More Astonished: The Parables of Jesus* (New York: Crossroad, 1983) 2-5.

[2] Matthew and Luke use δένδρον to describe the mustard plant (Matt 13:32; Luke 13:19), whereas Mark says that the mustard becomes greater than all the shrubs (Mark 4:32). Matthew and Luke also agree in the phrases ὁμοία ἐστίν and ὃν λαβὼν ἄνθρωπος in the verb αὐξάνω. See further B. H. Streeter, "St. Mark's Knowledge and Use of Q," *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem* (ed. W. Sanday; Oxford: Clarendon, 1911) 165-183, esp. pp. 172-173.

[3] J Schmid, *Matthäus und Lukas: Eine Untersuchung des Verhältnisses ihrer Evangelien* (Biblische Studien 23/2-4; Freiburg im B.: Herder, 1930) 299-301; H. Zimmermann, *Neutestamentlichen Methodenlehre: Darstellung der historisch-kritischen Methode* (3rd ed.; Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1970) 123-127; H. K. McArthur, "The Parable of the Mustard Seed," *CBQ* 33 (1971) 198-210, esp. pp. 198-199; R. Laufen, *Die Doppelüberlieferungen der Logienquelle und des Markusevangeliums* (BBB 54; Konigstein/Bonn: Hanstein, 1980) 174.

history, and interpret the parables. Reconstructions usually follow Luke's text, but doubts linger about some details of the parables.[4]

I. The Q Reconstruction

A. The Introductory Verses

The introductory verses (Matt 13:31a, 33a; Luke 13:18a, 20a) challenge anyone who wants to reconstruct Q. To fit the Q material into their gospels, Matthew and Luke had to alter the introductions to the pericopes more radically than the pericopes themselves, so critics often balk at reconstructing the introductory verses.[5] Polag, for example, collects uncertain introductions in an appendix to his text, and he relegates the introductions of the Mustard Seed and the Leaven to it.[6] But the more we know about the introductions, the more we know about Q. They play an important role in determining the shape of the document and in identifying its genre. We must recover them wherever possible.

We begin by investigating Matthew. Matthew adds a formula quotation (13:34-35) to the two parables and places this complex between the parable of the Weeds among the Wheat (13:24-30) and its explanation (13:36-43). He introduces the Mustard Seed with the same stereotyped formula that he uses to introduce the Weeds among the Wheat—ἄλλην παραβολὴν παρέθηκεν αὐτοῖς λέγων (13:24a, 31a)—and a variant appears as the introduction to the Leaven—ἄλλην παραβολὴν ἐλάλησεν αὐτοῖς (13:33a). In 21:33 Matthew introduces a similar expression (ἄλλην παραβολὴν ἀκούσατε) into his Marcan source (compare Mark 12:1), so there can be little doubt that these introductions are all redactional.[7] Matthew abandoned the Q introductions to bring the Mustard Seed and the Leaven into line with the Weeds among the Wheat.

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[4] For reconstructions of the Q text, see A. Jülicher, *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu* (2 vols.; 2d ed.; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1910) 2.569-5Bl; A. Harnack, *The Sayings of Jesus* (New York: Putnam, 1908) 26-28, 142; W. Bussmann, *Synoptischen Studien. 2. Zur Redenquelle* (Halle: Waisenhaus, 1929) 83-84; J. Schmid, *Matthäus und Lukas*, 299-301; H. Zimmermann, *Methodenlehre*, 125-127; H. K. McArthur, "Mustard Seed," 200-202; S. Schulz, *Q: Die Spruchquelle der Evangelisten* (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1972) 298-300, 307; J. D. Crossan, "The Seed Parables of Jesus," *JBL* 92 (1973) 244-266, esp. pp. 254-255; A. Polag, *Fragmenta Q: Textheft zur Logienquelle* (2d ed.; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1982) 66-69; R. Laufen, *Doppelüberlieferungen*, 174-176.

[5] Laufen (*Doppelüberlieferungen*, 174-175) comments on the Mustard Seed: "Es ist zu vermuten, dass das Gleichnis in der Logienquelle mit einer kurzen Einleitungswendung begann, etwa mit ἔλεγεν (wie bei Lukas) oder εἶπεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς. Wie sie tatsächlich gelautet hat, ist nicht zu entscheiden und darf hier as Nebensächlichkeit unberücksichtigt bleiben."

[6] A. Polag, *Fragmenta Q*, 88-91.

[7] W. Bussmann, *Synoptische Studien. 2. Zur Redenquelle*, 83; H. Zimmermann, *Methodenlehre*, 127; S. Schulz, *Q*, 298-299; R. Laufen, *Doppelüberlieferungen*, 174. See further N. Turner, "The Style of Matthew," in J. H. Moulton and W. F. Howard, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek* (4 vols.; vols. 3 & 4 by N. Turner; Edinburgh: Clark, 1906, 1929, 1963, 1976) 4. 31-44, esp. pp. 41-42.

Luke also has a stereotyped expression which he uses to introduce parables—εἶπεν/ἔλεγεν παραβολήν.[8] Since the expression does not occur here, it is tempting to identify Luke's introductions with Q, but we need to look first for signs of Luke's redaction. Luke's introduction to the Mustard Seed—ἔλεγεν οὖν—is also redactional. Luke uses οὖν frequently (Luke: 33 times; Acts: 61 times), introducing it into both his Marcan source and Q material.[9] He has just related the Healing of the Crippled Woman (13:10-17) which ends with the confusion of Jesus' opponents and the joyful reaction of the crowd (13:17). He enlarges the perspective of Jesus' triumph with these two kingdom parables, and he emphasizes the connection with the particle οὖν.[10] Luke's ἔλεγεν is also redactional. Luke uses the imperfect often, especially to introduce an extended speech.[11] So neither ἐλεγεν nor οὖν comes from Q.[12]

Luke does, however, preserve the original introduction to the Leaven—καὶ πάλιν εἶπεν (13:20a). Luke generally avoids πάλιν. Although he has parallels to thirteen of the twenty-eight passages in which Mark uses πάλιν, Luke only takes over the adverb once.[13] So καὶ πάλιν εἶπεν is probably the original introduction to the Leaven.[14]

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[8] Luke 5:36; 6:39; 12:16; 14:7; 15:3; 18:1, 9; 19:11; 21:29 (compare also Luke 4:23; 12:41; 20:9, 19). See J. C. Hawkins *Horae Synopticae: Contributions to the Study of the Synoptic Problem* (2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1909) 17, 20, 39, 43; H. J. Cadbury, *The Style and Literary Method of Luke* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1920) 106-107.

[9] Compare Luke 4:7 with Matt 4:9; Luke 7:31 with Matt 11:16; Luke 8:18 with Mark 4:24; Luke 14:34 with Matt 5:13; Luke 20:15 with Mark 12:9; Luke 20:17 with Mark 12:10; Luke 20:29 with Mark 12:20; Luke 20:33 with Mark 12:23; Luke 20:44 with Mark 12:37; Luke 21:7 with Mark 13:4; Luke 21:14 with Mark 13:11. See further M. Devisch, *De geschiedenis van de Quelle-hypothese. 1. Van J. J. Eichhorn tot B. H. Streeter; 2. De recente exegese* (2 vols.; Louvain: Leuven University, 1975) 2. 500-501.

[10] J. Dupont, "Les paraboles du sénevé et du levain," *NRT* 89 (1967) 897-913, esp. p. 909; compare also A. Jülicher, *Gleichnisreden*, 2. 577.

[11] Schulz (*Q*, 299) claims that Luke's ἔλεγεν was the Q introduction, but he does not take into account Luke's use of the imperfect. According to Hawkins (*Horae Synopticae*, 51) the imperfect occurs 94 times in Matthew, 228 times in Mark, 259 times in Luke, and 329 times in Acts. Luke begins speeches with ἔλεγεν in 3:7, 11; 5:36; 6:20; 9:23; 10:2; 12:54; 13:6, 18; 14:7, 12; 16:1; 18:1; 21:10 and with ἤρξατο λέγειν in 7:24; 11:29; 12:1; 20:9. See M. Devisch, *Geschiedenis*, 2. 498-500.

[12] M. Devisch (*Geschiedenis*, 2. 498 n. 33) claims that Luke's ἔλεγεν comes from Mark 4:30. But it is not necessary to have recourse to Mark since the verb reflects Luke's preference for the imperfect to introduce extended speeches.

[13] Mark uses πάλιν in 2:1, 13; 3:1, 20; 4:1; 5:21; 7:14, 31; 8:1, 13, 25; 10:1 *bis*, 10, 24, 32; 11:3, 27; 12:4; 14:39, 40, 61, 69, 70 *bis*; 15:4, 12, 13. Luke has parallels in 5:17, 27; 6:6; 8:4, 40; 18:31; 20:1, 11; 22:58, 59; 23:20, 21 (in 22:58 Luke omits two Marcan uses), but he only takes over πάλιν in 23:20. Luke also has πάλιν in 6:43 where it may also come from Q (compare Matt 7:18), and he uses it five times in Acts (10:15; 11:10; 17:32; 18:21; 27:28). See J. C. Hawkins, *Horae Synopticae*, 24; H. J. Cadbury, *Style*, 199; J. Jeremias, *Die Sprache des Lukasevangeliums* (MeyerK; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1980) 148.

[14] A. Jülicher, *Gleichnisreden*, 2. 569-570; J. Schmid, *Matthäus und Lukas*, 300; H. Zimmermann, *Methodenlehre*, 126.

If καὶ πάλιν εἶπεν is the Q introduction to the Leaven, the πάλιν suggests that εἶπεν or καὶ εἶπεν was the original introduction to the Mustard Seed.[15] Of the two καὶ εἶπεν is more likely. In Q the Mustard Seed followed the parable about Going before the Judge (Q 12:58-59). Since this parable ends with a λέγω σοί saying (Q 12:59), καὶ εἶπεν would provide a smoother transition than εἶπεν. If Luke read καὶ εἶπεν in Q, then we can easily account for his redactional ἔλεγεν οὖν. Luke wants to bind the two parables to the Healing of the Crippled Woman (Luke 13:10-17). Q's καί is too weak, so he substitutes οὖν. Since he is beginning a speech of Jesus, he shifts from the aorist to the imperfect. Luke makes a similar redactional move in Luke 3:7a where he binds John's Preaching to the preceding scripture quotation with οὖν and switches from the aorist (compare Matt 3:7a) to the imperfect to begin a speech.[16]

So Q introduced the two parables with καὶ εἶπεν and καὶ πάλιν εἶπεν. We turn now to the parables themselves.

B. The Mustard Seed

Because Matthew conflates Mark and Q, Matthew's version of the Mustard Seed differs considerably from Luke's:

	Matt 13:31-32	Luke 13:18-19	
		τίνι ὁμοία ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ;	18
		καὶ τίνι ὁμοιώσω αὐτήν;	
31	ὁμοία ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν κόκκῳ σινάπεως,	ὁμοία ἐστὶν κόκκῳ σινάπεως,	19
	ὃν λαβὼν ἄνθρωπος	ὃν λαβὼν ἄνθρωπος	
	ἔσπειρεν ἐν τῷ ἀγρῷ αὐτοῦ·	ἔβαλεν εἰς κῆπον ἑαυτοῦ,	
32	ὃ μικρότερον μέν ἐστιν πάντων τῶν σπερμάτων,		
	ὅταν δὲ αὐξηθῇ, μεῖζον τῶν λαχάνων ἐστὶν	καὶ ηὔξησεν	
	καὶ γίνεται δένδρον,	καὶ ἐγένετο εἰς δένδρον,	
	ὥστε ἐλθεῖν τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ	καὶ τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ	
	καὶ κατασκηνοῦν ἐν τοῖς κλάδοις αὐτοῦ.	κατεσκήνωσεν ἐν τοῖς κλάδοις αὐτοῦ.	

Luke begins the Mustard Seed a double question, Matthew with a statement. Matthew frequently uses one of two stereotyped expressions—ὡμοιώθη ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν or ὁμοία ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν—to begin a parable.[17] Every

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[15] Since neither Matthew nor Luke expresses the subject, it is not likely that Q did so.

[16] M. Devisch, *Geschiedenis*, 2. 491-509.

[17] The first expression (ὡμοιώθη ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν) appears in Matt 13:24; 18:23; 22:2 (compare also Matt 25:1—ὁμοιωθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν). The second (ὁμοία ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν) occurs in Matt 13:31, 33, 44, 45, 47; 20:1. A dative which leads into the parable follows both expressions. See D. A.

parable in Matthew's Parable Discourse except the first one begins with one of these formulas, so it is likely that Matthew altered the Q beginning.[18] But is Luke's double question original? Although McArthur ultimately decides that it is, he hesitates, suggesting that Luke could have adopted the double questions from Mark.[19] But this is not likely. Both Matthew and Luke tend to avoid Mark's double questions so it is more probable that Matthew would eliminate a double question than that Luke would introduce one.[20] Besides, Luke's questions are quite different from Mark's. Mark introduces the questions with πῶς . . . ἤ, Luke with τίνι . . . καὶ τίνι. Although they both use ὁμοιόω in one question, Luke has the singular instead of Mark's plural, and the other questions are not close.[21] Luke's double question is much closer to the double question in Luke 7:31:

Luke 7:31	Luke 13:18
τίνι οὖν ὁμοιώσω τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῆς γενεᾶς ταύτης; καὶ τίνι εἰσὶν ὅμοιοι;	τίνι ὁμοία ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ; καὶ τίνι ὁμοιώσω αὐτήν;

Both of these double questions begin with τίνι . . . καὶ τίνι, and both use the same constructions: ὁμοιώσω with the accusative in one question, ὅμοιος with the copula in the other. Each double question introduces a Q parable, and since there is no Marcan parallel to Luke 7:31, Luke could not have borrowed the questions from Mark in that instance. Furthermore, the vocabulary is not Lucan. Both ὁμοιόω and ὅμοιος appear almost exclusively in Q contexts in Luke, and τίνι . . . καὶ τίνι occurs

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Carson, "The ὅμοιος Word-Group as Introduction to some Matthean Parables," *NTS* 31 (1985) 277-282.

[18] H. K. McArthur, "Mustard Seed," 200; J. D. Crossan, "Seed Parables," 254.

[19] H. K. McArthur, "Mustard Seed," 200. See also T. Schramm, *Der Markus-Stoff bei Lukas: Eine literarkritische und redaktionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung* (SNTSMS 14; Cambridge: University Press, 1971) 50 n. 1b; F. Neirynck, "Recent Developments in the Study of Q," *Logia: Les paroles de Jésus – The Sayings of Jesus: Mémorial Joseph Coppens* (ed. J. Delobel; BETL 59; Louvain: Peeters/Leuven University, 1982) 29-75, esp. p. 52.

[20] F. Neirynck has compiled a list of double questions in Mark (F. Neirynck, *Duality in Mark: Contributions to the Study of the Markan Redaction* [rev. ed.; BETL 31; Louvain: Peeters/University Press, 1988] 125-126). If we eliminate three textually uncertain cases (Mark 1:27; 4:13; 14:60) and the Mustard Seed (Mark 4:30), then twenty-one double questions remain (Mark 1:24; 2:7, 8-9; 3:4; 4:21, 40; 6:2, 3; 7:18-19; 8:17-19 [3 double questions], 19-20, 36-37; 9:19; 11:28; 12:14, 24-26; 13:4; 14:37, 63-64). Matthew and Luke do not have parallels to all of the Marcan double questions, but where they do they both tend to eliminate the double question, Luke even more than Matthew. Matthew takes over ten double questions from Mark (Matt 9:4-5; 13:55; 15:16-17; 16:8-9, 9-10, 26; 17:17; 21:23; 24:3; 26:65-66), but he eliminates at least one question nine times (Matt 9:3; 8:26; 12:12; 13:54; 16:9 [two double questions eliminated]; 22:17, 29-31; 26:40). Luke takes over five double questions from Mark (Luke 4:34; 5:21, 22-23; 20:2; 21:7), but he eliminates at least one question nine times (Luke 6:9; 8:16, 25; 9:25, 41; 20:22, 34-37; 22:46, 71).

[21] Mark 4:30b: ἐν τίνι αὐτὴν παραβολῇ θῶμεν; Luke 13:18a: τίνι ὁμοία ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ;

nowhere else in Luke-Acts.[22] Since Matthew and Luke tend to avoid double questions, it is probable that the double questions in Luke 7:31 and Luke 13:18 come from Q. Q's extensive use of rhetorical questions confirms this conclusion. Q packs at least thirty-eight rhetorical questions into its roughly 220 verses.[23] Q uses eight double rhetorical questions and even has two sets of four rhetorical questions.[24] So Luke preserves the Q beginning of the Mustard Seed.

After the questions Q continued as in Luke: ὁμοία ἐστὶν κόκκῳ σινάπεως, ὃν λαβὼν ἄνθρωπος. Since Matthew dropped the double question, he had to add a reference to the kingdom.[25] Matthew and Luke differ in the predicate of the relative clause (Matthew: ἔσπειρεν ἐν τῷ ἀγρῷ αὐτοῦ; Luke: ἔβαλεν εἰς κῆπον ἑαυτοῦ). McArthur claims that the mustard plant was excluded from gardens in Palestine, and he therefore maintains that the word "garden" reflects a Hellenistic milieu and so is not original.[26] McArthur, though, confuses the search for an original form of the parable in Jesus' ministry and the reconstruction of the Q text used by Matthew and Luke. Matthew and Luke took over the Q material from a Greek document. The close verbal agreement of many Q passages and the fact that the scripture quotations come from the Greek Old Testament prove this beyond any doubt. So the Mustard Seed had already undergone Hellenistic influence before it reached Matthew and Luke. Furthermore, the word κῆπος may be part of the tree imagery the parable exploits. Commentators usually trace the scripture quotation at the end of the parable to the classic tree passages in Ezek 17 and 31 and Dan 4.[27] In Ezekiel

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[22] The verb ὁμοιόω appears only three times in Luke's gospel, all in Q contexts (Luke 7:31; 13:18, 20); ὅμοιος occurs in Q contexts eight times (Luke 6:47, 48, 49; 7:31, 32; 13:18, 19, 21) and only once in a non-Q context (Luke 12:36). Each word appears once in Acts—the verb in Acts 14:11 and the adjective in Acts 17:29.

[23] In many Q texts Matthew and Luke agree in using a rhetorical question. Often, though, one or the other eliminates a rhetorical question from a Q text. Rhetorical questions should be restored in the following texts: Q 3:7b; 6:32a, 32b, 33a, 33b, 39a, 39b, 41, 42a, 44b, 46; 7:24b, 24c, 25a, 25b, 26a, 26b, 31a, 31b; 10:15; 11:11, 12, 18, 19; 12:6a, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 42b, 51; 13:18a, 18b, 20; 14:5, 34; 15:4.

[24] Double rhetorical questions occur in Q 6:39a, 39b; Q 6:41, 42a; Q 7:26a, 26b; Q 7:31a, 31b; Q 11:11, 12; Q 11:18, 19; Q 12:25, 26; Q 13:18a, 18b. Series of four rhetorical questions are found in Q 6:32a, 32b, 33a, 33b and Q 7:24b, 24c, 25a, 25b.

[25] Three observations prove that the Q expression was "the kingdom of God" as in Luke 13:18 and not "the kingdom of heaven" as in Matthew. First, Matthew is the only New Testament writer to use ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν, and it occurs thirty-two times in his gospel (Matt 3:2; 4:17; 5:3, 10, 19 *bis*, 20; 7:21; 8:11; 10:7; 11:11, 12; 13:11, 24, 31, 33, 44, 45, 47, 52; 16:19; 18:1, 3, 4, 23; 19:12, 14, 23; 20:1; 22:2, 23:13; 25:1). Second, Matthew changes Mark's ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ to ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν in 4:17; 13:11; 19:14, 23. Third, Matthew agrees with Luke on one occasion in using ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ in Q material (Matt 12:28). See J. C. Hawkins, *Horae Synopticae*, 4, 30.

[26] McArthur ("Mustard Seed," 201) refers to *m. Kil.* 3. 2 and *t. Kil.* 2. 8.

[27] Psalm 104 is also drawn into the picture. See J. D. Crossan, *In Parables: The Challenge of the Historical Jesus* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973) 47; J. A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel according to Luke* (2 vols.; AB 28 & 28A; Garden City: Doubleday, 1981, 1985) 2. 1017.

and Daniel the cedar symbolizes the kingdom, at first the earthly kingdom of the world empires, but also God's eschatological kingdom. The location of the cedar plays an important role in the portrayal of the eschatological kingdom. In Ezek 17:22-24 Yahweh plants a sprig from the cedar on Mount Zion, and Ezek 31:8 compares the cedar to the cedars in the garden of God. The LXX uses παράδεισος for the garden, but κῆπος appears in the Theodotion text of Ezek 31:8. Since the tree symbolizes the eschatological kingdom in the Mustard Seed, the word "garden" may reinforce the image by placing the tree in God's garden. In any case we cannot eliminate κῆπος as a Hellenistic intrusion. If we now examine the vocabulary of the predicate, the Q reconstruction should become clear. Luke's ἔβαλεν εἰς κῆπον comes from Q. Luke does not use βάλλω often; the preposition εἰς is demanded by the parallelism with the Leaven (compare Q 13:21); and κῆπος appears only here in the synoptic gospels.[28] For his only change Luke altered an original αὐτοῦ to ἑαυτοῦ.[29] Matthew's ἔσπειρεν ἐν τῷ ἀγρῷ is redactional. Matthew borrowed the verb from Mark 4:31[30] and the prepositional phrase from the Weeds among the Wheat (Matt 13:24, 27).[31] So the Q expression was ἔβαλεν εἰς κῆπον αὐτοῦ.

Luke's καὶ ηὔξησεν καὶ ἐγένετο εἰς δένδρον preserves the Q wording of the next clause. Both Matthew and Luke use the aorist in the parable of the Leaven, so Q probably used the aorist throughout the Mustard Seed. At this point Matthew shifts to Mark's present. He borrows μικρότερον . . . πάντων τῶν σπερμάτων, μεῖζον τῶν λαχάνων,[32] and ὅταν from Mark.[33] He wraps these around Q's verb αὐξάνω (contrast Mark's ἀναβαίνω and compare συναυξάνω in Matt 13:30) and combines Mark's description of the mustard plant as "the greatest of the shrubs" with Q's "tree." He has considerably improved the syntax, however, by eliminating one ὅταν, by introducing μέν . . . δέ with the copula,[34] and by substituting a predicate

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[28] βάλλω appears 34 times in Matthew, 18 times in Mark, 18 times in Luke, and 5 times in Acts. Luke removes the verb in 12:50 (compare Mark 10:34).

[29] Luke uses ἑαυτοῦ frequently (Matthew 32 times; Mark 24 times; Luke 57 times; Acts 21 times). Luke substitutes ἑαυτοῦ for αὐτοῦ in 13:34 (compare Matt 23:37), 14:27 (compare Matt 10:38), and 19:36 (compare Mark 11:8). See J. Schmid, *Matthäus und Lukas*, 277 n. 3.

[30] Matthew uses σπείρω 14 times in his Parable Discourse (13:3 *bis*, 4, 18, 19 *bis*, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27, 36, 37, 39). See A. Jülicher, *Gleichnisreden*, 2. 572.

[31] See further Matt 13:36, 38, 44. Matthew uses ἀγρός frequently (Matthew 17 times; Mark 9 times; Luke 10 times; Acts 1 time) and he introduces it into Q in 24:40 (compare Luke 17:34). See H. Zimmermann, *Methodenlehre*, 127; R. Laufen, *Doppelüberlieferungen*, 175; S. Schulz, *Q*, 299.

[32] Matthew omits πάντων before τῶν λαχάνων. Jülicher (*Gleichnisreden*, 2. 574) comments: ". . . vor τῶν λαχάνων streicht Mt das πάντων, wohl nicht ganz ohne Absicht, denn durch dies μεῖζον τῶν λαχάνων ἐστὶν καὶ γίνεται δένδρον schafft er einen Gegensatz zwischen λάχανα und δένδρον: der Senf wächst über die λάχανα hinaus und tritt in die Reihe der Bäume ein."

[33] S. Schulz, *Q*, 299-300.

[34] Matthew uses μέν . . . δέ often (Matt 3:11; 9:37; 10:13; 13:4-8a, 8b, 23, 32; 16:14; 17:11-12; 20:23; 21:35; 22:5-6, 8; 23:27, 28; 25:15, 33; 26:24, 41. He introduces μέν . . . δέ into his sources in 13:23 (compare Mark 4:20); 16:14 (compare Mark 8:28); 20:23 (compare Mark 10:39); 21:35 (compare Mark 12:3); 22:5-6 (compare Luke 14:18-20); 22:8 (compare Luke 14:21).

nominative for Q's εἰς δένδρον.[35]

Luke also preserves the Q text of the final clause. Matthew borrows the ὥστε with the infinitive construction from Mark,[36] and he replaces Mark's δύνασθε with ἐλθεῖν.[37]Matthew retains Mark's infinitive κατασκηνοῦν, coordinating it with ἐλθεῖν, but he prefers the Q prepositional phrase because he has kept Q's tree image.

Luke, then, basically preserves the Q version of the Mustard Seed. The only change he introduces is the shift from αὐτοῦ to ἑαυτοῦ. We turn now to the Leaven.

C. The Leaven

Except for the beginning of the parable, Matthew and Luke agree closely in the Leaven, so the reconstruction is relatively easy.

	Matt 13:33	Luke 13:20-21	
		τίνι ὁμοιώσω τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ;	20
33	ὁμοία ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν ζύμῃ,	ὁμοία ἐστὶν ζύμῃ,	21
	ἣν λαβοῦσα γυνὴ ἐνέκρυψεν	ἣν λαβοῦσα γυνὴ ἔκρυψεν	
	εἰς ἀλεύρου σάτα τρία,	εἰς ἀλεύρου σάτα τρία,	
	ἕως οὗ ἐζυμώθη ὅλον.	ἕως οὗ ἐζυμώθη ὅλον.	

Matthew begins the Leaven with a statement like the statement he used at the beginning of the Mustard Seed (compare Matt 13:33 with Matt 13:31). Luke again begins with a question, although he only has a single question instead of a double question (compare Luke 13:20 with Luke 13:18). Again Matthew has altered the original beginning to conform the parable to the other parables in his Parable Discourse. Luke has again preserved the Q beginning. The question that introduces the Leaven compresses into one the two questions that introduce the Mustard Seed. As the second member in a parable pair, the Leaven is roughly half as long as the Mustard Seed, so the beginning was pared down to a single question.[38]

After the beginning Matthew and Luke agree word for word with one possible exception. Matthew has the compound ἐνέκρυψεν as the main verb in the relative

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[35] The Q expression γίνεσθε εἰς reflects a Semitic idiom (compare Gen 2:7; Ezek 17:6). See A. Jülicher, *Gleichnisreden*, 2. 573; BDF #145 (1).

[36] Matthew introduces ὥστε into his sources in 8:28 (compare Mark 5:4); 10:1 (compare Mark 6:7) 12:12 (compare Mark 3:4); 13:54 (compare Mark 6:2); 15:31 (compare Mark 7:37); 15:33 (compare Mark 8:4); 24:24 (compare Mark 13:22); 27:1 (compare Mark 15:1).

[37] The shift is not difficult to understand. First, the redundant use of a verb of motion is common in Matthew (2:9; 9:13; 12:45; 18:12; 25:16; 27:66; 28:13). Second, Matthew may intend to echo 13:4 where he described the birds' "coming" (ἐλθόντα τὰ πετεινὰ κατέφαγεν). See A. Jülicher, *Gleichnisreden*, 2. 573. Third, he may intend to shift from Mark's possibility (ὥστε δύνασθαι) to an actuality (ὥστε ἐλθεῖν). See C. E. Carlston, *The Parables of the Triple Tradition* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975) 26.

[38] The Mustard Seed contains 38 words in Luke whereas the Leaven has only 21 words.

clause. Many manuscripts of Luke also read ἐνέκρυψεν in the relative clause, but there is also strong support for the simple verb. Both readings are well attested:

(1) ἔκρυψεν B K L N 892. 1010. 1424. *al*
(2) ἐνέκρυψεν P^{75} ℵ A D W Θ Ψ 070 f^{13} l *pm*

We should reject Reading (2) as an assimilation to Matthew and adopt Reading (1).[39] But what is the Q verb? Did Q have Matthew's ἐνέκρυψεν or Luke's ἔκρυψεν? A decision is not easy. Matthew's verb is a *hapax legomenon* in the NT and is often considered the original verb.[40] But Luke tends to avoid simple verbs, preferring compound forms instead.[41] It is difficult to imagine him altering the compound if he had read it in Q. The preposition εἰς could easily have suggested the compound to Matthew. Furthermore, the aorist of κρύπτω is probably attested elsewhere in Q. In the Praise of the Father we find the clause "because you hid these things from the wise and intelligent" (Q 10:21). In this passage Matthew has the simple ἔκρυψας (Matt 11:25) while Luke has the compound ἀπέκρυψας (Luke 10:21). Again the simple verb probably stood in Q. Luke shifted to the compound because he prefers compound verbs and because both the preposition ἀπό and the coordinate verb ἀπέκαλυψας suggested the compound to him. This Q parallel confirms the conclusion that the Q verb in the relative clause was ἔκρυψεν. So Luke presents the Q Leaven unchanged. This in turn confirms our analysis of the Mustard Seed where Luke intervened only slightly in the Q text.

We can now draw the discussions together by printing the reconstructed Q text.

Q 13:18-21

18 καὶ εἶπεν·
τίνι ὁμοία ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ;
καὶ τίνι ὁμοιώσω αὐτήν;
19 ὁμοία ἐστὶν κόκκῳ σινάπεως,
ὃν λαβὼν ἄνθρωπος ἔβαλεν εἰς κῆπον αὐτοῦ,
καὶ ηὔξησεν καὶ ἐγένετο εἰς δένδρον,
καὶ τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κατεσκήνωσεν
ἐν τοῖς κλάδοις αὐτοῦ.
20 καὶ πάλιν εἶπεν·
τίνι ὁμοιώσω τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ;
21 ὁμοία ἐστὶν ζύμῃ,
ἣν λαβοῦσα γυνὴ ἔκρυψεν εἰς ἀλεύρου σάτα τρία,
ἕως οὗ ἐζυμώθη ὅλον.

II. Formal Correspondence, Tradition History, and Interpretation

A. Formal Correspondence

Before investigating the tradition history and interpretation of the Mustard Seed and the Leaven, we need to discuss a literary question—the formal correspondence

[39] H. Zimmermann, *Methodenlehre*, 125.
[40] J. Schmid, *Matthäus und Lukas*, 300; H. Zimmermann, *Methodenlehre*, 126.
[41] H. J. Cadbury, *Style*, 166-168.

of the two parables. J. Jeremias includes the Mustard Seed and the Leaven in his discussion of "double parables" which he defines as two parables that express the same idea in different symbols.[42] However, J. Dupont points out that Jeremias' definition does not include any formal elements; and, following Bultmann, he prefers to characterize double parables as two parables that have a parallel structure and express the same theme.[43] We note such a parallel structure in the Mustard Seed and the Leaven, especially at the beginning:

Mustard Seed	Leaven
καὶ εἶπεν·	καὶ πάλιν εἶπεν·
τίνι ὁμοία ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ;	τίνι ὁμοιώσω τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ;
καὶ τίνι ὁμοιώσω αὐτήν;	
ὁμοία ἐστὶν κόκκῳ σινάπεως,	ὁμοία ἐστὶν ζύμῃ,
ὃν λαβὼν ἄνθρωπος ἔβαλεν	ἣν λαβοῦσα γυνὴ ἔκρυψεν
εἰς κῆπον αὐτοῦ	εἰς ἀλεύρου σάτα τρία
. . .	. . .

After the brief introduction each parable begins with a single or double question, followed by ὁμοία ἐστιν with the subject of the parable in the dative. A relative clause then describes the action of the parable. The two relative clauses have the same initial structure: the relative + λαβών/λαβοῦσα + the agent + an aorist verb + εἰς with the accusative. The parables coordinate the two agents—the first speaks of a man, the second of a woman. Zimmermann suggests that the parables also coordinate the place of activity—the garden and the house—but the house is not mentioned explicitly, so it is best not to insist on this point.[44]

The parables certainly correspond closely enough to be called a parable pair, but this raises some further questions. Were the two conceived as an original unit or were they secondarily joined together? Why are there two parables? Would not one have sufficed to make the point? Hopefully the tradition history and the interpretation will shed light on these questions.

B. Tradition History

Including the reconstructed Q text we now have five versions of the Mustard Seed (Q 13:18-19; Matt 13:31-32; Mark 4:30-32; Luke 13:18-19; *Gos. Thom.* 20) and four versions of the Leaven (Q 13:20-21; Matt 13:33; Luke 13 20-21; *Gos. Thom.* 96). How are these texts related? We begin with the Mustard Seed. Matthew and Luke of course depend on Q, and Matthew also makes use of Mark, so the earliest version is found in either Q, Mark, or the *Gospel of Thomas*. Each of the three has

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[42] J. Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus* (rev. ed.; New York: Scribners, 1963) 90-92.

[43] J. Dupont, "Le couple parabolique du sénevé et du levain," *Jesus Christus in Historie und Theologie: Neutestamentliche Festschrift für Hans Conzelmann zum 60. Geburtstag* (ed. G. Strecker; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1975) 331-345, esp. p. 331; compare R. Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963) 194.

[44] H. Zimmermann, *Methodenlehre*, 126-127.

its advocates. For example, Schulz and Dupont claim that the Q version is the earliest; Pesch and Schnackenburg prefer Mark; and the Jesus Seminar considers Thomas' version closest to the original.[45] We begin by comparing the Q text and the Marcan overlap:

	Q 13:18-19	Mark 4:30-32	
18	καὶ εἶπεν·	καὶ ἔλεγεν·	30
	τίνι ὁμοία ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ;	πῶς ὁμοιώσωμεν τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ;	
	καὶ τίνι ὁμοιώσω αὐτήν;	ἢ ἐν τίνι αὐτὴν παραβωλῇ θῶμεν;	
19	ὁμοία ἐστὶν κόκκῳ σινάπεως,	ὡς κόκκῳ σινάπεως,	31
	ὃν λαβὼν ἄνθρωπος ἔβαλεν εἰς κῆπον αὐτοῦ,	ὃς ὅταν σπαρῇ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, μικρότερον ὂν πάντων τῶν σπερμάτων τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς,	
	καὶ ηὔξησεν καὶ ἐγένετο εἰς δένδρον	καὶ ὅταν σπαρῇ, ἀναβαίνει καὶ γίνεται μεῖζον πάντων τῶν λαχάνων καὶ ποιεῖ κλάδους μεγάλους,	32
	καὶ τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κατεσκήνωσεν ἐν τοῖς κλάδοις αὐτοῦ.	ὥστε δύνασθαι ὑπὸ τὴν σκιὰν αὐτοῦ τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κατασκηνοῦν.	

Laufen tries to probe ehind Mark and Q to reconstruct their common ancestor. He falls, though, into a methodological error, for he presumes without demonstration that the two texts independently reflect an earlier form of the parable.[46] Instead, we must compare the texts to determine if one is later than the other, and, if so, whether the later form derives from the earlier one.

Two main considerations show that Mark is secondary to Q. First, Q calls the mustard plant a "tree," while Mark describes it as "greater than all the shrubs." Q obviously exaggerates the size of the mustard plant in order to make room for the scripture quotation that follows. Mark's description consciously corrects the exaggeration. The opposite development from Mark's "shrub" to Q's "tree" is not likely because all synoptic versions refer to the classic "tree" passages from Ezekiel and Daniel. In other words, Mark's text presupposes that the mustard plant has been

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[45] S. Schulz, *Q*, 301; J. Dupont, "Le couple parabolique," 340-341; R. Pesch, *Das Markusevangelium* (2 vols.; HTKNT 2; Freiburg/Basel/Vienna: Herder, 1976, 1977) 1. 264 n. 20; R. Schnackenburg, *Matthäusevangelium* (2 vols.; Neuer Echter Bibel; Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1985, 1987) 1. 124; R. W. Funk, B. B. Scott, and J. R. Butts, *The Parables of Jesus: Red Letter Edition* (Sonoma: Polebridge, 1988) 34, 80.

[46] R. Laufen, *Doppelüberlieferungen*, 176-182. J. D. Crossan ("Seed Parables," 258-259) tries to describe the form of the parable that lies behind Q, Mark, and Thomas, but he also fails to establish that the three versions are independent of one another.

identified with the tree as an image of the kingdom, and Mark moves to eliminate the exaggeration. This should not surprise us, for we find other overlap texts where Mark tones down a radical or exaggerated Q statement.

In the Mission Discourse Mark softens Q's harsh equipment rule by allowing the missionaries to carry a staff and wear sandals (compare Mark 6:8-9 with Q 10:4), and in the Cross Saying Mark turns Q's radical prohibition into a softened admonition (compare Mark 8:34 with Q 14:27).[47] The second sign that Mark is secondary to Q is related to the shift from "tree" to "greater than all the shrubs." Q contrasts the proverbially small mustard seed with the grown tree, but the contrast remains implicit. Because he eliminates the tree, Mark makes the contrast explicit by emphasizing how small the seed is and how large the grown plant is: "when it is sown in the earth, it is the smallest of all the seeds on the earth, and when it is sown it increases and becomes greater than all the shrubs and produces large branches" (Mark 4:31-32). Because he consciously corrects an exaggeration and makes explicit what is implicit, Mark is clearly secondary to Q.

Not only is Mark secondary to Q, we can also show that Mark redacts the Q text. By eliminating the tree image and highlighting the contrast, Mark centers the parable around the seed, so the sower drops out. Other changes follow. Although the mustard plant is no longer a tree, it puts forth "great branches"; and, although the birds no longer nest in its branches, they still dwell in its shade.

Mark also conforms the Mustard Seed to the parable of the Seed Growing Secretly (Mark 4:26-29). Both have the same introductory phrase ("and he said"); both are seed parables; both mention the kingdom of God; both have similar connotations; both end with a scriptural quotation or allusion.[48] The structure and phraseology of the two parables are similar. Both begin with an aorist subjunctive and switch to the present. The sowing and growth are similarly described:

vv. 26-27	vv. 31-32
as a man	as a mustard seed
casts seed	which when it is sown
on the earth . . .	on the earth . . .
and the seed sprouts	and when it is sown, rises
and grows . . .	and becomes great . . .

Mark clearly conceived the parables as a unit.[49]

If we now examine the diction, we can confirm both that Mark is secondary to Q and that Mark is redacting the Q text. The introduction "and he said" (καὶ ἔλεγεν) conforms the parable to the Seed Growing Secretly (compare Mark 4:26). Like Q

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[47] According to Lührmann Mark's equipment rule is characterized by "denials of denials." By allowing staff and sandals Mark presupposes that they were once questioned. See D. Lührmann, "The Gospel of Mark and the Sayings Collection Q," *JBL* 108 (1989) 51-71, esp. p. 63. On the Cross Saying see H. Fleddermann, "The Cross and Discipleship in Q," *Society of Biblical Literature 1988 Seminar Papers* (ed. D. J. Lull; SBLSP 27; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988) 472-482, esp. pp. 479-480.

[48] The Seed Growing Secretly alludes to Joel 4:13; Mark's Mustard Seed combines Q's use of Dan 4:21 (Theodotion) and Ezek 17:23.

[49] J. Lambrecht, "Redaction and Theology," 296-297.

Mark begins with a double question. He draws the Q verb from the second question into the first and uses a Marcan term πῶς to introduce the question.[50] Mark has two first person plural verbs and two direct objects in the two questions. In this way he makes the questions more symmetrical. With the phrase ἐν τίνι . . . παραβολῇ Mark formulates a more explicit question than Q does. Both the greater symmetry and the more explicit formulation betray Mark's text as a redactional reworking.[51] Besides πῶς the phrase ἐν . . . παραβολῇ has a Marcan ring to it.[52] Mark shortens the beginning of the parable (ὡς κόκκῳ σινάπεως, ὃς . . .) because he wants to eliminate the sower and concentrate on the seed. The ὡς reflects the πῶς of the introduction and the ὡς that begins the Seed Growing Secretly (Mark 4:26). Typically Marcan is the repetition of ὅταν σπαρῇ and ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.[53] The verbs ἀναβαίνει, γίνεται, and the construction ὥστε δύνασθαι are all readily understandable as resulting from Marcan redaction.[54] Because Mark no longer describes the mustard as a "tree," he alters the scripture quotation by introducing ὑπὸ τὴν σκιὰν αὐτοῦ from Ezek 17:23, but he preserves Q's "branches" by constructing the clause καὶ ποιεῖ κλάδους μεγάλους.[55] We conclude that Mark's Mustard Seed is a redaction of the Q parable. Two main concerns guide Mark's redaction. First, he corrects the exaggerated description of the mustard plant as a tree, and he emphasizes the contrast between the tiny seed and the large plant. Second, he conforms the parable to the Seed Growing Secretly.

The *Gospel of Thomas* contains versions of both the Mustard Seed and the Leaven. The Mustard Seed appears in *Gos. Thom.* 20:

> The disciples said to Jesus, "Tell us what the kingdom of the heavens is like."
>
> He said to them, "It is like a grain of mustard seed, smaller than all the seeds. But when it falls on the earth which has been cultivated, it puts forth a large branch (and) becomes a shelter for birds of the heaven."

Gos. Thom. 20 agrees with Mark repeatedly against the Q version found in Matthew and Luke. In Thomas as in Mark the Mustard Seed is a similitude, a general statement in the present, whereas in Q it is a parable, a specific event narrated in the past. Thomas, like Mark, does not mention the sower but concentrates instead on the seed. Thomas also reflects Mark in the phrase "smaller than all the seeds" and in stating that the seed falls on the "earth" (*kah*) rather than in a "field" (Matthew) or a "garden" (Luke). As in Mark the seed produces a "large branch" in Thomas, and Thomas does not mention a "tree." We have seen that Mark's version of the Mustard Seed is secondary to the Q version and that the differences are due to

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[50] πῶς is frequent in Mark (Matthew 14 times; Mark 14 times; Luke 16 times; Acts 9 times). It is redactional at least at Mark 3:23; 4:13; 9:12; 14:1, 11. See J. Lambrecht, "Redaction and Theology," 294 n. 114.

[51] J. Lambrecht, "Redaction and Theology," 294.

[52] Compare Mark 4:2, 11. See J. Lambrecht, "Redaction and Theology," 294.

[53] Compare σπόρος in Mark 4:26 and σπείρω in Mark 4:3-9, 14-20. For ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς compare Mark 4:26. On the repetition of the two phrases see F. Neirynck, *Duality*, 97-101.

[54] For ἀναβαίνει compare Mark 4:7, 8. For γίνεται compare Mark 2:15, 21; 4:11, 19; 11:23. For ὥστε δύνασθαι compare Mark 1:45; 3:20.

[55] J. Lambrecht, "Redaction and Theology," 295.

Marcan redaction. Since Thomas' version of the parable reflects these Marcan redactional alterations, it depends on Mark's gospel.[56]

In two places Thomas also reflects Matthew. First, Thomas refers to "the kingdom of the heavens" instead of "the kingdom of God." Tuckett maintains that this is not significant because Thomas has an aversion to calling the ultimate deity "God."[57] But Thomas usually refers to the kingdom as either "kingdom" (*Gos. Thom.* 3, 22, 27, 46, 49, 107, 109) or "the kingdom of the Father" (*Gos. Thom.* 57, 76, 96, 97, 98, 99, 113).[58] The gospel only uses "the kingdom of the heavens" three times, and the other two occurrences come in set phrases that have a Matthean ring to them. "For yours is the kingdom of the heavens" (*Gos. Thom.* 54) combines Matthew's and Luke's first beatitude, and "to enter the kingdom of the heavens" (*Gos. Thom.* 114) is a phrase that occurs only in Matthew.[59] So it is likely that all three occurrences of "the kingdom of the heavens" in Thomas depend on Matthew's gospel. Second, Thomas uses the expression ὅταν δέ which occurs only in Matthew's version of the parable. Again Tuckett discounts this because the phrase is common, but ὅταν δέ occurs in Thomas at the exact spot it appears in Matthew, immediately after the clause that describes the size of the seed.[60] This clearly does not result from chance. Since both "the kingdom of the heavens" and ὅταν δέ are Matthean redactional additions to the parable, Thomas reflects Matthew's version as well as Mark's.

Besides taking over redactional elements from Mark and Matthew, Thomas also develops the parable. In all three synoptics Jesus directly addresses his audience, but in Thomas the disciples question Jesus who then responds with the parable. This aphoristic dialogue form surfaces often in Thomas, and Jeremias has shown that it reflects a secondary development in the parables.[61] Thomas further describes the earth as "cultivated." This description allegorizes the earth which bears no special significance in Mark, but allegorization is also a sign of secondary development in the parables.[62] Because it depends on the redactional work of Mark and Matthew and because it shows signs of further development, Thomas' version represents the latest stage in the tradition history of the Mustard Seed.

To find the earliest version of the Leaven we need only compare Q and Thomas since Matthew and Luke depend on Q. The Leaven appears in *Gos. Thom.* 96:

> Jesus [said], "The kingdom of the Father is like [a] woman. She took a little yeast, [hid] it in dough, (and) made it into large loaves of bread. Whoever has ears, let [him] hear."

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[56] L. Cerfaux and G. Garitte, "Les paraboles du royaume dans l'Evangile de Thomas," *Recueil Lucien Cerfaux: Etudes d'exégèse et d'histoire religieuse: Tome III* (2d ed.; BETL 71; Louvain: Leuven University/Peeters, 1985) 61-80, esp. pp. 65-66; C. Tuckett, "Thomas and the Synoptics," *NovT* 30 (1988) 132-157, esp. pp. 148-153.

[57] C. Tuckett, "Thomas and the Synoptics," pp. 152-153.

[58] K. King, "Kingdom in the Gospel of Thomas," *Forum* 3/1 (1987) 48-97, esp. p. 82.

[59] Compare Matt 5:20; 7:21; 18:3; 19:23, 24; 23:13.

[60] C. Tuckett, "Thomas and the Synoptics," 153 n. 81.

[61] We find the form in *Gos. Thom.* 6, 12, 18, 20, 22b, 24, 37, 43, 51, 52, 53, 113. See K. King, "Kingdom," 64; J. Jeremias, *Parables*, 98.

[62] J. A. Fitzmyer, *Luke*, 2. 1015-1016; J. Jeremias, *Parables*, 66-89.

In the Q version that lies behind Matthew and Luke the leaven permeates the whole three measures of dough. Thomas' version does not mention the three measures, emphasizing rather the contrast between the small amount of leaven and the large loaves. Furthermore, Thomas compares the kingdom to a woman, not to the leaven as Q does. Neither of these differences need indicate that Thomas had access to a version of the parable that was independent of the synoptics. Both differences could stem from the redactor of Thomas. The contrast between something small and something large occurs elsewhere in Thomas (*Gos. Thom.* 8, 20, 107), and Thomas compares the kingdom to a woman to bring the Leaven into line with the following parable of the Empty Jar (*Gos. Thom.* 97). Two details of Thomas' version reflect Matthew's gospel. The parable begins with a statement in Thomas, "The kingdom of the Father is like [a] woman." We have seen that the original Q parable began with a question as in Luke, but Matthew eliminated the question to begin the parable with a statement. Second, Thomas ends the parable with the sentence, "Whoever has ears, let [him] hear." Variations of this sentence occur seven times in the synoptic gospels.[63] Mark and Luke always have the infinitive ἀκούειν in the dependent clause, but Matthew never uses the infinitive. Thomas uses the sentence often, especially at the end of a parable.[64] Thomas has both the Matthean form of the sentence without the infinitive (*Gos. Thom.* 24, 63, 65, 96) and the form with the infinitive that Mark and Luke use (*Gos. Thom.* 8, 21). Here at the end of the Leaven we find Matthew's form. Since Matthew uses the sentence twice in his Parable Discourse (Matt 13:9, 43), Thomas probably took both the sentence and the parable of the Leaven from Matthew. So like *Gos. Thom.* 20, *Gos. Thom.* 96 reflects the redactional work of the synoptic writers and is secondary to them.

We can now answer the question whether the parables were originally united or originally independent. We find the parables joined in Q, the earliest form of the text. Mark and Thomas secondarily separated them. Mark could find no room for the Leaven in his parable chapter which contains only seed parables. To a certain extent Thomas already found the parables separated. We have seen that Thomas' main source for the Mustard Seed was Mark, so it was natural for Thomas to take over the Mustard Seed without the Leaven. Thomas incorporated the Leaven into a new cluster (*Gos. Thom.* 96, 97, 98), so the separation also flows from Thomas' redaction of the parables.

We can now sketch the tradition history of the parables. Q preserves the original form of the parable pair. This is Phase 1. There is no evidence that the parables ever existed independently of one another. On the contrary, the formal correspondence shows that they constitute an original pair. In Phase 2 Mark took over the Mustard Seed and radically reworked it. He replaced the Leaven with another seed parable—the Seed Growing Secretly. Matthew and Luke form Phase 3. Luke took over the parables from Q practically unchanged and incorporated them into his Travel Narrative. Matthew worked the parables into his Parable Discourse, conflating the Q Mustard Seed with Mark's version. In Phase 4 the *Gospel of Thomas* took over the parables from Mark and Matthew and reworked them.

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[63] Matt 11:15; 13:9, 43; Mark 4:9, 23; Luke 8:8; 14:35. See J. D. Hawkins, *Horae Synopticae*, 106-107.

[64] *Gos. Thom.* 8, 21, 24, 63, 65, 96. Except in *Gos. Thom.* 24 it always falls at the end of a parable. See R. Cameron, "Parable and Interpretation in the Gospel of Thomas," *Forum* 2/2 (1986) 3-39, esp. p. 14.

C. The Parables in Q

The Mustard Seed and the Leaven form a parable pair in Q. Bultmann and Jeremias maintain that the two parables in a parable pair express the same idea in different symbols, but this can be misleading, for it implies that the second parable merely repeats the first.[65] If this were true, the second parable would be redundant. Moreover, parables present images, not ideas, and we must be open to the possibility that each member of the parable pair carries its own nuance, that both may be necessary to present a complex reality.

The interpreter of Q's Mustard Seed needs to account for three emphases in the parable—the contrast between the seed and the tree, the growth of the seed, and the final state of the tree which provides shelter for the birds.

First, the parable contrasts the tiny mustard seed with the tree large enough for birds to build their nests in. C. H. Dodd minimizes this contrast, pointing out that the Q parable does not emphasize the size of the seed like Mark's version. Dodd sees the point of the parable in the end stage only—the birds flock into the kingdom. According to Dodd "the time has come when the blessings of the Reign of God are available for all . . ."[66] Dodd's explanation, though, ignores important elements in the parable. If only the end stage were important, then we cannot explain why the parable introduces the mustard seed, for the OT image of the tree by itself would suffice to make the point. And although Q does not emphasize the tiny size of the seed as explicitly as Mark does, Q implies as much with the statement that the seed "grew and became a tree" (Q 13:19c).

Jeremias includes the Mustard Seed in the group of contrast parables. The mustard seed was proverbially small, and the tiny beginning stage of the kingdom, symbolized by the mustard seed, contrasts with the magnificent end stage, symbolized by the tree.[67] The mustard seed resurfaces in the Q Faith Saying (Q 17:6) where it also symbolizes an apparently insignificant reality which nonetheless produces powerful effects. The same contrast lies at the heart of the parable.

Besides emphasizing the contrast between the seed and the tree, the parable also focuses on the growth of the seed with the clause, "and it grew and became a tree" (Q 13:19c). N. Dahl points out that the growth is not an evolutionary process as if the kingdom unfolded on its own. At every step it is God who brings the kingdom to reality, but it is a reality that is only gradually realized in history.[68] So the parable does more than just contrast the beginning and the end stages, it also draws attention to the period between the beginning and the end when the kingdom grows.

Although Dodd erred in eliminating other emphases of the parable, he correctly stressed the final image of the sheltering tree. According to the principle of end stress (*Achtergewicht*), the end of a parable contains important clues to its meaning.[69] The end of the Mustard Seed develops the OT symbol of the tree that stands for the world empire. In Ezekiel and in Daniel the tree symbolizes a universal kingdom,

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[65] R. Bultmann, *History*, 194; J. Jeremias, *Parables*, 90-92.

[66] C. H. Dodd, *The Parables of the Kingdom* (rev. ed.; New York: Scribners, 1961) 153.

[67] J. Jeremias, *Parables*, 146-149. On the proverbial size of the seed see C.-H. Hunziger, "σίναπι," *TDNT* 7 (1971) 287-291.

[68] N. Dahl, "The Parables of Growth," *ST* 5 (1951) 132-166, esp. p. 145.

[69] R. Bultmann, *History*, 191.

both the secular kingdoms of the great world empires, but also God's universal kingdom that will replace them.[70]

Opinions diverge sharply, though, on the exact scripture reference. After referring to the usual passages, Crossan comments, "If one makes the mistake of actually looking up these references, one immediately senses a problem: the allusion is not very explicit and not very appropriate."[71] Because no one passage seems to fit, Sherman E. Johnson speaks of mixed exegetical traditions.[72] Fitzmyer, sensing the same problem, sees a combination of Psa 104:12 and Dan 4:9, 18.[73] But Dupont has demonstrated that Dan 4:21 Theodotion is the closest passage.[74]

Dan 4:21 Theodotion	Q 13:19d
καὶ ἐν τοῖς κλάδοις αὐτοῦ κατεσκήνουν τὰ ὄρνεα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ . . .	καὶ τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κατεσκήνωσεν ἐν τοῖς κλάδοις αὐτοῦ.

We can easily account for the differences between Dan 4:21 Theodotion and Q. Theodotion's imperfect is more natural to describe the dwelling of the birds, but Q switches to the aorist to bring the quotation into line with the other aorists in the parable. Q changes the word order so that the prepositional phrase falls at the end of the clause like the other prepositional phrases in the parable, and Q substitutes the more common πετεινά for ὄρνεα. The former word appears much more frequently than the latter in the Greek OT, and it is attested elsewhere in Q.[75] So Q 13:19d is really a Q redaction of Dan 4:21 Theodotion. There is no reason to speak of mixed exegetical traditions.

The nesting birds may reflect the gentiles crowding into the kingdom. In the OT the tree symbolizes the world empire in whose branches the nations find shelter. Q is interested in the gentile mission, so the OT tree image fits smoothly into the world of Q.[76] However, the reference to the gentiles remains at best implicit; it is not a central focus of the parable.[77]

Two Q passages help us to see how the parable should be interpreted in the document as a whole. The mustard seed image recurs in the Faith Saying which is best preserved in Luke: "If you have faith like a mustard seed (ὡς κόκκον σινάπεως), you would say to this sycamore, 'Be uprooted and planted in the sea,' and it would obey you" (Luke 17:6). Here again the mustard seed symbolizes a small but powerful reality which can have extraordinary effects. The second passage occurs in the Demands of Discipleship (Q 9:57-60). Jesus says to a potential disciple, "The foxes

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[70] Ezek 17:22-24; 31:1-18; Dan 4:1-37.

[71] J. D. Crossan, *In Parables*, 47.

[72] S. E. Johnson, "The Biblical Quotations in Matthew," *HTR* 36 (1943) 135-153, esp. p. 148.

[73] J. A. Fitzmyer, *Luke*, 2. 1017.

[74] J. Dupont, "Le couple parabolique," 342-343.

[75] τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ occurs about 40 times in the Greek OT; τὰ ὄρνεα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ is found only in Gen 40:19; Bar 3:17; Dan 4:12, 21 (Theodotion). Q uses the first expression in Q 9:58 (compare Q 12:24).

[76] See Q 7:1-10; 11:31-32.

[77] See the cautions of Fitzmyer, *Luke*, 2. 1017.

have dens, the birds of the air nests (τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κατασκηνώσεις), but the Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head" (Q 9:58). The disciple must share the homelessness of the Son of Man, but the Q Mustard Seed shows that the shelter denied the disciple in this life will be restored in the eschatological kingdom.

Turning now to the Leaven, we need to explain three aspects of the parable—the symbolism of the leaven, the verb "hid," and the three measures of dough.

In the Bible leaven frequently symbolizes evil (Exod 12:15-20; 23:18; 34:25; Lev 2:11; 6:14-18; Matt 16:5-12; Mark 8:15; 1 Cor 5:6-8; Gal 5:9), but it can represent something good (Lev 7:13-14; 23:17).[78] The beginning of the parable equates the leaven with the kingdom, so it must represent something good. The rest of the parable unfolds the meaning of the symbolism.

The verb "hid" strikes the reader as a strange way to describe the action of the woman, but there is a Q passage that sheds light on the word choice. In the Praise of the Father Jesus says, "I praise you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and intelligent and have revealed them to small children" (Q 10:21). For Q the kingdom is a hidden reality. It comes only through a revelation from the Father (The Praise of the Father), and its work in the world remains hidden (The Leaven).

Jeremias considers the three measures as an unusually large quantity of dough, and he sees the point of the parable in the contrast between the small amount of leaven and the large quantity of dough.[79] But the three measures are quite possibly just a conventional amount (compare Gen 18:6).[80] In any case the emphasis of the parable falls elsewhere. Again using the principle of end stress, we note the weight that falls on the strongly emphasized final word—ὅλον. The point of the parable is not the contrast between the small amount of leaven and the large amount of dough. In this case the Leaven would simply repeat an emphasis of the Mustard Seed. Instead the Leaven insists that the kingdom, though hidden, is powerfully at work permeating the whole dough.

We noted above the formal correspondence between the Mustard Seed and the Leaven. Besides corresponding in form, the parables also correspond somewhat in thought. The hidden work of the leaven corresponds to the tiny size of the seed. The time required for the leaven to work corresponds to the growth of the tree. The totally leavened dough corresponds to the fully grown tree. But the Leaven does not repeat the Mustard Seed; it adds two elements to the description of the kingdom—the kingdom is now hidden, but it will completely penetrate the world.

When we read the Mustard Seed and the Leaven in their Q context, the following picture emerges. At present the kingdom is a tiny, hidden reality. Jesus and his followers are poor, homeless, and persecuted. Nonetheless, in them the kingdom is already powerfully at work transforming everything. In its final eschatological stage the kingdom will magnificently shelter those who up until then have been homeless.

The Mustard Seed and the Leaven help us to see the full scope of Q's eschatology. There can be no doubt that Q reckoned with the delay of the parousia. The Householder and the Servant Left in Charge (Q 12:39-40, 42b-46) furnish the

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[78] R. H. Gundry, *Matthew: A Commentary on his Literary and Theological Art* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982) 268.

[79] J. Jeremias, *Parables*, 146-149.

[80] J. A. Fitzmyer, *Luke* 2. 1019.

clearest text. The unfaithful servant says in his heart, "My lord is delayed" (Q 12:45). But it is not enough to note that the parousia has been delayed. The delay presents a theological problem and it requires an explanation. Q assigns a reason for the delay both on the individual level and on the cosmic level. The Servant Left in Charge (Q 12:42b-46) and the Pounds (Q 19:12-27) give a reason for the delay on the individual level. The delay provides an opportunity for the individual to show fidelity to the absent Lord. The Mustard Seed and the Leaven assign a reason for the delay on the cosmic level. The delay allows the tiny, hidden kingdom to grow and permeate the whole world.

D. The Parables in the Synoptic Gospels

The Mustard Seed and the Leaven celebrate the ultimate triumph of the kingdom After a period of lowliness and hiddenness the kingdom will emerge in its full splendor. Each of the three synoptic writers highlights this basic thrust of the parables. As we have seen Mark edits the Mustard Seed with great care. He eliminates the exaggerated tree image, but he compensates by contrasting the tiny seed and the large shrub that grows from it. He also conforms the parable to the Seed Growing Secretly. These two parables stress God's power in bringing in the kingdom without any human help. The seed grows even while the farmer sleeps in the Seed Growing Secretly, and the human agent drops completely out of Mark's Mustard Seed. These two parables bring Mark's Parable Discourse to a close, and as Lambrecht points out, "With the concluding parables assurance and promise concerning the Kingdom of God comes to the fore."[81]

Two concerns drive Matthew's redaction of the Mustard Seed and the Leaven. First, he wants to fit the parables smoothly into his Parable Discourse, relating them especially to the Weeds among the Wheat; and, second, he wants to conflate Mark's Mustard Seed and the Q version because both contain important motifs. To fit the parables into the Parable Discourse Matthew joins a fulfilment quotation (13:34-35) to them and places the unit between the Weeds among the Wheat (13:24-30) and its interpretation (13:36-43). The scripture quotation characterizes parabolic speech as the revelation of things that were hidden. It looks back to the verb "hid" in the Leaven and forward to the revelation contained in the explanation of the Weeds among the Wheat. Matthew rewrites the beginning of the parables to conform them to the stereotyped introductions he uses for all the parables in the Parable Discourse except the first one, and he incorporates the phrase ἐν τῷ ἀγρῷ αὐτοῦ into the Mustard Seed to provide a further link to the Weeds among the Wheat. The Mustard Seed and the Leaven in a sense form a foil to the Weeds among the Wheat. In the Weeds among the Wheat Matthew shows that the community before the end time contains both good and evil in a mixed body. The Mustard Seed and the Leaven with their promise that the kingdom will eventually unfold in its true magnificence balance the picture presented in the Weeds among the Wheat. Matthew is also anxious to combine Mark's version of the Mustard Seed with the Q version. Mark eliminated the exaggerated description of the mustard plant as a tree. To compensate Mark worked out the contrast between the seed and the shrub more explicitly than Q. Matthew wants t incorporate the explicit contrast into his version of the parable, but the Q image of the tree also appeals to him so he conflates the two versions of the parable that lay before him.

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[81] J. Lambrecht, "Redaction and Theology," 306.

Luke takes over the two parables from Q practically unchanged and fits them into the Travel Narrative where he joins them to the Healing of the Crippled Woman (13:10-17). The sabbath healing sparked a sharp exchange between Jesus and his opponents in which Jesus clearly prevailed much to the delight of the crowd. Luke places the two parables here to underscore Jesus' victory. They highlight the inevitable success of the kingdom as it is breaking in in Jesus' ministry.

Thus each of the synoptic writers found a way to work the message of the Q parables into his gospel. We turn now to the *Gospel of Thomas.*

E. The Parables in Thomas

In discussing the tradition history of the parables we saw that Thomas' Mustard Seed depends primarily on Mark's version of the parable. The editor of Thomas, though, does not take over the parable unchanged. He casts it into the aphoristic dialogue form, and he sets a new accent.[82]

Three emphases dominate Thomas' version of the parable, two of which the editor takes over from Mark. First, Thomas emphasizes the contrast between the small seed and the large branch. This contrast comes from Mark, but it fits smoothly in the *Gospel of Thomas* where the contrast "small/large" plays a role in several sayings (*Gos. Thom.* 8, 96, 107).[83] The contrast has the same meaning in Thomas as in Mark—the kingdom, though apparently insignificant, nevertheless produces powerful results. Second, Thomas highlights the role of the mustard in providing shelter for the birds. Again Thomas takes over this feature from Mark. The shelter motif symbolizes the beneficial effects of the kingdom. Third, Thomas adds a new emphasis on the need for preparation if the kingdom is to have its effect. The clause "but when it falls on the earth which has been cultivated . . ." echoes two other passages in the *Gospel of Thomas.* After noting the failure of much of the seed, the parable of the Sower adds "and others fell on the good earth . . ." (*Gos. Thom.* 9), and the parable of the Wicked Tenants states, "He gave it to tenants that they might cultivate it . . ." (*Gos. Thom.* 65). The note that the earth has been cultivated slightly allegorizes the parable and draws attention to the disposition that makes it possible for the kingdom to take root. Thomas found this allegorical feature in the parable of the Sower with its treatment of the different kinds of soil. The editor transferred it to the Mustard Seed to forestall a misunderstanding—the kingdom does not come automatically but depends on the right kind of disposition in the hearer. The kingdom does not bring a guarantee, but an obligation.[84] When we combine these three emphases, the following picture emerges. The kingdom appears insignificant, but when it finds the right environment, it produces spectacular results and becomes a refuge for those who are prepared for it.

Thomas' Leaven differs from the synoptic version in significant ways. Thomas refers to the kingdom as "the kingdom of the Father" and compares the kingdom not to the leaven but to a woman. The latter change may strike the reader as strange given the negative view of women expressed in the final logion (*Gos. Thom.* 114).

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[82] On the aphoristic dialogue form see note 61 above.

[83] R. Cameron, "Parable and Interpretation," 26.

[84] J.-E Ménard, *L'Evangile selon Thomas* (NHS 5; Leiden: Brill, 1975) 109-110.

However, the Leaven opens a series of three parables—the Leaven, the Empty Jar, and the Assassin— which all begin in the same way.[85]

"The kingdom of the Father is like [a] woman" (*Gos. Thom.* 96)
"The kingdom of the [Father] is like a woman" (*Gos. Thom.* 97)
"The kingdom of the Father is like a man" (*Gos. Thom.* 98)

Similar parable introductions occur elsewhere in the gospel (*Gos. Thom.* 57, 76, 107, 109), so it is likely that the editor of Thomas changed the beginning of the parable to conform it to the following two parables. The agent in these parables shifts from woman to man depending on the subject matter. The leaven and the meal of the first two demand a woman agent; the sword of the third requires a man. Since a woman already appeared in the synoptic parable, the editor could easily bring the Leaven into line with the following two parables. Thomas also wants to emphasize the role of the human agent.[86] The synoptic parable centers on the hidden power of the leaven itself, but Thomas highlights rather the woman's ability to use the leaven. The other two parables in the cluster confirm this interpretation. The third parable, the Assassin, emphasizes the ability of the man to use the sword, and the second parable, the Empty Jar, contrasts with the first and third by showing someone who is unsuccessful. Thomas' Leaven further stresses the woman's ability with the contrast between the small leaven and the large loaves. The woman uses only a little leaven to produce large loaves. Thomas takes over the contrast from the Mustard Seed, and to make room for it he has to drop Q's "three measures." In the Mustard Seed Thomas emphasizes the importance of human effort with the description that the earth "has been cultivated." The Leaven similarly highlights human skill with its picture of the woman using only a little leaven to make large loaves. At the end the editor adds the tag, "Whoever has ears, let him hear," to encourage the reader to probe the meaning of the parable.

F. Conclusion

When we look back over the Mustard Seed and the Leaven, we almost see the whole synoptic problem in a microcosm. Many of the questions we associate with the Two-Source Theory and the Q hypothesis intersect in these texts. What did Q originally look like? How did Q join one pericope to another? What is the theology of Q? How did Matthew and Luke incorporate Q into their gospels? How is Mark related to Q? Does Thomas provide an independent source of the Jesus tradition? The content of the parables provides the main reason so many of these questions surface here. Q welded the images of the mustard seed, the tree, and the leaven into a powerful statement on the nature of the kingdom and indelibly stamped the images on the tradition. The tradition returned to them over and over again, leaving us an unusually full record. And the parables continue to fascinate us.

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[85] On the cluster see B. B. Scott, "The Empty Jar," *Forum* 3/2 (1987) 77-80; R. Doran, "A Complex of Parables: GTh 96-98," *NovT* 29 (1987) 347-352.

[86] The Mustard Seed is the only parable in Thomas that does not have a human subject. See R. Cameron, "Parable and Interpretation," 30.

Luke 9:57-62: A Systematic Adaptation of the Divine Challenge to Elijah (1 Kings 19)

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As already indicated elsewhere,[1] the account of Jesus' departure for Jerusalem (Luke 9:51-56) consists largely, though not exclusively, of an adaptation of the account which describes the events surrounding Elijah's departure for the Jordan (2 Kgs 1:1-2:6). In both cases the departure is shadowed in diverse ways by death, but in both cases this grim reality is alleviated by the prospect of being taken up into heaven. The relatively long text from 2 Kings has not only been distilled into an account that is much shorter but has also been so adapted that it fits smoothly into the requirements of Luke's own narrative.

The purpose of this paper is to indicate that a similar procedure has been employed in the writing of Luke's next text, the account of Jesus' challenge to would-be followers (9:57-62)—a passage which occurs in shorter form in Matt 8:18-22, and which is generally attributed to Q.

In itself this attribution is plausible, and it will be necessary to return to it. But it is better for the moment to concentrate on developing the alternative proposal: that just as Luke distilled and adapted 2 Kgs 1:1-2:6 to form 9:51-56, so also he distilled and adapted 1 Kings 19 to form 9:57-62. In the first case he reduced twenty-four verses to six, and in the second, twenty-one to six.

One of the first questions that arises is why, if Luke did this, he should combine the distillation of 1 Kings 19 with that of 2 Kgs 1:1-2:6; these texts, after all, are separated from one another by three chapters. On closer inspection the answer quickly emerges: the two are inherently connected. The theme of impending death and departure, so strong in 2 Kgs 1:1-2:6, had first been dealt with in another form in 1 Kings 19.[2]

A somewhat similar procedure is found in the composition of Luke 7. Apparently because of the inherent connection between the various women-related stories in 1 Kings 17 and 2 Kgs 4:1-37, Luke has brought them together and has used them,

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[1] T. L. Brodie, "The Departure for Jerusalem (Luke 9:51-56) as a Rhetorical *Imitatio* of Elijah's Departure for the Jordan (2 Kgs 1:1-2:6)," *Bib* 70 (1989) fasc. 1 or 2.

[2] The threat of death in 2 Kings 1 refers first of all to Ahaziah, but his impending death is so described that from several points of view it forms a foil for the impending assumption of Elijah and for the emergence of Elisha (2 Kgs 2:1-18); see Brodie, "The Departure for Jerusalem." Thus the ideas of impending death and of replacement by Elisha, first broached in 1 Kings 19, are taken up again in 2 Kgs 1:1-2:18. It is within this context that Luke combines 1 Kings 19 and 1 Kgs 1:1-2:6.

in adapted form, as major components in the writing of chap. 7.[3]

The word "components" needs emphasis. 1 Kings 19 alone does not account for all the elements of Luke 9:57-62; it makes no mention, for instance, of foxes and birds, as does Luke 9:58; it is but one of a number of components. But it is a component that is central, foundational: and, even without tracing the origin of the other components, it is sufficient to provide an understanding of the essential nature of the Lukan passage. Against this background it is now appropriate to look more directly at the texts in question.[4]

1 Kings 19 and Luke 9:57-62: Introductory Analysis

Within the context of the Elijah-Elisha narrative,[5] 1 Kings 19 is unusual. The prophet Elijah, instead of proceeding, as he usually does, with decisiveness and power, begins instead to waver. Suddenly, and to some degree inexplicably, he feels profoundly vulnerable. The threat of death, which previously he would have countered with the word of the living God, now assumes frightening proportions and begins to overpower him. The text consists of three sections:

1. *The desert journey (vv 1-8)*

Under threat of death, Elijah journeys into the wilderness and lies down. But he is not allowed to stay where he is. An angel awakens him—first to the fact that there is food at his head, and later, in a repetitive scene, to the fact that the food is not for lying down but for journeying. And the journey is through the wilderness to the mountain of God.

2. *The death-centered Elijah is commissioned by the living God to go anoint kings and a prophet (vv 9-18)*

At the mountain, Elijah is not much more outgoing than he had been in the wilderness. Twice he goes in or near a cave (*spēlaion*), and the basic reason, despite all his high-flown rhetoric about jealous zeal for the God of Hosts, is that he is afraid of being killed (vv 9-10, 13-14). But again, as in the wilderness, there is a twofold repetitious pattern which awakens Elijah, as it were, first to the reality of the living God (vv 11-12, a theophany) and then to the need to go forth and anoint kings and a prophet so that they will bring that living reality to others (vv 15-18).

3. *The call of the vigorous ploughman (vv 19-21)*

The sense of life which had first been indicated by the food-ministering angel and then by the living God now finds powerful expression in human life—in the image

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[3] See T. L. Brodie, "Towards Unravelling Luke's Use of the Old Testament: Luke 7.11-17 as an *Imitatio* of 1 Kings 17.17-24," *NTS* 32 (1986) 247-267; idem, "Luke 7,36-50 as an internalization of 2 Kings 4,1-37: A Study in Luke's Use of Rhetorical Imitation," *Bib* 64 (1983) 457-485.

[4] For 1 Kings 19, the present article relies on the LXX (Cambridge edition), and for Luke, the *UBSGNT*, 3d ed.

[5] The death of Elisha is not recorded until 2 Kings 13, but the Elijah-Elisha narrative proper may be said to consist of 1 Kings 17:1-2 Kgs 8:15; see R. Nelson, *First and Second Kings* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1987) 107-195.

of Elisha the ploughman. In contrast to the preceding images of the desert and the cave, the picture of a ploughman is one which, of its nature, suggests energy and hope. Details accentuate this impression: there is not just one yoke of oxen but twelve; Elisha is "in" or "with" the oxen—a detail that associates their energy with him; and at the touch of Elijah's cloak Elisha "ran" after him (vv 19-20a).

Here also there is twofold repetition. Elisha's initial act of responding positively (vv 19-20a) is followed immediately by a further scene in which that response is intensified (vv 20b-21): having declared "I will follow you," he says good-bye to his father[6] and burns his oxen and plough—an action which, among other things, is like burning his boats. But the repetition in this third section is unlike that of the preceding sections. In these, particularly in the response of Elijah as he is in and near the cave, the repetition is word-for-word—a reflection of Elijah's death-centered paralysis (vv 9-10, 13-14). But in the third section, the two-scene portrayal of Elisha's response avoids any such mechanical repetition. Instead, in accord with the vigor of the whole passage, the action and repetition in these two brief scenes moves swiftly and with a certain unpredictability.

As a whole, therefore, 1 Kings 19 is a carefully wrought unit.[7] Against a background of desert and death, its three twopart passages build increasingly an awareness of the living God and of the need to bring word of that God to others.

The Lukan passage also consists largely of three twopart texts. As Jesus is on his journey he challenges three would-be followers, and each challenge is built on an exchange which is essentially twopart.

Aside from this similarity of underlying structure, there is the similarity of substance. As implied by 9:51, the journey of Jesus is a journey towards his death. And thus in Luke 9:57-62, as in 1 Kings 19, there is a tension between, on the one hand, limiting factors, especially death, and on the other, the awareness of God and of the need to spread God's word.

This does not mean that Jesus is weary and frightened in the way Elijah was. On the contrary, his implicit defiance of death and his call to announce God's kingdom means that, as well as taking over positive aspects of the role of Elijah—those aspects subject to God's word—he also takes over the role of God's own self. It is the more negative aspects of Elijah's role—those dictated by human fear and limitation—which are taken over by the would-be followers.

Thus the tension between the divine word and human limitation—a tension which in 1 Kings 19 is played out in a drama of considerable complexity and subtlety—is presented in Luke in a form which is clear and vivid.

In thus transforming the OT text Luke not only continues the process which he had already used in composing 9:51-56. He also follows some of the basic procedures and goals of hellenistic rhetoric, particularly the widespread practice of simultaneously imitating (Gk., *mimēsis;* Lat., *imitatio*) and surpassing (Gk., *zēlos;*

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[6] The LXX does not refer to Elisha's mother.

[7] The unity of 1 Kings 19 has sometimes been contested. For instance, E. V. Nordheim, "Ein Prophet kündigt sein Amt auf (Elia am Horeb)," *Bib* 59 (1978) 153-173, esp. 171, sees the central section as quite distinct from the rest of the chapter. But others perceive the whole chapter as a unit; cf. R. A. Carlson, "Élie à l'Horeb," *VT* 19 (1969) 418-439; B. S. Childs, "On Reading the Elijah Narratives," *Int* 34 (1980) 128-137, esp. 134-136.

Lat., *emulatio*) existing texts.[8] Nor is this transforming practice alien to the transforming spirit of ancient Jewish writers.[9] Furthermore, in doing this Luke achieves one of his most basic aims—to show that in Jesus the prophetic scriptures are fulfilled.[10]

1 Kings 19 and Luke 9:57-62: Detailed Analysis

An initial idea of the relationship between the texts is provided by the simplified outline which is given in the following pages.

As the outline shows, Luke generally follows the order of the OT episodes. However he makes some minor rearrangements. The declaration "I will follow you" which in 1 Kings 19 occurs climactically at the end (v 20), is found in Luke in various forms from the beginning: "I will follow you wherever you go" (v 57); "follow me" (v 59); "I will follow you, Lord" (v 61). A somewhat similar procedure is found in the way Luke 9:51-56 reworks 2 Kgs 1:1-2:6: the image of assumption is taken from near the end of the OT text (cf. 2 Kgs 2:1) and placed at the beginning of the NT passage (cf. Luke 9:51); thus it achieves a certain dominance over the subsequent text. In the case of "I will follow you" and its variations, the phrase not only has a certain dominance over the NT text; it also establishes a rhythm of repetition which holds the text together, which moves it along, and which reflects something of the repetitive aspect of the OT passage.

There are some other details which Luke has rearranged—for instance the use of "my father(s)" (cf. 1 Kgs 19:4,20; Luke 9:59)—but by and large the three NT exchanges correspond, in order, to the OT episodes. This correspondence may now be seen more closely.

1. *The homeless journey (1 Kgs 19:1-8; Luke 9:57-58)*

Threatened by Jezebel, the fearful Elijah journeys alone into the desert but when he lies under a tree to die, mysterious food is placed at his head and he is told to keep journeying to the mountain of God. In the NT, Jesus tells a would-be follower that, unlike the foxes and birds, the Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head.

Luke has made several adaptations. The circumstantial details of the past—concerning Jezebel—have been omitted. He has preserved the central idea of a

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[8] On Greco-Roman imitation, see T. M. Greene, *The Light in Troy. Imitation and Discovery in Renaissance Poetry* (New Haven/London: Yale University, 1982) 54-80; T. L. Brodie, "Greco-Roman Imitation of Texts as a Partial Guide to Luke's Use of Sources," *Luke-Acts. New Perspectives from the Society of Biblical Literature* (ed. C. H. Talbert; New York: Crossroad, 1984) 17-46.

[9] On Jewish transformation of texts, see esp. M. Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985) 318-440, 465-505; W. Roth, *Hebrew Gospel. Cracking the Code of Mark* (Oak Park, IL: Meyer Stone, 1988) 101-118; D. J. Harrington and M. P. Horgan, "Palestinian Adaptations of Biblical Narratives and Prophecies," *Early Judaism and its Modern Interpreters* (eds. R. A. Kraft and G. W. E. Nickelsburg; Philadelphia: Fortress and Atlanta: Scholars, 1986) 239-258. Note also G. H. Hartman and S. Budick, eds., *Midrash and Literature,* New Haven/London: Yale University, 1986.

[10] Cf. Luke 24:25-27,32,46; C. H. Talbert, "Promise and Fulfillment in Lucan Theology," *Luke-Acts* (ed. Talbert) 91-103.

journey which allows no permanent resting place. The idea of lying down and finding, at one's head, food which means that one must keep going, has been abbreviated into the imagery of having nowhere to lay one's head. And in describing the absence of a resting place, the rather subtle allusion to not having the tree any more—it is implied that Elijah has to leave it—has been replaced apparently by the clear and vivid imagery of not having a den or a nest. Furthermore, certain elements have been added—not just the image of the foxes and birds, but also the reference to the Son of Man.

Thus in various ways the OT text has been abbreviated, modernized, clarified and christianized. Yet, as the chart of linguistic similarities indicates, it still manages to fuse certain words and phrases from 1 Kings 19 and thus it retains some detailed echoes of the older passage. Examples of fusion, some of them quite complex, may also be found elsewhere in Luke's use of the OT.[11]

2. *From preoccupation with death to being met by the Lord and sent forth (1 Kgs 19:10-18; Luke 9:59-60)*

When Elijah is in the cave, preoccupied by destruction and death, God calls him out and speaks to him powerfully yet gently (vv 9-12). And then, in order to inaugurate a radical God-centered change, Elijah is sent forth to anoint two kings and a prophet (vv 13-18). In Luke the man who is preoccupied with burying his father is first spoken to by Jesus, simply yet powerfully ("Follow me"), and then he is told to go and announce the kingdom of God.

Again Luke's text involves several adaptations. The complex scene of preoccupation with a widespread destruction which leads to death is synthesized into the single striking image of being preoccupied with burying one's father.

The phrase "my father" is itself adapted from 1 Kings 19. First there is an allusion to *the death of one's fathers* ("Take my life . . . I am no better than my fathers . . . ," 19:4), and later *the leavetaking of one's father* ("Elisha left . . . and said 'I will kiss my father and follow . . . ,'" 19:20). Luke fuses these into the idea of *leaving one's dead father* ("'. . . bury my father'. . . 'Let the dead . . .'" 9:60).

The call and the elaborate theophany have been distilled into the simple strong invitation "Follow me." To some degree the OT text itself undermines or purifies the emphasis on spectacular theophanies; it places its emphasis on a gentle sound. Thus Luke's adaptation completes that anti-spectacle tendency.

And the elaborate picture of going forth to anoint the kings and the prophet of a radical new God-centered order is again distilled and purified into the command to go announce the kingdom of God. To a significant extent, this process of purification is a form of christianization.

Thus once again Luke uses the processes of abbreviation, modernization, clarification and christianization. And once again, both in reworking the OT references to "my father(s)" and in echoing other linguistic details, there is a process of fusion.

At the same time Luke is shaping the materials to the requirements of his own narrative. Thus the second exchange is composed in such a way that it maintains and develops the basic elements of the first exchange—the element of rhythm, and the underlying theme of letting go of an undue attachment to home and to the security which home seems to offer. The third exchange will follow suit.

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[11] For instance, in his reworking of 2 Kgs 4:1-37; cf. Brodie, "Luke 7:36-50 as an internalization," 469, 477.

1 Kings 19 and Luke 9:57-62

A simplified outine

1 Kings 19	Luke 9:57-62
The desert journey (vv 1-8). Under threat of death Elijah lies down, but the food at his head means he must keep journeying.	*The homeless journey* (57-58). Journeying to his death Jesus says that the Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head.
From death to anointing God's kings and prophet (9-18). Preoccupied by death Elijah is first met by God, and then told to go anoint God's kings and prophet.	*From burial to announcing God's kingdom* (59-60). Jesus first meets someone who is preoccupied by burial. Then Jesus tells him to go announce the kingdom of God.
Burning the plough (19-21) Reflecting his decidedness, Elisha says good-bye, and burns his plough.	*Resolute ploughing* (61-62) To someone preoccupied with good-bye, Jesus speaks of ploughing & not looking back.

1 Kings 19 and Luke 9:57-62: Aspects of Linguistic Continuity and Fusion

The journey (1 Kgs 19:1-8; Luke 9:57-58)

OT	v 4	καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπορεύθη ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ ὁδὸν ἡμέρας . . .
	v 5	καὶ ἰδού τις ἥψατο αὐτοῦ καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῇ . . .
	v 6	καὶ ἰδοὺ πρὸς κεφαλῆς . . .
	v 20	ἀκολουθήσω ὀπίσω σου . . .
NT	v 57	καὶ πορευομένων αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ εἶπέν τις πρὸς αὐτόν, Ἀκολουθήσω σοι ὅπου . . .
	v 58	ποῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν . . .

Leaving death and working for the living God (19:9-18; 9:59-60)

OT	v 9	καὶ ἰδοὺ ῥῆμα Κυρίου πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ εἶπεν Τί σὺ . . .
	v 13	καὶ ἰδοὺ πρὸς αὐτὸν φωνὴ καὶ εἶπεν Τί σὺ
	vv 15-16	ἀνάστρεφε . . . χρίσεις . . . εἰς βασιλέα . . . εἰς βασιλέα . . .
	v 19	καὶ ἀπῆλθεν . . .
NT	v 59	Εἶπεν δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον . . .
	v 60	σὺ δὺ ἀπελθὼν διάγγελλε τὴν βασιλείαν . . .

The plough (19:19-21; 9:61-62)

OT	vv 19-21	αὐτὸς ἠροτρία . . . ἐπέρριψε τὴν μηλωτὴν αὐτοῦ ἐπ' αὐτόν . . . ὀπίσω . . .ὀπίσω . . . ὀπίσω . . .
NT	v 62	ἐπιβαλὼν τὴν χεῖρα ἐπ' ἄροτρον καὶ βλέπων εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω . . .

3. *The resolute ploughman (1 Kgs 19:19-21; Luke 9:61-62)*

At one level the demand of Elijah seems to be surpassed by that of Jesus. Elijah allows the ploughman to say good-bye; Jesus does not. Yet Elisha, even in saying good-bye, had been extremely resolute. What Luke has done is take the resoluteness which is implicit in the OT text and—as with other OT passages—turn it into a form which is clear and vivid.

Here too Luke has employed essentially the same procedures that he had used in reworking the preceding sections. The new text is brief and graphic. The image of the plough is retained, but in a context which is less tied to ancient agriculture. And the explicit emphasis on "the kingdom of God" is essentially christian. Finally, the process of fusion, which to some degree is present in the other sections, seems at this point to be brought to a new level of complexity and sophistication: as the chart of linguistic similarities suggests, the images of Elisha *ploughing* and Elijah *throwing the cloak over him* have been combined into the single image of *putting* (*or throwing, epiballō*) *one's hand to the plough*. And in a touch of word-play and further fusion, the resoluteness of Elisha in following *after* Elijah (*opisō . . . opisō . . . opisō*) has been turned around to refer to a resoluteness which does not look *backwards* (*eis ta opisō*).

Assessing the Evidence

The evidence consists of a mixture of elements, some strong, some weak. When assessing such a mixture it is important not to allow what is weak to distract from what is strong. Insistence on what is weak—whether by someone presenting the case or by someone opposing it—tends to obscure the central issue: is there evidence which is strong, sufficiently strong to conclude that Luke is dependent on the OT?

It would seem that there is, particularly in view of certain key factors:

(1) *The broad context of ancient literary practice.* As noted earlier, Jewish writers engaged in far-reaching processes of transforming texts. And hellenistic writers rewrote older works in a way which sought both to imitate and to surpass, and in a way which strove for clarity and vividness. The methods of Livy, for instance—he followed one basic source and rendered it into a form that was brief, clear and vivid[12]—provide a significant precedent for some aspects of Luke's work.

(2) *The immediate context* of Luke's relationship to the LXX, especially to the Elijah-Elisha narrative.

(3) *The wide range of the similarities*—structure, order, themes, images, linguistic details. So many similarities go far beyond the range of coincidence.

(4) *The coherence of the differences.* The differences are great but they are not a meaningless jumble, at odds with one another and with known literary practices. On the contrary, they follow well-established procedures for transforming and imitating texts and, in particular, they follow the processes—abbreviation, modernization, clarification, christianization and fusion—which Luke employs elsewhere in reworking the Elijah-Elisha narrative.

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[12] See P. G. Walsh, *Livy. His Historical Aims and Methods* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1961) 188.

A further factor might be added: Luke was a *littérateur*. Thus in the final analysis, the essential claim being made here is very simple—that a *littérateur* employed a literary method.

The Implications for Q

As a result of this investigation there are rival claimants—Q and 1 Kings 19—for the literary origin of Luke 9:57-62. The Q solution is both plausible and easy, but it has two major weaknesses: it is hypothetical and it is partial. It is hypothetical because the shape of Q is uncertain[13] and so one cannot be sure that Luke 9:57-62 really belongs to Q. And it is partial because the Matthean version (8:18-22) contains only two of the three exchanges, and so, even if dependence on Q be granted, the origin of the third exchange remains unexplained.

The other solution—dependence on 1 Kings 19—may not seem at all plausible or easy. On the contrary in many ways it appears far-fetched and difficult. Yet this far-fetched method of transforming a text is quite at home within the context of the many transforming processes—Jewish and hellenistic—of the ancient world. And despite the difficulty, it is possible, by taking the texts slowly, and by applying a mixture of sympathetic imagination and pedantic patience, to establish that the connection, instead of being hypothetical and partial, is reasonably certain and reasonably complete. It does not account for all the components, but the one component which it does supply, underlies the entire text.

However, while the invoking of 1 Kings 19 explains much of Luke 9:57-62, it creates considerable uncertainty with regard to Matt 8:18-22. Thus it would seem that the relationship of these two NT texts should be investigated. So it should, but not yet. In the present state of research such an investigation would end in an inconclusive discussion about the relationship between Matthew as a whole and Luke as a whole. Rather than attack that problem frontally it is better to work around it by trying, piece by piece, to establish the nature and origin of Luke. When that is done, or at least when a significant proportion of it is done, there will be a more productive context both for comparing the two gospels and for examining specific texts.

This slow process—of tracing Luke's dependence on the OT—has implications also for Q. Most obviously, it means that Q should not be regarded as having included Luke 9:57-62; such an attribution is simply not necessary. More significantly perhaps, it suggests that an unknown proportion of the material which belongs to Q or is attributed to Q may be directly traceable to the OT. Such literary dependence would provide Q studies with a valuable element of control, and in so doing should help significantly in the task of reconstructing Q.

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[13] For aspects of recent discussion on Q, see esp. A. D. Jacobson, "The History of the Composition of the Synoptic Sayings Source, Q," *SBLASP* 26 (ed. K. H. Richards; Atlanta: Scholars, 1987) 285-294; for bibliography, see D. M. Scholer, "Q Bibliography: 1981-1988," *SBLASP* 27 (ed. D. J. Lull; Atlanta: Scholars, 1988) 483-495.

Theology in 1 Corinthians: Initial Soundings

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Introduction

While this is not a general essay on Pauline theology, or even on 1 Corinthians, it is important to indicate at the outset how the term "theology" will be used in reference to Paul and how it is proposed to gain access to theology in 1 Corinthians.

1. Understanding "Pauline Theology"

Since the term θεολογία (literally, "an account of the gods [or God]") is never used by Paul, and in fact occurs nowhere in the New Testament or the Septuagint,[1] one should exercise some caution in speaking of Paul as a "theologian" or of his thought as "theology." The word was apparently introduced into Christian circles by the second century apologists, by whom it was used to mean, *inter alia*, "teaching about the gods," "teaching about divine things," or even more generally, "religious speech." The earliest extant reference to Paul as a "theologian" seems to come from the fourth century. Athanasius refers to what he has learned "from the theologians, among whom is Paul,"[2] and then quotes Rom 1:20 (*Against the Pagans* 35.18-20 [dated *ante* 337]; cf. 10.11ff.). Here the apostle is included among the theologians not because he offers some teaching about God, but because as one of the writers of scripture he is regarded as having been inspired by God (see *On the Incarnation* 56.6-10; cf. *Against the Pagans* 1.9-10). It was first of all among the twelfth century scholastics (e.g. Abelard, Peter Lombard) that "theology" came to be identified with comprehensive, systematic presentations of Christian doctrine.

While it is clear that Paul was not the architect of a "theology" in the scholastic sense, it is also clear that he did not just make assertions about God, Christ, humanity, etc., or recite the "story of salvation." In his letters we find him *reflecting* on and *arguing* for "the truth of the gospel" (Gal 2:5, 14), and *interpreting* its meaning—which is to say *conceptualizing* it in ways that he hopes will enable his readers to grasp its significance for their lives, corporately and individually.[3] Thus, although

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[1] See, e.g., Gerhard Ebeling, "Theologie. I. Begriffsgeschichtlich," in *RGG* 6 (3d ed., 1962) 754-69, and Frank Whaling, "The Development of the Word 'Theology,'" *SJT* 34 (1981) 289-312.

[2] παρὰ τῶν θεολόγων ἀνδρῶν ἔμαθον, ὧν εἷς ἐστιν ὁ Παῦλος . . . .

[3] J. Christiaan Beker rightly emphasizes the hermeneutical character of Paul's thought. See, e.g., *Paul the Apostle. The Triumph of God in Life and Thought* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980) 109-31; "The Method of Recasting Pauline Theology: The

his letters do not yield a theology, they do introduce us to Paul the theologian. That is, they introduce us to one for whom the beliefs and rites of the Christian tradition, and the social structures within which those beliefs and rites are continued, have become objects of critical inquiry and thought.[4] It is with this understanding of "theology"—as critical reflection on the meaning and truth of the gospel, that 1 Corinthians is being approached in this study. And it is for this reason that, departing from precedent, this essay is not entitled, "The Theology *of* 1 Corinthians,"[5] but rather "Theology *in* 1 Corinthians."

If Paul's theology is to be understood as suggested above, then it should be clearly distinguished—although by no means separated—from his proclamation of the gospel (his κήρυγμα).[6] The apostle's kerygmatic affirmations and appeals, whether traditional or of his own creation, are formulated as direct address and are invitations (either explicit or implicit) to receive and commit oneself to the gospel. In 1 Corinthians there are examples of such kerygmatic formulations in 1:30; 6:11b, 14 (cf. 15:15b); 6:19b-20a/7:23a; 11:12b; 12:27; and 15:3-5, 20, 22 (cf. 15:49). The apostle's theological statements, however, are formulated as teaching and constitute an explication of the meaning and truth of the gospel. Here "teaching" must be understood to include not only Paul's ethical instructions and counsels (e.g., chapters 5, 6, 7), but also what he has to say about such topics as wisdom (1:18-3:4), spiritual gifts (chapters 12-14), and the resurrection of the dead (chapter 15). All kerygmatic statements are implicitly theological, of course, because every summons to the gospel implies and requires some understanding of it. Similarly, in so far as Paul's theological statements lead to an understanding of the gospel, they serve as an indirect summons to it. Nevertheless, the distinction between kerygma and theology remains: Paul's kerygmatic affirmations and appeals constitute a summons to "believe in the gospel," while his theological statements seek to clarify what it means to do so.

2. Gaining Access to Paul's Theology

(a) If Paul's theology is to be identified with his critical reflection on the meaning and truth of the gospel, then it follows that one can only gain access to that theology

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Coherence-Contingency Scheme as Interpretive Model" (*Society of Biblical Literature 1986 Seminar Papers* [SBLSP 25; ed. by Kent Harold Richards; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986]) 596; and "The Faithfulness of God and the Priority of Israel in Paul's Letter to the Romans," in *Christians Among Jews and Gentiles. Essays in Honor of Krister Stendahl on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday* (ed. by G. W. E. Nickelsburg, with G. W. MacRae; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986) 10.

[4] For this understanding of theology I am greatly indebted to the writings of and conversations with my colleague, Schubert M. Ogden. See, especially, his essays in *On Theology* (San Francisco: Harper, 1986).

[5] Previous papers in this series have been on "The Theology of 1 Thessalonians" (Donfried), "The Theology of 2 Thessalonians" (Krentz; Jewett), "The Theology of Philemon" (Getty), and "The Theology of Galatians" (Dunn). Only Pheme Perkins (Philippians) and Beverly Gaventa (Galatians) have chosen other kinds of titles.

[6] For this distinction see Rudolf Bultmann, "Church and Teaching in the New Testament," in *Faith and Understanding* (ed. by Robert W. Funk; tr. by Louise Pettibone Smith; New York and Evanston: Harper, 1969 [original German ed., 1929]) 208, 213-14, 218-29.

through the apostle's argumentation. It is wrong to suppose that his theology exists apart from the texts of his letters, as if it were something that "lies behind" or in some way "transcends" the texts. Paul's theology lies within the texts, which means that it can only be uncovered and understood by exegesis.[7] The exegetical method requires, at least initially, a letter-by-letter approach, for only in this way can one take account of the particular circumstances which have occasioned and helped to shape Paul's argumentation.[8] More specifically, the following fourfold procedure would seem to make sense.

The *first step* must be to analyze those passages in which Paul is most deliberate about developing or explicating an idea or topic with reference to the meaning and truth of his gospel. One will seek to determine what particular theological conceptions find expression in each, and by which of those conceptions Paul's argument is most decisively informed and guided. Until all of the pertinent data are in and assessed, the identification of such passages must remain to some degree tentative. But in most cases it will not be too difficult to decide which passages within a letter hold promise of turning out to be of special theological significance. Polemical passages are by no means to be excluded from consideration.[9] They are in fact of special importance, because it is often in the thrust and parry of debate that Paul's most fundamental convictions about the gospel are conceptualized and explained.[10]

Once the controlling theological conceptions of each of the key passages have been identified, the *second step* is to ascertain whether any of those emerge at other points in the letter, and then to inquire in each case how they are developed and how they function. One should note that this second procedure is directly dependent on the first. It is important to avoid just "going fishing" for theological ideas in a letter. The first step provides some control and direction for the second.

The *third step* is to take particular note of those passages (not already examined) in which Paul cites, presupposes, or himself formulates some kerygmatic affirmation or appeal,[11] and of those passages in which he makes some kind of theological generalization, issues some statement about a deeply-held conviction, or appears to be offering a summary of his preaching or teaching. In the case of citations, particular notice needs to be taken of how the apostle means those to be understood. Again, one is not just "going fishing," but focusing on materials which, by reason of their *formulation*, have a special place in the argument.

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[7] Similarly, Georg Eichholz, who properly insists, "Wir müssen den Texten begegnen" (*Die Theologie des Paulus im Umriss*, 2d ed. [Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1977 [1st German ed., 1972] 7). My own thoughts on exegesis as the only proper method for approaching Pauline theology are developed more fully in an essay on "Paul the Theologian," to be published elsewhere.

[8] Whether it is desirable or even possible to produce some kind of a synthesis of the cumulative results of this process is an important question, but one which need not be discussed in the present paper.

[9] Correctly, Robin Scroggs, "A Synthesis of Paul's Thought in I Thessalonians, Philippians, and Galatians" (unpublished; 1988) 3.

[10] Note Bultmann, "Church and Teaching in the New Testament," 214: "to be legitimate, theology must always be critical and polemical. With Paul, in fact, it is exactly that."

[11] Among these I would include any scriptural passage which Paul employs as a kerygmatic affirmation or appeal.

It is reasonable to suppose that once these first three steps have been taken, the theological conceptions which are most important for a letter's argument will have been located. Then the *fourth step* is to determine how, if at all, these various conceptions are related, and whether the overall argument of the letter is driven or shaped by any particular theological conception or set of conceptions.

(b) Given the length and complexity of 1 Corinthians, as well as the limited scope of this paper, it will be impossible to complete each of the four procedures as described. Instead, only some initial soundings can be taken of Paul's theological reflection here. Any general comments about "theology in 1 Corinthians" to which these may lead will therefore be preliminary and incomplete.

Where in this letter is Paul especially deliberate about developing his argument with reference to a certain understanding of the meaning and truth of his gospel? The most extensive discussions of this sort are in 1:18–3:4, chapters 12-14, and chapter 15, from which only one can be selected for examination. The choice of 1:18–3:4 is not entirely arbitrary, however. It is not unreasonable to suppose that such an extended discussion so early in the letter will be of special importance for what follows; and this, in fact, seems to be the case.

(c) When a letter-by-letter approach to Paul's theology is being followed, it is obviously very important to have some confidence that the document at hand is not a composite of several different letters or parts thereof. The integrity of 1 Corinthians is presupposed in the present study, although it has not gone unquestioned.[12] Since, in compliance with the overall procedures established for papers in this series, no texts from the other Paulines will be drawn into the discussion, it is unnecessary to presuppose anything further about the composition of this letter, or about its relation to the other letters of the Pauline corpus.

In order not to be distracted from the main point of this essay, which is to understand how Paul is operating as a "theologian" in 1 Corinthians, citations of the secondary literature will be kept to a minimum. It will be evident, however, that numerous studies of the letter, including the major commentaries,[13] have substantially informed the discussion.

1 Corinthians 1:18–3:4

The thanksgiving paragraph of this letter (1:4-9) is followed by a section of appeals which extends from 1:10 through 6:20. In the first main sub-division, 1:10–4:21, Paul's fundamental concern is with the profane and arrogant boasting (note 1:29-31; 3:21-23; 4:6-7) which, he believes, poses a serious threat to the unity of the congregation (1:10-12; 3:4, 21, etc.). Within this sub-division, 1:18–3:4 stands as a kind of excursus on true and false wisdom—or perhaps more correctly, as an excursus on "the word of the cross." In any case, one notes a shift from the first person singular (1:10-17) to the first person plural, which is used throughout most of 1:18–3:4.

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[12] E.g., Robert Jewett, "The Redaction of 1 Corinthians and the Trajectory of the Pauline School," *JAAR* 44, Supplement B (1978) 389-444; Gerhard Sellin, "Hauptprobleme des ersten Korintherbriefes," in *ANRW* 2.25.4 (1987) 2964-86.

[13] Special note should be taken of the recent, particularly important commentary by Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987).

1. The Argument

In *1:18-25* Paul is following up the distinction between εὐαγγελίζεσθαι and σοφία λόγου which is implicit in 1:17. Now (1:18) the subject of his gospel is characterized as "the word of the cross" which, though perceived as "foolishness" by "those who are perishing," is experienced by "those who are being saved" as God's power. This point is supported with a citation from Isa 29:14LXX (1:19), to which Paul may have been attracted because of the occurrence there of the two words, ἀπόλλυμαι and σοφία, both of which figure in his argument here.[14]

The first three rhetorical questions in 1:20 anticipate the affirmative answer presupposed by the fourth. God has indeed shown that it is not the word of the cross that is foolish, but rather those who reject it as foolish, for thereby they are closing themselves to its saving power. The thought is extended in 1:21, where Paul for the first time in this discussion refers to God's wisdom. Here he has particularly in mind the divine plan for salvation, according to which God has chosen to effect salvation through the kerygma. (As in the LXX, εὐδοκεῖν is used here to express a purposeful action of God.)

There are two special points worth noting in 1:21. First, "those who are being saved" (1:18) are now identified as "those who believe." Although no specific object of the believers' πιστεύειν is indicated, that clearly involves their accepting the kerygma, the content of which is "the word of the cross." Second, the idea of knowing God (γινώσκειν τὸν θεόν) is introduced here: the world cannot know God by what it values as wisdom. It would seem a plausible inference, then, that Paul understands the kerygma and one's believing acceptance of it to provide some knowledge of God. What this may be or involve is of course not said, at least not here.

However, the mention of the "foolishness" of the kerygma leads Paul to comment more particularly on what the kerygma is and how it differs from what the world seeks, 1:22-24. The kerygma offers neither the kind of signs sought by the Jews nor the kind of wisdom sought by the Greeks, but "Christ crucified." For this reason it remains a σκάνδαλον to the former and μωρία to the latter (1:22-23). Yet for those who accept it, who are "called" of God (οἱ κλητοί, 1:24 = οἱ πιστεύοντες, 1:21 = οἱ σωζόμενοι, 1:18), whether Jews or Greeks, this word of the cross becomes God's power for salvation, and therefore the fulfillment of God's gracious purpose (cf. "God's wisdom," 1:21). What all of this means, in case the Corinthians have been slow to pick it up, is formulated as a paradox in 1:25: God's "foolishness" is wiser than human wisdom, and God's "weakness" is stronger than human strength.

In *1:26-31*, to support the point, Paul invokes his congregation's own experience of God's call (1:26-29); and then, quoting scripture, he issues a specific appeal (1:30-31). The Corinthians, who are of course among "the called" mentioned in 1:24, should be able to recognize how radically different God's values are from the world's, how the kerygma fundamentally redefines the meaning of wisdom, strength, and status. After all, very few of them would have been considered "wise," "powerful," or "well-bred" as the world ordinarily judges things (κατὰ σάρκα, 1:26, = τοῦ κόσμου, 1:27, 28), and yet God chose them for salvation.

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[14] There are, however, both more and more substantial links (verbal and conceptual) between 1:18-31 and Baruch 3:9–4:4; see Hans Hübner, "Der vergessene Baruch. Zur Baruch-Rezeption des Paulus in 1 Kor 1,18-31," *SNTU* 9 (1984) 161-73.

When Paul suggests (1:29) that God's purpose (ὅπως . . .) in thus overturning the world's values is to remove from every human being any ground for boasting , he is thinking not only of unbelievers, however. He is also—and especially—thinking of those who have been "called," and not least of those he is addressing. This is made clear by 1:30-31: it is entirely God's doing that his Corinthian readers are "in Christ Jesus" (ἐξ αὐτοῦ [=τοῦ θεοῦ, 1:29] δὲ ὑμεῖς ἐστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, 1:30a). Moreover, it is by no "wisdom" of their own that they have come to be "in Christ Jesus." Rather, in accordance with God's purpose *Christ* has come *as* wisdom *for* them (ὃς ἐγενήθη σοφία ἡμῖν ἀπὸ θεοῦ), even as he has become their righteousness, sanctification, and redemption, 1:30b.[15] Scripture therefore decrees that one should boast only "in the Lord" (Jer 9:22-23), 1:31.

The first person plural of 1:18-31 is briefly abandoned as, in *2:1-5*, Paul further supports the point of 1:18-25 by recalling the content and character of his missionary preaching in Corinth. Whether one should read τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ θεοῦ or τὸ μαρτύριον τοῦ θεοῦ (2:1), the reference is still to the kerygma (as in 1:21). Moreover, just as the kerygma has been identified previously with "the word of the cross" (1:18) and "Christ crucified" (1:23), so now it is identified with the proclamation of "Jesus Christ and him crucified." That Paul intends to place particular emphasis on the crucified Jesus is apparent from the special locution, καὶ τοῦτον ἐσταυρωμένον (2:2), as well as from the context.

It is equally apparent that the apostle is concerned to draw a sharp distinction between his preaching and the mannered discourses of those whose wisdom consists only of high-flown speech and flattery (see 2:1, ἦλθον οὐ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν λόγου ἢ σοφίας καταγγέλλων ὑμῖν . . . ; and 2:4, οὐκ ἐν πειθοῖ[ς] σοφίας [λόγοις]; cf. 1:17, οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου). The kerygma he preached in Corinth had not been ornamented in any such way, having come to the Corinthians as a demonstration of (God's) Spirit and power. Paul could hardly be thinking of the kind of apostolic "signs and wonders" which he mentions, for example, in 2 Cor 12:12, since he has just referred to the "weakness" he exhibited when first in Corinth (2:3). He is thinking, rather, of the inherent saving power of the word of the cross itself (1:18). Throughout this discussion the apostle has been setting that word over against the world's empty wisdom, and now he contrasts his preaching of that word with the vain and fatuous rhetoric of sophistic oratory.[16] Since it was through his "foolish" proclamation of the "foolish" word of the cross that the Corinthians have come to be "in Christ Jesus," they should realize that their faith is not a matter of human wisdom, but of God's own power, 2:5.

In *2:6-16* Paul is no longer writing about his initial visit to Corinth, so he abandons his use of the first person singular and employs once more the first person plural. The terminology of these verses is also somewhat distinctive. Here, writing straightforwardly about the divine wisdom (apart from 2:14, it is not described as "foolishness"), the verbs εὐαγγελίζεσθαι (1:17), κηρύσσειν (1:23), and καταγγέλλειν (2:1) are replaced by λαλεῖν (2:6, 7, 13 [and 3:1]). Moreover, when he now distinguishes between the "mature" and the "infantile" (οἱ τέλειοι, 2:6; see νήπιοι in

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[15] Is it possible that Paul has inserted the words σοφία . . . ἀπὸ θεοῦ into a traditional kerygmatic formulation (ὃς ἐγενήθη ἡμῖν δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ἁγιασμὸς καὶ ἀπολύτρωσις), thus tailoring it to this particular context?

[16] See Richard A. Horsley, "Wisdom of Words and Words of Wisdom in Corinth," *CBQ* 39 (1977) 224-39.

3:1) and between those who are "spiritual" and those who are "ordinary" (ὁ πνευματικός, 2:13, 15; 3:1; ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος, 2:15 [cf. σαρκικοί and ἄνθρωπος in 3:3]), he is introducing terms evidently taken over from the Corinthians themselves.

The subject matter of 1:18–2:5 has not been left behind, however, even though some new terms are used and a new line of argument is followed.[17] Up until now attention has been given to the kerygma itself, to the word of the cross which to the world seems like foolishness. Now, perhaps to meet Corinthian charges that he has no wisdom to impart, the apostle maintains that God's wisdom is in fact disclosed through his preaching, although it remains "secret and hidden" to those who are not "mature" and truly "spiritual" (2:6-7; cf. 1:21). Paul's intention here is surely not to support the spiritual elitism which, he believes, so threatens the integrity of the Christian community in Corinth (e.g., 1:10-17; 3:3-4; 4:6-7, 8-13; 5:2, 6; chapters 12-14). His intention is in fact the opposite, as one can see from 3:1-4. If the arrogant Corinthians have not perceived God's wisdom in their apostle's preaching, then it is because they are not truly "mature" and "spiritual," but still "infantile" and "worldly" (σαρκικοί)—as their behavior in fact demonstrates. The first person plural pronouns in 2:7 (ἡμῶν), 2:10 (ἡμῖν), and 2:12 (ἡμεῖς) must certainly be read as including all believers.

In 1:18–2:5 God's wisdom was contrasted with the world's wisdom. Now the same contrast is evident in 2:6-8, as "the secret and hidden wisdom" which God ordained "before the ages for our glory" is distinguished from the kind of wisdom which belongs only to this age (ὁ αἰῶν οὗτος). Whether the "rulers" mentioned here are political or cosmic authorities does not affect the main point: their jurisdiction is over this age only and they are ignorant of God's wisdom. When Paul refers to their crucifixion of "the Lord of glory" as proof of this, he is echoing a chord which had been struck in 1:18-25, that God's wisdom is manifest in the kerygma, in the proclamation of "Christ crucified."

That the rulers who remain ignorant of the divine plan have nevertheless played a role in fulfilling God's saving purpose (2:7), is perhaps to be regarded as part of the ultimate mystery of God's wisdom. In any event, the inclusion of a scriptural citation in 2:9 further emphasizes that mystery.[18] The divine purpose—salvation ("what God has prepared for those who love him")—cannot be fathomed by merely human faculties. Even if the syntactical connection between 2:9 and 10 is textually uncertain (δέ or γάρ?), the logical connection is generally clear. While no eye can see, nor ear hear, nor mind conceive this mystery of salvation, "to us" (to "those who love God," 2:9)[19] God has revealed it through the Spirit. Here Paul is not thinking, as he is in 14:6, 26, 30, of the kind of revelations which come to particular believers on specific occasions as discrete manifestations of the Spirit. Given the context, his thought must be of what is revealed in the kerygma to all who believe.

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[17] Against Martin Widmann ("1 Kor 2 6-16: Ein Einspruch gegen Paulus," *ZNW* 70 [1979] 44-53), I assume the authenticity of this passage and its original positioning here. That it continues and supports the argument of 1:18–2:5 is shown by Peter Stuhlmacher, "Zur hermeneutischen Bedeutung von 1 Kor 2,6-16," *TBei* 18 (1987) 133-58.

[18] According to Stuhlmacher ("Zur hermeneutischen Bedeutung von 1 Kor 2,6-16," 146 n. 56), H. P. Rüger has argued that the citation is of Isa 64:3[4], formulated under the influence of the Jewish hermeneutical tradition.

[19] Cf. 1:18, where ἡμῖν = οἱ σωζόμενοι, and 1:30, where ἡμῖν = all believers.

Why the revelation of God's wisdom comes "through the Spirit" is explained in 2:11-13, where it is assumed that the Corinthians will not demur from the truism that "like must be known by like." Arguing by analogy, Paul first points out (2:11) that just as a person's thoughts (τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) are known only to that person's own "spirit," so God's thoughts (τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ [=τὰ βάθη τοῦ θεοῦ, 2:10b]) are known only to the Spirit of God. But this is the very Spirit which believers have received (2:12; the aorist, ἐλάβομεν, suggests that Paul is thinking of baptism) in order that they might understand (εἰδῶμεν) what God has granted to them (τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χαρισθέντα ἡμῖν). The reference here is not to the various "spiritual gifts" (τὰ χαρίσματα) which are mentioned in chapter 12, but to the salvation which God has revealed (2:9-10). Therefore, when Paul says that his words are not informed by merely human wisdom but by the Spirit, and that they are for those who have the Spirit (2:13),[20] he is not thinking of some special wisdom reserved for a select few, but of the kerygma—which is to say, of Christ crucified, as in 2:1-5.

The distinction implicit in 2:12 between those who have received "the spirit of the world" and those who have received "the Spirit from God" is still in view in 2:14-15. On the one hand (2:14), the existence of an "ordinary person" (ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος) is defined by "the spirit of the world," which means that he or she is unable to receive those things which can only be discerned (ἀνακρίνεται) "spiritually," through the Spirit of God; so to this ordinary person God's wisdom seems like folly (cf. 1:18—2:5). On the other hand (2:15), "the spiritual person" has received God's Spirit and is enabled through that Spirit to discern "everything" which God has revealed—and without being subject to judgment (ἀνακρίνεται) by the ordinary person, to whom he or she appears foolish.[21]

The question which Paul adapts from Isa 40:13 (2:16a) requires a negative response, and thus reinforces the distinction he has been making between God's wisdom and the world's. No one is wise enough to have "known the mind of the Lord, so as to teach him"; God's wisdom is in a class by itself. Yet those who have received the Spirit of God "have the mind of Christ" (2:16b).[22] This is another way of expressing what has been affirmed earlier, that "in Christ Jesus" believers have experienced God's saving power and wisdom (1:24, 30).

The resumption of the first person singular in *3:1-4* signals a return to the specific concern with which Paul had begun his appeals in 1:10-17 (and which is continued in 3:5ff.). Whatever the Corinthians may be claiming about their spiritual status, it is evident to him that they are acting like ordinary, worldly people who have not received the Spirit. As long as they persist in their present infantile behavior, they show themselves incapable of appropriating the "solid food" of the gospel.

2. Theological Conceptions

Underlying the argument in 1:18-d1-3:4 is Paul's conviction that true wisdom stands apart from and indeed over against what passes for wisdom in this present

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[20] I read πνευματικοῖς in v. 13 as a reference to "spiritual persons."

[21] Here I am especially indebted to Gordon Fee's comments (*The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 115-20). Contrast Horsley's judgment that in 2:15 Paul is citing a Corinthian principle which he cannot himself accept ("Wisdom of Words and Words of Wisdom in Corinth," 238).

[22] The first person plural (ἡμεῖς . . . ἔχομεν) embraces the whole Christian community, as in vv. 7, 10, and 12.

age (2:6-7). The argument itself consists largely of the apostle's development of a number of contrasts which derive from this fundamental opposition between ἡ σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ (1:21) and ἡ σοφία τοῦ κόσμου (1:20d; cf. σοφία ἀνθρώπων, 2:5).

(a) God's wisdom was decreed "before the ages" (πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων, 2:7). The world's wisdom belongs to this age (ὁ αἰὼνος οὗτος, 1:20; 2:6).

(b) Since God's wisdom does not belong to this age, it remains "secret and hidden" (ἐν μυστηρίῳ and ἀποκεκρυμμένη) apart from an act of divine revelation (ἀπεκάλυψεν ὁ θεὸς, 2:10). Since the world's wisdom belongs to this age, it can be sought, cultivated, and displayed by human beings themselves (cf. 1:20, 22, 2:4, 13; cf. 1:17).

(c) God's wisdom appears foolish to the world, because it is disclosed in the word of the cross (1:18), which is the kerygma (1:21) of Jesus Christ the crucified one (1:23; 2:2; cf. 2:8). The world's wisdom is presented ἐν πειθοῖ[ς] σοφίας [λόγοις] (2:4; cf. 1:17; 2:1).

(d) The kerygma is conveyed in words taught by the Spirit; the world's sages speak in words informed only by human wisdom, 2:13.

(e) Those who have accepted the kerygma are "believers" (οἱ πιστεύοντες, 1:21; cf. 2:5). They show that they have received "the Spirit from God" (2:12), through whom the deepest counsels of God (God's saving purpose and plan) have been revealed (2:9-10; cf. 1:21; 2:6-8). Hence, they are also οἱ πνευματικοί (2:15; 3:1; cf. οἱ τέλειοι, 2:6). But those who have not accepted God's wisdom are only "wise according to worldly standards" (σοφοὶ κατὰ σάρκα, 1:26). They show that they continue to be controlled by "the spirit of the world" (2:12), and that they remain ψυχικοὶ ἄνθρωποι (2:14; cf. κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖτε [3:3], σάρκινοι, νήπιοι [3:1], σαρκικοί [3:3]).

(f) Believers have been "called" and "chosen" by God for an existence "in Christ Jesus" (1:24, 26-30). They are not thereby removed from the world, but have been given a new status within it. Their status is no longer determined by the accident of their birth or social fortunes, but by the "wisdom," "righteousnesss," "sanctification," and "redemption" which they have in Christ. It is thus implied that those who live by the world's wisdom have only the status to which their birth and their fortunes have consigned them, and that their existence has no meaning apart from that which the world can confer.

(g) Those who are in Christ experience God's wisdom as a saving power, and can therefore be described as those "who are being saved" (1:18; cf. 1:24; 2:4, 5). Their salvation does not lie within this age, however, but beyond it, as something God has "prepared" for them (2:9). It is, specifically, their "glory" (δόξα), for which God provided "before the ages" (2:7). Hence, those who know only the wisdom of this present age, who perceive the word of the cross only as foolishness, can be described as those "who are perishing" (1:18). They share the fate of "the rulers of this age" who are destined to come to naught (τῶν ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου τῶν καταργουμένων, 2:6; cf. 15:24; 1:27-28; 7:31).

Although Paul offers no definition of wisdom, it is clear that he regards it as something which transcends the present age, and therefore all human capacities. It is equally clear, however, that he associates it closely with God's purpose for human beings—that they should be saved from their preoccupation with what passes for "wisdom" in this present age, which will lead to their destruction, and come to know the true wisdom of God. In a sense, the question which animates the discussion is, "Where shall wisdom be found?" (Job 28:12). Thus here, as in Job 28 and certain other texts from the wisdom tradition, "wisdom" signifies "something like the

'meaning' implanted by God in creation,"[23] and therefore the meaning of human existence itself.

Paul believes that the disclosure of this meaning comes with saving power in the kerygma of Jesus Christ crucified. Through that word of the cross, and through the mediating presence of God's Spirit, believers have been called to find in Christ Jesus the true meaning of their present existence and, along with that, an understanding of the glorious destiny to which God has appointed them.

Given everything that crucifixion connoted in the first century, one has no problem understanding why "the word of the cross" would have been to "the perishing," Jews and Gentiles, a "scandal" and "foolishness" (1:18a, 22). It is not self-evident, however, how Paul can say that "those who are being saved" have found in this same crucified Christ "God's power [and God's wisdom]" (1:18b, 23). To be sure, later in the letter he will indicate that it was by God's power that Jesus was *raised from the dead* (6:14; cf. 15:15); but that point is not registered here, even though one might think that it would be appropriate. In the present passage *only* Jesus' crucifixion is in view; there is not a single reference to his resurrection.[24] So the question remains, in what sense does the crucified Christ, *precisely as the crucified one,* manifest the saving power of God? In looking for an answer, one must consider what it means to be among "those who are being saved" rather than among "those who are perishing."

From 1:20-21 it is apparent that Paul identifies "those who are perishing" with "the world" which, because it has only its own wisdom, does not know God (1:21; cf. 2:8—because they "did not know" God's wisdom the rulers of the world crucified "the Lord of glory"). These same verses show that "those who are being saved" are to be identified as "those who believe," persons who have accepted the "foolishness" of the kerygma, having found in "the word of the cross" (1:18) *God's* power and wisdom. One may therefore infer that "those who are being saved" have rejected the world's wisdom and do indeed "know God" through this kerygma.

One learns more about "those who are perishing" and "those who are being saved" in 1:26-31 (although the terms themselves are not used here). Those who are perishing, being ignorant of God, can "boast" only in the kind of wisdom, power, and status that is recognized by the world, and (along with everything associated only with this present age; cf. 2:6; 7:31; 15:24-28) they do not endure (1:26-29). But those who are being saved, having accepted the foolishness of the kerygma, "are in Christ Jesus" and boast "in the Lord" (1:30-31)—knowing that God has already prepared for them a destiny which lies beyond this present age (2:7, 9). That is, "those who are being saved" no longer identify themselves with reference to who they are (whether "nobodies" or "somebodies") or may yet become in the eyes of the world (κατὰ σάρκα). Although for the present they remain in this world (Paul certainly presumes this; note 5:10 and 7:12-16), it is their "being in Christ Jesus" (cf. "having the mind of Christ," 2:16) which establishes their identity and gives them their hope. One might describe this new existence experienced by believers in various other ways—perhaps as "an eschatological existence," or as their "liberation," or as their "new self-understanding." In 1:30 Paul himself uses three terms to suggest

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[23] See Gerhard von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel* (tr. by James D. Martin; London: SCM Press, 1972) 148.

[24] In the title which appears in 2:8, ὁ κύριος τῆς δόξης, there is at most an allusion to Jesus' resurrection.

what it means to be a beneficiary of God's wisdom in Christ: δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ἁγιασμὸς καὶ ἀπολύτρωσις. None of these is explicated in 1:18–3:4, however, and none occurs (as such) elsewhere in this letter.[25]

Now to return to the question posed above: Why does Paul identify God's power and wisdom specifically with the *crucified* Christ? Because precisely in the "foolish" word of the cross "the world"[26] is confronted with an understanding of wisdom and power—and therefore of what it means to "have standing" as a human being—which is the polar opposite of its own. Paul appears to be convinced that there is no escaping the question which is raised when the word of the cross is proclaimed: In whom shall one "boast," in oneself (one's standing in the world) or "in the Lord" (one's standing before God)? Or, expressed differently: Where shall wisdom be found, in the world or in Christ? In either formulation, one is confronted with the question about the *meaning* of human existence. Those who affirm the meaning offered in the kerygma are "believers," and they experience the power of the cross as a *wisdom* which at once transcends their own and places their own under judgment. Their faith is expressed in lives that are oriented no longer to what counts according to the world's wisdom, but to what counts according to God's wisdom—as that is present for them in the crucified Christ. In him, and through the Spirit, they have come to know God as the world does not. In him they experience a wisdom—a *meaning* in their existence—which the world of itself cannot provide. In him they have a standing with God which transcends any to which they have been consigned by the world, and any to which they may aspire in the world.

Before attempting a summary of all of this, one more point is worth noting. In 1:18–3:4 there is hardly a trace of the terms and formulations which are used of Jesus' death in the church's traditions, and elsewhere by Paul himself, even in this letter.[27] For instance, no use is made of the creedal affirmation, "Christ died for our sins" (15:3; cf. 8:11; 11:24); and the occurrence of the word ἀπολύτρωσις in 1:30 is only a hint of the notion that Christ's death has "purchased" freedom from sin for those who believe (6:20; 7:23). In this particular passage, more of the terms and conceptual categories have been adapted from the Corinthians than from the tradition. While this does not necessarily make the exegetical task easier, it does open up another angle of vision from which to view Paul at work as a theologian.

Summarized in the briefest possible way, Paul's argument in 1:18–3:4 is that *God, acting with a wisdom and power which utterly transcend what passes for these in the present age, has called those who accept the word of the cross to a new standing in Christ Jesus, and to a salvation which lies beyond this age.* The next step is to determine whether Paul is reflecting on any of these matters elsewhere in 1 Corinthians, and if so, what else may be learned about his thinking. The major results of such an investigation (preliminary though they are) can be presented under three headings: God and the cosmos, Christ and the kerygma, faith and salvation.

God and the Cosmos

The distinction between God's wisdom and the world's, which is fundamental to

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[25] Other passages may be compared, however; for δικαιοσύνη, 6:11; for ἁγιασμός, 1:2; 3:17; 6:11, 19; and for ἀπολύτρωσις, 6:19b-20a; 7:23.

[26] Given the epistolary situation, read: "the Corinthians."

[27] The judgment about what is "traditional" has to be based to some extent, of course, on more than the text of just one Pauline letter.

the excursus of 1:18–3:4, is picked up in the first explicit exhortations which follow that: anyone who presumes to be "wise in this age" should become a "fool" (that is, "wise" in the sight of God, 3:18; cf. 1:20-25), and no one should "boast" in human beings (3:21; cf. 1:29, 31). The first appeal is supported by a re-statement of the thesis of 1:18-25, that "the wisdom of this world is folly with God" (3:19a), and by citations from Job 5 and Psalm 94 (3:19b-20). The second appeal is supported by the assertion, "all things are yours" (πάντα ὑμῶν [ἐστιν], 3:21b, 22b), by which Paul clearly means to refute the notion (which seems to be abroad in his congregation) that individual Christians somehow "belong" to particular spokesmen for the gospel (1:12; 3:4, 22a). He claims that the reverse is true, and supports this with a second assertion, the "you are Christ's" (3:23a). A third is then added, that "Christ is God's (3:23b). The second of these is a kerygmatic affirmation,[28] and will be taken into account below. Comments on the other two are in order here.

First, the Corinthians' relationship to Christ means not only that Paul, Apollos, and Cephas belong to *them.* It also means that the κόσμος (here: the universe, the sum of all creation[29]) belongs to them–and therefore both life and death, both the present and the future. The point is certainly not that believers are granted *control* over the human agents of the gospel or over the cosmos, life, and death. It would seem to be, first, that believers are not *controlled by* any human or cosmic agency; and second, that the human agents of the gospel are in fact their servants (3:5b; 4:1). Whether Paul means to imply that also the cosmos, etc., have been given for their good is not clear. But is it unreasonable to infer that he is thinking of the cosmos–including the "life," "death," "present," and "future" which are experienced within it–as having some meaning precisely for *human* existence?

Second, the Corinthians are to understand that by belonging to Christ they belong ultimately to God, for Christ himself belongs to God. Their existence is not defined by what belongs to them, but by the one to whom the entire cosmos, even Christ, belongs. With the mention of God Paul's thought has been completed, since it is apparent that his conception is of a God who is utterly transcendent and absolutely sovereign: God is the one who belongs to no other, and to whom all else belongs. Yet God's transcendence and sovereignty are identified less with God's "being" as such, than with God's "being *for*" those who belong to God.

A survey of other passages shows that this conception of God (and thus of the cosmos) underlies much of the argumentation in 1 Corinthians.[30] In so far as the results can be given here, they may be organized according to what Paul says or implies about (1) God as sovereign over "all things," and (2) the beneficence of the sovereign God.

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[28] This may be called "kerygmatic" because it affirms the consequence of the Corinthians' acceptance of the kerygma (cf. 1:30, ὑμεῖς ἐστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ).

[29] So, too, in 4:9, and wherever it is used interchangeably with "this age" (e.g., 1:20; 2:12; 3:19; 7:31). In other instances the scope of the word is restricted to the inhabited world (e.g., 5:10), or to fallen humanity (e.g., 6:2; 11:32).

[30] The vocable θεός appears 106 times in 1 Corinthians; in Romans and 2 Corinthians, the Paulines most comparable in length, it appears 153 times and 79 times, respectively (*VKGNT* 2.130). One must of course add the instances where κύριος (which appears 66 times in 1 Corinthians, 44 times in Romans, and 29 times in 2 Corinthians; *VKGNT* 2.166), refers to God, and other ways of referring to God, including the use of the passive voice.

1. God as Sovereign over "All Things"

Paul's affirmation of the transcendence and sovereignty of God is bound up with his belief that God is *one*, which in 1 Corinthians finds expression in the traditional affirmation of 8:4 ("we know that . . . there is only one God"), and then particularly in 8:5-6, where a creedal formula is also employed: "For although there may be so-called gods in heaven or on earth—as indeed there are many 'gods' and many 'lords'—yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist."[31] Here God is understood as the creator of all that exists (ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα), as superior in authority to all other "gods" and "lords" (who are themselves conceived as created beings, 8:5), and as the one in whom humanity finds the meaning and goal of its existence (ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν, 8:6a).

This universal sovereignty of God is again emphasized in Paul's subsequent declaration—which echoes the formula of 8:6—that "all things are from God" (11:12b). However, in this context the special focus is on God's creation of humanity (as male and female, 11:8, 12a), thus on God's creation specifically of the earth. It is also God's sovereign status as creator of the earth with which Paul is concerned when he quotes the psalmist's declaration that "the earth is the Lord's, and all that fills it [τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῆς]" (10:26 [Psa 23:1LXX]).

The conception of God as absolutely transcendent and sovereign is expressed in Paul's reflections about the *end* of all things as well as in his reflections about their origin. The idea that creation has an end as well as a beginning is implicit in every reference to "*this* age" or "*this* world" (see especially 2:6), and it is quite explicit in the comment that "the form of this world is passing away" (παράγει γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου, 7:31). This "passing away" is apparently related to a conception of the disobedience and "fall" of creation. Such a conception must lie behind the statements that by Adam "came death" and "in Adam all die" (15:21, 22), and also behind the comment that "the sting of death is sin, and the power of sin is the law" (15:56). Although these ideas remain undeveloped in 1 Corinthians,[32] it seems clear that Paul intends to associate sin not only with the law, but also with the world's "ignorance" of God (ἀγνωσία θεοῦ, 15:34). One might therefore suggest that sin is also in view in 1:18-21 (although the word itself is not used there): because the world pursues only its own wisdom, it does not know God, and therefore perishes.

It does not appear that Paul is thinking of the world's demise as a matter of inevitable *self*-destruction, however. Just as God has presided over its creation, so God will preside over its destruction, when at "the end" every hostile power (including death) has been defeated (15:24-28; cf. esp., 6:13; 11:31-32, as well as what is said about "the rulers of this age" in 2:6). As in 8:6a God's sovereignty is presented with reference to the creation of "all things," so in 15:24-28 it is presented with reference to the subjection of "all things" (τὰ πάντα, 15:27, 28). And as in 8:6b Christ is presented as the agent of creation (δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα), so in 15:24-28 Christ

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[31] A conception of the oneness of God also lies behind the references in 12:4-6 to "*the same* Spirit . . . , *the same* Lord . . . , *the same* God," even if it could be held that there is some sort of proto-trinitarianism here.

[32] "Sin" terminology appears only infrequently in this letter: ἁμαρτία in 15:3, 17, 56; ἁμαρτάνειν in 6:18; 7:28, 36; 8:12; 15:34; ἁμάρτημα in 6:18. Four of the eight other occurrences of [ὁ] νόμος are in connection with appeals to the authority of scripture (9:8, 9; 14:21, 34), and the other four are in 9:20.

is presented as the one through whom the final victory will be won (15:24-25, 57). Yet God remains the sovereign: it is to God that the kingdom will be delivered (15:24), it is by God's power that Christ will subject every hostile power (15:27a, where "God" is the subject of ὑπέταξεν), and it is to God that Christ himself will finally be subjected (15:28; cf. 3:23; 11:3).

Just as in 3:21-23 God is conceived as the one who belongs to no other, and to whom all else belongs, so here God is conceived as the one who is subjected to no other (15:27), and to whom all else is subjected (15:28). It is this absolute, unrivalled sovereignty which is expressed in the formula which Paul has employed in the last phrase: "that God may be *all in all*" ([τὰ] πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, 15:28b).[33]

2. The Beneficence of the Sovereign God

Someone reading the excursus in 15:24-28[34] apart from chapter 15 as a whole, might gain the impression that Paul conceives of God's sovereignty only as "sheer power," exercised strictly for God's own sake (to defeat every other claimant to cosmic power). This is not, however, the character of God's sovereignty as Paul is conceiving of it in 1 Corinthians. He understands it to be expressed as a beneficent and, above all, *saving* power. The victory which God will accomplish at "the end" will not be God's alone. Thus Paul can write, "Thanks be to God, who *gives us* the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ" (15:57). Even as this acclamation points toward the future, it attests that the reality of God's saving power is in some sense already experienced (see 1:18; 2:5).[35]

Paul's conception of God as a sovereign who exercises power purposefully and with beneficent intent is disclosed in what he implies about creation, as well as in what he affirms about salvation (which will be treated more fully below).[36] Thus when Paul refers to the different kinds of "flesh" which God created (15:39; cf. Gen 1:20, 24; 8:17), he must be implying—because it is essential for his argument—that such variety is for the good of humanity, a beneficent act of God. The same is said, quite clearly, when Paul describes the human body, in order to draw an analogy between that and the Christian community (12:12-26): God has purposefully, and for the benefit of the body as a whole, composed it of many different and interdependent parts (see esp., 12:18 and 24b-25). And when one reads Paul's quotation of Ps 24:1 within the context of the argument in 10:23-30 (as of course one must), it is evident that there, too, the conception is of a beneficent sovereign. Since "'the earth is the Lord's, and everything in it,'" two things follow: one can (in principle) eat any food, and one does so with thanksgiving.

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[33] Cf. Andreas Lindemann, "Parusie Christi und Herrschaft Gottes: Zur Exegese von 1 Kor 15,23-28," *WD* 19 (1987) 102-103; Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians* (tr. by James W. Leitch; Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975) 275.

[34] Lindemann, "Parusie Christi," 88, 105.

[35] It is not clear whether Paul's sense of the "already but not yet" of salvation is also evident in his comment that "the end of the ages has arrived" (τὰ τέλη τῶν αἰώνων κατήντηκεν, 10:11).

[36] When God is called "Father" in 8:6 and 15:24, nothing particular is thereby emphasized about God's "character" (as, e.g., beneficent or caring). What is in view is God's plenipotentiary status (including God's role as creator) and God's relation to Christ (as in 1:3).

This conception of God as absolutely and beneficently *sovereign*, as the one from whom all things come, is inseparable from Paul's conception of humanity as absolutely *dependent upon*, and thus accountable to God. These twin conceptions lie behind one of the most inclusive exhortations in this letter: "So, whether you eat or whether you drink, or whatever else you do, do everything to the glory of God" (10:31). They also lie behind the most searching question in the letter: "What do you have that you did not receive? And since you have received (everything), why do you boast as if you have not?" (4:7).

Christ and the Kerygma

In 1:18-25 Paul specifically identifies God's saving power with "the word of the cross" (1:18), and thus with his missionary kerygma of Christ crucified (1:21-23). When he refers to "the testimony about God"[37] which he had proclaimed in Corinth (2:1), it is still of the kerygma, and still of God's saving power in the word of the cross that he is thinking (2:2-5). These three terms, λόγος, κήρυγμα, μαρτύριον, are all synonyms for "gospel" (note εὐαγγελίζεσθαι in 1:17), and they all appear elsewhere in the letter, as does εὐαγγέλιον itself.[38]

Judging by the way these nouns (and the related verbs) are used here by Paul, he can just as readily summarize his gospel with a reference to Christ's resurrection as with a reference to Christ's death—that is, in terms of either of the principal affirmations of the creed which he quotes in 15:3-5. It is of course the second of these which is emphasized in chapter 15 itself: "Now since Christ is preached [κηρύσσεται] as raised from the dead . . ." (15:12); "If Christ has not been raised, then our kerygma is empty . . ." (15:14); "we testified about God [ἐμαρτυρήσαμεν κατὰ τὸν θεόν] that he raised Christ . . ." (15:15). But in 11:26 (as in 1:17 and 1:18—2:5), it is Christ's death—and only *that*, not also his parousia!—which is identified as the gospel's content ("you proclaim [καταγγέλλετε] the Lord's death until he comes"). In either case, the proclamation concerns Christ, and when Paul is thinking specifically about his own apostolic task it is simply to "the gospel of Christ" that he refers (9:12). This is also the case when, writing metaphorically of his apostleship and his gospel,[39] he portrays himself as a "master builder" who laid no other "foundation" (= preached no other gospel) than "Jesus Christ" (3:10-11).[40]

What, then, does 1 Corinthians disclose about Paul's view of Christ himself? The

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[37] Reading τὸ μαρτύριον (instead of τὸ μυστήριον), and interpreting τοῦ θεοῦ as an objective genitive. In support of both points, see Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 88 n.1; 91 (and n. 14).

[38] While in this excursus God's Spirit is mentioned in connection with the saving power of the kerygma (2:4-5), and then specifically in connection with its reception (2:10-16), there is nothing really comparable elsewhere in the letter (although 6:11; 12:3, 13 could be read as implying a role for the Spirit in bringing people to the gospel).

[39] "Planting" (3:6) is another of Paul's metaphors for his missionary service (cf. 9:11).

[40] The references in 9:14, 16, 18, 23 to "the gospel" and "preaching the gospel" should probably be read in the light of "the gospel of Christ" in v. 12. In 15:1-2 εὐαγγέλιον and εὐαγγελίζεσθαι refer to the whole creed that is quoted in vv. 3-5, as does κηρύσσειν in 15:11. In 4:15 the content of "the gospel" is left unspecified; so too the content of "the word of God" in 14:36.

"titles" which are used of him here are of little help.[41] Nor do the isolated comments, affirmations, and images help a great deal. Many of these remain undeveloped, and any attempt to synthesize them runs the risk of imposing an alien conceptual framework.[42] In the creedal statement of 8:6, for example, Christ is affirmed as the agent through whom God has created "all things" (δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα), and thus (by implication) as pre-existent; but neither Christ's pre-existence nor his status as God's agent in creation plays a significant role in the overall argument of the letter. When the argument as a whole is examined, particularly those passages in which there is some significant measure of focused reflection, it becomes apparent that Christ is presented especially as (a) the crucified and (b) resurrected one, and then also as (c) the one who is to come.

(a) Paul's comments about "Jesus Christ and him crucified" have already received attention, since that is one of the major themes in 1:18–3:4. While neither the cross nor crucifixion is mentioned apart from that passage (and 1:13 [implied], 17), there are of course other kinds of references to Jesus' death. One of the most prominent of these appears in the creedal affirmation of 15:3-5, and affirms the expiatory significance of Christ's death ("Christ died ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν . . ."). The statement that "Christ, our paschal lamb, has been sacrificed" conveys the same view, given the context within which Paul makes (or cites) it (5:6-8), and so do the words of eucharistic institution, "'This is my body which is for you [ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν] . . .'" (11:24; cf. "the new covenant in my blood," v. 25). A similar idea lies behind the references to Christ's "redemption" (1:30) and "purchase" (6:20; 7:23) of believers (from sin), although in these instances his death is not specifically mentioned.

The conception of Christ's death as expiatory is also echoed where there is no question of traditional formulas being employed: indirectly in the phrasing of the question, "Was Paul crucified for you [ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν]?" (1:13), and somewhat more directly in the comment about "the brother for whom [δι' ὃν] Christ died" (8:11; note the reference to sin in v. 12). In this second instance, however, more is involved. Here the reference to Christ's death supports a call to be guided by love rather than by "knowledge" in dealing with those of the congregation who are "weak" (see 8:1, 9, as well as 8:11-13). The presumption is that one's relationship to Christ—specifically, one's status as a beneficiary of Christ's death—sets one within a *community* of beneficiaries bound together in love. This conception is in evidence again when Paul writes about the way the eucharist should be celebrated, particularly in his interpretive gloss of the traditional eucharistic words: "For as often as you eat this bread and drink the cup, you are proclaiming the Lord's death until he comes" (11:26). By calling this to the attention of the Corinthians, he wants them to understand that when, as at present, the poorer members of the congregation are demeaned and neglected (11:21-22), "the body and blood of the Lord" are being

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[41] The most prominent title is κύριος—largely because practical conduct is so often the topic, and many of the appeals are authorized by invoking "the Lord" (e.g., 7:10 [cf. vv. 12, 25], 32-35; 9:14; 14:37). See Werner Kramer, *Christ, Lord, Son of God* (tr. by Brian Hardy; SBT 50; Naperville: Allenson, 1966) 169-73.

[42] For example, neither the statement, "For Christ our paschal lamb has been sacrificed" (5:7), nor the image of Christ as the "rock" (10:4) is developed "christologically." Other images, like "wisdom" (1:30), "first fruits" (15:20, 23), and "last Adam" (15:45) are more significant christologically, precisely because of their relationship to the arguments within which they are employed.

profaned (11:27; cf. what Paul has said about κοινωνία in Christ's body and blood, 10:16). In that case, the Lord's death (the gospel) is not proclaimed.

(b) The first and only mention of Christ's resurrection apart from chapter 15 is in 6:14, which anticipates the argument of chapter 15: "And God raised the Lord and will also raise us up by his[43] power." Neither here nor in chapter 15 is Christ's resurrection itself the matter under discussion; it is, rather, the future resurrection of those who belong to Christ. In both places, of course, the affirmation of Christ's resurrection is fundamental to the affirmation of the believers' resurrection. Thus it is above all the "second article" of the creed in 15:3-5 of which Paul wants to remind his congregation, as his glossing of the creed with reference to Christ's resurrection appearances already suggests.

Within chapter 15 the most direct comments on Christ's resurrection are in vv. 12-17, 20-23, and 45-49. Paul affirms it as an act of God (v. 15), without which the believers' faith is void (ματαία) and they are "still in [their] sins" (v. 17). It is doubtless an important move when he goes on to present it as the counterpart to Adam's death (vv. 21-22, 45-49), although his remarks in this regard are tied so closely to the larger argument, that one must refrain from presuming too much about any "christology" which they may reflect. What is plain from the text itself is Paul's belief that the believers' relationship to Christ is at least comparable with their relationship to Adam; and that through Christ, the death which comes through Adam shall be[44] replaced with life. It is also clear, and of course vital to the argument, that the resurrected Christ is conceived not just as one who "lives again," but as one who *gives* life. In distinction from "the first Adam" who was "a living being [ψυχὴν ζῶσαν]," the resurrected Christ, "the last Adam," not only lives but has the power to bestow life; he is "a life-giving spirit [πνεῦμα ζῳοποιοῦν]" (15:45; cf. v. 22).

(c) At the very beginning of this letter, in the thanksgiving, Paul expresses his gratitude that the Corinthians have been so richly endowed with speech, knowledge, and spiritual gifts (1:5-7a). But then he immediately mentions Christ's future return (1:7b-8), doubtless to correct the notion that such gifts are evidence of the Corinthians' present "reigning" in the fullness of salvation (4:8). Similarly, at the very end of the letter, just before the closing benediction, Paul includes a prayer for the Lord's return (16:22); for it is only at Christ's parousia that those who belong to him will be raised from the dead and come into the true life of the kingdom. The parousia of Christ is thus presupposed throughout the discussion in chapter 15.

Since the fundamental issue is the "whether" and not the "when" of Christ's parousia, there is no special attention to the latter (e.g. the "signs of the end"). It is clear, however, that Paul anticipates the Lord's imminent return (7:29), and that he himself will still be alive (15:51b). This is surely presumed in 11:26 as well as in 1:8 (so the idea of "proclaiming the Lord's death until he comes" is not to be compared with the Lucan conception of an extended interval for the church's witness).

At certain points in the letter, where appropriate to the argument, Paul emphasizes the judgment which will take place at the parousia (3:12-15; 4:4-5; 5:3-5, 13; 6:2; 11:32). In 4:4-5 he seems to conceive of Christ's role in this as rather like that of courtroom lawyers (both prosecutors and defenders); Christ will lay bare the pertinent evidence that God may deal appropriately with those who stand before the bench. (What role is envisioned for "the saints" [6:2, 3a] is not indicated.)

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[43] αὐτοῦ = ὁ θεός (see 15:15, 38, 57).

[44] Note the future tense in vv. 22, 49.

In chapter 15, where no such "judgment scene" is envisioned,[45] Paul is interested primarily in the part that Christ will have in bringing life to those who belong to him (15:22-23). The penultimate sentence of the chapter, "Thanks be to God, who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ" (15:57), recapitulates in the language of thanksgiving what is emphasized in the excursus of 15:24-28: the final victory over death belongs to *God*, who achieves is *through Christ*. As Andreas Lindemann has shown,[46] the theme of the excursus is the relationship between God and Christ, which is defined functionally, and in a way which makes it impossible to describe the conception as either "christocentric" or "theocentric."[47] To be sure, the absolute sovereignty of God is emphasized: Christ delivers the reign to "God the Father" (15:24a) and, as "the Son," is himself ultimately subjected to God (15:28). This does not mean, however, that Paul has assigned to Christ a "subordinate" role in salvation,[48] for it is precisely the *parallelism* of God's role and Christ's which is brought out in 15:24-28.[49] A similar parallelism is evident in the creedal statement of 8:6, which affirms God as the one "from whom are all things and for whom we exist," and Christ as the one "through whom are all things and through whom we exist." The saving power belongs to God, the absolute sovereign, and Christ is the one "through whom" that power is operative in creation and salvation.

Faith and Salvation

In this letter the object of faith (πιστεύειν) is the kerygma/gospel (1:18-21; 15:1-2, 11), through which the saving power of God is present for those who believe.[50] For Paul, however (even if the point has been lost on the Corinthians), salvation itself[51] remains something "prepared" (2:9) until, at "the end," it is given in its fullness. Thus hope is a fundamental constituent of faith (15:17-19); to "stand" in faith requires "watchfulness" (16:13), an eager expectation of Christ's return (1:7).

In 2:6 Paul refers to the believers' ultimate salvation as their "glory" (δόξα), and what he means by this can be determined in large part from chapter 15. It will

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[45] This has been noted by Lindemann, as well, who observes that the usual apocalyptic motifs of a new age and a new heaven/new earth are also absent ("Parusie Christi," 106). The scenario which can be reconstructed from what Paul says in chapter 15 is approximately as follows: (a) Christ will return and defeat every hostile power, including death (vv. 24b-26), and thus the dead will be raised. (b) Both those who have been resurrected and those who have remained alive will be given new, imperishable bodies (vv. 51-53), whereby to "inherit the kingdom of God" (v. 50). (c) Finally, Christ will deliver the kingdom to God (v. 24a) and will himself be subjected to God (v. 28).

[46] "Parusie Christi," 103-107.

[47] Cf. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 760.

[48] Contrast Fee, who believes that Paul is thinking of the "functional" (although not "ontological") subordination of Christ (*The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 155, 374, 760).

[49] Lindemann, "Parusie Christi," especially 105-106.

[50] Πίστις occurs 7 times, forms of πιστεύειν 6 times, and the substantive, οἱ πιστεύοντες 3 times.

[51] The noun σωτηρία is never used, but forms of σώζειν occur 8 times, and the substantive, οἱ σωζόμενοι, once.

involve the replacement of their perishable (physical) bodies with imperishable (spiritual) bodies (15:42-46, 51-55), whereby they will have been granted "the image" of Christ (15:49; cf. 11:7) and can come into their rightful inheritance, the kingdom of God (15:50; cf. 6:9-10). In gaining the kingdom of God they will be fully and finally subjected to God, along with τὰ πάντα and Christ himself (15:24a, 28). But they will also come to "know" God in a way that is impossible in this present age (13:12): "now" they know God indirectly and in part, but "then"—and here the verb changes from γινώσκειν to ἐπιγινώσκειν—they will know God just as fully as they have been known by God.[52]

This "having being known by God" is part of what faith *already* experiences, namely, the power of God's electing grace (Paul's language here is biblical; e.g., Gen 18:19; Exod 33:12, 17; Ps 144: 3; Jer 1:5; Amos 3:2). The concept is present in 8:3 as well as in 13:12, and expresses an understanding that believing in God (or "knowing" or "loving" God) is always but a response to God's first move. Thus "call" language is prominent in this letter: believers have been "called" and "chosen" by God (1:2, 24, 26-29) for life "in Christ Jesus" (1:30), in whom they meet the reality of God's grace (1:4). In accepting God's call (which means responding in faith to the preaching of Christ) they receive the Holy Spirit (2:12), through whom they understand "the gifts of God" (God's precedent grace). It is also through the Spirit that they have been initiated into a community where the only "standing" that counts is their standing as brothers and sisters "for whom Christ died" (12:13—and 1:8; 8:11; cf. 6:11).

Moreover, in accepting God's call believers also accept the claim that is given with it, whereby their relationship to the world and all of their relationships within the world are decisively altered (7:17-24; cf. 7:29-31, 35). How radical and total Paul conceives this claim to be is apparent from the metaphor he twice invokes (6:19b-20a; 7:22-23a): accepting God's call does not just mean accepting a new set of orders, but the new Lord by whom one's whole life has been purchased.[53] Similarly, when Paul writes of being "in-lawed to Christ" (ἔννομος Χριστοῦ, 9:21) he seems deliberately to avoid suggesting that believers stand under some new law.[54] Their whole existence is "normed" as well as "graced" by their belonging to Christ, and through him to God (3:23; cf. 8:6, ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν [God] . . . ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ [Christ]).

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[52] See the discussion of 1 Cor 13:12 by Oda Wischmeyer, *Der höchste Weg. Das 13. Kapitel des 1. Korintherbriefes* (SNT 13; Gütersloh: Mohn, 1981) 130-42.

[53] The notion of "keeping the commandments of God" in 7:19 must be understood in the light of the metaphor in 7:22-23, not the reverse.

[54] From the standpoint of the rhetoric of 9:20-21, the phrase ὑπὸ τὸν νόμον τοῦ Χριστοῦ would be more appropriate than the expression, ἔννομος Χριστοῦ. Cf. C. K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians* (HNTC; New York and Evanston: Harper, 1968) 214.

Toward a Theology of 1 Corinthians[1]

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It seems neither possible nor desirable to analyze the theology of a letter like this without some degree of "mirror reading" of the historical situation presupposed by the text.[2] Thus my own views on this matter, which at times will color my understanding: (1) This is the third in a *series* of letters between Paul and this church; (2) the letter basically reflects *conflict between Paul and the church* on most of the issues addressed; (3) the basic theological point of tension between them is over what it means to be *pneumatikos* (a Spirit person); (4) their view of being *pneumatikos* involved a "spiritualized eschatology,"[3] wherein because of their experience of glossolalia they considered themselves to be "as the angels" and needed finally only to slough off the body; (5) their false "theology" was informed by popular philosophy tainted with hellenistic dualism; (6) the net result was a "spirituality" and

[1] The tentative nature of my title is related to the fact that of all the literature on 1 Corinthians (some 2500 journal articles alone), there is not a single piece known to me that attempts this particular task: to deal with the theology of the letter as a whole. The reasons for which are obvious. Our interests in this letter tend to reflect Paul's in writing it—the behavioral aberrations which he addresses.

There are, of course, scores of items that deal with various aspects of its theology; and several of the commentaries (Barrett, Fee, etc.) offer a section in their Introductions on "Theological Contributions," but these tend to highlight the unique contributions of this letter to Paul's overall theology.

[2] A few words are also in order about basic assumptions: (a) In keeping with the ground rules of the seminar, I have tried to write this paper as if 1 Corinthians were Paul's only extant letter. This is an especially difficult exercise, since one is regularly tempted to point out what Paul does *not* say here in light of other letters (e.g. the relatively sparse use of *dikai-* words). And how does one make sense of 15:56 ("the power of sin is the law") without outside help?

(b) My task is primarily descriptive; at times, however, such description must consider Paul's assumed symbolic universe—both his own and that shared with his readers. Otherwise, one is bound to create distortions.

(c) In keeping with these assumptions, I have approached the task inductively, trying to look at the theology of 1 Corinthians on its own grounds. I have therefore, and without apology, purposely avoided much interaction with the work of others.

(d) In much of what follows I assume the exegesis of my recent commentary (NICNT; Eerdmans, 1987). In the interest of space, I do not here repeat arguments that appear there; hence the embarrassingly high incidence of footnotes to that work.

[3] Cf. H. Koester's "radicalized spiritualistic eschatology" as his description of alleged pneumatics in Philippi ("The Purpose of the Polemic of a Pauline Fragment [Philippians iii]," *NTS* 8 [1961/62] 330).

"higher wisdom" that was generally divorced from ethical behavior, at least as Paul perceived it.

1. The Central Issue

Because Paul primarily, and in seriatem fashion,[4] addresses *behavioral* issues, it is easy to miss the intensely theological nature of 1 Corinthians. Here Paul's understanding of the gospel and its ethical demands—his theology if you will[5]—is getting its full workout.

What is at stake is Paul's singular urgency, the gospel itself,[6] which from this letter may be defined as "God's eschatological salvation, effected through the death and resurrection of Christ, and resulting in an eschatological community who by the power of the Spirit live out the life of the future in the present age as they await the consummation."[7] The *way* the gospel is at stake is in their non-Christian *behavior*, which completely misses its redemptive, transformational nature. More simply, then, the central issue in 1 Corinthians is "salvation in Christ as that manifests itself in the behavior of those 'who are being saved.'" This is what their misguided spirituality is effectively destroying.

Thus three phenomena must be reckoned with in attempting a theology of this letter: (1) Behavioral issues (= ethical concerns) predominate. Paul is urging, cajoling, remonstrating, using every kind of rhetorical devise, to get this community both to see things his way and to conform their behavior accordingly, i.e. in keeping with the gospel.

(2) Even though Paul is clearly after behavioral *change*, his greater concern is with the theological distortions that have allowed, or perhaps even promoted, their behavior. This alone accounts for the unusual nature of so much of the argumentation. For example, the simple and clear response to "division over leaders" (1:10-4:21) is to prohibit it in the name of Christian unity. But Paul scarcely touches on such; his primary concern is with their radical misunderstanding of the gospel (1:18-2:16), and of the church (3:5-17) and apostleship (4:1-13), which their sloganeering in the name of wisdom represents.[8]

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[4] At least apparently so. I have argued that a "crisis of authority and gospel" holds all of chaps. 1-6 together; and "worship" is what holds chaps. 8-14 together.

[5] With regard to the discussion generated by Sampley's paper at the 1986 meeting, I am still prepared to understand Paul as speaking out of his *theological* convictions; but in this case, as in most cases, what is being explicated is his understanding of the gospel.

[6] See esp. chap. 9, where in defense of his own behavior (apparently regarding the eating of marketplace food), Paul emphasizes that he does all things *for the sake of the gospel* (vv. 12, 16-18, 23).

[7] One will recognize that in its own way, although I will not hereafter make a point of it as such, this view of things further supports Richard Hays' model of the narrative framework that shapes Paul's theological reflection (see "Crucified with Christ: A Synthesis of 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Philemon, Philippians, and Galatians," *SBL 1988 Seminar Papers*, 324-33).

[8] So also with sexual immorality in 6:12-20 and with their insisting on the right to attend temple feasts in 8:1-11:1. See below on "The Ethical Response." Even in chaps. 12-14 a theology of church (the need for diversity in unity) and of love precedes the specific correctives in chap. 14.

(3) In every case but two,[9] Paul's basic theological appeal for right behavior is the work of Christ in their behalf. Such appeal begins in the thanksgiving,[10] and is thoroughgoing thereafter. Note for example how crucial to Paul's response the following texts are to their respective issues:

a) 1:18-25, 26, 30; 2:1-2; 3:11; and 4:15 ("Christ crucified" as God's "wisdom" which effected their salvation)—to strife, both internal and over against Paul, carried out in the name of wisdom.

b) 5:7 ("Christ our passover has been sacrificed")—to the church's complacent attitude toward a brother's incest.

c) 6:11 ("Such were some of you; but you were washed, sanctified, justified, through Christ and the Spirit")—to the church's failure to arbitrate between two brothers.

d) 6:20 ("You were bought at a price")—to some men going to the prostitutes (and apparently arguing for the right to do so on grounds that the body is destined for destruction).

e) 7:23 ("You were bought at a price")—to their considering change of status a matter of religious value.

f) 8:11 (". . . destroy a brother for whom Christ died") and 10:16 (our "fellowship in the blood of Christ" that makes temple attendance totally incongruous)—to the Corinthians' insisting on the right to continue to eat meals in the pagan temples; and 9:12-23 (Paul's defense of his actions as totally for the sake of the gospel)—to their questioning his authority to prohibit temple attendance.

g) 11:23-25, 26 (the bread and wine of the Table as proclaiming Christ's death until he comes)—to *schisma* between rich and poor at the Table.

h) 15:1-5, 11 (Christ's death "for our sins" and his resurrection)—to their denial of a future bodily resurrection of believers.

These texts in particular illustrate that the gospel is the central issue. My concern in this paper is to reflect on the various strands of Paul's understanding of the gospel as saving event, including both its theological basis and its necessary ethical response, which alone brings the experience of the gospel to proper fruition.

2. God and Salvation

The gospel ultimately has to do with God, who alone stands at the beginning and end of all things. Salvation is wholly the result of God's own initiative and activity; God foreordained it and effected it—through Christ. Both the fact and the way he did so reflect his character. Moreover, God's own glory is the ultimate foundation of Pauline ethics (10:31). Since salvation finally has to do with being known by and knowing God (13:12), what makes the Corinthians' persisting in sin so culpable is that it keeps others from the knowledge of God (15:34).

At the same time, however, Paul's own experience of God's saving activity through Christ (as Savior and risen Lord) and through the Spirit (who appropriated

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[9] 11:2-16 and 12-14, both of which involve community worship, and thus take on a different form of theological argumentation.

[10] One can scarcely miss the christological emphasis that pervades both the salutation and thanksgiving. The past, present, and future of salvation dominates the paragraph—salvation that God has initiated and Christ has brought about.

it to his life) meant for him, as for the early church before him, an expanded understanding of the one God as Father, Son, and Spirit.[11]

a. God the Father[12]

In keeping with Paul's Jewish roots, the one and only God is the primary reality, who stands at the beginning of all things as Creator[13] and at the consummation of all things as their goal (8:6).[14] Even though there is little reflection on God's character as such,[15] the God of grace and mercy is always the cause and goal of the saving event. Thus, for example, in the argument of 1:18-2:16, God the Father is the subject of all the saving activity. Himself having foreordained (2:7) and purposed salvation (1:21), God thus thwarted human wisdom (1:19-20) by setting forth a crucified Messiah as his wisdom and power at work in the world (1:18-25). God also chose for salvation those of humble origins and status, whose only "boast," therefore, must be God alone (1:26-31). And since God's purposes stand in such bold contrast—indeed, as absolute contradiction—to merely human wisdom, human access to those purposes is only through revelation, which God himself made possible through his Spirit (2:7-13).

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[11] Several texts suggest or imply that salvation is the joint work of the Father, Son, and Spirit. In 2:1-5, Paul's preaching of Christ crucified came with the Spirit's power, so that their faith might rest only in God's power (as defined in 1:18-25). In 6:11 the divine passives point to God as the initiator, while the saving activity is effected "in/by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ and in/by the Spirit of our God." In 6:19-20 the body participates in redemption as the temple of the Spirit, whom God has given them, having been purchased by Christ. And in 12:4-6 the diversity of God, as Spirit, Lord, and God (=the Father), is the theological foundation for the necessity of diversity in the Spirit's manifestations in their midst.

[12] Although Paul does not often so designate God—he most often uses the simple designation "God" when referring to the Father— the fact that Christ is God's Son (1:9; 15:28) means that when the two are spoken of conjointly, either one or the other is often called "Father" or "Son" (1:3, 9; 8:6; 15:28).

[13] Although creation language as such is used only once, in an incidental way in 11:9, creation is the point of 8:6 (*ex hou ta panta* [against Murphy-O'Connor; see Fee, 374-75]) and is assumed in the analogies of the body in 12:18 and 12:24 ("God has arranged/composed the body as he willed") and of the seed in 15:38 ("God gives it a body as he willed"). Note especially the aorist *ethelesen* in both cases, although Paul's interest in the latter instance is in the continuation of the creative activity.

[14] See esp. 15:23-28, where after all things (esp. the final enemy, Death) are subjected to Christ, then Christ himself is subject to God (="hands over the Rule to God the Father," v. 24), "so that God might be all in all." So also the second half of 8:6, "and we for [*eis* =purpose/goal] him."

[15] The reason for this is simple; this is the symbolic universe that the Corinthian believers, even though Gentiles, share with Paul through both the gospel and the Scriptures that had become a fixed part of their religious life. Cf. 15:3, 4 ("according to the Scriptures") and the frequent appeals to the OT as the final court of appeal for a point Paul wants to make (1:19, 31; 2:9; 3:19, 20; and passim).

The little that is said in this letter that reflects on God's character (that God is faithful [1:9; 10:13], a "God of shalom" [14:33], who is the source of grace and peace [1:3], etc.) is esp. in keeping with the OT revelation.

Likewise, God's *call* is what initiates the believer's experience of salvation (1:9; 7:17-24). The "divine passives" in 1:4-8 and 6:11 assume God as the one who "washes, sanctifies, justifies, enriches, and confirms" those who are being saved. The resultant church thus belongs to God (1:2; 3:9), who made it grow (3:6-7); and because the church is *his* temple, God will destroy anyone who destroys it (3:16-17). Moreover, it is God's faithfulness that provides escape from too severe testing (10:13); and even the manifestations of the Spirit in their midst are the activity of God, who works all things in all of them (12:6-7). Prayer and thanksgiving are thus always directed toward God the Father.[16] Finally, it is God who will judge (5:13) or praise (4:5) at the Eschaton.

That the true source of the Corinthians' illicit behavior is bad theology—ultimately a misunderstanding of God and his ways— is evident from the beginning, especially with Paul's use of crucifixion language in 1:10-2:16. This language, which occurs only here, stands in deliberate contrast to their fascination with *sophia* and *logos*.[17] God's choice of the cross as his way of salvation, and the subsequent bypassing of the world's beautiful people for the nobodies, was the deliberate expression of his own wisdom to nullify every human machination and idolatry. To those seeking signs—demanding that God perform powerfully in their behalf—the cross is an egregious scandal; to those seeking wisdom—demanding that God be at least as smart as our better selves—the cross is unmitigated folly. But for Paul a crucified Messiah was God's way of turning the tables on these two most common of human idolatries.

The cross, therefore, turns out to be the ultimate expression of God's power *and* wisdom, because it alone could achieve what the gods of human expectations could never do—redeem and sanctify sinners from all ranks of humanity, who by believing (placing their trust in God's folly and weakness) thus lose their own grounds for boasting before God. Here God "outsmarted" the wise, and "overpowered" the strong, with lavish grace and forgiveness, and thereby divested them of their strength (1:25). Thus in his crucifixion Christ not only effected salvation for the "called," but ultimately revealed the essential character of God, which is revealed further in the servant character of Paul's apostleship (3:5; 4:1-2, 9-13), and which stands over against every human pretension and boasting. This is what is at issue in 1:10-4:21, their understanding of God and his ways, not mere sloganeering, with its *eris* and *schisma*. These latter but reflect human fallenness that has lost its vision of the eternal God.

At issue, it should be noted further, is not mere belief in the reality of the one God. Paul's argument is made possible, both here and elsewhere, precisely because these former idolators (6:9, 11; 12:2) now share this conviction with Paul. Indeed, in their letter to him they play back the twin themes of "one God" and "no reality to an idol" as grounds for their continuing to attend meals in the idol temples (8:4).[18]

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[16] For prayer see 14:2, 28; for thanksgiving, 1:4, 14; 14:18; 15:57.

[17] That these two terms together form one dimension of the problem is to be seen not only by the contrasts in 2:1-5, but especially in the subtle but significant way the whole argument begins in vv. 17-18. Christ sent Paul to preach the gospel "not with *sophia logou* (=wisdom characterized by *logos* [reason? rhetoric?])," since that would empty the cross of Christ of its significance. "For" he goes on in v. 18, "there is another *logos*, that of the cross, which is God's power for salvation."

[18] Their point seems to have been that "since there is only one God, and thus

At issue is their misapprehension of the *nature* of the one God and the nature of idolatry. Paul's response is twofold, and allows us to see how the coherence-contingency model works out in his thinking.

On the one hand, coherence demands that he agree with the fundamental premise that there is only one God. That is the only *objective* reality. Contingency is found in people's *subjective experience* of a variety of "gods" and "lords" as divine beings; and this, too, is a reality that must be reckoned with—especially in the lives of some converts for whom that "reality" has been a powerful conviction (8:7, 10-12). Thus the gods and lords are "so-called," but there is also reality to them, even though not reality as "gods." Rather, Paul argues, on the basis of the OT, the idols are the locus of demons (10:19-22). Thus what (for former pagans) was subjective reality as a god is in fact also (for Paul) objective reality as demonic. In that way he not only works within their now shared—and for him unwavering—monotheism, but provides the ultimate reason for the incompatibility of participation in both Christian and pagan meals.

On the other hand, Paul's experience of Christ as Savior and risen Lord has meant for him an expanded understanding of the one God as Father and Son. Thus, picking up the language of the so-called gods and lords (8:5), Paul affirms that "for us" (in contrast to *them* and their obvious polytheism) there is only *one God,* namely the Father, the source and goal of all things, including us, and *one Lord,* namely Jesus Christ, the divine agent of all things, including our redemption (v.6).

Paul does this in such a way so as to affirm two realities simultaneously: first, he speaks of the Father and the Son together in the language of deity (one God, one Lord), and, second, he does so in a context where he is at the same time affirming the strictest kind of monotheism. Which leads us directly to Paul's christology.

b. Christ the Son, Savior and Lord

This is one of the more complex theological issues in this letter. First, as noted, there is every kind of evidence that Paul's thinking about God has been expanded to include the reality of Christ as Son and Lord. Yet, second, there are texts that also seem to suggest a kind of subordination between Christ and God (3:23; 11:3; 15:27-28). Third, and most problematic, is to determine the relationship between christology and soteriology, which is not immediately discernible. Paul does not himself resolve these tensions, first, because either their resolution or simply their affirmation belongs to his and their shared symbolic universe, and second, because his interest in Christ in this letter is almost altogether soteriological. Christ both saves and sets the pattern for the ethical life of those who are being saved (11:1).

One can scarcely doubt that Paul sees Christ in terms of deity. The basic appellation is the primary Christian confession of "Lord," whose deep roots in the LXX as the appellation for God, however, allows (causes ?) Paul to attribute every kind of divine activity to Christ. Thus, believers pray to Christ;[19] to know the mind of the Lord (from Isa. 14:13) is now to have the mind of Christ (2:16). The OT "day

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no reality to the idol, and since food itself is a matter of indifference to God (8:8), then why can't we continue to join our friends at these feasts? We can scarcely be honoring a god, since the god doesn't exist." See Fee, 361-63.

[19] By "calling upon the name of the Lord," 1:2; cf. the early Aramaic prayer to Jesus recalled in 16:22 (*Marana tha*).

of the Lord" has become the "day of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1:8). The Lord whom Israel "provoked to jealousy" in the Song of Moses (Deut. 32:21) is now the Lord Christ, whom the Corinthians are provoking by attending idolatrous feasts (10:22). The divine will is both God's (1:1) and the Lord's (4:19; cf. 16:7); and judgment is now the prerogative of the Lord (4:4-5; 11:31). With fine irony Paul designates the one whom the rulers of this age killed as the "Lord of glory" (2:8), picking up the language "for our glory" in the preceding verse, and thus designating the Crucified one as Lord of all the ages and inheritor—as Lord—of the final glory that is both his and his people's.

Moreover, one must take seriously that grace and peace come from both God our Father *and* the Lord Jesus Christ (1:3), since one preposition controls both nouns. Thus the Father and Son (and Spirit) cooperate in the saving event. The Father calls, the Lord assigns (7:17); God washes, sanctifies, justifies by the authority of Christ and by the Spirit (6:11); everything God does is "in/by Christ Jesus."[20]

All of this is unthinkable language for a strict monotheist such as Paul, and can only be explained in light of his own encounter with the risen Christ. He had "seen Jesus our Lord" (9:1), which serves as the basis for his christology.[21] The resurrection and the designation "Son of God" probably lead to Paul's conviction of Christ's pre-existence, which is implied by the affirmation that "all things are through him" (8:6).[22] In any case, such is almost certainly their shared conviction.

What, then, does one do with, "and Christ is God's" (3:23) and "even the Son will be subjected to him . . . so that God might be all in all" (15:28)? The answer seems to lie in Paul's primary interest in soteriology. Whenever he uses Father and Son language (1:9; 8:6; 15:28), his interest is in salvation, which lies ultimately in the one God. Hence, the language of subordination is primarity functional, i.e. referring to Christ's function as savior, not to his being as God. In any case, these two realities hold together for Paul: God the Father is the source and goal of all that is; Christ the Lord functions as Savior, who effects the saving work of God in human history.

Although Paul does not *explicitly* make this point, Christ the Lord's role as Savior further establishes the connection between theology, gospel, and ethics. This is surely the way we are to understand the "hardship catalogue" of 4:11-13. Here is Paul's theology of the cross being applied to Christian life: the whole point of the next paragraph (vv. 14-17) is to urge them to "follow his way of life *in Christ Jesus.*" So also with his "not seeking his own good but the good of the many" as his way of "imitating Christ," which they again are commanded to follow. The life of the

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[20] This formula occurs some 22 times in the letter; its precise nuance is especially difficult to pin down. Sometimes it seems to be clearly locative (Christ is the sphere of their new existence); but in other cases is seems just as certainly instrumental (God has acted "in" Christ Jesus). In both cases the high christology is unmistakable.

[21] As well as for much else, I would argue, esp. his understanding of grace and apostleship.

[22] So also with "and the Rock *was* Christ," which probably intends to designate Christ not simply typologically as the rock at Horeb that "followed them," but also as the Lord, their Rock, whom Israel rejected in the wilderness (cf. Deut. 32:4, 15, etc.). On the other hand, 15:47, which is often seen this way, almost certainly refers to his present resurrection existence as "of heaven (= heavenly)" rather than "from heaven" in terms of his origins (see Fee, 792).

Son of God on earth, exemplified ultimately in his crucifixion, serves as the basis and goal of Christian ethics; this is to do all things for God's glory (10:31-11:1).

c. The Role of the Spirit

More than anywhere else this crucial issue is where the Corinthians and Paul are at odds. For them "Spirit" has been their entrée to life in the realm of *sophia* and *gnosis*, with their consequent rejection of the material order, both now (7:1-7) and for the future (15:12), as well as their rejection of Christian life as modeled by Paul's imitation of Christ (4:15-21). Their experience of tongues as the language(s) of angels had allowed them to assume heavenly existence now (4:8), thought of primarily in terms of non-material existence, rather than of ethical-moral life in the present. Thus Paul tries to disabuse them of their singular and overly enthusiastic emphasis on tongues (the point of chaps. 12-14); but in so doing, he tries to retool their understanding of the Spirit to bring it into line with the gospel. There are therefore three emphases as to the role of the Spirit.

First, despite an emphasis on sanctification, Paul only twice uses the full designation, *Holy* Spirit (6:19; 12:3). Most often he refers to the Spirit *of God* (2:11, 14, 16; 6:11; 7:40; 12:3) or the Spirit who is *from God* (2:12; 6:19). Thus the Spirit's activities are first of all the activities of God. With especially pointed irony Paul argues in 2:6-16 that since the Corinthians are *pneumatikoi* (Spirit people), they should have understood the cross as God's wisdom; for the Spirit alone knows the mind of God and has thus revealed what was formerly hidden. Since "like is known by like," the Spirit, who alone knows the thoughts of God and whom they have received, becomes the link on the human side for their knowing the thoughts of God. Moreover, by "the Spirit of our God" they have been washed, sanctified, and justified (6:11); only by the Spirit of God is the basic confession made as to the Lordship of Christ (12:3); and through one and the same Spirit God gives to the church the variety of manifestations for their common good (12:7-8). Thus Paul does not think of the Spirit as some energy or influence, but as God's own presence at work in their midst.

Second, and related to the first, the Spirit effectively appropriates the work of Christ to the life of the individual believer and the community. Paul's preaching in weakness a message of "divine weakness" brought about their conversion— through the power of the Spirit (2:4-5; cf. 4:20). It is the prophetic Spirit who reveals the secrets of the heart that leads to conversion (14:24-25). Hence it was by the Spirit they themselves were converted (6:11); and by the Spirit they confess Jesus as Lord (12:3). On the analogy of the one-flesh relationship in sexual intercourse, the believer has been so joined to the Lord as to become one S/spirit with him.[23] Furthermore, the Corinthians together became the one body of Christ by their common, lavish experience of Spirit (12:13);[24] and the Spirit's presence in/among them forms them into God's temple in Corinth (3:16).[25] Thus the Spirit belongs to

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[23] On this translation of this term see Fee, 204-05.

[24] As noted in the commentary (Fee, 603-06), the basic issue in this text is not how people become believers, but how the many of them (Jew, Greek, slave, free) became the one body of Christ.

[25] Thus the two basic images of the church in this letter (body, temple) are tied directly to the activity of the Spirit.

the gospel, not to *sophia* or *gnosis*[26] or non-material existence.

Third, the Spirit is also the key to ethical and community life. It is especially because they have received the Spirit of God, who is *in you,* that makes the body a temple of the Spirit and thus disallows sin against the body in the form of sexual immorality. This becomes the more pronounced in chaps. 12-14, where the key to true Spirit manifestations among them is to be found in the language of *oikodome.* After the description of love in chap. 13, which is first of all a description of the character of God and Christ (see how it begins with "love [=God] suffereth long and is kind"), he urges that they pursue love, and in that context eagerly desire the things of the Spirit, especially intelligible utterances, because they *build up.*

Thus "salvation in Christ" is the great concern in this letter, because such salvation is at once God's activity in their behalf and the revelation of his character. Therefore, salvation calls them to conform their own behavior to God's, as it is reflected and modeled by Christ and made effective by the Spirit.

3. Salvation and Ethics

The gospel that effects eschatological salvation also brings about a radical change in the way people live. That is the burden of this letter, and the theological presupposition behind every imperative. Therefore, although apocalyptic-cosmological language is also found, salvation is expressed primarily in ethical-moral language.

a. The Human Predicament

In a former day Paul had divided the world into two basic groups: Jew and Gentile. As a Christian the world is still divided into two groups: "us who are being saved" and "those who are perishing" (1:18), the latter now including both the former groups, seen in light of their basic idolatries (power and wisdom) and in terms of their response to the cross as God's saving event (1:20-24). For Paul the preaching of the gospel is intended to save people *from* the one existence and *for* the other. "Such were some of you," he says to them, following a major sin list (6:11); "when you were pagans," he says in 12:2 of their former life in idolatry.

Given the eschatological framework of Paul's thinking (see below), one is not surprised to find him at times referring to human fallenness in apocalyptic-cosmological terms. Idolatry is fellowship with demons (10:20-21); Satan tempts those who lack self-control (7:5); death is the final enemy, obviously one of the *archai, exousiai,* and *dynamai,* that Christ will destroy at his Parousia (15:24-26). Likewise the five items mentioned in 3:22 (world, life, death, present, future) are best understood as the tyrannies to which people are in lifelong bondage as slaves, and over which Christ has already taken jurisdiction.

The human predicament is also expressed in terms of people's living in the present age, apart from, and over against, God. Three terms describe this existence: The *psychikoi,* because they do not have the Spirit of God, cannot know what God is

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[26] Surely Paul's heading the list of Spirit manifestations in 12:8 with the *logos sophias* and *logos gnoseos* is another moment of irony. These "gifts" that are their special province are thus reshaped in terms consonant with the gospel (=message of wisdom, etc.).

about in Christ (2:14). They are also *sarkinoi/sarkikoi*[27]—still in the physical body, and as such giving way to the flesh (=sinful nature).[28] The ultimate censure of such people is that they are living *kata anthropon* (as "mere human beings," 3:3-4).

In each case this depiction of the fallen condition stands in contrast to those who are Spirit people, who have thus entered the realm of eschatological existence that stands in contradiction to what is merely human. What is "merely human" belongs to "this world/age" that is passing away (2:6-8); the "disputer of this age" and the "wisdom of this world" do not know God (1:20-21), just as the "rulers of this age" did not understand God's wisdom revealed in Christ crucified (2:8). Because they lack the Spirit, such people have eyes that cannot see, ears that cannot hear, nor can their (merely) human minds conceive what God has done in Christ (2:9).

Despite such ways of expressing the human predicament, however, and because the letter deals mostly with behavioral aberrations, salvation is most often seen in terms of moral failure. People are sinners, and what God has provided in Christ is salvation from sin. Sin is the deadly poison that leads to death (15:56). Christ died "for our sins" (15:3); and to deny a future resurrection means to deny Christ's resurrection, thus leaving the living still in their sins and the dead without hope (vv. 17-18). Although *hamart-* language does not abound,[29] this is the burden throughout. The ultimate exhortation is to "sober up as you ought and stop sinning," precisely because others *do not know God* (15:34). Those who are perishing are thus described as *adikoi* (6:1, 9) or *apistoi.*[30] If the latter term is most often descriptive, for Paul it is never merely descriptive. People are "wicked," not simply overtly so, but also because they do not believe.

The specific forms of wickedness that lead to the world's being condemned (11:32) are many and varied. Often they reflect Paul's Jewish view of the pagan environment of Corinth: idolatry (5:10-11; 6:10; 8:10; 10:7, 14); various forms of *porneia* (5:1-2, 10-11; 6:10 [several words]; 6:18; 10:8); greed (5:10-11; 6:1-6, 10); robbery (5:10-11; 6:10); drunkenness (5:11; 6:10); and delighting in wickedness (13:6). But just as often it includes particularly self-centered sins: pride (4:6, 18-19; 5:2, 6; 8:1; 13:4); seeking one's own interests (10:33; 13:5); shaming those who have nothing (11:22); keeping records of the evil done by others (13:5); and various sins of discord (*schisma* [1:10; 11:18], *eris* [1:11; 3:3], *zelos* [3:3; 13:5], *loidoria* [5:11; 6:10], *aposterein* [6:8; 7:5], *gogguzein* [10:10]).

People are wicked and sinful; they do not know God. But Christ died "for our sins," not only to forgive, but also to free people from their sins. Hence Paul's extreme agitation at the Corinthians' sinfulness, because they are thereby persisting in the very sins from which God in Christ has saved them. This, after all, is what most of the letter is all about.

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[27] I have argued that Paul uses these terms with precision in 3:1-3, to refer to physical existence (3:1, *sarkinos*) and to the "sinful nature" (*sarkikos*, 3:3), as a twin blow against their false spirituality (see Fee, 121-24).

[28] I would also include here the usage of *sarx* in 5:5. On this much debated text and reasons for seeing it as referring to the incestuous man's sinful nature, see Fee, 208-12.

[29] *hamartia* 15:3, 17, 56 [2x]; *hamartema* 6:18; *hamartano* 6:18; 7:28 [2x], 36; 8:12 [2x]; 15:34.

[30] 6:6; 7:12, 13, 14 [2x], 15; 10:27; 14:22 [2x], 23, 24.

b. The Saving Event

The focus of Paul's gospel is on the saving event effected by Christ's death (8:11; 11:26; 15:3), and especially on his *crucifixion* (1:13, 17, 18, 23; 2:2, 8; cf. 5:7), which is variously asserted to be "for you" (*hyper hymon;* 1:13; 11:24) or "for (*hyper*) our sins" (15:3). In the words of institution the wine represents "the new covenant in my blood" (11:25), and those who partake of the Table are thus said to "fellowship in the blood of Christ" (10:16).

Despite the frequency of these references, it is not easy to determine how Paul understood Christ's death as "for us." The combination of 5:7 (Christ as the sacrificed paschal lamb), 11:24-25 (my body "for you"; the new covenant in my blood), and 15:3 (Christ died for our sins) suggests a much richer understanding than is actually spelled out. Most likely, this language reflects Isaiah 53 (LXX), where God's suffering servant bears the sins of the many. In any case, this is the language of atonement, in which a combination of motifs from both the Exodus and the sacrificial system combine into a rich tapestry. It presupposes alienation between God and humans because of human sinfulness, for which the just penalty is death. The death of Christ "for our sins" means that one died on behalf of others to satisfy the penalty and to overcome the alienation. For Paul this almost certainly includes not only forgiveness of past sins, but in a very real sense deliverance from the bondage of one's sinfulness as well. That, at least, is what the primary metaphors for salvation in this letter suggest, especially so in light of the overall concern of the letter.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the predominant metaphors for salvation all touch on the ethical sphere. At issue is human sinfulness; not only in its boasting over against God, but in its various forms of behavior that reflect that boasting. Salvation involves both deliverance *from* sin and *for* righteousness. This is especially true of the two sets of three metaphors in 1:30 (as nouns: righteousness, sanctification, redemption) and 6:11 (as verbs: washed, sanctified, justified [made righteous?]). Thus:[31]

Dikaiosyne (1:30; cf. *edikaiothete,* 6:11) most likely places emphasis on "righteousness," both as gift and requirement, rather than on rightstanding before the Law. Nothing else in the letter suggests a forensic metaphor, whereas, especially in the context of 6:1-11, the verb seems to be used in a kind of wordplay over against the *adikoi* (the unbelieving "wicked," vv. 1, 9) and the one who by "wronging" (*akideite,* vv. 7-8) his brother is acting just like the *adikoi.* "Such *were* some of you," Paul says, "but you *edikaiothete* (have been made right[eous])."

Sanctification is also a metaphor for conversion in this letter (1:30; 6:11; cf. 1:2). In calling people to himself, and in effecting their salvation through Christ's death, God has determined to set them apart for himself as his "holy people," which in this letter regularly entails observable behavior.

Redemption, which occurs as a noun in 1:30, also occurs as a full metaphor in 6:20 and 7:23 ("You were bought at a price"). The noun most likely reflects Exodus

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[31] Since the emphasis throughout is on God's initiative and Christ's redemptive work, there is very little emphasis on the believer's own response. Most often Paul refers simply to their "believing" (1:21; 3:5; 15:2, 11; cf. *pistis,* 2:5; 15:14, 17); but the near equation of "your faith" in 15:14 and 17 with "having put our hope in Christ" in v. 19 suggests that "faith" means to respond to Christ's saving activity with full trust, including a total confidence that he has secured the believer's future.

imagery, thus the deliverance of slaves held in bondage to sin. But the usage in 6:20 (and partly so in 7:23) seems to put emphasis on being purchased *for God,* so that one is now his "slave," to walk in his ways.

Washing (6:11), although very likely also referring to Christian baptism, in the context of 6:1-11 refers primarily to being "washed" from the sins just mentioned in vv. 9-10.

Thus God's aim in salvation is not merely to create a people for his name who will inherit his kingdom, but to create a people for his name who will be "sanctified," i.e., who will be like Christ himself and thus live and behave in the present in ways that will glorify God's name.

c. The Ethical Response

It is emphatic in this letter that the gospel demands a proper ethical response, that salvation in Christ is not complete without Christlike attitudes and behavior. Such is assumed at every point; it is also frequently stated. In the context of their excluding the incestuous man, Paul asserts that they are a "new lump" because "Christ our Passover has been sacrificed." That is, the sacrifice of Christ for sin is the basis of their transfer from the old to the new. "So then," he concludes, still playing on Passover imagery, "let us keep the feast without the old leaven of *kakias kai ponerias* (two synonyms which gather under their umbrella every form of iniquity), but with the new leaven of sincerity and truth (fully authentic behavior, without sham or deceit, that can stand the light of day)."

Likewise, in 6:11, after a severe warning, which includes a considerable sin catalogue describing the *adikoi* who will *not* inherit the eschatological kingdom, Paul reasserts with equal vigor: "And these things are what some of you *were;* but you were washed, etc." Paul simply cannot let warning be the final word; but neither will he allow the warning to be taken lightly.[32] It is precisely this tension that needs theological resolution. What seems to miss Paul's theology are resolutions that either turn the imperatives into "Christian rules," on the one hand, or effectively emasculate them, on the other.

The classic expression of Paul's understanding of the relationship between gospel and ethics (indicative and imperative) is to be found in 5:7. With reference to the incestuous man, he commands the church, "cleanse out the old leaven, in order that you might become a new batch of dough." But that comes perilously close to sounding as if the imperative preceded the indicative, so he immediately qualifies, "even as you really are." Thus "become what you are" is a basic form of Pauline parenesis.

But to say the imperative now follows the indicative is not quite adequate, since there are different kinds of imperative, both before and after the indicative. What Christ has done is forever to abolish the old imperatives, the Jewish boundary-markers of circumcision (7:18-19) and food laws (9:19-22; 10:23-11:1), that gave privilege. These may *not* be placed after the indicative, as imperatives, either in their Jewish form or in any new Christian form. Neither circumcision *nor* uncircumcision counts for anything (7:18); and food will not commend us to God (8:8). Since in Christ neither kosher nor non-kosher has significance, Paul does or does not depend-

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[32] Cf. esp. the combination in chap. 10 of warning (vv. 6-12), affirmation (v. 13), and imperative (v. 14).

ing on context (9:19-22). Likewise Jewish Christians may continue to eat as Jews. What they may not do is to superimpose these regulations on the one who is free in Christ.[33]

On the other hand, because Paul dismisses all such boundary markers as totally outside questions of Christian conscience (10:25), one may not infer that for Paul there are no absolutes with regard to conduct. Paul warns that those who persist in the sins of 6:9-10 will not inherit the kingdom; they are commanded to stop sinning in 15:34. While it is true that neither circumcision nor uncircumcision counts for anything, something does count, namely "keeping the commandments of God"! (7:19). If Paul eats as one who is *anomos* ("outside the Jewish law") with those outside the Law, this does not mean he is truly *anomos* (="lawless"). To the contrary, he is *ennomos Christou* ("under Christ's law" 9:21). Both of these phrases ("keeping the commandments of God" and "under Christ's law") must be understood as requiring obedience to the Christian imperatives, in the form of Pauline parenesis.

Thus, idolatry in the form of attendance at idol meals is incompatible with life in Christ—absolutely (10:14-22); sexual immorality is wrong—absolutely (6:18-20). And so also is strife and slander and greed, and all those other sins mentioned in this letter. Ethical life is not optional; it is the only viable fruition of the work of the gospel.

But even here, Paul never begins with the imperative. For him it must be response to the gospel, or it is nothing at all. That is why so much of the content of this letter, in all of the behavioral sections, takes the form of theological argumentation. The divine order still has moral and ethical absolutes; there is conduct that is totally incompatible with "being in Christ." But Paul never begins here. Going to the prostitutes (6:12-20) is wrong first of all because their own case is based on a faulty view of *exousia* and of the body, and exhibits an invalid understanding of the nature of the sexual relationship. But it is finally prohibited because the body, which is destined for resurrection, has been thus redeemed by Christ and invaded by the Holy Spirit. Going to the temples is prohibited because their case is based on a false view of idolatry and an incorrect basis for conduct (*gnosis*), but it is finally prohibited because fellowship with demons is imcompatible with fellowship with Christ at his Table, where one reaffirms the benefits of the new covenant (8:1-13; 10:1-22).

But all has not been said. Ethics for Paul is ultimately a *theological* issue pure and simple. Everything has to do with God, and what God is about in Christ and the Spirit. Thus (1) the *purpose* (or basis) of Christian ethics is the glory of God (10:31); (2) the *pattern* for such ethics is Christ (11:1); (3) the *principle* is love, precisely because it alone reflects God's character (8:2-3; 13:1-8); (4) and the *power* is the Spirit (6:11, 19). Since we have already made note of items 1, 2, and 4, a further word is needed about love.

Although Paul clearly understands that the gospel sets one free and thus gives one *exousia* (6:12; 9:1-2, 19; 10:23), this is not for him the basis of ethical conduct—because as in the case of the Corinthians it can be abused (6:12-20; 8:9). So also with *gnosis*—Paul is not against it,[34] it simply fails as the basis for ethics. In both cases it leads to abuse of others (8:7, 9); indeed, ethics based on *gnosis* invariably

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[33] Which, of course, is what makes the whole argument of 11:2-16 so surprising, the best solution to which is not Paul's basic cultural conservatism, but their apparent disregard for sexual distinctions in the present age. They are not yet as the angels!

[34] See esp. 12:8; 13:2; 14:6.

"puffs up," gives one too high a view of oneself and a correspondingly too low view of others.[35]

Love, on the other hand, is the ultimate expression of the character of God. Therefore, it "builds up" (8:2); indeed the one who loves is the truly "knowing [or known] one."[36] The basis of Christian conduct is what is beneficial, what builds up; therefore, it does not seek its own good but that of the other (10:23-24, 33; 13:5). And this of course is what God himself is all about in the gospel.

d. The Church, the Sphere of Salvation

Finally, 1 Corinthians is about the church, the local community of believers, who live out the gospel in relationship to one another and over against the world. If the gospel is at stake by the Corinthian theology and behavior, so also is its visible expression in the local community of redeemed people. This is made clear both by his basic images for the church (temple of God, body of Christ) and by the nature of the argument in several sections, especially 5:1-13 and 6:1-12.

Two great images predominate. First, the local church is God's temple in Corinth (3:16-17). With this imagery Paul makes several points: (a) As the temple of God they are expected to live as his alternative both to the pagan temples and to the way of life that surround them. Indeed, this is precisely the concern throughout so much of the letter, that there are too many gray areas so that they are hardly distinguishable from the Corinth in which they live (cf. 5:1; 6:7; 10:32; 14:23). (b) What makes them God's temple is the presence of the Holy Spirit in their midst. Thus, in contrast to the mute idols around them, they are themselves the sanctuary of the living God by his Spirit. And when God's Spirit is manifested among them by prophetic utterance, pagans will have their hearts searched and judged and they will come to recognize that God is among his people (14:24-25). (c) So sacred (*hagios*) to God is his temple that those who would destroy it—as they are doing by their quarrels and worldly wisdom—will themselves be destroyed by God (3:17). This understanding of their existence as a people among whom God is powerfully present by his Spirit makes possible our understanding of 5:1-13, where the church is purified by removing the incestuous man, yet he himself will experience salvation from such an action. Apparently being removed from such a community will lead to his repentance.

Second, the church is the body of Christ (10:17; 11:29; 12:12-26). With this image Paul makes essentially two points: (a) Underlying the imagery is the necessity of unity. As with the preceding image, the key to this unity is their common, lavish experience of the Spirit (12:13). Whether Jew or Greek, slave or free, they are one in Christ through the Spirit. Precisely because they are *one* body in Christ, the rich must cease abusing the poor at the Lord's Table (11:22, 29); and those who are more visible may not say to the less visible, "we have no need of you" (12:21-26). God has so arranged the body that all the members are essential to one another. (b) But his greater concern with this imagery is the concomitant necessity of diversity. Rather than the uniformity that the Corinthians value, Paul urges that they recognize the need for all the various manifestations of the one Spirit. Otherwise there

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[35] See esp. the biting rhetoric of 4:7, "What have you that you have not received?" expressed in the context of condemning their pride. Such people fail to see everything as gift; hence they also fail to live out of gratitude.

[36] See my argument for this as the original text of 8:2-3 (Fee, 367-68).

is no body, only a monstrosity (12:15-20).

Therefore, neither the gospel, nor its ethical response, is individualistic. God is not gathering individuals into his kingdom; he is saving a *people* for his name. Above all, it is as a people that they must live out the gospel. Thus, every argument is aimed at their becoming this people. This is especially spelled out in the most highly unusual arguments of 5:1-13 and 6:1-11, where in both cases the sins of individuals, grievous as they are, and as strongly as Paul condemns them, play a secondary role to his consternation with the church.

In 5:1-13 the argument is addressed almost entirely to the church and its arrogance. What is at issue is not simply a low view of sin; rather, it is the church itself: Will it follow Paul's gospel with its ethical implications? or will it continue its present "spirituality," one that tolerates (or condones) such sin and thereby destroys God's temple in Corinth?

In 6:1-11 the two great urgencies, besides his concern over the two men themselves (taken up in vv. 7-11), are the church's self-understanding as God's eschatological people (vv. 2-4) and its witness before the world (vv. 5-6). Their existence as an eschatological people, who are to judge both the world and angels, trivializes all matters that belong merely to this present age. But what concerns him in this is their "defeat" before the world, their shooting down the gospel and its "new-age" behavior "in front of unbelievers" (v. 6; cf. 15:34).

And so it goes throughout. God's eschatological salvation is creating a new people, who collectively must live the life of the future in the present age, as they await its consummation. Which leads to the final matter—the eschatological goal of salvation.

4. The Eschatological Goal of Salvation

It is now time to return to the longer definition of the gospel suggested earlier: "God's *eschatological* salvation, effected through the death and resurrection of Christ, and resulting in an *eschatological community* who live out *the life of the future in the present age* by the power of the Spirit, as they *await the consummation.*" Salvation is not simply a matter of changed behavior in the present. The absolutely essential framework of all of Paul's theological thinking, as well as the goal of God's saving event, is eschatological. This note is struck at the beginning in the thanksgiving (1:7-8, they "await the revelation of our Lord Jesus Christ" at which time God "will confirm them blameless on the day of our Lord Jesus Christ"), and it is the final note before the concluding grace-benediction (16:22, *Marana tha;* "Come, O Lord"). So, too, it is the assumption of the theologoumenon in 8:6 ("one God, the Father, from whom are all things and we *for* him"). Since salvation is essentially eschatological, always pointing toward its final consummation at the Parousia, the future is therefore understood to condition everything in the present. Which is why ethical life is not optional; life in Christ in the present age is but the life of the future already begun.

a. The Framework Itself

Paul's eschatological thinking has its focus in the event of Christ, his death and resurrection, and the subsequent gift of the Spirit. Christ's resurrection marks the turning of the ages (15:20-23; cf. 10:11); the subsequent gift of the eschatological Spirit is the certain evidence that the End has begun (cf. 1:7; 13:8-13). But the facts

that believers still live in bodies subject to decay (15:49-53), that the *charismata* are *only* for the present (13:8-13), and that there is yet a future Parousia of the Lord (11:26; 15:23) with a subsequent resurrection (15:20-28), also offer clear evidence that what has begun has not yet been fully brought to consummation. Thus, salvation is both "already" and "not yet."

This framework is thoroughgoing: God's Rule, begun by Christ who *now* reigns until his Parousia (15:24-25), is both present (4:20) and future (6:9-10; 15:50). At the Lord's Table they proclaim his death until he comes (11:26). Judgment belongs essentially to the future (4:4-5; 5:13), but the death of some is God's "judgment" at work now so that they will escape final condemnation (11:30-32).

b. The Future as "Already"

This perspective can be seen especially in Paul's ethics. The believer's present existence is entirely determined by the the future that has already been set in motion ("the time has been foreshortened" 7:29-31). God's people live "as if not"; they are not, as others, conditioned by the present order that is passing away.[37] Such a point of view controls Paul's ethical imperatives at every step. Believers may not take one another to pagan courts, because their lives are conditioned by eschatological realities that render the redressing of one's grievances a mere triviality (6:1-6); believers may not attend pagan feasts because the judgments against idolatry of a former time have been written down to warn those upon whom the end of the ages have come (10:11). All merely human values and behavior have already been judged by God in Christ; already the present age is passing away (1:26-28; 7:31). Thus believers must exercise internal judgments in the present (5:12-13); the church must cleanse out the old leaven so that it might be a new loaf (5:7-8).

c. The Future as "Not Yet"

On the other hand, the future that has begun and absolutely conditions present existence still awaits its final consummation. In contrast to the Corinthians' overly spiritualized present realization of future realities,[38] Paul frequently reminds them that they still await the revelation of the Lord (1:7), that they themselves must yet face the day of the Lord (1:8; 3:13-15), that they are to withhold judgment until the appointed time when the Lord comes and will expose hearts (4:5), that even

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[37] Paul uses the terms "this age" and "this world" somewhat interchangeably (cf. 1:20 and 3:18-19). The use of the demonstrative "*this* age/world" (1:20; 2:6 [2x]; 2:8; 3:18/3:19; 5:10; 7:31) tends to emphasize its present character in contrast to that to come, while the use of the verb *katargein* especially emphasizes that this present age and that which belongs to it have been judged and rendered ineffective through the cross and resurrection (see 1:28; 2:6; 6:13; 13:8 [2x], 10, 11; 15:24, 26; cf. *paragei* in 7:31).

[38] Despite some demurrers, both the nature of the rhetoric and the combination of "already" and "ruling" in 4:8 seems to reflect Paul's own view of their present perspective. Whether this is a carefully thought through position, and whether it is an over-realized eschatology in a linear sense of time is more debatable. Most likely their experience of Spirit has simply put them "above" the present age, having already assumed angelic existence.

though Christ reigns now (15:25) and death is already theirs (3:22), only at the still future Parousia will all the powers finally be destroyed (15:23-26).

Such a future is as certain as life itself. Being Christ's means that both both life and death, both the present and the future belong to those who are his (3:22-23). Again, this certainty has been guaranteed by the resurrection. Just as God raised up the Lord, so he will raise up believers (6:14; 15:1-28). Christ is the firstfruits, God's own surety of the full harvest (15:20). When Christ comes again, not only will he raise the dead and transform the living, but by these events he will also have finally destroyed the last enemy, death itself (15:24-28, 54-57). So certain is Paul that Christ's resurrection guarantees the future of believers that he finally taunts death in the language of Hos. 13:14 (15:55). When death is thus rendered helpless by resurrection, then salvation will have reached its conclusion; and the present reigning Lord, having destroyed all other dominions, will hand over the rule to God the Father, so that the God who initiated salvation will thus be "all in all."

But even here the final word is one of exhortation (15:58). Despite the magnificent crescendo with which Paul brings the argument of chap. 15 to its climax, the last word is not the sure word of future hope and triumph of vv. 50-57; rather, in light of such realities, the last word is an exhortation to Christian living (v. 58). Thus, eschatological salvation, the great concern of the epistle, includes proper behavior or it simply is not the gospel Paul preaches.

Horeb/Sinai and the Rise of Law in the Wilderness Tradition

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Two observations provide a starting point for this paper. First, the wilderness is the primary setting of the Pentateuch. Defined as broadly as possible the wilderness consists of Exod 13:17-Deuteronomy.[1] Second, the revelation of law presently dominates the Wilderness Tradition. Of the 134 chapters in Exodus 13:17-Deuteronomy, 73 are law leaving 61 chapters for the remaining narratives, poetry, itinerary lists, land lists, and genealogies. Furthermore, a quick overview of the literature also illustrates how central the law is and how intimately it is presently woven into the thematic development of the wilderness, both positively in defining Israel as the people of God, and negatively in providing background for interpreting Israel's rebellion. The departure from Egypt into the wilderness leads quickly to the extended revelation of (primarily) priestly law at Mount Sinai (Exodus 19-Numbers 10) as one stage in Israel's wilderness travels. After this initial revelation of law provides definition for the people of God, law continues to be interspersed throughout the remainder of Israel's wilderness wanderings and rebellions in Numbers, as the people approach the outer reaches of the land (law occurs in Numbers 15, 18, 19, 28, 29). Law remains the central focus when Israel's wilderness wanderings and rebellions are recounted in Deuteronomy in order to provide a context for the revelation of deuteronomic law on Mount Horeb.

In spite of the pervasiveness of the wilderness setting and the close interrelationship between law and narrative in the present structure of the Pentateuch, the tendency in past scholarship has been to define the boundaries of the Wilderness Tradition much more narrowly and to separate the two genres of law and narrative in investigating its tradition-historical development. Noth provides illustration. First, he not only limits discussion of the Wilderness Tradition to the Tetrateuch (thus eliminating Deuteronomy), but he also determines the boundaries of the Wilderness Tradition in Exodus/Numbers in relation to the two adjacent themes "Guidance out of Egypt" and "Guidance into the Land."[2] The result of this is that the theme "Guidance in the Wilderness" is a linking tradition, according to Noth, which fills the gap between its two adjacent themes. Second, although he is not able to separate clearly the theme "Guidance in the Wilderness" from the themes "Guidance out of

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[1] See G. W. Coats, "A Structural Transition in Exodus," *VT* 22 (1972) 129-142; and "An Exposition for the Wilderness Traditions," *VT* 22 (1972) 288-295.

[2] M. Noth, *The Deuteronomistic History* (JSOTSup 15; Sheffield: University of Sheffield, 1981); and *A History of Pentateuchal Traditions* (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981) 58-59, 115-136.

Egypt" and "Guidance into the Land," he is confident that the Wilderness Tradition is distinct from the theme "Revelation at Sinai," which provides the locus for the rise of law in the Tetrateuch.[3] By isolating the themes "Guidance in the Wilderness" and "Revelation at Sinai," and by separating Deuteronomy from the Tetrateuch Noth was able to bypass law in tracing much of the growth of the Wilderness Tradition. Given Noth's presuppositions and his methodology there is no room for a paper on the rise of law within the Wilderness Tradition except as a later addition to a firmly fixed tradition, since, according to Noth, the wilderness is really developed within the source narratives to link the themes of deliverance and land. Within this framework, a study of law should be undertaken within the theme "Revelation at Sinai."

Recent research on the Wilderness and the so-called Sinai Traditions both in the Tetrateuch and in Deuteronomy call into question the narrow boundaries of the Wilderness Tradition and the assumed absence of law in the very formation of the tradition. In the following paper I would like to review this scholarship in general, while focusing more specifically on the tradition-historical development of Mount Horeb and Mount Sinai, since law in the wilderness is clustered primarily around these two cosmic mountains and they are usually not considered to be firmly anchored in the Wilderness Tradition. The paper will separate into three parts. First, the tradition history of Mount Horeb in deuteronomistic tradition must be traced in relation to the Wilderness Tradition. Second, the rise of Mount Sinai as one stage in Israel's wilderness travels must be briefly sketched as a development within priestly tradition. Third, we must return to examine three presuppositions that inform Noth's tradition-historical anslysis of the Wilderness Tradition: that the tradition history of Deuteronomy does not directly inform the growth of the Wilderness Tradition in the Tetrateuch; that "Revelation at Sinai" is an ancient tradition with its own distinct and extensive development of law; and that narrative sources exist independent of law.[4]

I.
Mount Horeb and the Wilderness Tradition

The interest of this paper in Mount Horeb as a signifier of law allows us to bypass its earliest tradition history and focus instead on its development within deuteronomistic tradition.[5] We will first trace the rise of Horeb in relation to the Wilderness Tradition in the Book of Deuteronomy and then branch out into Exodus-Numbers. This procedure will allow us to test Noth's assumption that Deuteronomy is distinct from the Tetrateuch, and therefore not influential in the growth of the Wilderness Tradition.

Although Horeb plays a central role in the Book of Deuteronomy (Deut 1:2, 6; 19, 4:10, 15; 5:2; 9:8; 18:16; 28:69), recent research has provided strong evidence

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[3] Noth, *A History of Pentateuchal Traditions*, 59-60, 141-145.

[4] Noth, *A History of Pentateuchal Traditions*, 8-41.

[5] See L. Perlitt ("Sinai und Horeb," *Beiträge zur alttestamentlichen Theologie: Festschrift für W. Zimmerli* [ed. H. Donner, R. Hanhart, R. Smend; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1977] 302-322 esp. 306-322) for a more broad based tradition-historical study ofHoreb which includes discussion of whether the term originally referred to a mountain or a wilderness region.

that there is a Wilderness Tradition of rebellion in Deuteronomy which precedes law and that the revelation of law at Mount Horeb is a later deuteronomistic innovation. Mayes, for example, argues that an early form of Deuteronomy included speeches by Moses (Deut 4:45; 6:4-6, 20-24; 7:1-3, 6, 17-24; 8:7-11a, 12-14, 17-18a; 9:1-7a, 13-14, 26-29; 10:10-11), which functioned as an introduction to law (Deut 12-26:16*).[6] The introductory speeches by Moses, according to Mayes, were given no exact location, but focused instead on Israel's relationship to the land and how they provoked God to wrath in the wilderness (9:7a, 13-14).[7] Most recently this argument has been taken up by Aurelius, who in tracing the tradition history of Deut 9:1-10:11, also concludes that references to the wilderness (*midbar*) are not designations of Horeb.[8]

Mount Horeb is judged to be an innovation by deuteronomistic editors, who incorporate Deuteronomy as an introduction to the Deuteronomistic History. References to Horeb occur primarily in Deuteronomy, where it functions as a symbol for deuteronomic law in general and the revelation of the Decalogue in particular.[9] Once again Mayes provides illustration of the effect that the introduction of Horeb had in Deuteronomy. He argues that with the incorporation of Mount Horeb into the Book of Deuteronomy the wilderness becomes the point of origin for law and covenant, with the result that rebellion in the wilderness becomes the breaking of deuteronomic law. The interrelation of law, covenant and rebellion within Deuteronomy, in turn, provides a paradigm for reading the Deuteronomistic History.[10]

Two conclusions concerning the tradition-historical development of the wilderness in Deuteronomy follow from this brief overview. First, early traditions in Deuteronomy suggest that there is a Wilderness Tradition of rebellion that precedes law. Second, the rise of law is not clearly isolated or separated from the Wilderness Tradition of Deuteronomy. Instead, law must be viewed as being part of the Wilderness Tradition itself, since it provides the basis for a major transformation both in structure and in theme. Wilderness itineraries must be adjusted to incorporate Horeb (Deut 1:2, 6, 19),[11] the revelation of law must be firmly anchored in the wilderness (Deut 5:2),[12] and finally Mount Horeb also becomes the paradigmatic place of rebellion in the wilderness (Deut 9:8).[13]

The question arises whether this transformation in the Wilderness Tradition is limited to the Book of Deuteronomy (hence supporting Noth's view of a Tetrateuch) or whether deuteronomistic editors also simultaneously transform wilderness

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[6] A. D. H. Mayes, *Deuteronomy* (NCB; Greenwood: Attic Press, 1979) 47-48.

[7] Mayes, *Deuteronomy*, 48-49.

[8] E. Aurelius, *Der Fürbitter Israels: Eine Studie zum Mosebild im Alten Testament* (ConBOTS 27; Lund: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1988) 13-18.

[9] See Perlitt, "Horeb und Sinai," 307-308.

[10] Mayes, *Deuteronomy*, 34-37; "Deuteronomy 5 and the Decalogue," *Proceedings of the Irish Biblical Association* 4 (1980) 68-83; and "Deuteronomy 4 and the Literary Criticism of Deuteronomy," *JBL* 100 (1981) 23-51.

[11] For a redaction-critical study of Deut 1:1-5, see S. Mittmann, *Deuteronomium 1,1-6,3 literarkritisch und traditionsgeschichtlich untersucht* (BZAW 139; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1975) 8-15.

[12] Mayes, *Deuteronomy*, 41-47.

[13] Aurelius, *Der Fürbitter Israels*, 10-18, 44-56.

stories in Exodus and Numbers to conform to Deuteronomy, and in so doing introduce a Horeb tradition of law as an integral part of these stories. A thorough redaction-critical examination of the literature exceeds the limits of this paper. Recent research, however, concerning the influence of deuteronomistic editors both in the Wilderness and in the so-called Sinai Traditions suggests that the rise of Mount Horeb in Deuteronomy also influences the structure and thematic development of these stories in Exodus and Numbers.

With regard to the so-called Sinai Tradition, Perlitt has argued that deuteronomistic editors significantly reshaped a theophany tradition into an occassion for the revelation of law and the establishment of covenant in Exodus 19-34. An important component of his argument is that the Decalogue is rooted in Deuteronomy and only secondarily incorporated in Exodus.[14] Nicholson has followed the lead of Perlitt while also expanding his argument by suggesting that the deuteronomistic redaction of Exodus 19-34 be identified with Mount Horeb in Deuteronomy.[15]

The work of Perlitt, Nicholson and others[16] allows for a number of proposals. First, it suggests that deuteronomistic editors are working on a much broader scale than simply reshaping the Wilderness Tradition in Deuteronomy, and that they are simultaneously transforming wilderness stories in Exodus/Numbers.[17] In this case Noth's notion of a Tetrateuch breaks down because deuteronomistic editors are anchoring Deuteronomy both in the Pentateuch and in the Deuteronomistic History. The tradition history of the wilderness in Deuteronomy lays the groundwork for two additional proposals: that the introduction of law into the wilderness in Exodus (most probably the Decalogue and the Book of the Covenant) is deuteronomistic; and that the deuteronomistic revelation of law in Exodus should not be interpreted as a distinct theme or complex within the Pentateuch (i.e., Revelation at Sinai), but as part of the tradition-historical development of the Wilderness Tradition along much the same lines as the Book of Deuteronomy. I would also argue that the introduction of a Horeb tradition of law in the wilderness stories of Exodus/Numbers is pre-Sinaitic. This conclusion, however, anticipates a tradition-historical study of Mount Sinai within priestly tradition in the second half of this paper.

With regard to the additional wilderness narratives in Exodus/Numbers, Aurelius (building on the work of among others Rendtorff, Rose, Schmid[18]) has most recently argued for a large role in the formation of the material by deuteronomistic editors.

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[14] L. Perlitt, *Bundestheologie im Alten Testament* (WMANT 36; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1969) 61-100, 156-238.

[15] E. W. Nicholson, "The Decalogue as the Direct Address of God," *VT* 27 (1977) 422-433.

[16] See also E. Zenger, *Die Sinaitheophanie: Untersuchungen zum jahwistischen und elohistischen Geschichtswerk* (Forschung zur Bibel; Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1971).

[17] See R. Rendtorff, *Das überlieferungsgeschichtliche Problem des Pentateuch* (BZAW 147; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1976) 164-165; and A. D. H. Mayes, *The Story of Israel between Settlement and Exile: A Redactional Study of the Deuteronomistic History* (London: SCM Press, 1983) 139-149.

[18] Rendtorff, *Das überlieferungsgeschichtliche Problem des Pentateuch*, 158-173; M. Rose, *Deuteronomist und Jahwist: Untersuchungen zu den Berührungspunkten beider Literaturwerke* (ATANT 67; Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1981); H. H. Schmid, *Der sogenannte Jahwist: Beobachtungen und Fragen zur Pentateuchforschung* (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1976) 61-82.

Whether one accepts his thesis that there are no pre-deuteronomistic narratives in Numbers, his work does underscore the prominence of deuteronomistic motifs and themes in Exodus 15-17 and in Numbers llff, and how these stories are also being structured in light of the Deuteronomistic History.[19]

In summary, there is strong evidence in Deuteronomy that law must be interpreted in the context of the wilderness and that the introduction of Mount Horeb significantly restructures the Wilderness Tradition. One suspects the same influence in Exodus and in Numbers. The evidence of deuteronomistic redactors throughout the Wilderness and so-called Sinai Traditions is clear. The role of law in actually shaping the narratives throughout Exodus and Numbers, however, has not yet been demonstrated. The interweaving of Horeb (Exod 3:1; 17:6; 33:6) as well as direct references to law (e.g., Num 14:11-19) certainly encourage further study, for they suggest that the Wilderness Tradition is being fundamentally reshaped both in Deuteronomy and in Exodus for the sake of law. If such is the case, then law could not be bracketed out in tracing the tradition history of the wilderness narratives.

II.
Mount Sinai and the Wilderness Tradition

The antiquity of Mount Sinai within pentateuchal tradition and its central role for the rise of law within the Pentateuch remain the majority position among scholars. Yet inroads are being made which make this position more difficult to hold. We have already seen how current research on the rise of law within deuteronomistic tradition raises questions concerning the antiquity of law within an independent Sinai Tradition. A closer examination of the tradition-historical development of Mount Sinai raises still further problems in the majority position. In particular, the nearly exclusive reference to Mount Sinai in relation to priestly legislation within the Pentateuch (Exodus-Leviticus-Numbers, 29 of 36 occurrences), as well as the absence of this term altogether in literature outside of the Pentateuch until the post-exilic period (Neh 9:13),[20] call into question the antiquity of the tradition of Sinai as a cosmic mountain of law.[21]

In view of these problems Booij, for example, has suggested that there is a late "Sinaitization" of the cosmic mountain tradition in Exodus.[22] Along the same lines, Van Seters's has most recently concluded, "It is possible that the giving of divine law was first associated with Moses and the wilderness period by the Deuteronomic reformers in the late monarchy, but there is no evidence that this notion rested on

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[19] Aurelius, *Der Fürbitter Israels*, 74-75, 195, *et passim.*

[20] See also Sir 48:7; 2 Esdras 3:17-19.

[21] The peculiar distribution of references to Mount Sinai in the Hebrew Bible and the absence of Mount Sinai in the pre-exilic prophetic literature were already problems for J. Wellhausen (*Prolegomena to the History of Ancient Israel* [New York: Meridian Books, 1957] 343-345. And the persistence of these problems for any tradition-historical study of Mount Sinai is evident when we note that they still provided the starting point for G. von Rad's penetrating essay on "The Form Criticism Problem of the Hexateuch," in *The Problem of the Hexateuch* (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1966) 1-25.

[22] Th. Booij, "Mountain and Theophany in the Sinai Narrative," *Bib* 65 (1984) 1-26.

cultic tradition of a covenant renewal festival or law making." Thus he argues, "There is no longer any basis for supporting the notion of a preexilic Sinai theology of law and covenant."[23] If such is the case then both the Sinai Tradition and the rise of law in Exodus/Numbers must not be interpreted independently, but as transformations in the Wilderness Tradition. Booij and Van Seters provide the thesis for this section.

Our procedure must change from the previous section. In particular, the majority position that Mount Sinai is deeply rooted in Israelite tradition requires that we not bypass its earliest tradition history as was done with Horeb. Thus the study will proceed in two parts. First we will examine the role of Sinai in pre-priestly archaic poetry, and, second, the development of Mount Sinai as a signifier of priestly law will be outlined.[24] My aim is to underscore the close association between Sinai and the wilderness, and the late tradition-historical development of Mount Sinai as a cosmic mountain of law within the Wilderness Tradition.

The close relationship between Sinai and the wilderness is implicit from its use in archaic poetry (Judg 5:5; Ps 68:9, 18; Deut 33:2).[25] The loose association of Sinai with Seir, Edom, and Mount Paran has prompted Clifford to argue that Sinai designates more a southern region than a specific mountain in the "March in the South" theophany tradition.[26] His research suggests that at an early stage of tradition, Sinai is tied closely to the wilderness, that it is a region and not a cosmic mountain, and that law plays no role at all in this pre-priestly tradition.

The importance of the wilderness for interpreting Sinai is made explicit in priestly tradition through the frequent use of the "wilderness of Sinai" (*midbar sînay*) both in itinerary notices[27] and in priestly law, where the "wilderness of Sinai" designates the place for cultic observance.[28] I have argued elsewhere that priestly tradents are also responsible for the transformation of Sinai from a region to a specific mountain

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[23] J. Van Seters, "Comparing Scripture with Scripture": Some Observations on the Sinai Pericope of Exodus 19-24," in *Canon, Theology and Old Testament Interpretation: Essays in Honor of Brevard S. Childs* (ed. G. M. Tucker, D. L. Petersen, R. R. Wilson; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988) 111-130 esp. 127.

[24] The tradition-historical development of Sinai is certainly more complex than the two stages (pre-priestly and priestly) that I am outlining in this paper. For example, a more detailed study might very well isolate a pre-priestly wilderness itinerary tradition that includes the *midbar sînay*. See for example Booij's ("Mountain and Theophany," 17) discussion of the *midbar sînay* in Exod 19:2ab as consisting of pre-priestly tradition. A more complex tradition history of the *midbar sînay*, however, would not effect the present argument that Mount Sinai is a tradition-historical innovation by priestly tradents.

[25] The bibliography on this poetry is vast. See especially the work of Albright and his students. See also J. Jeremias, *Theophanie: Die Geschichte einer Alttestamentlichen Gattung* (WMANT 10; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1965) 10-12; and Perlitt, "Sinai und Horeb," 303-305.

[26] R. J. Clifford, *The Cosmic Mountain in Canaan and the Old Testament* (HSM 4; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) 115.

[27] Exod 16:1; 19:1, 2; Num 10:12; 33:15, 16.

in Exodus 19-34[29] and throughout priestly law.[30] The purpose of this transformation is to articulate a priestly Kabod Theology of divine presence over against the deuteronomistic Name Theology of Horeb and at the same time to provide a setting for the revelation of priestly legislation in the wilderness.[31]

The preceding tradition history suggests that the wilderness is essential for understanding Mount Sinai and priestly law. First, there is a close relationship between Sinai and the wilderness in archaic poetry. Second, I have proposed that a cosmic-mountain tradition of Sinai as the place of law is a priestly innovation and transformation of the Wilderness Tradition, which requires that priestly law be interpreted in the context of the wilderness and not within a distinct Sinai Tradition. The interspersing of priestly law throughout the wandering and rebellion stories in Numbers (Numbers 15, 18, 19, 28, 29) further supports the close interrelationship between priestly law and the wilderness. Finally, as was the case in deuteronomistic tradition, although the evidence of priestly tradents in the wilderness narratives is clear,[32] the degree to which priestly law may be influencing the shaping of these narratives must remain an open question at this time.

III.
Horeb/Sinai and the Rise of Law in the Wilderness Tradition

We have reached a point where we can sketch the rise of law in the Wilderness Tradition and in the process return to Noth's three presuppositions that were stated at the outset: that Deuteronomy not be included in defining the boundaries of the Wilderness Tradition; that "Revelation at Sinai" is an ancient and independent tradition; and that law can be clearly separated from source documents in tracing the growth of the Wilderness Tradition.

I have proposed the following tradition-historical development of Horeb and Sinai within the Wilderness Tradition. A pre-law Wilderness Tradition of rebellion (evidenced in Deuteronomy) is reshaped by deuteronomistic redactors both in Deuteronomy and in Exodus/Numbers in order to anchor the revelation of deuteronomic law in the wilderness at Mount Horeb. Such a broadly based transformation of the Wilderness Tradition by deuteronomistic tradents argues against the notion of a Tetrateuch that is distinct from Deuteronomy. Priestly tradents build on a structure already in place by deuteronomistic redactors by anchoring the priestly legislation

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[28] Lev 7:38; 9:1, 5; Num 1:1, 19; 3:4, 14; 26:64.

[29] T. Dozeman, *God on the Mountain: A Study in the Redaction, Theology and Canon in Exodus 19-24* (SBLMS; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989). The influence of priestly redactors in emphasizing Mount Sinai as the location of revelation is evident in three contexts within Exodus 19-34: in the initial revelation of Exodus 19 (vv. 11, 18, 20, 23); in the revelation of the Kabod in Exodus 24 (v. 16 [Exod 31:18]); and in the reveltion of Covenant Renewal in Exodus 34 (vv. 2, 4, 29, 32), which provides an immediate context for priestly law in Exodus 35-Numbers 10.

[30] Lev 7:38; 25:1; 26:46; Num 28:6.

[31] For the most recent comparison of these distinct theologies see T. N. D. Mettinger, *The Dethronement of Sabaoth: Studies in the Shem and Kabod Theologies* (ConBOTS 18; Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1982).

[32] See Noth (*A History of Pentateuchal Traditions*, 18) for an outline of priestly tradition in Exodus/Numbers.

in the wilderness at Mount Sinai as one stage in Israel's wilderness travels. The result of these two redactions gives rise to the opening observations in this paper, namely that the wilderness is the primary setting of the Pentateuch and that law dominates the Wilderness Tradition. Or to state the same conclusion in reverse. The prominence of law and the close interrelationship of law and narrative in the present structure of the Wilderness Tradition (Exod 13:17-Deuteronomy) are the keys to its tradition history.

The preceding tradition-historical outline would not support an interpretation of Sinai as an ancient and distinct tradition as Noth understood it, nor would it support a clear separation of law from source narratives in the growth of the Wilderness Tradition. Each of these tradition-historical conclusions requires a more detailed summary.

First, concerning the antiquity of the Sinai Tradition, I have proposed that there is no more a Sinai Tradition in the Pentateuch than there is a Horeb Tradition. Rather, both are transformations in the Wilderness Tradition. Although Sinai has deep roots in the "March in the South" theophany tradition, its transformation into a cosmic mountain of law is not an independent development, but a late transformation in the Wilderness Tradition by priestly editors, who are building on deuteronomistic tradition that is already in place in Exodus/Numbers and in Deuteronomy. The result of this late transformation is that the itinerary stop in the wilderness of Sinai predominates in the Pentateuch to the point where the revelation of priestly law nearly subsumes the Wilderness Tradition in Exodus-Numbers.

Second, the strong influence of deuteronomistic and priestly redactors throughout the narratives in Exodus/Numbers argues against a source-critical hypothesis, in which law can be separated from narrative or source documents. I have proposed instead a redaction-critical model, in which narrative is used to anchor both deuteronomic and priestly law into the Wilderness Tradition. This proposal calls for a closer study of the interrelationship between law and narrative in the very formation of the Wilderness Tradition. Although it is far beyond the scope of this paper, I suspect that each of these redactions spans the entire Pentateuch, so that the question of the interrelationship between narrative and law should not be limited to the Wilderness Tradition but be carried through an entire tradition-historical study of the Pentateuch.

In conclusion, the narrow focus of this paper on the rise of law in the Wilderness Tradition has necessarily left some important questions unstated. I wish to end by raising three questions that must influence a more broadly based study of the rise of law in the Wilderness Tradition. First, is there a pre-rebellion tradition in the wilderness as Coats has argued?[33] If there is, how do we account for the pre-Horeb rebellion tradition in Deuteronomy? Is this rebellion tradition an innovation within the deuteronomic school to provide a narrative context for an early form of deuteronomic law, or is this tradition building on an already established tradition (a Yahwist)? Second, where is the Yahwist in the Wilderness Tradition? I have argued that there is not a yahwistic Sinai Tradition of law. The question remains, however, whether there is a yahwistic account of the wilderness period and where it might fit in chronologically with deuteronomistic and priestly traditions. I prefer

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[33] G. W. Coats, *The Murmuring Motif in the Wilderness Traditions of the Old Testament: Rebellion in the Wilderness* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1968).

a pre-exilic yahwistic tradition (that is also pre-deuteronomistic and pre-priestly), but this paper has certainly not demonstrated that. Third, the proposal that there is a close relationship between law and narrative in the formation of the Wilderness Tradition requires a study of the relationship between law and historiography.[34]

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[34] Such a question is raised by J. Van Seters, *In Search of History: Historiography in the Ancient World and the Origins of Biblical History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983) 2 n. 4.

The Wilderness Traditions of the Pentateuch
A Reassessment of Their Function and Intent in Relation to Exodus 32-34

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In his traditio-historical investigation of the wilderness murmuring motif in the Hebrew Bible, George Coats identifies a clear anti-Ephraimite bias in key texts pertaining to the tradition, particularly the spy narrative in Numbers 13-14.[1] The wilderness generation's rejection of YHWH's promise of the land of Canaan, based on the people's acceptance of the reports of the strength of Canaan's inhabitants by the ten faithless spies, serves as a paradigm for the rebellion of the northern tribes of Israel against the House of David and their rejection of the Jerusalem Temple. On this basis, he argues that the murmuring tradition originated in a Judean polemic against the northern kingdom which dates to the early period of the divided monarchy.[2]

Subsequent research has identified problems with this understanding in that the wilderness traditions also emphasize the inclusiveness of the twelve tribes and their reconstitution at the end of the wilderness period. For example, the presence of Joshua, of the tribe of Ephraim, together with Caleb, of the tribe of Judah, as the two faithful spies in this narrative undermines its anti-northern character.[3] The portrayal of Israel's unity is likewise supported by Olson, whose analysis of the final form of Numbers demonstrates that the spy narrative functions within the editorial framework of the book which emphasizes the reconstitution and inclusiveness of the

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[1] *Rebellion in the Wilderness: The Murmuring Motif in the Wilderness Traditions of the Old Testament*. (Nashville & New York: Abingdon, 1968), esp. pp. 137-156.

[2] Although details of Coats' analysis and traditio-historical reconstruction have been challenged, the anti-Ephraimite focus continues to play an influential role in scholarly interpretation of the tradition. Cf. S. de Vries, "The Origin of the Murmuring Tradition" *JBL* 87 (1968) 51-58, who argues that the tradition originated in an attempt to harmonize an original Judean conquest tradition with that of an all Israelite conquest. In his view, the tradition was later employed as a polemic against the northern kingdom.

[3] De Vries explains Joshua's presence in the spy narrative, together with the rebellion motif and its forty years punishment of wilderness wandering, in tradition-historical terms as an expansion of an original Caleb tradition by later tradents intended to harmonize a southern conquest tradition with an overall view of a united conquest by the twelve tribes of Israel ("The Origin of the Murmuring Tradition," pp. 56-58).

people prior to entering the land.[4] When considered in relation to the anti-Ephraimite bias, these factors indicate the need to clarify the interrelationship of the anti-Ephraimite and inclusivist concerns of the wilderness traditions.[5]

An important aspect of this issue is the relationship of Exodus 32-34 to the wilderness rebellion tradition.[6] This narrative is often excluded from the discussion because of its Deuteronomistic editorial influence and the perception that its origin was independent from that of the rest of the wilderness traditions.[7] It is apparent, however, that in the present form of the Pentateuch, Exodus 32-34 has clear links with the wilderness tradition, especially the spy narrative in Numbers 13-14. Not only does it share an anti-northern perspective, as indicated by its focus on the golden calf and its links to the narratives concerning Jeroboam's calves, but it also focuses on Moses' intercession on behalf of the people to dissuade YHWH from destroying them altogether and creating a new people from Moses' descendants (Exod 32:7-14).[8] As in Numbers 13-14, Exodus 32-34 emphasizes the destruction and reconstitution of the people following their lack of faith in YHWH.

Exodus 32-34 plays a key role in relation to the structure of the wilderness traditions in particular and that of the Pentateuch in general. Childs has shown that

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[4] Olson, *The Death of the Old and the Birth of the New: The Framework of the Book of Numbers and the Pentateuch* (BJS 71; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1985), esp. pp. 129-152.

[5] Although both Olson and De Vries point to an overall interest in the unity of the tribes in this narrative, neither fully examines the interrelationship of the anti-Ephraimite polemic and the inclusivist concerns or the motivation for the combination of these motifs. Olson merely identifies the "death of the old/birth of the new" theme as a paradigm for YHWH's wrestling with Israel found throughout the Hebrew Bible (*The Death of the Old*, pp. 179-198). Because of his exclusive interest in the final form of Numbers, he does not pursue the question of the editor/author's motivation for combining the motifs. De Vries maintains that the rebellion motif is a secondary addition meant to rationalize the delay in the conquest and harmonize it with the eastern conquest tradition associated with Joshua ("The Origin of The Murmuring Tradition," pp. 56-58). Yet Olson's study indicates that the final editors/authors of this tradition are not so much interested in simply delaying the conquest as they are in examining the process of punishment and reconstitution in the wilderness period. Certainly, the pervasive nature of the rebellion motif throughout the wilderness tradition indicates that the author/editors were not motivated solely by the desire to preserve an ancient tradition. As Olson's study demonstrates, the rebellion motif serves a purpose in the overall framework of the narrative that must be considered in relation to the interest in presenting a reconstituted and inclusive Israel.

[6] For studies that analyze the literary coherence and meaning of these chapters as a block, see H. C. Brichto, "The Worship of the Golden Calf: A Literary Analysis of a Fable on Idolatry," *HUCA* 54 (1983), pp. 1-44; R. W. L. Moberly, *At the Mountain of God: Story and Theology in Exodus 32-34* (JSOTSS 22; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1983).

[7] Cf. Coats, *Rebellion in the Wilderness*, pp. 184-191. On the Deuteronomistic character of this narrative, see now J. Vermeylen, "L'affaire du veau d'or (Ex 32-34): Une clé pour la 'question deutéronomiste'?" *ZAW* 97 (1985) 1-23.

[8] Both traditions also emphasize a similar liturgical statement of YHWH's mercy and justice (Exod 34:5-8; Num 14:18). See below.

Exodus 32-34 constitutes a major transition in the Pentateuchal wilderness tradition in that the wilderness narratives focus on YHWH's aid in overcoming genuine needs of the people prior to the golden calf incident, but emphasize illegitimate rebellion against YHWH following the golden calf incident.[9] Furthermore, Knierim's analysis of the structure of the Sinai pericope demonstrates that Exodus 32-34 appears at a crucial point in the general Pentateuchal narrative as well, immediately following YHWH's instructions concerning the building of the tabernacle in Exodus 25-31 and the compliance report in Exodus 35-40 which establishes the tabernacle as the holy center for YHWH's presence in the midst of the people.[10] Obviously, any conclusions concerning the function and intent of the wilderness traditions, including the interaction of rebellion and restoration, must include consideration of Exodus 32-34.

It is also important to note that previous studies have identified close links between various components of Exodus 32-34 and other Biblical texts, which include not only the spy narrative in Numbers 13-14, but also Jeroboam's erection of the calves at Beth-El and Dan in 1 Kings 12-13, YHWH's self revelation to Elijah in 1 Kings 19, the laws forbidding covenants with the Canaanites in Deut 7:1-6, and the regulations concerning the cultic calendar in Exod 23:10-19. In most cases, they have concluded either that they represent parallel traditions or that Exodus 32-34 is the earlier narrative on which the corresponding tradition is dependent. There are good reasons, however, to maintain that in each case, the writer of Exodus 32-34 has drawn upon other traditions in order to provide essential elements of this narrative. The purpose of the writer in employing these traditions in the present context is to constitute the disruption and restoration of the people as an essential component of the Pentateuchal narrative.

Scholars have long noted the connections between the traditions concerning Jeroboam's calves at Beth-El and Dan in 1 Kings 12:28-13:34 and the golden calf narrative in Exodus 32. Aberbach and Smolar present the most extensive list of

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[9] B. S. Childs, *The Book of Exodus: A Critical Theological Commentary*. (OTL; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974), pp. 256, 258.

[10] R. Knierim, "The Composition of the Pentateuch," *Society of Biblical Literature 1985 Seminar Papers*. Ed. by K. H. Richards. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1985), pp. 393-415, esp. pp. 404-406. Knierim's analysis demonstrates that the initial goal of the narrative is the establishment of the tabernacle as the sanctuary or locus for YHWH's revelation to the people. Revelation from the mountain in Exodus 19-40 was the necessary preliminary to the decisive revelation from the tabernacle in Lev 1:1-Num 10:10, the essential core of the Sinai revelation which establishes Israel as a "holy" community. Exodus 32-34 therefore appears at a crucial juncture in this narrative in that it presents the last obstacle, and its resolution, to the establishment of YHWH's central locus of revelation in the Sinai pericope. Furthermore, Knierim's analysis demonstrates that Exodus 32-34 not only disrupts the covenant between YHWH and Israel in this narrative, it also disrupts the ascent-descent pattern that constitutes the basic structure of this Sinai pericope. The position of this narrative between the covenant narrative in Exodus 19-24 and the instructions for building the tabernacle in Exodus 25-31 on the one hand and the compliance report concerning the completion of the tabernacle in Exodus 35-40 on the other indicates the importance of this disruption in the editorial scheme of the narrative. In addition, it suggests that Exodus 32-34, or elements thereof, may well be a secondary intrusion into the primary narrative.

parallels between the two traditions which includes thirteen separate items.[11] On the basis of these parallels, they maintain that Jeroboam modeled his cult reform on an earlier form of Israelite worship, but that the present narrative reflects a Judean polemic against Jeroboam following the revolt of the northern tribes. This presupposes that the Jeroboam narrative was modeled on that concerning Aaron and the golden calf. It seems likely, however, that Aaron's golden calf narrative is modeled on that of Jeroboam. Because the other parallels offer little evidence of the direction of dependency, the key consideration is Aaron's statement, "These are your gods, O Israel, who brought you up out of Egypt," in Exod 32:4.[12] The use of the plural forms *ʾēlleh* and *heʿĕlûkā* in this passage is paradoxical in a context that refers to a single calf image and can only be understood as a reflex, of and conscious reference to, Jeroboam's statement in 1 Kings 12:28 where the plural reference is entirely appropriate.[13]

Scholars have also noted the connections between the presentation of Moses in the Pentateuchal traditions and that of Elijah in the Deuteronomistic history to the extent that Elijah is often referred to as a "second Moses."[14] Of particular interest here is the parallel between YHWH's self-revelation to Moses in Exod 33:12-34:8

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[11] Moses Aberbach and Leivy Smolar, "Aaron, Jeroboam, and the Golden Calves," *JBL* 86 (1967) 129-140. Among the more important parallels are the golden calves themselves; the parallel statements, "[Behold/These are] your gods, O Israel, which brought you up out of the land of Egypt," by Jeroboam (1 Kings 12:28) and Aaron (Exod 32:4); the altar feast declared at the completion of the calves in both traditions, the non-Levitic priests employed in both traditions; the similar manners in which the golden calf was destroyed by Aaron (Exod 32:20) and Jeroboam's altar was destroyed by Josiah (2 Kings 23:15). The most telling piece of evidence for the parallel, however, is the similarity between the names of Aaron's two oldest sons, Nadab and Abihu, and Jeroboam's only two recorded sons, Nadab and Abijah, and their deaths in the prime of life because of their association with idolatry. Aaron's sons are punished with death because they offer a "strange fire before the Lord," an idolatrous act (Lev 10:1-7). Jeroboam's sons die as a consequence of his burning incense at the altar at Beth-El (1 Kings 13, esp. vv 33-34). Abijah dies of illness in conjunction with his father's condemnation (1 Kings 14:1-20) and Nadab is assassinated by a usurper who fulfills the prophetic promise that Jeroboam's house would be destroyed (1 Kings 15:25-32).

[12] N.b., it seems unlikely that Jeroboam would name his sons after the sons of Aaron in a conscious attempt to imitate the founder of an earlier form of Israelite worship, particularly when there is no record of the continuity of their lines. It is likely, however, that the writer of the Pentateuchal narratives could create two sons of Aaron, whose lines are eradicated because of their sin, in an attempt to draw a parallel between Aaron and Jeroboam.

[13] Cf. Neh 9:18 which employs singular forms for the same statement, "This (*zeh*) is your god who brought you up (*heʿĕlkā*) out of Egypt." As Childs remarks, "The issue is exegetical rather than grammatical" (*Exodus*, p. 556).

[14] Cf. esp. R. P. Carroll, "The Elijah-Elisha Sagas: Some Remarks on Prophetic Succession in Ancient Israel" *VT* 19 (1969) 400-415; R. Wilson, *Prophecy and Society in Ancient Israel*. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), pp. 197-198; B. O. Long, *1 Kings; with an Introduction to Historical Literature*. (FOTL 9; Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1984), p. 201.

and that to Elijah in 1 Kings 19.[15] A natural conclusion from these parallels might be that the Elijah narrative is somehow dependent upon the Mosaic account.[16] Yet, there are indications that the Mosaic account is dependent on that of Elijah. The Elijah revelation functions smoothly in its context as the means for YHWH to inform the prophet of his future course of action in a time of crisis when his own life is at stake. In its present form, the Moses revelation narrative plays a key role in Exodus 32-34 in that it provides the transition and therefore links the narratives concerning the breaking of the covenant through the golden calf and its restoration through the second set of tablets. Childs has noted tensions in this narrative, however, in that it shifts its emphasis from a visible revelation to one that focuses on YHWH's *acts* of mercy on behalf of the people. It also shifts its emphasis from an individual revelation to Moses to one that serves as the basis for restoring the covenant broken by the golden calf incident.[17] The need for this individual revelation to Moses is somewhat unusual in a context where YHWH has already revealed himself (Exod 6:2-9; 20:2) and reiterated his commitment to the people despite the golden calf episode (Exod 33:1-3). Obviously, the self-revelation account has its origins outside the context of the present narrative. The remaining tensions indicate a deliberate attempt by the writer of Exodus 32-34 to incorporate an originally independent narrative into the present context. As to the original form of this narrative, the lack of hard evidence for an original Moses tradition raises the possibility that the Elijah tradition serves as the model for the Moses narrative.

A further consideration concerns the form of YHWH's revelation to Moses which centers around the proclamation in Exod 34:6b-7, "[YHWH,][18] YHWH, a God compassionate and gracious, slow to anger, abounding in kindness and faithfulness, extending kindness to the thousandth generation, forgiving iniquity, transgression and sin; yet he does not remit all punishment but visits the iniquity of parents upon children and children's children, upon the third and fourth generations." As parallels to the first part of this statement (v 6b) indicate, it is apparently based on a liturgical

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[15] There are a number of points of contact including the location of the revelation at Mt. Horeb (= Mt. Sinai) for Elijah and Mt. Sinai for Moses; Elijah's 40 day fast prior to the revelation at Mt. Horeb (1 Kings 19:4-8) and Moses' 40 day fast while writing the second set of tablets on Mt. Sinai (Exod 34:28); Elijah's finding shelter in a cave on the mountain which serves as the specific site of the revelation (1 Kings 19:9, 13) and Moses' being placed in a cleft of rock (Exod 33:21-23); and Elijah's hiding his face in his mantle as YHWH "passed by" (1 Kings 19:13, cf. v 11) and YHWH's protection of Moses by placing his hand over Moses while he "passed by" (Exod 33:21-23; 34:6). Cf. Wilson, *Prophecy and Society in Ancient Israel*, p. 198, who emphasizes that the Elijah narrative is linked to a *specific* incident in Moses' career. He also emphasizes that the crisis in Elijah's time is the result of illicit worship of bovine cult images.

[16] Cf. J. Robinson, *The First Book of Kings*. (CBC; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 220-221, who maintains that the editor of 1 Kings 19 added selected passages to emphasize the parallel with the Mosaic account.

[17] Childs, *Exodus*, pp. 595-597.

[18] It is possible that the first "YHWH" is the subject of the preceding verb, *wayyiqrā'*.

confession.[19] If the Elijah narrative is dependent on the Mosaic account, it is somewhat surprising that such a well-known liturgical statement has no influence on Elijah's revelation. The only other occurrence of the full version of this formula, including both v 6b and the expansion in v 7, appears in Num 14:18,[20] albeit in a slightly shortened form. Although the appearance of this formula in the context of the spy narrative is generally considered as a quotation of Exod 34:6b-7,[21] it is unlikely that the author of this narrative would have deliberately eliminated elements of a well-known liturgical formula. It is more likely that the author of Exodus 32-34 would have expanded the formula found in Num 14:18. The introduction of this formula enabled the author to establish YHWH's mercy and fidelity together with his justice. In the context of Exodus 32-34, this provides the core of YHWH's self-revelation and the grounds for reestablishing the covenant in Exodus 34.[22] It also suggests that the author of Exodus 32-aa-34 was dependent on both 1 Kings 19 and Num 14:18 in constructing the episode of YHWH's revelation to Moses in Exod 33:12-34:8.

Finally, scholars have recognized the complex literary character of the narrative concerning the reconstitution of the covenant in Exodus 34. Two features of this section are particularly important for the present discussion. The first is the Deuteronomic character of the framework narrative in vv 11-16, 27-28 and the second is the relationship between the festival law code in vv 17-26 and the parallel code in Exod 23:10-19. Despite the frequently verbatim parallels between the two codes, scholars have been reluctant to argue that one code is dependent on the other.[23] There is evidence, however, that the narrative in Exodus 34 represents a reformulation of the Exodus 23 code in relation to Deuteronomic traditions which is designed to address the concerns of the larger literary context of Exodus 32-34.

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[19] Cf. Pss 86:15; 103:8; Joel 2:13; Jon 4:2; Nahum 1:3; Neh 9:17. For a discussion of the liturgical character of Exod 34:6b-7 and its literary connections, see R. C. Dentan, "The Literary Affinities of Exodus XXXIV 6f," *VT* 13 (1963) 34-51.

[20] Cf. Nah 1:3 where elements of both halves appear to be associated together, but not in a well-defined formulaic context.

[21] G. B. Gray, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Numbers*. (ICC; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1903), p. 157; M. Noth, *Numbers: A Commentary*. Translated by J. D. Martin. (OTL; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1968), p. 109; N. H. Snaith, *Leviticus and Numbers*. (NCB; Greenwood: Attic, 1967), p. 244; J. Sturdy, *Numbers*. (CBC; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 103.

[22] N.b., Exod 34:6b-7 includes references to YHWH as "a God merciful and gracious," and adds the qualities of "faithfulness" and "keeping steadfast love for thousands," all of which is lacking in Num 14:18. In Num 14:18, the formula merely provides the basis for YHWH's decision not to destroy the people immediately but to allow them to wander for 40 years only to die in the wilderness before reaching the promised land. The initial focus on Caleb alone (vv 20-25) and then on Caleb and Joshua (vv 26-38) indicates a localized tradition in that the lack of concern with the continuity of the people as a whole stands in contrast to the overall concerns of the Numbers narrative in reconstituting the people following the punishment of the wilderness generation. The presence of the theme of reconstituting the covenant in Exodus 32-34 correspond to the larger concerns of the Pentateuch narrative and thus indicates the priority of the Numbers 14 example.

[23] Cf. Childs, *Exodus*, pp. 604-610, for a summary of the discussion.

A comparison of the narratives concerning the two codes indicates that Exodus 34 contains several elements that are absent from Exodus 23 and some that appear in a different location in the two narratives. In each case, the additions or changes in Exodus 34 relate either to Deuteronomic tradition, the literary context of Exodus 32-34, or both.

The first concerns the ban against covenants with the Canaanites in Exod 34:10-16. This concern also appears in Exod 23:23-33 which lists the same six Canaanite nations (Exod 34:11; 23:23) together with similar commands to break down their pillars (Exod 34:13; 23:24). Exodus 34 contains several additional elements, including a ban against intermarriage with these peoples (34:16), a command to destroy their altars and asherim as well as their pillars (34:13), and a reference to YHWH's jealousy (34:14). Moreover, each of these additions has parallels which indicate a relationship to Deuteronomic literature. The first two relate directly to Deut 7:1-6. Although Deut 7:1-6 includes a seventh Canaanite nation, it contains a similar ban on covenants with the Canaanites which emphasizes a prohibition against intermarriage (Deut 7:3) and a command to destroy their alters, asherim, and graven images as well as their pillars (Deut 7:5). Furthermore, the reference to YHWH's jealousy in Exod 34:14 employs the formula, *'el qannā*, which appears elsewhere only in Deuteronomic literature (Deut 4:24; 5:9 [=Exod 20:5]; 6:15).[24]

The second case concerns the prohibition against molten gods (*'ĕlōhê massēkâ*) in Exod 34:17. This verse stands at the beginning of the legal corpus in Exodus 34 but is otherwise absent from Exodus 23 which begins with a command to observe the Sabbath in 23:10. The placement of this command at the beginning of the law code relates directly to the concerns of the golden calf narrative in Exodus 32, which employs similar language (*'egel massēkâ*) to describe the calf.[25] Although discussion of this verse's parallels generally relates to the prohibition against gragen images (*pesel*) in Exod 20:4/Deut 5:8, scholars have overlooked its relationship to Deut 7:5 which commands the destruction of Canaanite graven images (*pĕsîlêhem*) together with the altars, asherim, and pillars mentioned above. The relationship of Exod 34:17 to Deut 7:5 would therefore complete the aniconic concerns of Deut 7:1-6 and demonstrate further influence of this passage on the code in Exodus 34.

A related issue concerns the movement of the Sabbath law from the beginning of the code in Exod 23:12 to a position following the Passover commands in Exod 34:21, thus interrupting the laws concerning the three festivals (Exod 34:18-20, 22-26; cf. Exod 23:14-19). Although the placement of the Sabbath law in Exodus 34 has frequently puzzled scholars, Noth has observed that the primary intent of this law relates not to the Sabbath *per se*, but to planting and harvest.[26] The placement of this law in relation to the three festivals therefore provides for a better ordered presentation of the Temple agricultural festivals and appears to be motivated by the reference to a seven day Passover pattern in Exod 34:18. Most importantly for the purposes of this study, the movement of the Sabbath command allows for the introduction of the prohibition against molten images at the beginning of the

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[24] N.b., The appearance of this formula in Exod 20:5 likewise establishes a relationship to the larger literary context of Exodus.

[25] Moberly, *At the Mountain of God*, pp. 99-100.

[26] M. Noth, *Exodus: A Commentary*. Translated by J. S. Bowden. (OTL; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1962), p. 264.

law code, thereby emphasizing the relation of this code to the golden calf episode of Exodus 32.[27]

The third case relates to the angel (*mal'āk*) that YHWH will send to lead the people and drive out the Canaanites. This angel is mentioned in the concluding exhortation of the Covenant Code in Exod 23:20-33 where it functions as an agent of YHWH's guarantee of protection for the people. It plays an entirely different role in Exodus 32-34, however, where it has been removed from its context in relation to the festival law code and placed in Exod 33:1-6 at the beginning of the narrative concerning the reestablishment of the covenant following the golden calf episode. Instead of functioning as a symbol of security, it functions as a symbol of YHWH's dissatisfaction with the people. The people's subsequent mourning prompts Moses' face-to-face meeting with YHWH which results in the revelation of the new law code in Exodus 34 and an enhanced role for Moses as mediator between the people and YHWH (cf. Exod 34:29-35). In short, the motif of YHWH's angel now becomes the catalyst for renewing the covenant between the people and YHWH, thereby restoring the relationship disrupted by the golden calf episode.

These considerations demonstrate that the narrative concerning the renewal of the covenant with the festival code in Exodus 34 is a reformulation of the festival code of Exodus 23. It employs Deuteronomic traditions, especially the ban against covenants with the Canaanites in Deut 7:1-6, and other elements from the larger Exodus tradition to create a narrative that relates specifically to the concerns of Exodus 32-34. The result is a code that gives greater emphasis to the ban on covenants and relationships with the Canaanites.

The use of Deuteronomic/Deuteronomistic traditions in Exodus 32-34 has a number of implications for understanding the composition of this narrative and defining its intent in relation to the wilderness traditions of the Pentateuch. It is quite clear that the Deuteronomistic traditions employed in the composition of Exodus 32-34 indicate an anti-northern emphasis. The author of Exodus 32-34 focuses on key traditions pertaining to the faithlessness of the northern kingdom, such as Jeroboam's establishing the calf sanctuaries at Beth-El and Dan and Elijah's conflicts with the syncretistic monarch Ahab and his pagan wife Jezebel, and associates them with Deuteronomic traditions prohibiting Canaanite syncretism to portray the faithlessness of the Mosaic wilderness generation.

But Exodus 32-34 also emphasizes the restoration of the covenant following the golden calf episode. This is somewhat striking given the anti-northern character of the narrative but the reason for such an attitude becomes clear when the Deuteronomistic context of the composition is considered. As studies of the Deuteronomistic history have demonstrated, the early form of the history was produced during the reign of king Josiah of Judah and emphasized Josiah's role in restoring the unity of the northern and southern kingdoms under Davidic rule following the northern kingdom's rebellion and ultimate destruction by Assyria.[28] This has implications for

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[27] Note also that the Sabbath law relates to the command to observe the Sabbath in Exod 20:8-11/Deut 5:12-15. This and the introduction of the laws concerning the first born in Exod 34:19-aa-20, which appears in Exod 13:11-13 but is absent in Exod 23:14-aa-19, establishes the relationship of this code to the larger literary context of Exodus.

[28] F. M. Cross, Jr., *Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic: Essays in the History of the Religion of Israel* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 274-289; R. D.

considering the relationship of Exodus 32-34 to the wilderness traditions of the Pentateuch. Given the anti-Ephraimite emphasis of Exodus 32-aa-34 and its concern with restoring the covenant, several features of the wilderness traditions become clear in relation to Josianic concerns. These include the wilderness tradition's emphasis on the centralization of the wilderness tabernacle in the midst of the people (Num 1-10) and Josiah's cult centralization; the defense of Moses' authority against challenges (Num 11-12) and Josiah's concern for reestablishing Davidic authority in the north; faithfulness to YHWH as the criterion for possessing the land (Num 13-14) and Josiah's concern to reunite the land; the priority of the Aaronic priests over other Levitic families (Num 16-18) and Josiah's policies concerning priests and Levites; the purge of syncretistic elements from the people (Num 25) and Josiah's cult purification; and the interest in reconstituting Israel following the purge of the rebellious wilderness generation (Num 22-24; 26)[29] and Josiah's general unification program. Of course, the golden calf symbolizes the sanctuary at Beth-El, the central focus of Josiah's attempts to shut down rival sanctuaries to the Jerusalem Temple.[30]

This issue will require further study and discussion. However, if they are substantiated, these considerations have implications for Pentateuchal studies in general in that they suggest a need to reconsider the role of the Deuteronomistic tradition, particularly in its Josianic manifestations, in the composition of the Pentateuch.[31]

Nelson, *The Double Redaction of the Deuteronomistic History* (JSOTSS 18; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1981); R. D. Friedman, *The Exile and Biblical Narrative: The Formation of the Deuteronomistic and Priestly Works* (HSM 22; Chico: Scholars Press, 1981). Note also that recent work on Isaiah points to a Josianic redaction which likewise emphasizes the restoration of the northern kingdom together with the southern kingdom (cf. H. Barth, *Die Jesaja-Worte in die Josiazeit* [WMANT 48; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1977]; R. E. Clements, *Isaiah 1-39* [NCB; Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 1980]; J. Vermeylen, *Du prophète Isaïe à l'apocalyptique* 2 vols. [EB; Paris: Gabalda, 1977-78]).

[29] Olson, *The Death of the Old*, pp. 43-127, emphasizes that the census list in Numbers 26 represents the reconstituted Israelite people following the purging of the wilderness generation.

[30] Cf. 2 Kings 23:15-20. Note that 1 Kings 13:1-2 emphasizes that Jeroboam's sanctuary at Beth-El would be destroyed in the days of Josiah. Of special note for the context of Exodus 32-34 is Josiah's renewal of the Passover celebration (2 Kings 23:21-23). Note also that through the time of Josiah, prophetic traditions view the wilderness period as an ideal time in the relationship between YHWH and Israel (Hos 2:14-23; Jer 2:2-3). Later prophetic traditions emphasize Israel's rebellion in the wilderness (e.g., Ezekiel 20).

[31] For discussions of Deuteronomistic influence on the composition of the Pentateuch, cf. H. H. Schmid, *Der sogenannte Jahwist. Beobachtungen und Fragen zur Pentateuchforschung* (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1976); R. Rendtorff, *Das überlieferungsgeschichtliche Problem des Pentateuch* (BZAW 147; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1977) and E. Blum, *Die Komposition der Vätergeschichte* (WMANT 57; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1984), pp. 362-419.

Syntactical Style in the "We"-Sections of Acts: How Lukan Is It?

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I

It was the opinion of Henry Cadbury and the editors of *The Beginnings of Christianity* that "the 'we-passages' [16:10-17; 20:5-15; 21:1-18; 27:1-28:16] raise the insoluble problem of the use, imitation, or incorporation of autoptic records or the participation of the author in the events which he records."[1] The editors recognized that there is no "difference in style . . . between the 'we' sections and the narrative in which they are embedded." In fact, where "there are slight differences of style between various parts of Luke and Acts, . . . the style of the 'we' sections is closer to the style of the redactional changes." Furthermore they asserted that these sections "prove that certain parts of Acts were originally written by a companion of Paul," but he was not necessarily the author of Acts.[2]

The latter contention is a reaction to Harnack, whose extensive analysis of the language and style of the "we"-sections led him to argue for "the identity of the

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[1] F. J. Foakes Jackson & K. Lake, eds. *The Beginnings of Christianity: Part I. The Acts of the Apostles* (London: 1920-33; reprinted: Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979) II, 15. Further support is provided in the following article by J. de Zwaan, "The Use of the Greek Language in Acts," *BC* II, 30-65, which includes appreciative use of Cadbury's *The Style and Literary Method of Luke* (Harvard Theological Studies VI; Cambridge, 1920). See also H. J. Cadbury, *The Making of Luke-Acts* (London: SPCK, 1927, 1961) 230, 357, 358; "'We' and 'I' Passages in Luke-Acts," *NTS* 3 (1956-57) 128-32, reaffirming: "Under any interpretation the we passages in Acts remain a problem" (128); "Four Features of Lucan Style," in *Studies in Luke-Acts: Essays Presented in Honor of Paul Schubert*, ed. L. E. Keck & J. L. Martyn (Nashville: Abingdon, 1966) 87-102. For a review of the debate over "we" in relation to sources in Acts, see Part II of J. Dupont, *The Sources of the Acts* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1964). After reviewing the options, Conzelmann also concluded: "The riddle of the "we" passages remains unsolved" (*The Acts of the Apostles* [Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987; German edition, 1972] xl).

[2] *BC* II, 158, 166, 161.

author of those sections with "the author of the whole work."[3] Harnack summarized the evidence:

> (1) In no other part of the Acts of the Apostles are the peculiarities of vocabulary and style of the author of the twofold work so accumulated and concentrated as they are in the "we"-sections.
>
> (2) Lukanisms . . . are as strongly represented in the fundamental passages, those which express the aim and interests of the "we"-sections, as in the subsidiary passages and all that belongs to the external literary form of these sections.

Consequently, "every possibility of ascertaining what really stood in the source at once vanishes."[4]

In his later studies on Acts, Dibelius was convinced by Harnack's "lexicographical" arguments regarding the stylistic unity of Acts. However, he preferred to see Luke introducing "we" editorially into an existing itinerary source, in order to indicate his personal presence with Paul.[5]

Haenchen likewise favored the "stylistic device" explanation, though he was less confident about the nature of the sources Luke may have had available for his "literary revision."[6] Haenchen provided a careful analysis of "'We' in Acts and the Itinerary," demonstrating "that we have before us a composition by Luke and not an itinerary."[7] While it may be presupposed that Luke had eyewitness sources, the evidence points to "quite deliberate stylization of the author" in earlier travel sections, and by the end, "obviously Luke revised the entire passage stylistically," editing "with complete freedom," using "we" to make "the reader feel . . . directly connected with Paul's life."[8] For Plümacher, the "we" in the sea voyages intends to convey to the reader nothing more than that the author is experienced at sea-travel, an expected competence for such an author.[9] Vernon Robbins suggests that the use of "we" is a stylistic device characteristic of contemporary Mediterranean sea voyage

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[3] A. Harnack, *The Date of the Acts and of the Synoptic Gospels* (New Testament Studies IV; New York: Putnam's, 1911) 1. The "Special Investigation of the So-Called 'We' Account" had been provided in Vol. I: *Luke the Physician*, 1909, 26-120. Harnack does acknowledge that this point had already been established in 1899 by Hawkins, *Horae Synopticae* (*Luke the Physician*, 27, 81-82).

[4] Ibid., 12, 13, 15.

[5] M. Dibelius, (*Studies in the Acts of the Apostles* New York: Scribner's, 1956) 70, 201; 104-5.

[6] E. Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles: A Commentary* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971) 85-87.

[7] E. Haenchen, *Journal for Theology and the Church*, 1 (1965) 65-99; 79.

[8] Ibid., 83-4, 93-4, 99. For an analysis of the development of Haenchen's position in response to previous theories, see Dupont, *Sources*, 140-47: Haenchen accepted Dibelius's proposed itinerary source until the 1959 edition of his commentary, after which he argued for more fragmentary sources, based on reminiscences and memories of a Pauline companion.

[9] E. Plümacher, "Wirklichkeitserfahrung und Geschichtsschreibung bei Lukas: Erwägungen zu den Wir-Stücken der Apostelgeschichte," *ZNW* 58 (1977) 2-22; 14.

literature.[10] Thus the author is demonstrating skill at "the sea voyage genre."[11]

Attention to the "we"-sections has also come from renewed interest in Pauline chronology. Jewett suggests that "the simplest explanation for the sporadic appearance of the 'we-sections' and their stylistic similarity with the rest of Acts is that the author used his own travel notes, giving them distinctive personal embellishments." Therefore, Jewett talks about a "we-source" from which the author "simply retained" the "we."[12] Luedemann accepts Dibelius's thesis that "we" cannot be used as the basis for reconstructing a written source, but the most that can be said about an itinerary is "that Acts has reworked some traditions that were of a continuous nature." The evidence suggests that in one instance "Luke had access to a source that derived from a companion of Paul," and that other places he has "reworked traditions," which, when analyzed carefully, "furnished a surprising confirmation" of data derived from the Pauline letters."[13]

II

Recently, Susan M. Praeder has taken a more comprehensive look at "The Problem of First Person Narration in Acts," finding that "ancient histories still offer no parallels to first person narration in Acts and no proof that first person narration refers to factual or fictional participation by the author of Acts."[14] She argues that it remains "the unsolved problem that it is," because of four unexplained features: (1) "the anonymity of the first person narrator," (2) "the plurality of the first person plural participants," (3) "the occurrence of first person narration only in [certain] passages," and (4) "first and third person sections in the first person passages." Praeder's conclusions are: (1) "It is still possible to maintain that the author of Acts or one or more of his sources had some role in Paul's sea and land travels"; (2) "The first person passages are not the compositions of a careful author or redactor,"

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[10] V. K. Robbins, "The We-Passages in Acts and Ancient Sea Voyages," *Biblical Research* 20 (1975) 5-18; 17. See also "By Land and By Sea: A Study in Acts 13-28," *SBLASP* (1976) 381-96.

[11] V. K. Robbins, "By Land and By Sea: A Study in Acts 13-28," *SBLASP* (1976) 381-396; 382. For further discussion of the genre evidence see S. M. Praeder, "Acts 27:1-28:16: Sea Voyage in Ancient Literature and the Theology of Luke-Acts," *CBQ* 46 (1984) 683-706.

[12] R. Jewett, *A Chronology of Paul's Life* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979) 15-7, which concludes his overview of the recent history of the discussion, 10-15. See also M. Hengel, *Acts and the History of Earliest Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979): "The remarks in the first person plural refer to the author himself. They do not go back to an earlier independent source, nor are they a mere literary convention, giving the impression that the author was an eyewitness. From the beginning, this is the only way in which readers . . . could have understood the "we" passages. "We" therefore appears in travel accounts because Luke simply wanted to indicate that he was there" (66). Likewise J. A. Fitzmyer regards as "creditable" that the We-sections "represent a diary of the author," who "was a companion or fellow worker of Paul for a time" (*The Gospel According to Luke I-IX* [AB 28; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981] 36, 48).

[13] G. Lüdemann, *Paul, Apostle to the Gentiles: Studies in Chronology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984) 26, 29, 199-200.

[14] *NovT* 29 (1987) 193-218; 208.

because he was "poorly informed about the conventions of ancient literature," and (3) "all the proposed solutions rely on contextual assumptions and evidence," rather than "interpretive contexts."[15] The desired approach must "offer an inclusive account of traditional, source critical, redaction critical, and comparative literary solutions."[16]

William Kurz suggests that after an ancient literary convention has been identified, "literary criticism must then show how the author uses this convention." A narrative approach to the text can discern "a literary significance in the use and avoidance of 'we' passages" that relates to other narrative features of the story, such as the implied presence and absence of the narrator, and how that reinforces "the narrative plot line."[17]

Praeder and Kurz thus call for scholarship that takes more seriously the narrative shape of the text. A more encompassing approach to studying the "we"-sections will integrate various scholarly disciplines as it seeks to better account for these passages in the context of Acts.

III

A more comprehensive solution to the problem of the we-passages in Acts must include a reassessment of the linguistic data. The purpose of this study is to look at the stylistic evidence for the unity of the "we"-sections within the rest of Acts, focusing mostly on syntactical style. We have seen in our overview that the modern study of this problem began with Harnack. He immodestly asserted:

> I have thoroughly investigated both halves of [Acts] as to vocabulary and style from all imaginable points of view and in all possible combinations, and I can answer for the statement . . . that Luke . . . proves himself as an author to be nowhere more Lukan than in the 'we'-sections.[18]

Dibelius was among many scholars who built upon Harnack's results, though he usually noted that Harnack's evidence was properly "lexicographical." The same may be said of Hawkins, who provided detailed lists of characteristic "words and phrases."

Most commentaries include an introductory section on "Language and Style." Typically, the "language" part means vocabulary, and "style" means grammatical peculiarities, as well as comparisons to other authors. E.g., Haenchen evaluates Acts as "the educated written language of Hellenism, . . . as yet untouched by classicism and Atticism." However, there is evidence of "the Attic heritage of the Hellenistic written language" in the use of the optative (with two of the 15 occurrences in "we"-passages), future participle and future infinitive (ἔσεσθαι four times, including 27:10 in a "we"-section). He also notes as "peculiarities of Lucan style" the frequency of relative clauses where a main clause is expected, and the "use of καί after a relative pronoun."[19]

Nigel Turner collected observations he could use "in assessing the Semitic style of Lukan Greek," which Turner viewed as "a Jewish kind of Greek," and "perhaps

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[15] Ibid., 214, 217.

[16] Ibid., 194.

[17] W. S. Kurz, "Narrative Approaches to Luke-Acts," *Biblica* 68 (1987) 195-220; 218-9.

[18] Harnack, *The Date of the Acts*, 12.

[19] *Acts*, 75, 77-78, see 139-140 ns. 7-8.

Luke's natural speech."[20] Thus the material on Acts is organized around potential sources; I Acts (1-15), which might reflect Aramaic sources, II Acts, where Semitic sources are unlikely, and further distinguishing within II Acts the "we"-sections, least likely to be from an Aramaic source, since they are from Luke's "diary."[21]

Using this division, Turner identifies stylistic features in the "we"-sections that demonstrate the least Semitic and most literary aspects of Acts. He notes features that are characteristic of both parts of Acts, except in the "we"-sections: ἐν τῷ with infinitive (47); redundant participles ἀναστάς, ἐγερθείς, ἀποκριθείς (51);[22] "large concentrations of occurrences" of recitative ὅτι (52); preference for πρός rather than the dative with verbs of speaking (54).

Turner also identifies constructions whose relative frequency is noticeably different in the "we"-sections: the least Semitic construction with ἐγένετο, the infinitive, is favored (47); the ratio of subordinate verbs to main verbs is "about equal," which is "much nearer to the non-literary Greek" papyri, and twice that of the rest of Acts (50-51); rarely an articular phrase following the noun, but "too often for normal Greek" in the rest of Acts (55); the third person pronoun in oblique cases has a frequency in the "we"-sections again similar to that of the papyri, whereas the rest of Acts is considerably higher (56); the frequency of the genitive absolute in the "we"-sections "exceeds anything in the LXX, and indeed in the NT, and is in this respect quite up to classical standards" (59).

Despite these distinguishing features in the "we"-sections, Turner affirms that "there is a linguistic unity throughout" Luke-Acts, because "the final editor has been able to impose his own style upon all his material" (57). Why then are the "we"-sections relatively freer of Semitic style than the rest of Acts? Luke was a Gentile proselyte, who, in his early Christian days, traveled with Paul and kept a diary, "with considerable display of 'literary' or secular Greek, that is, of the Koine as used by Greek professional men, such as Luke" (61). Later he "acquired the Biblical dialect," where influences from the LXX and traveling with Paul became "a conspicuous mannerism of his style" (54).

In his review of Turner's *Style* volume, Lorenz Nieting called attention to its nineteenth-century linguistic perspective and proposed a discussion of style based on "the fundamental principle of *generative grammar*. When language is described as a system of choices, then individual patterns of choices can be identified."[23] While we cannot do justice to Nieting's appeal in this study, we can extend the discussion about style beyond its previous dimensions. One of the most significant areas of linguistic choice involves the syntactical choices made in the formation of complex

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[20] N. Turner, *Style*, vol. IV of J. H. Moulton, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1976) 45, 56. Much the same material is also in "The Quality of the Greek of Luke-Acts," in *Studies in New Testament Language and Text: Essays in Honour of George D. Kilpatrick*, ed. J. K. Elliott (Leiden: Brill, 1976) 387-400.

[21] "Quality," 389.

[22] This is treated more fully in "Quality," 393, where Turner calls them features of Septuagintalism or "free Biblical Greek," that are "never used in secular Greek."

[23] L. Nieting, "*A Grammar of New Testament Greek, Volume IV: Style*, by Nigel Turner," *JBL* 96 (1977) 591-2.

sentences. The pattern of such choices constitutes the syntactic style of an author, a writing, or a source.[24]

Turner made a step in this direction with his observation about the ratio of subordinate verbs to main verbs. However, the limitation of his approach can be seen in his disclaimer that "Under subordinate verbs we have not included participial clauses."[25] It is not at all clear what concept of syntactical subordination would exclude all participles.

IV

We can assess the syntactical style of the "we"-sections by attempting to discern whether there are any peculiar subordination patterns within the sections or noteworthy changes of style in the transition before or after the sections or in contrast with the surrounding material. Computer-assisted analysis allows for observations about syntactical patterns that are not so tied to lexicographical features as in earlier studies.[26]

The first section (16:10-17) is relatively brief and its syntactical style does not have any readily discernible overall pattern. However, v. 14 includes the first instance in a "we"-section of what Haenchen calls "ostensibly relative, but in reality main clauses to which Luke is addicted." His list includes 54 examples from throughout Acts, of which eight are in "we"-sections.[27] Here the relative clause with ἧς is separated from its antecedent by the main verb:[28]

καὶ τις γυνὴ ὀνόματι Λυδία, . . . ἤκουεν,
σεβομένη τὸν θεόν,
ἧς, . . .

(We might also note the Lukan use of τις, elsewhere mostly following the noun, but see Acts 14:8 καὶ τις ἀνὴρ.)

Haenchen's list does not include v. 16, where the relative follows an infinitive, which in turn follows ἐγένετο, a Lukan construction found throughout Acts.[29] In this instance there is a genitive absolute intervening, with another participle between

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[24] Linguistic arguments for one such construction are provided in D. D. Schmidt, *Hellenistic Greek Grammar and Noam Chomsky: Nominalizing Transformations* (SBLDS 62; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981). For an application of this approach to another NT stylistic problem, see D. D. Schmidt, "The Syntactical Style of 2 Thessalonians: How Pauline Is It?" in a forthcoming volume of *BETL*, ed. by R. F. Collins.

[25] *Style*, 51.

[26] Grammatical searches of the Greek text have been greatly facilitated by the use of the GRAMCORD computer program, GRAMCORD Institute. Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2065 Half Day Road, Deerfield, IL 60015.

[27] Haenchen, *Acts*, 139. The other "we"-passages in Haenchen's list are 21:4; 27:17; 28:8, 10, 14, 15, 18.

[28] The layout of the text is designed to show the subordinate clause pattern by placing each clause on a separate line and using indentation to show the syntactical relationships between the clauses: the doubly indented ones are *internal* to the previous clause, others are sequential.

[29] Noted by Hawkins, 37-8: 4:5; 9:3, 32, 37, 43; 11:26; 14:1; 16:16; 19:1; 21:1, 5; 22:6, 17; 27:44; 28:8, 17.

the accusative noun and the infinitive. While the entire construction seems cumbersome, the final "we"-section has the same syntactical sequence in 28:8, except for the genitive absolute:

16:16 ἐγένετο δὲ
πορευομένων ἡμῶν εἰς τὴν προσευχὴν
παιδίσκην τινὰ ὑπαντῆσαι ἡμῖν,
ἔχουσαν πνεῦμα πύθωνα
ἥτις. . . .

28:8 ἐγένετο δὲ
τὸν πατέρα τοῦ Ποπλίου κατακεῖσθαι,
πυρετοῖς καὶ δυσεντερίῳ συνεχόμενον
πρὸς ὃν. . . .

In the rest of Acts a sequence similar to 16:16 is found at 19:1, with an articular infinitive replacing the genitive absolute:

19:1 ἐγένετο δὲ
ἐν τῷ τὸν Ἀπολλῶ εἶναι ἐν Κορίνθῳ
Παῦλον ἐλθεῖν εἰς Ἔφεσον. . . .
διελθόντα τὰ ἀνωτερικὰ μέρη

A similar construction occurs in 9:32, without the intervening adverbial clause:

9:32 ἐγένετο δὲ
Πέτρον κατελθεῖν
διερχόμενον διὰ πάντων

The subordinate construction without ἐγένετο occurs at 8:31, 15:39, and 23:10. Thus 16:16 is a combination of syntactical constructions that are typical in Acts, but none of these combinations is found elsewhere in the NT.

In the second section (20:5-15) the most noticeable construction is the genitive absolute following the nominative participle in v. 9:

καταφερόμενον ὕπνῳ βαθεῖ
διαλεγομένου τοῦ Παύλου ἐπὶ πλεῖον.

There is a precedent for this much in 1:9 (unlike 24:2 with a conjunction between the two participles). The context of this construction is unique, however, in that the genitive absolute is one of four adverbial participles preceding the main verb. In fact, the preponderance of participles in the entire section is distinctive: 22 participles to one infinitive (and that in a periphrastic construction in v. 7 μέλλων ἐξιέναι) and two subordinate clauses with subordinating conjunctions (relative adverbs ὅπου and οὗ in vv. 6 and 8). In contrast, the rest of the chapter (vv. 16ff) has 23 participles to 8 infinitives and 21 subordinating conjunctions, utilizing six different words. The dominance of participles reappears with the next "we"-section in ch. 21. In total count, the ratio of participles to infinitives is over 5:1 in the middle two "we"-sections, more than twice that of the other two sections, which are the same as the rest of Acts.

We might also note the emphatic construction with the "we" in v. 13: ἡμεῖς δὲ + participle, which also occurs in the next "we"-section in 21:7. However, there are third person parallels in 13:14 αὐτοὶ δὲ + participle and 18:19 αὐτὸς δὲ + participle, and the same construction with a characteristic Lukan conjunction

in 13:4 αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν + participle and no conjunction in 17:25; 21:24; and 24:8. An emphatic αὐτοί follows a participle in 16:37, similarly αὐτός in 20:13.

The third "we"-section (21:1-18) opens with another ἐγένετο construction, this time with the infinitive first and then a participle ὡς δὲ ἐγένετο ἀναχθῆναι ἡμᾶς ἀποσπασθέντας, syntactically less distinctive than 16:16. Elsewhere in the section are features already noted: a relative clause separated from its antecedent by the main verb (v. 4), ἡμεῖς δὲ + participle (v. 7), and a large number of participles. We should also note the use of τοῦ + infinitive in v. 12:

παρεκαλοῦμεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ οἱ ἐντόπιοι
τοῦ μὴ ἀναβαίνειν αὐτὸν εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ.

This use of the genitive article with the infinitive when it is functioning as either an object or subject clause is often called "pleonastic" and attributed to LXX influence.[30] It is used again in the "we"-sections at 27:1, 20, and numerous other times in Luke-Acts. Turner suggested, "It may be argued that . . . the construction has atticistic affinities," but "never outside Biblical Greek is it found so persistently." This kind of construction demonstrates that "the LXX Hebraisms are widespread, occurring even in the most Gentile sections."[31]

A rather Pauline use of coordinated conjunctions is found at 21:13 οὐ μόνον δεθῆναι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποθανεῖν, and again in the last "we"-section at 27:10 οὐ μόνον τοῦ φορτίου καὶ τοῦ πλοίου ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ἡμῶν. Elsewhere in Acts it occurs at 19:26 (without καί), 27, and 26:29, but it is most frequent in Paul (18 times).

The final section (27:1-28:16) is the longest and considered the most "literary." Among its more interesting features we note these. There are five instances of a relative pronoun followed by a participial construction.[32] In several of these the relative pronoun also functions within the participial phrase: 27:17 ἧν ἄραντες; 28:8 πρὸς ὃν ὁ Παῦλος εἰσελθὼν; 28:15 οὓς ἰδων ὁ Παῦλος. A similar construction with the relative adverb is at 28:13 ὅθεν περιελόντες and 28:14 οὗ εὑρόντες ἀδελφοὺς. Such constructions already occur at 11:6 εἰς ἣν ἀτενίσας and 15:29 ἐξ ὧν διατηροῦντες ἑαυτοὺς. More common are instances similar to 28:4 ὃν, διασωθέντα, and 28:7 ὃς, ἀναδεξάμενος,where the participle functions as an adverbial within the relative clause, as indicated by putting a comma between them.

A noteworthy stylistic tendency in this final "we"-section is the increased length of adverbial clauses that end with a participle:

27:3	φιλανθρώπως τε ὁ Ἰούλιος τῷ Παύλῳ χρησάμενος
27:5	τό τε πέλαγος τὸ κατὰ Κιλικίαν . . . διαπλεύσαντες
27:7	ἐν ἱκαναῖς δὲ ἡμέραις βραδυπλοούντες
27:20	χειμῶνός τε οὐκ ὀλίγου ἐπικειμένου
27:33	τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτην σήμερον ἡμέραν προσδοκώντες
28:3	ἀπὸ τῆς θέρμης ἐξελθοῦσα
28:6	ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ αὐτῶν προσδοκώντων καὶ θεωρούτων

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[30] See M. Zerwick, *Biblical Greek* (SPIB 114; Rome: 1963) §386.

[31] *Style*, 47, 61. The basic Septuagintal nature of this construction is confirmed by Conybeare and Stock, *A Grammar of Septuagint Greek* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1980; reprinted from 1905) 60, where Acts 3:12, 15:20 and 27:1 are cited as NT illustrations of the LXX usage.

[32] Also part of Haenchen's list of relative clauses that should be main clauses (*Acts*, 139).

28:6 μηδὲν ἄτοπον εἰς αὐτὸν γινόμενον
28:8 πυρετοῖς καὶ δυσεντερίῳ συνεχόμενον
28:13 καὶ μετὰ μίαν ἡμέραν ἐπιγενομένου νότου

The tendency begins to emerge already in ch. 26:

v. 7 v. ἐν ἐκτενείᾳ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν λατρεῦον
v. 10 τὴν παρὰ τῶν ἀρχιερέων ἐξουσίαν λαβὼν
v. 11 καὶ κατὰ πάσας τὰς συναγωγὰς πολλάκις τιμωρῶν αὐτοὺς
v. 20 ἄξια τῆς μετανοίας ἔργα πράσσοντας.

This phenomenon may be associated with the general observation that the last chapters in Acts are "more literary," which may only be the culmination of how the style of the entire book moves from sounding "more Semitic" to "less Semitic."[33]

V

Conclusions: Our study of syntactical features within the "we"-sections of Acts has not discovered any significant patterns that characterize all four sections. Furthermore, the somewhat peculiar constructions that might be noteworthy can also be found elsewhere in Acts. Thus we have not discovered any basis in the syntactic style of the text for isolating this material from the rest of Acts. It is neither uniform enough nor distinctive enough to make that possible.

This also suggests that there is not sufficient evidence to argue either that "we" is an addition to a source or that it is retained from a source, even a source from the same author. A study of the sytactical style confirms the earlier conclusions based on lexicographical data: the "linguistic unity," or "uniformity of style," is sufficiently consistent throughout Acts to preclude any meaningful discernment of sources. An explanation for the "we"-sections must be based on more than a search for sources in Acts.

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[33] This, in turn, may be mostly a function of imitating Septuagintal style where appropriate. See E. Plümacher's discussion of "Septuagintanachahmung" in *Lukas als hellenistischer Schriftsteller: Studien zur Apostelgeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972) 38-72. This is one aspect of the larger question regarding Acts historiography. See D. Schmidt, "The Historiography of Acts: Deuteronomistic or Hellenistic?" *SBLASP* (1985) 417-427; David Balch, "Acts as Hellenistic Historiography," *SBLASP* (1985) 429-432.

Must Luke and Acts Belong to the Same Genre?

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Introduction

"Luke and Acts *must* be treated as affiliated with one genre," asserts David Aune in the course of a learned and valuable survey of the genre of Luke and Acts.[1] His view is a logical outcome of the reversal of the canonical separation of Luke and Acts pioneered by H. J. Cadbury. The object of this paper is to raise questions about Aune's assertion and thereby to contribute to the refinement of the discussion of the unity of Luke and Acts.[2]

Neither Aune nor, to my knowledge, anyone else has sought to demonstrate this presumed necessity. The thesis fundamentally begs the question, for it is derived from the belief that Luke and Acts are a single work in two volumes and thus must represent one genre. The post-redaction critical shift from emphasis upon the manipulation of sources to focus upon the text as a self-sufficient literary product has established Luke and Acts as major controls upon one another, rather than Luke as primarily a revision of Mark and Acts as a document to be viewed (for better or worse) in the light of the Pauline corpus. Literary unity appears to require generic unity and gives rise to Aune's demand.

The Unities of Luke and Acts

Mikeal Parsons observes that the unity of Luke and Acts embodies a number of "unities," of which he identifies five: authorial, theological, narrative, generic, and canonical.[3] Each variety of unity requires independent scrutiny and evaluation before general observations may be affirmed, for the recognition of one type of unity does not imply others. The acceptance of authorial unity, for example, does not establish generic unity, as ancient authors could, and did, compose in different genres.

The unity between Luke and Acts is more than a matter of common authorship.

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[1] *The New Testament in Its Literary Environment*, LEC 8, Philadelphia: Westminster, 1987, 80. Pp. 17-157 are relevant to this paper.

[2] Mikeal Parsons and I are preparing a book on the subject of the unity of Luke and Acts. He has initiated this project.

[3] "The Making of 'Luke-Acts': The Unity of the Lukan Writings Reconsidered," a paper presented at the SBL Southwest Regional Meeting, March, 1988, and a revision of the same, delivered in shorter form as "The Unity of Luke-Acts: Rethinking the *Opinio Communis*," read at the SBL Annual Meeting in Chicago, November, 1988.

The two books are joined by a common dedication and related prefaces. Acts assumes the Gospel and seems—for its preface is deficient—to continue it. There are, moreover, the well-known "parallels"[4] between the works. The author clearly hoped that the two would be read together, for they enhance one another's meaning. Recognition of such narrative unity does not depend upon generic unity, nor do many of its exploiters deal in any depth with the question of form, since they often prefer to address works as more or less "*sui generis*."[5] Their findings bear little upon questions of genre, questions they may regard as extraneous. The discovery of the narrative unity of Luke and Acts does not establish generic identity.

The Purpose of Generic Analysis

The study of literary types is a comparative discipline based upon the presupposition that language has social and cultural contexts relevant to its meaning, and that formal units of discourse cannot properly be understood without consideration of their social functions. A major object of form criticism is the discovery of how typical audiences may have received particular works.

For several generations the application of form criticism to the New Testament largely restricted itself to oral and "non-literary" texts. A footnote to Overbeck and/or K. L. Schmidt once sufficed to dismiss "literature" proper from the New Testament scene, freeing scholars to pursue its literary and theological uniquenesses. The welcome demise of this procedure[6] has left the discipline in a somewhat confused state. So eagerly has research returned to the study of ancient literature and genres that the danger now exists of overlooking the obvious contrasts between early Christian texts and the sophisticated writings produced by and for those with the resources to receive and enjoy higher education. One cannot, for example, simply identify Pauline letters with specimens of learned rhetoric or the Gospels with biographies like those of Plutarch, however valuable such texts may be in lending profile to our subject. There are vast contrasts in subject matter, style, and cultural level,[7] and therefore in expectations by and from audiences. In general one may safely state that the authors of the New Testament writings lacked both the educational refinement to produce "elevated" discourse and hearers equipped with the education and interest to enjoy them. Those who compare New Testament texts

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[4] The most comprehensive investigation of Lukan parallelism is probably C. Talbert, *Literary Patterns, Theological Themes, and the Genre of-Acts*, Scholars: Missoula, Montana, 1974. For methodological discussion note S. M. Praeder, "Jesus-Paul, Peter-Paul, and Jesus-Peter Parallelisms in Luke-Acts," *1984 SBL Seminar Papers*, Scholars: Chico, CA, 1984.

[5] So R. Tannehill, for example, the second volume of whose *Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts* (Vol. 1 Fortress, 1986) will soon appear. Tannehill has stated that he is not concerned about genre.

[6] Witnessed by several volumes of Westminster's *Library of Early Christianity*, to name but one example. See K. Berger, "Hellenistische Gattungen im Neuen Testament," *ANRW* II.25.2, 1031-1432, 1831-1885, for a comprehensive survey of research.

[7] On these matters see R. Pervo, *Profit with Delight*, Fortress: Philadelphia, 1987, pp. 5-8.

with Greco-Roman literature of the cultured sort have to work with analogies, some of which are rather remote.

Freedom from cultured norms brought a bonus in the creativity and flexibility available to those not bound by learned conventions. Many types of poetry and prose had their roots in "folk culture." The old saws about Gospels and Acts as "*sui generis*" had in their favor the recognition of the creative potential inherent within popular culture. So long as our repertory of truly "popular" literature remains circumscribed, we shall be obliged to recognize that the comparison of New Testament texts to the writings of Josephus, Lucian, and Dio, for example, will have limited results. No classification of Luke-Acts in ancient literary terms will enable it to be shelved alongside them, nor will such classification fully illumine such issues as purpose or "accuracy."[8]

The immediate application of this *caveat* is against applying too rigid a theory of genre to Luke and Acts, one based, for example, upon the notion that vol. 2 must adhere to the generic conventions of vol. 1. Luke was, to a degree, venturing into *terra incognita*. His readers were not particular about the niceties, and it is not outrageous to suspect that he was an author who regarded models as bridges that might be burned once their purposes had been fulfilled.

The principal value of formal analysis for Luke and Acts is the light it may shed upon the original audience and their expectations. The quest for such comparative materials reveals a distinct gap between Luke and Acts. For the first volume there is a wealth of biographical material of varying type and quality, not to mention the other canonical gospels. In the case of Acts, however, the basis for comparison is rather slim, particularly if the apocryphal acts are taken off the board before play properly begins.

Form criticism has tended to distinguish between Luke and Acts, having found for Luke a reasonably safe haven within the gospel genre, while forced to let Acts drift amidst the dangerous shoals of historiography, with shipwreck in store for those who probe too sharply.[9] Only the emergent dominance of the unified Luke-Acts has brought the question of a necessary common genre to the fore.

Evidence of the Early Church

The different uses of and attestations for Luke and Acts do not lend support to the view that the work was a generic unity ruthlessly separated by canonizing hacks.[10] Justin's position is unclear,[11] but he apparently knew both. Marcion explicitly rejected Acts (if Tertullian is to be trusted[12]), thereby reflecting a distinction prior to the inclusion of Luke in a Gospel collection. Irenaeus seeks to establish the closest possible connection between Luke and Acts (thereby becoming the first

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[8] Note, in this connection, that most commentary and related discussions of Luke within the context of ancient historiography are of a limiting sort, noting license available to ancient, but not to modern, historians.

[9] See *Profit with Delight*, esp. pp. 11-15.

[10] For the reception of Acts in the early Church see the various commentaries, e.g., E. Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles*, tr. R. McL. Wilson et al., Westminster: Philadelphia, 1971, pp. 6-14.

[11] Haenchen believes that Justin knew Acts, 8f. This is still disputable.

[12] Tertullian (*Adv. Marc.* 5,2,7; *Praescr.* 22) implies that Marcion rejected Acts.

known proponent of Luke-Acts as the hermeneutical key to Paul), but the Bishop of Lyons recognized these as distinct works by a common author. The first he registered among the Four Gospels; the second he delineated as "Doctrina Apostolorum."[13]

Clement distinguishes the second book by the title it still bears: *Praxeis tōn Apostolōn,*[14] which is arguably a generic designation.[15] The so called "Muratorian Canon," if it is early,[16] also takes notice of distinct works and discusses them in different places.[17] The argument for generic unity draws no aid or comfort from the earliest witnesses. Marcion's activity indicates that the separation of Luke and Acts was not due to the creation of a collection of Gospels.[18]

Modern Proposals of Generic Unity

Cadbury dealt only briefly with the question of genre. After musing upon the merits of biography and history, he concluded that Luke-Acts was more like history than anything else.[19] This tentative suggestion, typical of Cadbury in its reserve, reveals the tension expressed by "biography" and "history," with their obvious applications.

Hans Conzelmann, followed by E. Plümacher and H. Steichele, has advanced the merits of the monograph, chiefly with regard to Acts,[20] but this theory is not developed in detail for the two books.[21] In any event, Conzelmann understands the monograph as highly flexible and related to other genres. One might squeeze both Luke and Acts into this category without providing much specific illumination.

A similar observation may be made about David Aune's own candidate: "general History."[22] History has not been kind to the general historians of antiquity, and

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[13] Irenaeus, *A.H.* 3,14,4.

[14] Clement, *Strom.* 5,12.

[15] On "*Praxeis,*" see Aune, p. 78 and the commentaries of Haenchen, Conzelmann, and Schneider.

[16] A. Sundberg (*HTR* 66 [1973] 1-41) proposes a later dating and Eastern provenance. H. Gamble holds to an early date, but admits that Sundberg has raised important questions, "The Canon of the New Testament," in *The New Testament and Its Modern Interpreters,* ed. E. J. Epp and G. W. MacRae, 212-214. Philadelphia: Fortress, and Atlanta: Scholars, 1989.

[17] Lines 2-8 are devoted to Luke, lines 34-39 to Acts.

[18] Aune believes that the fourfold Gospel was a creation of the early Second Century and that this caused the division of Luke and Acts. His dating is too early, for Irenaeus had to argue for the collection. See Gamble, pp. 208-212.

[19] *The Making of Luke-Acts,* London: SPCK, 1958, pp. 132-134.

[20] See Conzelmann's brief remarks in *Acts of the Apostles,* tr. ed. E. J. Epp with C. Matthews, Hermeneia, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987, pp. xl-xli. See also E. Plümacher, *Lukas als hellenistischer Schriftsteller,* SUNT 9, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972, and H. Steichele, "Vergleich der Apostelgeschichte mit der antiken Geschichtsschreibung," Diss., Munich, 1971.

[21] Plümacher mainly exploits the monograph and other historians for stylistic parallels.

[22] Aune prefers this translation to the common "Universal History." His discussion is on pp. 88-89. See also the paper of D. Balch in this volume.

scarcely half of the best-preserved specimen, Diodorus Siculus, survives. Comparison is thereby difficult.

General historians apparently wrote from some kind of understanding of world unity, whether political, as with Polybius, or philosophical-theological, as in the case of Posidonius. What survives from the beginning of the Common Era suggests a macro-genre, capable of subsuming within itself a variety of genres or becoming in essence a collection of monographs. Even if Luke and Acts were to be assigned to this comprehensive category, it would be appropriate to seek generic peculiarities in each volume. General histories, moreover, were ethnic, national, and military-political works, whereas Luke presents the claims of Christianity to qualify as the world religion.[23] The relatively limited scope of Luke and Acts constitute a barrier to this categorization, for even the most nationalistic of general historians worked upon a much vaster canvass than did Luke.[24] Aune has pointed to a pliable and disparate genre, one that is probably too flexible to advance the discussion.

Charles Talbert, unlike others, has made a sustained case for a common genre: the histories of succession developed amidst philosophical school conflicts.[25] His proposal focuses upon a leading Lukan concern, the demonstration of continuity and legitimacy. Talbert argues for a typical pattern visible in the collection of Diogenes Laertius, including a life of the founder, data about successors, and fundamental doctrines. Aune has objected that this pattern is relatively rare in Diogenes,[26] and that succession lists are not to be equated with narratives.

Christians from the Second Century *did* adopt a kindred model, beginning with Hegisippus. Luke and Acts do not follow this procedure. Only by inference can one detect succession in the Lukan works, for the author does not explain the fate of the apostles, the emergence of *presbyteroi* (of which office he does not disapprove), and bishops (of which office he does not approve), the rise of James to leadership, or the links among these developments. Arguments for succession of the sort later presented would have weakened Luke's case for Paul, since the latter, as was well known, was neither a disciple of Jesus nor of the "twelve." Luke has, in essence, finessed the succession question by his portrait of Paul's relationship to Jerusalem and his avoidance of the problems of relations between the Twelve and the family of Jesus. The philosophical succession model would have been quite disadvantageous for Luke. Talbert's theory has met with no general approval.[27]

Differences between Luke and Acts

Canonical separation has not been the single reason for the divergence of generic approaches to Luke and Acts. The constituent forms (sayings, pronouncement stories, miracles, parables, etc.) of Luke are shared with the other Synoptics, so that

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[23] Sensitive to this issue, Aune presses for the importance of Luke's "National Consciousness," pp. 140-141.

[24] Luke and Acts represent the kind of sources utilized by some general historians. The fragments of Artapanus and other "Hellenistic Jewish Historians" were transmitted to Eusebius through the work of Alexander Polyhistor.

[25] *Literary Patterns*, pp. 125-140.

[26] P. 141.

[27] See M. Parsons, "Reading Talbert," *1987 SBL Seminar Papers*, Atlanta: Scholars, 1987, pp. 689-711.

much of the Gospel yields to traditional form-critical analysis, but Acts does not. The contrasting approaches of Martin Dibelius to Luke and to Acts illustrate this difference, just as they established the patterns for subsequent research. The objection that Luke was bound by his sources does not hold much water, for, on the one hand, Luke was capable of introducing into the Gospel scenes like those so common in Acts (e.g., Luke 4:16-30), and, on the other hand, differences in sources are not without relevance for generic considerations. Finally, the picture of Luke the Evangelist hog-tied by his sources scarcely represents the cutting-edge of Lukan studies.[28]

The use of different material is most apparent in the famous speeches of Acts, compositions by the author in frequent agreement with contemporary rhetorical models. It is difficult to argue that only in Acts did Luke have the license of an historian to invent speeches. The presence of these numerous addresses remains a formidable obstacle to the case for generic unity. They could be construed as a clear signal that in Acts Luke is doing something different.

Both Luke and Acts utilize journeys as structural devices. Their content offers contrasts, for the Gospel journey of Jesus to Jerusalem is quite artificial, largely lacking in travel information, and replete with teaching. The Gospel journey is a medium for the presentation of Jesus as an itinerant preacher of the "Way." The travel reports of Acts are rich with circumstantial detail and prefer accounts of missionary adventure to ethical teaching. In Luke Jesus is a model almost exclusively in his passion. The leaders depicted in Acts exemplify their faith by their deeds throughout the narrative. For this reason the book was entitled "*Praxeis.*"

The tone of Acts is markedly different. Punishment miracles come to the fore. Sinners receive punishment rather than forgiveness, and harlots and publicans have been swept offstage, giving place to converts of social prominence. There is little about ministry to the needy and much about the disreputable urban rabble. One is hard-pressed in attempting to portray Acts as exemplifying the sentiment of the Sermon on the Plain.[29]

These differences indicate that the author approached Acts with other objectives and methods than those which governed the composition of Luke. These differences may best be understood by examining each work from different generic perspectives.

Possible Models

What justification might Luke have had for presenting two consecutive volumes of differing literary type? In the first place, I reiterate that Luke required no justification of the sort required by formal "rules," for he was producing fundamentally popular works. The continuation of the story was required by his theological vision and conception, and by a perceived need to vindicate the Pauline heritage.[30] These

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[28] The situation of the Fourth Gospel, with its free use of tradition, also comes to mind.

[29] R. J. Cassidy, *Society and Politics in the Acts of the Apostles,* is compelled to shift his ground to focus upon political questions regarding Paul. His work is useful but not fully convincing.

[30] Conzelmann's view of Lukan theology demonstrates the rationale for a continuation. A recent presentation of the importance of the legitimacy of the gentile mission is P. Esler, *Community and Gospel in Luke-Acts,* SNTSMS 57, New York: Cambridge, 1987.

requirements constituted for the author a priority far more important than did any need for literary justification.

Secondly, I would point to the prototype most certainly available to Luke: The Greek Bible. Within this collection the author would encounter *1–4 Kingdoms, 1–2 Esdras,*[31] and *1–2* (or more) *Maccabees.* Each would have appeared as an individual volume within a group, although by our standards a variety of types are represented. These precedents would have provided the author of Luke and Acts with any necessary warrant for joining two volumes of differing genres. In this, as in other respects, Luke may well have followed the patterns set by Biblical "historians."

Ancient Collections

Rationales for the division of ancient works into books and the collection of writings varied greatly. In some cases (Homer, for example[32]) division followed composition after a long interval. Other divisions reflect the artistic plan of the author (Vergil). Still other collections grew over time with the addition of subsequent "books." Technical factors, especially the desire for rolls of manageable length, also applied.[33] Firm rules for book divisions cannot be drawn.

The division between Luke and Acts is certainly neither arbitrary nor accidental, whatever the length of a roll. The first volume is complete and self-contained. Acts is, in several senses, a new departure, but it can be read independently of the Gospel, however much it is enriched by the former. Closure and openness mark both books. Neither practices of book division, technical requirements, nor literary intentions require generic unity.[34]

Canonical Issues

Current emphasis upon the unity of Luke and Acts implicitly or explicitly regards the canonical separation of the two as an error to be remedied by criticism. The obvious cause of this error, if such it is, is the canonical proclivity for arranging material by (collected) genres rather than by presumed authors. The received shape of the New Testament Canon (Gospels, Acts, Pauline letters to churches and to individuals, Hebrews, catholic letters, Revelation) exhibits a sensitivity to differences of genre and type. The claim that Acts was separated from Luke because of the four-gospel collection[35] is another *petitio principii,* as genre was the grounds for that separation. The canonical division provides a better argument for generic disparity than it does for the obfuscation of generic identity.

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[31] The editorial history of the work of the Chronicler is problematic, to say the least.

[32] Not to mention the Bible, with its various divisions and enumerations of books!

[33] For limitation due to space see the conclusion of Josephus's *Contra Apionem* I, 320.

[34] On the literary questions see the papers of M. Parsons, n. 3 above.

[35] See n. 18 above.

Conclusion

Since form criticism has value only if it contributes to understanding, those who require a common genre for Luke and Acts should do more than propose a vague label which will facilitate examination of the reunited work. They must advance models which will shed as much light upon Luke-Acts as have the researches of those who have examined aretalogies, novels, apocryphal acts, monographs, biographies, and other "gospels." At present Talbert alone has attempted this in any depth. The results of research suggest that more can be learned about Luke and Acts by studying them from *different* generic perspectives.

Finally, if the argument for generic unity is pressed vigorously, Luke must cease to be regarded as a Gospel and be considered no more than half a work.[36] What then could be made of Matthew, Mark, and John? My conclusion is that the argument for generic unity begins in obscurity and ends in absurdity, the obscurity of seeking no more than a convenient label and the absurdity of challenging the completeness of any Gospel. If the unity of Luke-Acts is not a modern construct, the demand for generic unity very probably is.

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[36] In view of the Gospel's obvious closure (see the references in n. 34), this would seem quite unlikely.

Characteristics of Folk-Epic in Acts

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In his intriguing book, *Profit With Delight*, Richard Pervo makes clear the impasse where Lukan scholars find themselves regarding the composition of Acts. After Haenchen, we have been left with "a Luke who was bumbling and incompetent as a historian yet brilliant and creative as an author."[1]

While focusing on the question of Acts' genre, Pervo locates the difficulty in Haenchen and other scholars' misguided view that Acts is historiography. Instead, Pervo compares the element of entertainment in Acts with entertainment in popular pagan, Jewish, and Christian literature of the Hellenistic world and argues that Luke appropriated the form of the historical novel to write down his vision of a utopian Christianized world. Thus, to Pervo, the author of Acts subsumed historical and edifying interests to a desire to delight his audience.

To my great delight, I find much profit in Pervo's book. What could be more obvious than the sense of adventure, the entertainment generated by the Acts of the Apostles? And what has been more overlooked by serious scholars?

Even more important is Pervo's object of contributing to the quest for connections between Christian and other early narratives. Unfortunately, too little has been accomplished in this area regarding Acts. It is high time that we turn in earnest to the question of the genre of Acts.

Also, to its great credit, Pervo's thesis takes seriously studies such as Cadbury's *The Book of Acts in History* showing the correct use of local color (geographical details, names and titles, ethnographic terminology, etc.) in Acts.[2] What could account for both the accurate, vivid description and the "unconcerned" representation of history in Acts? How could an author who so correctly portrayed the political, geographical, and social world of Paul, not give a better history of Paul's stay in Ephesus, for example, than what we find in Acts 19?[3]

To me, in fact, the greatest strength of Pervo's view rests in the deft way in which it accounts for the author's fidelity to the details of the story's setting, on the one hand, and the author's infidelity to events, on the other. The author of Acts wrote like a novelist—not a historian. The preface of Acts would have been a device used to create verisimilitude.[4] Likewise, the multitude of accurate details that clothe the story would have been crafted by the novelist to draw his readers into the narrative

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[1] Richard I. Pervo, *Profit with Delight: The Literary Genre of the Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 3.

[2] Henry J. Cadbury, *The Book of Acts in History* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955).

[3] Pervo, 9-10.

[4] Pervo, 5.

world. While being careful to paint realistic settings in which to place the people of his narrative, the author, like all good novelists, would have allowed the story–characters to live lives of their own.

But, as appealing as it is, the thesis that Luke appropriated the form of the (historical) novel for Acts presents some difficulties. In particular, two problems seem insuperable to me. Let me simply mention the first one, before concentrating on the second. In my opinion, Pervo's thesis too much disassociates Acts from a cultic setting. How are we to explain the Septuagintal language in Acts?[5] Even if the semitisms of Acts are literary devices, do they not point to a setting in worship?[6] Would not the worshiping community rather than individual Christians have been the natural audience for Acts, and would not the Church instead of the reading room have been the natural setting for the story's hearing?

Second, the view that Acts is like a novel makes the author appear too much the creative author (or too much in control of his material) for my taste. In its bluntest form, Pervo's view is that the author was a popular writer who so wished to write an entertaining novel that he invented incidents, characterized people and events in improbable (and fictive) ways, and generally "disregarded sources, even if available."[7] But, was the author really like the creative writers of our modern day, composing new literature with unbridled imagination, or was he more like the storytellers of very ancient societies, a keeper and reshaper of tradition?[8] And where would one encounter this "reading audience" who held Paul to be a hero, waiting to be tittilated by his escapades, but who, at the same time, was not offended by the fabrication of early Christian events? Who would have commissioned and published the book? Would it have been distributed, marketed? And if the Acts of the Apostles were the creative work of an author, why would it not have suffered the same fate as the Acts of Paul?

Author or Editor?

Was the writer of Acts more like a creative author or like an editor? We must thank Richard Pervo for once again fastening on to this central question to Lukan studies, and for challenging us with his view that the Acts of the Apostles was written by an author who so had in mind to tella good story that he played fast and loose with his sources.[9]

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[5] For semitisms in Acts, see Max Wilcox, *Semitisms of Acts* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965); H. F. D. Sparks, "The Semitisms of Acts," *JTS* n.s. 1 (1950):16ff.

[6] Fred C. Horton, "Reflections on the Semitisms of Luke-Acts," in *Perspectives on Luke-Acts,* ed. Charles H. Talbert (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1978), 1ff.

[7] Pervo, 8.

[8] Elsewhere, I have suggested that ἀνατάξασθαι in Lk. 1:1 indicates the repetition of something already established. See, James M. Dawsey, *The Lukan Voice* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1986), 109.

[9] Pervo admits to the close relationship that exists between the question of genre and the question of sources. (Pervo, 137) He also indicates that "the question of sources is wide open" regarding Acts (Pervo, 2). Of course, most of us agree that the author of Acts drew upon early Christian tradition. The lack of consensus to which Richard Pervo so correctly refers concerns the nature and the form of the author's sources and the extent of the author's use of them. Were the sources written

In a sense, Pervo follows in the footsteps of Henry Joel Cadbury, who perhaps is the North American scholar who has most made us aware that the writer of Acts was an author in his own right. At one point, when referring to the prefaces of Luke-Acts, Cadbury even called Luke a litterateur.[10] But, in his claim for the creativity of the author of Acts, Richard Pervo has pushed far beyond Cadbury. Cadbury's fuller opinion was that the author of Luke-Acts rearranged, reworked, and edited tradition with the main motive of passing on information.[11] Thus, Cadbury thought that the author of Luke-Acts drew readily from early Christian accounts, and was more the historiographer and less the novelist.

Also different from Pervo, Cadbury never quite credited the element of entertainment in Acts to the author's desire to delight his audience. Rather, Cadbury implied that the element of entertainment in Acts came in some degree from the author's sources. He thought that Luke-Acts combined popular forms of expression, "folk-story," with more conventional literary forms of composition. Although "the popular literature of antiquity and its oral forms of expression" are for the most part unfamiliar to us,[12] Cadbury was convinced that we can recognize in the hero tales and the travel tales in Acts examples of those popular forms that Luke took over from sources.[13] Thus, here too we find a view of authorship which admits the entertainment and page-turning adventure that one encounters in Acts, but in this case the writer of Acts appears more dependent upon sources and less dependent on creative imagination.

Elements of Folk-Story in Acts

To my mind, Cadbury's hint that some of the more entertaining qualities of Acts come from Luke's use of folk-stories bears greater attention. In a book published in 1983, Dennis Ronald MacDonald attempted to show that oral legends stand behind the Acts of Paul.[14] According to MacDonald, the entertaining content and form of the Acts of Paul would have come from the oral sources behind the writing. Could something similar have happened with regard to the Acts of the Apostles? While admittedly turning upside down the usual view holding that the Apocryphal Acts were derived from the canonical Acts of the Apostles,[15] MacDonald here seems to approximate the pattern of composition suggested by Cadbury.

For his study of the oral form of the stories in the Acts of Paul, MacDonald drew heavily on Alex Olrik's "Epic Laws of Folk Narrative."[16] MacDonald was careful to

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or oral, Greek or Aramaic? Did the author draw upon small units of tradition or larger collections of materials? Was the author a creative writer or an eyewitness, tendentious or objective?

[10] Henry J. Cadbury, *The Making of Luke-Acts* (reprint ed., London: SPCK, 1968), 194.

[11] Cadbury, *The Making of Luke-Acts*, 299.

[12] Cadbury, *The Making of Luke-Acts*, 141.

[13] Cadbury, *The Making of Luke-Acts*, 142, 144.

[14] Dennis Ronald MacDonald, *The Legend and the Apostle* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1983).

[15] Edgar Hennecke, *New Testament Apocrypha*, vol. 2., ed. by Wilhelm Schneemelcher, trans. by R. McL. Wilson (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965), 169.

[16] MacDonald, 26-33.

back away from Olrik's superorganic view of culture, and rather than holding the laws to be totally deterministic, thought of them much more simply as characteristics oftentimes encountered in folk narratives. Used generally in this way, Olrik's study seems to have shed light on the Acts of Paul. Could it illumine the Acts of the Apostles as well?

For some reason MacDonald did not mention one of Olrik's "laws" that I find particularly pertinent to the Acts of the Apostles. Olrik wrote that "two is the maximum number of characters who appear at one time [in a folk narrative scene]. Three people appearing at the same time, each with his own individual identity and role to play would be a violation of tradition. The *Law of Two to a Scene* (das Gesetz der scenischen Zweiheit) is a strict one. . . . The interaction of three or more characters, which is so popular in literary drama, is not allowed in folk narrative."[17]

In another context, I have pointed out the striking occurrence in Acts 17-18 where Timothy is only introduced into the account once Paul leaves Athens.[18] Even though Timothy is present behind the scenes, he is not mentioned along with Paul and Silas until Acts 18:5, at which time he is paired with Silas. The reason is the author's fondness for doubles. The author almost always pairs his characters or groups of characters, two to a scene.

Thus, Acts begins with Jesus speaking with the group of disciples (Acts 1:6-11) and ends with Paul speaking with the leaders of the Roman Jews (Acts 28:17-28). Peter interacts with Ananias (Acts 5:1-5), and later with Sapphira (Acts 5:7-10), one at a time. Philip baptizes the Ethiopian eunuch (Acts 8:26-40), Peter meets with Cornelius (Acts 10:1-43), the angel leads Peter out of prison (Acts 12:6-11), etc. Almost invariably, the interaction in Acts is between two.

A complementary characteristic common in Acts is what Olrik calls "the greatest law of folk tradition": *Concentration on a leading character*. Acts first concentrates on Peter; then, it concentrates on Stephen; then, Philip; then, Saul (Paul); then, Peter again; and finally it concentrates on Paul. Even though the story recognizes more than one hero, it is single-stranded. It always settles full attention on only one protagonist at a time.

As all know, this characteristic is so strong in Acts that many earlier-day scholars used the shift from leading character to leading character as a clue to help distinguish literary sources. In the last 30 years, however, form critics have questioned whether the stories in Acts were so fixed in their oral stage of transmission that they would have been written down as documents.[19] We perhaps need to be reminded that the question, rightly, has not been whether the pericopes in Acts go back to oral accounts, but whether they were fixed into "written sources" before Luke used them. Most assuredly, the stories already existed and were being transmitted orally before being written in Acts.

I might add also that the tendency in Acts to settle attention on one hero at a time points to another characteristic of folk narratives: *the Importance of Initial and Final Position*. According to Olrik, "whenever a series of persons or things occurs,

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[17] Alex Olrik, "Epic Laws of Folk Narrative," in *The Study of Folklore* by Alan Dundes (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), 134f.

[18] James M. Dawsey, "The Literary Unity of Luke-Acts: Questions of Style—A Task for Literary Critics," *NTS* 35 (1989):64.

[19] C. S. C. Williams, *A Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles*, 2nd. ed. (London: A & C Black, 1964), 11.

then the principal one will come first. Coming last, though, will be the person for whom the particular narrative arouses sympathy. . . . The center of gravity of the narrative always lies in the *Achtergewicht*."[20]

Examples of how principal persons are listed in the initial position abound in Acts. For instance, Peter appears first in a pair: "Peter and the eleven" (Acts 2:14); "Peter and the rest of the apostles" (Acts 2:37; 5:29); "Peter and John" (Acts 3:1, 3, 4, 11; 4:13, 19; 8:14). Also, note how the Peter stories precede the Paul stories in the book.

The association in the narrative of Barnabas and Paul seems especially instructive in this regard. When Acts refers to the official leadership roles of the two, such as in the letter sent from the apostles and elders in Jerusalem to Antioch (Acts 15:25), then Barnabas is invariably mentioned first (cf. Acts 14:12). If, however, Acts refers to the teaching and preaching of the two, then Paul is mentioned first because Paul is the principal spokesman of the mission (see Acts 13:46; 15:2; 15:35).

But how about Olrik's claim that folk narratives are governed by *Achtergewicht?* That also is self evident in Acts as the book only begins to focus on Paul one third of the way through. Notice also how much more sympathetically Agrippa and Festus come off in the trial scenes near the end of Acts than do Felix and Ananias. The high priest Ananias appears first in the narrative. He strikes Paul on the mouth (Acts 23:2), is implicated in a plot to murder Paul (Acts 23:12-14), and joins in the false accusation against Paul (Acts 24:1-8). Felix, second in the narrative, appears in a better light than does Ananias. He has a rather accurate knowledge of the Way (Acts 24:22) but nevertheless, hoping for money (Acts 24:26) and wishing to do the Jews a favor, he keeps Paul in prison for two years (Acts 24:27). Festus, third in the narrative, appears in yet better light. After two weeks in office, he already hears Paul's case and allows his appeal to Caesar (Acts 25:1-12). He also arranges for Paul to speak before Agrippa (Acts 25:13-22). Agrippa, last in the narrative, arouses the most sympathy as after hearing Paul, he says "This man could have been set free if he had not appealed to Caesar" (Acts 26:32).

Earlier I mentioned Acts' fondness for doubles. This extends to what Olrik calls the *Law of Twins,* or "two people who appear together in the same role."[21] Oftentimes these twins in the same role are lesser characters in the story. Ready examples are the combinations "men and women" (Acts 5:14; 8:3, 12; 9:2; 17(?):12; 22:4), "women and children" (Acts 21:5), "Jews and Greeks" (Acts 14:1, 5; 18:4; 19:10, 17; 20:21), "the people and the city authorities" (Acts 17:8), "Silas and Timothy" (Acts 17:15; 18:5), "Jews and God fearers" (Acts 17:17); "The Athenians and the foreigners who lived there" (Acts 17:21), "Dionysius and Damaris" (Acts 17:34), "Aquila and Priscilla" (Acts 18:1, 18, 26); "soldiers and centurions" (Acts 21:32), "the tribune and the soldiers" (Acts 21:32), "the high priest and the whole council" (Acts 22:14), and "the people and the Gentiles" (Acts 26:23). Pair after pair appear in Acts.

While the law of twins applies to characters who share the same function in a folk narrative, *the law of contrast* characterizes opponents of the story's protagonist.[22] A few scattered examples from the first part of Acts are: Peter (and John) who are uneducated but have power from the Holy Spirit are contrasted with the leaders of the Jews who are educated and only think that they have power (Acts 4:5-22);

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[20] Olrick, 136.
[21] Olrik, 136.
[22] Olrik, 135.

Barnabas who sells a field and lays the money at the apostles' feet is contrasted with Ananias and Sapphira who keep back some of the proceeds from the sale of property and only lay part of the money at the apostles' feet (Acts 4:36 -5:2); Stephen who is without malice and asks the Lord to forgive those who stone him is contrasted with opponents who secretly instigate the crowd and set up false witnesses (Acts 6:8-7:60); Philip who performs great miracles and preaches good news about the name of Jesus is contrasted with Simon, who practices magic and claims himself to be great (Acts 8:9-13); Peter who has the Holy Spirit and prays that others might receive it is contrasted with Simon who does not have the Holy Spirit but wants to buy it (Acts 8:14-25); Saul, the Jew, who wishes to murder the disciples of the Lord is contrasted to the Lord who wishes to save Gentiles (Acts 9:1-19); etc.

The polarization in Acts, perhaps, is most evident between the Christian heroes, who one after another are innocent and yet persecuted, and the jealous, scheming Jews who stand behind the persecution. It has been commonplace to understand the contrast between the innocent Christian heroes and their jealous Jewish opponents in Acts as a literary motif originating with the author.[23] The purpose of the motif generally has been said to be propagandistic or theological. Thus, Acts would have been written perhaps as a defense brief for Paul in Rome;[24] or perhaps to show the the "leaders of the christian mission, far from falling away from their Jewish faith, in fact held fast to it."[25]

The perspective of folk epic, however, offers us another possibility. The contrast between hero and opponent might not so much represent the author's view as it does a formal characteristic of the narrative. The opponents might appear as jealous, scheming persecutors because jealous, scheming persecutors are demanded to satisfy folk narrative composition when the hero is innocent and persecuted. The opponents might appear as jealous Jews simply because the heroes are open to Gentiles.

Another important principle of folk narrative composition mentioned by Olrik is *the law of repetition*. According to Olrik, a folk narrative's "spare descriptions are all too brief to serve as an effective means of emphasis. For our traditional oral narrative, there is but one alternative: repetition."[26]

Although not quite as pronounced as found in the book of Judges, there is a pattern to Acts. Jews, annoyed at Christian teaching, persecute the hero who is forced to move on to a new location spreading the message that Jesus is Lord of all. Then the pattern repeats itself.

Olrik calls this particular type of repetition "patterning," and what he writes of it in general, we could plagerize for Acts: "Two people and situations of the same sort are not as different as possible, but as similar as possible."[27] Thus, for example, in Acts there is little difference between the personalities, beliefs, intentions, views, messages, and activities of Peter and Paul. Also, for example, the situations in which Paul finds himself, and even the events themselves, at Philippi, Thessalonica, Berea,

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[23] This was Cadbury's view in *The Making of Luke-Acts*.

[24] For a discussion, see Johannes Munck, *The Acts of the Apostles*, revised by William F. Albright and C. S. Mann (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1967), lviii.

[25] Ernst Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles*, trans. by B. Noble, G. Shinn, H. Anderson, and R. McL. Wilson (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1971), 100.

[26] Olrik, 133.

[27] Olrik, 137.

Athens, Corinth, and Ephesus all run together (Acts 16:6-19:40). In fact, as Pervo so ably reminded us, this characteristic of Acts is one of the most difficult facing those who claim that the narrative is historiography.[28]

Acts, in fact, contains a great amount of repetition of all types. For example, the form and much of the content of the apostolic speeches are repeated with each new speech. Amazement precedes sermons throughout the book. The arrival of the Holy Spirit is followed by the sharing of goods (Acts 2:45; 4:32). The company of believers are united heart and soul. There are healing stories, miracle stories, preaching stories, and interminable travel from town to town.

The repetition in Acts is especially surprising given the tendency in the Gospel of Luke to avoid stylized speechmaking and to omit doublets (for instance, the Lukan omission of the second story of the feeding of the crowd in Mk 8). This apparent oral tendency in Acts is indeed striking when one thinks about the extensive repetition used in such stories as Peter's encounter with Ananias and Sapphira (Acts 5:1-11), Peter's visit to Cornelius (Acts 10-11), Paul's visit to Jerusalem (Acts 15), and Paul's defenses before the people, Felix, Festus, and Agrippa (Acts 22-26).

Other Elements of Composition in Acts

In spite of the many parallels between Acts and folk narratives, I think that it would be a mistake to return to where earlier form critics were taking us by submerging the creative identity of the author of Acts under a sea of popular stories. I myself do not think for one minute that the writer was only a compiler of sources. Certainly, we should think of him as an author. He was creative. He worked with his materials, rearranging sources, editing them into one story. To me, a good example of literary stiching occurs with the introduction of Saul at the end of the Stephen story (Acts 8:1). Here the author provides a connection between the two figures and unifies the plot.

Furthermore, we should remain aware of those places where Acts does not readily admit to the folk story form. There are some characteristics of folk narratives that do not appear in a pronounced way in Acts. For instance, in connection with the law of repetition, Olrik mentions *The Law of Three*. Although he writes that "the entire world of folk narrative does not obey the law of three" he also writes that "three appears in *Marchen* and myths and even in simple local legends with incredible frequency" and that "nothing distinguishes the great bulk of folk narrative from modern literature and from reality as much as does the number three."[29]

But here, it seems to me, in spite of the three-fold telling of Paul's conversion, we should be extremely cautious less we impose this law on Acts. According to Acts, Paul seems to go on three missionary journeys and Acts seems to focus on three important persecutions originating in Jerusalem: one against Stephen (Acts 7), another against Peter (Acts 12), and the third against Paul (Acts 21-26). Beyond these instances of a three-fold pattern, there might be others: for example, the three formal speeches by Peter (Acts 2:14-36; 3:11-26; 4:5-22) or the three stories relating the power of the Holy Spirit which follow the death of Stephen: the account of Simon, the magician (Acts 8:924); the account of the Ethiopian eunuch (Acts 8:26-39); and the account of Saul, the persecutor (Acts 9:1-30). On the whole,

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[28] Pervo, 9-10.

[29] Olrik, 133.

however, there is much more evidence for repetition in Acts than there is for a three-fold repetition.[30]

Besides the law of three, Olrik lists some others that I think require caution before being too quickly adopted for our discussion of possible oral sources behind Acts. Almost in passing, he mentions that folk stories are single-stranded, have unified plots, and have a consistent logic of their own, not "always commensurable with that of the natural world."[31] While these characteristics are certainly true of Acts, I do not think that they necessarily point to the author's reliance on sources, for ancient historical novels also seem to me to have a logic of their own and to be single stranded. Also, the occurrence in Acts of what Olrik calls "tableaux scenes" (such as the scene of Paul's Calling where he and the Lord draw near, or the Pentecost scene where all are filled with the Holy Spirit) prove nothing to me.[32]

Conclusion

Was the writer of Acts more like a creative author or like an editor? To me, the author of Acts was a creative writer who was also bound by his sources, and we make a mistake if we too easily disregard either sources or writer. Acts as literature and Acts as folk narrative exist together in tension.

The tension that exists between literary and folk narrative characteristics in Acts is well illustrated, I think, by the opening of the book. The preface, of course, is consciously literary. But, I have until now avoided mentioning two characteristics of folk narrative that make the beginning of Acts appear not quite so literary. These are *the Law of Opening* and *the Law of Closing*. According to Olrik, the folk narrative "does not begin with sudden action and does not end abruptly. . . . The *Sage* begins by moving from calm to excitement, and after the concluding event, in which a principal character frequently has a catastrophe, the *Sage* ends by moving from excitement to calm."[33]

What we find at the beginning of Acts matches the characteristic slow, calm start of folk narratives. While Jesus promises the coming of the Holy Spirit (Acts 1:5, 8), the big event itself, "the coming," does not take place until chapter 2. Actually, the scene at Pentecost seems to be purposefully delayed in the narrative by relating the selection of a disciple to replace Judas (Acts 1:15-26).[34]

And likewise, the book of Acts does not build up to a climax and then end abruptly. It does not, for instance, end with Paul's trial and death. In fact, as many have pointed out, if thought of strictly as literature, the ending of the book is extremely peculiar. Where is the story's climax? Did the author plan a third volume to Luke-Acts, telling what happened to Paul? To me, these would be valid questions if Acts were plotted literature, like a novel. But if Acts is like folk narrative, then it does not demand strict closure, and the questions are inappropriate.

Even the teaching of Paul does not come to a close abruptly in Acts. After defending himself (Acts 28:17-22), Paul testifies about the kingdom of God and tries to

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[30] Dawsey, "The Literary Unity of Luke-Acts," 61-65.

[31] Olrik, 137-138.

[32] Olrik, 138.

[33] Olrik, 131-132.

[34] Could this characteristic of folk narrative, that it starts slowly and not with sudden action, explain Jesus' forty day stay in Jerusalem?

convince a crowd of Jews about Jesus (Acts 28:23). Some are convinced, but some disagree, prompting Paul to say that God will turn to the Gentiles. (Acts 28:24-28). The book then closes with a summary type statement: And he lived there two whole years at his own expense, and welcomed all who came to him, preaching the kingdom of God and teaching about the Lord Jesus Christ quite openly and unhindered" (Acts 28:30-31).

Luke-Acts and Apologetic Historiography

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The connections of Luke-Acts and Hellenistic historiography have long been noted. Although serious challenges to the understanding of Luke-Acts as a historical work have been made,[1] the presence of the double preface, the methodology, and the inclusion of the speeches of Acts suggest that Luke-Acts is a historical narrative.[2] More recently, some have tried to specify the type of history to which Luke-Acts belongs.[3] Hans Conzelmann thought Acts was a "historical monograph."[4] Klaus

[1] The most significant challenges are Charles Talbert, *Literary Patterns, Theological Themes and the Genre of Luke-Acts* (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1974), who thinks it belongs to the biographical tradition of antiquity—especially philosophical biography—and Richard Pervo, *Profit with Delight: The Literary Genre of the Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), who considers Acts a historical novel. Cf. also Susan Praeder, "Luke-Acts and the Ancient Novel," in SBL 1981 Seminar Papers, ed. Kent Richards (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981) 269-292.

[2] W. Ward Gasque, "A Fruitful Field: Recent Study of the Acts of the Apostles," *Int* 42 (1988) 119, 129, notes that the view of Luke-Acts as history is the *communis opinio.*

[3] There were no hard and fast categories of historical writing in antiquity. The primary distinction was between writing about antiquity vs. current events. The most important statements differentiating types of historical writing are Thucydides 1.21.1; Polybius 1.4.1-3; 9.1.4-2.3; Diodorus Siculus 4.1.1-4; Asclepiades of Myrleia *apud* Sextus Empiricus *Math.* 1.252-253 (and Sextus' own comments in 1.257); and Cicero *De Or.* 2.51-64, where historiography is subsumed under rhetoric. On Cicero see the treatment by A. J. Woodman, *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography: Four Studies* (Portland: Areopagitica Press, 1988) 70-116. On Polybius see Kenneth Sacks, *Polybius on the Writing of History.* Univ. of Calif. Publications in Classical Studies 24 (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1981). There were, however, distinct traditions which are recognizable. The most important modern attempts to categorize these are Felix Jacoby, "Uber die Entwicklung der griechischen Historiographie," *Klio* 9 (1909) 80-123 and C. W. Fornara, *The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1983) 1-46. Cf. also Arnaldo Momigliano, "Greek Historiography," *History and Theory* 17 (1978) 1-28 (with excellent bibliography on 23-28).

[4] *Acts of the Apostles,* trans. James Limburg, A. Thomas Kraabel, and Donald H. Juel. Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987) xl. So also Martin Hengel, *Acts and the History of Earliest Christianity,* trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979) 14, 36-37; Gerhard Schneider, *Die Apostelgeschichte,* 2 vols. HTKNT

Berger has taken this a step further by arguing that Acts is a special type of monograph, i.e., apologetic history. He thinks that the closest analogues are I-III Maccabees, the Hellenistic-Jewish historians, and Josephus.[5] In the most detailed study to date, David Aune places Luke-Acts in the stream of "general historiography."[6] Over against all of these attempts others have argued that Luke-Acts is a descendant of OT historiography.[7]

This paper is an attempt to locate Luke-Acts within a specific Hellenistic tradition. Since there is no exact analogy, we must compare the texts of different historical works.[8] In order to do this, I have employed the genre model developed by the Apocalypse Group of the SBL Genres Project. Their model consists of analyzing the content, form, and function of a text.[9] We will use this model to trace a particular historiographical tradition, apologetic historiography.[10] After we have established the tradition, we will compare Luke-Acts with it. Since this tradition is a direct descendant of Greek ethnography, it will first be necessary to sketch the progenitor.

Apologetic Historiography

Greek Ethnography.[11] The antecedents of Greek historiography arose in the sixth century B.C.E in the form of *periploi*, either reports of navigators or manuals for

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(Freiburg/Basel/Wien: Herder, 1980-82) 1:122; Earl Richard, "Luke-Writer, Theologian, Historian: Research and Orientation of the 1970's," *BibTheolBull* 13 (1983) 10; and Rudolf Pesch, *Die Apostelgeschichte*, 2 vols. EKKNT (Zurich/Einsiedeln/Koln: Benziger und Neukirchener, 1986) 1:23.

[5] "Hellenistische Gattungen im Neuen Testament," in *Religion (Vorkonstantinisches Christentum: Leben und Umwelt Jesu; Neues Testament, Forts [Kanonische Schriften und Apokryphen]).* ANRW II 25.2 (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984) 1275, 1281 and his *Formgeschichte des Neuen Testaments* (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer) 359-360.

[6] *The New Testament in Its Literary Environment* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1987) 77-157, esp. 77, 88-89. This somewhat amorphous category includes such diverse authors as Ephorus, Polybius, Poseidonius, Strabo, Diodorus Siculus, Nicolaus of Damascus, and the native intellectual barbarians according to Aune.

[7] E.g., John Drury, *Tradition and Design in Luke's Gospel: A Study in Early Christian Historiography* (London: Darton Longman & Todd 1976) 3-8 and Daryl Schmidt, "The Historiography of Acts: Deuteronomistic or Hellenistic?" in *SBL 1985 Seminar Papers*, ed. Kent Harold Richards (Atlanta: Scholars press, 1985) 417-427. Cf. also the response to Schmidt by David Balch, "Acts as Hellenistic Historiography," in ibid., 429-432.

[8] Note also the comments of Momigliano, "Greek Historiography," 20 and Aune, *The New Testament in Its Literary Environment*, 78.

[9] Adela Yarbro Collins, ed. *Early Christian Apocalypticism: Genre and Social Setting.* Semeia 36 (Decatur: Scholars Press, 1986) esp. 1-11.

[10] I use the term tradition to denote the entire legacy and genre to refer to specific forms within it. Tradition is thus broader and more comprehensive.

[11] On ethnography see K. Trudinger, "Studien zur Geschichte der griechisch-römischen Ethnographie," (Diss., Basel, 1918).

use in navigation,[12] and in the famous map of Anaximander who applied the insights of Ionian philosophy to a physical map of the world.[13] Hecataeus of Miletus (*fl.* 500 B.C.E.), following this lead, drew up his own map and wrote a commentary on it known as the *Periegesis Ges.*[14] His commentary was an attempt to describe the entire Mediterranean world by systematically moving around it offering pictures of the people and lands as he went. The map and accompanying commentary were apparently designed to bring the traditions of other *ethne* to the attention of Ionian Greeks who had recently become more aware of them as a result of the expansion of Persia.[15]

The treatment of the respective peoples in Hecataeus' *Peregesis* soon became the basis for subsequent works on individual countries.[16] Charon of Lampsacus, Xanthus, and Hellanicus of Lesbos all wrote works which employ the adjectival form of the people they are describing as their title. These works form a distinct genre of prose writing and may be grouped together under the heading of ethnography. The fragments which remain suggest that each described a particular land and people by presenting their land, history, wonders, and customs (content) in an extended prose narrative (form) in an effort to define who these people were for other Greeks (function).[17]

The greatest successor to Hecataeus was, however, not an ethnographer, but the *pater historiae.*[18] Based upon his research, *historie,* Herodotus developed a hierarchy of values for his materials placing autopsy before native traditions.[19] The Ionian traveler wrote ethnographic logoi which he inserted into the theme of conflict between the East and the West at the point where the people in question came into contact with Persia.[20] This juxtaposition of ethnographic treatments and "history"

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[12] The best known of these is that of Scylax who was sent by Dareius I down the Indus to its mouth, then along the coast until the party reached Egypt thirty months later. Cf. Herodotus 4.44. On Scylax see Felix Jacoby, ed. *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker,* 3 vols. in 16 parts (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1923-69) 709 (hereafter abbreviated *FGrH*).

[13] The form of his map is likely that ridiculed by Herodotus in 4.36.2. On Anaximander see G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers,* 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 100-42. Details on both these early forms may be found in Kurt von Fritz, *Die Griechischen Geschichtsschreibung,* 2 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1967) 1:23-47.

[14] *FGrH* 1 and the more recent work of Giuseppe Nenci, *Hecataei Milesii Fragmenta* (Florence, 1954). I have used the work of Nenci for Hecataeus. Agathemerus says that Hecataeus "corrected (*diekribosen*)" the map of Anaximander. (1.1 = T34) This is generally understood to mean that he made his own.

[15] So Dionys. Hal., *De Thuc.* 5.

[16] On Hecataeus and the early Ionian historians see Lionel Pearson, *The Early Ionian Historians* Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1939).

[17] Cf. *FGrH* 262, 765, and 4 respectively. The four items listed under content are common to Hecataeus and these successors, although the order of occurrence is not uniform.

[18] The title was conferred on him apparently by Cicero, *De leg.* 1.5.

[19] Herodotus clearly enunciates his principles in 2.99.1. Note the more nuanced treatment of K. H. Waters, *Herodotus, the Historian: His Problems, Methods, and Originality* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985) 90-91.

[20] The most important of these ethnographic *logoi* are 1.131-140 (Persia);

proper influenced both the newly created form of history and ethnography: the former included ethnographic excursuses[21] and the latter tended to become more historical.[22]

Ethnography in Transition. While the rise of Persia helped to create the milieu in which historiography arose, the Persian wars gave the Greeks a unified sense of the Hellenic way of life over against that of *hoi barbaroi.*[23] When Macedon's military prodigy overthrew Persia, not only were the political institutions of the eastern Mediterranean altered, but ultimately the cultural values as well.[24] Fittingly, it was another Hecataeus (of Abdera) who laid the foundations for the transformation of ethnography. The court philosopher of Ptolemy I wrote an *Aigyptiaka* which in content appears to be another ethnographic treatment of Egypt, but which in form and more particularly in function veered markedly away.[25] Instead of describing Egypt in a tone of wonder as Herodotus had done, Hecataeus claimed that Egypt was the mother of all civilization – presenting her through the lens of Greek philosophy in utopian terms.[26] Realizing the difference between his picture of the "gift of

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1.178-87, 192-200 (Babylon); 1.201-204.1, 215-16 (Massagetae); 2.1-182 (Egypt); 4.5-82, 99-101 (Scythia); 4.168-99 (Libya). On the location of these *logoi* within the work see Henry Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (Cleveland: The American Philological Association, 1966) 34, 317. The relationship between the ethnographic *logoi* and the theme of conflict has been a major debate in Herodotean studies in this century.

[21] E.g., Thucydides 6.2-5; Hieronymous of Cardia (*FGrH* 154 [cf. Diod. Sic. 18.5.2-6.4]); Polybius 34; and Poseidonius (*FGrH* 87).

[22] E.g., Ctesias of Cnidos (*FGrH* 688) and Timaeus of Tauromenium (*FGrH* 566). On Herodotus' influence on the Hellenistic world see Oswyn Murray, "Herodotus and Hellenistic Culture," *Classical Quarterly* 22 (1972) 200-213.

[23] Cf. Hans Diller, "Die Hellenen-Barbaren-Antithese im Zeitalter der Perserkriege," in *Grecs et Barbares.* Entretiens sur l'Antiquite Classique 7 (Geneve: Fondation Hardt, 1962) 37-82.

[24] It was at this time that Pan-Hellenism arose. Isocrates was the greatest exponent although by no means the only one. Cf. *Paneg.* 50 and *Evag.* 47.

[25] The work is preserved in part in Diod. Sic. 1.10-98, not all of which is Hecataean. This has become the occasion of a debate over whether or not Hecataeus was Diodorus' main source. I believe that he was for four reasons: first, Diodorus was familiar with Hecataeus' work (1.46.8); second, on three occasions events are dated by Diodorus to Ptolemy Lagus (1.31.7; 46.7, 8; 84.8 [cf. also 1.33.11 and 37.5 which date events to Ptolemy Philadelphus]); third, all of book one has a common theme, i.e., the antiquity and superiority of Egypt; fourth, the first book is cast in the form of an ethnography: 10-29, the religion of Egypt; 30-31, the land (cf. also 32-41 which are not from Hecataeus but which deal with the land); 42-68, the history; 69-95, the customs; 96-98, an appendix. The most important secondary literature is *RE,* s.v. "Diodoros," by Eduard Schwartz and Anne Burton, *Diodorus Siculus: Book I, A Commentary.* Etudes Preliminaires aux Religions Orientales dans l'Empire Romain 29 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972) 1-34.

[26] Felix Jacoby correctly compared Hecataeus' *Peri Hyperboreon* and the *Aigyptiaka* in *RE,* s.v., "Hekataios aus Abdera." The former used a legendary people in order to present a utopia via Greek philosophy; the latter takes a real people and tells their story through Greek ethnography molded by philosophy. Egypt's role as

the Nile" and his ethnographic predecessors, he attacked the methodology of Herodotus by affirming that only native texts could serve to define a people.[27] Egypt was thus redefined according to the greatness afforded by her own texts.

The competitive matrix of the Hellenistic world soon found expression in a similar way in the work of Megasthenes, ambassador of Seleucus Nicanor, who like Hecataeus presented his respective country, India, in a philosophically colored portrait.[28] As a true Greek he claimed that Dionysius and Heracles established Indian culture in the remote past.[29] Antiquity had thus become the battleground of superiority.

The difference between ethnography proper and the works of Hecataeus and Megasthenes is primarily one of perspective and function. Earlier ethnographers wrote to fellow Hellenes within the context of the Greek world. Hecataeus of Abdera and Megasthenes wrote as Greeks in their adopted Hellenistic kingdoms. Each began the process of fusing their allegiances; they remained, however, outsiders to the country they celebrated.

Apologetic Historiography. The situation changed dramatically when a Babylonian priest named Berossus picked up a reed on behalf of his *patria.* The priest of Bel wrote a *Babyloniaka* in three volumes which he dedicated to Antiochus I.[30] He began in good ethnographic fashion with an autobiographical introduction and a description of the land. The remainder of the fragments retell the history of Babylon from primitive humanity until the time of Alexander.[31] Berossus claimed to have

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the mother of all civilization is underscored through her colonization of the world described in 1.28.1-29.6.

[27] Diod. Sic. 1.69.7. He is far from consistent. He used Herodotus heavily in his section on the history of Egypt. This is clear from their common king list and more impressively from a comparison of the texts which reveals borrowing. E.g., Herodotus 2.111.1-4 and Hecataeus *apud* Diod. Sic. 1.59.1-4.

[28] *FGrH* 715. I reconstruct his text as follows: Book one, the land; book two, *archaiologiai* and customs; book three, society and philosophy; book four, history. Contrast the reconstruction in *RE,* s.v., "Megasthenes," by O. Stein who places the *archaiologiai* in book four. Stein reconstructed the text on the basis of Strabo 15.35-60; I have opted to reconstruct it on the basis of a common pattern in Diod. Sic. 2.35-42; Arrian, *Ind.* 1-17, and Strabo. In either case, the work stands squarely in the ethnographic tradition in terms of content and form.

[29] Diod. Sic. 2.38.3-39.4; Strabo 15.1.7; Arrian, *Ind.* 7.4-9.8.

[30] *FGrH* 680 and Stanley Burstein, *The 'Babyloniaka' of Berossus* (Malibu: Undena Publications, 1978). The text is again fragmentary. The main issue about authenticity has been the astronomical fragments which Jacoby assigned to a "Pseudo-Berossus." (FF 15-22) The strength of this argument is that these fragments have not come down to us through Polyhistor and they appear to be dependent on Greek philosophy (F 21). I have, nonetheless, included them in my analysis since Eusebius could have excised them and since Berossus' claim to fame in antiquity rested on his astronomical knowledge. Josephus tells us that he wrote about astronomical matters in *CA* 1.128. Cf. Paul Schnabel, *Berossos und die babylonisch-hellenistische Literatur* (Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1923; reprint ed., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1968) 19 and the discussion in Burstein, op. cit. 31-32.

[31] I reconstruct the work as follows. Book one: autobiographical introduction, the land, primitive humanity, Oannes establishes civilization, Oannes reveals creation,

translated native Babylonian sources and in contrast to Hecataeus actually made them the basis of his work. He apparently used *Enuma elish*, a flood account similar to the *Epic of Ziusudra*, and the Neo-Babylonian chronicles.[32] Like Hecataeus he was critical of Greek accounts which—in his judgment—distorted the facts about Babylon.[33] The work emphasized Babylon's greatness by claiming that all of culture had been given by a revelation vouchsafed to the Babylonians in the remote past.[34] The *Babyloniaka* thus served to define a humbled Babylon by pointing to her illustrious past.

A younger contemporary soon wrote an Egyptian equivalent. Manetho, also a priest, wrote a three volume *Aigyptiaka* which told the story of Egypt from the period of the gods to c. 341 B.C.E.[35] Contrary to his Babylonian counterpart, Manetho dropped Greek ethnographic conventions and appears to have worked solely from the native sacred texts.[36] Like Berossus, but apparently in a more sustained polemic, Manetho attacked Greek ethnographic accounts, especially that of Herodotus.[37] He reconstructed Egyptian history in thirty dynasties. Even the otherwise dull scribe who worked from Julius Africanus in composing the *Excerpta Latina Barbari* saw the significance of this as he began recounting Manetho's history: Egyptiorum regnum invenimus vetustissimum omnium regnorum.[38]

The work of Berossus and Manetho established apologetic historiography as a distinct form of historical writing. In content it roughly matched Greek ethnography: it told the story of a particular people. The shift from an outsider to insider perspective, however, had an important consequence for the form. Instead of eyewitness reporting and investigation, the basis for the new genre became native records. This, however, carried a built-in tension: How much emphasis would be given to the native tradition and how much to the Hellenistic form in which it was being clothed? Authors would vary in their judgments: Berossus and Manetho both adhered closely to their native sources. The function of the new genre was again similar to ethnography: it defined the people. The difference was that apologetic historiography was in some senses a redefining since it arose—in part anyway—as

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the astronomical material (?); book two: the ten ante-diluvian kings, the deluge, the kings down to Nabonassaros; book three: Assyrian kings, the Neo-Babylonian kings, the Persian kings, the conquest of Alexander.

[32] F 1: "Berossos says . . . that he [translated] many (?) books which had been preserved with great care at Babylon and which dealt with a period of more than 150,000 years." Cf. also Josephus, *CA* 1.129.

[33] F 8 = Josephus, *CA* 1.142.

[34] F 1.4.

[35] *FGrH* 609 and W. G. Waddell, *Manetho*. LCL (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

[36] E.g., T 7a = Josephus, *CA* 1.73. The text of Manetho is again preserved only in fragments and is extremely complex. I have reconstructed it as follows. Book one: Gods (F 3a, 4, 5), demi-gods (F 3a, 4), spirits of the dead (F 3a), and dynasties 1-11 (F 2, 3a, 3b); book two: dynasties 12-19 (F 2, 3a, 3b); book three: dynasties 20-30 (F 2, 3a, 3b, 3c). The textual tradition has been 28 fully discussed in *RE*, s.v. "Manethon," by Richard Laquer, esp. 14:1064-89.

[37] Josephus, *CA* 1.73. Cf. also F 13 (= Eustanthius, *Hom. Il.*' 9.480, where Manetho is credited with an independent work against Herodotus.

[38] F 4.

a reaction to Greek ethnography. Syncellus understood the tendency of each work when he wrote: "Berossus and Manetho sought to glorify their own nations."[39]

The Jewish Hellenistic Historians.[40] The most extensive tradition of apologetic historiography in antiquity which has come down to us belongs to the Jews. Toward the end of the third century B.C.E., Jewish and Samaritan authors began telling their own story in Hellenistic categories. Four of these authors are particularly important for our analysis. In contrast to Berossus and Manetho, these historians were more open to the Hellenization of their own traditions. Perhaps the passage of time—from the beginning to the end of the third century B.C.E.—made the possibility and necessity of Hellenism more obvious.

The first of these authors was an Egyptian Jew named Demetrius, who during the reign of Ptolemy IV Philopator, wrote a careful chronological history from Adam to Philopator based upon the LXX.[41] The form of the work was probably modeled on the *Chronographiai* of Erathosthenes (c. 275-194 B.C.E.).[42] The other major element of his fragments is the presence of *quaestiones et solutiones* through which Demetrius attempted to resolve difficulties posed by the biblical text.[43] This presupposed knowledge of the text by his audience and implies a Hellenistic Jewish readership. The chronological system which he set forth served to prove the antiquity of the Jews as Eusebius correctly saw.[44]

A second Egyptian Jew, Artapanus, took a different tact. The three fragments which have come to us in his name present Abraham, Joseph, and Moses in the role

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[39] T 11c. Cf. also 11d.

[40] All analyses for these authors depend upon the fragments as edited in Carl R. Holladay, *Fragments from Hellenistic Jewish Authors,* Volume 1: *Historians.* Texts and Translations 20/Pseudepigrapha 10 (Chico: Scholars Press, 1983). The work of J. Freudenthal, *Alexander Polyhistor und die von ihm erhaltenen Reste judaischer und samaritanischer Geschichtswerke.* Hellenistische Studien, Heft & 2 (Breslau: H. Sketch, 1875), remains indispensable in spite of its age. More recent overviews include Harold W. Attridge, "Jewish Historiography," in *Early Judaism and Its Modern Interpreters,* ed. Robert A. Kraft and George W. E. Nickelsburg. The Bible and Its Modern Interpreters (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986) 311-43; Robert Doran, "The Jewish Hellenistic Historians Before Josephus," in *Rise and Decline of the Roman World,* ed. Wolfgang Haase. ANRW II 20.1 (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1987) 246-97; and D. Mendels, "'Creative History' in the Hellenistic Near East in the Third and Second Centuries BCE: The Jewish Case," *JSP* 2 (1988) 13-20.

[41] For the scope of the work see FF 2 and 6. I am reluctant to accept the first fragment Holladay prints (it is anonymous) as authentic since it is introduced with a very imprecise chronological note which runs directly against the pattern established elsewhere in the fragments. It was defended by Freudenthal, *Alexander Polyhistor,* 36, but questioned by Jacoby, *FGrH* 722 and others. I have not included it in my analysis.

[42] This was pointed out by P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria,* 3 vols. (Oxford: The Clarendon press, 1972) 1:693-4, 456-7. On Eratosthenes see *FGrH* 241, esp. FF 1-3.

[43] F 2.13, 14; 3.3; 5. This is a clear use of a Hellenistic technique which had become famous through the Homeric questions. Cf. *RAC,* s.v. "Erotapokriseis," by Heinrich Dorrie and Hermann Dorries, esp. 6:342-5.

[44] *HE* 6.13.7. Cf. also Plato, *Tim.* 22B; Diod. Sic. 1.9.3; Josephus, *CA* 2.152.

of *Kulturbringer.* Interestingly, the focus is exclusively on Israel in Egypt.[45] In his use of the biblical text Artapanus represents the obverse of Demetrius: instead of drawing from the biblical material, he used the text as a point of departure to tell his own stories. The episodes he relates—such as Moses' Ethiopian campaign—are Jewish counterparts of the national legends of other peoples.[46] The text was written *ad maiorem Iudaeorum gloriam* in an effort to place Jewish heroes on the same footing as the legendary figures of other peoples.

Jewish activity was not restricted to Egypt. An anonymous Samaritan author writing in the first half of the second century B.C.E. interwove biblical and Palestinian traditions with pagan myths in a retelling of the careers of the giants (Gen. 6-II, LXX) and of Abraham who is again cast as a *Kulturbringer.*[47] The myths, however, are not taken over wholesale, but were subjected to a "demythologizing euhemerism"—to use Martin Hengel's apt phrase.[48] The anti-Egyptian and pro-Phoenician tendency of the two fragments suggests that the work helped to define Samaritans both politically and culturally.[49]

In Judea proper, a Jewish ambassador by the name of Eupolemus wrote a nationalistic history of the Jewish nation around the middle of the second century B.C.E.[50] Like the Chronicler's history, his narrative sketched the early period very briefly and concentrated on David and Solomon and the temple. It continued the story by relating the kings of Judah and her prophets.[51] *Kulturgeschichte* again made

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[45] The transitional phrases for FF 2 and 3 (which is corrupt [I understand Mempsasthenoth to be the name of the king of Egypt and the preceding "his son" to refer to Joseph whose name has fallen out through either a scribal error or the work of Polyhistor]) suggest that Artapanus primarily dealt with these three figures. His work is an account of the Jews in Egypt.

[46] On these figures see Plutarch, *De Is. et Os.* 360B. Note the following comparisons between Sesoosis in Hecataeus (?) 30 *apud* Diodorus Siculus and Moses in Artapanus: divided Egypt into 36 nomes (1.54.3; F 3.4); Ethiopian campaign (1.55.1; F 3.7-10); honored the gods (1.56.2; F 3.4); plot against his life on return from campaign (1.57.6-8; F 3.11-18); organized military (1.99.4 [54.5]; F 3.4, 8). On national legends see Martin Braun, *History and Romance in Graeco-Oriental Literature* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1938).

[47] Freudenthal, *Alexander Polyhistor,* 82-91, established the identity of this author as a Samaritan. The major Palestinian traditions are also reflected in Jub. and 1QapGn. Pseudo-Eupolemus apparently knew Berossus as a comparison of F 1.3 with Josephus' report of Berossus in *CA* 1.158 demonstrates.

[48] *Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in their Encounter in Palestine during the Early Hellenistic Period,* 2 vols. trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974) 1:88

[49] Astrology first comes to Phoenicia then to Egypt; Egypt is the last place to which Abraham journeys in the remaining fragments (note the reversal of Gen. 12:10-20 and 14 in F 1.4-7); and the alteration of the genealogy of Gen. 10:6 in F 1.9 (Chous, the brother of Mestraeim [=Egypt], is made the son of Canaan instead of his brother).

[50] I Macc. 8:17. On Eupolemus see Ben Zion Wacholder, *Eupolemus: A Study of Judaeo-Greek Literature.* Monographs of the Hebrew Union College 3 (New York: Hebrew Union College/Jewish Institute of Religion, 1974).

[51] Compare the basic structure of I & II Chronicles: 1-9, a genealogical summary; 10-29, David; 1-9, Solomon; 10-36, the kings of Judah.

its presence felt: Moses was the first wise man[52] and the Jewish nation came into existence in the hoary past.[53] Eupolemus' *Concerning the Kings in Judea* buttressed the fledgling Maccabean movement by holding the glories of Israel's past out before the eyes of the Jewish people.

These four authors all retold Israel's past (content) through a Hellenization of her sacred texts (form). They vary in their fidelity to their traditions: Demetrius carefully made deductions, Eupolemus revised them, and Artapanus and Pseudo-Eupolemus inserted other traditions into their framework. Yet in function they are all national historians—*tout-a-fait*—who claimed the superiority of the Jewish nation over both other Orientals and the Greeks. The major change in the tradition they attest is that they appear to have addressed their works primarily to Jewish audiences and only indirectly to pagans.[54] They provided the Jewish people with a sense of identity in the new world and helped them relate to the surrounding culture.

The Antiquitates Iudaicae of Josephus. The greatest representative of this tradition is the *magnum opus* of Josephus which he published in 93-94 C.E.[55] Josephus entitled his history *Ioudaike Archaiologia* indicating that he intended to relate the story of the Jewish people with an accent on their antiquity.[56] Significantly on the two occasions where he mentions *archaiologiai* of other authors, he gives pride of place to Berossus and Manetho.[57] He brought the accent on antiquity to the fore in both his own summary of *AJ* and in the prefaces to both *AJ* and *CA*: it encompasses 5000 years.[58] The vast scope of time embraced is divided into three periods corresponding to the literary divisions of Jewish records: the books of Moses comprise 3000 years, the prophets (and secondarily the Writings) deal with the period from the death of Moses to Artaxerxes I, and the final period has been dealt with but not authoritatively since the succession of prophets has not been kept intact.[59]

Like Berossus and Manetho, Josephus claimed that his work was a translation of sacred writings.[60] He cited the LXX as a precedent since it also presented the Hebrew scriptures in Greek.[61] Josephus, however, went further than his predecessors by claiming that he had "added nor omitted anything" (*ouden prostheis oud'*

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[52] F 1. Note the threefold *protos*.

[53] F 5. The MS tradition places the exodus in 2738 B.C.E. Even if we follow the conjectural deletion of *dis*, the date is still 1738 B.C.E.

[54] The audience of these historians has been a matter of dispute. Peter Dalbert, *Die Theologie der hellenistisch-judischen Missions-Literatur unter Ausschluss von Philo und Josephus.* Theologische Forschung 4 (Hamburg-Volksdorf: Herbert Reich, 1954), argued the works were missionary. This has been successfully challenged by Victor Tcherikover, "Jewish Apologetic Literature Reconsidered," *Eos* 48 (1956) 169-93.

[55] *AJ* 20.267.

[56] Josephus calls it this himself in *AJ* 20.259, 267; *V* 430; *CA* 1.1, 2 (?), 54, 127; 2.136, 287.

[57] *AJ* 1.93-5; 107-8.

[58] *AJ* 20.259-61; 1.13; *CA* 1.1.

[59] *CA* 1.39-41.

[60] *AJ* 1.5; 10.218; *CA* 1.54.

[61] *AJ* 1.10-13.

au paralipon).[62] The significance of this disputed clause is best understood in light of its use in Josephus in relationship to both the Hebrew scriptures and the LXX.[63] In these instances the claim underscored the reliability of the biblical text. What is important to note is that Josephus is making the same claim for his own narrative that he elsewhere made for scripture. Nor is this coincidental. The only authors capable of writing scripture were prophets according to Josephus.[64] His own claim of prophetic powers should be recalled in this light.[65] It appears that Josephus considered *AJ* to be a sacred narrative in much the same way that the OT works of history are prophetic history.[66]

Following the lead of the Hellenistic Jewish historians, Josephus recast the OT text in a Hellenized form. They served as precedents and helped to indicate the general direction (chronological emphasis, legends, and national historiography), but failed to provide an adequate model for the scope of his own undertaking.[67] For this he turned to Dionysius of Halicarnassus who served him in much the same way that Eratosthenes served Demetrius.[68] Yet for all of his structural and historiographical dependence on Dionysius, Josephus clearly distances himself from the Greek tradition in the writing of *AJ*. This can be seen from the polemics against Occidental historians within *AJ* and even more from the sustained attack against Greek historiography and defense of Oriental—especially Jewish—historiography that opens *CA*.[69] Josephus thus exploited Dionysius but maintained his distance when forced to declare his own allegiances. In this case he was an Oriental with a reliable rather than a contradictory tradition.

At the outset of *AJ* Josephus declared that he had undertaken the work with the hope that the Greek world would take it seriously.[70] He specified what he had in mind when he wrote *CA*: "I believe that in my writing of the *Antiquities* . . . I have made perfectly clear to any who read it that the Jewish race is most ancient, is originally of pure stock, and how it settled the land which we now possess."[71] The

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[62] *AJ* 1.17.

[63] *CA* 1.42 and *AJ* 12.108-9.

[64] *CA* 1.37.

[65] *BJ* 3.340-408, esp. 351-4, 399-402; 5.391-3. The literature on this subject is large. Cf. H. R. Moehring, "Joseph ben Matthia and Flavius Josephus: the Jewish Prophet and Roman Historian," in *Religion (Hellenistisches Judentums in romischer Zeit: Philon und Josephus)*. ANRW II 21.2 (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984) 864-944.

[66] So also Joseph Blenkinsopp, "Prophecy and Priesthood in Josephus," *JJS* 25 (1974) 241; David Daube, "Typology in Josephus," *JJS* 31 (1980) 35; and D. E. Aune, "The Use of PROPHETES in Josephus," *JBL* 101 (1982) 421.

[67] There are numerous points of contact between Josephus and the Hellenistic Jewish historians. Virtually all possible explanations have been offered. I have elsewhere argued that Josephus knew them through Alexander Polyhistor. "The *Antiquitates Iudaicae* of Josephus and Apologetic Historiography," at the SBL Annual Convention (Chicago, 1988).

[68] One of the most important discussions of the relationship between the two is Harold W. Attridge, *The Interpretation of Biblical History in the 'Antiquitates Judaicae' of Flavius Josephus*. HDR (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1976) 43-60.

[69] *AJ* 1.121; 8.253, 260-2; 12.358-9; 16.183-7; 20.154-7; *CA* 1.6-56.

[70] *AJ* 1.5. Cf. also 1.9b, 12; 16.174; 20.262.

[71] *CA* 1.1.

first claim places the *Antiquitates* in the debate over origins and the pervasive assumption that the oldest is the best. The second and third claims are a rejoinder to any who would cast aspersions on Jewish origins. The apologetic nature of *AJ* is repeatedly affirmed in the references back to it in *CA*.[72] He thus makes it clear that what is implicit in the *Antiquitates* is explicit in *Contra Apionem*.

Why such an apology to the Greek world? Throughout the Roman world there were communities in which the Jews and the other inhabitants lived in a state of tension.[73] Traditionally the Jews had been able to depend upon Rome for support—support which had continued in spite of the revolt. Under the excesses of Domitian, however, there were signs of a weakening of this traditional support.[74] Josephus addressed the *Antiquitates* to the Greek world at large in the hope of winning respectability for his nation. To support his effort he cited a large number of *acta* which were designed to prove that the Jews had been accorded the right to maintain their ancestral ways in the past.[75]

Josephus also addressed Jewish readers.[76] For his compatriots *AJ* offered a new definition of Judaism. Like the rabbis in Palestine Josephus found the touchstone to be the law. Yet his version of the law is different from that of the rabbis. Rather than living in comparative isolation from the Greco-Roman world, Josephus presented a version of Judaism that interacted with that world. The issue was not Judaism or Hellenism, but Judaism in Hellenism. He recast Jewish history in these terms hoping to reconcile both Greeks to Jews and Jews to Greeks.

The *Antiquitates* thus concurs with the apologetic tradition by emphasizing the antiquity of the Jewish people as it retells their story. It more successfully Hellenizes the Jewish story in form than any of its predecessors. Like all of its antecedents, *AJ* offers a self-definition. The emphasis is, however, somewhat different. The third and second century B.C.E. works concentrated on cultural claims. Josephus notices these in *AJ*, but does not accord them the prominence they find in some of his earlier counterparts. He instead brings political concerns to the forefront. The difference is not one of exclusion, but of accent.

Luke-Acts and Apologetic Historiography

At approximately the same time that Josephus was finishing his *Antiquitates*, a third generation Christian composed Luke-Acts.[77] We now need to determine what

[72] *CA* 1.1-5, 127; 2.136, 287.

[73] *AJ* 12.120, 121, 125-6; 13.104, 195, 200; 14.213, 242, 245; 16.27-8, 45-7, 58, 160, 170; 18.371; 19.278; 20.173-8, 183-4.

[74] The key texts are Suetonius, *Dom.* 12.2 and Cassius Dio 67.14.1-3. See E. Mary Smallwood, "Domitian's Attitude toward the Jews and Judaism," *Classical Philology* 51 (1956) 1-13 and her *The Jews Under Roman Rule*. SJLA 20 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976) 356-88.

[75] *AJ* 14.145-55, 188-264 (see 185-267), 306-22; 16.162-73 (see 160-78); 19.278-91; 20.10-14.

[76] They are specifically addressed in *AJ* 4.197. Cf. also 1.88 which presupposes an audience with access to the biblical text.

[77] I date Luke-Acts c. 90 C.E. The *termini* are Mark (65-75) and the collection of the Pauline corpus (c. 95-100?). The author distinguishes himself (I use the masculine pronouns because I am not aware of any reason to attribute the work to a female and assume that in a patriarchal society, the former is more likely) from both the first generation (Lk. 1:2) and the second (Lk. 1:1).

relationship, if any, Luke-Acts has to apologetic historiography.

Content. We may begin by asking how the author of Luke-Acts perceived the contents of the work? The author opened with the statement: "Since many have taken in hand to set forth a narrative concerning the things which have been *peplerophoremenon* among us . . ." The participle of this clause has long been debated. Henry Cadbury thought it should be rendered "accomplished."[78] While this is linguistically possible it violates the presence of the "us." The inclusion of the "us" must serve to link the church of the author's day with the events of the past. If we render the participle "accomplished" we leave everything in the realm of *bruta facta* and the "us" is superfluous. The meaning which makes the most sense in connection with the "us" is "fulfilled." This fits in nicely with the continued emphasis on the fulfillment of scripture in the narrative.[79] The events the author narrates are thus understood to be fulfillments of OT prophecy.[80]

The fullest statement of what the author considers these to be is the formulation of the commission Jesus gave the disciples at the end of the gospel. (Lk. 24:44-49) After Jesus explained to the disciples that it was necessary (*dei*) for everything written about him in scripture to be fulfilled (*plerothenai*), he opened the minds of the disciples so that they could understand the scriptures. He then stated that "it is written that (1) the Christ must suffer (2) and be raised from the dead on the third day (3) and that remission for the forgiveness of sins should be preached in his name to all the nations." (Vs. 46-47a) The first two clauses summarize the preceding narrative and help the reader to understand the significance of what took place. The third clause is the Lukan formulation of the commission. What is significant about it here is that it is part of the scheme of fulfillment. It is elaborated more fully in vs. 47b-49 where the author provides a deliberate lead-in to the book of Acts as the echoes of this text in the early chapters of Acts confirm.[81]

The significance of the prologue and conclusion to the gospel is that both the gospel and Acts are presented as fulfillment narratives. The whole story is thus a continuation of the OT narrative of Israel. Unlike the other gospel writers, the author did not tell the fulfillment in terms of Jesus alone, but in terms of Christianity

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[78] F.J. Foakes Jackson and Kirsopp Lake, eds. *The Beginnings of Christianity,* 5 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1920-23; reprint ed., Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1979) 2:496. Cf. also Schuyler Brown, "The Role of the Prologues in Determining the Purpose of Luke-Acts," in *Perspectives on Luke-Acts,* ed. Charles H. Talbert. Perspectives in Religious Studies (Danville, VA: Association of Baptist Professors of Religion, 1978) 102-3.

[79] Note the use of *pleroo* in this sense in Lk. 4:21; 24:44; Acts 1:16; 3:18; 13:27.

[80] So Richard J. Dillon, "Previewing Luke's project from His Prologue (Luke 1:1-4)," *CBQ* 43 (1981) 211-14. This appears to be the dominant view among recent commentators, e.g., Gerhard Schneider, I. Howard Marshall, Joseph Fitzmyer, and Heinz Schurmann.

[81] The items repeated in Acts include the following. The beginning in Jerusalem: 1:8; the apostles as witnesses: 1:8, 22; 2:32; 3:15; 5:32; 10:39; 13:31; 22:15; 26:16; the promise of the Father: 1:4; the command to wait in Jerusalem: 1:4; power from on high: 1:8; 2:1-4, 33. Robert C. Tannehill, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts: A Literary Interpretation.* Vol. 1: *The Gospel According to Luke.* Foundations and Facets (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986) 293-298, has an excellent discussion of how this text prepares the reader for Acts.

as a movement. As such Christianity has an identity as a movement. It is called a "sect," *hairesis*,[82] or "the way," *he odos*.[83] Nor should it be overlooked that two of the three NT occurrences of *Christianoi* occur in Acts.[84] David Aune is thus correct when he speaks of the "national consciousness" of Luke-Acts.[85] Luke-Acts, like apologetic historiography, tells the story of a specific group of people.

Form. Our author indicates the use of sources in the *polloi* of Lk. 1:1. In spite of recent challenges, the *communis opinio* is that Mark was one of those sources—a presupposition I share. The gospel of Mark appears to have influenced the gospel of Luke primarily in two ways. First, it provided a great deal of the material of Luke.[86] Second, it served as the basic structure into which the material of Q and L were inserted. The author did not, however, take Mark over wholesale. The oldest extant testimony we have about Mark criticizes the gospel for its lack of order—a fault with which our author apparently agreed since he transposed Markan material on seven different occasions in an effort to provide a smoother narrative.[87] The refinement did not stop at structure but extended to phraseology: it is a well-known fact that the third gospel polishes the language of the second. The significance of this relationship is that Mark served our author in the same way that native traditions served apologetic historians.

A second major literary document which may be considered a "native" source is the LXX. It is universally acknowledged that the author of Luke-Acts knew the LXX, the issue is how did it affect the formation of Luke-Acts? The language of Luke-Acts at times betrays a heavy Semitic tinge. While there may be Semitic material beneath some of it, the agreement of a number of expressions with the LXX suggests that the author deliberately imitated the language of the Seventy.[88] This imitation combined with the scheme of fulfillment suggests that our author conceived of his work as sacred history.

The LXX also provided our author with his concept of history. The closest contacts Luke-Acts has with the OT are with P (Genesis-Numbers) and the Deuteronomistic history (Deuteronomy-II Kings). The common denominator among P, the Deuteronomistic history, and Luke-Acts is their confessional stance towards the

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[82] Acts 24:5, 14; 28:22. In Acts 5:17; 15:5; 26:5, the term is used of Jewish sects just at it is in Josephus.

[83] Acts 9:2; 19:9, 23; 22:4; 24:14, 22.

[84] Acts 11:26; 26:28. Cf. also I Pet. 4:16.

[85] *The New Testament in Its Literary Environment* 140-1.

[86] B. H. Streeter, *The Four Gospels: A Study of Origens (Treating of the Manuscript Tradition, Sources, Authorship, and Dates)* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1956) 159-60, estimated 350 of Mark's 661 verses reappear in Luke or about 53% of the actual vocabulary.

[87] The testimony of Papias is recorded in Eusebius, *HE* 3.39.15. On the Lukan transpositions see Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke*, 2 vols. AB 28 & 28A (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1981-5) 1:71-2.

[88] The canticles in the infancy narrative may be previous compositions by Jewish Christians which the author has appropriated. Cf. Raymond E. Brown, *The Birth of the Messiah: A Commentary on the Infancy Narratives in Matthew and Luke* (Garden City: Image Books, 1979) 346-55.

activity of God in human history. In Luke-Acts this is expressed by the terms[89] *he boule tou theou,*[90] *dei,*[91] and the verbs denoting God's determinations of the course of history (*horizo,*[92] *prohorizo,*[93] and *proborao*[94]) as well as by the description of key events as the actions of God. So Jesus poured out the Spirit in Acts 2, 8, and 10 to indicate the will of God.

In keeping with his concept of history, the author presents God's will in connection with the fulfillment of scripture.[95] The concept of fulfillment of God's will as the driving force of history is common to both P and the Deuteronomistic history. In P it is the fulfillment of the promises[96] and in the Deuteronomistic history prophecy is accorded a special place.[97] So, for example, the speech of Moses in Deuteronomy 28 may be regarded as a type of advance history of what will unfold. The distinctiveness of the specific interpretation of the fulfillment in terms of the salvation of God suggests that the primary impulse for our author's concept came from the Christian attempt to relate the life of Jesus and the church to the OT. At the same time, there was a clear scriptural precedent for conceiving of history along these lines.

There are a number of features of Luke-Acts, however, which can not be explained on the basis of Christian or OT precedents. The most obvious are the prologue, the frequency of the speeches of Acts and their function, and the technique of imitating the LXX inspired by Atticism.[98] What Hellenistic models would have served the author as he Hellenized Christian traditions? I believe the best place to look is the apologetic tradition. The author of Luke-Acts was certainly aware of some of the same techniques and materials we discovered in the tradition. Like

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[89] The terms are pointed out in Hans Conzelmann, *The Theology of St. Luke,* trans. Geoffrey Buswell (New York: Harper & Row, 1960) 151-4.

[90] *Boule* occurs 12t. in the NT, 9t. in Luke-Acts. It is used in connection with God's will in Lk. 7:30; Acts 2:23; 4:28; 13:36; 20:27.

[91] 1.101t. in the NT, 40t. in Luke-Acts vs. 6t. in Mark and 8t. in Mt. There is no Hebrew equivalent. When it appears in the LXX it generally translates an infinitive construct with the preposition *l* in a purpose clause; although it can transform a future reference into a necessity in apocalyptic texts, e.g., Dan. 2:28, 29, 45. In Luke the term may denote the divine compulsion which propels the course of Jesus' life (2:49; 4:43; 9:22; 13:33; 17:25; 22:37; 24:7, 26, 44; Acts 3:21) and in Acts the path of Paul's life (19:21; 23:11; 27:24, 26).

[92] 8t. in the NT, 6t. in Luke-Acts. Cf. esp. Lk. 22:22; Acts 2:23; 10:42; 17:31.

[93] 6t. in the NT, only once in Luke-Acts (Acts 4:28).

[94] 4t. in the NT, 3t. in Luke-Acts but only once in the sense of God's plan (Acts 2:31).

[95] Note the use of *dei* in connection with the fulfillment of scripture in Lk. 22:37; 24:7, 26, 44; Acts 1:16; 17:3. Cf. also David L. Tiede, *Prophecy and History in Luke-Acts* (Philadelphia: Fortress press, 1980) 23-33.

[96] E.g., Gen. 12:1-3, 7; 13:15-17; 15:5, 7, 18-21; 17:2, 4, 5-8, 16; 18:18; 22:17-18; 26:4; 28:4, 13-14; 32:12; 48:21-22; 50:24; Ex. 2:24; 3:15-17; 6:3-8; 32:13; 33:1-3; Lev. 26:42; Num. 32:11.

[97] E.g., I Kgs. 22:38; II Kgs. 1:17; 7:17-20; 9:36-37; 15:12.

[98] The most significant work along these lines is that of Eckhard Plumacher, *Lukas als hellenistischer Schriftsteller: Studien zur Apostelgeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972).

Hecataeus, he presented his early community in idealistic terms colored by philosophy.[99] More importantly, the author appears to have understood the OT in some of the same terms as the Hellenistic Jewish historians. It is striking that the three figures which dominate the speech of Stephen in Acts 7 correspond to the three fragments of Artapanus.[100] That the author knew some of the Hellenistic Jewish interpretations of the OT is made clear from the description of Moses in Acts 7:22 where the lawgiver is given an Egyptian education and said to be "powerful in words and deeds."[101] While encomiastic treatments of Moses pervade previous literature, it is the apologetic tradition which specifically accents his Egyptian learning. By themselves these ties are too broad for us to attach much weight to them. They simply attest some common elements.

The case is different if we compare the historiographical procedures of Luke-Acts and Josephus. The closest parallels to the prologues of Luke and Acts are statements of Josephus. In *CA* 1.53 Josephus defended his historical works against those who attempted (*epikecheirekasin*) to slander them. He contended that "it is necessary for the one who promises others the tradition (*paradosin*) of correct facts (*praxeon*) to first learn them accurately (*akribos*) himself." He/she can do this "either by having investigated (*parekolouthekoti*) the events or by learning from those who know." He goes on to claim that he followed the first of these canons in *AJ* (54)[102] and the second in *BJ* where he was himself an *autoptes*. (55) The Christian author (Lk. 1:2-3) combined the two methods and affirmed that the eyewitnesses (*autoptai*) delivered (*paredosan*) the tradition which he has accurately (*akribos*) investigated (*parekolouthekoti*). While the vocabulary common to both is impressive, it is not conclusive since the same vocabulary characterized different types of Hellenistic works.[103] What is significant is the agreement in methodology and the way that Josephus' statements illuminate the more condensed comments in Luke 1:1-4. The same broad methodological agreement can be seen in the prologue to *CA* 2.1-2 and Acts 1:1-3 where both authors refer to their former book, address their patron or addressee, and introduce the second book.

Nor do the similarities end here. Both told the story of their own people by emphasizing their antiquity: Josephus through a chronological system and Luke-Acts through the claim that Christianity was a continuation of Israel. Each combined biblical and Hellenistic forms and concepts. At the same time, both thought of their work as a sacred narrative: Josephus wrote as a priest/prophet and the author of Luke-Acts narrated the fulfillment of the OT in the language of the OT.

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[99] Note especially Acts 2:44 and 4:32 and the discussion by Plumacher, op. cit. 16-18.

[100] Acts 7:2-8, Abraham; 9-16, Joseph; 17-43, Moses.

[101] This contravenes Ex. 4:10. Cf. Artapanus F 3.3-4; Josephus, *AJ* 2.236-7, 275-6; and also Philo, *Mos.* 1.20-4.

[102] Cadbury, *Beginnings* 2:502, misunderstood this to refer to *BJ*. I do not see how "learning from those who know" can refer to *AJ* since it is clearly based on written records and not living witnesses.

[103] Vernon K. Robbins, "Prefaces in Greco-Roman Biography and Luke-Acts," in *SBL 1978 Seminar Papers*, ed. Paul Achtemeier (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1978) 194-8, pointed out parallels to "didactic biographies" and Loveday Alexander, "Luke's Preface in the Context of Greek Preface-Writing," *NT* 28 (1986) 48-76, has done the same for scientific prefaces. There was apparently a common stock of terms.

These agreements do not establish any dependence, but suggest that the Jewish and Christian historians shared historiographical traditions. Yet their works are significantly different. Josephus included a great deal of political history while by comparison Luke-Acts has very little. The Atticistic and rhetorical Greek of Josephus is on a different level than the more bourgeoise style common to most of Luke-Acts. How should we explain the gap?

Function. I would attribute the differences to the functions of the two works. Our author tells us that he has written to Theophilus "so that you may know the certainty (*asphaleian*) concerning the matters (*logon*) about which you have been instructed." (Lk. 1:4) The *logon* here must echo the *traditio apostolica* of v. 2. It is what the apostles have handed down about the "events fulfilled among us" that constitutes the substance of what the "many" have previously written and about which Theophilus had been instructed. It is the same tradition which the author has carefully investigated from its beginning and proposes to set forth for his reader. Through his orderly account he intends to provide certainty about the tradition.

The work was intended for Christians as the presupposition of knowledge of the LXX proves. Why did the *traditio apostolica* need to be defined? As Christianity became a distinct movement the need for definition became more pressing. The greatest obstacle blocking this definition was the variety of views which characterized so much of early Christianity. We need to remember that the ancient world saw truth largely in terms of unity; discordant voices were of themselves proof of error.[104] Luke-Acts presented Christianity as a unified movement beginning with Jesus and extending through the apostles.

The recognition of Christianity's separate existence also raised the question of its relationship to the Roman world. In earlier scholarship it was fashionable to think of a Roman audience or official reading Luke-Acts. This is no longer tenable in my opinion and any explanation of the political/social concerns of Luke-Acts must presuppose that the work was addressed primarily to Christians.[105] The basic problem is: Why are the consistent "innocent" verdicts rendered at the trial of Jesus and the trials of Paul are addressed to Christians? It is worth noting that eight of the ten NT occurrences of *apologeomai* appear in Luke-Acts. In all eight of these cases the verb always denotes a defense before outsiders.[106] It appears that Luke-Acts helped Christians understand their place in the Roman empire by providing

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[104] Josephus, *CA* 1.15-18, ridiculed the Greeks for their failure to agree and in 37-8 claimed accord for Jewish writings. For Christian examples see Shepherd of Hermas, *Vis.* 3.5.1.

[105] The shift in recent works is instructive. Richard J. Cassidy, *Jesus, Politics, and Society: A Study of Luke's Gospel* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1978) and *Society and Politics in the Acts of the Apostles* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1988) has attacked the *religio licita* school directly and argued for an "allegiance-conduct-witness" theory. Paul W. Walaskay, *"And so we came to Rome": The Political Perspective of St. Luke.* SNTSMS 49 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), argued for an *apologia pro imperio* rather than an *apologia pro ecclesia.* More recently, Philip Francis Esler, *Community and Gospel in Luke-Acts: the Social and Political Motivations of Lucan Theology.* SNTSMS 57 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 210, has suggested that there were Roman Christians in the Lukan congregation.

[106] Lk. 12:11; 21:12-14; Acts 19:33; 24:10; 25:8; 26:1, 2, 24.

examples and precedents for them. It is an apology in an indirect way—in much the same way as were the writings of the Hellenistic Jewish historians. Luke-Acts therefore defined Christianity both internally and externally.

Conclusions

Does Luke-Acts belong to apologetic historiography? I think it does. It tells the story of a specific group of people from an insider's standpoint. In true apologetic fashion it emphasizes the antiquity of Christianity. The same tension between native traditions and Hellenism which exists in every work within the tradition is also attested in Luke-Acts. It served to offer a self-definition of Christianity, the very task of an apologetic historian. Like the Hellenistic Jewish historians its apology is indirect; yet it is there. In its specific form it is closer to Josephus with the emphasis on political standing rather than on cultural accomplishments.

It is intriguing that just as Hellenistic Jewish historiography came to a climactic *terminus* in the work of Josephus, the same tradition shaped the *fons* of Christian historiography.

Comments on the Genre and a Political Theme of Luke-Acts: A Preliminary Comparison of Two Hellenistic Historians

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I submit this paper to the SBL Acts Group for discussion. The approach to Luke-Acts is novel at several points, so that evaluation, refinement and critique will certainly be helpful as I expand this comparison of Dionysius and Luke into a book.[1] As a caution against misinterpretation of what follows, I note at the beginning that neither one ethnic origin—Hebrew or Greek—,nor one genre—biography, romance, historical monograph or general history—will clarify the content and structure of these two books, which are a mixture on both counts. However, both as a method of research and as the primary genre of Luke-Acts, I focus on comparing Hellenistic "general history" with Luke-Acts and suggest that this Greek genre explains the presence of significant, primary elements both of the genre and the content of our books.[2] By this thesis, I do not mean to deny that similar elements may be found in Deuteronomy, the Psalms and Deutero-Isaiah, but first I am attempting clearly to delineate the Greco-Roman patterns, before making any comparison. Further, I will cite primarily one such Greco-Roman historian, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Roman Antiquities*, who arrived in Rome in 30 BCE, did research for twenty-two years, and then began writing his history in 7 BCE, a narration which became a model a century later for Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities*.[3]

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[1] I am grateful for Fulbright and ATS grants as well as for a sabbatical from Brite Divinity School/Texas Christian University which made research on these texts possible. The book has the tentative title *Values and Historiography: Luke-Acts and Dionysius of Halicarnassus Compared* (Studia ad Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti; ed. Hans Dieter Betz; Leiden, Brill, forthcoming). A systematic comparison of these two authors has never been made despite the fact that Wettstein cites Dionysius often.

[2] Compare David E. Aune, *The New Testament in Its Literary Environment* (Library of Early Christianity; ed. Wayne A. Meeks; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1987) 77: "Luke-Acts is popular 'general history' written by an amateur Hellenistic historian with credentials in Greek rhetoric." Similarly, N. A. Dahl, *Jesus in the Memory of the Early Church* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976) 88.

[3] On the little we know of Dionysius and his associates see S. F. Bonner, *The Literary Treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. A Study in the Development of Critical*

Luke-Acts narrates the will of God as prophesied and as (being) fulfilled,[4] the twofold content of which is given by the resurrected Christ to witnesses in Lk 24:46-47. One purpose of the books is to takes sides in an active social-political debate within the Roman empire and the church, not *primarily* either to entertain[5] or to characterize the essence of any single individual, whether Jesus, Peter or Paul.[6]

A. Of Origins and Ancestors: Dionysius, *Rom. Ant.* I.9-70, Acts 7 and 13

Dionysius does not narrate these stories primarily as a "historian," but as a rhetorician. "At no time in Greco-Roman antiquity was history taught as a subject."[7] I assume that rhetorical conventions in Dionysius may well also have influenced Luke, independently of whether she or he read the particular rhetorician/historian Dionysius or not.

When a rhetorician speaks of a people, a city or a family, their origins (τόπος ἀπὸ γένους) are narrated. At the beginning of his narrative, Dionysius has a long section describing the origins of the six groups which later combined to found Rome (I.9-70, immediately following the preface). There was a key epoch in history, the Roman monarchy, which he reckons has having lasted 244 years from 751 to 507 BCE (I.75.1, 3; V.1.1). In I.75 he lists the order in which these kings succeeded each other and the total years each ruled. Dionysius refers repeatedly to events that happened "during the monarchy" or "after its overthrow" (e.g. in the preface, I.8.2). Another example of this terminology occurs when he is outlining Romulus's constitution and discussing the power of a Roman father, who has even more power over his son than a master has over his slaves. This, he suspects, will sound "harsh and tyrannical" to his Greek readers, but was a practice "in the beginnings" when kings ruled; it was not introduced "after the overthrow of the monarchy," as is proved by an early law of king Numa (II.27.1-4; cp. also III.36.4; 62.2; V.1.1-2).

Method (Cambridge: University Press, 1939) 1-15. G. W. Bowersock, "Historical Problems in Late Republican and Augustan Classicism," *Le Classicisme à Rome aux 1ers Siècles avant et après J.-C.* (Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique 25; Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1979) 57-78. On Josephus's use of Dionysius: Harold W. Attridge, *The Interpretation of Biblical History in the Antiquitates Judaicae of Flavius Josephus* (HDR 7; Missoula: Scholars, 1976) 44. I will cite the edition and translation of Dionysius, *Roman Antiquities*, by Earnest Cary (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge: Harvard, 1937ff.), 7 vols.

[4] I do not focus on the will of God in this paper; see the recent Yale dissertation by John T. Squires, "The Plan of God in Luke-Acts" (1988).

[5] Richard I. Pervo, *Profit with Delight. The Literary Genre of the Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987).

[6] See the article by Charles H. Talbert, "Ancient Biography," *Anchor Bible Dictionary* (forthcoming), which the author graciously sent me before publication, and also his survey of scholarship on "Luke-Acts," in E. J. Epp and G. W. MacRae, *The New Testament and Its Modern Interpreters* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989) 297-320, at 310.

[7] Hermann Strasburger, "Die Wesensbestimmung der Geschichte durch die Antike Geschichtsschreibung," *Studien zur Alten Geschichte*, hrsg. W. Schmittenner und R. Zöpffel (Collectanea 42/2; Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1982) II, 963-1016, at p. 963.

These incidental phrases indicate that Dionysius divides history (and his literary work narrating that history) as follows:

	I.1-8	Preface
I.	I.9-70	Rome: Ancestors and Date of Settlement
II.	I.71-IV.85	The Roman Monarchy: Founding and Overthrow
III.	V-XX	The Roman Aristocracy: Annual Consuls to the First Punic War (before Polybius's history)

Telling the story of the sixth group of those which make up the ancestors, that is of the Trojans under Aeneas, he observes, "but the subject requires (ἀπαιτεῖ) that I relate (διηγήσασθαι) also how Aeneas descended" (ἐξ ὧν; I.62.1). Later, when he is describing the end of the wars between the Romans and the Sabines, he names the king of the Sabines, Tatius from the city of Cures and observes parenthetically, "for the course of my narrative requires (ἀπαιτεῖ γὰρ ἡ διήγησις) that I should speak of them also, and say who they were and whence" (οἵτινες τε καὶ ὁπόθεν; II.48.1). One must narrate who the ancestors were, from where they immigrated, and when the city or people were founded. Further, these points can be treated either as a eulogy or as an invective; a people could be praised or criticized in relation to the required topics. Since Luke (1:1) tells us he is writing a "narrative" as Dionysius has done, "the subject requires" that he also describe these people's origin, their immigrations, and the founding events. However, unlike Dionysius Luke surprisingly does not tell us about these at the beginning of the narrative, but delays until the speeches in Acts 7 and 13. Corresponding to the outline of Dionysius's history above, I propose that Luke-Acts has the following structural elements:[8]

	Lk 1:1-4; Acts 1:1-2	Prefaces
I.	Lk 3:23-38; Acts 7:1-53; and 13:16-41, 46-47	Ancestors
II.	Luke	The Royal Founder
III.	Acts	Growth of the Word among All Nations

I include Jesus' genealogy in the section on ancestors because Dionysius includes them in such sections (see e.g. I.60.3). Both Acts 7 and 13 also belong here. Commenting on 13:17, Haenchen says, "As in Stephen's speech, only more briefly, the orator [Paul] begins by outlining the history of salvation from the time of the fathers. . . . This time Luke omits the patriarchal and Mosaic periods, thus dividing his description of the Heilsgeschichte between Chapters 7 and 13."[9] Indeed, the term γένος (race, family, tribe) occurs in 7:13, 19 and in 13:26. Through himself, "Joseph's *family* became known to Pharaoh," but another king arose who "dealt

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[8] Talbert, "Luke-Acts" 301-02 judges that Conzelmann's basic suggestion of a three-stage salvation history in Luke-Acts (Israel-Jesus-Church) has not been successfully criticized, although it has been modified in important ways. The outline given in the text corresponds with Conzelmann's. Both historians have severe difficulty explaining the transition from the second to the third epochs, Dionysius from monarchy to aristocracy (see book IV and V.1.1-2), Luke from Israel and Jesus to all nations, because in theory they are narrating continuous history, but they must explain dramatic change.

[9] E. Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971) 408.

craftily with our *race*." And the speech in 13 contains the address, "Brethren, sons of the *family* of Abraham." These ancestors are often called "fathers."

1. Acts 7, an Invective (ψόγος)

A glance at the Lucan texts about the "fathers" reveals that this treatment of the ancestors is not a eulogy as it is in Dionysius,[10] but rather an invective. There is prophetic hope for the fathers and their children in Lk 1:17 and 32, but on the other hand, the woes in 6:26 and 11:47-48 prepare for Acts 7: "Woe to you when all people speak well of you, for so their *fathers* did to the false prophets." "Woe to you! for you build the tombs of the prophets whom your *fathers* killed. So you are witnesses and consent to the deeds of your *fathers;* for they killed them and you build their tombs." Similarly, in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, the former argues, "'No, *father* Abraham; but if some one goes to them from the dead, they will repent.' He said to him, 'If they do not hear Moses and the prophets, neither will they be convinced if some one should rise from the dead (16:30-31; cp. 24:44, 46).'" Peter's speech in Acts 3 contains the same message: "The God of Abraham and of Isaac and of Jacob, the God of our *fathers,* glorified his servant Jesus, whom you delivered up and denied in the presence of Pilate" (3:13). This speech ends with a prophetic citation and an appeal: "All the prophets who have spoken, from Samuel and those who came afterwards, also proclaimed these days. You are the sons of the prophets and of the covenant which God gave to your fathers, saying to Abraham, 'And in your posterity shall all the families of the earth be blessed' (Gen 22:18). God having raised up his servant, sent him to you first, to bless you in turning every one of you from your wickedness" (3:24-26).

Stephen's speech follows referring to the fathers, the ancestors, fifteen times! As rhetorical theory requires, Stephen tells us *who* the fathers are: Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Moses, Joshua and David (not Solomon). Further, because the author of such a "narrative" must, we hear of their *migrations:* from Mesopotamia to the promised land, to Egypt, burial in Shechem, to Midian, to the Red Sea, the wilderness and Mt. Sinai, and finally the conquest, migrations analogous to those of Aeneas and his Trojans to the land which the oracle had foretold (Dionysius I.48.2; 49.2; 51.1; 53.5; 55.5-56.5; 58.2, 5; 59.1). Then too, we hear of the *founding events:* the epiphany to Moses in the wilderness of Mount Sinai (Acts 7:30-34), the exodus (7:36), the reception of living oracles at Sinai (7:38) as well as the vision in the wilderness of the pattern for the tent of witness (7:44).

Dionysius's topos on origins is an encomium, Luke's an invective. The last two words of Stephen's speech are the crucial ones: "As your fathers did, so do you. Which of the prophets did not your *fathers* persecute? And they killed those who announced beforehand the coming of the Righteous One, whom you have now betrayed and murdered, you who received the law as delivered by angels and did *not* keep it" (οὐκ ἐφυλάξατε!) (Acts 7:51-53), precisely what Dionysius's apologetic history denies may be said of the Romans (see esp. VII.70-73, e.g. VII.70.2: ἔθη καὶ νόμιμα . . . παλαιὰ . . . φυλάττουσι, and the discussion under "C." below). It is often noticed that Stephen's speech does not defend him against the charges listed in Acts 6:11, 13, 14. In this instance, the specifics of the accusation are less

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[10] David L. Balch, "Two Apologetic Encomia: Dionysius on Rome and Josephus on the Jews," *Journal for the Study of Judaism* 13/1-2 (1982) 102-22.

important than the general charge that Jesus will "change the customs" (6:14). Stephen's speech is not a defense (ἀπολογία); it is rather an invective (ψόγος) on origins which reverses the charges. Those who are accusing Stephen of *changing* the law do not themselves *keep/guard* it, and they are the sons of their *fathers* who did not *guard* the Mosaic law. As 2 Maccabees shows, the worst sin of the Gentiles is to worship idols (2 Macc 12:40), precisely the charge Stephen makes against the fathers of his Jerusalem audience (Acts 7:40-43). The primary charge then is "impiety" (ἀσέβεια) or even "superstition" (δεισιδαιμονία).

This fits rhetorical theory. According to Anaximenes, *Rhetoric to Alexander* 1440b 6ff., a speech of censure has three parts: the prooemium, the narration, and the epilogue. ". . . we shall place first after the introduction the genealogy of the person we are speaking of, as that is the fundamental ground of reputation or discredit for human beings. . . ."[11] Then Anaximenes gives more detailed instructions:

> The proper way to employ genealogy is this. If the ancestors are men of merit, you must enumerate them all from the beginning down to the person you are eulogizing, and at each of the ancestors summarily mention something to his credit. If the first ones are men of merit but the rest do not happen to have done anything remarkable, you must go through the first ones in the same way but omit the inferior ones, explaining that because of the number of the ancestors you do not wish to make a long story by mentioning them all. . . . Similarly in vituperation use must be made of genealogy in a case of bad ancestry. This is the way to introduce genealogy in eulogy and vituperation.[12]

Anaximenes's instructions concern censuring individuals, but his examples and those in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* show that governments and groups could also be censured, which is the case in Acts 7.[13] The primary vice to be censured is injustice (*Rhetoric to Alexander* 1421b 37[14]; Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1366a 35-36[15]). Offense against the virtue of justice is prominent in Acts 7:24, 26, 52. And when Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1396a 19-24 gives examples of censurable injustice, he writes, ". . . the Athenians subjugated the Greeks, and reduced to slavery the Aeginetans and Potidaeans who had fought with distinction on their side against the barbarians . . . ,"[16] a case similar

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[11] *Rhetoric to Alexander* 1440b 23-26, trans. by H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge: Harvard, 1965) 404-05; cited by Craig Wayne Rinker, "The Art of Censure: Classical ΧΟΓΟΣ Rhetoric" (Norman, OK: unpublished University of Oklahoma dissertation, 1979) 75, 81, 123, 128.

[12] Ibid. 1440b 29-37 and 1440a 9-14, trans. Rackham 406-09. Rinker, "Art of Censure," 254, notes that Anaximenes' genealogical approach predominated over Aristotle's in the later Hellenistic and Roman periods.

[13] *Rhetoric to Alexander* 1440b 25 and 1422a 12-14, trans. Rackham 279 and 405; Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1383b 13-1384a 20, trans. J. H. Freese (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge: Harvard, 1975) 211-15; cited by Rinker, "Art of Censure," 57, 91, 122-24, 193, 219 and 198, where he recommends comparing Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* V. Rinker 248 is incorrect, however, that censure in the later Roman period was restricted theoretically to individuals; Dionysius and Josephus wrote works to oppose the censure of their city and people respectively.

[14] Trans. Rackham 276; cited by Rinker, "Art of Censure," 121.

[15] Trans. Freese 91; cited by Rinker, "Art of Censure," 192, 230.

[16] Trans. Freese 291; cited by Rinker, "Art of Censure," 206, 219.

to the censure of Joseph's brothers in Acts 7:9. Further, disobedience toward rulers is censurable,[17] a vice prominent in Acts 7:27, 35, 39, a charge against which Josephus repeatedly defends his people. After these two handbooks were written, apparently, the vice of impiety becomes central, as it is in Dionysius, Josephus and Acts 7:39-43.[18]

Since Acts 7 is an invective on the Jerusalem audience's ancestors, it is to be compared with other such invectives in Greek historians, especially the one in Strabo, *Geog.* 16.2.35-40.[19] There also one reads praise of Moses, the migration (exodus), and the founding of the city, the rites of worship, and even of his successors to a certain point in time, who were "acting righteously and being truly pious toward God" (δικαιοπραγοῦντες καὶ θεοσεβεῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντες; 16.2.37). Moses is compared to ancients who consulted oracles, then to Minos and Lycurgus, and to prophets worthy to be kings (16.2.38). But afterwards (ἐπειτ'), in the first place, superstitious men (δεισιδαιμόνων) were appointed to the priesthood, and then tyrannical people (τυραννικῶν) and from superstition arose abstinence from flesh, from which it is their custom to abstain even today (νῦν ἔθος; 16.2.37). Examples of such tyrants are the Maccabeans Alexander, Hyrcanus and Aristobulus (16.2.40). The conclusion is that "Moses was such a person as these [Minos etc.], as also his successors (οἱ διαδεξάμενοι ἐκεῖνον), who, with no bad beginning, turned out for the worse" (τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς λαβόντες οὐ φαύλας, ἐκτραπόμενοι δ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον; 16.2.39)

One related detail in Acts has more than a general similarity to Strabo's text. Acts 7:45 refers to "our fathers who succeeded" (διαδεξάμενοι οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν) Moses, which in this speech includes king David, but not his son, Solomon, whose actions constitute a deterioration (Acts 7:45-47). Strabo 16.2.37 refers to Moses' righteous and pious "successors" (οἱ διαδεξάμενοι), then after skipping the whole period of Israelite kingship, criticizes the "tyrannical" Maccabees. Both Strabo and Acts are concerned with Moses' "successors" and specify the point where they "turned out for the worse."

The origin of this section in Strabo praising Moses and his successors, to a certain chronological point, is disputed. If one accepts Norden's conclusions, Polybius first wrote about the Jews in relation to Antiochus the Great's victory over the Egyptian Skopas in 198 BCE.[20] Then Posidonius, either in his work "History after Polybius" (perhaps describing the clash between Antiochus Sidetes and the Hasmoneans in 134 BCE)[21] or in his work "On Divination," expanded Polybius's narrative, after

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[17] See Balch, "Two Apologetic Encomia."

[18] Ibid.

[19] See Menahem Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism, Edited with Introductions, Translations and Commentary* (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1974) I, 261-67, 294-311. Eduard Norden, "Jahve und Moses in hellenistischer Theologie," *Festgabe von Fachgenossen und Freunden A. von Harnack zum siebzigsten Geburtstag dargebracht* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1921) 292-301. John G. Gager, *The Origins of Anti-Semitism. Attitudes Toward Judaism in Pagan and Christian Antiquity* (New York: Oxford, 1983) 72-75. Compare Matthias Klinghardt, *Gesetz und Volk Gottes. Das lukanische Verständnis des Gesetzes nach Herkunft, Funktion und seinem Ort in der Geschichte des Urchristentums* (WUzNT, 2.Reihe, 32; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1988) 288-93, who sees the encomium of Moses, not the invective.

[20] Norden, "Jahve und Moses" 295.

[21] Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors* I.265.

which Strabo took it over with very little editing. Polybius, Posidonius and Strabo are all "historians," as is Luke; all praise good beginnings under Moses and criticize the deterioration under his successors. However, whereas Moses was a Founder for the other Greek historians, he becomes an ancestor for Luke. The "history" of deterioration after Moses produces Stephen's—Luke's—final words: you who received the law did not keep it![22]

2. Stories of Ancestors Foretell the Coming King

Understanding Stephen's speech as an invective on the ancestors explains another often-noticed characteristic of the speech: there is no positive affirmation of the possibility of salvation through Jesus.[23] Again, Dionysius offers a parallel: when he is narrating the Romans' ancestral origins (I.9-75), he says little of their descendants, the coming kings, Romulus or Augustus. However, according to Paul Martin, all these stories of the ancestors—those of Evander (I.31-33), Hercules (I.34-44), and Aeneas (I.45-70) as well as Romulus (I.71-II.56)—are told by Dionysius in the service of Augustus's regime.[24]

> Toute les grandes figures du passé sont ainsi mobilisés au service du règne nouveau. Cette accumulation de traits *augustéens* dans la physionomie et l'action d'Énee et de Romulus, mais aussi d'Évandre et d'Hercule, apparait trop systematique pour qu'on puisse croire à une simple influence et non à la mise en oeuvre d'un dessein délibéré.[25]

Prophetic oracles, e.g., the *Iliad* 20.307-08, "foretell" the dynasty of Aeneas/Augustus (Dionysius I.53.5). If we exchange the *Iliad* for the prophetic Hebrew scriptures, the thesis in Luke 1 and 2 as well as Acts 7 and 13 is parallel: Abraham, Moses and David prepare for the prophet like Moses and the royal son of David, Jesus Christ. Dionysius does include philosophical speculations about Romulus's nature, but later, at the beginning and the end of the "book" on Romulus (I.77.2; II.56.6), not earlier in the section on ancestors.

In this paper I will merely suggest that "Paul's" speech in Acts 13:16b-41, 46b-47 continues the story of the ancestors.[26] Just as Dionysius's story of Romulus's and

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[22] The purpose of such speeches of censure is discussed by Isocrates; see Rinker, "Art of Censure," 85-88.

[23] R. Maddox, *The Purpose of Luke-Acts*, 52. On the Christology of Acts see Philipp Vielhauer, "On the 'Paulinism' of Acts," in *Studies in Luke-Acts. Essays Presented in honor of Paul Schubert*, ed. L. E. Keck and J. Louis Martyn (Nashville: Abingdon, 1966) 33-50, esp. 43-45.

[24] Paul M. Martin, "Le Dessein de Denys d'Halicarnasse dans. les Antiquites Romaines et sa Conception de l'Historie a travers sa Preface du Livre I," *Caesarodunum* 4 (1969) 197-206, esp. 204-05 and "La Propagande Augustéenne dans les *Antiquités Romaines* de Denys d'Halicarnasse (Livre I)," *Revue des Études Latines* 49 (1972) 162-79, esp. 172, 178. Martin is cited with approval by Herman Verdin, "La Fonction de l'Histoire selon Denys d'Halicarnasse," *Ancient Society* 6 (1975) 289-307, at p. 291, 294. With respect to Livy, compare Jan Burian, "Die Vergangenheit Roms im Rahmen der Augusteischen Gegenwartspolitik," *Klio* 67 (1985) 29-34.

[25] Martin, "Propagande Augustéenne" 178 (my emphasis).

[26] See Haenchen, cited n. 9 above.

Rome's ancestors "est imprégnée de propagande, puisque le héros y est dépeint comme prototype de l'imperator triomphant—titre et honneur désormais monopolisés par l'empereur,"[27] so also the story of Israel's ancestors and founders in Psalms and Isaiah is read by Luke as a promise to the fathers of the coming son of David, who brings salvation to and rules the entire world.

One wonders why Luke delays the story of the ancestors until the narrative is into the second volume instead of beginning with it. While Dionysius thinks it appropriate to begin with an encomium, Luke might think it less appropriate to begin with an invective. The most appropriate place to insert this interpretation of previous history would be at that point where God's prophesied will is fulfilled, where the promise to "all nations" (Lk 24:47) is heard. Precisely in the story of Stephen, where there is conflict between Hellenists and Hebrews (Acts 6:1), the narrative resolution leads to Luke's summary in 6:7, "the word of God increased," a summary followed by similar ones (12:24; 19:20; 28:30), each of which is related, I suggest, to all nations hearing the Word.[28]

B. The Royal Founder

Reading Dionysius's and Luke-Acts' narratives together, certain structural similarities emerge. Within the key section on Founder(s) and founding events, the various stories exhibit similar content and concerns, some of which I will outline. (1) Dionysius is concerned with chronology at the beginning of his book on Romulus (I.74-75), as is Luke, e.g. 1:5; 2:1-2. He informs us, in fact, that "there was a great dispute concerning both the time of the building of the city and the founders of it" (I.72.1), the kind of tension which Luke rarely lets us observe (but see Acts 15:2).

(2) Dionysius gives various versions of the story, but Romulus's mother, Ilia, was ravished by someone, most writers mythically say it was the image of a daemon; there were supernatural signs, the sudden disappearance of the sun and darkness spreading over the sky. This god comforted the girl, commanding her not to grieve since she had been united in marriage to a divinity and would bear two sons far exceeding other men in virtue and warlike courage (I.77.1-2), an event which is the "work of the god" (I.78.4). Our author worries whether he ought to relate such a story, since God is incorruptible and blessed, but on the other hand, some philosophers suppose that between the race of gods and mortals, there is a third order of being, daemons who, uniting sometimes with humans and sometimes with gods, beget the fabled race of heroes (I.77.3).[29]

We can be grateful that Luke did not take over the philosophical theory, but the story of Jesus' birth does have parallels in an angel prophesying her son's greatness and divinity to Mary (Lk 1:26-38), a section perhaps added in the final redaction

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[27] Martin, "Propagande Augustéenne" 172.

[28] Henry J. Cadbury, "The Summaries in Acts," in *Beginnings of Christianity*, ed. F. J. Foakes Jackson and Kirsopp Lake (London: Macmillan, 1922) V, 392-402.

[29] Dionysius may refer to the Platonist Xenocrates. See C. Zintzen, "Geister (Daemonen): c. Hellenistische und kaiserzeitliche Philosophie," *RAC* 9 (1976) 640-68 and Frederick E. Brenk, "An Imperial Heritage: The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaironeia," *ANRW* II.36.1 (1987) 248-349, at 276-84.

of the gospel.[30] There is miraculous divine intervention in both stories;[31] Luke's differs in narrating a virginal conception.

Compared to Dionysius, Luke *reduces* the number of such miraculous divine births, i.e. demythologizes. One of Rome's ancestors, Hercules, had a divine lineage and was honored as a god (I.40.1, 3). Others, the Trojans led by Aeaneas, have Atlas, the seven stars in Pleiades, Zeus, Hermes, the nymph Hieromneme and Aphrodite in their lineage (I.61.1-3; 62.2). And Romulus's successor, the sixth king, Tullius Servius, was born of a slave woman and a divine phantom, so that he also was "superior to the race of mortals" (IV.2.2), divinity confirmed by a transfiguration story (IV.2.3-4). As some doubt Jesus' divine sonship (Lk 4:22), so despite stories of his birth generated by a god, many called Tullius merely the son of a slave woman (IV.1.2-2.3; 6.6).

Another significant difference between Dionysius's narrative and Luke-Acts is that the former has several founding kings, seven in fact: after Romulus, Numa Pompilius (II.57-76), Tullus Hostilius (III.1-35), Ancus Marcius (III.36-45), Lucius Tarquinius Priscus (III.46-73), Servius Tullius (IV.41-40), and Lucius Tarquinius Superbus (IV.41-85). Luke has only one Founder, as well as only one character without a human father.

(3) As a result of their genealogy and this story of divine conception, "the Romans believe them [Romulus and Remus] to have been the sons of Mars (πεπίστευνται δὲ ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων Ἄρεος υἱοὶ γενέσθαι; II.2.3), a near confessional formulation close to Lk 1:35 (cp. 3:38 and even Acts 17:28-29).

(4) Romulus died suddenly, darkness rushed down out of a clear sky, and a violent storm burst, after which he was nowhere to be seen (ἀφανῆ). Some writers "believe that he was caught up into heaven by his father, Mars." Others plausibly say he was murdered, because he exercised his power more like a tyrant than a king (II.56.2-3). Nevertheless,

> the incidents that occurred by the direction of Heaven in connection with this man's *conception* and *death* would seem to give no small authority to the view of those who made gods of mortal men (θεοποιοῦσι τὰ θνητὰ) and place the souls of illustrious persons in heaven. For they say that at the time when his mother was violated, whether by some man or by a god, there was a total eclipse of the sun (τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλιπεῖν) and a general darkness as in the night covered the earth, and that at his death the same thing happened. (II.56.6)

At the death of Jesus, Mk 15:33 and Matt 27:45 mention darkness over the whole land, repeated by Lk 23:44, but only the latter adds that "the sun's light failed" (τοῦ ἡλίου ἐκλιπόντος), an observation not to be explained by apocalyptic imagery in Luke. Like Romulus, Jesus disappears (ἄφαντος; Lk 24:31). Absolutely central for Luke, of course, is Jesus' ascension (Lk 9:51; 24:51; Acts 1:9).

The stories of Romulus's and Jesus' death differ in many ways, not least in their length, but one similarity is striking. The reason given for Romulus's murder is that "he released without common consent, contrary to custom, the hostages (τήν τε ἄφεσιν τῶν ὁμήρων) he had taken from the Veientes. . . ." (II.56.3) In his

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[30] Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel according to Luke (I-IX)* (Anchor Bible 28; Garden City: Doubleday, 1979) 89-90, 310.

[31] See Fitzmyer 338 for an interpretation of Lk 1:35.

inaugural sermon at Nazareth, Jesus informs the audience that the Lord "has sent me to proclaim release to the captives, . . . to set at liberty those who are oppressed" (αἰχμαλώτοις ἄφεσιν, . . . τεθραυσμένους ἐν ἀφέσει; Isa 61:2 and 58:6 cited in Lk 4:18), a mission concerning which the resurrected Christ is still teaching the disciples (Lk 24:47).

(5) There is also an appearance story. The second king, Numa, ordered Romulus honored under the name of Quirinus as one beyond mortal nature. While Romans were in doubt whether divine providence or human treachery had been the cause of his disappearance, Julius Ascanius, who had never told an untruth, said he saw Romulus departing from the city fully armed [rather physical!]. He was told to "announce to the Romans from me, that the genius to whom I was allotted at my birth is conducting me to the gods, now that I have finished my mortal life, and that I am Quirinus" (II.63.3-4; compare Livy 1.16). Jesus, too, appeared after his death to two on the way to Emmaus (Lk 24:13-35), then to the disciples in a way which stresses his physical body (Lk 24:36-53, esp. 42-43).

(6) His grandfather had instructed (διδάξαντος) Romulus what to say about the Roman form of government, and he followed his teaching (διδαχή; II.3.1; 4.1; see 28.1). Romulus's πολιτεία ("constitution" or "way of life") is then presented (II.6-29).

Jesus, too, is presented as teaching in synagogues (Lk 4:15), delivers his inaugural sermon in Nazareth and continues teaching in Capernaum (4:31), a teaching to which Pharisees object (5:17, 21); he teaches the disciples to pray (11:1) and teaches in the temple (19:47), for which he is accused of stirring up the people (23:5), etc. There are several significant similarities and differences between Romulus's way of life and Jesus' teaching in Luke. One of the parallel political practices will be presented in section C. below.

One might compare the "last words" of the two. Romulus's final words are consistent: they stress Mars's, his father's, values, military preparedness and courage, not only as reported by Julius Ascanius in Dionysius, but also in Livy: "declare to the Romans the will of Heaven that my Rome shall be the capital of the world; so let them cherish the art of war. . . ." (1.16.7). This is consistent with Dionysius's whole narrative, fairly described as nationalistic and militaristic. Every war fought by the Romans has been just, so declared by the *fetiales* instituted by the pious king Numa (II.72)! Whichever of Jesus' final words (Lk 22:19 or 24:46 or one of John's "I am" sayings?) are compared with those of Romulus, the result is a fundamental contrast.

(7) If one excludes the stories of his birth and death, Romulus performs no healing or nature miracles. Dionysius is quite reluctant to narrate any miracles, one of the only exceptions being the "many marvelous stories" told of Numa (II.60.4). The only one he does narrate concerns the nymph Egeria, who visited and instructed him in the art of reigning. When people did not believe, he gave the unbelievers proof of his converse with the daemon, as she instructed. Then Dionysius narrates a feeding miracle, at which the Romans are astonished (II.60.6-7). He is hesitant about this "myth" (II.61.1), so explains it comparing Numa to other wise men, Minos of Crete and Lycurgus of Sparta.[32]

Jesus, of course, works many miracles in Luke, including one feeding miracle (Lk 9:10b-17), so here is another fundamental contrast with Dionysius' narrative, perhaps to be explained as follows. He narrates the reign of each of the seven

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[32] Dionysius shortens this discussion, choosing not to narrate such "accurate mythical history" (II.61.3)!

founding kings mentioned above in *two* sections.[33] For example, after the people choose Romulus as king, our author declares, "I shall relate such of his political and military achievements (τὰς πράξεις τάς τε πολιτικὰς καὶ τὰς κατὰ πολέμους) as may be thought worthy of mention in a history (ἐν ἱστορίας; II.7.1). There is a short narrative of Tullus's civil administration (πολιτικὰ), but we hear that many military exploits (πολεμικαὶ δὲ πράξεις) are related of him (III.1.5-2.1; cp. IV.26.6).

Livy narrates the two political and military sections together, Dionysius divides them, and Luke drops one of them, the narration of military achievements, altogether.[34] Similarly, Dionysius's section on Numa contains *only* administrative deeds, no military ones (II.60.4; 76.2). There are both rhetorical and religious reasons for Luke's modification of the genre. In later rhetorical handbooks, we read that, since the Romans now rule the world, one can no longer narrate and praise the military victories of other peoples.[35] Luke has religious reasons for doing what is rhetorically necessary. Prof. Hans Dieter Betz suggests to me that Luke has substituted miraculous "deeds" for military ones. Luke does narrate the "political achievements" of Jesus and the early church, one of which will be sketched in section C. below.

In summary, I find significant similarities as well as important differences between the "narratives" of Dionysius and Luke in their central sections describing the Founder(s), but it seems possible to explain many of the differences as developments within the genre.

C. The Reception of Foreign Nations, a Roman and Christian Custom from Their Very Beginnings

Some of the most important chapters in Dionysius's history for understanding his purpose are in I.89-90.[36] There we learn that Rome is the most hospitable and friendly of all cities (κοινοτάτην τε πόλεων φιλανθρωποτάτην) (I.89.1), having intermixed with Aborigines, Arcadians, and Peloponnesians, but, Dionysius insists, Rome has not been barbarized, even after receiving (ὑποδεξαμένη) Opicans, Marsians, Samnites, Tyrrhenians, Bruttians, thousands of Umbrians, Ligurians, Iberians, Gauls, and innumerable other nations (ἔθνη), who differed from one another in language and habits (I.89.2-3). One might expect this mixture (ἐπιμιξίαι) to cause many innovations in the ancient order, so that they would no longer speak the same language, observe the customs, acknowledge the same gods, nor have the

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[33] R. M. Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy, Books 1-5* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965) 146 notes that Dionysius keeps these two in separate compartments, while Livy interweaves them.

[34] Despite boundless respect for him, I disagee with W. C. van Unnik, "Luke's Second Book and the Rules of Hellenistic Historiography," in *Les Actes des Apôtres: traditions, rédaction, théologie*, ed. J. Kremer (Gembloux: Duculot, 1979) 39: "whatever may have been the special purpose of Luke, it was decidedly *not political history*." (his emphasis) However, Luke did modify the genre by deleting *half* its material.

[35] See Balch, "Two Apologetic Encomia" on Menander, who repeats this three times in his section on praising cities and peoples.

[36] See esp. H. Hill, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the Origins of Rome," *JRS* 51 (1961) 88-93, whose reflections on the purpose of Dionysius's narrative revolve around I.89.

same equitable laws (I.89.4) But all these have been maintained from the first; Romans are not more virtuous now than formerly, a thesis for which Dionysius has many arguments to be supplied later, which turns out to mean seven books later (VII.70-73). He gives these proofs not to make his narrative (διήγησις) more agreeable, but to win credence for an essential matter of history (VII.70.1). He argues the problematic thesis that the founders of Rome were Greeks sent out from the most famous places, not as some believe, originally barbarians and vagabonds. As he promised, he demonstrates this thesis by several proofs, citing time-honored customs, laws and institutions which they [Romans] preserve (φυλάττουσι) down to my time just as they received them from their ancestors (VII.70.2). He begins with the established worship of the gods, because both the Greek and barbarian world have preserved (διὰ φυλακῆς ἔχει) this for the longest time and have never thought fit to make any innovation in them due to their fear of divine anger (VII.70.3). Egyptians, Libyans, Gauls, Scythians, Indians, nor any other barbarian nation can be induced to forget or transgress rites of their gods, unless a foreign power compels them to exchange their institutions for those of their conquerors (VII.70.4).[37] Dionysius's specific examples begin with an ancient Roman festival which included a procession in honor of the gods: this custom continued even to my time at Rome. . . , but it is now abolished (καταλέλυται) in Greece, the Lacedaemonians having put an end to it (VII.72.2). Dionysius establishes the nature and antiquity of these customs by citing Homer (VII.72.3, 4, 8, 9, 16, 17; 73.3).

These passages show that Dionysius holds two values which are in high tension with each other: (1) valid customs and laws must be ancient,[38] and (2) one of these ancient Roman customs is the reception of foreign nations into the body politic. The second custom leads either to the accusation that Romans were immoral barbarians from their beginnings (I.4.1, 2) or that the ancient, originally Greek customs have been barbarized and corrupted (I.89.3; II.19.2). I will examine the second value and compare it with Luke-Acts.

Because it is related to the basic apologetic in Dionysius's history as seen in the key passage I.89-90, I will focus on one section of Romulus's constitution, the one having to do with Rome receiving foreign nations (II.15-17).[39] The Greek historian counters the charges against Romans by insisting in the early lines of his history that "from the very beginning (ἐξ ἀρχῆς), immediately after her founding, she began to draw to herself the neighboring nations" (I.3.4) Romulus made the city large and populous by welcoming (ὑποδέχεσθαι) and attracting fugitives, provided that they were free, from cities governed by tyrannies and oligarchies (II.15.3). His purpose was to increase the power of the Romans (τὴν Ῥωμαίων δύναμιν αὐξῆσαι βουληθείς).[40] He invented a pretext, appearing to honor a god; picking a place, he

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[37] Compare the discussion of 2 Maccabees below.

[38] Luke shares this value, a primary source of his movement away from an imminent eschatology, the change which offends Ernst Käsemann, "Ephesians and Acts," in *Studies in Luke-Acts. Essays Presented in Honor of Paul Schubert,* ed. L. E. Keck and J. Louis Martyn (Nashville: Abingdon, 1966) 288-97.

[39] See Balch, "Two Apologetic Encomia" 106, 111, 118-19.

[40] The theme of "increase" or "growth" occurs not only in Dionysius and Luke-Acts, but also in earlier historians. It appears in Herodotus 1.58.4, 8 and is developed by Polybius, e.g. 2.37.8; 2.39.11; 5.10.1. When Polybius compares Athens and Rome, he dismisses the former simply because it did not continue to "grow" (6.43.2)! I owe this observation to Hubert Cancik, professor of classics in Tübingen.

made it an asylum for suppliants (II.15.4). Using this occasion of piety toward the divine, he protected the ones fleeing from suffering any harm at the hand of their enemies. A related policy was not to kill all men of military age and enslave the rest of cities captured in war, but to send (ἀποστέλλειν) settlers, make them Roman colonies, and grant citizenship to some (II.16.1). By these measures, he made Rome great from small beginnings, for the number of those at the founding of Rome was not more than three thousand foot (II.16.2), but it became inferior in numbers to no other nation.

Greek customs, especially those of Athenians, who pride themselves on their wisdom, guard (φυλάττοντες) their noble birth, grant citizenship to none or few, and even expel foreigners, are not advantageous and are not to be praised (II.17.1). Through a single disaster, Athenians lost the leadership of Greece and the liberty they inherited from their ancestors. But Rome derives strength from disasters thanks to the number of her soldiers.

Later in his work, Dionysius stages a debate between the Alban general Fufetius and the Roman king Tullus on this issue (III.10-11).[41] In this debate over which city should rule the other, the Alban makes the charges: Fufetius observes that the Albans are Greek, and they sent out a colony to Rome. Second, Albans have granted citizenship only to Greeks and Latins, whereas Romans have corrupted the purity of their body politic by admitting (ὑποδεξάμενοι) Tyrrhenians, Sabines and others who were homeless, vagabonds and barbarians in great numbers, so that most are now of an alien race (III.10.4). The immigrant mob has control of public affairs, kings are outsiders, and most of the senate are newcomers (III.10.5). Third, Albans have not altered their constitution, now in its eighteenth generation, but continue to observe all its customs and traditions, whereas Rome is without order and discipline, a conglomeration of many races (III.10.6).

The Roman responds to the first charge, then second, offers his own comparison of the ways of life of the two cities. Tullus responds to the charge that Rome has been corrupted by various admixtures of foreigners (διέφθαρται ταῖς ἐπιμιξίαις τοῦ ἀλλοφύλου) so should be ruled by "noble" Albans; far from being ashamed, he takes pride that the privileges of the city are free to those who want them (III.11.3-4). Owing to this humane policy, the city from a small and contemptible beginning has become large and formidable. One should disparage another state and praise one's own when, by the practices laid down, the city has become great and flourishing, true for Rome, not Alba (III.11.7). The factional strife resulting from this mixture does not corrupt and diminish the commonwealth, but preserves and enhances (αὐξήσει) it, a result of competition for honor between older and newer citizens (III.11.8). This debate in Dionysius's literary work corresponds, he tells us, to an actual contemporary debate: "there is a great dispute concerning both the time of the building of the city [Rome] and the founders of it" (I.72.1).

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[41] On Dionysius's deliberative, agonistic speeches see Kenneth S. Sacks, "Rhetorical Approaches to Greek History Writing in the Hellenistic Period," *SBL 1984 Seminar Papers*, ed. K. H. Richards (Chico: Scholars, 1984) 123-33. However, as my paper on "Two Apologetic Encomia" demonstrates, Dionysius's history is also epideictic. For a modern participant in the debate on the side of the Alban Fufetius, see T. Frank, "Race Mixture in the Roman Empire," *The American Historical Review* 21 (1916) 689-708, reprinted in *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Why Did It Collapse?*, ed. D. Kagan (Problems in European Civilization; Boston: D. C. Heath, 1962) 44-56.

We can follow this debate in a related work praising Athens written a century and a half later by Aristides.[42] If A. D. Nock was correct, the reception of foreigners of which Dionysius boasts was originally Roman, not Athenian,[43] but the eulogies of Rome were so effective that now Aristides must praise Athens using the same topos, although ambivalently! On the one hand, he insists that Athenian Attica "alone has assumed the appearance of an unblemished Greek people, and is to the greatest degree racially distinct from the barbarians" (14 Behr; 13 Oliver). It is "as if this city had been naturally disposed as an opponent and enemy of the barbarian race. . . . From these causes it has always provided its people with pure and uncorrupted customs, and it also introduced, as a model for all Greek speech, a dialect which is clear, pure and pleasant" (15 Behr; 14 Oliver).

In some contrast to this attitude, however, is the section praising Athens which Oliver names "the key passage of the whole oration,"[44] (322-32 Behr; 225-32 Oliver). In the Hellenistic pattern for an encomium, Aristides praises Athens in just the way Dionysius had praised Rome's "growth," but with some intriguing developments and modifications, which Oliver explains:

> The Athenian Empire which Thucydides admired but recognized as oppressive is defended. . . . The objection of Plato to a Periclean admiration of the *dynamis* of the city is not forgotten. . . . The city is shown as public-spirited and philanthropic; the virtue of an outgoing philanthropia which Plato, *Menexenus* 244e rather disapproves, takes the place of the stricter justice which Plato idealized. . . . In a climactic passage which had no parallel in the public orations Aristides reveals to the Greek world the *dynamis* of the Athenians. It is not a *dynamis* represented by 200 or more triremes and supported by garrisons; it is not limited to the islands, Ionia, and the Thraceward region; it extends over the whole world. It is the language, literature, and the philosophy of Athens, a cultural empire which attracts all men. . . . he too admires the *dynamis* when he reinterprets it from the point of view of *logos* and *logoi*. As you hear this climactic passage of the Panathenaic Discourse, the notes struck by the elaborate play with the words *logos* and *logoi* in the prooemium become thoroughly intelligible for the first time as something more than mere word play. They are the essence of his message.

That is, in the second century AD, Aristides could no longer praise Athens as Dionysius had narrated and praised Rome's military victories. He rather reinterprets the power, growth and attraction of this city for all humans: Athens is the power, the logos, that civilizes the whole world. Athens, he proclaims, has won a "bloodless trophy," not like the battle at Marathon, but all cities and races of humans (πάντα

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[42] Aristides, "Panathenaic Oration," ed. and trans. C. A. Behr (LCL; Cambridge: Harvard, 1973). A superior work is by James H. Oliver, "The Civilizing Power. A Study of the Panathenaic Discourse of Aelius Aristides Against the Background of Literature and Cultural Conflict, with Text, Translation, and Commentary," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 58/1 (1968) 1-223, which includes a complete concordance.

[43] A. D. Nock, "The Praises of Antioch," *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 40 (1954) 78.

[44] Oliver, "Civilizing Power" 14. Cp. Balch, "Two Apologetic Encomia" 118-19.

τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένη) have turned to Athens, to the form of life and the dialect of the city. The power of the city is not in garrisons, but in the fact that all people of their own accord have chosen the city's ways (322-23 Behr; 225 Oliver). Emulation of Athens' wisdom and way of life has spread over every land by some divine fortune (324 Behr; 226 Oliver). All peoples (πάντα . . . ἔθνη) cling to Athens' dialect (325 Behr; 226 Oliver).

The section of Aristides' oration on Athens which praises the reception of other nations (49-74 Behr; 45-62 Oliver) corresponds to the similar section of Dionysius's history of Rome (II.15-17). He praises the reception (ὑποδοχή) and consolation of unfortunates from every place (50 Behr; 46 Oliver). When Heracles' children were driven from the Peloponnesus and all were forbidden to receive them, Athens received them nevertheless (52 Behr; 49 Oliver). The city right from the start gave herself for all in need (χρείαν) to share (54, 57, 60, 67, 70, and see 73 Behr; 51, 53, 54, 59, and see 62 Oliver). "And it showed its usefulness for all men not only by what it sent them of its own, but also by the offer of its soil to those who sought refuge in it from without and its acceptance of all men as part of itself" (61 Behr; 54 Oliver). Those accepted are an addition to Greece (62, 95 Behr; 55, 78 Oliver), by which the Greek race grows (αὔξω) (50, 64, 77, 95 Behr; 46, 57, 65, 78 Oliver).

I conclude that there is a cluster of problematic ideas associated with the central apologetic passage I.89-90 in Dionysius's history of Rome, ideas repeated with significant variations by Aristides in his encomium of Athens. In a narrative or a history, one recounts a city's or a people's customs and laws, which must be guarded both by the people as a whole and by individuals, not abolished, corrupted, exchanged for others, transgressed, or altered, nor may they undergo innovation. Some argue that one of these ancient customs among Greeks and Romans has been to guard their pure race (γένος), but others contend, on the contrary, that from the beginning Athenians and Romans have sent out colonists (or according to Aristides, one's *logos*) and received other nations, foreigners, fleeing calamities, experiencing need, by which Athens and Rome have grown (αὐξάνω, αὔξω) to be many.

2 Maccabees[45] and Luke-Acts employ this cluster of ideas in opposed ways, that is, they restate the debate between the Alban Fufetius and the Roman Tullus, this time not in the context of Roman but of Jewish history and customs. 2 Maccabees is also a narrative (διήγησις; 2:32; 6:17; see 2:24) concerned with "living according to the customs of their forefathers" (11:25) and the laws (1:4; 2:2 and passim) which some keep (3:1) and obey (7:30) and others threaten to abolish (καταλύω; 2:22; 4:11; 8:17). Antiochus Epiphanes destroys the constitution and introduces new customs (τὰς νομίμους καταλύων πολιτείας, παρανόμους ἐθισμοὺς ἐκαινίζεν; 4:11); he wants to compel the Jews to change the laws of their fathers to those of the Greeks (6:1, 9, 24). This conflict occurred in "times of mingling" with Gentiles

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[45] See C. Habicht, *2.Makkabäerbuch* (Jüdische Schriften aus hellenistisch-römischer Zeit, Band I/3: Historische und legendarische Erzählungen; Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1979) 175, dates three layers of the book: Jason in 161-60 BCE, the epitomizer in 124 BCE, and a redactor in 63 or 60 BCE. Hubert Cancik, *Mythische und historische Wahrheit. Interpretationen zu Texten der hethitischen, biblischen und griechischen Historiographie* (SB 48; Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1970) 95-96, 108-26 relates 2 Maccabees to Mark, but he also refers (124, n. 133) to "eine divinatorische Bemerkung über die Ähnlichkeit zwischen 2 Makk und Lukas" by E. Meyer.

(14:3),[46] when even the high priest defiled himself, although it was different in former times of not mingling (14:38). Later Antiochus is translated to the gods (11:23), but Eleazar and the widow's seven sons are willing to suffer this tyrant (6:30; 7:27) and die for the laws and the country (8:21). Jewish institutions include helping maimed, widows and orphans (3:10; 8:28, 30). The temple is central to these laws and customs (e.g. 1:18; 2:19; 3:2; 4:14; 5:15; 13:10, 14; 15:18). But assumptions about foreigners are exclusively negative; foreigners profane the temple and build pagan altars (named "Hellenism," 4:13), which are pulled down (10:2, 5). Their sin is to consecrate idols, which the law forbids to Jews (12:40). The nations (ἔθνοι) enslave Jews (1:27), revel with prostitutes in the temple (6:4), want to destroy the Jews (8:9; 14:15), are blasphemous and barbarous (10:4; 13:11), but cannot withstand Judas Maccabeus (8:5). God has power (δύναμις: 9:8; κράτος:11:4 and 12:28; μέγαν τοῦ κόσμου δυνάστην: 12:15, 28). Even an enemy of the Jews decides to go through all the inhabited world and proclaim this power (9:16). The God of Israel relates one way to the nations, another to Jews (6:14), which includes defending them (14:34; 15:8), a lessening of their opponents (11:13). Jews fight for their law, country and the holy temple (13:10), or alternatively, for the laws, temple, city, country and the constitution (13:14).

By now the direction of my argument will have become obvious: this cluster of "historical" ideas is central not only in Dionysius, Aristides, and 2 Maccabees, but also in Luke-Acts. Dionysius and 2 Maccabees develop the military possibilities of the topos, Aristides and Acts emphasize rather the logos, the powerful "word" "growing" throughout the world. Interpreters have puzzled over the unusual formula, "The word (λόγος) of God (the Lord) grew" (Acts 6:7; 12:24; 19:20). Various explanations have been offered: (a) it is said to be either a Lucan development of the parable of the sower (Lk 8:4-15) or (b) an adaptation of the "be fruitful and multiply" formula from the Priestly tradition (e.g. Gen 1:22, 28, as well as twelve other OT texts).[47] I will leave examination of the Lucan parable to a later time, but the "be fruitful and multiply" formula refers to reproduction in God's creation or to the growth of a particular family (e.g. Gen 28:3, Jacob's family, which is not to intermarry with Canaanites; cp. Jer 23:3).

In contrast to Priestly Israelite theology, Dionysius narrates Rome's growth[48] through the addition or mixing of nations, of which I will give one of many examples in Dionysius. The Trojans under Aeneas, whose reign is foretold (I.53.5), sails to Italy and no further because of "the divine power which revealed its will (βούλησιν) in many ways" (I.55.1). On arriving near Rome, they realize this is the place because an oracle is fulfilled, and they remember the prophecy (I.55.4-5; 56.2). Aeneas hears a voice and does as the god commands (I.56.4), after which he has

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[46] The text and meaning of the term in 14:3 and 14:38 are problematic. See F.-M. Abel, *Les Livres des Maccabées* (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1949) 457 and R. Hanhart, *Septuaginta . . . Gottingensis* IX/2, Maccabaeorum Liber II (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1959) 106.

[47] Jerome Kodell, "'The Word of God Grew.' The Ecclesial Tendency of ΛΟΓΟΣ in Acts 1(sic),7; 12:24; 19:20," *Biblica* 55/4 (1974) 505-19.

[48] Olof Gigon, "Zur Geschichtsschreibung der römischen Republik," *Studien zur antiken Philosophie* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972) 276 says this is a Greek idea, dependent on Greek political theory, as is the construction of an Urgeschichte in Dionysius I.76-84.

a vision giving him advice. Latinus, king of the country, hears that a foreign army is wasting the coast, but a god appears to him telling him to receive (δέχεσθαι) the Greeks (I.57.4). Aeneas's speech to Latinus explains that they are natives of Troy, not the least famous city among Greeks, but that they have been wanderers, without city or country and in an unfortunate situation (I.58.2). They receive land and build the city Lavinium, during which time a sign appears: a wolf, eagle and a fox struggle over building a fire; the first two prevail, making it flame up, which Aeneas interprets as meaning that the colony will grow (αὐξομένη) despite the envy of those who oppose it (I.59.5). They unite (μίξαντες) their two races, native and foreign, by marriage, combine their customs, laws and religious ceremonies, so that the nations share a common life, from which the Roman people derive their origin (ἐξ ὧν τὸ Ῥωμαίων γένος ὥρμηται) (I.60.1-3). An important summary genealogy of the six nations which had united according to Dionysius's previous narrative follows.

2 Maccabees is not concerned about such "growth,"[49] but in Acts "the word grows" in a context of Hebrew/Hellenist or Jew/Greek polarity and unity. (a) After the resolution of the Hellenist/Hebrew conflict in Acts 6:1-6, "the word of God grew" (6:7). (b) At first the word was spoken to none except Jews, but then some spoke to Greeks (11:19-20), with the result that "a large company was added to the Lord" (11:24). Thereafter James is killed by Herod which "pleased the Jews" (12:1-2), Peter is rescued from Herod's prison and a similar death, the king lets himself be proclaimed a god and dies because he did not give God the glory (12:22-23), then "the word of God grew and multiplied" (12:24). (c) Paul preaches in the synagogue in Corinth where some disbelieve, and he changes to the hall of Tyrannus so that both Jews and Greeks hear the word (19:8-10). Jewish exorcists compete with Paul, but are overpowered, which is known to all Ephesians, Jews and Greeks. The name of the Lord Jesus is extolled and magic books burned, "so the word of the Lord grew and prevailed mightily" (19:20). I conclude that the story in Dionysius's narrative of the growth of Rome leaves its mark on the vocabulary of Luke's narrative of the growth of the early church.

Just as Romans receive (ὑπο-προσ-δέχομαι) fugitives, foreign nations, so the church receives converts (Lk 8:13; 9:48, 53; 10:8, 10, 38; 18:17; 19:6; see 15:2; Acts 8:14; 11:1; 17:11).[50] Especially close to Dionysius and Aristides is Acts 11:1, "Now the apostles and the brethren who were in Judea heard that the Gentiles (τὰ ἔθνη) also had received the word of God." And just as in Dionysius, this causes controversy! Dionysius wrote his work in order to defend, promote (I.89-90), and modify (IV.24)[51] the policy; and despite the fact that, historically (now using a modern meaning of "history"), Athens had not received "all peoples," Aristides had to praise the city using this topos.

There are several such texts in Luke-Acts. The resurrected Christ interprets the law and the prophets to mean that repentance and forgiveness are to be preached in his name to all nations (Lk 24:47). There are Jews from every nation under heaven (Acts 2:5) present for the Pentecost sermon. But the phrase is prominent

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[49] 2 Macc 5:16 mentions the "augmentation" of the temple. 4 Macc 13:19, 21 tells of the seven brothers' "growth," which makes it clear that there is a fundamental contrast between "brotherly love" (φιλαδελφία) and "love of humanity" (φιλανθρωπία).

[50] Compare Isa 56:3, 6, 8.

[51] See Hill, "Dionysius . . . and the Origins of Rome" 88.

especially in the conflicts in chapters 10-11 and 15 (10:35; 45; 11:1, 18; 14:27; 15:3), which I would compare to key problematic (apologetic) passages in Dionysius I.89.3; III.10.6 and VII.70.1. Another related term is "foreigner" (in Acts 10:28 and Dionysius II.17.1; III.10.4; 11.3). In both Roman and Jewish cultural-religious contexts, there were intense debates about the identity of the group in relation to the "nations," to "foreigners," who wanted to become part of the people. Dionysius and Luke write their "narratives" to argue for the reception of foreigners into Rome and the church; both add certain conditions (Dionysius IV.24; Acts 15:20, 29). I assume that the earlier Roman practice and stories influenced Luke, so I would call this practice a Romanization of Jewish-, then of Gentile-Christianity. As many in the modern world are impressed by Western technology and business and imitate them, so we can see in Josephus and in Luke-Acts, that some Jews and Christians were impressed by the means of Roman expansion and imitated it. The author of 2 Maccabees employed variations of this cluster of ideals, but rejected those involving "receiving the nations" and "mixing" with them.

I conclude that a cluster of problematic ideas in Dionysius's history of Rome, variations of which appear in 2 Maccabees as well as in Aristides' encomium of Athens, are also employed in Luke-Acts. The customs and laws of Moses are guarded both by the God's people as a whole and by the individuals, e.g. Stephen (and Paul), not abolished, corrupted or transgressed. From the beginning Abraham and Moses spoke of God blessing all nations, Jesus preached about prophets being sent to Syrians, the apostle Peter preached already on Pentecost to people "from every nation under heaven," and the foreigner Cornelius was received and baptized by the same apostle. "So the word of the Lord grew and prevailed mightily."

Summary

Dionysius and Luke-Acts both narrate history in three epochs: ancestors, Founder(s), and successors. For both historians the first epoch requires an encomium of selected patriarchs, but for Luke this means an invective of the remaining "fathers" who were unjust, enslaved their brother, were disobedient and impious (Acts 7), an invective present in other Hellenistic historians like Strabo. One function of these stories of the ancestors for both Dionysius and Luke is that these great heroes of the past serve as models of the coming king, Aeneas and Romulus of Augustus, Moses and David of Christ.

The Founders which both writers describe have a number of remarkable similarities: stories of their birth, nature, teachings, disappearance, physical appearance after death and ascension are told sometimes in the same words. Stories of their deaths differ significantly in length, but one primary reason for their being killed is related. However, Dionysius tells of no miracles performed by Romulus, Luke of no military deeds accomplished by Christ. Aspects of their teaching also offer sharp contrasts.

Some political policies already practiced by the ancestors and taught authoritatively by the Founders are, however, debated in the present by their successors. One such debate concerns whether the group "guards" its racial/ethnic purity or, alternatively, "receives" "all nations" and "grows," a key problem for Dionysius (I.89; III.10-11) and Aristides, as well as for 2 Maccabees and Luke (Acts 10-11, 15). Given the alternatives of the debate, paradoxically, the author of 2 Maccabees rejects "hellenism" but accepts the Greek Alban/Athenian position of guarding ethnic purity. Luke rejects this Greek/Athenian/Maccabean ethnic exclusivism for

Roman mixing, for "receiving" "all nations," with the result that "the Word of God grew."

Luke-Acts is written in the genre of Greco-Roman political historiography, which the author both imitates and dramatically revises. The author is aware of Romulus's/Augustus's "constitution," enthusiastically accepts some of its policies and emphatically rejects others. The process has analogies in the First Testament: George Mendenhall and others have demonstrated that Ancient Near Eastern treaties—after they are depolytheized, monotheized, Yahwized and Israelitized (James Sanders)—provide the structure for the Mosaic covenant. Luke attempts something similar in the Greco-Roman, Augustan world.

Acts of the Apostles and the Graeco-Roman World: Narrative Communication in Social Contexts

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From the birth of Jesus[1] to Paul final speech in Rome, Luke's makes clear that the acts of the Christian movement did not take place in a corner (Acts 26:26).[2] Luke's consummate artistry[3] communicates a plethora of social, political, economic, and religious information pertinent for an audience concerned with two sets of issues. First and most immediate were the individual and community concerns internal to the group itself. Why should one join? What should one believe? How should one act? What is one's relation to Jesus, the early apostles, God? Related and equally significant for Luke was the relation of the movement to external factors, most particularly the 'web of power' that bound in varying degrees Roman authority and power with most social, economic, political, and religious facets of life.[4] How were individual members and the movement as a whole to engage this 'web of power'?

This essay explores in preliminary fashion Luke's response to the 'web of power' and what it may tell us of his audience. In addition, it compares Luke's response with a near contemporary, Chariton of Aphrodisias[5] to highlight how Luke

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[1] J. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX*. The Anchor Bible Series 28 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1982), pp. 393-394.

[2] I use the term Luke as a convenient label for the author who wrote the two volume work The Gospel of Luke and The Acts of the Apostles. For a summary of evidence that substantiates that a single author wrote both works by Robert Maddox, *The Purpose of Luke-Acts* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1982), pp. 3-6. Joseph Fitzmyer has recently attempted to revive the traditional theory that Luke the physician, a Syrian from Antioch wrote the work Luke-Acts. *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX*, The Anchor Bible Series, volume 28 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1982), pp. 51-53. In his classic study *The Style and Literary Method of Luke* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), pp. 39-72, H. J. Cadbury shows that the so-called medical terms in Acts do not indicate that the traditional Luke the physician was the author. See also J. Meier's criticism of Fitzmyer's attempt in *Antioch and Rome* (New York: Paulist Press, 1983), p. 26 f.n. 2.

[3] Cf. C. H. Talbert, *Literary Patterns, Theological Themes, and the Genre of Luke-Acts* (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1974), p. 1.

[4] The term 'web of power' is used by Simon Price, *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 239-247.

[5] *Chaereas and Callirhoe* represents the earliest of the complete and extant Greek

participated amidst the *Zeitgeist* of the Greek East.[6] Henry J. Cadbury noted long ago that Chariton's historical romance, *Chaereas and Callirhoe*, offers more "illustrations of the idiom and ideas of the author of Acts in 150 pages" than any work of comparable length.[7] More importantly Chariton and Luke are part of a larger group of provincial writers from the Greek East who use religion or philosophy to construct a power base that explicitly or implicitly redefined the 'web of power' that affected them all.[8] To highlight Luke's participation in this process of redefinition in the Greek East, I focus on the way Luke and Chariton use travel by major characters to highlight the antiquity of their movements and the power and presence of their respective deities throughout the *oikumene*.

Text and Contexts: Methodological Considerations

Some justification for comparing Acts with a single text rather than a generic construct seems in order. Interpreters have long looked to ancient genres in order to clarify Luke's style, language, purpose for writing, audience, or relation to the contemporary Graeco-Roman environment.[9] Some question such comparisons or at best regard them as secondary to literary or theological studies of the author's special concerns.[10] Hans Conzelmann, for example, characterized Acts as closest to the

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romance. Probably written between 50-150 C.E., the author, Chariton identifies himself as a secretary to the rhetor Athenagoras in Aphrodisias, no doubt of Caria (in Turkey). For further discussion with documentation of date, provenance, and program see my "Chariton's *Chaereas and Callirhoe*: Religions and Politics Do Mix," *SBL 1985 Seminar Papers* 24, editor Kent H. Richards (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press), pp. 175-181 and "Acts of the Apostles and Chariton's *Chaereas and Callirhoe*: A Literary and Sociohistorical Study" (Ph.D., Boston University, 1987), esp. pp. 4-7; 25-99.

[6] E. L. Bowie rightly suggests that *Chaereas and Callirhoe* and other ancient romances offer realistic portrayals of aspects of their contemporary world and provide important information on societal attitudes. Such information, he argues, "should also be pertinent to literary evaluation of the characters in the novels as points of reference for significant aspects of the *Zeitgeist*." In "The novels and the real world," in *Erotica Antiqua: Acta of the International Conference on the Ancient Novel*, edited by B. P. Reardon (Bangor, Wales, 1971), p. 96.

[7] Henry J. Cadbury, *The Book of Acts in History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1955), p. 8.

[8] I intend to explore this further in a future article.

[9] For an introduction and survey of genre analysis and Acts see Klaus Berger, "Hellenistische Gattungen im Neuen Testament," *ANRW* 25.2 (1984), pp. 1034-1045, 1218ff.; Eckhard Plümacher, "Acta-Forschung 1974-1982," *Theologische Rundschau* 49.2 (1984), esp. pp. 138-153; Earl Richard, "Luke—Writer, Theologian, Historian: Research and Orientation of the 1970s," *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 13 (January, 1983), p. 11; Charles H. Talbert, "Shifting Sands: the Recent Study of the Gospel of Luke," *Interpretation* 30 (1976), pp. 394-395.

[10] E.g. R. Maddox, *The Purpose of Luke-Acts* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1982); Karl Ludwig Schmidt in his "Die Stellung der Evangelion in der allgemeinen Literaturgeschichte," in *Eucharisterion*, ed. by H. Schmidt, II, Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments XXXVI (1923), pp. 50-134.

"historical monograph" but felt that comparison with literary genres was "relatively unproductive."[11] One difficulty is that Acts simply does not fit neatly into any of the principal genres with which it is compared: ancient historiography,[12] the historical monograph,[13] ancient biography,[14] and the ancient romance.[15] Indeed, the most convincing argument appears to be that the author of Acts adapted or at least reflects aspects of several genres.[16]

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[11] Hans Conzelmann, *Act of the Apostles*, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), pp. xl-xli.

[12] Modern scholars into the 1950s focused for the most part on Luke as an historian; W. Ward Gasque, *A History of the Criticism of the Acts of the Apostles* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1975); E. Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles*, pp. 14-50. More recently see the article by W. C. Van Unnik, "Luke's second book and the rules of Hellenistic historiography," in *Les Actes des Apôtres*, ed. J. Kramer (1979), pp. 37-60. This group emphasizes those elements with close parallels to ancient historians, most notably Luke's use of a prologue, references to eyewitnesses, implementation of sources, references to historical figures and events, and the use of speeches, letters and summaries. As Fitzmyer has shown Luke's interest in history serves a theological end and thus places him outside the bounds of the hellenistic historian, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX*, 28: 16-17; see also the criticism by Martin Hengel, *Acts and the History of Earliest Christianity*, trans. by John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), pp. 20-21.

[13] E. Richard draws attention to important characteristics of this genre including a biographical interest, geographical dialect, multiplicity of themes, standard assortment of literary conventions, miracles and omens, and a similar ending to Acts "Luke–Writer, Theologian, Historian: Research and Orientation of the 1970s," *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 13 (January, 1983): p. 11; cf. H. Conzelmann, *Die Apostelgeschichte*, pp. 6-7; E. Plümacher, "Acta-Forschung," *TR* 49.2 (1984): esp. 150-153 (with bibliography). Martin Hengel, for example, must call Acts a "*special* [my emphasis] kind of historical monograph" that "describes the missionary development of a young religious movement" in *Acts and the History of Earliest Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), p. 36.

[14] C. H. Talbert remains the principal proponent of this position in his *What Is a Gospel?: The Genre of the Canonical Gospels* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977) and *Literary Patterns, Theological Themes and the Genre of Luke-Acts* (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1974). David Aune has offered a persuasive critique of Talbert's position in "The Problem of the Genre of the Gospels: A Critique of C. H. Talbert's *What Is a Gospel*," in *Gospel Perspectives: Studies of History and Tradition in the Four Gospels*, II, ed. R. T. France and David Wenham (Sheffield: JSOT, 1981).

[15] See most recently Richard Pervo, *Profit with Delight: the Literary Genre of the Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987). Ronald F. Hock provides a general summary of the Greek novel's importance for New Testament study in "The Greek Novel," in *Graeco-Roman Literature and the New Testament*, ed. David Aune, Society of Biblical Literature Sources for Biblical Study 21 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), pp. 127-146. For an overview and critique of recent New Testament research that draws on the ancient romance see Douglas R. Edwards, "The New Testament and the Ancient Romance: A Survey of Recent Research," *The Petronian Society Newsletter* 17.1&2 (February, 1987), pp. 9-14.

[16] A number of scholars have concluded that Acts of the Apostles represent a 'mixed genre.' David E. Aune, "The Problem of the Genre of the Gospels: A

Thus, there seems good reason for comparing Acts with texts from various genres, especially those which are roughly contemporary and within an identifiable social matrix.[17] This synchronic approach allows one to situate Acts amidst its *Zeitgeist* and less in all-too-rigid generic categories.[18] Interpreters in other fields have recognized the value of such an enterprise. Tomas Hägg, for example, notes that the less ancient romances, also a type of 'mixed' genre, are regarded

> as links in a chain of development within the hierarchy of a closed genre, the more horizontal influence and openness to contemporary society we may expect to find in them. The individual writer made his choices, deliberate or unconscious, under the influence of his social and cultural surroundings and in answer to an existing demand; the fixation of each romance in time must involve the identification of this historical context.[19]

Comparing Luke with writers such as his near-contemporary Chariton, therefore, can begin to elucidate Luke's participation in the *Zeitgeist* as well as his "social and cultural surroundings."[20]

Critique of C. H. Talbert's *What Is a Gospel,*" in *Gospel Perspectives: Studies of History and Tradition in the Four Gospels,* II, ed. R. T. France and David Wenham (Sheffield: JSOT, 1981), p. 46; Howard C. Kee, *Miracle in the Early Christian World,* pp. 190-220; Talbert considers Acts primarily a biography and notes that it can at best be described as a 'mixed' form, "a biography with motifs from the Romance." In *Literary Patterns, Theological Themes and the Genre of Luke-Acts,* p. 132. What seems clear in the on-going discussion is that no single genre will adequately explain Luke-Acts; a point that Henry J. Cadbury rightly suggested long ago in *The Making of Luke-Acts* (London: SPCK, 1968 [reprint, 1927]), pp. 127ff., especially 134-139.

[17] Such a matrix could be as specific as the city of Aphrodisias or as broad as texts written by provincial writers in the Greek East. The comparison is dependent on the nature of the question asked.

[18] No author operates in a literary and social vacuum, a fact that was apparent to Ben E. Perry. A writer's values "are mingled with those of many other intellectual and spiritual forces, and it is these in their aggregate that will determine what will be written not the mere substance of what has been written . . ." in B. E. Perry, *The Ancient Romances: A Literary-Historical Account of Their Origins,* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), p. 10. This suggests that the issue of comparing two or more texts must he placed in a broader context; that is, the relationship of a text to its literary, social, historical, and cultural environment.

[19] *Narrative Technique in Ancient Greek Romances: Studies of Chariton, Xenophon Ephesius, and Achilles Tatius* (Upsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1971), p. 335.

[20] Few New Testament interpreters have taken the religious features in Chariton's romance seriously. Pervo is an important exception, *Profit with Delight,* pp. 105-106. See also my "Chariton's *Chaereas and Callirhoe:* Religions and Politics Do Mix," *SBL 1985 Seminar Papers* 24, editor Kent H. Richards (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press), pp. 175-181. Many New Testament commentators label the function of the ancient romance as pure entertainment, failing for the most part to offer a clear definition of what entertainment meant in the first century or that one could compose a text in which one could "profit with delight" as Pervo has shown. Even Pervo acknowledges the difficulty of finding a clear definition for what was delightful or entertaining

Setting the Stage: Roman Power and the Greek East

By the second century CE, the Greek East had dealt with Roman power for at least three hundred years and with imperial power for over one hundred years. Response to Roman power had been turbulent, varied, complex, and largely dependent on an individual or group's status, local and regional history, and location within the empire.[21] The Greek East in general promoted its hellenic culture and for the most part the Romans made no attempt to undermine or replace it. Indeed, cities that were expanded or built in the Greek East during the Imperial period of Rome did so using Hellenic not Roman culture.[22] Members of the Greek East had to respond to Roman power, especially the elite or aspiring elite classes if they wished to participate in this 'web of power.'[23]

One part of the response was the use of religion. Roman attitudes toward religions were generally tolerant into the second century although Christianity as well as mystery religions had the potential for appearing subversive. Such groups, Garnsey and Saller note, "threatened to break the exclusive control of the political authorities over religious activities" and had the potential to undermine ancestral Roman religion.[24]

Religious groups that wished to attract adherents who participated in and benefitted from Rome's 'web of power' (including Roman citizens, freedmen, and even slaves)[25] had to make clear that their movement operated within the bounds of lawful society. Important also would be the antiquity of the group's traditions.[26] Either or both aspects could be used. Thus, according to Tacitus, Ephesus received approval from the Romans for its cult of Artemis to serve as a site for asylum based on ancient myths. In contrast, Aphrodisias and Stratonicea received the right of asylum for their respective cults based on decrees from Julius Caesar and Augustus praising their fidelity (*Annals* III.62-63). In addition, it helped if a movement could exhibit the universal significance of its deity if it wished to appeal to persons who cooperated with the 'web of power' (or 'from above' as Wengst has argued).[27] Allegiance to a movement or group was more forthcoming if the movement or group could display how their deity had the power or control to make sense of a 'world grown large.'

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in antiquity (ibid., p. 13). He rightly argues that pure entertainment rarely if ever existed in the ancient world (ibid., p. 103).

[21] For a superb analysis of the initial stage of this interchange see Erich S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). For the most articulate analysis to date on the redefinition of Roman power by the Greek cities of Asia Minor see S. R. F. Price, *Rituals and Power.*

[22] Peter Garnsey and Richard Saller, *The Roman Empire: Economy, Society, and Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 189.

[23] See Klaus Wengst, *Pax Romana and the Peace of Jesus Christ* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), pp. 38; 51-54.

[24] Garnsey/Saller, pp. 170-171.

[25] Ibid., pp. 118-125.

[26] See the discussion by Ramsay MacMullen, *Paganism and the Roman Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 2-4.

[27] Wengst, *Pax Romana*, p. 10.

Chariton and the Power of Aphrodite

Chariton, secretary to the rhetor Athenagoras at Aphrodisias (I.1.1), situates his story in a historical period, portrays several historical persons and events,[28] and in style and structure writes a work that appears as a history or biography of Callirhoe, the daughter of Hermocrates,[29] the leading political figure and war hero in Syracuse after the defeat of the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War (I.1.1,3).[30] The work, which centers on the travel of Callirhoe and Chaereas (her husband) begins with a description that compares Callirhoe to the goddess Aphrodite and ends with her praying at the base of Aphrodite's cult statue in Syracuse.[31] Throughout her journey Callirhoe depicts mythic and social roles of Aphrodite[32] and effectively portrays the power and presence of the goddess. Callirhoe's human appearance embodies the *kallos* of the goddess Aphrodite (I.1.2).[33]

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[28] Perry discusses the historical material in *AJP* 51 (1930), pp. 100-103, esp. f.n. 11, 105ff. and *The Ancient Romance*, pp. 137f. See also F. Zimmermann, "Chariton über die Geschichte," *Sozialökonomische Verhaltnisse im alten Orient und im klassischen Altertum, Tagung der Sektion alte Geschichte der Deutschen Historiker-Gesellschaft*, 12-17 October 1959 in Altenburg, Berlin, 1961, pp. 329-345.

[29] A recent fragment of the *Metiochus and Parthenope* romance indicates the importance of historiography for the early romances, see Herwig Maehler, "Der Metiochus-Parthenope-Roman," *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 23 (1976): pp. 1-20. For a summary of his paper see the *Proceedings for the Ancient Novel*, (1977), pp. 49-51. See also Tomas Hägg, *The Novel in Antiquity*, pp. 16-17 and Perry who remarks "What Thucydides did for the Peloponnesian War, that Chariton has done for the daughter of Hermocrates!" *The Ancient Romances*, p. 137. Perry notes the mixed nature of Chariton's composition and that his style and structure compare favorably to the contemporary biography and the historical monograph (ibid., pp. 143-148). The historical component was noted early. An anonymous editor of the first English edition labelled *Chaereas and Callirhoe* a history because it had "much the appearance of a true story . . . containing a great variety of incidents, all well prepared; and very artfully interwoven; with scarce anything improbable and improper; and the whole drawn up with a gravity of style becoming an historian," in *The Loves of Chaereas and Callirhoe* (London, 1764), cited by A. Heiserman, *The Novel Before the Novel*, p. 22, f.n. 3.

[30] This places Callirhoe in the upper strata of Syracusan society. Little is known about the real daughter of Hermocrates from the two major sources that mention a daughter of Hermocrates (Plutarch, *Dionysius* 3; Diodorus Siculus III.112). See discussion by Perry, *The Ancient Romances*, p. 353, f.n. 25 and K. Plepelits, *Chariton von Aphrodisias: Kallirhoe*.

[31] I.1.1-2; VIII.8.15-16. Accurately observed by E. H. Haight, *Essays on the Greek Romances* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1943), p. 32 and Tomas Hägg, *Narrative Techniques in Ancient Romances*, p. 216.

[32] E.g., her beauty and presence compare to that of Aphrodite Parthenos. Parthenos is an unusual epithet for Aphrodite (although see *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique* XXXII [1908], p. 500). Marcel LaPlace plausibly suggests an allusion to Athena Parthenos in "Les Légendes Troyennes dans le 'Roman' de Chariton Chairéas et Callirhoé," *REG* XCIII (January-June, 1980), pp. 124-125.

[33] Cf. Remy Petri, *Über den Roman des Chariton* Beitrage zur Klassischen

The major stops of Callirhoe's journeys seldom occur without a temple of Aphrodite and worshipers. The narrative opens with Callirhoe proceeding to the temple of Aphrodite in Syracuse during a public festival of the goddess.[34] Later, when Callirhoe is carried to the estate of the Milesian aristocrat Dionysius, the shrine of Aphrodite becomes a significant center of activity. The cult is venerated by aristocrats (Dionysius holds the goddess in special honor (II.2.5)) as well as countryfolk who recognize the importance and viability of the cult. Even Callirhoe's trip to Babylon stresses Aphrodite's power. Stateira, the queen of Babylon herself, holds the goddess in special honor (V.9.1). And Artaxerxes, the Persian king, recognizes the power of the goddess and offers sacrifices so that she might intervene on his behalf (VI.2.4). The narrative displays Aphrodite's power and presence among all social classes, especially the elite throughout the ancient Mediterranean world.

Aphrodite controls cosmic forces and political figures. Callirhoe, Aphrodite's representative, often depicts the mix of civic and religious realms. She overwhelms crowds and her *kallos* repeatedly overcomes the reason and control of political figures as she debilitates the *psyche* of Dionysius, the most powerful man in Miletus, Mithridates, the governor of Caria, and even Artaxerxes, the King of Persia himself. Callirhoe's religious and corporate significance appear in her connections to Sicily and Syracuse, Miletus, and Babylon. Aphrodite arranges both marriages of Callirhoe (II.2.8; II.3.5; V.1.1), reunites Chaereas and Callirhoe (VIII.1.3,5), and overrules the whims of Tyche (VIII.1.3).[35]

Fate or Tyche dominated much thought in the Roman world.[36] Chariton paints Tyche as both a hostile and benign force that often brought about unexpected turns of events and created sudden changes in fortune. Yet in Chariton's narrative, Tyche's actions only lead inexorably to the final chapter, the reunion of those who have been separated. Tyche serves the final aims of Aphrodite, that is to test and train (*gymnadzein*, VIII.1.3) the major protagonists Callirhoe and Chaereas until they are

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Philologie (Verlag Anon Hain. Meisenheim am Glan, 1963), pp. 11-12; Johannes Helms, *Character Portrayal in the Romance of Chariton* (The Hague, Paris, Mouton and Co., 1966), pp. 42-45, who note the close relationship between Callirhoe and the goddess Aphrodite but who downplay its importance for the narrative. Peter Walsh cites the similar role played by Psyche in Apuleius's *Metamorphoses* in *The Roman Novel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 55 fn. 2, 200. In the ancient romances, comparisons of the human protaganist (both hero and heroine) with a deity is common (E.g., Xenophon's *Ephesiaca*, I.2.6-8, I.12.1; II.2.4. Heliodorus, *Aethiopica* I.2; I.7; II.23; II.39; III.4.; X.9.)

[34] It matters little whether such a temple existed or whether such a festival actually occurred at Syracuse. Those at Aphrodisias would understand the implications of the festival. See G. Schmeling, *Chariton*, TWAS (New York, 1974), p. 83.

[35] E.g., I.1.11f; I.1.16f.; II.3.5. At Syracuse her divine appearance amazes (*thaumadzein*) the crowd and many (*polloi*) worship her (*proskunein*) (I.1.16). After Callirhoe is carried from Syracuse to the country estate of Dionysius, a Greek aristocrat in Miletus, her sudden entrance astounds (*kataplessein*) all who see her and they think they have seen a goddess since word (*logos*) had it that Aphrodite appeared (*epiphainein*) in the countryside (I.14.1). I address this in detail in chapters 2 and 3 of my dissertation; see f.n. 5.

[36] E.g. John Ferguson, *The Religions of the Roman Empire* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 81-82.

prepared to be reunited.[37] It is little wonder that the narrative concludes with Callirhoe in the temple of Aphrodite praying to Aphrodite that she never separate Callirhoe from Chaereas again (VIII.8.16). Callirhoe (and by this time the reader/hearer) knows where the power resides.

Chariton makes clear the antiquity of the cult of Aphrodite as the major characters visit ancient cult centers of Aphrodite, one at the island of Aradus (VII.5.1) and the other at Paphos in Cyprus, renowned in antiquity as the birthplace of Aphrodite (VIII.2.8). Temples of Aphrodite become the places where prayers are offered (and later answered), the antiquity of the cult is highlighted, and the cult is apparent across the *oikumene*. Callirhoe's journeys display for the reader the antiquity of the cult of Aphrodite and the goddess' influence across the ancient world.

Thus, the journey of the heroine displays for the reader the power of Aphrodite through the *kallos* of Callirhoe, Aphrodite's personal intervention in reuniting the separated hero and heroine, and repeated emphasis on the location of Aphrodite's cult sites throughout the Mediterranean world. Chariton's Aphrodite affects all levels of society, alters individual lives, participates in the political and social fabric of society, and has a cult that is ancient and widespread. At least one consequence of travel in Chariton's work is that it highlights for his readership the universal scope and antiquity of the cult of Aphrodite, and depicts Aphrodite's influence over significant aspects of ancient society.

The Audience of Chariton

One can agree, in part, with B. P. Reardon that the ancient romances address the isolated person who searches for meaning in a world grown large.[38] But this is not the total picture. Chariton affirms and confirms the power and significance of Aphrodite over all aspects of the world order especially the machinations of fate and social upheaval (represented by pirates, wayward politicians, disruption of proper marriage, separation from family, friends, country, and spouse). Even the mightiest are susceptible to her power. This is important for a Greek city that understands the power of Rome through the lens of Greek tradition and pride.[39] Indeed, the setting of Chariton's romance, the period following the Peloponnesian War, belongs

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[37] See discussion by B. Reardon, "The Greek Novel," pp. 293ff., 297 f.n. 16 and 17. H. Koester mistakenly draws the conclusion that Tyche rejoins the lovers and thus provides the resolution in Chariton's text. He fails to consider the final act in VIII.1.3 in *Introduction to the New Testament: History, Culture, and Religion of the Hellenistic Age*, vol. 1; *History and Literature of Early Christianity*, vol. 2, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), p. 138. G. Anderson (*Ancient Fiction: The Novel in the Graeco-Roman World* [New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1984], p. 2) correctly observes that it is a common feature in the ancient romances to show divine intervention prevailing over Fate. See also T. Hägg, *The Novel in Antiquity*, p. 13; J. Helms, *Character Portrayal in the Romance of Chariton*, p. 120.

[38] "Aspects of the Greek Novel," *Greece and Rome* 23 (1976), pp. 118-131; "The Greek Novel," *Phoenix* 23 (1969), pp. 291-309.

[39] The Sebasteion or Imperial cult complex at Aphrodisias is dedicated first to Aphrodite, then to the emperors, and then to the city. Joyce Reynolds, *AJA* 85 (1981), p. 472. Note also that in the Sebasteion Roman power is portrayed in Greek guise. See R. Smith, "The Imperial Reliefs from the Sebasteion at Aphrodisias," *JRS* 77 (1987), pp. 88-138.

to the classical period of literary and political fame for the Greeks. As E. L. Bowie has shown, Greeks during the imperial period often portray the "classical" period in heroic terms as a means to interpret their present diminished situation amidst the grandeur of their past.[40]

To whom would Chariton's text appeal? On one hand Aphrodisians, who looked with pride at their cult of Aphrodite as the one that created and sustained their present prosperity; even the emperors acknowledge, they would argue, the power and significance of Aphrodite. In short, those very elites who were on the periphery of Roman power gained local prestige and civic power by their association with Rome and their promotion of Aphrodite as the deity whose power encompasses even the Roman empire.[41] Chariton's work would also appeal to those outside of Aphrodisias proper who acknowledge the universal power of Aphrodite, esp. soldiers and merchants.[42] Each group was well-disposed toward a deity such as

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[40] E. L. Bowie, "Greeks and Their Past in the Second Sophistic," *Studies in Ancient Society* (Past and Present Series; ed. M. I. Finley; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 166-209.

[41] Both sides benefited from the political, economic, and religious relationship established between Rome and Greek cities in western Asia Minor. Here again see the excellent study by Simon Price, *Rituals and Power*, esp. chapter one. Many individuals during the early Imperial period did not feel "adrift in a world they could not comprehend or control" (p. 15). Greek cities in Asia Minor provided an important locus of political, social, and religious identity for their inhabitants and many like Aphrodisias sought to interpret Roman power in the context of their own systems of meaning, especially through their religion. Robert Fleischer, for example, observes that the statue of Aphrodite at Aphrodisias is similar to Artemis of Ephesus statue in that the decoration and zones depict the universal and cosmic power of the goddess over nature, heavens, earth and water; a conception he notes is late hellenistic/early Roman, in *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae* II. 1 (Zurich und München: Artemis Verlag, 1984), pp. 153-54. See also the discussion by G. Karl Galinsky, *Aeneas, Sicily, and Rome* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), esp. 216ff.

[42] F. Sokolowski documents the significant role that Aphrodite played for these groups in "Aphrodite as Guardian of Greek Magistrates," *Harvard Theological Review* 57.1 (January, 1964): 1-8; cf. F. Croissant and F. Salviat, "Aphrodite gardienne der magistrats," *BCH* 90 (1966): 460-471. Sokolowski cites a number of votive inscriptions from magistrates in Greek cities that stress Aphrodite as a "patroness of friendship and of harmony" (op. cit.: p. 1). He notes Aphrodite's close association with police officials, supervisors, naval commanders, and those involved with penal facilities who "paid most frequently their tribute to Aphrodite because of friendly relations existing among themselves or between them and the people" (ibid., p. 2). Sokolowski mentions that magistrates often dedicated to Aphrodite at the end of their military or civic service. "The agoranomoi and army men usually left their inscriptions upon quitting their posts and reaching the end of their work" (ibid., p. 6). An example of this in *Chaereas and Callirhoe* occurs when Chaereas offers sacrifices to Aphrodite at the end of his military ventures and before his return to Syracuse (VIII.2.8). In certain literary circles (e.g. Empedocles and Lucretius) "Aphrodite was Love uniting and bringing together opposite forces in nature and in human beings, an omnipotent and creative power which engendered concord,

Chariton's Aphrodite who controls cosmic forces and political rulers, had a universal presence throughout the *oikumene*, and provided a mmeans with which to participate within the 'web of power' of the Roman world with a modicum of power.

Luke and the Christian God

Travel forms a constituent part of the structure of Luke-Acts as it does for most ancient romances. The structure of Acts, which begins at Jerusalem and ends at Rome, emphasizes the universal scope and the power of Luke's God who creates and rules over all aspects of society.[43] Travel becomes the vehicle that permits the major characters to refer repeatedly to Jewish scriptures and themes, highlighting the Jewish character of the movement. Speeches by Peter, James, Stephen, and Paul make a direct link with Christ and the covenant begun with Abraham and continued through Moses. The constant retelling of the Jesus story in light of Old Testament prophets and scriptures[44] situates the Christian movement amidst the ancient and venerable Jewish tradition, a tradition widely recognized throughout the Roman empire.[45] In addition, the repeated mention of synagogues throughout the journeys of the major characters stress the spread of the Jewish faith throughout the *oikumene* and effectively associates the Christian movement with an acknowledged ancient religion.

Power terminology permeates Luke's narrative.[46] Jesus in Luke 24:48-49 clarifies the nature and result of the movement's power: "you will receive power [*dynamis*] when the Holy Spirit comes upon you; and you will bear witness for me in Jerusalem, and all over Judea and Samaria, and away to the ends of the earth." Luke depicts the Christian movement as squarely in the Mosaic and prophetic tradition; the apostles and disciples are agents of God. The disciples perform signs and wonders so that the "sense of awe was everywhere" (Acts 2:43); indeed, "the Lord added to their number those whom he was saving" (Acts 2:47).[47] The miracles at the hands of apostles cause amazement and wonderment (*thaumbos/ekstasis*) (Acts 3:10); in addition, the apostles' words influence many to join the movement (Acts 4:4).[48] Thus, Philip, also one of the seven, drew crowds who "listened eagerly" to him, "when they heard him and saw the miracles that he performed" (Acts 8:6). Philip, like the prophets, has the power of speech and ability to perform miraculous acts.[49]

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harmony and peace throughout the world" (ibid., p. 7). Even Aelius Aristides while discussing Roman rule praises "Aphrodite as a cause of ecumenical peace" (ibid., p. 8).

[43] Hans Conzelmann, *The Theology of St. Luke*, translated by G. Buswell (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), pp. 18-94.

[44] See the recent article by C. H. Talbert, "Promise and Fulfillment in Lucan Theology," in *Luke-Acts: New Perspectives from the Society of Biblical Literature Seminar*, edited by Charles H. Talbert (New York: Crossroad, 1984), pp. 91-103.

[45] P. Esler, *Community and Gospel*, pp. 215-219.

[46] E.g. the liberal use of the term *dynamis* at significant junctures of the narrative in Luke-Acts.

[47] Signs and wonders highlight God's intervention in the affairs of the people Israel; e.g., Deut. 13:2,3; 28:46; 29:2; 34:11; cf. Nehemiah 9:10; Wisdom of Solomon 8:8; 10:16; Isaiah 20:3; Jeremiah 39:20,21; Daniel 6:28.

[48] Cf. Acts 2:19, 22, 43; 4:30; 5:12; 6:8; 7:36; 14:3; 15:12.

[49] Cf. Acts 4:1-4, 29-31; 8:1-3, 14; 9:31; 11:19; 12:18-24; 13:4-12; 45-51; 14:4-7; 17:5-13; 20:19-20.

The movement of the disciples brings them into contact with significant political officials[50] and crowds; conflict and intrigue raise the dramatic scale of the narrative.[51]

Luke portrays the foreknowledge of God who employs human agents to accomplish his designs. Luke's narrative has the divine plan revealed to the participants.[52] Luke uses a preponderance of *pro* prefixes on verbs which indicates God's preordained work in the lives of those involved.[53] Luke's constant use of *dei* becomes the author's way of stressing God's ever active role and functions much as the Greek notion of *pronoia*.[54] Peter's inaugural speech is replete with allusions to God standing behind the action of the narrative. Jesus' signs and wonders were done at the behest of God (Acts 2:22) and even Jesus' death was according to the plan and foreknowledge of God (Acts 2:23). God has sworn to David that one of his descendants should be put on his throne (2:29). God has foretold all these events through the prophets (Acts 3:15ff.), has raised Jesus from the dead (4:10), and created the universe—"Sovereign Lord, who made the heaven and the earth and the sea and everything in them . . ." (Acts 4:24). Herod, Pontius Pilate, the Gentiles, and even the people of Israel did whatever God had predestined to take place (Acts 4:28). Paul also argues that God's power extends over the cosmos and history before the people of Lystra:

> Men, why are you doing this? We also are men, of like nature with you, and bring you good news, that you should turn from these vain things to a living God who made the heaven and the earth and the sea and all that is in them. In past generations he allowed all the nations to walk in their own ways; yet he did not leave himself without witness, for he did good

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[50] E.g. the Ethiopian eunuch, an official of the Queen (Acts 8:27), Dionysius a member of the court on the Areopagus (Acts 17:34), Festus and Herod Agrippa II.

[51] H. Cadbury, *The Making of Luke-Acts*, pp. 311ff. Opposition and intrigue also cause the movement of Callirhoe. Indeed, Arthur Heisermann argues that intrigue is the primary plot device in Chariton's work, *The Novel before the Novel: Essays and Discussions of Prose Fiction in the West* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 78ff.

[52] David L. Tiede, *Prophecy and History in Luke-Acts* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), p. 32f. Tiede concludes: "Perhaps no New Testament author is more concerned than Luke to testify to the accomplishment of the will of God in history or so caught up in the language of the divine plan and predetermined intention, purpose, and necessity. Compare the similar conclusion with qualifications of Earl Richard, "The Divine Purpose: The Jews and the Gentile Mission (Acts 15)," in *Luke-Acts: New Perspectives from the Society of Biblical Literature Seminar*, edited by Charles H. Talbert (New York: Crossroad, 1984), pp. 192f.

[53] Most appropriate are the following examples: Acts 3^{20}; 22^{14}; 26^{16} (*procheiridzein*); Acts 10^{41} (*procheirpotonein*); Acts 4^{28} (*prooridzein*). I would like to thank Howard Kee for first drawing my attention to this feature.

[54] Luke 2:49; 4:23; 9:22; 12:12; 13:14, 16, 33; 15:32; 17:25; 18:1; 19:5; 21:9; 22:7, 37; 24:7, 26, 44; Acts 1:16, 21; 3:21; 4:12; 5:29; 9:6, 16; 14:22; 15:5; 16:30; 19:21; 19:36; 20:35; 23:11; 24:19; 25:10; 27:24. F. Danker has rightly observed that *dei* operates in the same manner as *pronoia*, "The Endangered Benefactor in Luke-Acts," *SBL Seminar Papers* 20 edited by Kent H. Richards (Scholars Press, 1981), pp. 46-47. Indeed, Callirhoe ends Chariton's work with a prayer to Aphrodite that states that all her toils were necessary (VIII.8.16).

> and gave you from heaven rains and fruitful seasons, satisfying your hearts with good and gladness (Acts 14:15-18).

The movement redefines the nature of power. God, Luke makes clear, stands behind all the forces, actions, and creation of this world, placing God under the same universal rubric extended to such deities as Isis, Artemis of Ephesus and, as we have noted, Aphrodite of Aphrodisias.

Luke and Chariton show the major deity to have the power to deal with a large, diverse, and sometimes hostile world, a world graphically portrayed in the wanderings throughout the Mediterranean basin. The deities stand behind the action in the narrative and maintain ultimate control over circumstances brought on by the whims of Fate, pirates, opposition and persecution, and even nature (especially apparent in the sea voyages). The major deity in both works affect crowds and political figures throughout the *oikumene* who come in contact with their representatives: Callirhoe's through her *kallos* and *peitho;* the disciples' through their signs and wonders and speech of the disciples.

The Audience of Luke

Luke sought to show the importance of his movement within the political and socal fabric of society. Unlike Chariton, however, who wrote from a city in the Greek East with clear legitimate ties to Rome, Luke had to argue that Christianity offered no immediate threat to the political and social fabric of Roman society. Thus, at the end of Luke's gospel, a Roman procurator, a Jewish king, a thief, and a centurion, persons intimately connected with Roman justice and capable of determining the guilt or innocence of an individual, in rapid succession absolve Jesus of complicity in any illegal or subversive activities. Luke argues instead that it is the Jewish leadership who circumvent the proper judicial channels and Roman authority. Pilate "released the man who had been thrown into prison for insurrection and murder, whom they asked for; but Jesus he delivered up to their will" (Luke 23:25).[55] The onus for Jesus' death falls on certain misguided Jews, not subversive activity on the part of Jesus.[56]

In a series of confrontations with Jews and Greeks, Paul reiterates the Christian movement's non-subversive activities. A tribune rescues Paul from a mob in

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[55] See F. Danker, *Jesus and the New Age,* p. 235. P. Walaskay observes that the identity of the soldiers that mocked Jesus is unclear but clearly the chief priests and rulers are implicated. Luke, he argues, wanted Pilate and Rome declared innocent of Jesus' blood. Herod bears the responsibility for Jesus' torture, the Jewish leaders his death. Herod as a half-Jewish vassal of Rome stands as link between empire and Sanhedrin (*'And so we came to Rome': The Political Perspective of St. Luke* (SNTS Monograph Series 49; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 45f.). Walaskay, however, does not address sufficiently the fact that Pilate and Herod become close associates from that day forward (Luke 23:12). Indeed, Herod wants to kill Jesus (Luke 13:31-33). In Acts, Herod Agrippa I continues the Herodian persecution and lays hands on members of the church; he kills James, brother of John, and arrests Peter (Acts 12:1).

[56] Cf. Jerusalem destruction (Luke 19:41): "Would that today you knew the things that make for peace." This implies that Jews did not have social and political responsibility.

Jerusalem (Acts 21:30ff.). When Paul speaks in Greek, the tribune thinks he may be the Egyptian who stirred up a revolt and led 4,000 assassins to the wilderness (Acts 21:38). He takes Paul back to the barracks (Acts 22:24f.) in order to scourge him but stops when he finds that Paul is a Roman citizen. Paul's social status, according to the tribune, is impressive because Paul was born a citizen whereas the tribune bought his citizenship for a large sum. Indeed, the tribune expresses fear because he has bound a Roman citizen (Acts 22:25-29). The tribune attempts to present Paul to the judicial branch of the Jews, the Sanhedrin, but once again the Jewish leadership circumvents Roman order and justice. The tribune, fearing violence, has to take Paul by force from the Jewish council and return him to the barracks (Acts 23:2-10). In this scene, Luke contrasts the subversive activities of the Jews and the revolutionary acts of the Egyptian with the 'model' citizen Paul. The readership knows the truth: Paul has done nothing to warrant the charges against him (cf. Acts 23:29-30).

Paul's hearing before Felix provides an additional opportunity for the Jewish leadership to charge sedition and for Roman officials to find nothing wrong (Acts 24:1-27). The innocence of Paul (and by implication the Christian movement) finds explicit support in Paul's trial before Festus (Acts 25:1-26:30). Paul argues that he has offended neither law, temple, or Caesar (25:8). Paul's appeal to Caesar (25:11) circumvents a trial by Jewish law and closes the trial by Festus. Festus finds no serious charges against Paul and concludes that the Jews have "certain points of dispute with him about their own superstition and about one Jesus, who was dead, but whom Paul asserted to be alive" (Acts 25:19). Agrippa II and Bernice, tribunes, and "prominent men of the city" (Caesarea) (Acts 25:23-24) hear Paul and affirm his lack of subversive action.[57] From Acts 21:27 through 26:32, Luke charts how the theological points of contention between Jews and Christians have no meaning for the Roman authorities; indeed, they can find nothing subversive about the Christian movement.[58] The Jewish accusations that Jesus, Paul, and, by implication, the Christian movement disrupt the social order, pervert Roman law, and threaten Rome's political authority have no foundation.

Yet this is not an apologetic on behalf of the Christian movement to Roman officials.[59] Features such as the kingly titles given to Jesus at birth would hardly appeal to a Roman official; the Christian church, however, would easily make the connection of the titles against the backdrop of the political and social order.

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[57] Cf. Gallio who hears the Jewish attack on Paul but refuses to make a judgment because it is an internal matter (Acts 18:12-17). Festus declares Paul innocent (Acts 25:18; 25:25; 26:31), Agrippa II declares Paul innocent and Paul recalls that no guilt was found (Acts 28:18).

[58] E. Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles*, pp. 692-693. Haenchen argues that Luke writes an apologetic but does not mediate between Jewish Christians, Jews, and gentile Christians. In addition, Haenchen correctly disagrees with Dibelius who believes that Luke writes to help Christians during his lifetime defend themselves before Roman officials. "Luke sees his task not in equipping the Church for martyrdom immediately before the end, but in securing for it the possibility of life within the Roman Empire." Paul as an upright Roman citizen offers the model for the Christian community (ibid., p. 693). Indeed, Luke's message, according to Haenchen, attracts or challenges Roman officials (e.g., proconsul Sergius Paulus is impressed with the message and power of Paul and Barnabus [Acts 13:7-12]).

[59] Contra Conzelmann, *The Theology of St. Luke*, pp. 138-149.

Further, Luke's directive that church members pay their taxes would have little significance to a Roman official who would assume that one did not do otherwise.[60] Nor does Luke show the unity of Christianity and Judaism and the universal significance of the movement in order to plug Christianity into a legally recognized religion for the sake of Roman officials.[61] Esler is correct that Roman officials may have been part of Luke's audience[62] but Luke does not attempt to paint a completely rosy picture of Roman rule.

Several negative images of Greek and Roman political structures suggest a different agenda. Pilate, for example, spills blood of Galileans implying that governmental authority as vested in Pilate is harsh and violent (Luke 13:1-4). In addition, at Jesus' trial Pilate falls victim to the machinations of the Jewish leadership, not the picture of the strong representative of the Roman empire that one might expect if Luke wrote an apology to Roman officials. Indeed, Luke makes clear that Pilate, Herod, the people of Israel, and the Gentiles all conspired against Jesus and played an active role in his death (Acts 4:27). The Roman system has its limits.[63]

Luke may blunt criticism against the imperial government, and in the sense that he desires that the Christian community "live effectively within the social, political, and religious realities of the present situation until the advent of God's reign," and in a certain sense he writes an "*apologia pro imperio.*"[64] Yet consistently inept or corrupt Roman officials who are at best misguided by the influence of the Jewish elite hardly seems a portrait designed to elicit total confidence in Roman justice.

Rather, Luke's audience no doubt benefits from the Roman 'web of power' (including perhaps Roman citizens); nevertheless, they experience themselves on the margin of Roman social and political power. Marginal persons or groups, according to Hans Mol, stand on the boundaries of one or more larger groups in society, "neither completely belonging nor suffering outright rejection."[65] Even centurions who experienced a good deal of power in the Roman 'web of power' would be on the margin of certain aspects of Roman society and power and often sought additional security and power in foreign cults.[66]

Why would those whose livelihood depends on the social and political stability of Roman society be drawn to the Christian movement? Wayne Meeks has rightly

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[60] See the useful discussion by Walaskay, *'And so we came to Rome,'* pp. 35ff.

[61] W. G. Kümmel, *Introduction to the New Testament, translated by H. C. Kee* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1973), p. 163. The audience, according to Kümmel, was not the general reading public but rather individual Gentile readers.

[62] Esler, *Community and Gospel,* pp. 217-219.

[63] Other examples display the tension between governmental act and Christian mission. Luke contrasts kings and benefactors with the way the community of God should function (Luke 22:24-27). See F. Danker, *Jesus and the New Age,* p. 222; cf. Felix who is alarmed by Paul's stress on justice, self-control, and future judgment, perhaps because it contrasts with Felix's own pattern of behavior. Felix keeps Paul in jail, hoping for a bribe and seeking to please the Jews and as Cassidy has recently noted Paul remains in chains for four years. In *Society and Politics in the Acts of the Apostles* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1987).

[64] Walaskay, op. cit., p. 67.

[65] *Identity and the Sacred* (Free Press, Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 31f.

[66] Witness for example the popularity of the Mithras cult among soldiers or as we argued earlier, the popularity of the Aphrodite cult.

argued that in Acts we find "gentiles whose adherence to the synagogue testifies to some kind of dissonance in their relation to their society."[67] Acts reflects persons who rank high in one area but low in others. Persons may be upwardly mobile but their achieved status appears higher than the status Roman society is willing to grant.[68] In part Luke addresses a non-Christian audience that stands on the fringe of Roman power but whose livelihood continues because of the political and social stability of Rome, that is, persons who could identify with Cornelius the centurion, Lydia the maker of purple dyes, Levi the tax collector, or those wealthy enough to own homes (Jason of Thessalonica; Mnason of Cyprus; Simon the tanner). Even though this diverse group remains on the fringe of social, religious, and political structures of power, they would not seek the violent overthrow of the government. Rather as marginal persons in society they sought to acquire power and a sense of control. Luke presents, in appealing fashion, an ancient, universally significant, and morally upright religion, a movement that promises future power as well as present stability. Luke's narrative would also encourage members within the Christian community. The story of Jesus and the expansion of the church promote a sense of identity, common purpose, and participation in the salvific purposes of God.

Luke addresses readers who seek individual and corporate identity within the context of the Roman empire. The empire, Luke acknowledges to these readers, provides a certain security, a system of justice, and an organization that allows the expansion of the movement and the prosperity of its membership. The Roman empire, however, performs its actions under the guidance of God.

Conclusion

Luke's use of travel in Acts highlights for his audience that the nascent Christian movement had ancient roots, the Christian God's power as exhibited by special representatives extended across the *oikumene,* the Christian God could control historical and political events, and Christian members and representatives operated within the lawful aegis of the Roman empire. This conveyed two messages to Luke's audience. On one hand it showed that the Christian movement participated in a cooperative manner from its inception with the 'web of power' established by the Roman government. Members should feel no incumbrances to practice their faith as well as their trades, occupations, and civil responsibilities while under Roman rule. On the other hand, it redefined the nature of the 'web of power'; those members who might operate on the fringe or margin of Roman rule or power became full participants in a new order with significant future possibilities. Luke acknowledges the power of Rome and its representatives but redefines that power under the rubric of God's all-encompassing rule and plan.

Luke was not alone in addressing the 'web of power' that bound the Roman empire. Provincial writers from the Greek East such as Chariton also sought to define their respective movements or groups within the 'web of power' of the first and second centuries. Chariton, like Luke, used travel by the major characters to demonstrate the antiquity of the cult of Aphrodite, the power of Aphrodite as

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[67] W. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians,* p. 73. As I suggest earlier, even wealthy members of Greek city-states such as Aphrodisias that have close ties to the Roman empire can have experience dissonance.

[68] Ibid., p. 73.

exhibited by special representatives across the *oikumene*, the power of Aphrodite over cosmic and political forces, and the importance of law and political authority. For an author whose hometown is Aphrodisias this is no accident. The city became prosperous in the first and second centuries in large measure because of its effective promotion of the Aphrodite cult and its close ties with the Roman emperors.

Both Luke and Chariton communicate to audiences in the Greek East that power represented in political figures or historical events operates under the aegis of their group's deity—reassuring news to marginal persons who sought to operate within a 'web of power' that bound local groups in the Greek East to an outside power, Imperial Rome.

Luke's Unique Interest in Historical Chronology

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Luke's interest in historical chronology has not gone unnoticed by NT scholars. Maurice Goguel comments: "The only direct indication which we possess concerning the chronology of the Gospel narrative occurs at the beginning of the Third Gospel."[1] I. Howard Marshall says: "On the broader scale Luke is interested in chronology. He alone sets the ministry of Jesus in the broad context of Roman and Jewish history."[2] Harold W. Hoehner remarks: "Certainly Luke was conscious of chronology in his works."[3] Henry J. Cadbury observes: "In matters of chronology . . . there would be available no public library, nor even a small collection of handbooks. Luke's immediate sources would be his main authority."[4] And George B. Caird concludes: "Among the NT writers only Luke had any interest in relating Christian history to world history."[5] Both in his gospel and in Acts Luke reveals a concern for chronology unmatched by any other NT writer.

This paper has two parts. In the first, those features in Luke's gospel which enable us to arrive at a chronologically accurate account of Jesus' birth, ministry, and death are analyzed. The second part presents the evidence in Acts which allows us to date, with some precision, the spread of Christianity from the death of Jesus to Paul's arrival in Rome.

The Gospel According to Luke

In the section on the birth of Jesus both the death of Herod (1:5) and the census of Quirinius (2:2) are examined. Among the features discussed under the ministry of Jesus are John the Baptist (3:1-2), the age of Jesus (3:23), and the duration of his ministry (4:19). The Last Supper as Passover meal (22:14ff.) is considered in the section on the death of Jesus.

I. The Birth of Jesus

A. The Death of Herod

In 1:5 the annunciation of the birth of John the Baptist came to Zechariah "in the days of Herod, king of Judea,"[6] followed, in the sixth month of Elizabeth's

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[1] *The Life of Jesus* (New York: Harper, 1960) 223.
[2] *Luke: Historian and Theologian* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1970) 65.
[3] *Chronological Aspects of the Life of Christ* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1977) 19.
[4] *The Making of Luke-Acts* (London: SPCK, 1958) 327.
[5] "The Chronology of the NT," *IDB* A-D (1962) 599.
[6] All biblical quotations are from the *RSV*.

pregnancy, by the annunciation to Mary of the birth of Jesus. Similarly, in Matt 2:1 Jesus was born "in the days of Herod the king," and the stories of the wise men and the flight into Egypt seem to indicate that Jesus was at least two years old at the time of Herod's death.

Herod died in the thirty-seventh year after being made king and in the thirty-fourth year after gaining possession of his territory. His death was immediately preceded by an eclipse of the moon which was visible in Palestine on March 12, 4 B.C.E. Also, Passover, which began on April 11 that year, was celebrated shortly after Herod's death.[7] Since the thirty-fourth year of his reign would have begun on Nisan 1 (or March 29), 4 B.C.E., Herod's death occurred sometime between March 29 and April 11, 4 B.C.E.—an event Luke understood as the *terminus ad quem* for the birth of Jesus.

B. The Census of Quirinius

According to 2:2 the birth of Jesus took place "when Quirinius was governor of Syria." Was Luke confused? Roman records reveal no general census at that time, and the Syrian governors during Herod's last years were C. Sentius Saturninus (9-6 B.C.E.) and P. Quintilius Varus (6-4 B.C.E.). P. Sulpicius Quirinius *did* conduct a census when he was governor of Syria, but the years were 6-7 C.E. On the other hand, perhaps Luke knew whereof he spoke. His reference in Acts 5:37 to the activity of Judas the Galilean "in the days of the census" seems to indicate that Luke not only knew about the census of 6-7 C.E., but intended to distinguish it from the nativity census. In 2:1 the decree of Augustus initiated a system of periodic enrollment in the Empire, not a one-time world-wide census, and the first enrollment in this system occurred in Palestine when Quirinius was the Syrian governor.[8]

Luke's nativity story is supported by what we know of the Roman census system. Clement of Alexandria, apparently familiar with a long-standing system of census-taking outside of Egypt, tells us[9] that Jesus was born "when they first began to make enrollments." Based on a tradition independent of Luke, Tertullian[10] locates the nativity census in the governorship of Saturninus (9-6 B.C.E.). Egyptian records reveal a census inaugurated by Augustus in 9 B.C.E. and held every fourteen years with all persons required to return home for taxation assessment the following year. The decree of Augustus mentioned in 2:1 must have had some connection with the census of Roman citizens held by Augustus in 8 B.C.E. after Herod had fallen into disfavor with the Emperor. On the basis of inscriptional evidence, it can be argued that Quirinius was governor of Syria *twice*, once ca. 6-7 C.E. and also a decade earlier during the latter years of Herod's reign.[11]

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[7] Josephus, *Ant.* xvii. 8. 1; 6. 4; 9. 3; see further Caird, "Chronology of the NT," 599f.; Hoehner, *Chronological Aspects*, 13; and J. Finegan, *Handbook of Biblical Chronology* (Princeton: University Press, 1964) 132-4.

[8] A. N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Society and Roman Law in the NT* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1978) 168.

[9] *Strom.* i. 21.

[10] *Marcion* iv. 19.

[11] See G. B. Duncan, "Chronology," *The Interpreter's One-Volume Commentary on the Bible* (1971) 1281; F. F. Bruce, *NT History* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1971) 32 n. 1; and, generally, Hoehner, *Chronological Aspects*, 13ff.; and Caird, "Chronology of the NT," 600f.

When all the evidence is considered, the birth of Jesus probably occurred in 7 B.C.E., give or take a year, with the census of Quirinius serving as Luke's *terminus a quo* for that birth.

II. The Ministry of Jesus

A. John the Baptist

Luke begins his account of the ministry of John the Baptist as follows: "In the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Caesar, Pontius Pilate being governor of Judea, and Herod being tetrarch of Galilee, and his brother Philip tetrarch of the region of Ituraea and Trachonitis, and Lysanias tetrarch of Abilene, in the high-priesthood of Annas and Caiaphas, the word of God came to John the son of Zechariah in the wilderness" (3:1-2). Since one would expect, from any writer, occasional references to contemporary rulers, Luke's mention elsewhere of Herod, Augustus, Quirinius, and Claudius indicates only that his story, at some points, makes contact with Gentile history. But identifying the exact imperial year along with naming the local rulers and religious leaders indicate that Luke intended a more formal dating here.

Official Egyptian documents were regularly dated by using the year of the Ptolemy or Emperor and the month and day of the local calendar. There are also parallels in Josephus. But the most remarkable parallel to 3:1-2 is the famous synchronism by which Thucydides dates the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (ii. 2). Then Luke combines this secular form with the OT formula "the word of the Lord came to _____ son of _____" which dates the call of several prophets, including Jeremiah (1:2-3).[12]

Five of the six references in 3:1-2 are chronological notes of secular history: Pilate was procurator from 26 to 36 C.E., Herod Antipas was deposed in 39 C.E., Philip died in 34 C.E., Lysanias cannot be dated, and Caiaphas was high priest from 18 to 36 C.E. The sixth reference, namely, "the fifteenth year of Tiberius," while providing a precise date, can be interpreted in at least two different ways. On the one hand, Augustus died on August 19, 14 C.E. and by the normal Roman method of reckoning, the "fifteenth year of Tiberius" would extend from August 19, 28 C.E. to August 18, 29 C.E. This interpretation, however, puts the baptism of Jesus rather late. On the other hand, it is probable that Luke used the Jewish system for dating the reigns of foreign kings. Accordingly, the first year of Tiberius would have extended from August 19, 14 C.E. to Tishri 1, 14 C.E., and his fifteenth year from Tishri 1, 27 C.E. to Tishri 1, 28 C.E., or from September 21, 27 C.E. to October 8, 28 C.E.[13] John the Baptist's ministry began sometime during this period, and that of Jesus shortly thereafter.

B. The Age of Jesus

Luke tells us in 3:23 that when Jesus began his ministry "he was about thirty years of age." Since Luke claims to know the dates for the birth of Jesus and the beginning of the Baptist's ministry, surely he could determine the interval between them. If

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[12] Cadbury, *Making of Luke-Acts*, 206ff.

[13] C. Cichorius, "Chronologisches zum Leben Jesu," *ZNW* 22 (1923) 17-9; see G. Bornkamm, *Jesus of Nazareth* (New York: Harper, 1960) 45; Hoehner, *Chronological Aspects*, 29ff.; Caird, "Chronology of the NT," 601; and J. Jeremias, *The Eucharistic Words of Jesus* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977) 39 n. 1.

Jesus was born in 7 B.C.E., give or take a year, he would have been thirty years old sometime between 23 and 25 C.E. But even the latest date, 25 C.E., would have Jesus beginning his ministry sometime *before* Pilate became procurator of Judea.

Perhaps "about thirty years of age" should be regarded as an elastic expression. In the ancient world it was difficult to calculate a person's age exactly. Even obituary notices were given in round numbers. If Jesus began his ministry shortly after John's in late 27 or early 28 C.E., he would have been thirty-two, thirty-three, or thirty-four years of age. According to Num 4:3 and 47 one had to be at least thirty years old to exercise priestly functions, and members of the Qumran community were required to be over thirty to be eligible for positions of leadership. Considered in this light, perhaps Luke meant by "about thirty years of age" nothing more than that Jesus, when he began his ministry, had reached the age of maturity.[14]

C. The Building of the Temple

There is a passage in the Fourth Gospel which sheds some light on conclusions reached in our study of Luke's chronology. The Fourth Evangelist places his account of the cleansing of the temple early in Jesus' ministry and associates it with a Passover. When the Jews ask Jesus for a sign of his authority to do such a thing, he answers: "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up," to which they reply: "It has taken forty-six years to build this temple, and will you raise it up in three days?" (2:19-20). We will not concern ourselves here with the question of whether the Fourth Gospel's outline is basically theological or historical. But if the Fourth Evangelist did not find the figure "forty-six" in the tradition, he must have arrived at it independently and had every reason to believe it was accurate.

According to Josephus Herod began to rebuild the temple in his eighteenth year (20-19 B.C.E.) and it was not completed until the procuratorship of Albinus (62-64 C.E.).[15] Hence, the proper meaning of the saying is not "It *has taken* forty-six years to build this temple," but "for forty-six years this temple *has been under construction.*" The Fourth Evangelist's figure of "forty-six" must refer to this project. Since Herod, in the early part of his eighteenth year, was occupied with a visit by Augustus to Syria, the rebuilding program probably did not begin until at least the fall of 20 B.C.E. This would make the Passover, at which it could be said that the temple had been forty-six years under construction, the Passover of 28 C.E.[16] This date harmonizes both with our interpretation of "the fifteenth year of Tiberius," i.e., September 21, 27 C.E. to October 8, 28 C.E. and the beginning of Jesus' ministry in late 27 or early 28 C.E.

D. The Duration of the Ministry

On the assumption that "the acceptable year of the Lord," quoted by Jesus from Isa 61:2 in the Nazareth synagogue (4:19), described literally his entire ministry,

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[14] On this topic, see G. Ogg, "Chronology of the NT," *PCB* (1962) 728; Finegan, *Handbook of Biblical Chronology,* 248; Caird, "Chronology of the NT," 601; and Hoehner, *Chronological Aspects,* 24f.

[15] *Ant.* xv. 11. 1.

[16] Caird, "Chronology of the NT," 601; see also Hoehner, *Chronological Aspects,* 100ff.; and J. Blinzler, *The Trial of Jesus* (2nd ed.; Westminster, MD: Newman, 1959) 74.

Origen[17] and Clement of Alexandria[18] argued for a duration of only one year.[19] As was the case in the preceding section, we must turn to other gospels to test conclusions drawn from Luke's chronological data. A case can be made from the Gospel of Mark for a one-year ministry: plucking grain on the Sabbath (2:23) in early summer, feeding the five-thousand when the grass is green (6:39) in early spring, and the crucifixion (14:1) in the Passover season. This theory is unlikely, however, due to the difficulty of compressing a ministry of one year between 2:23 and 14:1. If Jesus' ministry lasted more than one year, how long was it? Matt and Luke do not help us here directly, and Mark's three seasonal references—ripe grain, green grass, and final Passover—could fit both a two or three-year ministry.

Again, it is the Fourth Gospel that provides the most help. Seven passages, dealing with Passover (2:13; 6:4; 11:55), fields white for harvest (4:35), and the Jewish feasts of Tabernacles and Dedication (5:1; 7:2; 10:22), can support a ministry of either two or three years. As previously mentioned, we will not discuss here whether the Fourth Evangelist's interests are primarily theological or chronological. But perhaps the former does not preclude the latter. The Fourth Evangelist may have had a theological reason for associating the feeding of the five-thousand with a Passover, but that does not necessarily mean that he invented that association. It is doubtful whether the ministry of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel can be compressed into less than two years, and there seems to be no compelling reason to extend it to three. If Jesus began his ministry in late 27 or early 28 C.E. and if he died during Passover in 30 C.E., the date most widely accepted as we will see in the next section, his ministry would have lasted just over two years.[20]

III. The Death of Jesus

A. The Evidence of Astronomy

All four gospels agree that Jesus died on a Friday during Passover. The Jewish day began at 6 P.M. and the Passover was eaten in the early evening of Nisan 15. According to Mark 14:12ff., Matt 26:17ff., and Luke 22:14ff. the Last Supper was the Passover meal, meaning that the arrest, trial, death, and burial of Jesus also took place on Nisan 15.[21] According to John 18:28 and 19:14 the Passover was eaten that year on the Friday evening after the crucifixion, which, therefore, occurred on Nisan 14. To determine the date of the death of Jesus we must ask the astronomers in which years during Pilate's procuratorship (26-36 c.e.) Nisan 14 or 15 would have fallen on a Friday.

Astronomically, there are two possibilities: In the year 30 C.E. Friday, April 7 was either Nisan 14 or 15, and in the year 33 C.E. Friday, April 3 may have been Nisan

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[17] *De Principiis* iv. 1. 5.

[18] *Strom.* i. 21. 146.

[19] More recent exponents of the one-year theory include Goguel, *Life of Jesus*, 233ff.; J. Klausner, *Jesus of Nazareth* (New York: Macmillan, 1925) 259; and, probably, H. Conzelmann, *History of Primitive Christianity* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1973) 30.

[20] Defenders of a two-year ministry include Duncan, "Chronology," 1281; Caird, "Chronology of the NT," 601f.; Blinzler, *Trial of Jesus*, 74f.; and E. Ruckstuhl, *Chronology of the Last Days of Jesus* (New York: Desclee, 1965) 6; on the general topic, see Hoehner, *Chronological Aspects*, 45ff.

[21] For details, see Jeremias, *Eucharistic Words*, 41-56.

14. The latter presupposes a three-year ministry and presents serious difficulties in dating the apostolic period, especially, the conversion of Paul. The most probable date for the crucifixion is 30 C.E.[22] If one accepts the Jewish reckoning of the reign of Tiberius, his fifteenth year extended from Tishri 1, 27 C.E. to Tishri 1, 28 C.E., or September 21, 27 C.E. to October 8, 28 C.E. During that year the ministry of John the Baptist began and that of Jesus shortly thereafter. This explanation is in agreement with the saying in the Fourth Gospel about the building of the temple and supports a duration for the ministry of Jesus of just over two years.

The Acts of the Apostles

For an absolute chronology of the apostolic age we are totally dependent on Acts, especially five events which can be assigned approximate dates from Jewish and Roman records: the death of Herod Agrippa I (12:23), the famine (11:28), the edict of Claudius (18:2), the proconsulship of Gallio (18:12), and the procuratorship of Festus (24:27). Working backward and forward from Gallio's proconsulship, relative dating of such events as Paul's conversion (9), the apostolic council (15), Paul's arrest in Jerusalem (21), and his arrival in Rome (28) is possible. There is as yet no evidence with which to date the proconsulship of Sergius Paulus in Cyprus (13:7).[23]

I. The Conversion of Paul

According to 9:19-22 following his conversion Paul stayed some time in Damascus proclaiming Jesus as the Christ. When some angry local Jews sought his life (v. 23), Paul's friends lowered him from the wall in a basket (v. 25). In his own account of this escape (2 Cor 11:32f.) Paul mentions Nabataean king Aretas IV who was in Damascus ca. 37-39 or 40 C.E. If Paul was converted prior to 34 C.E. he could not have referred to Aretas's presence in Damascus since according to Gal 1:18, he waited three years before going up to Jerusalem. A conversion date in 35 C.E.[24] would put the first visit to Jerusalem in 38 C.E. and the apostolic council visit "fourteen years later" (Gal 2:1) in 49 C.E.

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[22] Supporters here include Blinzler, *Trial of Jesus*, 72-80; Caird, "Chronology of the NT," 602f.; Ruckstuhl, *Chronology of Last Days*, 1-12; Duncan, "Chronology," 1282; and Jeremias, *Eucharistic Words*, 36-41. Among the adherents for a 33 C.E. crucifixion date are Hoehner, *Chronological Aspects*, 103ff. and B. Reicke, *The NT Era* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1968) 183f. E. Stauffer, *Jesus and His Story* (New York: Knopf, 1960) 17, 91-110 thinks Jesus had a ministry of a little over four years and died in 32 C.E.

[23] See K. Lake, "The Chronology of Acts," *The Beginnings of Christianity. Part I. The Acts of the Apostles* (eds. F. J. Foakes-Jackson and K. Lake; 5 vols.; London: Macmillan, 1920-33) 5. 455-9; and E. Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles: A Commentary* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971) 64.

[24] Among those who opt for this date are C. J. Cadoux, "A Tentative Synthetic Chronology of the Apostolic Age," *JBL* 56 (1937) 177ff.; R. P. C. Hanson, *The Acts* (The New Clarendon Bible; Oxford: Clarendon, 1967) 116; and Haenchen, *Acts*, 71.

II. The Death of Herod Agrippa I

According to Josephus[25] Caligula gave Agrippa both the tetrarchy of Philip following the death of Tiberius on March 16, 37 C.E. and the tetrarchy of Galilee when Antipas was banished to Gaul in 39 C.E. When Claudius came to the throne (January 24, 41 C.E.) Agrippa's realm was extended to include Judea and Samaria. Agrippa died suddenly at a festival in Caesarea early in 44 C.E., having completed his third year as king over Iudea and the seventh year of his total reign. Apparently, just before he died he was acclaimed as divine prompting Luke to say that "because he did not give God the glory . . . an angel of the Lord smote him and he died" (12:23).

There are two coins which purport to come from the eighth and ninth years of Agrippa's reign which, if genuine, would call in question Josephus' evidence. A majority of scholars, however, trust Josephus, especially since the festival at which Agrippa died was the quadrennial games instituted by Herod the Great in 9 B.C.E. to commemorate the founding of Caesarea. Taking four-year intervals from 9 B.C.E., the games would have been held in 44 C.E.[26]

III. The Famine

In 11:28 Luke refers to "a great famine" which "took place in the days of Claudius." Following the death of Agrippa, Claudius sent Cuspius Fadus, Tiberius Alexander, and Ventidius Cumanus as procurators of Judea. Josephus' only reference to their terms of office is that Cumanus was procurator when Agrippa's brother, Herod of Chalcis, died in the eighth year of Claudius, or 48 C.E.[27] Most scholars assume that Alexander's administration lasted from 46 to 48 C.E.—the period of the famine which prompted Christians at Antioch to send relief by the hand of Paul and Barnabas to the church in Jerusalem (11:29f.).[28]

IV. The Apostolic Council

There have been several attempts to harmonize Acts 9-15 and Gal 1-2. Acts 9-15 report three visits of Paul to Jerusalem: a. the acquaintance visit, 9:26-9; b. the famine relief visit, 11:30 and 12:25; and c. the conference visit, 15. Gal reports only two visits: d. 1:18-20 and e. 2:1-10. Without question, a = d. Beyond this, the two most popular explanations are: c = e and b = e. It has also been proposed that Acts 15 was an amalgamation of two conferences: c^1—vv. 1-4, 12—which dealt with circumcision as a condition of church membership, and c^2—vv. 5-11, 13ff,—which dealt with table fellowship between Jewish and Gentile Christians. It follows that $e = c^1$, but Paul was not present at c^2 because he had to be told of the contents

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[25] *Ant.* xviii. 6. 10; xviii. 7. 2; xix. 5. 1; and xix. 8. 2.

[26] See further Caird, "Chronology of the NT," 603; Lake, "Chronology of Acts," 446-52; Haenchen, *Acts*, 61f.; and Hanson, *Acts*, 13.

[27] *Ant.* xix. 9. 2; and xx. 5. 2.

[28] On this topic, see Caird, "Chronology of the NT," 604; Hanson, *Acts*, 13; Haenchen, *Acts*, 62-4; and Lake, "Chronology of Acts," 452-5.

of the apostolic decree in 21:25. As was mentioned earlier, the most plausible date for the apostolic council is 49 C.E.[29]

V. The Edict of Claudius

According to 18:1f. Aquila and Priscilla had recently arrived in Corinth from Italy because "Claudius had commanded all the Jews to leave Rome." Suetonius[30] attributes this expulsion to disturbances instigated by "Chrestus," but gives no indication as to when it occurred. Only fifth-century historian Orosius[31] provides a precise date by placing the edict in the ninth year of Claudius (49 C.E.). Although Orosius has been criticized for being a year off in his dating of the reign of Claudius, his date for the banishment of the Jews from Rome fits perfectly with Paul's first visit to Corinth and is generally accepted.[32]

VI. The Proconsulship of Gallio

In 18:12 Luke refers to Gallio's proconsulship in Achaia. Normally a proconsul's term of office lasted only one year and began on July 1. The year when Gallio served has been determined by a mutilated inscription found at Delphi in the form of a letter from Claudius prompted by a report from Gallio concerning affairs in that city. The inscription reveals that Claudius, at the time of writing, had been acclaimed Emperor twenty-six times. Imperial acclamations, occurring as they do at frequent and irregular intervals, cannot be used to establish precise dates. However, some precision regarding the year of Gallio's proconsulship is possible from other inscriptional evidence. Two inscriptions[33] attest that Claudius' twenty-second and twenty-fourth acclamations occurred during his eleventh year (January 25, 51 C.E. to January 24, 52 C.E.). Another inscription[34] shows that by August 1, 52 C.E. Claudius had been acclaimed for the twenty-seventh time, and a Greek inscription from Kys in Caria published in 1887 demonstrates clearly that Claudius' twenty-sixth acclamation came in the first half of his twelfth year (January 25, 52 C.E. to August 1, 52 C.E.).

A few scholars[35] contend that Gallio began his proconsulship on July 1, 52 C.E. and immediately sent a report to Claudius in time for him to reply by letter and celebrate his twenty-seventh acclamation before August 1. But the vast majority of

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[29] So, among others, Duncan, "Chronology," 1275; and Caird, "Chronology of the NT," 605f. For thorough treatment of the problems surrounding the council, see Hanson, *Acts*, 15ff.; Haenchen, *Acts*, 64f.; and J. Munck, *Paul and the Salvation of Mankind* (Richmond, VA: John Knox, 1959) 231-8.

[30] *Claudius* xxv. 4.

[31] *Historia contra paganos* vii. 6. 15f.

[32] The edict is given fuller discussion by Caird, "Chronology of the NT," 604; Haenchen, *Acts*, 65; and Lake, "Chronology of Acts," 459f.

[33] *CIL* iii. 476 and 1977.

[34] *CIL* vi. 1256.

[35] See, e.g., J. A. Fitzmyer, "The Pauline Letters and the Lucan Account of Paul's Missionary Journeys," *SBL 1988 Seminar Papers* (ed. D. J. Lull; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988) 89.

commentators[36] interpret the Delphi inscription as yielding as the date of Gallio's proconsulship in Achaia, July 1, 51 C.E. to June 30, 52 C.E.[37]

Paul, who had arrived in Corinth eighteen months earlier (18:11)—probably during the winter of 49-50 C.E., was acquitted by Gallio sometime in the late summer or fall of 51 C.E. He would have left Corinth either that fall or the following spring and, after spending time in Jerusalem, Antioch, and Asia Minor, would have reached Ephesus in the fall of 53 C.E. Leaving Ephesus in the summer of 56 C.E., he went through Macedonia and reached Corinth by the end of the year. He celebrated Passover of 57 C.E. in Philippi and reached Jerusalem by Pentecost of that year. Shortly after his arrival (21:30) Paul was arrested[38] and taken to prison in Caesarea (23:33).

VII. The Procuratorship of Festus

Both Josephus (*Ant.* xx. 8. lff.) and Tacitus (*Annals* xii. 54) agree that Felix succeeded Cumanus in 52 C.E. and ruled for a number of years before being succeeded by Festus, but neither historian dates Nero's recall of Felix with any precision. A few scholars date this recall in 55 C.E.[39] but most commentators regard that year as too early in Nero's reign and argue that two years would be too short a time for all the events in Felix's term to have occurred.

According to 24:27 when Festus became procurator in Caesarea Paul had already been in prison there for two years.[40] Eusebius, in his Chronological Tables, places the arrival of Festus in the tenth year of Agrippa II. Since we know from Josephus (*War* ii. 14. 4) that Agrippa's reign began on Nisan 1, 50 C.E., his tenth year would have commenced on Nisan 1, 59 C.E. Consequently, it is probable that Festus became procurator in the summer of 59 C.E.[41] Paul would have appeared before Festus that summer (25:23ff.), left Caesarea, and journeyed to Rome (28:14), arriving there in the spring of 60 C.E.[42]

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[36] Among them, H. Conzelmann, *Acts of the Apostles* (Hermeneia Commentaries; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) 153; G. Krodel, *Acts* (Proclamation Commentaries; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981) 117f.; M. Hengel, *Acts and the History of Earliest Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980) 137; Finegan, *Handbook of Biblical Chronology*, 317f.; Duncan, "Chronology," 1275, 1282; *The NT Background: Selected Documents* (ed. C. K. Barrett; rev. ed.; San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989) 52; and Haenchen, *Acts*, 66f.

[37] On the Gallio proconsulship generally, see Caird, "Chronology of the NT," 604; and Lake, "Chronology of Acts," 460-4.

[38] So Caird, "Chronology of the NT," 607; Duncan, "Chronology," 1275; Krodel, *Acts*, 118; and Hengel, *Acts and History*, 137. Some, including Lake, "Chronology of Acts," 470; Hanson, *Acts*, 21; and Haenchen, *Acts*, 71, date Paul's arrest in Jerusalem two years earlier.

[39] Among them, Conzelmann, *Acts*, 195; and Lake, "Chronology of Acts," 466.

[40] Haenchen, *Acts*, 661, understands the "two years" as referring to the time Felix was in office.

[41] Advocates for this date include Caird, "Chronology of the NT," 604f.; and Duncan, "Chronology," 1275, 1282.

[42] No study involving the chronology of Paul's career would be complete without

reference to John Knox's classic work *Chapters in a Life of Paul* (see the author's revision of the original 1950 book, edited, with introduction, by D. R. A. Hare; Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1987). Knox's thesis is that our principal sources for the life of Paul are the letters, and in case of conflict with Acts the letters are always to be followed. Special note should be made of the recent publication of two books expressly devoted to Knox's position regarding Pauline chronology: R. Jewett's *A Chronology of Paul's Life* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979) and G. Lüdemann's *Paul, Apostle to the Gentiles: Studies in Chronology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984). These works, Knox's earlier writings, and others in the debate are thoroughly examined in Hare's introduction.

Universalism and Particularism in Matthew's Gospel: A Jungian Approach

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> "To be properly expressed, a thing
> must proceed from within, moved
> by its form; it must not come in
> from without, but out from within."
> Meister Eckhart

In terms of C. G. Jung's famous psychological distinction between "extraversion" and "introversion,"[1] the predominant mode of reading the gospels in Western Christianity has clearly been extraverted.

In pre-critical times, when the sacred text was assumed to point to an underlying historical reality,[2] the gospels were read as biographies of Jesus. The Enlightenment introduced a critical distinction between the biblical narrative and the "reality" it depicts which shattered the pre-critical unity of text and history.

Nevertheless, the reading of the gospels continued to be extraverted. Only instead of reading the gospels as records of Jesus life and teaching, historical criticism reads them in order to recover the "theology" of their authors and the history of the communities for which they were written.[3]

Modern exegesis appears to share the assumption of modern theology that religion is a rational matter. The "meaning" of a gospel is "explained" by "the intention of the author," that is, a rationally conceived and rhetorically executed objective, which the modern scholar can infer by combining indications in the text with conjectures about the historical circumstances in which the text was written.

Just as modern biblical scholarship can be traced to the "sola scriptura" principle of the Reformation, so the rationalism of this scholarship appears to be a

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[1] Cf. *Psychological Types = The Collected Works of C.G. Jung* (*CW*), tr. R. F. C. Hull (Princeton University Press, 1971), vol. 6. The publisher and translator are the same in all the following references to *CW*.

[2] Cf. C. W. Frei, *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), chapter 2: "Precritical Interpretation of the Bible."

[3] Cf. "Jesus, History, and the Kerygma" in H. Frankemölle and K. Kertelge (ed.), *Vom Urchristentum zu Jesus. Für Joachim Gnilka* (Freiburg/Basel/Vienna: Herder, 1989), 487-96.

consequence of the "intensification of rational consciousness"[4] and "chronic iconoclasm"[5] which Jung associated with Protestant Christianity.

Even when interest in biblical interpretation has shifted from reconstructing the past to changing the present, the emphasis has remained extraverted. In her 1987 Presidential Address, E. Schüssler Fiorenza called for a "rhetorical-ethical turn," which would "insist on the public-political responsibility of biblical scholarship."[6]

Whether an extraverted reading of the gospels be motivated by historical or socio-political interests, the inner world of the reader is ignored. Yet it is precisely this inner world where the transformation takes place which Christianity claims to have effected. E. P. Sanders writes:

> The heart of Paul's thought is . . . that one dies with Christ, obtaining new life and the initial transformation which leads to the resurrection and the ultimate transformation. . . .[7]

The extraverted reading of the gospels, whatever its practical results, runs counter to the nature of religious experience, which, in Eckhart's words, "must not come in from without, but out from within." In its modern forms, this extraverted reading is a product of the "despiritualization" set in motion by Western religion and culture.[8]

The problem of Christian universalism is a case in point. In keeping with Western extraverted consciousness, universalism is asserted as a dogmatic and historical *fact:*

> In Christ there is no East or West,
> In him no South or North,
> But one great fellowship of love
> Thro'out the whole wide earth.
> John Oxenham, 1908[9]

From a psychological perspective, such a one-sided affirmation is immediately suspect. For universalism and particularism are simply two sides of the same coin, the social expression of the tension between the one and the many. Paul's claim, "τοῖς πᾶσιν γέγονα πάντα" (1 Cor 9:22), is unrealizable and ideological.

Today, with growing awareness of world religions, we recognize that the conscious universalism proclaimed by Christianity contains an unconscious and unacknowledged particularism: "in Christ."[10] Christological exclusivism has replaced the national exclusivism of Judaism.[11] Even within the Christian movement, the dogmatic assertion that we are "one in Christ" has been powerless to halt confessional fragmentation. Moreover, in an age of sensitivity to sexual and ethnic

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[4] *Psychology and Religion: West and East* = *CW,* vol. 11 (1969), p. 199.

[5] *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious* = *CW,* vol. 9, pt. I (1980), p. 13.

[6] *JBL* 107 (1988) 4.

[7] *Paul and Palestinian Judaism* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), p. 514.

[8] *Psychology and Religion,* p. 85.

[9] Cf. Gal 3:28.

[10] Cf. P. F. Knitter, *No other Name? A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes toward the World Religions* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985).

[11] "The True Light," *TJT* 1 (1985) 223.

discrimination, many Christians feel excluded by the proclamation of God's incarnation as a white male.[12]

Judaism has been wiser than Christianity in recognizing the dialectical relationship between universalism and particularism. Rabbinic legend has it that the Ten Commandments were given on Sinai, rather than in Jerusalem, so that they would be accessible to *all* people. Nevertheless, it was to the *Jewish* people that the Law was actually given. In this paradox we see the "strange interplay between the particular and the universal."[13]

It was just such an interplay that first attracted me to a study of universalism and particularism in Matthew's gospel. I offered as a historical explanation for this phenomenon the hypothesis that a Jewish group was still active and influential within Matthew's community at the time the gospel was written.[14] However, texts are not reducible to their causes, and the narrative dialectic between universalism and particularism in Matthew's gospel suggests a point of connection with the dialectical nature of the development of the human psyche.

Like many religious texts, Matthew's gospel engages in "scapegoating" the outsider.[15] But the outsider does not remain constant; in the tension between "them" and "us," the reference of the two pronouns is seen shifting.

Jesus' name is interpreted to mean that "he will save his people from their sins" (1:21). The Jews are therefore the object of Christ's saving mission (10:5-6; cf. 15:24). However, this same people (πᾶς ὁ λαὸς) is represented as demanding Christ's crucifixion with the words, "His blood be on us and on our children" (27:25). The Pharisees are denounced repeatedly as "hypocrites" and charged with numerous transgressions (23:4-33), and yet they "sit on Moses' seat" (v. 2), and their teaching is to be followed (v. 3).

The Gentiles, on the other hand, appear as the potential benefactors of the Matthean community (25:31-46) and the object of its missionary concern (28:18-20).[16] Nevertheless, they are also presented as examples of how *not* to act (5:47; 6:7) and are linked to the hated "tax collector" in a formula of excommunication (18:17). Although I had assumed that the particularist position was defended by *Jews* within the Matthean community, one of the harshest accusations in the gospel is directed against Jewish proselytizing of *Gentiles* (23:15).

My concern, from a *historical* perspective, was not to allow the theological postulate of Christian universalism to dissolve the complexities of the narrative:

> Einige Exegeten meinen, man müsse das Evangelium von hinten her interpretieren, weil die Schlussszene offensichtlich die wichtigste theologische Aussage des Evangelis ten darstellt. Meines Erachtens aber darf man nicht

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[12] Cf. J. Bowden, *Jesus: the Unanswered Questions* (London: SCM Press, 1988), pp. 94-103.

[13] C. Ozick, "Heritage Conversations with Bill Moyers," Transcript #3 (New York: Educational Broadcasting Corporation, 1986), p. 9.

[14] "The Two-fold Representation of the Mission in Matthew's Gospel," *StTheol* 31 (1977) 21-32: "The Mission to Israel in Matthew's Central Section (Mt 9:35–11:1)," *ZNW* 69 (1978) 73-90: "The Matthean Community and the Gentile Mission," *NT* 22 (1980) 193-221.

[15] Cf. S. B. Perera, *The Scapegoat Complex: Toward a Mythology of Shadow and Guilt* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1986).

[16] "The Matthean Apocalypse," *JSNT* 4 (1979) 2-27.

> übersehen, dass die matthäische Theologie nur in der Form eines Evangeliums zum Ausdruck kommt. Infolgedessen soll man die Reihenfolge beachten, die vom Verlauf der Geschichte bestimmt ist, und das Evangelium nicht auf den Kopf stellen, in dem man mit der Perikope beginnt, die *theologisch* am wichtigsten zu sein scheint.[17]

It now appears to me that the narrative tensions of the gospel are also *psychologically* instructive:

> The discovery of the reality of the inner world [of the unconscious]—of which we are ordinarily unaware but which greatly affects our conscious life—is the most important religious fact of our time. . . .[18]

In this situation, the absence of a *consistently* hostile stance in the Matthean text towards either side of the conflict—Jews/Gentiles; universalism/particularism—expresses a psychological reality: in the inner life, help often comes from where we least expect it, as from the mysterious strangers from the East who come bearing gifts of gold, frankincense, and myrrh (2:1-11). The ethical injunction, "Love your enemies" (5:44), has profound psychological significance.

The dialectic between universalism and particularism which characterizes the social psychology of Matthew's community grows out of an inner dialectic which, in Jung's view, governs all psychic growth: our moral task is to achieve *wholeness* through a *complexio oppositorum*. "Wholeness" is how Jung would like to understand the object of Jesus' injunction to his disciples: "Ἔσεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τέλειοι ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος τέλειός ἐστιν" (5:48). But for Christian orthodoxy, τελείωσις, which God *has* and we *seek*, is "perfection," the absence of defect: a one-sidedly positive ideal, in Jung's view.[19]

The psychological consequences of such a view of God and of our moral task are portentous:

> [W]hen the individual remains undivided and does not become conscious of his inner opposite, the world must perforce act out the conflict and be torn into opposing halves.[20]

The social and individual ideals of orthodox Christianity thus manifest a common flaw: one-sidedness. By *ignoring* their opposites, they *produce* the opposite of what they consciously intend. Universalism (28:19: πάντα τὰ ἔθνη) which is unconscious of its own particularism leads to sectarianism. Perfectionism (5:48: τέλειοι) which is unconscious of its own shadow side leads, through the psychological mechanism of projection, to the apocalypticism of the "evil empire" mentality.

Jung emphatically rejected the charge of Manichaeanism.[21] For him, "good" and "evil" are not metaphysical absolutes. They are relative moral judgments: something

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[17] "Die Mission an Israel nach der matthäischen Aussendungsrede," unpublished paper (1976), p. 2.

[18] J. A. Sanford, *The Kingdom Within*, revised edition (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), p. 10.

[19] *Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self* = *CW*, vol. 9, pt. II (1979), pp. 68-69.

[20] *Aion*, p. 71.

[21] *Aion*, p. 61n.

is always good or bad *for* someone. Whether the glass is half full or half empty depends on the perspective of the imbiber. If good and evil are absolutized and projected onto God and the devil, respectively, the results are truly catastrophic.

Τελείωσις implies a τέλος, the God-image of wholeness, which Jung calls the Self, and which resides in the unconscious.

> The life of Christ, understood psychologically, represents the vicissitudes of the Self as it undergoes incarnation in an individual ego and of the ego as it participates in that divine drama.[22]

Orthodox Christianity too speaks of "incarnation" and "deification": "[ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ] ἐνηνθρώπησεν ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν."[23] But, for Jung, there is, psychologically, but one process, viewed from the perspective of the ego and of the Self.[24] Only the individual is the bearer of consciousness, and only through the individual's coming to consciousness ("individuation") can God enter into this world.

Jung was well aware of the central role of Christ in Western consciousness, and he discovered through the dreams of his patients, and his own famous dream of "the green Christ,"[25] how active this central image remains, even in this "despiritualized" phase of Western Christianity.

Since God is the norm for human τελείωσις (5:48) or individuation, and since only the Son can reveal the Father (11:27), the Christ-image has profound psychological significance. A one-sided understanding of God as the "one who is good" (19:17)—and *only* good—causes Christ, as the God-image, to be the "perfect man," in whom sin cannot exist (cf. 2 Cor 5:21; Jn 8:46). Human τελείωσις then becomes an impossible and illusory quest for "perfection" or "sinlessness," rather than the integrative task of individuation. It is surely no coincidence that the emergence of the Christ-image of sinlessness and perfection occurred at the same time that Satan turned into a figure wholly hostile to God.[26]

Jung's most thorough analysis of the Christian symbol system is found in his interpretation of the Trinity.[27] Although Jung was entirely familiar with the Bible,[28] it was to the doctrinal formulation of the Trinity that he turned, for both personal and systematic reasons.[29]

However, a narrative representation of Christ, such as we find in Matthew's gospel, is more akin to the material which Jung characteristically preferred: myths and folktales. Although Matthew's gospel will reveal the same one-sidedness which

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[22] E. F. Edinger, *The Christian Archetype: A Jungian Commentary on the Life of Christ* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1987), p. 15.

[23] Athanasius, *De Incarnatione* 54: *PG* 25.192B.

[24] Cf. "Answer to Job," *Psychology and Religion*, pp. 355-470.

[25] Cf. M. Stein, "Jung's Green Christ: A Healing Symbol for Christianity" in M. Stein and R. L. Moore (ed.), *Jung's Challenge to Contemporary Christianity* (Wilmette, Ill.: Chiron Publications, 1987), pp. 1-13.

[26] Cf. P. L. Day, *An Adversary in Heaven: śāṭān in the Hebrew Bible* (Harvard Semitic Monographs, Number 43: Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1988).

[27] "A Psychological Approach to the Dogma of the Trinity," *Psychology and Religion*, pp. 107-207.

[28] W. Rollins, *Jung and the Bible* (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1983).

[29] C. A. Brown, *Jung's Hermeneutic of Doctrine* (AAR Dissertation Series, number 32: Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981), especially chapter IV, "Jung's Psychology of Doctrine."

Jung points out in his analysis of the doctrine of the Trinity, it can nevertheless be read as a powerful portrayal of the individuation process.

Jung credited the Gnostics with greater psychological insight than their orthodox protagonists. Indeed, Irenaeus himself seems to have recognized the psychological thrust of his opponents' writings.[30] Today there is no need to distinguish, as Jung did, between "Gnostic-Christian circles" and "eyewitness accounts in the synoptic gospels."[31] Matthew's gospel, though not an eyewitness account, does antedate the Gnostic-orthodox schism and, consequently, it can be read from either of the later two perspectives. Moreover, since Matthew is a *narrative* text, which imitates the psychic processes through which it came into being, it lends itself to the discovery of "spiritual senses"[32] characteristic of reader-oriented interpretation.[33]

Γένεσις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (1:1) need not be limited to the genealogy which follows (vv. 2-17) or to the passage where the same phrase is repeated (vv. 18-24). Γένεσις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ can be understood as the title of Matthew's book (1:1: Βίβλος). The allusion to the first book of the Greek Bible suggests that Matthew (the first book in the New Testament) may be read as an account of the ascent to γνῶσις, as were the first chapters of its Old Testament counterpart.[34]

The Gnostic separation of the double name Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ[35] facilitates Jung's understanding of "Christ" as a symbol of the τέλος which governs the process narrated in the gospel,[36] while "Jesus" comes to represent the individuating ego.

Jung recognized that psychological criticism must not presume to judge the pre-psychological age. Indeed, he candidly asks, "Who can guarantee that our conception of totality is not equally in need of completion?" The essential point is that "Christ did not merely *symbolize* wholeness, but, as a psychic phenomenon, he *was* wholeness."[37]

The Christian theological postulate of Christ's sinlessness finds narrative expression in the story of Joseph's doubt (1:18-25). Here the role of the spirit is opposed to the shame of an extra-marital pregnancy. The dark side of the scene is evident enough,[38] since the penalty for adultery was death by stoning (Deut 22:20-21), though it was not carried out in Jesus' day. However, the threat of disgrace *did* exist, even if only in Joseph's mind.

The first mention of the spirit (v. 18), by the narrator, lets the *reader* know that Joseph's doubt (v. 19) is unfounded. The second mention (v. 20), by an angel in a dream, removes the doubt from *Joseph*'s mind and makes him abandon his intended

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[30] "Id quod extra et quod intra dicere eos secundum agnitionem et ignorantiam, sed non secundum localem sententiam" (*Adv. haer.*, II,4,2).

[31] *Aion* p. 93.

[32] Cf. F. Kermode, *The Genesis of Secrecy: on the Interpretation of Narrative* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), especially chapter 1: "Carnal and Spiritual Senses."

[33] Cf. "Reader Response: Demythologizing the Text," *NTS* 34 (1988) 232-37.

[34] *The Origins of Christianity: A Historical Introduction to the New Testament* (Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 151.

[35] K. Rudolph, *Gnosis: The Nature and History of Gnosticism*, tr. R. M. Wilson (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), p. 151.

[36] *Aion*, chapter V: "Christ, a Symbol of the Self."

[37] *Aion*, p. 62n.

[38] Cf. J. Schaberg, *The Illegitimacy of Jesus: a Feminist Theological Interpretation of the Infancy Narratives* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987).

course of action and take Mary as his wife (cf. v. 24). The role of the holy spirit is thus set against the sinfulness of a suspected adultery and the consequent illegitimacy of the offspring.

The miraculous birth of Jesus (1:25) suggests the way the genesis of the individuating ego is experienced. A child frequently appears in dreams as an anticipation of a breakthrough to a new level of consciousness in the dreamer. The birth is miraculous, since it gives the individual a standpoint beyond the brute facts of worldly existence, "the incontrovertible experience of an intensely personal, reciprocal relationship between man and an extramundane authority which acts as a counterpoise to the 'world' and its 'reason.'"[39]

In Matthew's gospel, the birth of Christ also marks a collective shift in consciousness, the new "Sinnwelt" which Christianity brought into being.[40]

Such a radical psychological shift, whether on the individual or the collective level, does not occur without a reaction. As in the Moses story (Exod 1:15–2:10), the birth of the child provokes a threat to its life. Herod, representing the ego position which is in possession, recognizes that the birth of a new king (2:2) signals his downfall. Since the new means the death of the old, the old seeks, in vain, to take preemptive action, in the Slaughter of the Innocents (2:16-18).

The citation of Hos 11:1 (2:15) is significant. In the Old Testament context, God's "son" is understood collectively; the word refers to Israel. The transfer of "son" to Jesus represents a step towards individualization. But the collective worship of Christ as "Son of God" in a metaphysical sense requires a further step towards individualization and beyond Christocentrism: the transformation of human individuals into "children of God" (cf. 5:45) through the psychological genesis of individuation.

Following the appearance of John the Baptist (3:1-12), we have two contrasted episodes: Jesus' Baptism (vv. 13-17) and The Temptation (4:1-11). The opposition we saw at Jesus' conception between the spirit and sin reappears here: Jesus receives the *spirit* in baptism (3:16) and encounters the *devil* in the desert (4:1).

Water is a symbol of the unconscious, where the Self resides. Through submersion in the water, Jesus comes under the guidance of Another and learns his personal destiny from the heavenly voice. This encounter with the Self is benevolent: Jesus is addressed as "beloved son" (v. 17; cf. 11:25). As the ego accepts its vocation, it knows it has the love and support of the Self. According to Cerinthus, it was after the baptism that Christ descended upon Jesus.[41]

The spirit drives Jesus into the desert, to encounter the spirit's opposite number, the devil (4:1). Like the Sphinx, who, upon Oedipus' arrival in Thebes, asks him to solve a riddle, the devil is a trickster-figure, who "stands at the very beginning of the way of individuation."[42]

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[39] C. G. Jung, *The Undiscovered Self*, tr. R. F. C. Hull (New York: Mentor Book, 1958), p. 33.

[40] Cf. G. Theissen, *Urchristliche Wundergeschichten: ein Beitrag zur formgeschichtlichen Erforschung der synoptischen Evangelien* (Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1974), p. 277: "Die neue Welt ist nicht gekommen. Und dennoch ist ihre Erwartung verständlich: Das urchristliche Wundercharisma leitete in der Tat eine tiefgehende Umstrukturierung der Antiken Welt ein. Nicht die kosmische Welt, wohl aber die durch symbolische Handlungen gedeutete Welt wurde revolutioniert."

[41] Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.*, 1,26,1.

[42] *Archetypes*, p. 271.

Jung was convinced of the truth of the Faustian legend that "it is possible for a man to attain totality, to become whole, only with the cooperation of the spirit of darkness."[43] Indeed, the Christian liturgy itself reflects this psychological truth in the "felix culpa" of the Easter Vigil. Without sin, there can be no redemption.

According to the Euchite doctrine of "the two sons of God,"[44] Christ and Satan are brothers—the nickname "Lucifer" or "morning star" applies to both.[45] However, in Matt 4:1-11, they are irreconcilable opponents; there is no hint of their psychological complementarity.

The object of the temptations is significant: the first temptation concerns food (v. 3); the third concerns political power (v. 8). From the collective viewpoint, "world-conquering Caesarism"—with its bread and circuses—is "transformed into spiritual kingship."[46]

However, this takes place at the cost of a rift between material needs and the "world" (v. 8), on the one hand, and, on the other, the God to whom alone service is due (v. 10). By the law of ἐναντιοδρομία (Heraclitus), "[t]he ideal of spirituality striving for the heights was doomed to clash with the materialistic earth-bound passion to conquer matter and master the world."[47]

One of Jung's closest collaborators, M.-L. von Franz, has declared:

> [P]ractically no religion began with such a highly one-sided spiritual accent and has landed—if you think of Communism as the end form of Christian theology—in such an absolutely one-sided materialistic aspect."[48]

The "spiritual accent" is reinforced by the concluding verse of the episode, where, after the devil's departure, Jesus is ministered to by angels (v. 11).

Christianity's hostile relationship to the instincts[49] finds expression not only in the hostile attitude towards the shadow—representing matter and power—that we found in The Temptation, but also in the absence of any encounter with the contrasexual—for the male ego, an encounter with the feminine.[50] Matthew reports Peter's conclusion that "it is expedient not to marry" (19:10), as well as Jesus' response: "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. He who is able to receive this, let him receive it" (v. 12).

But the rejection of a psychological reality does not cause it to disappear, and Satan reappears in the person of Peter (16:23). In this scene, Jesus rejects the admonition to self-preservation implied in Peter's reaction (v. 22) to his prediction of his passion (v. 21). Such concern for one's physical safety is assigned to "τὰ τῶν

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[43] *Archteypes*, p. 251.

[44] "The Spirit Mercurius," *Alchemical Studies = CW*, vol. 13 (1983), p. 223: cf. Ἰησοῦν Βαραββᾶν (27:16).

[45] *Aion*, p. 72

[46] *The Development of Personality = CW*, vol. 17 (1981), p. 180.

[47] *Aion*, p. 43.

[48] *Alchemy: An Introduction to the Symbolism and the Psychology* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1980), pp. 212-13. If liberation theology can be considered the Christian surrogate of Marxism, then this observation is even more strikingly acute.

[49] *Aion*, p. 77.

[50] The Gnostic gospels have made up for this omission in their canonical counterparts. The best known text is *Gos. Phil.* 63:34—64:5, which, unfortunately, is fragmentary.

ἀνθρώπων" (v. 23), which come from Satan, represented here by his surrogate. An antithesis between θεός and ἄνθρωποι (v. 23) continues the opposition between κόσμος (4:8) and θεός (4:10), and between ὁ Ἰησοῦς, τὸ πνεῦμα, and ὁ διάβολος (4:1). Martyrdom is the τελείωσις for both Jesus and his disciples (16:24-25).

The one-sidedness of the Christ symbol leads, by ἐναντιοδρομία, to the spontaneous production of its opposite, the anti-Christ.[51] Peter's confession (16:16) is balanced by Jesus' prediction: "Many will come in my name saying, 'I am the Christ,' and they will lead many astray" (24:5).

The moment of destiny for Jesus, as the representative of ego consciousness, occurs in the connected episodes of The Entry into Jerusalem (21:1-11) and The Expulsion of the Money Changers (vv. 12-17). As Jesus rides into the holy city, he hears acclamations which confirm what the heavenly voice had declared at his baptism (21:9; cf. 3:17). His violent action (21:12) is carried out in obedience to his divine mission as a prophetic reformer of Judaism.

Jung has said: "Egocentricity is a necessary attribute of consciousness and is also its specific sin."[52] Jesus' expression of ego consciousness leads, with historical and psychological inevitability, to the events of his arrest, passion, and death. His exercise of divine authority (cf. 21:23) leads to his abasement by God.

Between the catalyst and the dénouement, we have the institution of the eucharist (26:26-30). Its contextualization as a Passover meal (v. 17) suggests ritual sacrifice and anthropophagy:

> [The psyche] must celebrate a Last Supper with himself, and eat his own flesh and drink his own blood; which means that he must recognize and accept the other in himself. . . .[53]

But for Jesus' disciples, the Christ whom they receive is not yet complete, since the "blood of the covenant"(26:28; cf. Exod 24:8) has not yet been shed.

In the scene in Gethsemane, which precedes the arrest, Jesus again encounters the Self, but no longer as a loving Father (cf. 3:17). Now Jesus must drink the "cup" (26:39) of God's wrath (Isa 51:17). The shadow side of God must be digested, and the ego (v. 39: ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω) must submit. The emphasis on wakefulness (vv. 38,41) suggests the importance of consciousness. The mysterious τέλος to which the individuating ego is subjected is "a determining power which comes upon man from outside, like providence or fate, though the ethical decision is left to man. He must know, however, what he is deciding about and what he is doing."[54] The recurring split between "spirit" and "flesh" appears here too (v. 41), but so does the hope that it may be healed in the crucible of the suffering psyche (v. 38).

In the second temptation, Jesus rejected the suggestion that he place himself in a situation from which only God could deliver him (4:7). But by rejecting, as Satanic, Peter's advice at Caesarea Philippi (16:23), Jesus finds himself in a situation where only angelic intervention could save him (26:53; cf. 4:6). By going up to Jerusalem for the feast, "the son of man is delivered into the hands of sinners" (26:45).

Individuation always involves a situation of conflicting loyalties, in which fidelity

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[51] *Aion*, p. 61.
[52] *Mysterium Conjunctionis* = *CW*, vol. 14 (1977), p. 272.
[53] *Mysterium*, p. 364.
[54] *Aion*, p. 27.

to one is the betrayal of the other. The theme of Judas' betrayal (26:14-16; 47-50) reflects Jesus' own betrayal of the collective values of Judaism (21:12-17). But there can be no redemption without betrayal ("felix culpa"), and there can be no betrayal without a betrayer. Accordingly, Judas is received with a kiss (26:49) and greeted as "friend" (v. 50; cf. 5:44).

In the crucible of the passion, Jesus' sense of his own identity is lost. The divine sonship assured him by the heavenly voice is not affirmed when Jesus responds to Pilate's solemn question (26:63-64a). The answer can only come in the future (v. 64b: ὄψεσθε). When ego consciousness is called into question by an experience of the Self, the only possible answer must come from beyond the ego.

The role of the collective in the passion story is psychologically instructive. The same crowds who shout "Hosanna!" to Jesus, as he enters Jerusalem (21:9), will later cry, "Let him be crucified!" (27:22.23), as Pilate seeks to have Jesus released. In the individuation process, the collective is not to be trusted:

> The dangerous alternative to the rediscovery of a personally relevant religion that can lead to greater consciousness of the Self is the erection of ever-increasing outer structures. . . . For the less structure we have within ourselves, the more we will desperately seek to find it out side of ourselves. . . .[55]

For Jung, the external fate of crucifixion represents the inner trial of individuation, which every human being is called to undergo, and for which not even Christ's atoning death can provide a substitute. Christ between two thieves (27:38) represents "the crucifixion of the ego, its agonizing suspension between irreconcilable opposites. . . . [T]he ego is a suffering bystander who decides nothing but must submit to a decision and surrender unconditionally."[56]

The crucifixion meant that Jesus and his prophetic mission to Israel had been abandoned by God: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" (27:46). But in this abandonment, Jesus himself must abandon the God who is "εἷς ὁ ἀγαθός" (19:17) and accept the reality of a God who does not distinguish between just and unjust (5:45). The gospel's oppositions between spirit and sin, spirit and devil, Christ and devil, spirit and flesh are finally overcome in the mandala of the cross, where ego and Self are superimposed. The defective Christ symbol is made whole through the incorporation of the divine shadow. The one-sidedness of the Trinity is superceded by the quaternity of the cross. Through φυλοκρίνησις,[57] the undivided state of "perfection" is separated into its components, so that the "wholeness" of individuation can come to be.

The presence of the women (27:55-56) further suggests that the crucifixion is a *conjunctio* with the feminine. The hymn, "The Church's one foundation," gives poetic expression to the *conjunctio* idea:

> From heav'n he came and sought her
> To be his holy bride;

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[55] *Kingdom Within*, p. 9.
[56] *Aion*, pp. 44-45.
[57] Hippolytus, *Elenchos*, VII,27,8.

With his own blood he bought her,
And for her life he died.
Samuel John Stone, 1866[58]

Jesus' appearance on a mountain in Galilee (28:16-18) shows that the alchemical *opus* is complete. Having received "all authority in heaven and on earth" (v. 18), Jesus is now, as "the 'total man,'" "as big as the world, like an Anthropos." The birth of the Self results in "the indescribable totality of the psychic or spiritual man, who cannot be described because he is compounded of consciousness as well as of the indeterminable extent of the unconscious."[59]

This brings to an end, in one sense, γένεσις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (1:1). Yet Jesus' command, μαθητεύσατε (v. 19), makes clear that the process is to continue. As long as the ἐκκλησία (16:18; 18:17) remained as the container for this genesis, it could be accomplished through faith in the church's teaching (28:20: διδάσκοντες), and the dialectic between universalism and particularism would remain a purely ecclesiological problem.[60]

But today, at least in the West, the Christian era seems to be drawing to a close, along with the Age of Pisces, with which it began.[61] In this situation, the "inward turn" is forced upon us, if we are not prepared to accept "public-political responsibility" as a substitute for the individual spiritual task.

The introverted approach to the Christian symbol system reveals its connection with the archetypal world which is our collective human inheritance. Only by becoming reconnected with this world, through the power of the imagination, can our present spiritual illness be healed.



The individual, as the bearer of consciousness, has the responsibility of relating not only to the community but also to the unconscious. Therefore, "collective," in our diagram, has a double reference. Moreover, not only the community is marked by the dialectic between the universal and the particular. The structure of the inner world also has a universal character. Like the *a priori* categories of Kant,[62] the archetypes are universal inherited possibilities. Like biological instincts, they "direct all fantasy into its appointed paths."[63]

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[58] Cf. Eph 5:25.

[59] *Archetypes*, p. 308.

[60] Cf. "*Koinonia* as the Basis of New Testament Ecclesiology?", *One in Christ* 12 (1976) 157-67.

[61] *Aion*, chapter VI: "The Sign of the Fishes."

[62] *Archetypes*, p. 67n.

[63] *Archetypes*, p. 66.

But these *a priori* biological norms of psychic activity only take on existence in concrete, individual images. In individuals, such images appear in dreams and active imagination: in communities, they undergo a cultural process which transforms them into a symbol system of collective consciousness. The Christian symbol system is the product of innumerable historical factors, but its numinosity comes from its roots in "the kingdom within" of the unconscious.

The numinous, as encountered directly in the unconscious, without the protective container of Christian doctrine, has a Protean quality quite foreign to the Judeo-Christian God, and the tale of the inner journey, even if told with traditional imagery, may not coincide with the official Christian proclamation of "the mighty works of God" (Acts 2:11).

However, this journey through the labyrinth of the unconscious offers a solution to the "extrinsicism" of the Christian doctrinal tradition, which "fails to convey and evoke meaning at precisely those points where the experience it embodies and represents clashes with contemporary experience."[64]

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[64] *Jung's Hermeneutic*, p. 146.

The Activity of God in the Gospel of Matthew

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Matthew frequently refers to God as *kyrios* ("Lord"), *theos* ("God") and *patēr* ("Father"). I have argued elsewhere that Matthew tends to locate these three divine appellations in different types of material and to use them in different ways. References to the Lord and *theos* but not to the Father occur in five types of material: OT quotations and allusions, references to the God who spoke and is speaking through the OT, words of Jesus addressed to the devil and to Jewish leaders, the words of other speakers, and descriptions of events. Although most of the references to the Lord and *theos* are in these five types of material, all of the references to the Father are in words of Jesus addressed to his heavenly Father, his disciples, or audiences composed of his disciples and the crowds. *Kyrios* may be characterized as the "biblical" epithet, for it is primarily found in OT quotations, formulas which introduce OT quotations, and the biblical phrase "angel of the Lord." *Theos* may be characterized as the "widely used" appellation, for it is spoken and heard by a wider spectrum of Matthean characters than are *kyrios* and *patēr*. *Patēr* may be characterized as the "special" epithet, for it is limited to words of Jesus addressed to his heavenly Father or to select human audiences.[1]

Many of the Matthean passages which contain one of these divine appellations refer to the "activity" of the Lord, *theos*, or the Father. The term "activity" will be used in this study to identify what the Lord, *theos*, or the Father "did," "is doing," or "will do." Examples occur in the Matthean claims that the Father "revealed" Jesus' identity to Peter (16:17), that he "feeds" the birds (6:26), and that he "will give" good things to those who ask him (7:11).

This study focuses on the Matthean passages which refer to the activity of the Lord, *theos* and the Father. The first section argues that Matthew associates different forms of communication with the Lord, *theos* and the Father. The second section identifies three activities which the Sermon on the Mount primarily or exclusively associates with the Father. The third section traces the manner in which Matthew

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[1] Robert L. Mowery, "God, Lord and Father: The Theology of the Gospel of Matthew," *BR* 33 (1988) 24-36. Concerning the Matthean references to the Lord, *theos* and the Father, see W. Schenk, *Die Sprache des Matthäus: Die Text-Konstituenten in ihren makro- und mikrostrukturellen Relationen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987) 285-93.

introduces the activity of the Lord, *theos* and the Father in the first seven chapters of the First Gospel.[2]

I. Communication

Matthew associates different forms of communication with the Lord, *theos* and the Father. Although the Lord and *theos* spoke through the OT and the Lord also spoke through an angel, the Father revealed things to people. The various Matthean references to prayer tend to identify God as the Father rather than the Lord or *theos*.

Old Testament. Matthew claims that God spoke through the OT as both the Lord and *theos*. The evangelist twice introduces OT quotations with the formula "what was spoken by the Lord through the prophet" (1:22; 2:15), and the passion narrative contains an OT quotation which concludes with the words "as the Lord commanded me" (27:10). When responding to the Pharisees, Jesus cited a psalm containing the words "the Lord said" (22:44). While two of these verses claim that the Lord spoke through the OT (1:22; 2:15), the other two are in material which Matthew identifies as OT quotations (22:44; 27:10). All four assert that the Lord "said" or "spoke" or "commanded."

Matthew states on several occasions that *theos* spoke and is speaking through the OT. When Jesus responded to the devil, he cited a Deuteronomic reference to "every word proceeding out of the mouth of God" (4:4). Although these words are in a Q context, they occur only in Matthew.[3] When confronting certain Pharisees and scribes, Jesus introduced two OT quotations with the words "God said" (15:4).[4] Matthew substituted these words for the words "Moses said" found in Mark 7:10. Jesus defined this OT material as "the commandment of God" (15:3) and "the word of God" (15:6).[5] When responding to the Sadducees, Jesus introduced an OT quotation with the words "what was spoken to you by God" (22:31). The Matthean alterations of Mark 12:26 stress that God was speaking through this OT quotation "to you," that is, to the Sadducees who were questioning Jesus.

Although claiming that both the Lord and *theos* spoke through the OT, Matthew never voices a similar claim concerning the Father. This pattern accords with the overall Matthean pattern of associating the Lord and *theos* but not the Father with the OT. Although various Matthean OT quotations and allusions refer to the Lord (4:7, 10; 5:33 (?); 21:9, 42; 22:37, 44; 23:39; 27:10; and perhaps 3:3)[6] and *theos*

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[2] I am grateful to Dennis Tevis of Morningside College for reading a formal response to an earlier version of this paper at the 1989 meeting of the Central States Region of the SBL.

[3] Various scholars (e.g., U. Luz, *Das Evangelium nach Matthäus* (EKKNT 1/1; Zürich: Benziger; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1985) 1. 160) assume that these words are redactional. For a contrary view, see H. Mahnke, *Die Versuchungsgeschichte im Rahmen der synoptischen Evangelien* (BBET 9; Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1978) 60-61.

[4] The textual variant, "God commanded saying," also indicates that God spoke.

[5] Concerning the text of 15:6, see B. M. Metzer, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* (London, New York: United Bible Societies, 1971) 39. The noun *theos* occurs in the Markan parallels (7:9, 13) of both of these phrases.

[6] Does *kyrios* in 3:3 refer to God or Jesus? For differing views, see K. Stendahl, *The School of St. Matthew* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1968) 48, and G. D. Kilpatrick,

(1:23; 4:4, 7, 10; 5:34 (?); 22:32 (tris), 37; 27:43 (?), 46 (bis), none refers to the Father.[7]

Angel of the Lord. Matthew claims that an "angel of the Lord" spoke to Joseph (1:20, 24; 2:13, 19) and to the women at the empty tomb (28:2, 5-7). This heavenly figure obviously spoke for the Lord. The evangelist never states that an "angel of God" or an "angel of the Father" communicated with people.[8]

Revelation. Jesus twice claimed that the Father revealed things to people. After addressing God as "Father, Lord of heaven and earth," Jesus declared in 11:25 that "you have hidden these things from the wise and understanding and revealed (*apekalypsas*) them to babes." Although Jesus addressed God as both "Father" and "Lord" in 11:25, he addressed God as simply "Father" in 11:26 when declaring, "Yes, Father, for thus it was well-pleasing before you." He then referred to God as "Father" three times in 11:27.[9] The verb "revealed" occurs again in Jesus' declaration that his heavenly Father "revealed" (*apekalypsen*) his identity to Peter (16:17).[10] Neither 11:25 nor 16:17 indicates that this revelation occurred through the OT or an angel.[11]

Several other passages deserve notice. Jesus referred to the Father when assuring the twelve that "you are not the ones speaking, but the Spirit of your Father is the one speaking in you" (10:20). The unusual phrase "Spirit of your Father" specifically associates this promise with the Father.[12] A heavenly "voice" twice identified Jesus as "my beloved Son" (3:17; 17:5); however, Matthew does not explicitly associate this voice with the Father (or with any other divine name).[13]

Prayer. Matthew usually associates prayer with the Father rather than the Lord or *theos*. The Sermon on the Mount uses *proseuchomai* ("pray") in several passages which refer to the Father:

> "Love your enemies and pray (*proseuchesthe*) for those who persecute you, so that you may be sons of your Father in heaven" (5:44-45)

"*Kyrios* Again," *Orientierung an Jesus* (ed. P. Hoffman, N. Brox, W. Pesch; Freiburg: Herder, 1973) 217.

[7] Mowery, "God, Lord and Father," 25-26.

[8] Several verses (16:27; 18:10; 24:36; 26:53), however, refer to both the Father and angels.

[9] Jesus proclaimed in 11:27a that "all things have been delivered to me by my Father."

[10] Although 11:25 preserves a Q tradition (cf. Luke 10:21), 16:17 lacks a Synoptic parallel.

[11] Jesus also performed a revelatory function, for he declared in 11:27 that "no one knows the Father except the Son and any one to whom the Son wishes to reveal (*apokalypsai*) him." It should also be noted that Jesus' words reveal the Father's will. See R. A. Guelich, *The Sermon on the Mount: A Foundation for Understanding* (Waco: Word, 1982) 399; R. H. Gundry, *Matthew: A Commentary on His Literary and Theological Art* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982) 131.

[12] Matt 10:20 seems to be based on Mark 13:11 rather than a Q tradition. See S. Schulz, *Q: Die Spruchquelle der Evangelisten* (Zürich: Theologischer, 1972) 443. Although two Matthean verses refer to "the Spirit of God" (3:16; 12:28), neither claims that the Spirit "speaks."

[13] Note, however, that the first reference to the heavenly voice (3:17) follows a reference to "the Spirit of God" (3:16).

"pray (*proseuxai*) to your Father who is in secret" (6:6)[14]
"And in praying (*proseuchomenoi*) do not heap up empty phrases . . . for your Father knows . . ." (6:7-8)
"Pray (*proseuchesthe*) then like this: 'Our Father . . .'" (6:9)

Most of these verses are within 6:5-15, the Sermon's section on prayer. In addition, the Gethsemane narrative uses *proseuchomai* when introducing Jesus' prayers to his Father (26:39, 42; cf. 26:36, 41, 44). The verb *proseuchomai* occurs in several other passages which do not refer to the Father (14:23; 19:13; 24:20; cf. 21:13, 22); however, none of these other passages uses another divine name.

Matthew also regularly refers to God as the Father rather than the Lord or *theos* when using the verb *aiteō* ("ask"). Jesus used this verb when declaring that "your Father knows what you need before you ask (*aitēsai*) him" (6:8), and he used it again when saying ". . . how much more will your Father in heaven give good things to those who ask (*tois aitousin*) him" (7:11). Jesus also used this verb when promising that "if two of you agree on earth about anything they ask (*aitēsōntai*), it will be done for them by my Father in heaven" (18:19). Although the verb *aiteō* occurs in several passages which refer to prayer without mentioning the Father (7:7, 8; 21:22), none of these passages uses another divine name.

Matthew seldom refers to God as the Lord or *theos* when speaking of prayer. Jesus once identified God as "the Lord of the harvest" (9:38) when using the verb *deomai* ("pray"), and he once addressed God as "Father, Lord of heaven and earth" (11:25).[15] When uttering the cry of desolation from the cross, Jesus addressed God with the Hebrew words *ēli ēli* which Matthew translates as "my God (*thee*) my God (*thee*)" (27:46).[16] In contrast with these verses, Jesus used the epithet "Father" four times when addressing God in prayer (11:25, 26; 26:39, 42), and he instructed his disciples to address God as "our Father in heaven" (6:9). When referring to prayer, Matthew usually identifies God as the Father rather than the Lord or *theos*.

Overview. Matthew associates different forms of communication with the Lord, *theos* and the Father. Although the Lord and *theos* spoke through the OT and the Lord also spoke through an angel, the Father revealed things. Matthew usually associates prayer with the Father rather than the Lord or *theos*.

These references to the Lord, *theos* and the Father tend to occur in different types of material. All five of the references to an angel of the Lord are in descriptions of what the angel "did" (1:20, 24; 2:13, 19; 28:2), and three of the four assertions that the Lord spoke through the OT are in comments directed to the reader (1:22; 2:15; 27:10).[17] Six of these eight references to the Lord or an angel of the Lord are in Matt 1-2, and the other two are in Matt 27-28. All five of the passages which claim that *theos* spoke through the OT are in words of Jesus addressed to his opponents, either the devil (4:4) or the Jewish leaders (15:3, 4, 6; 22:31). Jesus referred to God as both *theos* and the Lord when arguing with these opponents in other passages,

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[14] The verb *proseuchomai* also occurs three other times in 6:5-6.

[15] Both of these references to the Lord are in Q material (Matt 9:38//Luke 10:2; Matt 11:25//Luke 10:21).

[16] These references to God are based on the references found in Mark 15:34.

[17] All three of these assertions are in passages found only in Matthew. The fourth assertion (22:44), which is in words of Jesus addressed to the Pharisees, is in material taken from Mark 12:36.

and they referred to God as *theos* on several occasions.[18] But they never referred to God as the Father, and Jesus never referred to God as the Father when confronting them.

Like all of the other Matthean passages which refer to the Father, all of the passages which associate the Father with revelation and prayer are in words of Jesus addressed to his heavenly Father, his disciples, or his disciples and the crowds. When instructing his disciples or his disciples and the crowds, Jesus referred to God as *patēr* thirty-seven times, as *theos* eight or nine times, and as *kyrios* only twice.[19] Like Jesus' opponents, the disciples and the crowds heard Jesus identify God as the Lord and *theos;* unlike these opponents, they also heard Jesus identify God as the Father.

The various Matthean statements concerning the communication of the Lord, *theos* and the Father therefore tend to occur in markedly different types of material. All of the references to an angel of the Lord are in descriptions of events. While most of the assertions that the Lord spoke through the OT are in comments directed to the reader, all of the claims that *theos* spoke through the OT are in words of Jesus addressed to his opponents. All of the statements which associate the Father with revelation and prayer are in words of Jesus addressed to his heavenly Father, his disciples, or his disciples and the crowds.

II. Three Activities of the Father

The Sermon on the Mount contains a series of references to the Father which are the grammatical subjects of active indicative verbs. These verbs, which are either present tense (6:8, 26, 32; cf. 5:45)[20] or future tense verbs (6:4, 6, 14, 15, 18; 7:11), indicate what the Father "is doing" or "will do." In addition, the Lord's Prayer contains a series of petitions which ask the Father to act in various ways.

Three or more of these passages indicate that the Father (1) provides providential care, (2) sees and will reward certain actions, and (3) will forgive trespasses. Matthew primarily or exclusively associates each of these activities with the Father rather than the Lord or *theos.*

Providential care. Several verses in the Sermon on the Mount proclaim that the Father provides providential care for both the world and people. Near the close of Matt 5, Jesus declared that the Father "makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good and sends rain on the just and on the unjust" (5:45). After noting that the birds "neither sow nor reap nor gather into barns," he claimed that "your heavenly Father feeds them" (6:26). In a logion located outside the Sermon, he stated that a sparrow does not fall to the ground "without your Father" (10:29). Although all three of these logia have Lukan parallels, all of the Lukan parallels refer to *theos* or the Most High instead of the Father.[21] The claim that the Father provides providential care for the world is a Matthean claim rather than a Markan or Lukan claim.

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[18] Mowery, "God, Lord and Father," 26-27.

[19] Ibid., 28.

[20] This list includes two examples of the perfect tense verb *oiden* ("(he) knows," 6:8, 32) which is used as a present tense verb. Not included in this list is the verb *estin* ("(he) is") in 5:48.

[21] Matt 5:45 ("your Father in heaven")//Luke 6:35 ("(the) Most High"); Matt 6:26 ("your heavenly Father")//Luke 12:24 (*theos*); Matt 10:29 ("your Father")//Luke 12:6 (*theos*).

In the midst of the unit on the heavenly Father's care[22] (6:25-34), Jesus argued, "If God (*theos*) so clothes the grass of the field, . . . will he not much more clothe you, O people of little faith?" (6:30). This logion speaks of God's providential care for both the world and people. Jesus twice pointed to the Father's providential knowledge, for he declared that "your Father knows what you need before you ask him" (6:8) and that "your heavenly Father knows that you need all these things (i.e., food and clothing)" (6:32). The fourth petition of the Lord's Prayer, the petition for bread (6:11), seems to be asking the Father to supply our material needs.[23] After observing that human fathers know how to give "good gifts" to their children, Jesus promised that the Father will give "good things" to those who ask him (7:11). These "good things" may include at least some provision for physical needs.[24] When asserting that the Father provides providential care for people, Matthew preserved a theme already found in the Q material.[25]

Matthew tends to identify God as the Father when speaking of the divine Provider, for all but one of the passages discussed above refer to the Father. The exception, which occurs in 6:30, uses *theos*. Perhaps Matthew retained *theos* in this verse because the wording of this Q logion was so well-known.[26]

Rewards. Three verses in the Sermon promise that the Father sees and will reward certain actions. Although Jesus warned that those who perform pious deeds in public for the purpose of being seen by people will not have a "reward" (*misthos*) from the Father in heaven (6:1), he promised three times that the Father "who sees (*ho blepōn*) in secret will reward (*apodōsei*)" those who practice their piety in secret (6:4, 6, 18). The eschatological reward assumed by these verses contrasts with the temporal reward sought and attained by the hypocrites, who have their "reward" (*misthos*, 6:2, 5, 16). The noun *misthos* also occurs in 5:46 in a saying located between two references to the Father (5:45, 48).

When writing the words "your Father who sees in secret will reward you" (6:4, 6, 18), Matthew was probably retaining the wording of the pre-Matthean cultic didache.[27] No other verse in the First Gospel repeats this wording, and no other

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[22] This title is used by W. D. Davies and D. C. Allison, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to Saint Matthew* (ICC; Edinburgh: Clark, 1988) 1. 645.

[23] Even Guelich (*Sermon on the Mount*, 291-93) and Davies and Allison (*Matthew*, 1. 607-10), who argue that this petition has an eschatological dimension, first relate it to material needs.

[24] E. Schweizer, *The Good News According to Matthew* (Atlanta: Knox, 1975) 174; J. Lambrecht, *The Sermon on the Mount* (Wilmington: Glazier, 1985) 179. Cf. W. Grundmann, *Das Evangelium nach Matthäus* (THKNT 1; Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1968) 225.

[25] Matt 6:11//Luke 11:3; Matt 6:32//Luke 12:30, but not Matt 7:11//Luke 11:13. Matt 6:8 has no Synoptic parallel.

[26] Eighteen of the twenty-two words in 6:30, including the noun *theos*, also occur in Luke 12:28.

[27] C. Dietzfelbinger, "Die Frömmigkeitsregeln von Mt 6:1-18 als Zeugnisse frühchristlicher Geschichte," *ZNW* 75 (1984) 184-201, esp. 190; H. D. Betz, *Essays on the Sermon on the Mount* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985) 55-69; S. H. Brooks, *Matthew's Community: The Evidence of His Special Sayings Material* (JSNTSup 16; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1987) 44-46, 160-61, 174-75.

verse makes the Lord, *theos*, or the Father the subject of the verbs *blepō* ("see") or *apodidōmi* ("pay, reward").[28]

Forgiveness. Three verses in the Sermon associate the Father with the act of forgiving expressed by the verb *aphiēmi* ("forgive"). The fifth petition of the Lord's Prayer asks the Father to forgive our debts (6:12), and subsequent verses identify the circumstances under which the Father "will forgive" and "will not forgive" human trespasses (6:14, 15). All three of these verses stand within a section on prayer (6:5-15) which repeatedly identifies God as the Father but never as the Lord or *theos*. In addition, 18:35 refers to both the Father and forgiveness, though this verse does not make "Father" the subject of the verb "forgive." When associating the Father with forgiveness, Matthew retained a theme already present in Mark and the Q material.[29]

Matthew once associates *theos* with forgiveness. After hearing Jesus declare that "the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins" (9:6) and after witnessing a healing, the crowds "glorified God (*theon*) who had given such authority to people" (9:8). The "authority" which *theos* had given was presumably the authority to forgive sins. Note that the reference to *theos* in 9:8 is in a description of the reaction of the crowds. When writing *theos* rather than *patēr* in this verse, Matthew not only retained the divine name found in Mark 2:12 but also followed his practice of using *theos* in various descriptive comments but limiting *patēr* to the words of Jesus.[30]

Overview. This section has identified three activities which Matthew primarily or exclusively associates with the Father rather than the Lord or *theos*. The Father

(1) provides providential care (5:45; 6:8, 11, 26, 32; 7:11 (?) 10:29),
(2) sees and will reward certain actions (6:4, 6, 18; cf. 5:46; 6:1), and
(3) forgives trespasses (6:12, 14, 15).

Although the verses which announce the Father's providential care lack a distinctive vocabulary, the three verses which declare that the Father sees and will reward certain actions use the verbs *blepō* and *apodidōmi* (6:4, 6, 18) and the three verses which refer to forgiveness use the verb *aphiēmi* (6:12, 14, 15).

Mark and/or the Q material associated the Father with two of these activities, namely, the provision of providential care for people and the forgiveness of trespasses; in addition, the pre-Matthean cultic didache presumably indicated that the Father sees and will reward certain actions. By retaining the pre-Matthean associations of the Father with these activities, Matthew showed that he agreed with

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[28] Davies and Allison, *Matthew*, 1. 584. The logion in 16:27 makes the Son of Man rather than the Father the subject of *apodidōmi*, and a parable indicates that the "lord (*kyrios*) of the vineyard" directed his *steward* to "pay" (*apodos*) the workers their "wages" (*misthos*, 20:8). The parable of the unmerciful servant repeatedly uses *apodidōmi* (18:25, 26, 28, etc.), and 18:35 claims that the Father will act like the master of the unmerciful servant if the disciples do not forgive one another; however, this parable never makes the servant's master the subject of *apodidōmi*.

[29] Matt 6:12 has a Q parallel (Luke 11:4), and 6:14 has a Markan parallel (11:25). Matt 6:15 has no Synoptic parallel.

[30] Mowery, "God, Lord and Father," 27.

these associations. The association of the Father with the providential care of the world is a distinctive Matthean emphasis.

III. The Activity of the Lord, God and Father in Matt 1-7

In terms of the number of references to the Lord, *theos* and the Father, the first seven chapters of the First Gospel successively shift the emphasis from the Lord to *theos* to the Father. The following table reports the number of occurrences of each of these divine appellations in various subsections of Matt 1-7:[31]

	Lord	*theos*	Father
Matt 1-2	6	1	0
Matt 3:1-4:16	2 or 3	7	0
Matt 4:17-25	0	0	0
Matt 5-7	1	5 or 6	17

Although the first two chapters tend to identify God as the Lord, verses 3:1-4:16 refer more frequently to *theos* than to the Lord. The Sermon on the Mount, which provides the first Matthean references to the Father, contains many more references to the Father than to either the Lord or *theos*.

What activities does Matthew ascribe to the Lord, *theos* and the Father in Matt 1-2, 3:1-4:16 and the Sermon on the Mount? This section will seek to answer this question.

Matt 1-2. All six of the references to the Lord in Matt 1-2 indicate that either the Lord or an angel of the Lord communicated with humans. The direct references to the Lord are in two occurrences of the fulfillment formula "in order that what was spoken by the Lord through the prophet might be fulfilled" (1:22; 2:15). Each occurrence of this formula indicates that the divine intention spoken by the Lord through an OT prophet has been fulfilled in the events narrated by Matt 1-2. Especially notable is the presence of *kyrios* in the formula in 2:15. Although this formula introduces an OT quotation in which the divine Speaker said, "Out of Egypt I called my son," it identifies the divine Speaker as *kyrios* rather than *patēr*.[32] The presence of *kyrios* rather than *patēr* in this formula accords with four Matthean patterns: the emphasis on the Lord in Matt 1-2, the association of the OT with the Lord (and *theos*) rather than the Father, the avoidance of references to the Father prior to the Sermon on the Mount, and the limitation of such references to words of Jesus. The four other references to the Lord in Matt 1-2 are in references to an "angel of the Lord" who spoke to Joseph in dreams (1:20, 24; 2:13, 19).

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[31] The divine epithet *kyrios* occurs in 1:20, 22, 24; 2:13, 15, 19; 3:3 (?); 4:7, 10; 5:33. Concerning the interpretation of the reference in 3:3, see note 6. *Theos* occurs in 1:23; 3:9, 16; 4:3, 4, 6, 7, 10; 5:8, 9, 34; 6:24, 30, 33 (?), the latter reference being textually uncertain. The divine epithet *patēr* occurs in 5:16, 45, 48; 6:1, 4, 6 bis, 8, 9, 14, 15, 18 bis, 26, 32; 7:11, 21.

[32] R. Pesch ("Der Gottessohn im matthäischen Evangelienprolog (Mt 1-2): Beobachtungen zu den Zitationsformeln der Reflexionszitate," *Bib* 48 [1967] 395-420) argues that Matthew placed references to the Lord in 1:22 and 2:15 because these verses introduce OT quotations containing the noun "son." In this manner, he argues, Matthew identified Jesus as God's Son. He fails to explain, however, why Matthew used *kyrios* rather than another divine name in these verses.

Although six references to the activity of the Lord or an angel of the Lord occur in Matt 1-2, only scattered references occur in Matt 3-28. Jesus once urged his disciples to "pray to the Lord of the harvest" (9:38), and he once addressed God as "Father, Lord of heaven and earth" (11:25). The OT quotation in 21:42 states that "this was done by the Lord,"[33] and two other OT quotations report that the Lord "said" (22:44) and "commanded" (27:10). The final Matthean reference to the Lord occurs in the reference to an "angel of the Lord" who appeared at Jesus' tomb (28:2). Given the widely-scattered locations of these references to the activity of the Lord in Matt 3-28, it is striking that Matthew concentrated six such references in Matt 1-2. These six references tie the events narrated by these chapters with the divine intention spoken by the Lord through the OT and through an angel.

The lone occurrence of *theos* in Matt 1-2 is in the words "God (*theos*) with us" which Matthew presents as the translation of "Emmanuel" (1:23). This translation represents the first in a series of Matthean christological references which contain *theos*.[34]

Matt 3:1-4:16. Although verses 3:1-4:16 contain five references to *theos* (3:9, 16; 4:3, 4, 6) followed by two references to "the Lord your God" (4:7, 10),[35] several of these references are in passages which do not refer to divine activity. Both of the references to "the Lord your God" are the objects of clauses, and two of the occurrences of *theos* are genitive modifiers in predicate nominative references to the "Son of God" (4:3, 6). Only three occurrences of *theos* are in passages which refer to the activity or potential activity of God. John the Baptist's declaration that "God is able from these stones to raise up children to Abraham" (3:9) testifies to God's potential power,[36] and the story of Jesus' baptism refers to the activity of the Spirit of God (3:16). When Jesus referred to "every word proceeding out of the mouth of God" (4:4), he affirmed that *theos* speaks. These three scattered verses provide the only references to the activity of *theos* in 3:1-4:16.[37]

Although *theos* occurs fifty-one times in the First Gospel,[38] only a fraction of these occurrences are in passages which refer to the activity of *theos*. Jesus testified in the Sermon on the Mount to God's providential care (6:30), and the crowds glorified God for giving "people" the authority to forgive sins (9:8). Jesus twice used *theos* when declaring, "If I cast out demons by the Spirit of God, then the kingdom of God has come upon you" (12:28), and he claimed in several sayings that *theos* spoke and is speaking through the OT (15:3, 4, 6; 22:31). He referred to "what God has joined together" (19:6), declared that "all things are possible with God" (19:26) and

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[33] This translation is from Schweizer, *Good News*, 413.

[34] "Son of God" occurs in 4:3, 6; 8:29; 14:33; 16:16; 26:63; 27:40, 43, 54. The presence of *theos* in these christological references needs to be studied in the light of such factors as the use of *theos* by a wide range of Matthean speakers, its frequent use by Jesus in words addressed to the devil and to Jewish leaders, and its comparative absence from his words to his disciples.

[35] In addition, Matt 3:3 refers to "the way of the Lord." See note 6.

[36] Davies and Allison (*Matthew*, 1. 309) suggest that, "From Matthew's perspective, God has in fact already raised up new offspring to Abraham: the Gentile Christians."

[37] Although 3:2 indicates that the kingdom "has come near," this verse refers to "the kingdom of heaven" rather than the "kingdom of God." Cf. 4:17.

[38] Schenk, *Sprache des Matthäus*, 285.

spoke of "the power of God" (22:29). References to God's rule occur in the phrases "the throne of God" (5:34; 23:22) and "the kingdom of God" (6:33 (?); 12:28; 19:24; 21:31, 43).

These references to the activity of *theos* are scattered throughout Matt 5-28. Unlike the first two chapters, which highlight the communicatory activity of the Lord, and unlike the Sermon on the Mount, which emphasizes the activity of the Father, no section of the First Gospel provides more than a few references to the activity of *theos*.

Sermon on the Mount. Matthew concentrated many more references to the Father in the Sermon on the Mount than in any of the four other great discourses. Although the Sermon contains seventeen references to the Father, none of the other great discourses contains more than four references.[39] The Sermon refers much more frequently to the Father than does any other equally lengthy portion of the First Gospel.[40]

All of the passages in the Sermon on the Mount which associate the Father with prayer, providential care, rewards and forgiveness identify the Father as "your (s.)/our/your (pl.) Father." The genitive personal pronouns "your (s.)," "our" and "your (pl.)" stress the personal relationship between the Father and Jesus' hearer(s). In contrast, none of the Sermon's references to the Lord or *theos* is modified by a genitive personal pronoun.[41]

Most of the Sermon's references to the activity of the Father are in 5:43-6:34. The verses which precede the Lord's Prayer associate the Father with prayer (5:44-45; 6:6, 7-8), proclaim the Father's providential care (5:45; 6:8) and promise that "your Father who sees in secret will reward you" (6:4, 6; cf. 6:1). The fourth petition of the Lord's Prayer presumably asks for the Father's providential care (6:11), while the fifth petition prays for the Father's forgiveness (6:12). The verses which follow the Lord's Prayer refer to the Father's forgiveness (6:14, 15), repeat the promise that "your Father who sees in secret will reward you" (6:18), affirm that the Father provides providential care (6:26, 32 7:11 (?)) and associate the Father with prayer (7:11).

Several petitions in the Lord's Prayer associate the Father with other divine activities. Although all three of the "thou petitions" contain third person imperatives, they all seem to call upon the Father to act.[42] The first petition ("let your name be

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[39] The second discourse (9:35-10:42) has four references (10:20, 29, 32, 33), the third discourse (13:1-52) has one reference (13:43), the fourth discourse (17:24-18:35) has four references (18:10, 14, 19, 35), and the fifth discourse (24:1-25:46 or 23:1-25:46) has two or three references (23:9; 24:36; 25:34).

[40] The references to the Father which are located outside the five great discourses are in 11:25, 26, 27 tris; 12:50; 15:13; 16:17, 27; 20:23; 26:29, 39, 42, 53; 28:19; cf. 21:31.

[41] The only Matthean references to the Lord or *theos* which are modified by such pronouns are in 4:7, 10; 22:37; 27:46 bis. See Mowery, "God, Lord and Father," 28-29.

[42] B. Gerhardsson, "The Matthaean Version of the Lord's Prayer (Matt 6:9b-13): Some Observations," *The New Testament Age: Essays in Honor of Bo Reicke* (ed. W. C. Weinrich; Macon: Mercer, 1984) 1. 210-13; Davies and Allison, *Matthew*, 1. 602-06. To say that these petitions call upon the Father to act does not exclude the possibility that one or more of them also call upon humans to act. See Luz, *Evangelium nach Matthäus*, 342-45.

made holy," 6:9c) is the only Matthean passage which associates the Father with this activity. The second petition ("let your kingdom come," 6:10a) is one of only a few Matthean passages which associate the Father with the kingdom.[43] The third petition ("let your will be done," 6:10b)[44] is the first in a series of Matthean references to the Father's will.[45] The sixth petition, which contains two requests ("lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil/the evil one," 6:13), is the only Matthean passage which associates the Father with these activities.[46]

The Sermon on the Mount contains many more references to the activity of the Father than to the activity of the Lord or *theos*. Apart from the reference to God's providential care (6:30), the Sermon's only references to the activity of *theos* are the references to God's reign in the phrase "the throne of God" (5:34) and in the textually uncertain phrase "the kingdom of God" (6:33).[47] The Sermon's lone reference to the Lord (5:33) does not refer to the activity of the Lord.

The Sermon on the Mount provides a series of references to the activity of the Father. The subsequent chapters, which contain more than two dozen references to the Father, provide many additional references to the activity of the Father. While some of these references provide additional pointers to the divine activities announced in Matt 5-7, others associate the Father with various other activities.[48] No other section of the First Gospel, however, contains nearly as many references to the activity of the Father as does the Sermon.

Matt 1-7. In terms of the number of references to the Lord, *theos* and the Father, the first seven chapters of the First Gospel sequentially shift the emphasis from the Lord (Matt 1-2) to *theos* (Matt 3:1-4:16) to the Father (Matt 5-7). In terms of the activity of the Lord, *theos* and the Father, these chapters shift the emphasis from the Lord (Matt 1-2) to the Father (Matt 5-7) without highlighting the activity of *theos*. The first two chapters frequently use the "biblical" epithet *kyrios* while stressing the communicatory activity of the Lord and an angel of the Lord. Although verses 3:1-4:16 frequently refer to *theos*, they provide only a few scattered references to the activity of *theos*. The Sermon on the Mount, which contains the first seventeen

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[43] When referring to the kingdom, Matthew not only tends to prefer the phrase "the kingdom of heaven" but also writes "the kingdom of God" (6:33 (?); 12:28; 19:24; 21:31, 43) more frequently than "the kingdom of my/their Father" (13:43; 26:29). Concerning the Father and the kingdom, cf. also 6:33 (?) and 25:34.

[44] The translations of the three "thou petitions" were taken from Guelich, *Sermon on the Mount*, 289-90.

[45] Besides repeating this petition in Gethsemane (26:42), Jesus referred to what the Father wills (18:14; 26:39) and to the person who "does" the Father's will (7:21; 12:50; cf. 21:31). The Jewish leaders once spoke of what *theos* "desires" (*thelei*, 27:43).

[46] Cf. 27:43, which associates the verb "deliver" with *theos*.

[47] The Sermon's other occurrences of *theos* (5:8, 9; 6:24) do not refer to divine activities.

[48] Many of these references associate the Father with prayer (11:25, 26; 18:19; 26:39, 42), providential care (10:29), rewards (10:32; 20:23; 25:34) and the divine will (12:50; 18:14; 26:39, 42; cf. 21:31). Other verses indicate that the Father revealed things (11:25; 16:17; cf. 10:20), has special knowledge (11:27b; 24:36), "did not plant" certain plants (15:13), will judge people (18:35; cf. 10:33) and could send legions of angels (26:53).

references to the Father, associates the Father with providential care, rewards, forgiveness and various other activities. The central portion of the Sermon contains most of these references.

In addition to referring to God as the Lord, *theos* and the Father, Matthew refers to God in a number of other ways, including the use of the divine passive.[49] A complete survey of the activity of God in the First Gospel would need to take into account the many passages which refer to God in these other ways.

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[49] J. Jeremias, *New Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus* (New York: Scribner's, 1971) 9-11.

Paul's Theology: Whence and Whither? A Synthesis (of sorts) of the Theology of Philemon, 1 Thessalonians, Philippians, Galatians, and 1 Corinthians

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In retrospect, of all the words that have been written over the past three years for the Pauline Theology Group, the most significant and prophetic are those tucked into a footnote of one of the earliest papers: "As long as we do not carefully define just what is and is not meant by 'theology,' each of us will be looking for something different and our conversations with one another will be all the more precariously grounded."[1] Since those words were penned in 1986, the struggle to define what, exactly, this group is looking for has continued unabated. The struggle is compounded by the fact that we are, by agreement, looking for two different things, the theologies of the individual letters and an ongoing synthesis of these theologies. Not only, however, are we not in obvious agreement over precisely what is meant by the theology of a particular letter, we are also not in obvious agreement over how a synthesis of the theologies of the various letters should be construed. Does a synthesis seek to find patterns through a summation of the individual theologies or does it seek somehow to find a locus of commonality *behind* the divergent expressions of Paul's thought?

Enough papers of both types—individual theologies and ongoing syntheses—have now been written for us to assess the various approaches that have been recommended and tried. Indeed, such an assessment seems timely, for if our conversations are to continue to be fruitful, we need to reach clarity, if not agreement, on how we should define the theology of a particular letter and what we can hope to achieve through a synthesis of these theologies. Thus although I was assigned the task of writing a synthesis paper on the theology of the letters considered to date (Philemon, 1 Thessalonians, Philippians, Galatians, 1 Corinthians), I would like to preface this assignment with a survey and assessment of our earlier work. If the preface threatens to dominate the paper, so be it. What is at stake here is not only a sense of direction but also of definition. What do we mean when we speak of the theology, e.g., of 1 Thessalonians or of Philippians? What should a synthesis of these theologies focus on? And how are these entities—the theology of a given letter and the synthesis of the various theologies—related to our larger goal of a fresh understanding of Paul's theology in general? When we have answered these

[1] J. Paul Sampley, "Overcoming Traditional Methods of Synthesizing the Theology of Individual Letters," *SBL 1986 Seminar Papers*, 604, n. 6.

questions perhaps we can see more clearly the concrete task of this particular paper. Let's consider, then, the ground we have covered and where we seem to be headed.

Whence? The Individual Letters

It was agreed in principle, if not always rigorously actualized in practice, that the theology of each individual letter would be defined without recourse to the other letters of the Pauline corpus. Each "word on target"[2] would be approached separately and in isolation from words Paul targeted for different audiences. It was further agreed that this phase of the task would be descriptive, but descriptive of what? Most contributors have assumed that the theology of a given letter is to be located somehow in that letter's argument, but is it in the surface structure of the argument, as Krentz and Jewett have argued (albeit in their own separate ways) for 2 Thessalonians, and as Dunn has argued for Galatians?[3] Or is it in a *deep* structure of binary opposition, such as the conflict between Christ and cosmos that Gaventa has presented as the basic theological structure of Galatians?[4] Actually we have not yet achieved complete agreement that the theology of a given letter is to be equated without remainder with its argument. Sampley, for example, has reminded us that each letter was written to restore a theological *balance* that had been "twisted askew" by the congregation. Thus the "theology" of a given letter cannot, in Sampley's view, be read directly out of its argument. It lies rather in the tension between the community's misplaced emphasis and Paul's often deliberately exaggerated response.[5] Martyn also takes seriously the tension between Paul's argument in a given letter and the addressees' situation, but he locates the "theology" of a letter somewhat differently from Sampley. According to Martyn, the argument of Galatians was intended to generate an "aural event" when it was read aloud to the Galatian congregations, and the "theology" of the letter is to be identified, not with the argument of the letter itself nor simply with the tension between the letter's argument and recipients' stance, but with the theological *event* precipitated by the argument.[6]

Three related but nevertheless distinct definitions have thus been proposed for the theology of a given letter: (1) the theological argument of that letter (variously defined), (2) the tension between the argument of the letter and the theological position of the community, and (3) the theological event evoked by the argument of the letter. Several observations are possible here. First, definitions one (theology as

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[2] This helpful phrase is J. C. Beker's; see "The Method of Recasting Pauline Theology: The Coherence-Contingency Scheme as Interpretive Model," *SBL 1986 Seminar Papers*, 596.

[3] See Edgar Krentz, "Through a Prism: The Theology of 2 Thessalonians" (1986); Robert Jewett, "The Theology of 2 Thessalonians as a Pauline Letter" (1986); James D. G. Dunn, "The Theology of Galatians," *SBL 1988 Seminar Papers*, 1-16. [Unpublished papers presented to the Pauline Theology Group are cited by title, date, and the author's pagination.]

[4] Beverly Roberts Gaventa, "The Singularity of the Gospel: A Reading of Galatians," *SBL 1988 Seminar Papers*, 17-26.

[5] Sampley, "Overcoming Methods," 605-6.

[6] J. Louis Martyn, "Human Entry into the Covenant Community on the Original Conditions, or Divine Invasion into the Enslaved Cosmos on No Conditions? A response to the paper by J. D. G. Dunn," (1988), 10-11.

argument) and two (theology in tension) can be reconciled by insisting that the task of describing the argument of a letter *includes* defining carefully the context in which that particular argument has been formulated. With regard to the third definition (theology as event), I would readily admit that Paul's letters caused (or were intended to cause) a response (theological event) within the community to which they were addressed and that the probable shape of this event is, in part at least, recoverable from our understanding of the argument of the letter and the situation to which it was directed. Nevertheless, this event, while aroused by the theological argument of a letter and thus intimately related to it, seems distinct from this theology. The one arises in Paul's head and is communicated by a letter. The other is generated by this letter and arises in the community. The letter links them but does not permit equating them. Thus I resist identifying an aural event as the *letter's* theology and would prefer finding another label for it in order to distinguish the two. Perhaps we could refer to the theology of Paul's letter to, e.g., the Galatians and the theological event *intended by* Paul's letter to the Galatians. Both, however, could serve as legitimate pointers to the larger entity that is the ultimate goal of our quest, Paul's theology.

Whence? Ongoing Syntheses

If the quest for the theologies of the individual letters is still plagued with conceptual difficulties, the attempts to generate a gradual synthesis of these theologies have faced even greater problems. Not only does the lack of agreement concerning the definition of a given letter's theology generate problems for the synthetic task, but the amount of data to be synthesized, though manageable in the early stages of our work, is rapidly becoming overwhelming. Even more problematical, however, is the fact that here, too, there is no agreement on what, precisely, is the object of this synthesis and what its relationship is to the larger task of defining Paul's theology. We may still be debating, for example, exactly what we mean by "The Theology of Galatians," but however this theology is defined, it is at least controlled by the argument of the canonical letter to those churches. But what do we mean when we speak of "Paul's Theology" in general?

Thus far two things are clear. First, there is complete agreement that Paul was *not* a systematic theologian. Thus we are not looking for a theological or doctrinal system, and certainly not a doctrine or system imposed by a later age. That much we agree on. Furthermore, there is agreement—in this group at least—that the deconstructive analyses of recent years that deny all coherence to Paul's thought do not pass our "test of satisfaction."[7] If Paul was not a *systematic* theologian, there seems nevertheless to be a pattern, a center, a commitment, a conviction, a vision, an underlying structure, a core communication, a set of beliefs, a narrative, a coherence—something—in Paul's thoughts or behind them that dispels any abiding sense of mere opportunism or intellectual chaos on the part of the apostle. Yet the Group has also agreed that nowhere does this core, center, vision, etc. come to expression in a non-contingent way.[8] All of Paul's words are words on target,

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[7] This test was proposed last year by Richard Hays; see "Crucified with Christ: A Synthesis of 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Philemon, Philippians, and Galatians," *SBL 1988 Seminar Papers*, 321.

[8] See, e.g., Paul J. Achtemeier's comments in his response to Beker (1986), 8.

addressed to and shaped for a particular community and its needs. Is it the goal, then, of the synthesis papers to summarize and systematize these words on target or should these papers attempt to get behind the contingent expressions? If so, how far behind them dare we or need we go and how shall we get there?

Actually the first question is whether it is *possible* to get behind Paul's specific words and reconstruct the center of his thought. An affirmative answer is, of course, the presupposition of Bultmann's magisterial work, and Käsemann, though so often in disagreement with his former teacher, here concurs.[9] Some members of our group, however, are not as sanguine about the task. Beker, for example, derides its artificiality. While arguing vigorously for the existence of a coherent center to Paul's thought, he questions on principle any attempt to construe this coherence with "linguistic precision." Any "attempt to go 'behind the text' . . . means that we reduce Paul's apostolic intent of proclaiming an intelligible and clear gospel to a 'Mitte' which is located in Paul's preconceptual disposition."[10] Scroggs, on the other hand, challenges the very possibility of fulfilling the task since the contingent nature and limited number of Paul's letters precludes easy identification of the core. "We may find coherence," he says, "but we should not claim that that coherence represents the core of Paul."[11] Finally, Reumann, in one of the earliest synthesis papers, argued that while the quest for the center of Paul's thought may be possible, it is not timely, "At this stage it is work enough to try to be somewhat descriptive."[12]

Such statements should give pause to anyone still convinced that the center of Paul's thought will be easily—or ever—recovered. Yet the sense of a center remains and it does not seem fully satisfied by summaries of the theological statements in the various letters. But if we continue our quest for the "heart and driving force"[13] of Paul's theology, what exactly is it that we are looking for? Various suggestions have been made: Paul's beliefs or conceptions,[14] his convictions,[15] a foundational story.[16] Let's consider first the recent proposal that the guiding center of Paul's thought is a narrative. It could change the direction of our quest.

Whither? Narrative or Theology?

Richard Hays proposed last year, as Stowers did more briefly the year before,[17]

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[9] Käsemann argues that the center of Paul's theology can be precisely defined, but he uses only Romans and 2 Corinthians to locate it ("Spirit and Letter," *Perspectives on Paul* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971] 138).

[10] Beker, "Recasting," 601.

[11] Robin Scroggs, "A Synthesis of Paul's Thought in 1 Thessalonians, Philippians, and Galatians," (1988), 3.

[12] J. Reumann, "The Theologies of 1 Thessalonians and Philippians, Concerns, Comparison and Composite," *SBL 1987 Seminar Papers*, 532.

[13] N. T. Wright, "Toward a Synthesis of Pauline Theology: 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Philippians, and Philemon," (1987), 3.

[14] Ibid., 2; see also Krentz, "Prism," 1.

[15] V. P. Furnish, "Summary Remarks in Response to Paul Sampley, Norman Petersen, J. Christiaan Beker, and Paul Achtemeier," (1986), 2; Furnish acutally refers somewhat more expansively to "the presuppositions, convictions, and concerns which inform and thereby distinguish Paul's interpretation of the gospel."

[16] So Hays, "Crucified with Christ," 324-6.

[17] Stanley Stowers, "Response to Mary Ann Getty," (1987), 5.

"that the ground of coherence in Paul's thought is to be found not in a system of theological propositions . . . but in [the] kerygmatic story of God's action through Jesus Christ."[18] Only allusions to this foundational story can be found in Paul's letters, but out of these Hays has pieced together the outline of a narrative that runs from God's initial promise to Abraham to the parousia of the Lord Jesus. Between these points the story includes the fulfillment of the promise in the death and resurrection of Jesus and the present life of the community in the power of the Spirit. According to Hays, this foundational story guides Paul's thoughts and provides the basis for their essential coherence, "As [Paul] confronts pastoral problems in his churches, he responds to them by thinking through the situation in light of the story, plotting the community's place within the unfolding narrative."[19] The diverse emphases of the various letters arise, then, because Paul appeals to different parts of the story to address different situations. The essential coherence of that story, however, remains unchanged and provides the unifying thread to Paul's thought.

Now it is not to be doubted that Paul would agree to the truth of the narrative that Hays has extracted, both as a whole and in all of its particulars. Whether, however, we are justified in regarding this narrative as the primary seat of the coherence of the Pauline corpus remains, I think, an open—and important—question. I raise the following points.

Hays himself concedes the allusive quality of the narrative in Paul's letters.[20] This does not, of course, constitute sufficient grounds for challenging its centrality to Paul's thought, for the narrative could be so foundational that it only rarely comes to explicit expression. Yet the elusive quality of the story does generate difficulties, for it means that we are looking for something that Paul does not fully articulate in every letter. This has led Hays to some cross-referencing among the letters that seems occasionally to force the foundational story on them instead of locating it in them. Hays, for example, was not exactly *incorrect* when he identified the "living and true God" of 1 Thess 1:9 as "surely the God of Abraham," but, to recall Hays's own words, would we ever know that from reading 1 Thessalonians?[21] The actual issue in this verse is true God versus false gods—monotheism—and not the God of Abraham. The influence of the story on the argument thus seems at times to be questionable.

This leads to a second point. In discussing the concept of "theology as narrative," G. W. Stroup points to what he sees as a frequent methodological defect: "At best they offer a vague description of 'story' and then use it as an excuse, rather than as a systematic principle, for the discussion of other themes."[22] I have much the same feeling about Hays's proposal, though *his* description of the story is quite detailed. Nevertheless, his fine discussions of "Israel, Gentiles, and Election," "The Messiah and the People of God," and "The Community's Cruciform Role in the Drama" do not seem to depend on the identification of a narrative *qua* narrative as the infrastructure of Paul's thought. Indeed, I have the uneasy feeling that this proposed narrative foundation fits a bit too comfortably with the current interests of contemporary theology. Are we not running the risk of having later generations accuse

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[18] Hays, "Crucified with Christ," 324.
[19] Ibid., 325.
[20] Ibid., 324.
[21] Ibid., 323.
[22] "A Bibliographical Critique," *Theology Today* 32 (1975), 134.

us of forcing our own agenda on Paul, much as the Reformers did in the past? If we have deemed it illegitimate of the Reformers to have imposed the categories of their debate on Paul's thought, we should be very cautious when today we find in Paul evidence of an interest in story similar to our own. Thus I still need to be convinced that Paul approached the problems in his churches "by thinking through the situation in the light of the (foundational) story." We really *do not know* if Paul did that or if that is the *only* way Paul approached problems, and if it was not, then it is difficult to justify on the basis of the letters themselves the claim that a foundational *story* provides the ground of coherence in Paul's thought.

Moreover, to affirm a story at the center seems to me to change radically the object of our quest. From our inception as the Pauline Theology Consultation, the object of our research has been something called "Pauline Theology." There has been some discussion over whether "Paul's Thought" is not a more valid label for what we are seeking to define, but "Paul's Thought" and "Paul's Theology" (if not "Pauline Theology," which is seen by some as a label best reserved for contemporary systematizations of what the apostle wrote) are viewed by most as essentially interchangeable labels to describe the presuppositions, convictions, and concerns that inform and distinguish Paul's interpretation of the gospel.[23] Doesn't it change the nature of our quest in fundamental ways to speak now of a search for the foundational story, especially since Paul's presuppositions, convictions, and concerns have already operated on the story? That is to say, the narrative that Hays has outlined is probably not the story that Paul received. It seems to bear clear traces of Paul's contributions to it. Are, for example, the universal implications of the Abrahamic promise part of the pre-Pauline tradition or do they derive from Paul? How much of the theological reflection on the death of Jesus antedates Paul and how much is Paul's own? Is the understanding of the significance of Jesus' faithfulness (or faith in Jesus) Paul's own insight or an insight that he received from others? It seems to me that the story does not simply influence Paul's theological statements to the various churches, but Paul's theology or thought has influenced the story itself. If that is the case, then Paul's theology or thought lies behind this version of the foundational story and remains, I think, the valid object of our quest. With this "foundational story," then, we have not yet reached the foundation. Indeed, we need to visualize the situation in a somewhat different way.

Another Model for Construing Paul's Theology

Various models or metaphors have been proposed by members of the Group to help clarify our understanding of Paul's theology. Some suggestions, like ellipses, binary stars, and electromagnetic fields, have had short but useful life spans. Two images, however, keep coming back into the conversation, suggesting perhaps their greater pedagogical and hermeneutical potential: a jigsaw puzzle and a lens. These two images were used, of course, in very different ways in the rhetoric of the papers. The puzzle image was used to underscore the very real difficulty of the task of delineating Paul's theology, if not to indicate a growing sense of despair. Thus, for example, Scroggs spoke of missing pieces of a puzzle impressed with a vague picture while Baird warned us that the pieces keep changing shape even as we try to fit them

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[23] This definition is Furnish's: see note 15.

together.[24] The lens image, however, has been put to more positive use to convey an understanding of Paul's theology as an *activity*, for something *passes through* a lens and is transformed by it.

This understanding of Paul's theology as an activity is, I believe, crucial to our task, though occasionally it tends to be obscured. Thus, for example, when Wright defined Pauline theology as "that integrated set of beliefs which may be supposed to inform and undergird Paul's life, mission and writing" and then specified the content of this set of beliefs,[25] a static view of theology seemed presupposed. Later in his paper, however, this gave way to a larger vision, "What, if anything, did Paul *do* with these beliefs? . . . How has he *modified* the Jewish doctrine of election? . . . How has the Pharisaic attitude to the Gentiles . . . *been taken up and reshaped*, and why has it been done like this? Questions such as these . . . are the stock-in-trade of what 'pauline theology' is all about."[26] Likewise Krentz defined theology as "a disciplined *response* to human need, hope, and aspiration in a given situation on the basis of a fundamental religious commitment,"[27] and Hays pushed us "to study the hermeneutical *transformations* that Paul performs."[28] All of these statements point to a construal of theology as an activity, but an activity more complex than the rather simple optical images have conveyed.

The images that have been presented so far have been of simple optical systems, with a single "lens" or "prism." Krentz, for example, defined *commitment* as "the prism through which the illumination of a theologian's thought is reflected."[29] Somewhat later Hays defined our task as seeking "to trace the contours of the hermeneutical lens through which Paul projects the images of the community's symbolic world."[30] Yet as I played with these ideas it became increasingly clear that this metaphor, with its single optical device (lens or prism) does not adequately or accurately construe the full range of activities that constitute Paul's theological process. We need to think in terms of a more complex series of activities, all of which contribute to Paul's theology and none of which in isolation *is* Paul's theology. If we retain the optical metaphor for a moment longer, we might begin to imagine the following.

The *raw material of Paul's theology* (the kerygmatic story, scripture, traditions, etc.) passes through the *lens of Paul's experience* (his common Christian experience as well as his unique experience as one "set apart by God for the gospel") and generates a *coherent (and characteristic) set of convictions.* These convictions, then, are refracted through a prism, Paul's *perception of the situations that obtain in various communities*, where they are resolved into specific *words on target for those communities.*

Even this model distorts terribly. It is clear, for example, that Paul's convictions continue to shape his understanding of the kerygmatic story, and that this shaped story, along with the convictions and theological conceptions that arose from it, are

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[24] Scroggs, "Synthesis," 3-4: William Baird, "Response to Richard B. Hays," (1988), 1.

[25] Wright, "Toward a Synthesis," 2.

[26] Ibid., 18 (emphasis mine).

[27] Krentz, "Prism," 1 (emphasis mine).

[28] Hays, "Crucified with Christ," 335 (emphasis mine).

[29] Krentz, "Prism," 1. In a later response to my comments on his paper, Krentz changed the metaphor somewhat: apocalyptic eschatology "is the prism through which the basic commitment is refracted" (p. 1).

[30] Hays, "Crucified with Christ," 319.

brought to bear on a specific situation. Yet I hope to clarify at least a few points with this model. First it helps to locate all the various aspects of Paul's theology that we have been discussing. Paul's theology is not a set of beliefs or religious convictions or a kerygmatic story, but an activity that embraces all of these. The model also emphasizes the shaping role of experience in the process and formally acknowledges "theology" as an activity rather than as a set of theological propositions or presuppositions. Indeed, it suggests a working definition of Paul's theology as his critical appropriation and application of the Christian witness,[31] a definition that embraces not only Paul's thought world, his thoughts, and his targeted communication of them,[32] but also the process of movement from one to the other.

If this is a reasonable definition of Paul's theology, then it raises serious questions about the desirable focus and contribution of a synthesis paper and the relationship of such a paper to the papers on the individual letters. If a synthesis is construed as a summation and organization of the discrete elements of Paul's thought that have appeared in the various letters, it can actually *synthesize* the contents of the papers on the individual letters. Yet it is not clear that such a synthesis contributes significantly to an understanding of Paul's theology as I have defined it here. Overarching patterns may become visible, but there is always a danger that these patterns are our own creation. More seriously, the discrete circumstances of each instance of Paul's theologizing will be lost and the activity that is Paul's theology will be replaced by a pattern of possible outcomes. It seems that to address this activity effectively means going back to the texts themselves and focusing there on *how* Paul has interpreted the theological data at his disposal and *how* theological conceptions and religious convictions have consistently structured his argument. Some papers have already begun to do this,[33] though the task is gargantuan even for a single letter and much more so for a corpus of letters. These papers, however, are not synthesis papers in the strict sense of the term, nor can they be. They cannot effectively build on the foundation of the individual theology papers because they are, for the most part, focusing on a different aspect of the letters. If the individual theology papers focus on the specific argument Paul has crafted for a particular congregation, a "synthesis" paper conceived in this way seeks to understand the fundamental presuppositions or convictions that lie behind and influence all the arguments. This requires, for the most part, a new beginning, a new focus on the texts themselves. I propose, then, to turn back to 1 Thessalonians and to attempt to locate in that letter the basic convictions that undergird its argument. Once these are isolated in this relatively

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[31] I have found very helpful here C. M. Wood's *Vision and Discernment* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars, 1985), 21-35.

[32] Sampley, "Overcoming Methods," 603: though Sampley did not emphasize these concepts in his paper, preferring the term "gospel" to define the focus of our search, Petersen argues persuasively that these three categories were more helpful in analyzing Paul's thought ("Response," 3). Scroggs, however, has questioned whether this triadic formulation does not imply more rigid distinctions than were actually operative in Paul's theology ("Synthesis," 2-3). By emphasizing theology as an activity that involves movement from one category to another, I have hoped to overcome that problem.

[33] Thus Wright has focused on how Paul has reworked the Jewish doctrines of monotheism and election while Hays addressed the question of Paul's appropriation and application of the kerygmatic story.

short letter, I will test the results against data in the other letters. This analysis will be rather superficial. I can do no more in a paper of this nature and length than to indicate possible directions for further work.

1 Thessalonians: The Quest for Convictions

How does one locate the presuppositions and convictions that underlie and undergird Paul's argument? A starting point will be to look for the warranting statements in the argument, the statements that Paul assumes are so basic that they can support an argument while requiring themselves no further confirmation.[34]

After the opening salutations, Paul follows his expression of thanks (εὐχαριστοῦμεν) with three participial phrases. The first complements the main verb (μνείαν ποιούμενοι . . .), the second expresses the content of Paul's thanks (μνημονεύοντες ὑμῶν τοῦ ἔργου . . .), while the last (εἰδότες . . . τὴν ἐκλογὴν ὑμῶν) may be construed as causal, providing then the warrant for Paul's attitude of thanksgiving: "For we know, brethren beloved by God, that he has chosen you" (RSV). This statement of election does not function, however, as a final warrant, for it is in turn backed by the statement in v. 5 concerning the empowering presence of the Holy Spirit in Paul's ministry: ὅτι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐγενήθη εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐν λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν δυνάμει καὶ ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ [ἐν] πληροφορίᾳ πολλῇ. This statement, however, is itself grounded in evidence that the Thessalonians had observed: καθὼς οἴδατε οἷοι ἐγενήθημεν [ἐν] ὑμῖν δι' ὑμᾶς. Where, then, in this chain of statements is the ultimate warrant? One senses at the foundation of Paul's argumentative logic his dual convictions of the Thessalonians' election and his own spirit-directed commission, but the logic rests ultimately on experiences that the Thessalonians can confirm.

Elsewhere in the letter these two convictions (election and the confirming presence of the Spirit) reappear in the argument. Thus in 1:6b Paul interprets without further explanation the Thessalonians' joy in the face of tribulation as deriving from the Holy Spirit (μετὰ χαρᾶς πνεύματος ἁγίου) and in 2:2 he affirms without further comment that his own courage in the face of affliction came from God (ἐπαρρησιασάμεθα ἐν τῷ θεῷ ἡμῶν). A few verses later (2:4) Paul asserts as part of his defense that he has been approved by God (καθὼς δεδοκιμάσμεθα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ . . .) and later in the same chapter (v. 12) he suggests essentially the same thing of the Thessalonians when he reminds them of his admonishments to walk worthily of *the God who called them* (ἀξίως τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ καλοῦντος ὑμᾶς). Paul's subsequent reference (v. 13) to God "who is working in you" (ὃς καὶ ἐνεργεῖται ἐν ὑμῖν) fits this pattern of assertions, though here it again receives further grounding by a reference to the Thessalonians' experience (v. 14). On the other hand, a later reference to "God who gives his Holy Spirit to you" (4:8) stands without further confirmation.

These statements asserting that God (through the Holy Spirit) is the power behind Paul's proclamation of the gospel and the Thessalonians' life in it and, further, that Paul has been elected to his task as the Thessalonians have been elected as God's beloved seem to function at a fundamental level in the argument. Though an affirmation of God's election and presence is appropriate to any situation of persecution,

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[34] While I do not completely embrace his approach, I have found D. Patte's discussion of faith as a convictional pattern helpful here: see *Paul's Faith and the Power of the Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 1-27.

and certainly the Thessalonian church was in such a situation, these assertions are not the argumentative goal of the argument but serve repeatedly to undergird it. It is important to note how they function in the argument. God's election of the Thessalonian Christians, their status as "Beloved by God," is the primary ground for Paul's expression of thanksgiving. The presence of the Holy Spirit is regarded as proof of this status, and this presence can be detected in the (unspecified) nature of Paul's actions (1:5) and in the joy and courage both Paul and the Thessalonians exhibit in the face of affliction (1:6, 2:2). Somewhat later in the letter Paul uses the concept of election to ground his ethical exhortations (2:12) and, in a subtle shift from his earlier argument, finds evidence of God's presence with the Thessalonians in the suffering which aligns them with the other churches ἐν χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ (2:13). Thus the convictions of the election of the Thessalonian Christians and the sealing of that election through the presence of the Holy Spirit in their congregation emerge as fundamental convictions through which Paul consistently interprets their world and motivates their behavior.

To these, other more subtle convictions might be added—the convictions that lie behind the address of the Thessalonians as ἀδελφοί, God as πατήρ ἡμῶν, and Jesus as κύριος, and the fundamental conviction behind the ethical admonitions of chapters four and five (cf. 4:3, 7). Thus one might summarize the convictions that seem to undergird this letter, its language, and its logic in the following way: God, through the Holy Spirit, is working through Paul and in the church which God has called. This call is not only a call of election, but also a call to community and to holiness.

It is not difficult to demonstrate that the same convictions can be found in the other letters under our purview. Indeed, to demonstrate this is probably an exercise in stating the obvious. When we turn to the other letters, however, the argument becomes much more complex and isolating its warranting level becomes correspondingly more difficult, yet the same threads emerge. In Phil 1:7, for example, Paul again grounds his thankfulness for the church in his conviction of their election (συγκοινωνούς μου τῆς χάριτος πάντας ὑμᾶς ὄντας). Ethical admonitions to the Philippians are grounded by the conviction of God's presence in or among them (2:13), and Paul cites the example of his own life to support this point: διώκω δὲ εἰ καὶ καταλάβω, ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ κατελήμφθην ὑπὸ Χριστοῦ [Ἰησοῦ] (3:12).

In Galatians the thread is somewhat clearer, though the conviction of a fundamental opposition between law and gospel also appears at the warranting level of the argument (2:19, 21, etc.). There is, of course, no expression of thanksgiving in this letter, but the opening statement of astonishment is rooted in the same conviction of election: "I am astonished that you are so quickly deserting *him who called you*" (1:6). Similarly, Paul's vigorous defense of his gospel appeals to his *own* sense of election (1:15). Later in the argument of the letter, as Paul seeks to convince the Galatians of the efficacy of grace appropriated through faith, it becomes clear that here, too, the conviction of the experience of God's grace rests, or ought to rest, on the detection of the active presence of the Spirit within the community. No "evidence" is presented here to demonstrate the presence of the Spirit, but the shared conviction of its presence functions at the basic, taken-for-granted level of the argument in 3:1-5:

> O foolish Galatians! Who has bewitched you, before whose eyes Jesus Christ was publicly portrayed as crucified? Let me ask you only this: Did you receive the Spirit by works of the law, or by hearing with faith? Are you

> so foolish? Having begun with the Spirit, are you now ending with the flesh? Did you experience so many things in vain?—if it really is in vain. Does he who supplies the Spirit to you and works miracles among you do so by works of the law, or by hearing with faith?

The issue of election is particularly strong in 1 Corinthians. Paul opens the letter by affirming not only his call (κλητὸς ἀπόστολος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ διὰ θελήματος θεοῦ) but also the Corinthians' (κλητοῖς ἁγίοις). This conviction reappears in the final verse of the thanksgiving, functioning there as part of the ultimate ground for Paul's confidence (1:9): "God is faithful, by whom you were called into the fellowship of his son, Jesus Christ our Lord." When the issue surfaces again a few verses later with renewed rhetorical emphasis (1:24, 26-30), it becomes clear that the concept of election or call no longer merely undergirds Paul's argument, it has instead become the focus of this argument. The Corinthians, it seems, have not grasped what election means. Since the significance of election is so prominent a part of the problem Paul faces with this church and since election is quite regularly confirmed by the Spirit, it is not surprising that there is also evidence of a dispute over the significance of the presence of the Spirit within the community (chaps. 12-14).

It is clear, then, from this brief survey, that the conviction of an election sealed by the presence of the spirit is not only in many ways the basis for what Paul has to say, it is also the basis for the act of writing itself. Not only is this obvious from the letters themselves, but in various ways the same points have been highlighted in earlier papers. Thus you will recall that Donfried and Krentz mentioned the primacy of the concept of call in 1 and 2 Thessalonians, respectively. Wright also, in an earlier synthesis, focused on monotheism and election as the emerging centers of Paul's theology, as did Hays.

Clearly we are beginning to achieve some consensus on at least one important component of Paul's theology or theological activity. I would, however, like to use the model I have so tentatively proposed in order to change somewhat the way we construe this. Wright, for example, has presented election and monotheism as a set of beliefs that functioned as "boundary markers" first within Judaism and then in the Pauline communities.[35] It seems to me that the evidence suggests, when you start with 1 Thessalonians, that these could serve as boundary markers when the circumstances of the community require it, but this is an application of these convictions, not an inherent aspect of them. A sense of call and of God's presence are rather basic convictions that Paul brings to his pastoral task of writing letters and there they can undergird the argument in various ways.

The centrality of the convictions of divine call and presence also sheds light on Hays's proposal that the kerygmatic story is the unifying feature behind Paul's

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[35] Wright, "Toward a Synthesis," 18: "Monotheism and election served not so much as abstract beliefs, mere propositions to which intellectual assent should be given by the thinking Jew, but as truths to be celebrated, as boundary markers round the community, as symbols of national and racial solidarity." Earlier on p. 4 he emphasized the importance of these boundary markers for Paul: "This is so [the vital importance of faith], not because he (Paul) is an Idealist wishing to achieve a coherence of abstract thought for its own sake, but because he is anxious about the boundary-markers of the communities he believes himself called upon to found and nurture."

letters. As I indicated earlier, I have no difficulty with the affirmation of the importance of this story to Paul and to his theology. But the story is not so important to Paul and his churches because it was the *kerygmatic* story, but because it was *their* story. By God's election they had been grafted onto it and their sense of being a part of this story of God's presence with God's people is the only reason for remembering the story and writing to the churches. I would thus argue that it is the conviction in this form, and only more distantly the story itself, that is part, at least, of the "heart and driving force" behind the various letters.

Conclusions

I make no claim to have uncovered the *center* of Paul's theology. It no longer seems completely accurate to speak of his theology in this way. I do not even claim to have written a "synthesis" paper in the strict sense of the word, for that seems to me to suggest that Paul's theology can be captured by a summary or synthesis of various statements. I have argued that instead we should self-consciously begin to construe Paul's theology as an activity,[36] and that way of construing it should change somewhat how we approach our task. Instead of focusing exclusively on the outcome of this activity or seeking to isolate a core of his theology, instead of looking for a set of doctrines, for example, or theological propositions, we need to address the far more complicated question of how Paul theologized. There are a number of ways to go about this. In my modest search for the underpinnings of his argument, I have been trying to understand some of the convictions Paul brought to this activity. Surely there are more, and these, too, need to be analyzed. We also need to look at the way Paul brings various theological conceptions to bear on his argument, and how he transforms them. A tidy summary of "Paul's theology" will not do. We need to look instead at Paul's theologizing. Baird's puzzle analogy seems very apt: the pieces do change shape as we look at them, and that is the very phenomenon we need to address.

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[36] I find exceedingly interesting Furnish's suggestion that while the "letters do not yield a *theology*, they do introduce us to Paul the *theologian*" ("Theology in 1 Corinthians," 2: emphasis his). This seems entirely compatible with my recommendations here.

Composite Texts and Oral Myths: The Case of the "Sermon" (6:20b-49)

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Introduction

The Q-Seminar appears to have accepted John S. Kloppenborg's basic proposal (in *The Formation of Q*) that the erstwhile document, Q, has at least two identifiable literary strata.[1] (Kloppenborg, of course, posits a third as well, effectively commensurate with the temptation narrative in 4:1-13.) Two distinct moments of broad compositional activity are discerned, largely on the basis of two criteria: (1) *continuity* of theme, implied audience, and patterns of speech; and (2) the observation of *discontinuity* or redactional breaks between and within blocks of otherwise cohesive materials, suggesting finally for Q a compositional chronology of, first, "wisdom" ($=Q^1$), then "apocalyptic" ($=Q^2$). Kloppenborg (in *The Formation of Q*) is careful to distinguish this literary history of the document from the history of its various "traditions," though tradition-historical analyses are often part of the set of observations that lead to his literary judgments.

This year, the Q-Seminar has proposed to go a step beyond Kloppenborg's work and investigate the possible presence in Q of earlier, smaller collections of sayings (i.e., prior to Q^1). We have not stated why we would want to do this, which perhaps we ought to do. But in any case, one possible example of the proposed object of our discussion, often referred to in preliminary musings and elsewhere, is the so-called "sermon" (6:20b-49). It is not uncommon for this block of materials to be imagined as, in some way, an antecedent independent composition.[2]

According to James M. Robinson in his essay, "Early Collections of Jesus' Sayings":

> It is particularly the Sermon on the Mount/Plain that has come in question in recent years, as to whether it is to be recognized as a collection in its own right rather than being merely considered a segment of Q. Lc 6,20-49 does not seem to be just a random segment within a larger whole, for it is a well-rounded unit, beginning impressively with the beatitudes and concluding appropriately with a parable of the house built on rock or sand, to illustrate

[1] See John S. Kloppenborg, *The Formation of Q: Trajectories in Ancient Wisdom Collections* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987).

[2] Cf., e.g., Hans-Theo Wrege, *Die Überlieferungsgeschichte der Bergpredigt* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1968); Hans-Dieter Betz, *Essays on the Sermon on the Mount* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985).

what doing or not doing Jesus' "words" (Lc 6,47) ultimately means. This done may suspect that it existed as a composition in its own right.[3]

Did it or didn't it? How shall we decide? What constitutes "proof"? What will make one argument "more probable" than another? The burden of this paper is to try to delimit our conversation so that we are not speaking past each other, due to the fact that, while we all "see" the "same" things, different categorical frameworks for talking about those things, even if we use the "same" terms, have us drawing quite distinct conclusions.

I believe that one of the fault-lines of disagreement will be the notion of "oral composition," i.e., whether or not we accept it. It is my opinion that, even if the idea as such is theoretically defensible, it cannot be instituted methodologically, is thus of no practical use and, therefore, should not be part of the debate.

In what follows, then, I consider first possible documentary evidence that the "sermon" once existed apart from its present context in $Q^{(1)}$. I subsequently review Kloppenborg's composition analysis of the "sermon" in *The Formation of Q*. In a third section, the independent integrity of the "sermon" versus its integration with the rest of $Q^{(1)}$ is considered. finally, the supposition of the "sermon" as an erstwhile oral composition is entertained. In conclusion, beyond summarizing results of the foreoing investigations, abiding peculiarities are noted with further questions to be addressed.

Documentary Evidence

Other documents of early Christian literature include (variants of) the "same" sayings that are found in Q 6:20b-49. What do they suggest about the possibility of an earlier text that would be the "sermon" apart from its appearance in Q^{1}?

An obvious example is the Gospel of Thomas. What does it tell us? The parallels are as follows:

Luke	GThom
6:20	54
6:21	69b
6:22-23	68-69a
6:30	95
6:31	6
6:39	34
6:41-42	26
6:43-44	43
6:45	45

It becomes immediately apparent that GThom does not share with the "sermon" in $Q^{(1)}$ any sequence of sayings. This is an extremely significant observation, if only because one of the fundamental arguments for the erstwhile existence of Q (as a

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[3] See James M. Robinson, "Early Collections of Jesus' Sayings," in J. Delobel, *Logia: Les Paroles de Jésus – The Sayings of Jesus* (Mémorial J. Coppens; Leuven: Leuven Univ. Press, 1982) 391.

document) has been the shared order of sayings between Matthew and Luke independently of Mark.[4] The absence of anything similar for Q and GThom suggests that, at least in the case of the "sermon," no written text (= earlier independent composition) ever existed that each might have used.

The only possible coincidences of order are Luke 6:21, 22-23/GThom 69, 68 (the same sayings contiguous in both instances, but mutually reversed) and Luke 6:43-44, 45/Gthom 43, 45 (same sequence, but with a gap/insertion in between). We are talking here, however, about no more than doublets, the consistent association of two sayings with each other—and that, just twice and each case quite separate from the other. Is this a sufficient basis for positing anything (especially if, upon second look, Luke 6:43-45 could actually be conceived of as a single saying, of which GThom 43-45 would then be a variant)?

Of course, one could always think that GThom simply selected sayings from the prior, independent document now imbedded in Q(1) as its "sermon" and placed them wherever it seemed appropriate to the "fifth" evangelist in his larger work. But this seems to me to beg the question. There certainly is no way of proving this "imaginable" occurrence. Moreover, at least half of the "sermon" in Q is unparalleled in GThom. Luke 6:27-29, 32-36, 38, 40, 46-49 par. have no counterpart. Did GThom simply "have no use for" this part of the hypothetical document (i.e., the one perhaps shared by GThom and Q[1])? And how is that anything more than an argument from silence?

Further parallels only deepen the conviction that the "sermon" did not exist as an independent work prior to its composition by Q(1).

Luke	GThom	Did	Polycarp, Phil	2 Clem
6:20	54	-	2:3	-
6:21	69b	-	-	-
6:22-23	68-69a	-	-	-
6:27-28	-	1:3	12:3	13:4
6:29-30	-	1:4-5	-	-
6:30	95	-	-	-
6:31	6	-	-	-
6:32-33	-	1:3	-	13:4
6:36	-	6:2	-	-
6:38	-	-	2:3	13:2
6:39	34	-	-	-
6:41-42	26	-	-	-
6:43-44	43	11:8	-	-
6:45	45	-	-	-
6:46	-	-	-	4:1-2

The parallels to the "sermon" found in the Didache, Polycarp's letter to the Philippians, and 2 Clement are virtually all different from those of the GThom (only GThom 43 and Did 11:8 both parallel 6:43-44, while both GThom 54 and

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[4] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 47-49, 64-80; Vincent Taylor, "The Order of Q" and "The Original Order of Q," in *New Testament Essays* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972) 90-94, 95-118.

Polycarp, Phil. 2:3 recall 6:20). Moreover, except for 6:27-28 (=Did 1:3, Polycarp, Phil. 12:3; 2 Clem 13:4) the Didache, Polycarp (Phil) and 2 Clem differ completely from each other in their correspondence with the "sermon" (though Did 1:3 and 2 Clem 13:4 recall together as well 6:32-33). Thus, it is impossible to claim that there existed at any time an independent composition antecedent to the "sermon" in $Q^{(1)}$ that might account for the charted interconnections.

Let us look at parallels to the "sermon" within the New Testament.

Luke	Rom	James	1 Pet	Mark	John
6:22-23	-	-	3:14	-	-
-	-	-	4:13-14	-	-
6:27-30	-	-	3:9	-	-
6:27-28	12:14	-	-	-	-
6:37-38	2:1	4:11-12	-	4:24	-
6:40	-	-	-	-	13:16
-	-	-	-	-	15:20
6:43-44	-	3:12	-	-	-

Once again, we see the impossibility of positing any shared text as the basis of these correspondences before the "sermon" in $Q^{(1)}$.

Most notable is perhaps the fact that beyond the slight agreement of 6:37-38 with Mark 4:24, absolutely no relationship appears to exist at all between the "sermon" in $Q^{(1)}$ and Mark. Overlaps between Q and Mark are often taken to signal clusters of tradition prior to either of these documents.[5] In this case, then, the total absence of any (significant) correspondence would suggest the non-existence of an earlier composition like the "sermon."

All other parallels to the "sermon" from any heretofore unmentioned document are limited to variants of a single saying.[6] No documentary evidence thus exists that warrants even the suspicion that the "sermon" once existed apart from its composition as part of $Q^{(1)}$.

But are there perhaps other grounds for continuing to imagine the possibility?

Composition Analysis

Kloppenborg sums up his view of the composition history of the "sermon" as follows.

> Composition analysis has shown that a rather complex process contributed to the formation of 6:20b-49. We have already suggested that the association of the beatitudes with the admonition to love one's enemies presup-

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[5] See, e.g., Philip H. Sellew, "Early Collections of Jesus' Words: The Development of Dominical Discourses" (Th.D. diss., Harvard University, 1985).

[6] The following list does not claim to be exhaustive. It depends heavily upon Kloppenborg, *Q Parallels: Synopsis, Critical Notes & Concordance* (Sonoma, CA: Polebridge, 1988): 6:20ff.—Book of Thomas (NHC II, 7:145, 3-8); 6:27-28—POxy 1224 fr. 2 recto col. i; 6:31—Acts 15:29 (Western text); 6:37-38—1 Clem 13:1-2; 6:40—DialSav 53; 6:41-42—POxy 1:1-4; 6:44—ApocPet (NHC VII, 3:76, 4-8); 6:46—PEger 2 fr. 2 recto.

> posed that 6:22-23b was already part of the beatitudes, and that 6:35b may have been inserted into 6:35a,c at the time of this addition. Q 6:36 provides a transition between 6:27-35 and 6:37-38. Whereas the first half of the speech concerns violence, generosity and mercy, Q 6:39-45 is unified by the concern with speaking and teaching (or correcting). In typically sapiential style, the speech closes with a mild reproach and a contrast saying designed to express the urgency of attending to the teacher's words.[7]

The summary does not say everything. Elsewhere, Kloppenborg notes as well that the initial beatitudes in 6:20-23 "share many of the structural and formal features of the sapiential beatitude, in particular, serialization and placement at the beginning of an instruction." He also states that "Q 6:46, 47-49 provides a good example of the warnings which typically conclude these instructions."[8] Thus, although Kloppenborg himself does not explicitly draw the conclusion, it would be very easy to read viz. use his remarks as support for the contention that the "sermon" in Q was, at one time, a separate piece of tradition.

Is, however, the leading statement, namely, "Composition analysis has shown that a rather complex process contributed to the formation of 6:20b-49," in fact what Kloppenborg's own measured observations regarding each saying reveal? I think not. What Kloppenborg's composition analysis of Q 6:20b-49 succeeds in demonstrating is simply that the "sermon" is indeed a composite text. It was not spun out of whole cloth. The precise significance, however, of the various disjunctures that make it clearly composite remains to be determined.

To say that these disjunctures betray "a rather complex process" suggests (viz. presupposes) that the "sermon" is the result of a temporally extended aggregation of materials.[9] But, to go straight to the point, shy not understand the same disjunctures as simply evidence of the less than flawless work of the person(s) who, at one particular time and place, put the "sermon" (viz Q^1) together? (Are there reasons why we should not assume that the document, Q^1 = initial literary stratum of Q was composed at one particular time and place?)

Let us look then more closely at what Kloppenborg says about each section of the "sermon." Regarding the opening set of macarisms, Kloppenborg concludes: "The cluster of beatitudes in 6:20b-23 thus contains (at least) three components: 6:20b-21, a *Grundwort*, which was expanded and reinterpreted by vv. 22-23b. Verse 23c is a further expansion of vv. 22-23b."[10]

Actually, the so-called "Grundwort" contains itself three distinct components, namely, the three individual beatitudes, respectively 6:20b, 6:21a, and 6:21b. Thus, all together 6:20b-23 has really five notable "breaks" in its conglomeration. Interestingly, Kloppenborg reserves judgment in this case about the meaning of these fissures, claiming that "Determination of the stages at which these units were combined must await a discussion of the entire sermon."[11]

We move on to "love your enemies" (6:27-35). Kloppenborg writes:

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[7] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 187.

[8] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 188.

[9] See further Kloppenborg, "Formative and Redactional Layers in Q" (paper presented to the Q-Seminar at the 1988 SBL annual meeting, Chicago, IL).

[10] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 173.

[11] Ibid.

> That 6:27-35 is composite is obvious. The first four imperatives are formulated in the second-person plural and all agree in placing the imperative in first position. Verses 29, 30, on the other hand, are in the second-person singular and follow the form TW + participle + imperative (or prohibitive). Most see in vv. 29-30 the combination of two originally independent sayings: an admonition concerning the seizure of goods and a much more general admonition to generous giving (or lending). It goes without saying that the Golden Rule (6:31), formulated in the second-person plural, had a widespread and independent circulation apart from this particular context. Verses 32-33 obviously refer back to and presuppose vv. 27-28 while v. 34, which seems to have been formed on analogy to the preceding verses, grounds 6:30 (with DANIEZW).[12]

The saying as a whole is complex, to say the least, being, as Kloppenborg suggests, rather somewhat of a composition in itself. The logical stresses and strains plus rhetorical deviations (viz. variations) from verse to verse once again betray the (imperfect?) art of crafting an argument from traditional materials. But why think that the process of composition precedes that of the "sermon" (viz. Q^1) per se?

Kloppenborg follows Schürmann, who "suggests that the earliest elaboration of vv. 27-28 was 32-33, 35a,c [thus above, "Verses 32-33 obviously refer back to and presuppose vv 27-28"] and that vv. 29-31 and 35b came later. Since vv. 29, 30, 31 appear to be an insertion which interrupts the connection between the imperative (vv. 27-28) and their elaboration (vv. 32-33), this solution is plausible."[13]

The argument loses in plausibility, however, if, for example, 6:29-30 does not "interrupt" the "elaboration" of 6:27-28 by vv. 32-33 but, instead, itself elaborates vv. 27-28 in a certain way.[14] Furthermore, the "Golden Rule" of reciprocity in 6:31, while it may seem to contradict the one-sided reasoning of vv. 27-28, thus revealing that it was "added later," can also be understood by virtue of its collocation to undergird (i.e., further elaborate) the exhortation in 6:27-28 to "love your enemies" plus those in 6:29-30. For if one does not especially want to be hated by every foe or perpetuate forever the circle of assault and personal violence, by doing unto others what 6:27-28, 29-30 implore, one might hope to receive eventually like in return.[15] Otherwise, as vv. 32-33 make clear, establishing the preceding argument through consideration here of a contrary situation, the "Golden Rule" serves just as well the interests of "tax-collectors" and the "Gentiles." Positive reasons are finally suggested in conclusion (6:35b) for behaving in this admittedly unorthodox fashion.

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[12] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 176.

[13] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 177. Reference is made to the article by Schürmann, "Das Zeugnis der Redenquelle für die Basileia-Verkündigung Jesu," in *Logia*, 137, plus Schürmann's *Das Lukasevangelium* (Freiburg: Herder & Herder, 1969) 1.357.

[14] See, e.g., Robert C. Tannehill, "The 'Focal Instance' as a Form of New Testament Speech: A Study of Matthew 5:39b-42," *JR* 50 (1970) 372-85; also *The Sword of His Mouth* (Missoula, MT: Scholars, 1975) 68-72.

[15] Obviously not without a certain cost, as Gerd Theissen has remarked: see "Gewaltverzicht und Feindesliebe (Mt 5,38-48/Lk 6,27-36) und deren sozialgeschichtlicher Hintergrund," in *Studien zur Soziologie des Urchristentums* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1979) 160-79.

The point here is simply that the composite character of 6:27-35 does not require that we imagine earlier viz. later aggregations of material, gradually forming what we now know as 6:27-35, as though it were a piece of sedimentary rock, laid down in successive waves of application. The development of the complex, 6:27-35, need be nothing other than that of an argument, for which a variety of imperatives (vv. 27-28, 29-30), a well-known proverb (v. 31), a couple of comparisons (vv. 32-33), and a corresponding couple of promises (v. 35b) are employed. Again, a certain textual unevenness is evident. What is not evident, however, is why this would necessarily signal a compositional history antecedent to the production of the "sermon" itself (viz. Q^1).

Regarding 6:36, 37-38, Kloppenborg writes:

> Q 6:37a, (b), 38c may have circulated as an independent sapiential admonition, conceivably in a cluster of sayings such as is found now in 1 Clem 13:2. In Q, however, it further develops the preceding speech on love of enemies and, more specifically, explicates the programmatic injunction to imitate divine mercy (6:36).[16]

This is a very telling set of statements. Kloppenborg recognizes that the sequence of sayings at this point in the "sermon" represents a certain compositional logic. Vv. 37-38 "explicate" v. 36, which both in Luke and in Matthew (though to somewhat different effects) is attested to have elaborated in Q the previous set of sayings, namely, 6:27-35.[17]

> The effect of the juxtaposition of 6:37-38 and 6:36 is twofold: to interpret the ethic of non-condemnation as an act of mercy, and to see this mercy as imitation of divine action. This motif binds 6:36, 37-38 closely with 6:27-35.[18]

The coherence that exists here between 6:27-35, 36, 37-38 is not evinced elsewhere in any other document. It seems logical, therefore, to conclude that before the composition of the "sermon" in $Q^{(1)}$, no such combination of sayings had previously been made. The supposition based on variants of the saying in other documents, that 6:37a, 38c "may have circulated as an independent sapiential admonition, conceivably in a cluster of sayings such as is found now in 1 Clem 13:2," whether right or wrong in itself, has nothing at all to do with the compositional history of the "sermon," specifically, the possibility that it was once an independent work. Notions of oral tradition at this point serve only to obfuscate without other foundation the contrary evidence at hand. Why would we want to do that?

Regarding 6:39-45, Kloppenborg writes: "It is clear that this section of Q is composed of several originally independent sayings: 6:39, 40, 41-42, 43-44, and 45."[19] In other words, we face here a composite text, something, of course, we already

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[16] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 180-81.

[17] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 180: "Since Q already has an adequate conclusion for 6:27-35 in v. 35c, and since Matthew's OUN in 5:48 is undoubtedly redactional, it seems advisable to regard Luke's formulation—which includes asyndeton in v. 36 and KAI connectives in v. 37—as original."

[18] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 181.

[19] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 182.

knew. To say, however, that the various sayings in question were "originally independent," connotes more than the text itself sustains. All we know, in fact, is that variants of (some) of these sayings appear in other documents as well.

Kloppenborg continues:

> Evidently the basis for the association between v. 39 and vv. 41-42 is the common motif of impaired vision and the importance of sighted instruction or correction. Since 6:40 does not share this motif, it is most likely that 6:40 was already attached to 6:39 prior to its association with vv. 41-42. Schürmann rightly observes, "Presumably no one would have encumbered the coherence of vv. 39, 41-42 so severely by a subsequent addition of v. 40."[20]

I beg to differ, not knowing exactly what Schürmann presumes when he says, "Presumably." Why should we not rather understand the "encumberance" represented by 6:40 to the "coherence of vv. 39, 41-42" as the mark of redactional insertion? Far from being "most likely that 6:40 was already attached to 5:39," it is more likely that 6:40 was added to 6:39 *after* 6:39 and 6:41-42 were combined (i.e., as part of the redaction of Q^2). It is interesting that 6:40 is unparalleled elsewhere, whereas both v. 39 and vv. 41-42 have counterparts in GThom 34 and 26 respectively.[21]

"The following cluster of sayings (6:43-45) is also composite," notes Kloppenborg.[22] Indeed, according to the same, the three verses are made up of four quite distinct elements: 6:43 = "a proverb"; 6:44a = an "interpret[ation]" of 6:43; 6:44b = "further grounding for vv. 43, 44a"; and 6:45 = "an originally independent saying," now a "commentary word" (Wanke). Nonetheless, only the prior attachment of 6:45 to 6:43-44 is discussed, "when this unit was connected with 6:41-42 and 6:39-40."[23]

As already seen in the case of 6:20b-23, disjunctive features in the sequence of sayings are not always taken to reveal a compositional history antecedent to that of the text in view. This, I think, is extremely important to recognize. For it is the rhetorical unevenness of the "sermon" which tends to feed the belief that "a rather complex process contributed to the formation of 6:20b-49." In this case, however, regarding 6:43, 44a, 44b, beyond establishing the progressive logic that links the sayings, nothing is said about any prior process of composition.

At one point while discussing the meaning of 6:39-45, Kloppenborg makes the following remarks:

> Q 6:36 recommends the imitation of divine mercy; 6:39, seen in the context of vv. 36, 37-38, 40-42, recommends imitation of the DIDASKALOS (Jesus) who exemplifies the ethic of non-judgment as well as non-retaliation, love of enemies and startling beneficence. Q 6:39-45, of course, takes particular aim at teachers (actual or imagined) who do not follow Jesus in his radical lifestyle and ethic.[24]

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[20] Ibid.

[21] Cf. the conclusions drawn from this kind of evidence by John Dominic Crossan, "Tradition in the Formation of Q" (paper presented to the Q-Seminar at the 1987 SBL annual meeting, Boston, MA).

[22] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 182.

[23] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 183.

[24] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 184-85.

These observations are made, debating whether vv. 39-42 were formulated with outsiders and opponents in view. Once again, however, purposefully or not, Kloppenborg reveals how the "sermon" (viz. 6:36-45) manifests a certain coherence at the level of the text as such, one quite unparalleled elsewhere. The logic, furthermore, that conjoins these sayings moves across their "surface" (that is, nothing "immanent" in the "isolated" sayings led to their protracted combination). At least, the pattern of thought which Kloppenborg suggest for 6:36-45 does not demand a process of compilation before that of the "sermon" per se.

The author(s) of Q^1 arranged the sayings in 6:36-45 in their present order to achieve the rhetorical thrust outlined by Kloppenborg. This took place in part with "traditional" materials, but without the use of any prior text that would correspond to the "sermon."

There is, then, the conclusion of the "sermon" in 6:46, 47-49. According to Kloppenborg:

> The parable of the two builders, which has several rabbinic parallels, may well have circulated independently as an admonition to act upon what one has been taught. Whether 6:46 ever existed as an independent saying is virtually impossible to determine. Schulz treats it as a prophetic saying. But the extreme brevity of the saying as well as the fact that both 6:46 and 6:47-49 speak of "doing my words" . . . suggest that 6:46 may have been formulated specifically as an introduction for the parable.
>
> In the Q context, 6:46, 47-49 serves as the conclusion to the inaugural sermon (6:20b-49).[25]

The fact that, as already noted, "Viewed in the context of sapiential and didactic literature, Q 6:46, 47-49 provides a good example of the warnings which typically conclude these instructions,"[26] only underscores the compositional role which 6:46, 47-49 plays at the level of the "sermon" as such.

In summary: It was already seen that no documentary evidence exists in early Christian literature that the "sermon" (6:20b-49) was ever found before or apart from its composition as the opening section of $Q^{(1)}$. A review or "composition analysis" of the "sermon" itself likewise provides no "internal" grounds for supposing that it once existed in any way whatsoever as a prior, independent work.

Independent Integrity vs. Integral Independence (vis-à-vis Q^1)

Of course, one could always opine that what is now the "opening section" of $Q^{(1)}$ was, at one time, a self-sufficient piece of "Instruction." The literary integrity that characterizes it as the first "block" of $Q^{(1)}$ would signal instead the completeness of a former composition. But, in the absence of the slightest evidence for this theoretical possibility in any other extant text we know, why would the historian opt for such a perspective to explain the presence of the "sermon" in $Q^{(1)}$, especially when the contrary point of view, namely, the "sermon" as the "first chapter" of $Q^{(1)}$ is perfectly intelligible as such?

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[25] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 185.

[26] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 187.

Nonetheless, let us consider the possibility that the "sermon" was, at one time, "its own thing" on the basis of its intelligibility apart from the rest of $Q^{(1)}$. Stated otherwise, if the "sermon" was created as the opening section of $Q^{(1)}$, how does it anticipate or fit into what follows in this stratum of the document?

In a sense, with these questions we come full circle. At the beginning of the article, I quoted a statement by Robinson as to why one might suspect that the "sermon" once existed as a composition in its own right. The heart of the argument was that "Lc 6,20-49 does not seem to be just a random segment within a larger whole, for it is a well-rounded unit." This is most certainly true.[27] Is the "sermon," however, the only well-rounded unit in $Q^{(1)}$? I think not. If not, then Robinson's observations vis-à-vis the "sermon" are inconclusive.

For example, I would suggest that the section on "discipleship and mission" comprising 9:57-60, 10:[2], 3-6, [7], 9-11, [12, 13-15], 16, [21-24] likewise represents "a well-rounded unit."[28] In Kloppenborg's words:

> The basis for the association of 9:57-62 [viz. 9:57-60] with the mission instructions is presumably the similarity of this homeless and radically obedient mode of existence of the disciples to the itinerant and penniless existence of Q's envoys of the kingdom. The effect of the juxtaposition of the chriae with 10:3-16 is noteworthy: it broadens the original mission instruction by setting them within the more comprehensive framework of a speech on discipleship. For Q preaching the kingdom and following Jesus are one.[29]

Whatever the compositional history here assumed may be, the notable feature of the description is the unity ("are one") it suggests for 9:57-10:16; in view is "a speech on discipleship."

One could add to this the short section on prayer in 11:2-4, 9-13,[30] plus the longer one on anxiety in 12:2-7, [8-9, 10], 11-12, 22-34. Kloppenborg treats the latter as two separate entities but, in my opinion, unnecessarily. He himself writes:

> Although composed of originally independent sayings, 12:2-7 has a unitary thrust.
>
> Although strictly speaking, 12:11-12 goes beyond the sapiential logic of 12:4-7, it coheres with the exhortations in 12:4-7 and 12:22-31 in its hortatory stance and especially in its use of the phrase MH MERIMNHSATE. . . 12:2-7, 11-12 forms a coherent unit, unified by mode of address (second-person plural imperative), tone (hortatory and comforting), setting (a situation of persecution), and function (to encourage fearless preaching).

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[27] Though perhaps not so clearly so. A rather notable "break" in logic occurs between 6:(20b-)38 and 6:39(-49); see Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 187; below, p. 16.

[28] The numbers in brackets represent verses which ought likely to be ascribed to the redaction of $Q^{(2)}$: see Leif E. Vaage, "Q: The Ethos and Ethics of an Itinerant Intelligence" (Ph.D. diss., The Claremont Graduate School, 1987) 72-300; Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 199-203.

[29] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 200-1.

[30] Kloppenborg (*Formation of Q*, 203) calls it "a short instruction"; see, further, R. Piper, "Matthew 7,7-11 par. Lk 11,9-13: Evidence of Design and Argument in the Collection of Jesus' Sayings," in *Logia*, 411-18.

> Almost immediately following in Lucan sequence is another cluster of Q sayings. Q 12:22b-31 comprises a small collection on the topic of concern over the necessities of life, and this is followed by a saying on the acquisition of wealth.
>
> . . . 12:4-7, 22-31 . . . counself the members of the community to rely completely upon God for provision of their daily needs.[31]

Thus, it seems to me that 12:2-34 is as "well-rounded" a unit as the "sermon." The slight "break" that may be discerned between 12:2-12 and 12:22-34 is no greater than the similar fissure in the "sermon" between 6:20b-38 and 6:39-49. Again, I refer to Kloppenborg: "Whereas the first half of the speech [="sermon"] concerns violence, generosity and mercy, Q 6:39-45 [viz. 49?] is unified by the concern with speaking and teaching (or correcting) [and doing what is said and taught]."[32]

Finally, there is the cluster of sayings constituted by 13:24 + 14:26, 27 + 17:33 + 14:34-35.[33] Kloppenborg suggests: "The original hortatory unity forms a rounded discourse on the nature of discipleship, with a programmatic statement about the nature of discipleship, specific instructions on following Jesus and a concluding warning."[34]

The "sermon" is thus not the only "well-rounded unit" in $Q^{(1)}$. Therefore, this fact about it can serve, at best, only as circumstantial evidence for any judgment made regarding the "sermon's" status prior to $Q^{(1)}$.

Does the "sermon" show evidence of belonging in an integral way to the rest of $Q^{(1)}$? Given what we have just seen that the document is composed of a number of distinct "well-rounded units," it ought not to surprise us if we find that the "sermon" is relatively self-contained. And, in fact, the sequence of larger units in $Q^{(1)}$: the "sermon" (6:20b-49); on "discipleship and mission," (9:57-10:16), "on prayer" (11:2-13), "on anxiety" (12:2-34), and on discipleship again (13:24-14:35),[35] is not an inevitable or especially suggestive one.

At the same time, there are a number of ways in which the various sayings of the "sermon" link up with the rest of $Q^{(1)}$. I will proceed serially through them all.

The kingdom of God referred to explicitly in the opening beatitude (6:20b) and implied in the subsequent two (6:21) is, of course, invoked repeatedly throughout $Q^{(1)}$.[36] The issue of hunger and getting enough to eat (6:21a) is also broached elsewhere.[37] Dealing with enmity and ill-will (6:27ff) is a concern of other sayings[38] as is confronting personal violence (6:29).[39] Imitating God viz. becoming "sons" of

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[31] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 211, 214, 216, 206.

[32] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 187.

[33] This is the conclusion of Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 234-37. The sayings found in 13:25-27, 28-30, 34-35; 14:16-24 would have been inserted by the redaction of $Q^{(2)}$ between 13:24 and 14:26-35.

[34] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 237.

[35] The titles in quotations marks are taken from Kloppenborg, *Q Parallels*, xxxi-xxxii.

[36] See 10:9; 11:2, 20; 12:31; 13:18, 20; 16:16; also Vaage, "The Kingdom of God in Q," *Forum* (forthcoming). The form of the beatitude is repeated elsewhere, but only at the level of Q^{2}; see 7:23; 10:23; 12:43.

[37] See, e.g., 10:4-6; 12:22-31.

[38] See, e.g., 10:3-4, 6b, 10-11; 12:4-7, 11-12[also 12:57-59].

[39] See, e.g., 14:27.

God, promised in 6:35b and enjoined in 6:36, is similarly imagined in the so-called Lord's prayer (11:2-4), where God is again called "father" and his treatment of human beings is considered paradigmatic (11:4a).[40]

The question of leadership viz. discipleship and the relationship between leader (viz. teacher) and follower (viz. student) discussed in 6:40 is apparent in a number of other places.[41] Although not stated as baldly, the matter ofhypocrisy and behavioural incongruity (6:41-42) is amply decried elsewhere.[42] The figure of a tree is used not only in 6:43-44a, but also in 13:18-19. Talk of treasure and the heart in 6:45 is, of course, taken up again in 12:33-34. Indeed, it is difficult not to see some sort of dialectical correspondence between these two sayings. The question asked in 6:46 ("Why do you call me, 'Lord, Lord,' but not do what I say to you?") is answered not only by the parable that follows (6:47-49), but even more directly in 9:59-60. The later statement in 16:13 about not "serving two masters" (=lords) is also relevant. Finally, the concluding parable (6:47-49) is not the only parable in $Q^{(1)}$.[43]

Consider furthermore the following observations by Kloppenborg.

> This instruction [11:2-4, 9-13] coheres with other parts of Q. Formally, it employs the typical sapiential admonition with a motive clause (cf. 6:27-28, 32-33; 6:37-38; 6:42, 43-44) . . . . Thus, it belongs to the same sphere of interests and applications as the inaugural sermon (6:20b-49) and to the expanded version of the discipleship "speech" (9:57-62 + 10:2-11, 16).[44]
>
> In its rhetorical structure it [12:2-12] coincides with several other Q texts, e.g., 6:27-31, 32-35; 11:9-13; 12:22-31, which also begin with admonitions (6:27-28; 11:9; 12:22b) buttressed either by rhetorical questions and examples drawn from everyday experience (6:32-34; 11:11-12; 12:24-26, 27-28) or by proverbial assertions (11:10; 12:23) or both.[45]

Does the "sermon" belong, then, in an integral way to the rest of $Q^{(1)}$? I would answer: Yes, as much as any other section of the document.

In summary: The evidence of early Christian documents that contain (variants of) (some of) the same sayings which are found in the "sermon" does not support in any way the assumption that the "sermon" ever existed independently apart from its composition with $Q^{(1)}$. A review of Kloppenborg's composition analysis of the "sermon" itself similarly revealed no necessity to assume that the process of compilation was ever more protracted than the time it took to produce the "sermon" per se. The "rather complex process" that ostensibly "contributed to the formation of

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[40] Cf. Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 206: "Like 6:27-35, it [viz. 11:2-4,9-13] portrays God as a generous patron, . . . In both the prayer and 6:27-35 there is an assumed correspondence between the actions of God and those of Jesus' followers: generosity and forgiveness are marks both of God and of the children of God. The invocation of God as PATER in the prayer finds a counterpart in 6:27-35 which represents discipleship as *imitatio Dei* leading to divine sonship."

[41] See, e.g., 9:57-60; 10:16; 14:26-27; 17:33.

[42] See 11:39-48, 52-54; also Vaage, "The Woes in Q (and Matthew and Luke): Deciphering the Rhetoric of Criticism," in *SBL Seminar Papers* (Decatur, GA: Scholars, 1988) 582-607.

[43] See, e.g., 13:18-19, 20-21; 15:4-7[also 14:16-24; 19:12-20].

[44] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 206.

[45] See Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 208.

6:20b-49" is, in fact, simply a way of noting that the "sermon" is a composite text, made up in part of "traditional" materials, whose editorial combination was not flawless or without a certain unevenness. A look at the "sermon" within the context of Q(1) yields no clear indications one way or another.

An "Oral" Composition?

In the light of the preceding considerations and the extremely tenuous character of any thesis that the "sermon" might represent an earlier independent composition subsequently incorporated into Q(1),[46] the question must now be addressed which I set aside in the introduction, namely, why we would want to think this thought in the first place. If we give ourselves the credit of not simply (viz. unconsciously) maintaining the view of Matthew and Luke that the "sermon" was once a particular speech of Jesus (viz. his first followers), the notion of the "sermon" as a separate piece of tradition seems to grow out of the habit we have of describing early Christian literature first in terms of "oral transmission."

We are able to think that the "sermon" might once have existed as a self-sufficient, independently transmitted unit, because we are able to imagine this kind of thing happening "orally" in the face of all material evidence to the contrary. Indeed, by definition, if the object of concern is oral (transmission), material (=literary) evidence is the last thing we would look for or take into account. It might even be unwelcome.

Obviously, by questioning the validity or helpfulness of notions like oral transmission for the study of Q, I open up a can of exegetical and historiographical worms. I cannot clean the mess up here. In part, what is in view is the need for an investigation into the originary matrix of our form- and tradition-critical habits of speech. I myself am still in the first stages of such research.

What can be said here? If we posit that the "sermon" was once an independent oral composition before its incorporation into Q(1), the insights of Werner Kelber into orality and the oral transmission of traditions become immediately pertinent. Kelber summarizes prevalent assumptions prior to his work (basically Bultmann's perspective) as follows.

> Sayings grew together, multiplied by analogous formation, and underwent expansion by secondary additions. New sayings joined the stream of tradition, developed into groups of sayings, and formed catechisms and speech complexes. . . . Single units showed a tendency to grow, to accumulate material, and cluster together. Materials in isolated and clustered form joined the stream of traditions, were sustained by it, and in turn accelerated the momentum toward still larger and more complex formations. One can readily form a mental picture of Bultmann's general model of the synoptic tradition as a process of aggregate growth.[47]

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[46] I leave unconsidered here the even more adventuresome possibility that the "sermon" might have continued to exist independently apart from Q(1) after the initial stratum of the document was written.

[47] See Werner H. Kelber, *The Oral and the Written Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983) 4.

We have already discussed somewhat this model of "oral tradition" in the context of Kloppenborg's composition analysis of the "sermon." Kloppenborg's form- and tradition-critical observations were seen to be equally intelligible as a description of the writing of (this part of) $Q^{(1)}$.

Kelber's point of view is even more radical. It would suggest that to the extent that the "sermon" in $Q^{(1)}$ represents oral speech, its prior structure and language was anything but fixed. The composition before us cannot reflect an oral work with sufficient stability to be identified as the "sermon," due to the nature of orality. Writes Kelber:

> In addition to growth and loss, or expansion and compression, a multiplicity of tendencies determines the course of oral transmission. Stock features are combined and reshuffled in endless variations, one theme is substituted for another, the order of sequence is changed, features are adopted from related or unrelated materials, and variant compositions are forever in the making. Taken as a whole, oral transmission shows many faces and inclinations.[48]

> The oral history prior to [$Q^{(1)}$] is a pulsating phenomenon, expanding and contracting, waxing and waning, progressing and regressing. Its general behaviour is not unlike that of the stock market, rising and subsiding at more or less unpredictable intervals, and curiously interwoven with social and political realities. Or, to use a different metaphor, the oral synoptic traditions represent proliferating tracks going in various directions, some intersecting with one another, others bound for a head-on collision, some running together and apart again, some fading and resurging. But all together they do not mount up to a preordained march controlled by the law of intrinsic causality.[49]

In other words, we must imagine for the oral phase before $Q^{(1)}$ that nothing equivalent to the "sermon" ever existed. It is as such the creation of this stratum of the document.

Every "oral composition" of the "sermon" could never by (Kelber's) definition exceed the moment in which it was uttered or performed with any guarantee that the next time, a given saying or sequence of sayings would be maintained within "it" and not forgotten. Writes Kelber:

> . . . if each utterance constitutes an authentic speech act, then the question of transmission can never be kept wholly separate from composition. In speaking, transmission involves an act of composition, or at least recreation. All too often when we think of transmission of traditions, we think of it primarily as the passing on of fixed forms. In other words, we think of it in literary terms. In orality, *tradition is almost always composition in transmission.* From this perspective, too, oral transmission enacts a multiplicity of discrete instances of speech rather than a continuous process of solidification of speech into written forms.[50]

There exists here the following assumption:

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[48] See Kelber, *Oral and Written Gospel,* 29.
[49] See Kelber, *Oral and Written Gospel,* 31.
[50] See Kelber, *Oral and Written Gospel,* 30.

> Forgetting is a form of death ever present in oral life. No model of oral transmission may be said to be valid that does not seriously reflect on and integrate amnesia, broken paths, and rejection of tradition. . . . Loss and discontinuity no less than growth and continuity dictate the realities of oral life.[51]

Thus, the "sermon" in Q (6:20b-49) would need to have been written down virtually at the very moment it was orally composed in order for the text we read to represent the oral composition we posit. But how oral is something committed immediately and so thoroughly to writing? Are we not back where we began?

In Conclusion: Abiding Peculiarities and Further Questions

The four probes made above into the possibility of the "sermon" in Q (6:20b-49) having once existed independently as a separate composition have all rendered negative results. A survey of other documentary evidence from early Christian literature reveals no reason for supposing that the "sermon" was ever known apart from $Q^{(1)}$. The observations which constitute the basis of Kloppenborg's form- and tradition-critical "composition" analysis of the "sermon" apply with equal intelligibility to the writing of this part of $Q^{(1)}$. The "sermon" itself is no more "well-rounded" than other "units" or sections of $Q^{(1)}$ at the same time that it appears to be as integrated with these other sections as they are otherwise among themselves. The idea that the "sermon" may represent a prior oral composition does not withstand the recent critique and description of the nature of orality by Werner Kelber. It would seem that any thought of the "sermon" as once a separate piece of tradition before $Q^{(1)}$ should simply be abandoned.

A number of peculiarities nonetheless persist regarding the "sermon." Robinson has described most of them:

> . . . Matthew respects the integrity of the Sermon on the Mount in a way he does not for any other section in Q. Vincent Taylor has shown that Matthew tends in its way to confirm that the Lucan order of Q is original. For the five main discourses of Matthew, and the Q material in Matthew outside these discourses, when each is considered separately, seem to follow much the same order as that found in Luke. It is as if Matthew thumbed through Q again and again selecting out sayings suitable for the collection he was composing at the time. But in the case of the Sermon on the Mount, and only here, Matthew's collection does not begin toward the beginning of Q and end near the end of Q. Rather Matthew's Sermon retains as its outline the same collection from near the beginning of Q found in Luke's Sermon. Then Matthew gleans from the rest of Q, in much the Q order (Lk 11-13), material to intersperse into Q's Sermon, thereby enlarging it, but leaving it intact.[52]
>
> If one may discern in Mark 4 traces of a pre-Marcan collection, it is possible that what we know in expanded form as the Sermon on the Mount (or

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[51] See Kelber, *Oral and Written Gospel*, 29.

[52] See Robinson, "Early Collections," 391-92.

> Plain) is the outgrowth of another such early cluster of sayings and parables. It uses as its conclusion a double parable exalting Jesus' *logoi* in much the same way as does Mark 13:31. For the double parable Luke 6:47//Matt. 7:24 (cf. v. 26) begins: "Every one who comes to me and hears my *logoi* and does them." Hence the term *logoi* may have functioned as a designation for this early collection [as titles were otherwise regularly placed at the end of ancient documents].[53]

> The end [of the "sermon"] seems to be the conclusion of a collection, and this not simply because of the occurrence there of the term *logoi*. Rather the eschatological climax is the same concluding motif that one can sense in the *Didache* (chap. 16), the gospels (Mark 13 parr.), and even in Q (Luke 17:20-37).[54]

> . . . each of the two small collections from the same period found in *Clem.* 13.2 and *Did.* 1.3-6 . . . seem to reflect a similar unity.[55]

The question is then whether these (and perhaps other) abiding peculiarities are sufficiently weighty to change the otherwise thoroughly negative results reached above. I would need to be persuaded that they do.

Additional questions could be asked. For example, given that no substantive evidence exists that the "sermon" as such ever existed apart from Q(1), what is the import of the fact that virtually all of the sayings that make up the "sermon" each has a (number of) variant(s) elsewhere? It is this that I have meant to recognize when on occasion I have referred to "traditional" materials in the "sermon." It is clear that everything in the "sermon" was not invented at the same time that the "sermon" itself was written. Can one, however, do more with this observation than make it? Does the evidence at hand finally permit any greater conclusion to be drawn than the following?

The "sermon" in Q (6:20b-49) was composed when the initial stratum of the document was written, drawing on materials attested elsewhere as well. The previous history of these materials, being apparently oral, admits no further delineation or specification, due to the nature of orality. To say more would be im/pure speculation.

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[53] See Robinson, "LOGOI SOPHON: On the Gattung of Q," in *Trajectories through Early Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971) 94-95.

[54] See Robinson, "LOGOI SOPHON," 94 n. 47. Is the parable in 6:47-49 really an "eschatological climax"? Can it not just as easily be understood as a "sapiential" parable of "natural" consequences? It describes the likely results of two opposing kinds of response to Jesus' teaching. Kloppenborg (*Formation of Q*, 185) refers to two rabbinic parallels (M. 'Abot 3:18; 'Abot R. Nat. [A]24). It is interesting to observe that both at the level of the "sermon" and at the level of Q as a whole, the parables found in the document are roughly grouped together toward the end of each composition.

[55] See Robinson, "LOGOI SOPHON," 94 n. 47. Can one really compare 1 Clem 13:2 (a single verse, being variations on the theme of 6:37-38) and Did 1:3-6 (a few verses, all related to 6:27ff.) with the "sermon" (approximately thirty verses, composed of many different sayings)? Moreover, as Robinson himself points out, Bentley Layton ("The Sources, Date, and Transmission of *Didache* 1:3b-2:1," *HTR* 61 [1968] 343-83) has suggested that "In the case of the *Didache*, this may in part be due to dependence on Matt and Luke."

James and the Q Sermon on the Mount/Plain[1]

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1 Introduction

The Epistle of James does not quote the words of Jesus directly. Nevertheless this writing shows a striking closeness to the words of Jesus.[2] Attention to correspondences between James and the Jesus tradition has been noted by commentators.[3] However, no real attempt has been made to examine these correspondences in depth. The scope of this paper will be to limit attention to the relationship between James and the Q Sermon on the Mount.[4] In investigating this relationship, notice will also be taken when Matthew and Luke differ from Q. The question to bear in mind is whether James shows a tendency to lie closer to Matthew's version of Q or to that of Luke.

2 Development of the Sermon on the Mount

Before the actual connections between James and the Sermon can be investigated, it is necessary to ascertain what more recent scholarship has illustrated with regard

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[1] The contents of this paper form part of the research undertaken in my doctoral thesis *James: a New Testament wisdom writing and its relationship to Q* (DTh dissertation, University of South Africa, Pretoria, 1988).

[2] As G. Kittel ("Der geschichtliche Ort des Jakobusbriefes," *ZNW* 41[1942] 84) remarks very strikingly: "Es gibt keine Schrift des NT ausser den Evangelien, die so mit Anklangen an Herrnworte gespickt ist wie er."

[3] For example: Kittel, "Der geschichtlche Ort des Jakobusbriefes," 84-94; J. B. Mayor, *The Epistle of St James: the Greek text with introduction, notes and comments and further studies in the Epistle of James* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, [1913] 3rd rev. ed. 1954) lxxxv-lxxxviii; W. D. Davies, *The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964) 402-403; F. Mussner, *Der Jakobusbrief: Auslegung* (Freiburg: Herder, 4.Aufl. 1981) 48-50; P. H. Davids, *The Epistle of James: A commentary on the Greek text* (Exeter: Paternoster, 1982) 47-48; P. H. Davids, "James and Jesus," in D. Wenham (ed.) *Gospel Perspectives: The Jesus Tradition outside the Gospels, vol. 5* (Sheffield: JSOT, 1985) 66-67.

[4] In referring to Q the Greek text of A. Polag, *Fragmenta Q: Textheft zur Logienquelle* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1979) will be used because it is among the most comprehensive texts of Q to be published to date. At the same time it is kept in mind that this is not the definitive text of Q.

to the Sermon on the Mount.[5] This Sermon attributed to Jesus by Matthew and Luke is in fact an amalgamation of small collections of sayings.[6]

There are some noteworthy differences between the two Sermons in Matthew and Luke, but there is sufficient similarity to support the view that within Q there was a "nucleus sermon."[7] Given the appearance of a Sermon in Q, what would be noteworthy in the content would be the following:

		Matthew	*Luke*
(a)	*Beatitudes*	5:3-12	6:20b-23
(b)	*Love of one's enemies*	5:44	6:27-28
	Patience	5:39b-41	6:29
	Giving and lending	5:42	6:30
	Decisive behavior	5:45-47	6:32-35
(c)	*Merciful like the Father*	5:48	6:36
	Judge not	7:1-2	6:37-38
(d)	*The golden rule*	7:12	6:31
(e)	*Blind leaders*	15:14	6:39
	Disciple and teacher	10:24-25	6:40
(f)	*Log and speck*	7:3-5	6:41-42
(g)	*Good and bad tree*	7:16-20	6:43-44
	Heart's treasure	12:34b-35	6:45
(h)	*"Lord-Lord" Sayer*	7:21	6:46
	House construction	7:24-27	6:47-49
(i)	*Conclusion*	7:28	7:1a[8]

[5] In my thesis *James: a New Testament Wisdom Writing*, 185-190, I have investigated the development of the Sermon on the Mount. Rather than reproduce the argument once again, the results of this investigation will be presented here in so far as they are seen to have significance for the examination of the relationship of James to the Sermon on the Mount.

[6] It is not the intention to argue for the historicity of the Sermon itself in the life and ministry of Jesus. What is important is the concept that the Sermon itself went through a development in the course of time through the addition of collections of sayings.

[7] J. A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel according to Luke (1-9): Introduction, translation and notes*. (The Anchor Bible. 2nd ed. Garden City: Doubleday, 1983) 627.

[8] Cf. Polag, *Fragmenta Q*, 23; and I. Havener, *Q: The Sayings of Jesus: with a reconstruction of Q by Athanasius Polag* (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1987) 117-118.

Luke's Sermon comes closest to that of the Q Sermon.[9] To this basic structure the Gospel of Matthew has added additional material which appeared elsewhere in Q. As Fitzmyer noted:

> In many of these episodes Luke has preserved the more original order of "Q" and sometimes even a more natural (perhaps the original) setting for sayings or pronouncements, whereas Matthew has topically arranged otherwise scattered, but related, sayings. For instance, contrast the use of the Our Father in Matthew 6:9-13 and Luke 11:2-4.[10]

In reference to the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew's Gospel Betz[11] has given attention to the development that the Sermon underwent before it was incorporated into the Gospel of Matthew. What is important in his investigation is the need to see three elements in Matthew's Sermon: the Q material, the further development of Q within the Matthean community, and the hand of the evangelist, Matthew.

In comparing the relationship between James and the Sermon on the Mount, it is important to keep in mind the above development. The question that lies at the back of the entire investigation is: to which stage in this transmission or development does the relationship actually belong?

3 James and the Beatitudes

3.1 The Beatitudes

It is necessary to investigate the question of the development of the beatitudes in order to illustrate and situate the relationship of James to these beatitudes and see where James fits within this development.

3.1.1 The common group of beatitudes

Matthew has nine beatitudes in his Sermon, while Luke has four in his Sermon. Luke's beatitudes parallel four of Matthew's either directly (6:20b = Matt 5:3; 6:21a = Matt 5:6; 6:22-23 = Matt 5:11-12) or indirectly (6:21b = Matt 5:4). For this reason most scholars see this common group as going back to Q,[12] but it must be admitted that from Q these very beatitudes did go through a certain adaptation and transformation within the respective communities from which the Gospels of Matthew and Luke emerged.

In the community of Matthew one notices the development of the beatitudes prior to the redaction of the evangelist Matthew. This Q material progressed in the following way:

(a) Matthew 5:3,4,6 represent the original heart of the Q beatitudes common to both Matthew and Luke, going back to the preaching of Jesus.

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[9] A. D. Jacobson, *Wisdom Christology in Q.* (PhD dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1978) 50.

[10] Fitzmyer, *The Gospel according to Luke (1-9)*, 628.

[11] H. D. Betz, "Die Makarismen der Bergpredigt (Matthäus 5, 3-12): Beobachtungen zur literarischen Form und theologischen Bedeutung," *ZThK* 75 (1978) 3-19.

[12] R. A. Guelich, "The Matthean Beatitudes: 'Entrance-requirements' or eschatological blessings?" *JBL* 95 (1976) 419.

(b) These three beatitudes were combined with a fourth (Matt 5:11-12 and Luke 6:22-23) which formed the beatitudes in the Sermon in the Q tradition. These beatitudes were followed by the teaching of Jesus on the love of one's enemies in the Q Sermon.

(c) Within the Matthean community these beatitudes were further developed by making use of material from elsewhere in Q (particularly in relationship to the following teaching on the love of one's enemies) together with the influence of the psalms.

All this produced eight beatitudes within the community of Matthew.[13] To refer to this group of beatitudes as Q^{Mt} as Guelich does[14] is important, for it upholds their status and origin as being closely associated with Q, rather than seeing their origin as coming from a source totally independent from Q, described as M. In taking over these eight beatitudes and the Sermon from the Q source, Matthew has himself contributed something to the beatitudes, bringing them into line with the theological outlook of his Gospel. The hand of the redactor, Matthew, is quite evident throughout the beatitudes. Probably the most evident change is that of bringing the original three beatitudes into line with Isaiah 61:1-3.[15] The influence of Isaiah 61 is quite marked upon these original beatitudes. A careful examination of these beatitudes in this way has revealed the following proposals for the original form of these beatitudes.[16]

First beatitude: μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοί, ὅτι αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ.
Second beatitude: μακάριοι οἱ πενθοῦντες ὅτι αὐτοὶ παρακληθήσονται.
Fourth beatitude: μακάριοι οἱ πεινῶντες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ χορτασθήσονται.
Ninth beatitude: μακάριοι ἐστε ὅταν μισήσωσιν ὑμας (οἱ ἄνθρωποι)
καὶ ἀφορίσωσιν καὶ ὀνειδίσωσιν ὑμᾶς
καὶ εἴπωσιν πονηρὸν καθ' ὑμῶν
ἕνεκα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
χαίρετε καὶ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε
ὅτι ὁ μισθὸς ὑμῶν πολὺς ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ
κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ἐποίουν τοῖς προφήταις οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν.

3.1.2 Matthew's non-common beatitudes

Five additional beatitudes occur in Matthew (5:5,7-10) which are not found in Luke. They are:

3rd beatitude:	Blessed are the meek,	
	for they shall inherit the earth	(verse 5)
5th beatitude:	Blessed are the merciful,	
	for they shall obtain mercy.	(verse 7)

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[13] This is contrary to Guelich, "The Matthean Beatitudes," 426. He mistakenly numbers them as seven, although he has in fact explained the origin of eight.

[14] Ibid., 426.

[15] Ibid., 427.

[16] Cf. Hartin, *James: a New Testament Wisdom Writing*, 192-201. In the ninth beatitude the parts underlined are those which are firmly agreed as belonging to Q, while the rest is commonly agreed as belonging to Q, while the rest is commonly agreed as belonging to Q.

6th beatitude:	Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.	(verse 8)
7th beatitude:	Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God.	(verse 9)
8th beatitude:	Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.	(verse 10)

(a) The fifth, sixth and seventh beatitudes (Matt 5:7-9). These are seen to emerge in the period prior to the redaction of Matthew. There are no specifically Matthean words or style in evidence in them.[17] These beatitudes fit more clearly into the original Q context whereby the teaching on loving one's enemy follows immediately after the beatitudes. "They shall be called sons of God" (Matt 5:9) corresponds to Matthew 5:45 (Luke 6:35) where those who love their enemies are referred to as "sons of your Father who is in heaven."[18] From these perspectives it appears that the more logical conclusion is that arrived at by Guelich whereby these beatitudes are seen to originate before the Gospel of Matthew.[19] They do not attribute their origin to Matthew, but come from an expansion of the Q material within the framework of the Matthean community. "Therefore, one would have to place the development of these beatitudes in a pre-Matthean expansion of the Q beatitudes (Q^{Mt})."[20]

(b) The third beatitude (Matt 5:5). Matthew 5:5 "Blessed are the meek" is parallel to the opening beatitude of Matthew 5:3 "Blessed are the poor." This third beatitude is constructed from Psalm 37:11 "But the meek shall possess the land." Behind the Greek concepts of πραΰς (meek) and πτωχός (poor) lie the Hebrew terms 'anawim and aniyyim which were synonymous and carried with them a socio-economic as well as a religious context.[21] Consequently, 5:5 forms a synonymous parallelism with 5:3:

Blessed are the poor
for theirs is *the kingdom of heaven*
Blessed are the meek
for they shall inherit *the earth.*

The possibility exists that originally the parallelism was far stronger whereby the two synonymous beatitudes occurred together.[22]

(c) The eighth beatitude (Matt 5:10). Of all the beatitudes this alone is the one which Matthew composed. His intention in its composition was to unify the beatitudes

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[17] G. Strecker, "Die Makarismen der Bergpredigt," *NTS* 17 (1970/71) 259.

[18] H. Schürmann, *Das Lukasevangelium* (Freiburg: Herder, 1969) 356-357.

[19] Guelich, "The Matthean Beatitudes," 423.

[20] Ibid., 423.

[21] Cf. F. Hauck & S. Schultz, "πραΰς" *TDNT* 6 (1968) 647; and E. Bammel, "πτωχός" *TDNT* 6 (1968) 888.

[22] As Guelich, "The Matthean Beatitudes," 426, concludes: "Text-critically, however, there is ample witness to indicate that originally there was no intervening Beatitude. The present location of the Beatitude might be explained by the loss of the epexegetic character of the parallelism to a Greek-speaking audience."

and to lock them together into a well developed unit.[23] The importance given to "righteousness" helps to unify the entirety of the beatitudes. The first reference to righteousness occurs at the end of the first section of four beatitudes, whereas the second reference takes place here at the end of the next four beatitudes.[24] Structurally, the unifying position of this eighth beatitude can be illustrated in this way:



3.1.3 The Lucan beatitudes

As has been indicated above, Luke has only four beatitudes which are all found in Matthew's list of beatitudes. An attempt to reconstruct the original formulation of the Q beatitudes has already been made (see above). The similarities and differences between Luke and Q emerge quite clearly from the following comparison:

Q	*Luke*
1st Beatitude	*Luke 6:20*
μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοί, ὅτι αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ	μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοί, ὅτι ὑμετέρα ἐστιν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ
2nd Beatitude	*Luke 6:21a*
μακάριοι οἱ πεινῶντες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ χορτασθήσονται	μακάριοι οἱ πεινῶντες νῦν ὅτι χορτασθήσεσθε
3rd Beatitude	*Luke 6:21b*
μακάριοι οἱ πενθοῦντες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ παρακληθήσονται	μακάριοι οἱ κλαίοντες νῦν, ὅτι γελάσετε

These differences appear to be more in the realm of style whereby Luke has structured them in a consistent way to agree with the fourth beatitude (which is in the second person) and the woes which follow (also in the second person).[25]

[23] Ibid., 431.

[24] N. McEleney, "The Beatitudes of the Sermon on the Mount/Plain," *CBQ* 43 (1981) 11.

[25] D. Daube, *The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism* (London: Athlone, 1956) 200.

3.1.4 The Lucan woes

In the Gospel of Luke four woes follow on his group of four beatitudes. Whether these woes actually belonged to the original Q Sermon has been much discussed. A solution to this question lies in viewing the way in which the beatitudes developed within the context of the community of Matthew. The woes are to be viewed as a further specification and development of the common beatitudes of Q in the Sermon within the context of the community of Luke. Instead of developing the beatitudes as such, as happened in the Matthean community, the beatitudes were expressed in an antithetical way in order to emphasize their message. Again, this development is not to be seen as happening independently of Q. With Matthew's community it was actually Q material which went to make up the "non parallel" beatitudes. So one should view the woes as developing pre-existent Q material, forming what can be referred to as Q^{Lk}. That this form of speech is already evident in Q can be seen from the woes that appear elsewhere in the Gospels of Matthew (23:4-29); and Luke (11:43-47).

3.2 The relationship between James and the beatitudes

When similarities are noticed between James and the beatitudes (as found in Matthew and Luke), it is necessary to establish wherein the relationship actually lies. Is the relationship with the common source Q, or is it to be established with the further development into Q^{Mt} or Q^{Lk}, or is it to that final composition of the Gospels of Matthew or Luke? One can note the following similarities between James and the beatitudes:

3.2.1 The poor (Jas 2:5; Matt 5:3; Luke 6:20)

James 2:5: οὐχ ὁ Θεὸς ἐξελέξατο τοὺς πτωχοὺς τῷ κοσμῷ πλουσίους ἐν πίστει καὶ κληρονόμους τῆς βασιλείας ἧς ἐπηγγείλατο τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν;

Q 6:20: μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοί, ὅτι αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ.

There are a number of aspects in common between James and Q. They both refer to "the poor" in unqualified terms. Whereas Matthew has developed it to become "the poor in spirit," James does not show this development. He lies closer to the simple οἱ πτωχοί as is the case in the Gospel of Luke. Just as Q does, James refers to "the kingdom" (ἡ βασιλεία). James has endeavored to work out a strong antithesis: the poor in the eyes of this world are to be considered blessed for they will become rich as heirs of the kingdom. The poor are contrasted to the rich; the world is contrasted to the kingdom. Just as Matthew and Luke have reworked the beatitudes within their own framework, so James reworks the same tradition of Q in this context.

It has been argued that in the development of the Matthean beatitudes a parallel beatitude to the first beatitude developed, namely Matthew 5:5: μακάριοι οἱ πραεῖς, ὅτι αὐτοὶ κληρονομήσουσιν τὴν γῆν. Noteworthy is the use of the verb κληρονομήσουσιν. When James in 2:5 makes a promise of the kingdom, it is the noun κληρονόμος which is used. Kittel poses the question: Is this an accidental similarity?[26] When James makes a reference to "heirs of the kingdom" it appears as an

[26] Kittel, "Der geschichtliche Ort des Jakobusbriefes," 86.

amalgamation of terminology derived from both beatitudes. In this way he shows a knowledge of the development of the beatitudes within the context of the Matthean community. At the same time he has kept the emphasis on the poor and has not developed it into "the poor in spirit," as occurred by the redactor Matthew. This illustration points to a knowledge of James of the development of Q within the Matthean community, but prior to its final form in the Gospel. Obviously, an isolated example of this nature does not conclusively point, but when it is taken together with other evidence, it becomes a sure marker pointing out a specific direction.

3.2.2 Those who mourn and weep (Jas 4:9; Matt 5:4; Luke 6:21b and Luke 6:25b)

James 4:9: ταλαιπωρήσατε καὶ πενθήσατε καὶ πλαύσατε. ὁ γέλως ὑμῶν εἰς πένθος μετατραπήτω καὶ ἡ χαρὰ εἰς κατήφειαν.

Q 6:21b: μακάριοι οἱ πενθοῦντες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ παρακληθήσονται.

Q 6:25b: οὐαί, οἱ γελῶντες νῦν, ὅτι πενθήσετε καὶ κλαύσετε

Linguistically, the only similarity between James 4:9 and the beatitude (Q 6:21b) lies in the use of the one verb πενθέω (to mourn). Instead, a far closer relationship occurs between this text of James and Luke 6:25b. In fact three points of contact can be noted: ὁ γέλως is related to the Greek verb γελῶντες and the use of the twofold verbs πενθέω and κλαίω in conjunction. It is striking that the verb γελάω is only found in the New Testament in these places.[27]

While it has been argued above that the woes were not originally part of the Q Sermon, nevertheless it was emphasized that the woes were to be seen as developments of Q material or pre-Lucan material.[28] James 4:9 shows an awareness of this woe (not in form, but in content). I am not arguing that James was aware of the development of Q within the Lucan community—this could only be argued if he had utilized as well the very form that the Lucan saying adopted. However, because of the similarity of content one is to see both James and Luke using a traditional saying, adapting it to the context of their own teaching. In this way James shows an awareness of this material before it was firmly fixed in the form and structure of the woes as expressed in Q^{Lk}.

3.2.3 Those who are merciful (Jas 2:13; Matt 5:7; Luke 6:36)

James 2:13: ἡ γὰρ κρίσις ἀνέλεος τῷ μὴ ποιήσαντι ἔλεος· κατακαυχᾶται ἔλεος κρίσεως.

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[27] Schürmann, *Das Lukasevangelium*, 339.

[28] R. Bultmann, *The history of the synoptic tradition* (tr. by J. Marsh from 2nd German edition [1931]; rev. ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1972) 111.

Matthew 5:7: μακάριοι οἱ ἐλεήμονες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἐλεηθήσονται

There are two points of contact evident here between James and Matthew. Firstly, the use of the term ἐλεήμονες in the beatitude of Matthew 5:7 is reflected in James 2:13 where the term ἔλεος occurs. In inserting this saying into this context, James shows his knowledge of the traditional understanding of the importance of the concept of mercy. The Matthean community has raised this concept to a beatitude which spells out the type of life a Christian should lead.[29]

Secondly, the thought content in James 2:13 and Matthew 5:7 is very similar.[30] The beatitude notes that the person who exercises mercy on earth acquires God's mercy: implied in this is the fact that he who shows no mercy cannot expect mercy from God. This latter implication James 2:13 spells out when he says: "Judgment is without mercy to him who shows no mercy." When James 2:13 goes on to add "mercy triumphs over judgment," this is indeed what the beatitude claims when it proclaims "blessed are the merciful."[31]

3.2.4 Those who make peace (Jas 3:18; Matt 5:9)

Matthew 5:9	*James 3:18*
μακάριοι οἱ εἰρηνοποιοί, ὅτι αὐτοὶ υἱοὶ Θεοῦ κληθήσονται.	καρπὸς δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἐν εἰρήνῃ σπείρεται τοῖς ποιοῦσιν εἰρήνην.

In the aspect of establishing peace among people, only two texts in the New Testament speak of making peace as being within the capacity of humanity: Matthew 5:9 and James 3:18. A close similarity in thought exists between these two passages: they each speak about making peace, which comes from a special relationship with God. James 3:18 presents the gift of righteousness as stemming from the gift of wisdom from above.[32] The gift of righteousness is illustrated by those who sow peace, by the peacemakers. In Matthew 5:9 a unique relationship is also established between God and the believers: they are addressed as "His sons." In both instances a special relationship exists between God and the believer: in James it is the relationship of righteousness, while in Matthew it is that of being "sons of God." Both James and Matthew show this relationship resulting in a life which establishes peace among humanity. This indicates a close bond between the two texts. It argues for a connection of the two traditions showing that James is aware of the Jesus tradition evident

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[29] Cf. Strecker, "Die Makarismen der Bergpredigt," 266. C. L. Mitton, *The Epistle of James* (London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott 1966) 98, argues for a reflection of this beatitude here in the saying of James: "Yet, it would not be improper for James here, in his own way, to enforce what he understands to be the meaning of the Lord's beatitude: 'Blessed are merciful, for they shall receive mercy.'"

[30] Kittel, "Der geschichtliche Ort des Jakobusbriefes," 88.

[31] Davids, *The Epistle of James: A commentary on the Greek Text*, 119, argues for a connection between James 2:13 and Matthew 5:7 in this way: "Here (Jas 2:13), then, is the negative statement of that saying (Matt 5:7) phrased in good Jewish form, juxtaposed (thus the lack of any connective particle) with a positive proverb following from it."

[32] Mussner, *Der Jakobusbrief: Auslegung*, 174-175.

here in the expanded Q tradition of the beatitudes emerging within the context of the Matthean community.

3.2.5 Those who are pure in heart (Jas 4:8; Matt 5:8)

James 4:8	*Matthew 5:8*
ἐγγίσατε τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἐγγιεῖ ὑμῖν. καθαρίσατε χεῖρας, ἁμαρτωλοί, καὶ ἁγνίσατε καρδίας, δίψυχοι.	μακάριοι οἱ καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ, ὅτι αὐτοὶ τὸν θεὸν ὄψονται.

The beatitude finds its home against the background of a community which has deep roots within Judaism. The language only makes sense in the context of a community that is familiar with cultic rituals such as the purification rites within Judaism. This beatitude takes over the cultic language and applies it in line with the teaching of Jesus to the purely personal and moral level. Now the reference is no longer to the purification of one's hands, it has become an entirely moral aspect, the purification of one's heart.

The text of James is also understandable against this background. He too shows a knowledge of the Jewish usage of the term "to purify" (καθαρίζω): he uses it in its cultic sense of purifying one's hands, but then shows that he wishes it to be seen entirely in its moral, personal relationship by adding the expression "purify your hearts" (ἁγνίσατε καρδίας). Consequently, in the context of James one would interpret the reference to pure hands as to the good deeds that one performs, while the pure hearts would be the total personal commitment to God.[33]

James and Matthew are similar in the use of the words καθαρίσατε (καθαροί) and καρδία as well as in the actual thought that was intended in the very context of these words. Here again occurs a similarity in content and vocabulary between James and the beatitudes, in particular the group of beatitudes that originated from an expanded Q within the Matthean community. In line with the previous connection with the beatitudes, it leads one to accept the view that James was familiar with the development of the Sermon's beatitudes within Matthew's community.

3.2.6 Those who hunger (Jas 2:15-16; Luke 6:21 = Matt 5:6)

James 2:15-16	*Q6:21*
ἐὰν ἀδελφὸς ἢ ἀδελφὴ γυμνοὶ ὑπάρχωσιν καὶ λειπόμενοι τῆς ἐφημέρου τροφῆς. εἴπῳ δέ τις αὐτοῖς ἐξ ὑμῶν· ὑπάγετε ἐν εἰρήνῃ, θερμαίνεσθε καὶ χορτάζεσθε, μὴ δῶτε δὲ αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐπιτήδεια τοῦ σώματος, τί τὸ ὄφελος;	μακάριοι οἱ πεινῶντες ὅτι αὐτοὶ χορτασθήσονται.

A number of points of similarity emerge in these two texts. Both James and Q promise to those who are hungry that they will be filled: the same verb χορτάζω

[33] Davids, *The Epistle of James: A commentary on the Greek Text*, 167.

is used in both. The needy are expressed by means of a synonymous expression: οἱ πεινῶντες (Q); λειπόμενοι τῆς ἐφημέρου τροφῆς (James). I would argue that on its own one would not be able to deduce that James had the beatitude in mind, but given the influence which had been observed with regard to the other beatitudes, it is legitimate to see the similarities between James and this Q beatitude as not being accidental, but directly caused.

3.2.7 Those who are persecuted (Jas 1:2; 5:10; Matt 5:11-12; Luke 6:22-23)

The theme of endurance amidst persecution is a theme that occurs on a number of occasions in the Epistle of James. Although it is not easy to establish what the exact form of the Q beatitude referring to the persecution of the prophets, nevertheless a reconstruction was given above in section 3.1.1. Two distinct connections can be observed between James and this Q beatitude on persecution.

(a) James 1:2 and this Q beatitude on persecution. Terminologically there is a close connection. Both issue a call to rejoice (Jas 1:2 Πᾶσαν χαράν; Matt 5:12 χαίρετε καὶ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε; and Luke 6:23 χάρητε). This call is then followed in all the passages with a reference to the persecution or trials that are to be endured.

From the viewpoint of content there are also close similarities. Both envisage trials and sufferings as coming from outside sources. They are not sought, but when they do come they are accepted with joy because they bring with them an eschatological reward. Sufferings are to be viewed in this eschatological light. When faced with such trials and persecutions the proper response is that of joy which is based on the intervention of God at the end of the age.[34]

(b) James 5:10-11 and the Q beatitude on persecution. The same theme of joy amidst persecution occurs here which was evident in James 1:2 and Matthew 5:11-12. A further connection is noted in the use of the verb μακαρίζομεν (Jas 5:11) which is reminiscent of the opening of the beatitude. In conjunction with this those who are called blessed in their persecution are the prophets, to whom both James and Q refer. This theme of enduring persecution as the prophets did was an important theme for the Q community who saw themselves as a community of prophets who imitated the life of Jesus. It is this explicit reference in James 5:10-11 to the prophets which betrays a connection between James and the Q community. As James 5:10 indicates this suffering has been endured because they spoke in the name of the Lord.[35]

The closeness between James and the Q source lies not simply in the terminology that is common to both, but above all in the thought-content that is common. Persecution on account of one's allegiance to the Gospel brings with it the eschatological promise of reward.

3.3 Conclusion

The examination of the tradition history of the beatitudes has shown a threefold development. The original Q source was seen to contain four beatitudes. Within

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[34] Ibid., 67-68.

[35] As Davids says: "their suffering came from their service to God," ibid., 186.

the Matthean community this Q source developed further with the aid of other Q material to comprise four more beatitudes. Finally, the hand of the redactor Matthew was seen to be at work throughout the eight beatitudes and in the construction of a further beatitude (Matt 5:10).

An analysis of the Epistle of James has shown a contact with all the beatitudes belonging to the original Q source, as well as the way in which they were further developed within the Matthean community. The similarities lie in the period prior to the final redaction of the apostle Matthew. In fact James shows no affinity with the way the beatitudes have been changed by the redactor Matthew through the influence of Isaiah 61:1-3. Neither does it show a connection with the beatitude composed by him (Matt 5:10). Instead, he bears witness to a development prior to this stage. From this the only conclusion that can be drawn is that James does not demonstrate a knowledge of the beatitudes in their final form in the Gospel of Matthew but rather their state of development prior to the final composition of the Gospel of Matthew.

A further question arises: Is there any relationship between James and the Lucan woes? It has been argued above that although the Lucan woes were not originally part of the Q Sermon, nevertheless they are witness to Q material which later developed within the context of the Lucan community. There are in fact two noticeable similarities between James and these Lucan woes.

The first similarity is between the third woe ("woe to you that laugh now, for you shall mourn and weep" Luke 6:25) and James 4:9. The similarity rests upon content and not form. This consequently indicates that both James and Luke are using a traditional saying of the Jesus tradition handed on in the Q community. Each has taken it over and developed it in his own way within his own tradition.

A second similarity is observed between the first woe (Luke 6:24) and James 5:1-6. In both texts the rich are addressed directly in strong language that is reminiscent of the prophets and in both the expression is tantamount to that of a woe. James and Luke also stress that the rich have already received their reward (Luke 6:24: ὅτι ἀπέχετε τὴν παράκλησιν ὑμῶν and James 5:5 ἐτρυφήσατε ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐσπαταλήσατε . . .). From this it appears that the thought-content of the Lucan woe is expressed in a developed way in this pericope of James. The contact between James and this woe is not to be seen from the fact that James is actually using the Lucan woe, but that they are both operating with a familiar saying of Jesus which belongs to the Q community, which has developed in different ways in the Lucan formulation of Q and in the expression of James.

What emerges from this analysis of the beatitudes in Matthew and Luke is that James appears to be familiar with the Q tradition of the sayings of Jesus as it developed within the Matthean community, but before they reached the final form through the hand of the redactor Matthew. On the other hand it cannot be shown that James is actually aware of the development of Q that takes place within the Lucan community. What does emerge is that certain sayings found in the Lucan woes have similarities with the teaching of Jesus through the dependence of both upon Q material which had not yet been incorporated into the Q Sermon. This is supported by the connection that has been advanced for seeing the Lucan woes as resting upon pre-existing material.[36]

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[36] Bultmann, *The history of the synoptic tradition*, 111.

4 James and Other Aspects of the Q Sermon on the Mount

One wishes to take the investigation further to see whether the relationship of James to the Q source is not limited to a small section, the beatitudes, but extends throughout the block of material known as the Sermon on the Mount.[37]

4.1 Love of one's enemies (Luke 6:27-33; Matt 5:40-47)

In the original Q Sermon this section on loving one's enemies follows the final beatitude on enduring persecution. Guelich argues that this final beatitude forms the bridge between the beatitudes as such and the instruction to love one's enemies.[38] Between the beatitudes and the command to love, Luke's Gospel has introduced the woes while Matthew's Gospel has added an extensive section on the spirit in which the commandments are to be obeyed.[39]

The Epistle of James gives close attention to the law of love of neighbor which it calls the kingly law. "If you really fulfill the royal law according to the scripture, 'You shall love your neighbor as yourself,' you do well" (Jas 2:8). In the synoptic tradition this law is central, appearing not just in Q but also in the tradition going back to Mark. In the Q Sermon on the Mount this section on the love of enemies is in fact a detailed illustration of this command to love one's neighbor.

Not only is there reference to the law of love, but within the same context as the law of love mention is made of upholding the commandments not to murder, and not to commit adultery. In the Sermon in Matthew's Gospel a number of antitheses occur between the beatitudes (5:3-12) and the command to love one's neighbor (5:43). These antitheses originated within the tradition in the Matthean community. Two such antitheses concern murder and adultery (5:21-30). In a similar context James has reference to the breaking of the law by quoting the examples of adultery and murder, but in the reverse order to Matthew. One is not arguing for a dependence of James on Matthew—but what I think it does show is again a knowledge by James of the Q tradition within the Matthean community.

Whereas for James the basic teaching of James on loving one's neighbor is emphasized as the kingly law, he too illustrates how it must be observed by avoiding whatever causes harm to one's brother (2:11; 4:1; 4:11). Both James and the Matthean community show a similarity in the way in which the kingly law of Jesus is applied and understood.

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[37] This was the approach called for by R. Bauckham, "The study of the Gospel Traditions outside the canonical Gospels: Problems and Perspectives," in D. Wenham (ed) *Gospel Perspectives: The Jesus Tradition outside the Gospels, vol. 5* (Sheffield: JSOT, 1985) 378. Bauckham calls for an examination of relationships between traditions, namely to see whether they extend not simply to individualities, but to a wider extent of blocks of material.

[38] Guelich, "The Matthean Beatitudes," 421.

[39] Polag's reconstruction of this section lies closer to the Lucan version; see Polag, *Fragmenta Q: Textheft zur Logienquelle*, 34-35.

4.2 Be merciful and do not judge (Q 6:36-37)

In the pericope, which Polag identifies as following on the command to love, two sayings occur: to be merciful, and the command not to judge.[40]

4.2.1 The command to be merciful (Jas 5:11; Luke 6:36)

Attention has already been given to the beatitude in the Matthean tradition to be merciful (Matt 5:7) which is seen to have an influence on James 2:13. Another connection can be observed between James and the Q sermon. In James 5:11 and Q 6:36 the same term οἰκτίρμων is used in order to refer to the mercy of God.

4.2.2 Against judging (Jas 4:11; Matt 7:1; Luke 6:37)

The synoptic tradition shows the centrality of the theme of judgment.[41] Jesus' call to repentance is inspired by the firm conviction of the impending judgment which lies over every person. The Q tradition stresses that since God alone is the judge no person has the right to usurp this function of God. This saying about not judging another seems to have had an important influence upon James. He refers to it on at least three occasions.

(a) James 4:11. James considers the question of speaking evil against one's brother. To slander and to judge one's brother is viewed as equivalent to slandering and judging the law. It is against the law of love and in this process one sets oneself up as judge over another, as judge over the law. The person is in fact usurping the authority and power of God.[42]

(b) James 5:6. In this text reference is made to the condemnation of the innocent man: κατεδικάσατε, ἐφονεύσατε τὸν δίκαιον, οὐκ ἀντιτάσσεται ὑμῖν. It is the same verb καταδικάζω which occurs in the form of Q which appears in Luke 6:37. Kittel also draws attention to the similar use of this verb in both texts.[43] This again points to the possibility that the same Q saying of Luke 6:37 lies behind this text of James.

(c) James 5:9. The first part of this verse appears to be an illustration of the antithesis in Luke 6:37 (Matt 7:1). To this admonition is added the reason why it is necessary to carry it out: "the judge is standing at the doors." The nearness of this day calls upon the hearers to look into their own conduct so that when the Lord does come they will not be judged.[44]

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[40] Ibid., 34. His reconstruction of the Q text follows closely that of Luke.

[41] F. Büchsel, "κρίνω" *TDNT* 3 (1965) 936.

[42] M. Dibelius, *James: A commentary on the Epistle of James* (tr. from the German, *Der Brief des Jakobus*, 11th rev. ed. prepared by H. Greeven [1964], English tr, by M. A. Williams, ed. by H. Koester for Hermeneia, Philadelphia: Fortress), 228, explains this well when he says: "Slander is not a transgression of merely one commandment, but a transgression against the authority of the law in general, and therefore against God—this is the thought here. It is expressed by the rhetorical use of the same words in the two halves of the verse: He who speaks against his brother or makes himself his brother's judge speaks against the law and makes himself judge of the law."

[43] Kittel, "Der geschichtliche Ort des Jakobusbriefes," 90.

[44] Davids, *The Epistle of James: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, 185.

(d) Conclusion. The admonition not to judge influences the thought of James in three distinct contexts. In other words James uses this Jesus tradition handed on in Q and applies it in his own way within his own teaching. This is a further illustration of what has been said previously in connection with the relation between James and the Jesus tradition.

4.2.3 The fruit of good works (Jas 3:12; Matt 7:16-18; Luke 6:43-44)

Following this command not to judge, the Q Sermon, as presented in the reconstruction of Polag,[45] contains three short sections, namely the sayings related to the golden rule (Luke 6:31; Matt 7:12); the blind guide and the disciple-master relationship (Luke 6:39-40; Matt 15:14 and Matt 10:24-25); and the log-splinter in the eye (Luke 6:41-42; Matt 7:3-5). None of these is reflected in the Epistle of James. However, the subsequent saying on the fruit of good works finds its parallel in the Epistle of James.

James 3:12	*Q 6:43-44*[46]
μὴ δύναται, ἀδελφοί μου, συκῆ ἐλαίας ποιῆσαι ἢ ἄμπελος σῦκα;	οὐ γάρ ἐστιν δένδρον καλὸν ποιοῦν καρπὸν σαπρόν, οὐδὲ πάλιν δένδρον σαπρὸν ποιοῦν καρπὸν καλόν. . . . μήτι συλλέγουσιν ἀπὸ ἀκάνθων σῦκα ἢ ἀπὸ βάτου σταφυλήν;

From a linguistic viewpoint the texts of James and Q do not appear to be derived from each other. The similarities lie in the actual thought-content being presented. Both Q and James present a rhetorical question, which expects the answer that what is being asked is an impossibility. For James it is impossible for a fig tree to yield olives or a grapevine to yield figs. For Q the impossibility lies in the realm of grapes being gathered from a bramble bush or figs from thorns. While the images used are not entirely the same in each tradition, what is important is that a similar thought appears in both: just as a tree only produces good or bad fruit according to its nature, so it is with a person: good or bad fruit is produced only according to the nature of the person. Here again a connection is noted between James and the Q Sermon.

4.4 Doers of the word (Jas 1:22; Matt 7:23-27; Lk 6:47-49)

The parable about the house built upon rock closes the Q Sermon. This parable is introduced by the saying on being a doer of the word. James 1:22 shows a close association with this Q saying

James 1:22	*Q (Luke 6:47-49; Matt 7:24-27)*[47]
Γίνεσθε δὲ ποιηταὶ λόγου καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀκροαταὶ	Πᾶς ὅστις ἀκούει μου τοὺς λόγους καὶ ποιεῖ αὐτούς, . . .

[45] Polag, *Fragmenta Q: Textheft zur Logienquelle*, 23.
[46] Ibid., 36.
[47] Ibid., 38.

παραλογιζόμενοι ἑαυτούς — καὶ πᾶς ὁ ἀκούων μου τοὺς λόγους καὶ μὴ ποιῶν αὐτούς . . . .

In comparing James to Q one notices the similarity in terms and thoughts in that they each concern the aspect of being a *doer of the word* and not just *a hearer of the word*. James expresses the thought in terms of an imperative, while Q places it in a reversed negative way in which it belongs to the context of introducing a parable which illustrates the thought.

In both Matthew and Luke the saying forms part of the original Q Sermon. The reference to "doing the words" is seen in the context to refer to the words of Jesus in the Sermon. It can be seen as an expression of carrying out the law of Jesus in one's life. James' expression "to do the word" corresponds to the above in that it also refers to obeying the commands of Jesus. When James refers elsewhere to the law as the "perfect law, the law of liberty" (Jas 1:25), "the royal law" (Jas 2:8), he has in mind not the stipulations of the Jewish law, but rather the new law as taught and expressed by Jesus. James, just as Q, calls upon the reader to put into practice the teaching and will of Jesus. The phrase "to do the law" has been taken over from Judaism in both James and Q in an identical way and has been used to refer to the words, namely the teaching of Jesus. The disciple of Jesus is instructed in both James and Q to put the teaching of Jesus into practice.

4.5 The oath (Jas 5:12; Matt 5:33-37)

Without doubt the clearest association between James and Sermon on the Mount as expressed in the Gospel of Matthew occurs in the saying on the taking of an oath.

Matthew 5:33-37	*James 5:12*
Πάλιν ἠκούσατε ὅτι ἐρρέθη τοῖς ἀρχαίοις· οὐκ ἐπιορκήσεις, ἀποδώδεις δὲ τῷ κυρίῳ τοὺς ὅρκους μου. ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν μὴ ὀμόσαι ὅλως· μήτε ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὅτι θρόνος ἐστὶν τοῦ Θεοῦ, μήτε ἐν τῇ γῇ ὅτι ὑποπόδιόν ἐστιν τῶν ποδῶν αὐτοῦ, μήτε εἰς Ἰεροσόλυμα, ὅτι πόλις ἐστὶν τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως, μήτε ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ σου ὀμόσῃς, ὅτι οὐ δύνασαι μίαν τρίχα λευκὴν ποιῆσαι ἢ μέλαιναν. ἔστω δὲ ὁ λόγος ὑμῶν ναὶ ναί, οὒ οὔ· τὸ δὲ περισσὸν τούτων ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ ἐστιν.	ἀδελφοί μου, μὴ ὀμνύετε μήτε τὸν οὐρανὸν μήτε τὴν γὴν μήτε ἄλλον τινὰ ὅρκον· ἤτω δὲ ὑμῶν τὸ ναὶ ναὶ καὶ τὸ οὒ οὔ, ἵνα μὴ ὑπὸ κρίσιν πέσητε.

These two texts are the only ones that actually forbid categorically the taking of oaths in the New Testament. There are a number of striking similarities between the way in which this saying of the Lord is recorded in Matthew and James:[48]

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[48] Cf. Dibelius, *James: A commentary on the Epistle of James*, 250.

	Matthew		*James*
1	Direct prohibition of all oaths	1	Direct prohibition of all oaths
2	*Examples:* (a) by heaven, for it . . . (b) or by earth, for it . . . (c) or by Jerusalem, for it . . . (d) or by head, for you . . .	2	*Examples:* (a) by heaven (b) or by earth (c) or with any other oath
3	Call for absolute truthfulness "Let what you say be simply 'Yes' of 'No' . . .	3	Call for absolute truthfulness: "Let your yes be yes and your no be no."
4	*Reason:* Anything more than this comes from evil	4	*Reason*: that you may not fall under condemnation.

The form in James appears to be much simpler than that of Matthew: the prohibition is presented in general terms and concludes with a personal threat. Matthew, on the other hand, shows an enlargement of the saying. From the examination of the form in both Matthew and James, Dibelius concludes: "The simpler, more unified and ethically purer form of the saying in James must be considered the earlier form."[49]

Although James appears to be the earlier form, this is not to say that Matthew simply borrowed from James. It is far more likely that Matthew and James represent the way the saying of Jesus came to expression and formulation in the course of time. James is the earlier formulation, while Matthew betrays a deeper reflection and hence expansion of the saying. In the context of Matthew this saying occurs in the Sermon on the Mount in that section dealing with the antitheses related to the new law that the follower of Jesus is meant to obey. Attention has already been drawn to James' reflection of two other antitheses, namely that related to murder (Matt 5:21-26) and adultery (Matt 5:27-32). Now James shows a connection with a third antithesis.

It is best, then, to postulate the connection between Matthew and James with regard to this saying in this way: It is not to be seen as part of the original Q tradition. However, being a saying of the Lord and containing such close relationships, some connection between James' expression and that of Matthew must be maintained. James shows an earlier knowledge of the saying as it is being handed on within the Matthean community, while Matthew's expression shows how it has been further developed or expressed in its final form within the Sermon on the Mount. This agrees with other connections which have been observed between James and Matthew.

5 Conclusion

The above examination has shown some noteworthy similarities between James and the Q Sermon on the Mount. It was particularly with regard to the beatitudes

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[49] Ibid., 251.

that one noticed a decided similarity in terminology and thought-content. Similarities were observed not just in this one section of the Sermon, but in most of the content of the original Q Sermon. In addition similarities were noted between James and with the way in which the Q Sermon had developed in the context of the Matthean community. None of the correspondences in itself was so forceful as to offer a solution which was beyond the shadow of a doubt. If each correspondence was taken on its own, it would be insignificant. Nevertheless, when they are all viewed together, then the correspondences appear to be impressive. It is in fact an argument from convergence. Taken together they are all converging towards one solution.

The question obviously arises: How does one account for these similarities? The obvious solution would be to argue that both James and the Q Sermon are dependent upon a common tradition, each using that tradition within the framework of his own work. However, this explanation fails to do justice to the noticeable similarities that have been highlighted in this article as well as the location of these similarities within a block of Q tradition, namely the Q Sermon on the Mount.

What has also been noted in the course of this examination is that although James shows a knowledge of the Q tradition as expressed in the original Q Sermon, he also demonstrates a knowledge of how this block of tradition developed within the context of the Matthean community. However, this development did not extend to the final redaction of the Q Sermon by the evangelist Matthew. James also shows a certain knowledge of Q traditions that formed part of the Lucan Sermon on the Mount (in particular the woes), but the relationship between James and Luke in these instances is seen to be at the level whereby certain Q material was in circulation and this material made its way into the Lucan Sermon as well as into James. In this sense, then, James does not show a knowledge of how the Q Sermon developed within the Lucan tradition.

Bauckham[50] has drawn attention to the important insight, namely that when one investigates connections between the Jesus tradition and other traditions of the New Testament, one must question whether these similarities are limited to certain blocks of tradition. In the case of the Epistle of James this is well illustrated. It has been shown that James demonstrates a connection with the block of Q material known as the Q Sermon on the Mount, as well as with the way in which this block of material developed within the context of the Matthean community. Before one can answer the further question as to whether James shows a knowledge of the entire Q source one must examine whether James shows a knowledge and a connection with other blocks of Q material beyond that of the Q Sermon on the Mount.

The scope, however, of this investigation has been to illustrate a knowledge by James of the Q Sermon on the Mount, and its development within the Matthean community prior to the final redaction of the evangelist Matthew. This is highly significant because James, then, becomes an independent witness giving support to the existence of this Q Sermon on the Mount. From a tradition that is outside of the synoptic Gospels, James bears witness to a knowledge of this Sermon as well as to its development within the context of the Matthean community.

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[50] Bauckham, "The study of Gospel Traditions outside the canonical Gospels: Problems and Prospects," 378-380.

Text vs. Tell: Which Sets the Agenda?

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The manner in which we frame questions can determine the answers to a large degree. The topic, "Text and Tell," which I assume refers in the first place to sources of information—written documents on the one hand and excavated artifacts on the other—perhaps presupposes some of the very distinctions we are here to debate. It seems obvious that both text and tell have a great deal to tell us about the past; what we are here to discuss is how best to facilitate conversation between the two.

I will argue that we should be very clear about drawing distinctions between text and tell at every point in our discussions. The two kinds of data—written and artifactual—are subject to distinct limitations, and each requires a mode of analysis sensitive to its own limitations. Further, the reconstruction of past entities, whether this takes the form of an explanation of social processes or a more accurate historical narrative, is in turn limited and determined by the mode of analysis. In other words, the data sets are of such different characters that we need distinct disciplines to deal with them.

Having recognized that historical studies, dealing with written records, and archeological studies, dealing with artifacts, are distinct disciplines, I will further suggest that we must also allow each to develop its own agenda: not only its own way of doing things, but its own set of questions as well. Archeology as an independent discipline is actually in a much better position to function as an interdisciplinary partner with historical studies than it can as a subdiscipline or dependent partner.

I. Written and Artifactual Evidence: Different Types of Data.

In the first place, the two kinds of data we are considering here, textual and archeological, are characterized by biases peculiar to each. In the case of the textual data, an inherent bias exists by virtue of ancient documents' origin in society: they are the product of a literate elite.

> The colouring of historical documentation arises from the inevitable filter effect of the individual author as a literate member of an elite literary subculture writing from the point of view and with the prejudices of his set, about selected matters of interest to that set.[1]

The perspectives of a relatively narrow segment of ancient societies, at least, are

[1] Clarke 1978: 394-5; see also Frick 1986: 13.

implicit in both what is written, what is not written, and even to an extent what is selected for preservation by successive generations. The evidence from literary data must, therefore, be handled with care if the investigation which utilizes such data is not to reflect in its results some of the same biases present in the literary data on which the investigation is based.

Archeological data are also characterized by their own limitations and bias. In the case of artifact recovery, Adams has argued persuasively that the collection of archeological data in Mesopotamia has been biased toward excavation of larger sites, partly because of a desire to increase the chances of recovering written texts.[2] The process of artifact deposition also complicates attempts to identify patterns on artifactual data. Hodder notes that sampling techniques, designed to eliminate the effects of subsequent patterned behavior (human or otherwise) on archeological data, may not be effective in many cases. This occurs because the data remaining to be excavated are so fragmentary that the relationship between them and what was originally deposited can no longer be recovered.[3] Many other kinds of limitations in archeologically-recovered data may be catalogued as well.[4]

The point here is not to examine the character and limitations of written and artifactual data in detail. Rather, it is to observe that each kind of data may be fairly characterized as radically incomplete. Further, while text and tell each provide us with very fragmentary views into the past, the views are fragmentary in different ways and for different reasons. Each must be used with a scholarly suspicion nuanced by an awareness of the biases and limitations peculiar to each.

II. Archeology as a Distinct Discipline

David Clarke argued for a clean break between the disciplines of history and archeology so that the issues and problems raised by the different sets of data could

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[2] I will cite Adams at length, because his remarks reveal that at least some of the shortcomings thought to be peculiar to biblical archeology may be more common than we realize: "Reference to the documentary sources reminds us that the availability of massive numbers of texts completely transforms the character and potentialities of the ancient record. Authorities may differ on the relative potential contributions of archaeological and historical approaches to the subject matter of the fully historical portions of this book, but there is no doubt that heretofore the archaeological contribution has been strictly secondary and ancillary. Work has been focused primarily on large-scale, relatively uncontrolled excavations of public buildings and tombs and has largely eschewed the quantitatively based, interdisciplinary theorems of investigation pioneered by the prehistorians to whom no information from texts is available . . . the dominant strategies of study—the avenues of investigation followed, the priorities, the questions asked—are still very largely those geared toward narrowly corroborating and supplementing texts as well as maximizing the chances for further textual recovery. The irony is that in the long run such strategies are precisely the wrong ones with which to complement and extend the textual testimony most effectively." (Adams 1981: 62-3).

[3] Hodder 1982; this article makes many excellent points about the limitations of archeological data, and especially warns against running such data through various statistical procedures designed to isolate patterns.

[4] Jamieson-Drake 1988, 39ff., 61ff., 119ff., 156ff.

be effectively addressed. He issued quite a ringing challenge to the concept of archeology as a subdiscipline of historical studies:

> Archaeology is a discipline in its own right, concerned with archaeological data which it clusters in archaeological entities displaying certain archaeological processes and studied in terms of archaeological aims, concepts and procedures. We fully appreciate that these entities and processes were once historical and social entities but the nature of the archaeological record is such that there is no simple way of equating our archaeological percepta with these lost events. We must certainly try to find out the social and historical equivalents of our archaeological entities and processes but we should not delude ourselves about the simplicity of these equivalents or our success in isolating them.[5]

Note that here Clarke uses the term "historical" to refer to actual events and entities of the past. I am attempting to limit my own use of the term in this paper so that it refers to the view of those events and entities which one can gain through the study of written texts, as opposed to archeology. Later, Clarke employs the term "historical" in this latter sense:

> . . . archaeological data and its entities are not so much less accurate or less informative than historical data and entities, as differently focused. Artefacts provide different information and bias as behavioural documents to those provided by written documents. The difficulty of equating archaeological and historical entities resides in this difference; no simple or exact equivalence is possible but correlation does exist within limits.[6]

Clarke's rather extreme view of the relationship between archeological and historical studies deserves serious consideration. The alternative to Clarke's position—namely, allowing the relationship between archeological and historical studies to remain conveniently fuzzy and vague—is fraught with problems.

One problem characterizing the relationship between historical and archeological studies is the tendency to use the results of archeological research as mere footnotes, whether corroborative or critical, to historical reconstructions based on texts. That this can even occur results from a lack of appreciation of the profound differences between past entities recreated on the basis of texts, and those reconstructed on the basis of artifactual evidence. Clarke rightly points out the dangerous ease with which entities "observed" on the basis of these different types of data may be equated, when in fact such entities may be related very complexly, if at all.

An even more fundamental concern arising from the relation of textually-based and artifactually-based studies is that of agenda. When archeology is used to address questions raised on the basis of textual data, it is embarrassed (pardon the anthropomorphism) by having to respond to questions it is illequipped to answer.

As a possible illustration of both of these difficulties consider the problem of the settlement of Israel in Palestine. The question was defined textually in the first place: dramatically oversimplified, it was noticed that the picture painted of Israelite settlement in the first twelve chapters of the biblical book of Joshua is inconsistent in several ways with the representation of that event in Judges 1-2. Then, after the

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[5] Clarke 1978: 11-12.

[6] Clarke 1978: 404.

discussion had gone on for some time, archeological results were called upon to challenge the view that the Judges picture was historically the more authentic. The archeological picture, in turn, proved to be less clear and applicable than had been hoped.

The problem was not that archeology had little to say about the question; on the contrary, if allowed to speak in its own time and way, it could say a great deal, as will be suggested later. But, illustrating the first problem noted above, the past entities whose behavior is under question were defined textually. What, archeologically speaking, is an Israelite? Or a Canaanite, Philistine, or other social entity of that temporal and geographical provenience? Archeology cannot properly be used to assess theories whose components are not archeologically defined. Even when entities are defined archeologically, they can still be simply equated with entities defined textually—as, for example, when people who lived in four-room houses in the Iron 1 Palestinian hill-country are identified as the biblical Israelites. Appealing to archeology when the terms of the discussion are primarily defined textually virtually guarantees that our classification scheme will slip and slide as we move from consideration of one type of data to the other and back again.

The example of Israelite settlement also illustrates the second and more fundamental problem. Archeology is best equipped to examine the behavior of entities defined by its own methods of definition and classification—this is true of any discipline, actually. But if archeology is not to borrow its categories of discussion from textual studies, it needs to define the process by which it builds its own set of terms and then relates these terms and sets them in motion as archeological theories. Slippage occurs the more easily because archeology as a discipline has lacked an agenda-setting theoretical framework of its own.

III. The Process of Archeological Entiation and Theory-Building

Archeologists reason from what is directly perceivable (their artifacts) to what is not (actual past entities and processes) by analyzing patterns in what can be seen and refining models which explain the patterns to enhance the models' predictive ability. Clarke describes this process using the 'Black Box' analogy:

> The problem of the Black Box arises in theoretical and practical terms when the investigator is faced with a complex system, completely concealed but for an input terminal and an output terminal. The only information available about the system within the box must come from observing the changing relationships between varying values at the input and output terminals. Consequently the investigation of Black Box systems depends upon the tabulation of as many varied input states and sequences of states as is possible together with a record of the corresponding output states. The investigator will primarily look for any evidence for constraint in the variety of states and for regularities in states or frequencies of states, such regularities as we can often observe in archaeological and anthropological data.[7]

The situation for archeologists is dissimilar to that of some other scientific disciplines in that the input terminal cannot be deliberately manipulated experimentally in order to facilitate the process of checking models. However, other disciplines do

[7] Clarke 1978: 59.

exist which operate successfully under this "disadvantage," such as astrophysics, geophysics and oceanography. Theoretical development has not been limited by an inability to "experiment" in the traditional sense in the case of these other disciplines, nor should it in archeological research.

As a by-product of the type of data archeologists employ in building their models of past processes and entities, archeology has been observed to become increasingly quantitative in character.[8] Though the observation may be accurate, this increasingly quantitative aspect of archeology is a less important characteristic than many seem to fear (or desire). A process of entiation which is consistent with the character of its own data and purposes, rather than an increasing degree of quantitation, is what archeology requires to liberate itself from the constraints placed on it as a subdiscipline of historical studies.

Archeologists have for some time perceived a need for theoretically sophisticated explanations of data rather than mere descriptions of them. Indeed, Binford's articles in the mid-sixties (see the bibliography for a few examples) helped make "explanation" something of a *cause celébre* among anthropological archeologists. When the desirability of models for theory-building became clear, the value of the works of van Thunen,[9] Cristaller,[10] Ziph[11] and others, which essentially propose simple, ideal systems with explicit rules for why they appear as they do, became obvious to archeologists. Cybernetics, or systems theory, which emphasizes the need to make explicit the rules governing the functioning of systems, was seen to be a helpful paradigm for bridging between archeological data, explanatory models, and ancient cultural systems.[12]

In systems theory, it is axiomatic that systems change in response to internal forces such as continuity or inertia, feedback, equilibrium, and homeostasis, to name a few.[13] Systems theory also demands an explanation of systemic evolution and devolution in terms of interactions between the cultural system and its environments: ecological, political, and economic. A holistic approach to entiation is thereby promoted: archeology is at the same time ecologically and processually focused, insofar as it adopts a systems orientation.

When we say that archeology is a subdiscipline of history, we mean that the loop from data collection, to data analysis, to theorization, to hypothesis formulation, to further data collection in order to test hypotheses, is an open loop. Archeology as a discipline has not fulfilled its primary responsibility for each step in the loop. Theories and questions have often been interpolated from other disciplines, and to that degree archeology has had the task of addressing issues foreign to it. The systems approach is a way of closing the loop. Archeologists should be in the business of testing and refining their own models and theories by further examination of the kinds of data that shaped the components of their theories in the first place. In other words, tells should be excavated to answer questions arising from the excavation of tells, not primarily to resolve problems raised by the study of ancient

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[8] Dever 1987: 150-151.

[9] See Chisolm 1970 for a synopsis and explanation of Van Thunen's work.

[10] See Berry 1961 for a synopsis and explanation of Cristaller's "Central Place Theory."

[11] See Adams 1981: 72-3 for a synopsis and explanation of Ziph's "rank-size rule."

[12] Flannery 1972; Clarke 1978

[13] Clarke 1978: 45ff.

texts. This is not a question of territoriality, or of the advantages of specialization *per se*. Rather, the hope is that archeology as a discipline will have more riches to share in an interdisciplinary context if it is nurtured independently of the agendas and entities of textually-based research.

The establishment of archeology as a discipline which synergistically excavates, analyzes, theorizes, and conducts further excavations liberates archeology not only from the agendas of textually-based research, but also from the more extreme difficulty of having no theoretical agenda at all. Excavation reports read at times as if the reason for excavation were self-evident. Excavations can seem to be conducted to gather information in a vague way, as if the mere conscientious recording of data justifies the exercise. They can also be conducted for the narrow purpose of resolving chronological issues relating to previous excavations at a site. Excavations have not, however, been focused by consideration of theoretical issues on a regional level, because such theorizing has been generally lacking.

We have heard aspersions cast on "arm-chair archeologists." There is another side to this coin. If archeologists are to avoid becoming mere technicians in the field, they must return to their studies and spend more time in the armchair and at the desk, assembling and integrating the massive quantities of unintegrated and non-standardized information pouring through the journals every month. This is the real "dirty work" of archeology, and much more time needs to be spent at it.

I freely admit that those in the best position to do this kind of theorization are those who have spent time in the field, since they are better equipped to interpret the variety (and there is great variety!) of recording systems, and to recognize faulty data collection. Field excavators must become theorists for another reason as well. Not only must existing information be articulated in a theoretical framework, but further excavations must be grounded in the purpose of theoretical reconstruction of archeological entities and processes as well. This grounding cannot take place as long as no theoretical framework, or complex of archeologically-based questions, exists, as has already been noted. But perhaps equally important, such grounding probably will not take place unless excavators have a professional stake in the regional, theoretical agendas of archeology.

Finally, and now I really am far afield, Palestinian archeology can converse with and profit from extra-Palestinian archeology more successfully if it speaks the language of anthropological archeology. Whole vistas of comparative and regional research remain to be opened. Palestinian archeology does not need to reinvent the wheel; an already vast and continually developing body of literature exists for anthropological archeology. Sadly, Palestinian excavations are rarely represented in this literature, even in footnotes. Movement of Palestinian archeology in this direction seems a more natural step in many ways that continued efforts to systematically link archeology and textual studies.

IV. Text and Tell: A Partial and Tentative Reintegration

As we come to a fuller appreciation of how archeological investigations can articulate ancient social entities and processes we can meaningfully move to the further question of how the two sets of questions—text and tell—might most fruitfully intersect. I can offer very little in the way of solid prediction here, but I do have some suspicions I would be happy to share.

I am confident that Palestinian archeology will develop increasingly independently

of textual studies. For reintegration between the disciplines to occur, textual studies will probably have to adopt a more sociological bent. That is, textual studies will have to translate their models of ancient societies and history into sociological entities and processes. There are some examples of this already: Gottwald's *Tribes of Yahweh* is almost entirely textually-based in terms of its raw data, and it adopts an avowedly sociological perspective at the same time.

The above-mentioned example of the settlement of Israel in Palestine may serve as a good example of how reintegration of textual and archeological studies might occur. Complaints have been raised about Mendenhall's proposed explanation for the settlement of Israel in Palestine (the "revolt model"[14]): it explains change in terms of social categories foreign to the time, and is therefore anachronistic. While this may be a problem for textual analysis (though I believe it is ultimately merely an aesthetic problem even there) it is hardly a problem for archeological research, which is not bound by textually-determined categories or concepts. The only criteria of value for an archeological model are the accuracy with which it models and the degree to which it explains the behavior of the archeological data. The entire systems process is essentially anachronistic: there is no primary interest in visualizing the processes of the past in the same terms as those who experienced the processes.

To continue our example, I believe that archeological data could be used to systematically define social entities in the Iron 1 period, to define the relationships between them, and to observe changes in the entire complex of related entities as it moves through time. Information regarding the degree to which settlement, conquest, and revolt played a part in the processes of social change and integration in this period could be recovered from the archeological record. However, the terms of the question will have to be redefined in order to allow archeological theorization to respond to it. An additional benefit may accrue to this endeavor in that biases of perspective may be revealed: the concepts "revolt" and "conquest," for example, can have a group-centered orientation that compromises the impartiality of the researcher. It is difficult indeed to disentangle oneself from the perspectives of the textual data on which one is dependent.

At the same time as reintegration becomes potentially more fruitful, the increasing independence of the two forms of study of the past will result in an increasing unrelatedness of purpose. Archeology will develop its own language, not just a separate vocabulary but also a different semantic scheme, a different way of relating components within its system, and an independent agenda. Conversation between text and tell will appear to become more difficult, but that is only because the currently existing difficulties have for too long been insufficiently appreciated. Intercommunication will be difficult, but archeology will have a great deal more to say for itself when such communication does occur. And attempts at intercommunication will continue, because the texts and the tells are both there, and neither we nor our scholarly descendants can resist the challenge of trying to relate the two.

[14] Mendenhall 1962; for a recent review see Fritz 1987.

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The Historical Jesus at Table

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Jesus at table is a widespread motif in the Jesus tradition. Its significance in scholarly reconstructions of the historical Jesus can be seen by the fact that a wide variety of scholars who disagree on virtually everything else include this motif in their respective pictures of the historical Jesus. They differ, of course, in their evaluation of its meaning, but they agree in including it as a part of the proclamation of Jesus. These studies have tended to utilize unstated and untested presuppositions about the structure and social function of ancient meals. It is appropriate, therefore, that we reexamine the data in terms of a more rigorous understanding of ancient meals as well as recent research in the Jesus tradition.

I. A Brief Review of Scholarship

A review of recent research on this subject must begin with Norman Perrin, whose *Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus* remains an authoritative resource.[1] His judgment on this issue has been widely used by subsequent authors, sometimes in the same form and sometimes in a modified form. He proposed the authenticity of the tradition that Jesus offered table fellowship to "outcasts," or "tax collectors and sinners," as especially recorded in Matt 11:16-19 ("Behold a glutton and a drunkard, a friend of tax collectors and sinners"). Furthermore, Jesus' table fellowship utilized the symbolism of the messianic banquet, as defined in Matt 8:11: "I tell you, many will come from east and west and sit at table with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven" (=Luke 13:28-29). Both of these texts he judged to be "indubitably authentic."[2] His basic argument for authenticity in both cases was along the lines of the classic criterion of dissimilarity, that these texts represent perspectives more appropriate to Jesus' setting than to that of the early church.[3]

According to his interpretation, therefore, "a regular table fellowship" would have been held by Jesus and his followers which would have included "Jews who had made themselves as Gentiles," Perrin's interpretation of the meaning of "tax collectors and sinners." Utilizing the symbolism of the kingdom, especially as exemplified by the messianic banquet imagery which symbolized the anticipated final kingdom, Jesus' action in effect served "to welcome those people back into the community."[4]

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[1] New York: Harper & Row, 1967.

[2] Ibid., 102-108.

[3] Ibid., 119-21, 161-64. Actually, his arguments are much more detailed than my cryptic summary suggests, but for the sake of brevity I would emphasize dissimilarity as the cornerstone of much of his argumentation.

[4] Ibid., 103.

According to Perrin, this reconstruction is seen as authentic because it explains how Jesus came to die: his actions defiled the boundaries of the community and thus functioned as an act of such offensiveness to Jewish sensibilities that Jewish leaders called for his death. It also explains how the early Christian community came to practice a communal meal together, a practice that came into existence so early that it must have been a continuation of the practice of Jesus himself.[5]

Subsequent scholarship has continued along these same lines. Thus, for example, the idea that Jesus offered the kingdom to outcasts by means of his table fellowship figures prominently, with some variation and elaboration, in the recent studies of James Breech, E. P. Sanders, Richard Horsley, and Marcus Borg.[6] This is not to say that they all come out at the same place; indeed, their reconstructions of the historical Jesus differ on significant points. Yet they all agree in giving prominence to the table fellowship theme. Indeed, for many scholars the theme of table fellowship with outcasts is primary and essential to any valid reconstruction of the historical Jesus.

What is especially lacking in all studies of the data to this point is a realistic appraisal from the perspective of social history, in which actual meal practices and their meanings in the social world of Jesus and the early church are brought into play. The ultimate question to ask is whether the picture of Jesus utilizing table fellowship with a symbolic meaning as part of his teaching program can be plausibly reconstructed as a real event in first century Palestine. There is no doubt that it is a powerful image on the literary level. But the question is whether it could function in the same way on the historical level in the time of Jesus.

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[5] Ibid., 102-108

[6] Breech, *The Silence of Jesus: The Authentic Voice of the Historical Man* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983) 22-64; Sanders, *Jesus and Judaism* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985) 174-211, 271-73; Horsley, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence: Popular Jewish Resistance in Roman Palestine* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987) 178-80; Borg, *Conflict, Holiness & Politics in the Teachings of Jesus* (Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity 5; New York and Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press, 1984) 78-121; Idem., *Jesus: A New Vision* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987) 101-102, 131-33. To be sure, I have severely truncated the detailed and distinct argument of these scholars by grouping them together in this way, but it is only to make the point that they all place significant emphasis on the table fellowship motif though they may interpret it differently. Some of their distinct arguments will be referenced later in this paper. Others who emphasize the table fellowship theme as part of the historical Jesus data are: Guenther Bornkamm, *Jesus of Nazareth* (New York: Harper & Row, 1960) 80-81; Joachim Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus* (6th ed.; London: SCM Press, 1963) 227; Idem., *New Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971) 115-16; Geza Vermes, *Jesus the Jew: A Historian's Reading of the Gospels* (London: William Collins Sons & Co., 1973) 224; Morton Smith, *Jesus the Magician* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978) 122-23, 152; Martin Hengel, *The Charismatic Leader and his Followers* (New York: Crossroad, 1981) 67; Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins* (New York: Crossroad, 1983) 119-21, 126-30. The list could go on. There are a few sceptics; see, e.g., William O. Walker, "Jesus and the Tax Collectors," *JBL* 97 (1978) 221-38, and Burton L. Mack, *A Myth of Innocence: Mark and Christian Origins* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988) 80-83.

II. Defining Ancient Meals

In order to assess the data correctly, we must understand the social function of meals in the ancient world. This involves analyzing how meals were practiced and what their social implications were. In addition, however, we must look closely at the possible differences between the social function of meals as practiced and the social values communicated in the idealizations of meals in literature. While both develop from the same social world, they nevertheless represent different kinds of experiences or representations of that social world.

A. Meal Customs in the Ancient World

The meals of Jesus mentioned in the Gospels tend to be occasions at which the most formal of social conventions, such as reclining, are practiced.[7] The type of meal that most clearly fits these texts is the banquet, a formal meal that is found with the same general characteristics throughout the Greco-Roman world, including first century Hellenistic as well as Palestinian Judaism.[8] The gospel texts thus envision Jesus practicing dining customs in accordance with those found in Greco-Roman literature at large. It is clearly a literary motif that is being conveyed, but it also appears to be consistent with what we know about actual dining customs in first century Palestine.

A banquet would generally include certain features such as the following: 1) The host would invite guests, see that the meal is prepared, and provide a place (e.g. a house) where the diners could dine.[9] 2) Guests would be met by a servant who would wash their feet before they reclined on the couches. After reclining, they

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[7] In all of the formal meals of Jesus described in the gospels, when a posture is mentioned it is reclining. Jeremias argued that this meant that the gospels only refer to unusually festive meals (*The Eucharistic Words of Jesus* [3rd ed.; London: SCM Press, 1966] 48-49). Rather, they are to be understood as presenting Jesus at table in a setting corresponding to the conventions of Greco-Roman formal meals in general as they were practiced and represented in literature throughout the Mediterranean world.

[8] The form of the Greco-Roman formal meal is defined in my dissertation, "Social Obligation in the Context of Communal Meals: A Study of the Christian Meal in 1 Corinthians in Comparison with Graeco-Roman Communal Meals" (Th.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1980) and in my forthcoming article in the *Anchor Bible Dictionary*, "Meals, Customs (Greco-Roman)." A summary of Greco-Roman meal practices may also be found in my article, "Meals and Morality in Paul and his World," in *SBL 1981 Seminar Papers* (ed. Kent H. Richards; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981) 319-39. I am currently preparing a monograph on this subject for publication. On the Greco-Roman character of meals in first century Palestine (based, however, on a non-differentiated collection of rabbinic references) see esp. S. Safrai, *The Jewish People in the First Century* (CRINT, Section 1; 2 vols.; ed. S. Safrai and M. Stern; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974, 1976) 2.736-38.

[9] For the general motif, see Plato *Symp.* 174A and Xen. *Symp.* 3-4. See also the references to invitations in Sir 13:9 and in the Parable of the Great Banquet, Matt 22:1-10 = Luke 14:16-24.

would be provided with water for washing the hands.[10] 3) Positions in the banquet hall were traditionally ranked and guests would be placed according to their rank or status in the community.[11] 4) A "religious" ritual, whether a prayer or a libation, would mark the beginning of the meal and/or the beginning of courses.[12] 5) The meal would include at least two courses, the first being the *deipnon* (dinner) where the actual eating took place, and the second being the *symposion* (drinking party) during which the guests enjoyed leisurely drinking of wine.[13] 6) During the symposium, a variety of traditional types of entertainment would be provided, ranging from music to games to dramatic entertainment to the more serious philosophical tradition of elevated conversation or "table talk."[14]

The banquet was a social institution of such significance in the ancient Mediterranean social world that it was commonly utilized by all sorts of distinct social groups as an effective means for confirming and celebrating their self consciousness as a community. Thus funerary societies, trade guilds, religious clubs, philosophical schools, Jewish sects, and early Christian groups all tended to center their community activities on their gatherings for communal meals.[15] This means that any social group that came into existence in the ancient world would commonly celebrate communal meals together. This factor offers adequate explanation for the phenomenon of communal meals in early Christian groups and indeed helps explain the fact that, while meals were common in early Christianity, interpretations of these meals varied.

B. The "Social Code" of Ancient Meals

The analysis of meals from a social science perspective has provided us with an understanding of the ways in which meals function in human societies. Mary Douglas is especially well known for her studies of the "social code" of meals. She summarizes her perspective as follows:

> If food is treated as a social code, the messages it encodes will be found in the pattern of social relations being expressed. The message is about different degrees of hierarchy, inclusion and exclusion, boundaries and transactions across the boundaries. Like sex, the taking of food has a social component, as well as a biological one.[16]

Another anthropologist who has studied meals is Jack Goody. He is critical of the

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[10] Washing the feet: Plato *Symp.* 175A; Luke 7:44-46. Washing the hands: Ath. 14.641d, 11.462c-d; Mark 7:3; *m. Hag.* 2:5.

[11] Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 615D, 619B; Luke 14:7-11.

[12] Plato *Symp.* 176A; Xen. *Symp.* 2.1. Compare the wine blessings in Jewish and Christian texts: *b. Ber. 51a;* 1 Cor 10:16.

[13] Plato *Symp.* 176A; Xen. *Symp.* 2.1; 1 Cor 11:25.

[14] Entertainment: Xen. *Symp.* 2.1-3.1, 9.3-7; Pliny *Ep.* 1.15; Sir 32:3-6. Philosophical conversation as a form of symposium entertainment: Plato *Symp.* 176E; Xen. *Symp.* 3.2-3; Ath. 5.185a; Plut. *Quaes. conv.* 7.7. On the Jewish version, namely discussing the Torah at table: Sir 9:15-16; Philo *Cont.* 75-78; *m. Abot.* 3.3.

[15] See evidence cited in Dennis E. Smith, "Table Fellowship as a Literary Motif in the Gospel of Luke," *JBL* 106 (1987) 633-34, notes 52 & 53.

[16] "Deciphering a Meal," *Daedalus* 101 (1972) 61.

structural approach of Douglas, preferring to study each culture on its own terms rather than proposing a universal theory of human culture.[17] His conclusions, however, come out remarkably similar to those of Douglas. He states:

> In looking at the cuisines of the Eurasian societies, we noted a set of specific characteristics: 1. The link between cuisine and "class", with social groups being characterized by different styles of life. 2. The contradictions, tensions and conflicts connected with this differentiation. The various forms include the contradiction between ideologies of equality . . . and ideologies of hierarchy . . . as well as the conflict, at the individual as well as the group level, between fasting acknowledged as "good" and feasting as "pleasurable".[18]

For our purposes, we may note the broad agreements between Goody and Douglas though they work from different perspectives. For this analysis, therefore, we will adopt the idea that there is a "social code" expressed by ancient meal practices and that that code may be expected to involve similar kinds of themes and issues as are identified by the studies of Goody and Douglas. Since our data is more limited than theirs—that is, since we do not have the option of actually observing our subjects eating their meals—we must expect some gaps in our knowledge. Nevertheless, an overview of the Greco-Roman data has tended to confirm the idea that ancient meals also expressed a "social code" which was shared across the Mediterranean world and which involved categories in which social bonding, boundaries, and hierarchies figured prominently.

The boundary maintenance function of meals is illustrated by the centrality of communal meals in the activities of distinct social groups in the ancient world as noted above. It should be pointed out, however, that while meals were highly effective and widely used as a means for celebrating community solidarity, they were not capable of creating a community *in themselves.* Rather communal bonds of some sort would need already to exist before a group would gather for a meal. The meal may help to enhance those bonds, but it would not create bonds that do not exist originally. This seems to me to be an important perspective on the function of meals in actual social settings. The rules are somewhat different in literary settings, however, for in a narrative world the symbolism of events can be more tightly controlled and regulated.

When meals were described in literature, recourse was made to standard motifs, many of which derived from the rich literary tradition of the symposium.[19] Thus whether an actual meal or a fictitious meal was being described the motifs used in the description were the same. These motifs tended to represent (or parody) the ideal of the "proper" meal at which complete concord was present among the diners and a good time was had by all. Meals were also part of the repertoire used to typify the life of the hero or great man. Thus when we come upon meals in the literature of early Christianity, we must be aware of the pervasiveness of literary and folklore motifs in the tradition. Indeed, given the fact that all of our data derives from literary

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[17] *Cooking, Cuisine and Class: A Study in Comparative Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) 29-33.

[18] Ibid., 191.

[19] See Josef Martin, *Symposion: Die Geschichte einer literarischen Form* (Paderborn: F. Schoeningh, 1931). See also Smith, "Table Fellowship as a Literary Motif," 613-38.

documents, it is to be expected that there will always be some element of idealization in any description we have.

III. Jesus at Table in the Gospel Tradition

Jesus certainly ate meals; this need not be proven. Our burden of proof has to do with which (if any) of the references to meals in the gospel tradition may be judged to be historical. The various references in the gospels in which actual meals of Jesus are referred to may be classified according to setting in three categories: meals with Pharisees, meals with disciples, and meals with "tax collectors and sinners."

A. Meals with Pharisees

The first of these, meals with Pharisees, is attested only in Luke (7:36, 11:37, 14:1). These texts are all clearly redactional and thus have no verifiable data concerning the historical Jesus. They are, however, rich with allusions to literary traditions concerning meals.[20]

B. Meals with Disciples

1. The Last Supper

It can perhaps be assumed that Jesus on several occasions took meals with his followers and associates. The most elaborated description of a formal meal with his disciples, however, is the Last Supper. This tradition is attested in Mark, which was then used as a source by Matthew and Luke, and in 1 Cor 11:23-25.

The earliest text is in 1 Cor, a text whose form is that of an etiological legend.[21] Mark has taken this tradition and incorporated it into his narrative.[22] Mark's passion narrative, however, has been shown in recent research to be largely a creation of the gospel writer.[23] Thus neither the text of 1 Cor nor that of Mark has a form that is demonstrably historical. Nevertheless, one could inquire whether the core data in these texts could be considered historical.

Those who support the historicity of the tradition in Mark tend to emphasize that Jesus celebrated a passover meal with his disciples as his last meal and that

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[20] Smith, "Table Fellowship as a Literary Motif."

[21] Mack, *A Myth of Innocence*, 116-20.

[22] Ibid., 299.

[23] Vernon K. Robbins, "Last Meal: Preparation, Betrayal, and Absence (Mark 14:12-25)," *The Passion in Mark: Studies on Mark 14-16* (ed. Werner H. Kelber; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976) 21-40; Robert M. Fowler, *Loaves and Fishes: The Function of the Feeding Stories in the Gospel of Mark* (SBLDS 54; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981); Philip Sellew, "The Last Supper Discourse in Luke 22:21-38," *Forum* 3,3 (September, 1987) 70-95; John L. White, "The Way of the Cross: Was there a Pre-Markan Passion Narrative?" *Forum* 3,2 (June, 1987) 35-49; Idem.; "Beware of Leavened Bread: Markan Imagery in the Last Supper," Forum 3,4 (December, 1987) 49-63.

reminiscences of that meal are contained in our Last Supper account.[24] Closer analysis has shown, however, that there is very little relationship to a passover meal in the Last Supper text at all other than the introductory reference (Mark 14:12-16), and that is clearly Mark's creation.[25] Thus, even if Jesus did celebrate a passover meal with his disciples as his last meal, we have no clear reminiscence of such a meal in the description we now have.

A historical reconstruction based on the Pauline text might point to the reference to these events taking place "on the night when he was betrayed" (1 Cor 11:23). Thus the pre-Pauline tradition referred to this as Jesus' last meal and placed it in relation to an assumed historical sequence of events. However, it should be noted that the so-called "eucharistic words" of Jesus in all forms in which we have them, both in 1 Cor and in Mark, are primarily concerned to interpret the death of Jesus. It seems highly unlikely that such traditions represent a self-understanding of Jesus during his own lifetime. Rather they most likely represent a retrojection back into Jesus' time of an interpretation that originated in the early church. Thus whatever might be proposed as the historical core of a meal or meals of Jesus with his disciples, it cannot have centered on an interpretation of Jesus' death. Consequently the Last Supper traditions do not provide adequate data to reconstruct a historical meal of Jesus with his disciples.

2. Other References to Meals with Disciples

a. General References. There are isolated references in the gospels in which seemingly incidental events take place at meals. In these instances, the meal provides the setting for the event but the meal symbolism is secondary to the overall theme. Thus even if these references were judged to be historical, the meals themselves do not carry the symbolic weight to be judged parabolic actions of Jesus. The most important example is the story of the anointing of Jesus at a meal which occurs in various forms in the gospels (Matt 26:6-13 = Mark 14:3-9 = Luke 7:36-50 = John 12:1-8). This text most likely originated as a redaction by Mark.[26] Another text is the story of Martha and Mary at a meal setting which is found only in Luke 10:38-42 and is best understood as another example of Luke's extensive use of the literary motif of table fellowship.[27]

References to meal symbolism may also be found in the sayings of Jesus. Such sayings could have originated in a meal setting, such as in the "table talk" of Jesus, but there is not sufficient evidence to affirm this. At the least, these references show the pervasiveness of meal symbolism as a motif in folklore and literature. One need not assume that they refer in any way to actual meals of Jesus. Examples, listed according to title and number in *Sayings Parallels*,[28] are as follows: 1) The Feast (*SP* 12, 365), 2) Blessed the Hungry (*SP* 39), 3) Salting the Salt (*SP* 44; see also 212,

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[24] Jeremias, *Eucharist Words.*

[25] See e.g. Eduard Schweizer, *The Lord's Supper according to the New Testament* (FBBS 18; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967) 29-32; Robbins, "Last Meal," 22-28.

[26] See esp. Werner H. Kelber, "Conclusion: From Passion Narrative to Gospel," *The Passion in Mark* (ed. Werner H. Kelber; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976) 153-80, esp. 173.

[27] Smith, "Table Fellowship as a Literary Motif," esp. 622 & 633.

[28] Ed. John Dominic Crossan; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986.

213), 4) Patches and Wineskins (*SP* 98; see also 212), 5) Leader as Servant (*SP* 172, 447), 6) Patriarchs and Gentiles (*SP* 94).

b. Debates about Dietary Laws. There are various other meal references in the gospels in which the primary motif is Jesus' opposition to certain interpretations of Jewish dietary laws. Some examples of these texts are as follows: 1) Unwashed Hands (*SP* 437), 2) What Goes In (*SP* 147), 3) Leaven of Pharisees (*SP* 152), 4) Inside and Outside (*SP* 187). Such a debate could only take place in a context dominated by Pharisaic viewpoints, since these are not issues endemic to Judaism as a whole. As Neusner and others have pointed out, it was the Pharisees who had interpreted the purity laws, including the dietary laws, to apply to daily life within the community. For the majority of Jews they applied only to the temple. Non-Pharisees followed the purity laws when they were involved with ritual at the temple; otherwise the laws did not apply to their daily lives.[29] To be sure, there were aspects of the dietary laws that were apparently interpreted as being of more general application, most notably the restrictions against the eating of pork.[30] However, there is a great deal we simply do not know about practices within Judaism during the first century. As Alan Segal observes, "We do not know exactly how ordinary Jews, as opposed to strict Pharisees, observed the dietary laws in the first century."[31]

If Jesus was debating dietary laws, as the texts surveyed above suggest, he would therefore have been debating with the Pharisees. This is, of course, what the tradition states. However, when we place these debates in the world of Judaism as defined above, we find that they would not represent the social stance that they appear to represent. That is, by separating himself from the viewpoints of the Pharisees, Jesus would simply be identifying with the masses in "ordinary" Judaism as opposed to the sect that was Pharisaism.[32] This would not at all mean, therefore, that Jesus and his followers were taking a separatist or sectarian position in Judaism.

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[29] Jacob Neusner, *The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism* (SJLA 1; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973) 64-71.

[30] Note, for example, the widespread motif in the non-Jewish world that Jews were known for their abstinence from pork; see e.g. Plutarch, *Table Talk* 4.5: "Whether the Jews abstain from pork because of reverence or aversion for the pig." See also Neusner, *The Idea of Purity,* 118.

[31] "Romans 7 and Jewish Dietary Laws," in *The Other Judaisms of Late Antiquity* (Brown Judaic Studies 127; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987) 175. Concerning the issue of handwashing before meals as a purification ritual (as in Mark 7:1-13), Sanders notes that we cannot adequately account for how it developed; in any case, "it is not a biblical purity law. . . . It is best . . . to presume that those who practiced it were *haberim*. . . . But before 70 the common people did not accept the practice" (*Jesus and Judaism,* 185-86). On handwashing before meals as a common practice in the culture, see note 10 above.

[32] On the Pharisees as a minority movement in first century Judaism, see Morton Smith, "Palestinian Judaism in the First Century," in *Essays in Greco-Roman and Related Talmudic Literature* (ed. Henry A. Fischel; New York: KTAV, 1977) 183-97; Jacob Neusner, *From Politics to Piety: The Emergence of Pharisaic Judaism* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973) 64-96; Sanders, *Jesus and Judaism,* 190-93.

And it would certainly not imply that they would have formed a separate table fellowship community.

This tradition does develop a distinctive sectarian thrust later in the early Christian community, however. This can be seen in the gospels whereby the trajectory of Jesus' critique of dietary laws results in the interpretation: "Thus he declared all foods clean" (Mark 7:19). This is a perspective that clearly derives from a time in which the early Christian community is developing its self-consciousness as a sectarian group within the social world of Judaism.

Thus even if the references to debates of Jesus with Pharisees over purity laws were historical, they would not imply that Jesus and his followers formed separate meal communities. Rather that idea is to be associated with the development of a separate community consciousness, a phenomenon not to be found in the lifetime of Jesus but only after his death. It was at that time that the Christian communal meal and its ideology began to develop. And consistent with that development was the interpretation of the Jesus tradition to represent a sectarian point of view in regard to dietary laws.

C. Meals with "Tax Collectors and Sinners"

These references all represent criticisms against Jesus and his followers. There are two basic versions of this data: 1) a description of a meal of Jesus at the home of a tax collector and 2) a tradition in which meal practices play a part in a larger argument in which Jesus is being contrasted with John the Baptist. The first tradition is found in its earliest form in Mark and the second in Q.

Both texts are defined as types of the chreia form. This form has been given extensive analysis and definition in recent research on the gospel tradition.[33] The chreia was a form of rhetoric that is described in ancient literature and was taught in the schools. It is related to the form known as the pronouncement story. It is defined as "a saying or act that is well-aimed or apt, expressed concisely, attributed to a person, and regarded as useful for living."[34] Especially important in the definition for our study is that a chreia was normally utilized to characterize a famous person or hero.[35] Chreiai were therefore used extensively in the philosophical tradition to characterize famous philosophers.

These traditional usages provide us with a further definition of the chreia form. At least two types can be singled out as widely used, the Stoic chreia and the Cynic chreia. The Stoic chreia is characterized by its emphasis on moral teaching. The

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[33] See especially Ronald F. Hock and Edward N. O'Neil, *The Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric. Volume I: The Progymnasmata* (SBLTT 27; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986). An excellent brief discussion of the chreia with an annotated bibliography is found in Vernon K. Robbins, "The Chreia," in *Greco-Roman Literature and the New Testament: Selected Forms and Genres* (SBLSBS 21; ed. David E. Aune; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988) 1-23. See also the helpful review of scholarship on this form in Mack, *A Myth of Innocence*, 172-78.

[34] Robbins, "The Chreia," 2.

[35] See especially Henry A. Fischel, "Studies in Cynicism and the Ancient Near East," *Religions in Antiquity: Studies in Honor of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough* (Studies in the History of Religions 14; ed. Jacob Neusner; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968) 372-411, esp. 374.

Cynic chreia "distinguishes itself by the odd, extreme, and often even burlesque action (or basic situation or final statement) of the central Sage-Hero that becomes the basis for a demonstration of Cynic ideals and values."[36] Recent studies have concluded that the chreiai in the Jesus tradition tend to be of the Cynic type.[37] This is also true for the examples studied here.

1. A chreia/description of a meal

Mark's description of a meal of Jesus at the home of a tax collector has been identified as a chreia of the Cynic type. The text is as follows:

> And as he sat at table [Greek: "reclined"] in his house, many tax collectors and sinners were sitting with [Greek: "reclining with"] Jesus and his disciples; for there were many who followed him. And the scribes of the Pharisees, when they saw that he was eating with sinners and tax collectors, said to his disciples, "Why does he eat with tax collectors and sinners?" And when Jesus heard it, he said to them, "Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick; I came not to call the righteous, but sinners" (Mark 2:15-17/Matt9:10-13/Luke 5:29-32 [*SP*#97]).

The basic, core chreia is reconstructed by Burton Mack as follows:

> When asked why he ate with tax collectors and sinners, Jesus replied, "Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are ill."[38]

The logic of the text takes on a Cynic cast because it represents a counter argument to the implied conventional logic of the objection. Furthermore, the saying about a physician is a conventional one, and is especially congenial to the Cynic tradition where a comparison of the philosopher with a physician was widely used.[39] The core chreia has then been elaborated with data that relates it to its context in Mark, especially by identifying the setting as the home of the tax collector whom Jesus has just called to follow him and by identifying Jesus' detractors as "scribes of the Pharisees."

The text in its present form, therefore, represents a creation by Mark to

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[36] Ibid., 373. See also Mack, *A Myth of Innocence*, 179-82.

[37] John S. Kloppenborg, *The Formation of Q: Trajectories in Ancient Wisdom Collections* (Studies in Antiquity and Christianity; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987) 322-25; Mack, *A Myth of Innocence*, 182-92; see also Idem., "The Kingdom That Didn't Come: A Social History of the Q Tradents," in *SBL 1988 Seminar Papers* (ed. David J. Lull; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988) 608-35.

[38] Mack, *A Myth of Innocence*, 183.

[39] See especially Diogenes *Epistles* 38.4: "I did not dine with everyone but only with those in need of therapy" (Abraham J. Malherbe, ed., *The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition* [SBLSBS 12; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977] 163; quoted in Leif E. Vaage, "Q: The Ethos and Ethics of an Itinerant Intelligence" [Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1987] 379). For other examples, see also Abraham J. Malherbe, "Self-Definition among Epicureans and Cynics," *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition. Volume Three: Self-Definition in the Greco-Roman World* (ed. Ben F. Meyer and E. P. Sanders; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982) 53; Mack, *A Myth of Innocence*, 183-84, esp. 184 n. 8.

coordinate with his own literary aims, both in terms of context and themes.[40] In addition, the form that the description takes has an air of unreality about it. It is difficult to imagine how Pharisees can be present in the dining room so that they can observe and comment without themselves being participants.[41] Such a feature cannot be made to fit conventional dining customs and settings, but obviously presents no problems to a narrator who is imagining a story world.

Another discordant historical note is presented by the phrase, "I came not to call the righteous, but sinners." This saying represents an elaboration on the physician saying but also has an independent relation to the meal setting. For the word "call" (*kaleo*) is used here as a pun; the same term is the ordinary term meaning "invite" to a meal.[42] According to this saying, therefore, Jesus is being pictured not as the guest but as the host, the one who invites to the meal. Though this presents insurmountable difficulties if the text is taken to be historical, it works quite well in the literary context. Here, while the character in the story, Levi the tax collector, thinks he is the host who has invited Jesus, the reader perceives Jesus as the one who invites and his invitation is to that which the meal merely symbolizes here. Furthermore, the theme of calling is inherent to the context of Mark, where the meal is connected with a "call" story.[43] Thus the meal is made to symbolize redemption and calling to discipleship, a symbolism that works quite well in the literary context but is difficult to reconstruct in a historical setting. The meal description presented here, therefore, represents a literary idealization rather than a recalling of an actual event.

When taken out of its context in Mark and reduced to its basic form, as seen in Mack's reconstruction quoted above, the text as chreia does not present a description of a specific meal but rather presents a characterization of Jesus. The assumption behind the chreia is that Jesus characteristically dined with "tax collectors and sinners," that this was somehow indicative of his overall character, and furthermore that it was inherently an unconventional thing to do.

The underlying logic behind the assumption that Jesus was engaging in an unconventional act by dining with such individuals appears to relate to traditional Jewish dietary laws and the assumption that Jesus would be transgressing those laws in some way by eating with such people.[44] The fact that the text assumes this motif means that it is clearly present in their social world. But accounting for a social setting that would represent that social world is difficult.

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[40] Bultmann confidently asserts about this text: "the artificiality of the composition is clear as day" (*The History of the Synoptic Tradition* [2nd ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1968] 47-48). He notes especially how the story artificially involves the disciples. In this it is parallel to other stories in the tradition whose function is to defend the conduct of the disciples. Thus it is ultimately the church rather than Jesus that is on trial; the text would therefore originate in the early church.

[41] Ibid., 18 n. 3, 66; Walker, "Jesus and the Tax Collectors," 233.

[42] See e.g. Bultmann, *History of the Synoptic Tradition,* 163; K. L. Schmidt, *Kaleo, TDNT* 3.488-89.

[43] According to Vernon K. Robbins (*Jesus the Teacher: A Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation of Mark* [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984] especially p. 109) the calling of the disciples in Mark is part of a larger theme in the Gospel as a whole in which the writer utilizes classic literary motifs of the day to present Jesus as a teacher who calls and instructs his disciples.

[44] Thus Mack, *A Myth of Innocence,* 183.

The status of the dietary laws in the time of Jesus has already been discussed above. The point is that Jesus would not be perceived to be making a statement like this text assumes merely by dining with questionable individuals. Rather he would simply be making the statement that he is not a Pharisee. On the other hand, it may not be dietary laws per se that lie behind this characterization of "tax collectors and sinners." It is difficult to account for these individuals as being clearly in the unclean category.[45] In any case, in the text before us, the reconstructed basic chreia, these terms are already functioning with a symbolic sense, for the text assumes that they represent an aspect of the teaching program of Jesus. How they derived that symbolic meaning predates this chreia and will be considered in part IV below.

This text also compares dining with Jesus with being healed by a physician. This is at best a subtle symbol, since it assumes that this apparent "parabolic action" of Jesus can be perceived as part of his teaching program. As the discussion below under part IV will point out, however, such an interpretation is difficult to reconstruct on the level of social reality, although clearly it works well on a literary level. Since the chreia in its basic form represents an attempt to typify the teaching of Jesus utilizing a popular proverb about a physician, it has the form of a text created in a community that is idealizing its hero.

Thus the tradition represented in this text in both its elaborated form as found in Mark and in its basic chreia form can be seen to have its origin in the early church. There is one aspect of this tradition that deserves further investigation, however. Since both Mark and Q have independent versions of the motif that Jesus characteristically dined with "tax collectors and sinners," it clearly took shape in the tradition at a very early stage. In order to trace it further, we will now look at the form it takes in Q.

2. Jesus Contrasted with John the Baptist

The Q saying about Jesus' eating habits occurs in the larger context of an elaborated chreia in which Jesus is being contrasted with John the Baptist. The larger block of texts of which this text is a part includes Q 7:1-10, 18-23, 24-26, 16:16, and 31-35. These texts all picture John and Jesus together as opposed to "this generation."[46] Our text in its immediate context is as follows:

> To what then shall I compare the men of this generation, and what are they like? They are like children sitting in the market place and calling to one another, "We piped to you, and you did not dance; we wailed, and you did not weep." For John the Baptist has come eating no bread and drinking no wine; and you say, "He has a demon." The Son of man has come eating and drinking; and you say, "Behold, a glutton and a drunkard, a friend of tax collectors and sinners!" Yet wisdom is justified by all her children. (Luke 7:31-35 = Matt 11:16-19).

John Kloppenborg has defined three layers in the compositional history of Q. The earliest layer is made up of wisdom speeches, while the second layer represents the introduction of sayings "which adopted a critical and polemical stance with respect to Israel."[47] This text is located at the second or Q2 layer. It is part of a larger group

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[45] Sanders, *Jesus and Judaism*, 174-211.

[46] Kloppenborg, *The Formation of Q*, 107-117.

[47] Ibid., 317.

of texts concerned with the theme of judgment and opposition to "this generation." Also characteristic of the stage represented by this text is the fact that Jesus and John are included together rather than being rivals. Thus they are pictured here as allies against "this generation," as two types of "children" of wisdom.[48]

In terms of textual history, it seems apparent that the parable in verse 32 is independent of the saying in verses 33-34, which has been attached as an explanation for the parable. Thus verses 33-34 represent an independent saying.[49] Furthermore, the primary contrast here is between "fasting" and "feasting." The corollary added to the description of Jesus, that he is a "friend of tax collectors and sinners," since it has no parallel referent in the descriptive phrase referring to John, is secondary and must have been added at a later point.[50] It has the potential to have existed as an independent tradition, however, since table fellowship is a traditional motif for expressing the idea of friendship.[51]

A social history connected with this text in its larger context in Q has been proposed by Burton Mack.[52] He characterizes the group represented by Kloppenborg's Q1 level of tradition as taking a critical stance to society and to the norms of social roles and rankings, but not proposing a radical break with the social order, such as would be represented by a sectarian mentality. Their mode of discourse, the wisdom saying, was consistent with that view, especially when placed in the context of a Cynic perspective in which society is critiqued but not with a view toward radical revision of its structure.[53] He understands this perspective to represent that of the earliest Christian group that can be identified on the basis of the Q data. Furthermore, he finds this definition to be closest to the perspective that is most likely to be attributed to the historical Jesus.[54]

Our text derives from Q2, however, and is thus to be connected with a later development in the history of the Q community. At this stage, a disruption with the social order of their world has taken place; indeed, they have evidently suffered rejection. This text and others of this level in the tradition present a literary record of that social history by preserving their attempts to rationalize and explain this experience. Thus here the text assumes a rejection has already taken place; a distinction is already drawn between "this generation" and the Jesus community. Indeed, the line is now so strictly drawn that judgment is pronounced on the detractors, a classical mode of legitimizing discourse in an apocalyptic community. Thus a changing social situation serves as a catalyst for a change in the mode of discourse in Q from wisdom to apocalyptic.[55]

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[48] Ibid., 110-112; see also Arland Jacobson, "Wisdom Christology in Q," (Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1978) 84-91.

[49] Kloppenborg, *The Formation of Q*, 111.

[50] Also noted by Jacobson, "Wisdom Christology in Q," 86-87, and Wendy J. Cotter C.S.J., "The Parable of the Children in the Market-Place, Q (Lk) 7:31-35: An Examination of the Parable's Image and Significance," *NovT* 29 (1987) 303 n. 58.

[51] Smith, "Meals and Morality in Paul and his World," 322-23; "Table Fellowship as a Literary Motif in the Gospel of Luke," 634.

[52] "The Kingdom That Didn't Come."

[53] Ibid., 613-16, 621-23.

[54] Ibid., 633-34. See also Mack, *A Myth of Innocence*, 67-69, 73-74.

[55] "The Kingdom That Didn't Come," 616-17, 620, 624-26.

Mack's reconstruction provides a basis for an ingenious explanation of the intriguing contrast of Jesus and John proposed here. The presentation of Jesus and John on the same side in opposition to "this generation" yet also representing contrasting forms of messages functions as a means for correlating the two forms of discourse in Q. Jesus as one who "feasts" is here representative of the wisdom figure; John as one who "fasts" represents the prophetic, apocalyptic figure. The juxtaposition of two modes of discourse within one social world is thus legitimized.[56]

Especially important in Mack's reconstruction, however, is his proposal that "social formation" or sectarian identity is not to be found until the Q2 level of the tradition. Indeed, as he reads the data, the history represented in Q provides the best explanation for the history of the Jesus movement in general. That is to say, the earliest occurrence of what can be called a sectarian identity of a Christian group within Judaism is neither to be located at the level of the historical Jesus nor at the level of the earliest identifiable group within the Jesus movement. That sectarian identity only develops in the context of conflict in the later history of the movement.[57] And, it should be added, it is only when that sectarian identity has developed that the meal can function as it does here as a boundary marker setting off one group from another.

There are two basic meal motifs present in this text, feasting versus fasting and dining with "tax collectors and sinners." As has already been indicated, textual analysis suggests that these originate as separate motifs. As Mack suggests, the feasting vs. fasting symbolism is best interpreted as a referent for another idea, in this case as a cipher for the inclusion of wisdom and apocalyptic modes of discourse and life styles within the same community. It can hardly serve, however, as a profile of the community meal nor as a critique of the dining customs of "this generation." Thus up to 34b, the meal data is utilized in a strictly symbolic sense without any logical reference to actual meal customs in the community.

It is 34c that refers the meal symbolism to some implicit aspect of actual meal practices. Being a "friend of tax collectors and sinners" by means of undiscrimating table fellowship serves to define the self identity of the community over against "this generation."

Mack assumes that the social world indicated by the idea that dining with "tax collectors and sinners" is somehow scandalous is that of Pharisaic Judaism. This text would then originate in an early Christian community that is closely tied to Pharisaic Judaism and has somehow been ostracized by that group. Mack proposes that the Q community existed as "house groups" in the context of a synagogue that was dominated by Pharisaic teachings. Some sort of tension would have developed in their recent history leading to their being rejected from that community and, in effect, from their social world. This reconstruction would provide a context to explain the development of the various anti-Pharisaic teachings in Q.[58]

Many of these anti-Pharisaic texts involved questions regarding dietary laws, as is appropriate to the Pharisaic tradition. Such disagreements would evidently develop in the larger context of a conflict over rules of table fellowship. Such a conflict implies the existence of some sort of community meal, although whether it

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[56] Ibid., 630.
[57] Ibid., 626.
[58] Ibid., 624-25.

existed in the community as a whole or only in the Christian groups (as "house groups") or both is difficult to determine.[59]

The rejection of the Q2 group from the community was connected with a critique that they had somehow become tainted by practicing table customs that were not discriminating enough. In our text, the phrase "tax collectors and sinners" is made to serve a symbolic function to represent in a general way this critique. The text provides a rationale for the developing identity that has been defined by this community conflict by means of a story that connects Jesus with apparently "impure" dining companions. In the context, the term "tax collectors and sinners" functions as a catchall term for scandalous companions and thus would function symbolically rather than as a reference to specific figures in the community; that is to say, one need not posit the existence of "tax collectors" in the early Christian community in order to understand the invective involved in the use of this phrase.

This text, therefore, is best understood as developing out of a social context in the early Christian community, one in which the conflict and social separation inherent in the text make sense. Nevertheless, it might be proposed that the separate themes, dining with tax collectors and sinners and feasting vs. fasting, be considered as independent and potentially authentic Jesus tradition.

IV. Analysis of the Earliest Motifs

To this point we have analyzed the specific texts that are the most likely to represent table fellowship practices of the historical Jesus. We have presented arguments in each case that the social context and social world represented by these texts is most likely that of the early church. However, it is also appropriate to look beyond the texts and ask if the motifs they utilize could be construed as historical. The best candidates for this are the two motifs, dining with tax collectors and sinners and feasting vs. fasting.

A. Dining with "Tax Collectors and Sinners"

In its basic meaning, this tradition is concerned with the regular practice of dining with people who are beneath one's own social status. In favor of this tradition as historical is its seeming consistency with other references from the most probable historical core that Jesus favored the less fortunate in the world (see e.g. "Blessed are the poor"), although it should be pointed out that "tax collectors" would hardly be considered "less fortunate." Indeed, what is most scandalous about tax collectors could be said to be their exploitation of the poor. It is usually argued, therefore, that what is in common in the mix of "tax collectors," "sinners," and "poor" is their

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[59] Neusner has emphasized the point that while the Pharisees' emphasis on dietary laws meant that table fellowship took on a special significance for them it did not mean that they gathered for meals as a group or celebrated "ritual" meals comparable to the Christian Lord's Supper (*The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism*, 66-67; *From Politics to Piety*, 87-89). He is surely right that there were no special rituals that characterized their meals, but that does not rule out the possibility that there may have been communal meals among some groups of Pharisees. See also Borg (*Conflict, Holiness & Politics*, 80-81) who argues that the table to the Pharisees had come to symbolize "the cultural dynamic of holiness."

supposed social location on the fringes of Jewish society.[60] But it should be noted that Jesus is not said to dine with the "poor." The symbolism connected with the meal is *not* that of a charity dinner.

In order to understand how this tradition works, it is helpful to isolate the elements that make it up and analyze them separately. The basic motif, that Jesus is criticized for dining with unacceptable individuals, assumes that all of the parties involved—Jesus, his critics, the "tax collectors and sinners"—share the same social world in significant details. For example, they must share the same view of dietary laws and the same view of the position of Jesus within the social world. The motif only works if all the parties involved assume that a person like Jesus would not be expected to dine with such people.

First, let us look at the definition of the term "tax collectors and sinners." Attempts to provide a historic definition to these characters that fits the story have proved to be problematic. In regard to "tax collectors," discussion has revolved around identifying who they were and what their offense was so that table fellowship with them would be scandalous. Distinctions have been made between tax collectors and toll collectors and the suggestion made that in the time of the gospels only the latter would be found in Palestine.[61] As to their offense, it has been argued that they were hated because of their status as "quislings," or those who have consorted with the enemy, and because theirs was considered to be an occupation characterized by dishonesty. The scandal in dining with them could involve ritual purity, since they would be "Jews who had made themselves as Gentiles [by becoming quislings]," or, alternatively, could be a moral question, since they were by nature dishonest people.[62]

"Sinners" have been widely assumed to be the impure and thus roughly equivalent with the *ʿammê hā-āreṣ* with whom the Pharisees presumably could not eat. Thus virtually every non-Pharisee could be included under this term.[63] Recently, however, E. P. Sanders has proposed an important qualification of the meaning of this term. He argues that it cannot refer to the ritually impure but only to "the wicked . . . those who sinned wilfully and heinously and who did not repent."[64] Purity laws, on the other hand, had very little to do with normal table fellowship, but only affected access to the temple. The only group for whom purity laws did affect table fellowship were the *haberim*, a group which Sanders distinguishes from the larger group of Pharisees. He points out that they would have been a minority group in first century Palestine and not at all influential enough to set the standards for acceptability in Jewish society at large. This means that if Jesus dined with the impure it would only identify him as a non-*haber;* it would not constitute an offense to Judaism.[65]

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[60] See e.g. Jeremias, *New Testament Theology*, 109-13. Horsley proposes that the reference to tax collectors is strictly slanderous; thus while the accusation is historical, what it states, that Jesus dined with tax collectors, is not (*Jesus and the Spiral of Violence*, 212-17).

[61] Jeremias, *New Testament Theology*, 110; John R. Donahue, "Tax Collectors and Sinners: An Attempt at Identification," *CBQ* 33 (1971) 39-61.

[62] Quisling: Perrin, *Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus*, 93-94. Dishonesty: Jeremias, *New Testament Theology*, 110-111; Donahue, "Tax Collectors and Sinners," 59.

[63] As suggested in Jeremias, *New Testament Theology*, 109-13, esp. 112.

[64] *Jesus and Judaism*, 177.

[65] Ibid., 182-99.

Sanders goes on to conclude, however, that Jesus' act consisted not in welcoming the impure into the kingdom, but rather in welcoming the "wicked" into *his* community. By thus offering *his* kingdom to them without first requiring repentance he was engaging in an act contrary to Jewish tradition and therefore scandalous.[66] This, then, is his interpretation of the table fellowship texts:

> His eating with tax collectors and sinners has, probably correctly, been seen as a proleptic indication that they would be included in the kingdom: the meal looks forward to the "messianic banquet," when many would come from east and west and dine with the patriarchs (Matt. 8:11).[67]

Sanders, however, has limited his interpretive options by being committed to this tradition as historical. Since "tax collectors and sinners" must be equated with specific individuals in Jesus' time, he is forced to propose a situation in which Jesus might be accused of associating with such people. This leads him to suggest the dubious scenario that Jesus was offering "his" kingdom to the unrepentant and that this was taken to be scandalous. What he has failed to recognize is the inherent character of this tradition as a literary motif.

In the basic form of the tradition, the category "tax collectors and sinners" has to be taken as symbolic from the outset, as representative of a *type*, for the motif that Jesus associates/dines with them is taken to represent a *pattern* for him, not a one-time individual activity. Thus the identity of the group so designated is not based so much on the actual as on the symbolic value of the terms. That is to say, at the earliest level of the tradition, "tax collector and sinner" go together and function as symbolic terms to define social position through the use of a set of apparently traditional terms of slander.[68]

The story also assumes that those designated by the term "tax collectors and sinners" must be desirous of the table fellowship that they are excluded from. But why would tax collectors feel excluded if *haberim* or Pharisees refused to dine with

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[66] Ibid., 203-208.

[67] Ibid., 208.

[68] See e.g. Joachim Jeremias (*Jerusalem in the Time of Jesus* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969] 303-312) who includes "tax collectors" in a list of "despised trades" culled from the Mishnah. What these references indicate is that the term tax collector had become synonymous with other categories of despised people. In the New Testament, it has taken on the overtones of a catchall term in such references as "tax collectors and harlots" (Matt 21:31) and especially the "church order" text in Matt 18:17: "If he refuses to listen even to the church, let him be to you as [my emphasis] a Gentile and a tax collector." James D. G. Dunn has made a similar point in regard to the term "sinner" in our texts. In opposition to Sanders, he argues that the term does not refer to a specific group in the social setting of first century Palestine but rather is a term of slander used most often in a sectarian context to refer to those outside one's group ("Pharisees, Sinners, and Jesus," *The Social World of Formative Christianity and Judaism: Essays in Tribute to Howard Clark Kee* [ed. Jacob Neusner et al.; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988] 276-80, esp. 278). Thus neither actual tax collectors nor actual sinners are being specifically singled out in the phrase "tax collectors and sinners"; rather it is a term of slander used to define the boundaries between one's own group and those outside.

them?[69] This points up the problem in correlating the presuppositions inherent in the motif with historical reality.

One indication of the literary, or oral narrative, character of the motif is its basic nature as an example of irony. That Jesus dines with "tax collectors and sinners" functions as a criticism of Jesus and is understood to be a true statement. But to the "reader" or "listener" it would have a different meaning than the one the critics in the story are applying to it. In truth, the motif assumes, Jesus does dine with what appear to be unsavory individuals, but these are in fact the types of individuals of which the kingdom is made up. Seen from this perspective, this motif would *not* be scandalous at the earliest level of its occurrence in this form. It would always have represented a characterization of the companions of Jesus with which the church would identify.

A further assumption of the story is that table fellowship with Jesus effectively breaks down barriers that are present in the social world. Thus the story requires that Jesus be assumed by all parties involved, even his critics, to be something more than just a normal teacher, that he somehow symbolize in his person the presence of the "kingdom." A common explanation, and one that is consistent with the gospel tradition, is that Jesus somehow made table fellowship with him take on the aura of a messianic banquet.[70]

There are numerous problems with this idea. Among other things, it requires that Jesus somehow be in charge of the meal so that its form and structure be attributable to him. While it is quite possible that Jesus did host meals,[71] the gospel texts make no such distinction. No matter who might ostensibly host a meal, if Jesus is present it takes on overtones of a messianic banquet. Thus the motif does not rely on historical data.

The motif of the messianic banquet is widespread in Jewish tradition and is utilized extensively in early Christian literature, especially the gospels. It is a motif that is especially connected with the apocalyptic world view, and envisages the coming of the messiah and the blessings connected with that event in terms of a great banquet. The classic themes of the messianic banquet are summed up in Isaiah 25:6-8:

> On this mountain the Lord of hosts will make for all peoples a feast of fat things, a feast of wine on the lees, of the lees well refined. And he will destroy on this mountain the covering that is cast over all peoples, the veil that is spread over all nations. He will swallow up death for ever, and the Lord God will wipe away tears from all faces, and the reproach of his people he will take away from all the earth; for the Lord has spoken.

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[69] Pointed out by Sanders, *Jesus and Judaism*, 193, 202-203.

[70] Bornkamm, *Jesus of Nazareth*, 81; Jeremias, *New Testament Theology*, 115-16; Perrin, *Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus*, 106-108; Schüssler Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her*, 119-21; Sanders, *Jesus and Judaism*, 208; Horsley, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence*, 178-80. Although Borg does not use the messianic banquet imagery, he does refer to the "powerful numinous presence" of Jesus as a "holy man" who could therefore "shatter the social world" of outcasts by offering table fellowship to them (*Conflict, Holiness & Politics*, 93; *Jesus: A New Vision*, 101-102, 132). In my opinion, this description best fits a literary setting, a narrative world, rather than the real world of Jesus.

[71] On Jesus hosting meals, see Jeremias, *New Testament Theology*, 115; Borg, *Conflict, Holiness & Politics*, 83; Idem., *Jesus: A New Vision*, 132.

Here one finds a summary of the basic motifs that come to be associated with the messianic banquet: victory over the primordial enemies (e.g. death), eternal joyous celebration, abundance of food, the (assumed) presence of the messiah, judgment, and the pilgrimage of the nations. It is a popular theme in various Jewish texts of the second temple period and occurs frequently in the parables of Jesus and in the redaction of the Gospels.[72]

The messianic banquet is thus a significant literary motif. But how can a messianic banquet be envisioned in real life? Note that such a meal requires the presence of a messiah, a "real" messiah who has full access to heavenly blessings, not a messianic pretender or someone in process of becoming a messiah. I find it incredible to propose that the historical Jesus could have added that dimension to a meal simply by being present. Indeed, I find it highly unlikely that any historical figure could celebrate such a meal centered around himself. The messianic banquet is in its essence a mythological meal, a meal that takes place on a divine level with the participation of divine characters. It functions well as a literary idealization of the apocalyptic consummation. There may even have been real communal meals that ritualize the presence of mythological forces or beings (the so-called "proleptic" messianic banquet).[73] But there can be no messianic banquet with Jesus *until Jesus has become a mythological character.* Note, however, that this process has already begun in the Q text when it is stated, "*The Son of Man* has come eating and drinking . . ." (Luke 7:34 = Matt 11:19).

In my opinion, it is only in a narrative context that all of the conditions necessary to make this motif work could be present. This tradition would therefore originate in the form of a chreia functioning to characterize the self-consciousness of the early Christian community. It cannot work if placed in a real, historical context. It only works if presented in a literary context in which the presuppositions of the situation and characters can be carefully controlled. The prior motif, which in fact may be historical, is that Jesus directed his preaching toward a critique of the norms of social stratification in his society. Early Christian preachers then exemplified that idea by creating a chreia which utilized the stock motifs of the hero at table and the catchall slanderous term, "tax collectors and sinners."

B. Feasting vs. Fasting

In favor of the historicity of this motif are the various classic arguments that have been proposed in past studies that this is a case of dissimilarity. The presupposition

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[72] See e.g. 1 En 62:12-14; 2 Bar 29:1-4; the parable of the great banquet (Matt 22:1-10 = Luke 14:16-24 = GospThom 64); the use of the motif in Luke (Smith, "Table Fellowship as a Literary Motif," esp 625-29). See also my forthcoming article, "Messianic Banquet," in the *Anchor Bible Dictionary.*

[73] The best known example is that of the communal meal at Qumran; see IQS 6:4-6, 1QSa 2:11-22, and Frank Moore Cross, Jr., *The Ancient Library of Qumran and Modern Biblical Studies* (Rev. ed.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1961) 85-91, which is still the classic discussion of this data. Cross refers to the latter text as "a liturgical anticipation of the Messianic banquet" because it refers to the presence of the Messiah but seems to do so in a context which refers to the current meal practices of the sect (p. 90). Essential to this definition, then, is the clear sectarian identity of the group and its meal and a text which appears to define current meal practices utilizing messianic imagery.

is that calling Jesus a "glutton and a drunkard" is not likely to have originated in the early church because it would have been an "embarrassment" to the church.[74]

What is not always emphasized, however, is the total meaning of the motif. That is, the primary motif includes the contrast of feasting with fasting as well as the contrast of Jesus with John the Baptist. Note, for example, that feasting in itself is not a revolutionary act; as indicated here, it only becomes a symbolic act when proposed in contrast to fasting. Furthermore, note that both fasting and feasting are constituent parts of Jewish piety. Thus to choose such actions does not necessarily set one apart from the group as a whole.

If this is to be taken as a historical reference to the ministry of Jesus, then it must not be separated from the connection with the John the Baptist tradition. There may, in fact, be a historical core here, designating Jesus as one who was known to have considered but rejected the monastic lifestyle of John. In the earliest form of the text, however, it presupposes a literary context. For here the lifestyles of Jesus and John are taken as wholes and placed side by side as two parts of a single message. Thus the text presents a characterization of Jesus and John in the form of a retrospect, one that can confidently sum up what Jesus and John were all about and how they were not in the end highly successful in their missions to Israel. The context for the formation of this motif, therefore, would most likely be the early church. While it may represent a reminiscence of an authentic characteristic of the historical Jesus, it only takes on the symbolism of a characterization of his ministry in the form that originates in the early church.

C. The Motif of the Hero at Table

According to the analysis presented to this point, the earliest meal texts in the Jesus tradition are chreiai which present idealizations of Jesus by means of traditional meal motifs. When we look at these materials more closely, we can detect a pattern. By and large, the type of characterization of the hero as is represented in these texts is roughly parallel to what we find in Cynic traditions. What many of these early texts have in common is a characterization of Jesus as one who parodied the institutions of society as a means of proclaiming his message, a message that therefore had a Cynic style to it.[75] Furthermore, the motifs present here are also common in Cynic tradition, such as the motif of the "hedonistic" Cynic or the use of the meal motif as a means of characterizing the Cynic hero.[76]

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[74] Breech, *The Silence of Jesus*, 23; see also Perrin, *Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus*, 120.

[75] On Cynic themes and perspectives in the Jesus tradition, see Kloppenborg, *The Formation of Q*, 324; Mack, *A Myth of Innocence*, 67-69, 73-74; Idem., "The Kingdom That Didn't Come," 615, 621-23; Vaage, "Q: Ethos and Ethics," 386-94, 469-80.

[76] See especially the concept of the "hedonistic" vs. the "ascetic" Cynic in literary idealizations, discussed in Abraham J. Malherbe, "Gentle as a Nurse: The Cynic Background to I Thess ii," *NovT* 12 (1970) 203-17; Idem., "Self-Definition among Epicureans and Cynics," 50-51; Ronald F. Hock, "Simon the Shoemaker as an Ideal Cynic," *GRBS* 17 (1976) 48-52; Mack, *A Myth of Innocence*, 188; Vaage, "Q: Ethos and Ethics," esp. 362-77. For examples of typifications of Cynic heroes utilizing meal motifs, see Fischel, "Studies in Cynicism," 377-85.

Thus the proposal that the early Jesus tradition is related to Cynic themes and motifs provides the best explanation for the context in which the table fellowship texts developed. This need not suggest that Jesus was himself a Cynic or identified with Cynic traditions. But it does suggest that certain early Christian communities utilized Cynic traditions to characterize and idealize Jesus as a hero.

This also means that there need be no other explanation for the development of these traditions than this. While authentic data may be utilized in the development of these chreiai, it is not necessary to propose any authenticity to the meal traditions to explain this data. Indeed, when it is noted that the meal data are utilized as a motif to characterize a particular aspect of Jesus' ministry, what emerges as prior and more important, perhaps, is not the motif itself but the characteristic that is illustrated thereby.

V. Conclusion

This study has found that none of the texts in which Jesus teaches by means of his table customs can be clearly affirmed as historical. Neither can it be affirmed that the cumulative effect of all these references implies a historical core, because one can explain the development of all these traditions merely by reference to existing oral and literary motifs. It is not necessary to posit that Jesus made use of meals in his overall teaching program in order to explain these texts.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that all of the characteristics of meals utilized in these texts are historically and socially valid. It is the case that meals defined community boundaries and, particularly in certain Jewish and Christian literary traditions, carried implications of the messianic kingdom. These factors are part of the function of meals among various social groups in the ancient world and were adopted into the myth and ritual of the early Christian communities. Thus these texts certainly represent social reality. The question is where that social reality is to be located.

My argument is that what is being identified as the historical Jesus at table is more likely to be the idealized characterization of Jesus at table that is produced in the early Christian community. The social realities of such meals are still being correctly assessed, but the one who presents parabolic messages by means of meal practices is more likely to be the idealized Jesus rather than the historical Jesus. And the social realities defined by these meals are more likely those of the early Christian community than those of the motley crowds who came to hear Jesus teach.

Of course, one could speculate that there is some consistency between these traditions and the historical figure of Jesus. The most likely scenario would be that Jesus was known to have chosen a lifestyle different from the monastic style of John and that this lifestyle was understood to be consistent with the tenor of his teachings as a whole. Beyond that it is difficult to go, because the data then become too entangled with the idealized, heroic Jesus of the tradition.

Were the Women around Jesus Really Prostitutes? Women in the Context of Greco-Roman Meals

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Embedded in the gospel tradition, but more so in the popular imagination, is the claim that Jesus gathered around himself various outcasts of Greco-Roman society, particularly prostitutes. Only Matthew actually uses the combination "tax-collectors and prostitutes," whereas in Luke and Mark (as well as Matthew) the phrase "tax-collectors and sinners," is found. Although one cannot conclude therefore that wherever "sinners" is used in conjunction with "tax-collectors" it means "prostitutes," the usual identification of individual women connected with Jesus as "prostitutes" (such as the woman sinner who anoints Jesus in Luke 7) has contributed to the understanding that the Jesus Movement included several women of low moral and social standing, and that Jesus was unusually compassionate towards such women. Moreover, the long (and somewhat erroneous) tradition that the central woman disciple of Jesus, Mary Magdalene, was also a reformed prostitute, has also contributed to the view that actual prostitutes numbered among the followers of Jesus. However, in light of recent discussions of the centrality of "table fellowship" and conviviality to early Christian communities,[1] this aspect of the popular depiction of the actual social make-up of the followers of Jesus needs to be reassessed, considering the social ideology governing the participation of women in public meal settings during the Greco-Roman period.

In recent years it has become clear that the literary setting of philosophical discussions in the context of a banquet was popular in Greco-Roman literature and may have influenced the setting of much of Jesus' teaching activities in the context of a meal.[2] Such a setting would seem natural, as various other works such as Plato's

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[1] The key work showing the relationship of Christian meal traditions to the standardized form of formal meals or banquets in the Greco-Roman world is Dennis E. Smith's "Social Obligation in the Context of Communal Meals: A Study of the Christian Meal in 1 Corinthians in Comparison with Graeco-Roman Communal Meals," (ThD Diss. Harvard Divinity School, 1980). See also Burton Mack, *A Myth of Innocence* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), pp. 80-83; Lee E. Klosinski, "Meals in Mark," (PhD Diss. Claremont Graduate School, 1988); Scott Bartchy, "Table Fellowship with Jesus and the 'Lord's Meal' at Corinth," from *Increase in Learning: Essays in Honor of James G. Van Buren,* Owens and Hamm, eds. (Manhattan, Kansas: Manhattan Christian College, 1979), pp. 45-61.

[2] D. Aune, "Septem Sapientium Convivium," *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature,* Hans Dieter Betz, ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1978), pp. 51-105; Dennis

Symposion, Plutarch's *Symposiaca*, Xenophon's *Symposion* and Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistae* attest. Moreover, the importance of meal settings in the gospel tradition would also probably reflect the importance of actual meals in early Christian groups and various Jesus movements. In this regard early Christian communities would fit well into the cultural milieu of their Greco-Roman contemporaries, for whom formal banquets were the most common context for the free association of both secular and religious groups.[3] This is the most likely setting in which Jesus people, the Pauline groups, as well as other developing Christian communities would have come together for the sharing of ideas, storytelling, and eventually ritual practice. Moreover, although the notion that Jesus himself also emphasized gathering for meals is by no means clear, it is nevertheless also not impossible to imagine that Jesus and his followers, like other Hellenistic peoples, found the meal setting to be a natural place for discourse to occur.[4] Hence the recent emphasis on "table fellowship" as the most important "generative matrix" of the social formation of the Jesus movements.[5]

Concurrent with such discussions has been that of feminist biblical scholars concerning the place of women in early Christian groups. Certain feminist scholars assert that women, as participants in the Jesus movements, and in the circle around Jesus himself, were full participants in what Fiorenza has called a "discipleship of equals."[6] If this were true, certainly women would have been welcomed at his table. The assumption would follow that part of the novelty of an open table fellowship would be that such a fellowship would include women, and not only women, but certain socially and sexually suspect women at that.

In their recent dissertations dealing with conviviality in early Christian groups, both Dennis Smith and Lee Klosinski mention the possible ramifications of the presence of women in the public gatherings for meals in early Christian communities. Their presence in such gatherings is usually seen as a sign of the improvement of the status of women during the Roman period, as during the Roman period women were allowed in meal contexts from which they would have been excluded in earlier Greek times.[7] As Roman matrons would have been free to accompany their husbands to public banquets, and in particular would have been allowed in religious meal settings, the inclusion of women in Christian meals would have been notable, but not unique.[8] This position is in part supported by assertions made by

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Smith, "Table Fellowship as a Literary Motif in the Gospel of Luke," *JBL* 106 (1987), pp. 613-638. Another dissertation done recently that may contribute to the discussion is Craig Thomas McMahan, "Meals as Type Scenes in the Gospel of Luke" (PhD Diss. Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1987). For a complete discussion of the literary genre, see Josef Martin, *Symposion. Die Geschichte einer literarischen Form* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1931).

[3] Mack, pp. 81-83.

[4] Mack, p. 82.

[5] Mack, p. 83, n. 4.

[6] Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her: A Feminist Reconstruction of Christian Origins* (New York: Crossroad, 1983), pp. 140ff.

[7] Smith, "Social Obligation," pp. 34ff., 209ff.; Klosinski, pp. 67ff.

[8] Smith, "Social Obligation," pp. 209ff.; See also Aune, p. 72, esp. note 45.

scholars both of women's history[9] and Greco-Roman social history.[10]

However, if the attendance of respectable women at public meals was so acceptable, where does the tradition of Jesus sharing meals with "sinners" and associating with "prostitutes" originate? The social ideology governing the practice of women's meal attendance in the Greco-Roman period may provide a clue. The social situation of women during the Roman period was complex, particularly as women's roles and the ideals governing women's roles often clashed. We will see that women's roles were certainly undergoing change, but the ideology surrounding women's roles and their proper behavior in the public sphere was certainly not advancing at the same rate as the actual behavior of women. Hence, even though there is indeed evidence that women were in fact beginning to participate in the public sphere in greater and more varied capacities, opinions concerning the propriety of such changes were mixed. There were many in the centuries immediately preceding the time of the New Testament, and during the two centuries in which the New Testament was being composed, who did not approve of the newer behavior of Greco-Roman women, whether they were Jewish, pagan or Christian. In fact, many Greco-Roman writers often characterized those women overstepping ideal womanly roles as prostitutes by accusing them of sexual misconduct or unchastity. This is no different in the case of proper table etiquette for women. Women, if matrons, would be expected to be present for certain portions of the meal, such as the δεῖπνον, but would also be somewhat circumscribed in the sort of meal that they could attend without earning a certain amount of criticism from those with more idealistic views, and would also be limited in the sorts of company with which they could dine. Therefore, women dining with, much less reclining with those not of their immediate family would still elicit a degree of social criticism, particularly as the first century wore on and social trends moved in a more conservative direction.

The roots of this social ideology governing the participation of women at meals can be found in the meal customs of ancient Greece. Women seldom dined with men, even in private, but were rather kept secluded in the women's quarters of the household where they often took their meals alone. The dining room of a house properly belonged to the area of the house reserved for men. As a rule, the wife of a family would only dine with her husband and children, or with others of the intimate family circle. If guests were invited, the wife and children would dine alone in the women's quarters, exception being made for family festivals such as weddings,

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[9] J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *Roman Women. Their History and Habits* (London: The Bodley Head, 1962), pp. 271-272; Eva Cantarella, *Pandora's Daughters. The Role and Status of Women in Greek and Roman Antiquity*, Maureen B. Fant, trans. (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 134; Sarah P. Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves. Women in Classical Antiquity* (New York: Schocken Books, 1975), p. 189; Leonard Swidler, "Greco-Roman Feminism and the Origin of the Gospel," in *Traditio-Krisis-Renovatio aus theologischer Sicht. Festschrift für Winfried Zeller zum 65. Geburtstag*, Bernd Jaspert and Rudolf Mohr, eds. (Marburg: N. G. Elwert, 1976), p. 46.

[10] Jerome Carcopino, *Daily Life in Ancient Rome. The People and the City at the Height of the Roman Empire* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press), pp. 265ff.; Ludwig Friedländer, *Roman Life and Manners Under the Early Empire*, v. 1 (London: George Routledge and Sons, Limited; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., n.d.), pp. 94, 239.

or other religious celebrations which had a limited guest list. In family meals, the man would recline, and the lady of the house would sit at his feet. As unexpected guests were a common occurrence, however, it is not clear just how often husbands and wives did actually eat together in ancient Athens.[11]

Public meals, or large banquets held in private homes, were also therefore reserved for men, except for those women classified as prostitutes or hetaerae, who were merely present to enhance the entertainment of the men. The flute girls, dancers and other entertainers present were certainly prostitutes, and the presence of such women was often considered essential for the συμπόσιον, or drinking party following the δεῖπνον, or meal.[12] There were symposia that were more sedate, such as those dedicated to more philosophical pursuits, in which case the necessity of the presence of such women was questionable.[13] Also present were those women of the higher class of prostitutes, the hetaerae, who were present for conversation as well as sexual sport.[14] The hetaerae, unlike men's wives, were allowed to recline next to the men at a meal, rather than being seated at their feet.[15] Therefore, if a woman was present at such a gathering, whether or not it was held in a public or private dining room, she was most certainly some sort of prostitute. Hence, the mere fact that a woman was known for eating and drinking with men would be enough for her to be labeled a prostitute.[16] It is for this reason respectable women usually took their meals in the women's quarters, lest they be surprised by unexpected male guests and thought to be hetaerae.[17]

As well as providing entertainment and sex, certain of these women present at banquets were also known for their ability to participate in the conversation of the men, and some were even known for their witticism, and for their rhetorical skills in philosophical repartée,[18] although this may not reflect the actual social reality of

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[11] Wilhelm Adolf Becker, *Charicles, or Illustrations of the Private Life of the Ancient Greeks* (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1889), pp. 488ff., 490ff.; Hugo Blümner, *The Home Life of the Ancient Greeks* (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1966), pp. 202ff.; Cantarella, p. 46; Pomeroy, pp. 80ff.; Michael Vickers, *Greek Symposia* (London: The Joint Association of Classical Teachers, n.d.), p. 5.

[12] Lucian, *Symp.* 46; *Dial. Meret.* 1, 3, 6, 12, 15; Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 4.129, 131, 150; 8.349; Plutarch, *Sept. Sap. Conv.* 150D. See also Aune, p. 72; Becker, pp. 241-50; 344ff; Blümner, pp. 171; 216-17; Vern and Bonnie Bullough, *Prostitution. An Illustrated Social History* (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1978), pp. 35ff.; Hans Licht, *Sexual Life in Ancient Greece* (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1953), pp. 172ff.; Martin, 255ff.; Vickers, p. 5. Smith argues that these women were not necessarily in attendance for the sexual sport of the men ("Social Obligation," p. 20-21, also nts. 49-50); but see more recently Eva C. Keuls, *The Reign of the Phallus: Sexual Politics in Ancient Athens* (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), pp. 160ff.

[13] Plato, *Symp.* 176E; Plutarch, *Quaest. Conv.* 7.7; see also Smith, "Social Obligation," pp. 20-21.

[14] Becker, pp. 317-18; Blümner, pp. 171-74; Bullough, pp. 36ff.; Keuls, pp. 160ff., Licht, pp. 339ff.

[15] Becker, p. 317; Blümner, p. 203; Vickers, p. 5.

[16] See Demosthenes, *In Neaer.*, 24; 48. Aune, p 73, n. 44; Becker, p. 490; Blümner, p. 203; Keuls, p. 160ff.

[17] Demosthenes, *In Neaer.* 24; Isaeus, *Pyr.* 13-14; Becker, p. 490.

[18] See esp. Licht for the romantic notion of educated hetaerae, pp. 394ff.; as well

Athenian hetaerae, whose main function was still to be sex objects for men.[19] Thus hetaerae, flute girls and the like were part and parcel of the banquet scene, remaining central to the literary symposia tradition, and as a banquet τόπος prevailed in the art and literature of both the Greek and Roman periods.[20]

In fact, prostitutes, flute-girls and hetaerae abound in artistic representations of banquets throughout the Greco-Roman period.[21] The most characteristic feature of vase paintings from ancient Greece is the banquet context as a setting for erotic scenes.[22] And, although the social condition of the women pictured in these vase paintings cannot easily be discerned, that they all represent prostitutes of some sort is clear.[23] The representation of banquets replete with prostitutes continues into the art of later periods, particularly the Roman period, as the symposium motif enjoyed a long history.[24] For example, an erotic bacchanal scene survives on an Etruscan ash urn which includes women,[25] and in the ruins of Pompeii can be found an erotic mosaic of an open-air banquet scene.[26] Moreover, erotic banquet scenes are a characteristic motif of Arretine art.[27] Otto Bendel, in his discussion of the pervasive influence of the banquet scene in erotic art of the Roman period, comments that such allusions to Greek banquets became a "reconstruction of a romantically viewed past," and that the convivial setting itself as the occasion of erotic goings on acquired

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as Sterling Bjorndahl, "Thomas 61-67: A Chreia Elaboration Pattern," (paper presented to the Nag Hammadi Section of the Annual Meeting of the SBL, Chicago, November, 1988), "Appendix A," pp. 7-9; Bullough, pp. 41-42; Cantarella, pp. 49ff., Ronald F. Hock, "The Will of God and Sexual Morality: I Thessalonians 4.3-8 in its Social and Intellectual Context," (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the SBL, New York, 1982), p. 9; Pomeroy, p. 89; William W. Sanger, *The History of Prostitution* (New York: Arno Press, 1972), pp. 55ff.

[19] See Keuls, pp. 194ff. where she critiques the romantic notion of these hetaerae. She writes: "It appears that Athenian men were at pains to construct an image of witty, prosperous hetaerae in order to gloss over the fact that their principal sex objects were debased and uneducated slaves, who were at the mercy of their profit-hungry owners, and who were almost certain to end their lives in misery" (pp. 199-200). She also notes that many of these recorded "witticisms" of hetaerae collected in the post-classical world are not sophisticated at all, but are rather male-generated jokes, relying heavily upon sexual innuendo (p. 199). Although Keuls' position may be overstated somewhat, it is certainly important to keep in mind that many of the legends of these women were collected and passed on by men, who certainly had a stake in painting a picture of their own behavior that was in some way defensible.

[20] Aune, p. 72, n. 42; Smith, "Social Obligation,"pp. 20-21.

[21] Smith, "Social Obligation," p. 20; Keuls, p. 160ff.

[22] Otto J. Bendel, "The Scope and Temperament of Erotic Art in the Greco-Roman World," in *Studies in Erotic Art*, T. Bowie and C. V. Christenson, eds. (New York and London: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), p. 19.

[23] Bendel, p. 32.

[24] Bendel, pp. 50ff.; 58ff.; J. M. C. Toynbee, *Death and Burial in the Ancient World* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1971), p. 12.

[25] Bendel, p. 28; plate 21.

[26] Bendel, pp. 50-51; plate 31.

[27] Bendel, pp. 58ff; plates 37-41.

a fictitious rather than realistic quality,[28] unlike the earlier Greek representations, which may have reflected actual social practice.[29] In general, then, when women appear in artistic representations of banquets from both the Greek and Roman periods, particularly recumbent women, they are most likely to be prostitutes of some kind, the anomaly of one Etruscan painting notwithstanding.[30] When wives appear with husbands in a meal setting, particularly in funerary reliefs, they are not recumbent, but seated.[31] Such then is the complex of images surrounding the banquet setting that the Hellenistic world fell heir to, the stock of images available for the popular imagination.

It is therefore not surprising to find that much of the ideology surrounding women's table etiquette found in polite society of the Roman period still can be shown to reflect Greek ideals. It has been sufficiently shown that the Romans by and large acquired Greek meal practices, including the custom of reclining, as well as the usual division of the meal into two parts: the δεῖπνον, or meal proper, followed by the συμπόσιον, the portion of the banquet reserved for drinking, entertainment, and conversation, or in some cases, philosophical discourse or religious ritual.[32] One major exception to Greek practice was the inclusion of wives in formal banquet settings, who eventually were allowed to recline at the table with their husbands.[33] This is a development of the late Republican and early Imperial periods, as before the time of Augustus, women, if present at a meal, still sat beside their husbands' couch, rather than reclined.[34] Cornelius Nepos, writing around 34-35 BCE

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[28] Ibid.

[29] Bendel, pp. 31-32; see also Keuls, pp. 160ff.

[30] Becker, p. 317; on the Etruscan piece, see Cantarella, p. 104; Jean-Marie Dentzer, "Aux Origines de l'Iconographie du Banquet Couché," *Rev. Arch.* 2 (1971), pp. 252ff. See also plates in Becker, p. 319 (wife seated); p. 338, 344 (reclining hetarae/flute-girl); Keuls, p. 161, plate 134; p. 164, plates 143, 144; p. 166., plate 140 (reclining hetaerae); p. 166, plate 138 (women at banquet in theatrical costume); p. 175, plates 152, 154; p. 177, plate 155; p. 213, plate 185 (hetaerae in the context of banquet revelry); p. 216, plates 189; 190 (funerary relief with wife seated); Toynbee, p. 24, 1 (men and women at banquet); 2 (wife seated); Paul Veyne, "The Roman Empire," in *A History of Private Life. I. From Pagan Rome to Byzantium*, Paul Veyne, ed.; Arthur Goldhammer, trans. (Cambridge, MA; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 184 (wife seated); p. 188 (well clothed women seated at banquet with four men); Vickers, fig. 4 (wife seated); fig. 12 (hetaerae at banquet); fig. 19 (flute girl on couch with man in sexual pose). On p. 317, n. 121, Carcopino suggests that seating practices in Gaul had no fixed custom. For evidence he cites Émile Espérandieu, *Recueil Général des Bas-Reliefs, Statues et Bustes de la Gaule Romaine* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale), v. 6 (1915), nos. 5154; 5155; v. 8 (1922), nos. 6449; 6489. However, looking over these plates I would say that the women are all well clothed and seated, and therefore wives.

[31] Becker, pp. 317-319; Carcopino, p. 317, n . 121; Toynbee, p. 12, 268.

[32] Smith, "Social Obligation," pp. 24ff.

[33] Smith, "Social Obligation," pp. 33ff.; Klosinski, p. 67; Friedländer, p. 239, nts. 8, 9.

[34] Balsdon, p. 272; Becker, p. 317; Carcopino, p. 265; W. Warde Fowler, *Social Life at Rome at the Time of Cicero* (New York: MacMilllan and Company, 1929), pp. 277ff.

notes this as a sign of the cultural superiority of Romans over the Greeks:

> Many actions are seemly according to our code which the Greeks look upon as shameful. For instance, what Roman would blush to take his wife to a dinner party? What matron does not frequent the front rooms of her dwelling and show herself in public? But it is very different in Greece; for there a woman is not admitted to a dinner party unless relatives only are present, and she keeps to the more retired part of the house called "the woman's apartment," to which no man has access who is not near of kin.[35]

Other primary texts indicate that some Roman women did indeed more commonly partake of meals privately with their husbands as well as attend public banquets as their husbands' escorts.[36] Weddings and other family celebrations were also regularly attended by women.[37] Moreover, although it is not clear that women were actually members of collegia and other associations, there is some evidence that women were at least present at the meals of these organizations, both secular and religious,[38] and that women even sponsored such organizations financially.[39]

Seating practices at such occasions, however, were not uniform. It appears that some women did recline next to their spouses, but not always.[40] In fact, there is evidence that some women kept the habit of sitting,[41] and even by the second century CE Lucian still calls sitting "womanish and weak."[42] Women and men also

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[35] Cornelius Nepos, *praef.* 6-7. Text and translation by John C. Rolfe, *Cornelius Nepos* (LCL; London: William Heinemann; New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1929), pp. 370-371.

[36] Private meals: Plutarch, *Praec. Conjug.* 140A; *De Cup. Div.* 528B; Achilles Tatius I. 5. Public meals: Dio Chysostom, *Or.* 7.67-68; Plutarch, *De Gen.* 594D-E; *Otho* 3.5-6; Dio Cass. 57.12, and the banquet of Trimalchio in Petronius' *Satyr.* I am greatly indebted to my colleague Sterling Bjorndahl for several of these references which he originally collected in "Appendix A," of "Thomas 61-67: A Chreia Elaboration Pattern."

[37] Lucian, *Symp.* 8-9; Athen. *Deipn.* 9.376ff.; Balsdon, pp. 181ff.; Becker, pp. 488ff.; Friedländer, pp. 234ff.; Smith, pp. 210ff.

[38] G. H. R. Horsley, "Invitation to the *kline* of Sarapis," *New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity,* I (Macquarie University, Australia: The Ancient History Documentary Research Centre, 1982), pp. 5-9; Ramsay MacMullen, "Women in Public in the Roman Empire," *Historia* 29 (1980), p. 212; Smith, "Social Obligation," pp. 109ff.; Veyne, p. 189-190. Veyne goes so far as to say that women were not admitted at all into these confraternities, which were created precisely as a place for men to associate away from women.

[39] MacMullen, p. 212: Pomeroy, pp. 200-201; Smith, "Social Obligation," pp. 109ff., Riet Van Bremen, "Women and Wealth," in *Images of Women in Antiquity,* Averil Cameron and Amélie Kuhrt, eds. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983), pp. 232-242; Elizabeth Lyding Will, "Women in Pompeii," *Archaeology* Sept./Oct. (1979), pp. 34-50.

[40] Bjorndahl, "Appendix 1," p. 7; Carcopino, p. 265; 317, n. 121; in addition to references in Bjorndahl, see also Ovid, *Amor.* 1.4.

[41] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 7.76ff. which depicts a rural household meal where wife and daughter sit, but there is a stranger present; note that in Plutarch, *Sept. Sap. Conv.* 150B, where Melissa is reclined on a couch, Eumetis sits.

[42] *Symp.* 13.

commonly reclined separately, men with men, women with women, couch by couch, or women were even given a couch or section of couches set completely apart from the men altogether, particularly at weddings.[43] Unmarried women, that is, young maidens, were still excluded from public banquet settings, although they may have been allowed to be present at a private meal even if a stranger was present.[44] One assumes that if present, daughters would be seated at their parents' feet, as all children were, until they came of age and were married.[45]

It was also apparently not thought proper for matrons to remain for the συμπόσιον part of the meal, and many apparently left after the completion of the meal proper.[46] In any case, proper matrons and young children alike would probably not have participated in the sort of after dinner frivolity which characterized many of the huge banquets of the late Republic and early Empire.[47] The one exception seems to be in Plutarch, *Banquet of the Seven Sages*, where Melissa and Eumetis remain for a short while after the conclusion of the meal proper, but leave well before the end of the συμπόσιον and never say a word during the time they are there.[48] Plutarch sums up this opinion concerning women's proper behavior: "Philosophy should no more have a part in conversation over wine than should the matron of the house."[49] And, although the reference in Cornelius Nepos is to a *convivium*,[50] the two references to matrons attending official banquets seem to be formal δεῖπνα, not συμπόσια.[51]

However, it is also not clear just how widespread the new Roman practices were. Paul Veyne, in his recent discussion of Roman private life, remarks:

> When a man was invited out to dinner, was it proper to invite his wife as well? From the few indications in the sources I have not been able to arrive at any firm answers.[52]

Ramsay MacMullen has also expressed doubts as to how prevalent the attendance

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[43] Lucian, *Symp.* 8-9; Petronius, *Satyr.* 67-69; Ovid, *Met.* 12.210-220; Athen., *Deipn.* 14.644D; Smith, "Social Obligation," p. 35.

[44] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 7,76ff.; Clement of Alexandria, *Paid.* 2.7; Friedländer, p. 236; Hock, pp. 11-12.

[45] Suetonius, *Claud.* 32; Tacitus, *Ann.* 13.16; Carcopino, p. 265; Fowler, p. 278; Smith, "Social Obligation," p. 34. As surprising as it may seem, Roman girls were married when they reached the age of 9-12 years. See M. K. Hopkins, "The Age of Roman Girls at Marriage," *Population Studies* 19 (1965), pp. 309-27.

[46] Aune, p. 72-73; Bjorndahl, "Appendix 1," pp. 9-11; Vickers, p. 5; Plutarch, *Quaest. Conv.* 612F-613A; 653A-D; *Sept. Sap. Conv.* 150-155 (here two women remain for a small part of the discussion, but leave long before the συμπόσιον is over).

[47] Balsdon, pp. 271-272.

[48] *Sept. Sap. Conv.* 150-155; In Petronius, *Satyr.* 67-69, the wife of Trimalchio chats, but she is not discussing philosophy. See also Smith, "Social Obligation," p. 210.

[49] *Quaest. Conv.* 612F-613A. Text and translation by Paul A. Clement and Herbert B. Hoffleit, *Plutarch's Moralia*, v. 8 (LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1969), pp. 8-9.

[50] *praef.* 6-7.

[51] Plutarch, *Otho* 3.5-6; Dio Cass. 57.12.

[52] Veyne, p. 39; see also Balsdon, pp. 271-272.

of women at public banquets was, even in Italy, particularly as people who were invited to such events were invited by rank. He writes:

> Not only were women, more often than not, excluded altogether from these occasions, however, and from apparently all inclusive phrases like "all citizens" or "the entire people;" beyond that, if they were indeed invited, they were generally put at the bottom of the pecking order, as the sequence of mention indicates, and as is sometimes made mathematically clear in differential distributions: largesses might be given out in the ratio 30:20:3 to town senators, Augustales and women.[53]

Women were indeed included, but only in far smaller numbers.[54] MacMullen does argue that patronesses would most likely have been included in the banquets of those associations they sponsored, but again in far smaller numbers. Male patrons of collegia and associations outnumber female patrons about 14 to 1.[55]

Besides the fact that even the numbers of upper class women attending such public functions may have been small, there are other reasons which may account for varying meal practice during the Roman period. First of all, many of the literary sources that discuss the practice of women limit their discussions to the practices of the upper classes, and the highest of these at that.[56] This makes it difficult to determine exactly how common, much less how acceptable, the attendance of wives at public meals actually was for the bulk of Roman society, and what the posture of women in such settings would have been. Dio preserves one picturesque rustic scene of a family meal (not a public banquet) at which a stranger is present. However, the wife sits beside her husband, rather than reclines, and the shy (and embarrassed) daughter helps with the serving before sitting quietly next to her mother. This picture is of course probably fictitious, but may reflect something of the everyday Roman meal practice of the lower classes in the country.[57] In Achilles Tatius' tale of *Clitophon and Leucippe* several family meals occur, but here the wives do not recline beside their husbands, although they do recline. Although we know the novel was possibly written in Alexandria in the early years of the second century CE, it is not clear when the narrative itself is meant to take place.[58]

Finally, it is also not clear that other Hellenistic people who had inherited Greek meal customs would have necessarily adopted the Roman practice of including women at public meals.[59] Cornelius Nepos seems to be comparing current Roman practice with current Greek practice, rather than with ancient Greek practice.[60] Moreover, Roman books on architecture still distinguish between Roman and Greek floorplans, and include the difference in the placing of dining rooms. Vitruvius writes:

> In these halls men's banquets are held. For it was not customary for women

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[53] MacMullen, p. 212-213.
[54] Ibid., p. 213.
[55] Ibid., pp. 211-212.
[56] Friedländer, pp. 264ff.
[57] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 7.64-77.
[58] See for example, I.5; Bjorndahl, "Appendix A," pp. 8-9.
[59] Smith, "Social Obligation," p. 210.
[60] *praef.* 6-7.

> to join men at dinner. Now these peristyles are called the men's block, for in them men meet without interruption from the women.[61]

The editors of this text assume that Vitruvius is describing the Alexandrian age, rather than the actual building plans of Greeks during the early Imperial period. However, the following story related by Cicero not much earlier belies the assumption that Greek families and others influenced by Hellenistic meal customs would have automatically embraced newer Roman customs.

In his orations against Gaius Verres, Cicero relates various stories intended to call into question the moral character of the former governor of Sicily, as well as to point out his inability to properly govern a Roman territory. In *Against Verres* Cicero opens his tale by asking his audience, "Are you aware of the number of free-born persons, of respectable married women, to whom he (Verres) offered violence during his foul and disgusting career as governor?"[62] He then goes on to relate a story of Verres' conduct while he was traveling in the province of Asia, where he stops at a town called Lampsacum. The inhabitants in this area are described by Cicero as well-behaved Greeks, but also as being "ready to oblige all Roman citizens." Verres, whom Cicero also describes elsewhere as one wont to carouse, chase disreputable women, and hold wild, drunken dinner-parties,[63] arrives in this quiet Greek town, and immediately asks his men to make inquiries as to the availability of a woman to make his stay more pleasurable. One of Verres' staff members, Rubrius, discovers that a well known, respected town official, Philodamus, has an unmarried daughter. She is described as "a woman of exceptional beauty, but accounted entirely chaste and modest." Verres, whom Cicero jibes as never having even seen such a woman, plots with Rubrius as to how he might procure this woman for the evening. Verres then has Rubrius installed in the house of Philodamus. Being a good host, Philodamus arranges a dinner-party and encourages Rubrius to invite whomever he wishes, so that all of Verres' staff become the dinner guests of Philodamus. Now the stage is set:

> The guests assembled in good time, and took their places. Conversation began; they were invited to drink in the Greek fashion; their host urged them to drink; they asked for bumpers, and the party became a general buzz of talk and merriment. As soon as Rubrius thought the ice was sufficiently broken, he said, "Tell me, Philodamus, why not send for your daughter to come and see us?" The respectable and already elderly father received the rascal's question with astonished silence. As Rubrius persisted, he replied in order to say something, that it was not the Greek custom for women to be present at a men's dinner party. At this someone in another part of the room called out, "But really, this is intolerable: let the woman be sent for!" At the same moment, Rubrius told his slaves to shut the front door and stand on

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[61] *De Arch.* 7.4. Text and translation by Frank Granger, *Vitruvius. On Architecture*, v. 2 (LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1956), pp. 48-49.

[62] For this quote, and the entire narrative that follows, see Cicero, *Verr.* II.1.24.62ff. Text and translation by L. H. G. Greenwood, *Cicero. The Verrine Orations*, 2 vols. (London: William Heinemann Ltd.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928).

[63] *Verr.*, II.3.68.159-160; II.5.12.30-13.31; II.5.13.34. II.5.32.83; II.5.36.94.

> guard at the entrance. Philodamus, seeing that their purpose was the violation of his daughter, called his slaves and told them not to trouble about himself, but to save his daughter.

After this, the whole house explodes in an uproar, the son returns to help guard the virtue of his sister, and the plan to abduct the daughter of Philodamus (who is never named) is thwarted. The town is so shocked by this outrage against their first citizen, that they gather in the streets to protest, and Verres realizes he had better get out of town.[64]

Now then, several things become clear in this story about Verres. First of all, Greeks under Roman rule, even those outside of Greece, at the end of the Republic (c. 70 BCE) still adhere to Greek meal customs, which included the exclusion of respectable women from men's dinner-parties. Moreover, even the Romans whom Cicero addresses are expected to be shocked and outraged by this sort of behavior on the part of a Roman assistant govenor. Verres' behavior is intolerable, not only because it is insensitive to local customs, but because by his conduct Verres is treating a modest and chaste woman like a courtesan by having a member of his staff request her presence at a men's banquet. It is not unreasonable to assume that many Greeks throughout the empire still kept, or at least respected, the old-fashioned custom of excluding women both from the public meal proper (δεῖπνον) as well as from the drinking party (συμπόσιον).[65] Just how far later Roman practices, such as allowing women to recline at meals, made inroads into predominantly Greek areas is therefore also difficult to determine.

Although the actual meal practices of women during the Roman period do not seem to be uniform, it is clear that the ideology connecting courtesans and prostitutes to banquet settings does remain constant, not only in the art of the period, but also in literature as well. There were many courtesans of the "Greek type" among the Romans, particularly after Italy became the center of the Mediterranean world, and merchants and slave traders flooded into Rome.[66] Sterling Bjorndahl concluded that when a man is found in a public dining scene with a woman not his wife, that woman is most likely to be a courtesan. Bjorndahl cites various sources from the Hellenistic and Roman periods in which it is clear that a man would still be expected to take a courtesan to a συμπόσιον rather than his wife,[67] and that such women were still known for their ability to partake of the evening's discussion and show a certain degree of rhetorical skill.[68] This conclusion can be substantiated further.

In the *Greek Anthology* we find at least two epigrams that reflect this connection of courtesans to banquets. The first comes from Meleager's collection of epigrams which were compiled sometime in the early part of the first century BCE, many of which go back to an earlier period:

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[64] *Verr.* II.1.26.65-27.68.

[65] Smith also suggests that "undoubtedly many Greeks clung to the old ways throughout the empire" ("Social Obligation,"p. 210).

[66] Pierre Grimal, *Love in Ancient Rome* (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986), p. 121.

[67] Alciphron, *Epist.* 13; Athen., *Deipn.* 13,588C-D; Bjorndahl, "Appendix A," pp. 9-10.

[68] Athen., *Deipn.* 13, *passim;* Bjorndahl, "Appendix A," p. 10-11.

> I know your oath is void, for they betray your wantonness, these locks still moist with scented essences. They betray you, your eyes all heavy for want of sleep, and the garland's track all round your head. Your ringlets are in unchaste disorder all freshly touzled, and your limbs are tottering with the wine. Away from me, public woman (or, "common whore"); they are calling you, the lyre that loves the revel and the clatter of the castanets rattled by your fingers.[69]

First of all, it is clear that the woman here described has been out drinking wine, and participating in banquets. On account of her behavior she is called "wanton" (φιλάσωτος), and she is described as a "public woman" (γύναι πάγκοινε), which was a euphemism for the more indelicate term, "whore" (πόρνη).[70] The identification of the woman as "public" or "common to all" is not surprising, given the clear demarcation between the realms of "public" and "private" according to gender in antiquity, the public and open areas being the sphere of men, and not of respectable women, who were relegated to the private sphere of the household.[71] Prostitutes were therefore associated with the marketplace and other open air areas that were usually reserved for men and closed to women of good reputation.[72] A prostitute was then, as now, characterized as a "streetwalker." The woman in this epigram is therefore clearly being described as a prostitute, a woman associated with public places, drunkenness and the revelry of banquets.

The second epigram found in the *Greek Anthology* dates from the time of Augustus, and concerns a procurer, that is, a pimp:

> Psyllus, who used to take to the pleasant banquets of the young men the venal ladies that they desired, that hunter of weak girls who earned a disgraceful wage by dealing in human flesh, lies here. But cast not stones at his tomb, wayfarer, nor bid another to do so. He is dead and buried. Spare him; not because he was content to gain his living so, but because as keeper of common women he dissuaded young men from adultery.[73]

Here we have the description of one responsible for the procuring of prostitutes (here ἑταῖραι) for young men's banquets (συμπόσια). Presumably this man hired the

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[69] *Anth. Graec.* 5.175. Text and translation with emendations from W. R. Paton, *The Greek Anthology*, v. 1 (LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1953), pp. 212-213.

[70] See Licht, pp. 330-332 for the many colorful euphemisms for "prostitute."

[71] The separation of men and women throughout history as well as in antiquity by means of the public/private dichotomy has been determined by Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981). Karen Torjesen has recently outlined the significance of this public/private distinction for the place of women in the early church. See "A Historical Case Study for the Public/Domestic Dichotomy: Women in the Early Christian Churches," (unpublished manuscript, 1987) as well as her forthcoming book on the crisis over women's leadership in the third century (Beacon Press, forthcoming).

[72] Balsdon, pp. 224ff.; Becker, pp. 464-465; Bullough, pp. 34-35; Cantarella, pp. 49-50; Keuls, p. 163; Licht, pp. 330ff.; Pomeroy, p. 201; Sanger, pp. 48-49.

[73] *Anth. Graec.* 7.403. Text and translation by W. R. Paton, *The Greek Anthology*, v. 2, pp. 216-217.

various sorts of women necessary for a party, musicians, actresses and the like, as well as those present for conversation. Again these women are called "common," i.e., shared by all (κοινή). Male procurers were common in antiquity (πορνοβοσκοί, *lenones*),[74] although many procurers were women (*lenae*), particularly older established hetaerae who became madams and trained young girls in order to make a profit from their amours.[75] Such people were usually classed as being particularly despicable for their trafficking in prostitution.[76] Moreover, procurers were also associated with tax-collectors, particularly those tax-collectors (πορνοτελῶναι) who collected the state revenue on prostitutes, and therefore kept lists of licensed harlots.[77] Roman prostitutes were not formally taxed until the reign of Gaius Caligula, but "lewd" women and prostitutes had been called upon in Rome's past for special contributions, particularly in times of war.[78] Even before they were formally taxed, however, prostitutes had to be licensed and registered in order to practice their trade.[79] In his fourth *Discourse on Kingship*, Dio Chrysostom, in his discussion of the true kingship characterized by the qualities of mind and character, not by qualities like avarice for wealth, describes a false king as being like a procurer:

> So let him be a man insignificant in appearance, servile, unsleeping, never smiling, ever quarrelling and fighting with someone, very much like a pander (πορνοβοσκός) who in garb as well as in character is shameless and niggardly, dressed in a coloured mantle, the finery of one of his harlots. A foul and loathsome spirit is this, for he brings every possible insult and shame upon his own friends and comrades, or, rather, his slaves and underlings, whether he find them in the garb of private citizens or that of royalty. Or is it not plain to see that many who are called kings (βασιλεῖς) are only traders, tax-gatherers (τελῶναι), and keepers of brothels (πορνοβοσκοί)?[80]

This reference from Dio gives a good example of the sort of reputation procurers had throughout the Greco-Roman period. In spite of the bad reputation of such people, in the latter epigram the procurer Psyllus is defended for keeping young men from adultery (i.e. sex with other men's wives) by making prostitutes available. This

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[74] F. Hauck and S. Schulz, "πόρνη," *TDNT*, v. 6 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1968), p. 582; Blümner, pp. 171ff.; Bullough, pp. 34-35; Grimal, pp. 121ff. ; Otto Kiefer, *Sexual Life in Ancient Rome* (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1953), pp. 61ff.; Licht, p. 334; Aline Rouselle, *Porneia. On Desire and the Body in Antiquity*, Felicia Pheasant, trans. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 78.

[75] Blümner, p. 171; Bullough, p. 40; Grimal, pp. 129ff.; Keuls, pp. 196ff.; Kiefer, pp. 61ff. Pomeroy, p. 89; Sanger, p. 48.

[76] Aeschines, *In Tim.* 117-120; Cicero, *Verr.* II.1.39.101; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 4.97-98; *Or. 14.14*; *Lucian, Men.* 11; Plutarch, *Apoth. Lac.* 236B-C; Theophrastus, *Char.* 6.5-6; see also Grimal, pp. 121ff. ; Hock, p. 24; Pomeroy, p. 201; Sanger, p. 48.

[77] See n. 76 above; Hauck and Schulz, p. 582; see also Licht, p. 334 and further references there, as well as Bullough, p. 48.

[78] Bullough, p. 48.

[79] Suetonius, *Tib.* 35.; Bullough, pp. 52-53.

[80] *Or.* 4.96-98. Text and translation by J. W. Cohoon, *Dio Chrysostom*, v. 1 (LCL: London: William Heinemann Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 212-213.

is a common defense of prostitution in general in antiquity, as the virtue of respectable women was highly prized, and prostitution was seen as a means to insure it.[81] Such a defense however, did not usually extend to the procurers themselves. As in the previous epigram, however, it is clear that the women brought by men to a dinner-party would still be associated with prostitution.

Prostitutes at banquets was such a common cultural theme that one of the elder Seneca's *Declamations* concerns a situation in which a whore asks a favor of a proconsul while dining:

> Flamininus, when proconsul, was once asked a favour by a whore while dining. She said she had never seen a man's head being cut off. He had a condemned criminal killed.[82]

Such declamations, or controversies as they were also called, were intended to be used in the training of lawyers, and therefore reflect the form of real life speeches made by rhetoricians.[83] The themes of these declamations, however, were often the object of derision, as they were not thought to reflect real situations. In fact, many of the declamation themes found in Seneca's collection are derived from the Greek schools, and rather reflect implausible situations with the stock characters of New Comedy, such as "rich man," "poor man," "prodigal son," and the like.[84] Banquet scenes with courtesans were also a stock setting of New Comedy,[85] which may perhaps explain the choice of the setting here, even though this is also a story about a real individual. In any case, such a scene would certainly have been recognized as stereotypical.

New Comedy plays and their stock characters were very popular throughout the Republican and Imperial periods.[86] Terence's *The Eunuch* serves as a good example of the popularity of New Comedy, as it also has a banquet as one of its settings. The plot centers on a young courtesan, Thais, who began her life of pleasure after she was seduced as an adolescent. Eventually she falls in love with one of her customers, and in the end love triumphs, and she ceases to ply her trade, and becomes her lover's official concubine.[87] This play in particular is quoted by Cicero, alluded to by both Horace and Persius, and is also quoted by several church fathers. Moreover, it was still being produced during the reign of Claudius.[88] This attests

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[81] Bullough, p. 53; Hock, pp. 24-25; Pomeroy, p. 91; Sanger, p. 79; Hauck and Schulz, p. 582-582. See also Rouselle, chapters 5 and 6 on concubinage as an alternative to marriage.

[82] *Controv.* 9.2. Text and translation by M. Winterbottom, *The Elder Seneca. Declamations*, v. 1 (LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1974), pp. 234-235. Two versions of this story concerning L. Quinctius Flamininus are given in Livy 39.42-3. See also Cicero, *Sen.* 42; Val. Max. 2.9.3 (Winterbottom, p. 234, n. 2).

[83] *The Elder Seneca*, "Introduction," p. xi.

[84] Ibid., pp. xii-xiii.

[85] Gordon Willis Williams, "Terence," *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, N.G.L. Hammond and H. H. Scullard, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 1044.

[86] Tenney Frank, *Life and Literature of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956), p. 65ff.

[87] Grimal, 130ff.

[88] Williams, "Terence," p. 1044.

to both the popularity of New Comedy in general throughout the Roman period, as well as to the availability for the popular imagination of the banquet scene itself.[89]

Cicero, one of the Latin writers who quotes Terence, who also narrates the infamous story of Gaius Verres' attempted abduction of a respectable Greek girl, maligns Verres further by painting him as an irresponsible person whose conduct at table is less than exemplary. Cicero mentions time after time that Verres habitually consorts with lewd women at banquets.[90] Verres' own son has become corrupted by the atmosphere his father has subjected him to, and at a tender age has been badly influenced by the disreputable friends of his father, particularly by those women his father was known to consort with at revels, where he "spent his adolescence feasting with unchaste women and intoxicated men."[91] Now then, many of these women present at these parties were married women,[92] and therefore would have had the status of matrons. However, because of their conduct, in particular their attendance at Verres' dinner-parties, Cicero maligns them as "unchaste,"[93] and uses language to describe them that one would usually reserve for prostitutes. For instance, he characterizes them as being available for the public like prostitutes, in that their names were easily spoken in public places:

> There were loud references to his (Verres') days on the shore, to his carousals and debaucheries there; his women's names were heard on the lips of the crowd.[94]

As traditionally the names of respectable women were never mentioned in public (remember that the chaste Greek girl Verres insulted is never named), this comment further underscores Cicero's invective that the women around Verres were more like prostitutes than matrons. Only the names of prostitutes and deceased women were freely mentioned in public.[95] The women usually singled out for mention during this period, such as Cleopatra, Julia, Poppaea, Sempronia and Messalina, were hardly those known by the Romans for their virtue. In contrast to their more noted sisters who were also often famous for their sexual promiscuity,[96] little could be said about ideal Roman matrons, not even their names. Respectable women were to be seen, but not heard, and certainly not heard of. The silence expected of a woman was not a sign of her philosophical education, as it was for men,[97] but was rather

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[89] See also Plautus, *The Casket Comedy.*

[90] See n. 63 above.

[91] *Verr.* II.3.68.160; II.5.12.30-13.31.

[92] *Verr.* II.5.13.34-14.35; II.5.52.137.

[93] *Verr.* II.3.68.160.

[94] *Verr.* II. 5.36.94.

[95] David Schaps, "The Women Least Mentioned: Etiquette and Women's Names," *Classical Quarterly* 27 (1977) 323-30; Cantarella, pp. 124-126.

[96] Marilyn Arthur, "Liberated Women: The Classical Era," in *Becoming Visible; Women in European History,* Renate Bridenthal and Claudia Koonz, eds. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1977), p. 83-84; M. I. Finley, "The Silent Women of Rome," *Aspects of Antiquity. Discoveries and Controversies* (New York: The Viking Press, 1968), pp. 129-142; Kathleen Wicker, "Mulierum Virtutes," in *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature,* pp. 106-134; Cantarella, pp. 129-132.

[97] Kathleen E. Corley, "Silence in the Context of Ascent and Liturgy in Gnostic

a sign of her submissiveness to her husband and her lack of participation in the public sphere of men. A properly trained young woman, then, was also one who had been trained to keep her mouth shut.[98] Respectable women who do attempt to speak out in public and participate in debates are described by Plutarch as "putting on men's airs."[99] This is undoubtedly why Plutarch excludes women from discussions over wine, instructs wives to be silent when their husbands are entertaining friends, and why Melissa and Eumetis remain silent while they are present at dinner.[100] This is in contrast to the reputation of courtesans, who were often expected to be witty, educated and involved in conversations at dinner.[101] By his remark about the verbal availability of Verres' women friends, then, Cicero is further characterizing them as courtesans. Finally, Cicero clearly likens one of the married women around Verres to a prostitute when he remarks that she was "one man's wife, but at all men's service."[102] Such a comment needs little elucidation. Cicero's personal letters are full of descriptions of such women of loose morals, "matrons" who acted like courtesans.[103]

Cicero's discomfort with those who chose such a lifestyle like that of Verres is well known, as he was not fond of attending wild dinner parties, preferring more sedate gatherings.[104] In one personal letter he writes of his dismay after having arrived at a dinner where he was seated near the notorious mistress of Antony, Cytheris. This occasion is often noted:[105]

> Next below Eutrapelus reclined Cytheris. At such a dinner party, then you remark, was the famous Cicero. . . . Upon my oath I never suspected that *she* would be there.[106]

In any case, Cicero left early, as he had no idea that it was to be that sort of soirée.[107]

This association of disreputable women with banquets still present in the literature as well as in the actual social world of the late Republic, can also likewise be found to continue into the first century of the common era. In Plutarch's *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend*, we find that a flatterer also has the characteristics similar to that of a procurer, who aids in the preparation of banquets by supplying women:

Texts," (Major Paper presented in the New Testament Seminar of the Claremont Graduate School, Fall, 1987), pp. 17ff.

[98] Ibid., pp. 18-20. See also Hock, p. 11.

[99] *Lyc. and Num.* 3.5.

[100] See n. 48 above; also *Praec. Conjug.* 139C. Aune, p. 72, n.44.

[101] See n. 18 above.

[102] *Verr.*II. 5.13.34.

[103] Grimal, p. 147.

[104] Smith, "Social Obligation," p. 31-32.

[105] Balsdon, p. 53; Bullough, p. 50; Amy Richlin, "Sources on Adultery at Rome," p. 384; Susan Treggiari, "Libertine Ladies," *The Classical World* 64 (1971), p. 197; Susan Treggiari, *Roman Freedmen During the Late Republic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 140-141; 224-225.

[106] *Fam.* 9.26. Text and translation by W. Glynn Williams, *Cicero. The Letters to His Friends*, v. 2 (LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1952), pp. 281-285.

[107] Bullough makes the incorrect statement that "Cicero enjoyed the companionship of Cytheris," (p. 50) which is hardly the case. Balsdon remarks that Cicero was shocked by her presence (p. 53).

> He is a faithful helper in a love affair, he knows exactly the price to be paid for a prostitute (πόρνη), he is not careless in checking up the charge for a wine supper, nor slow in making arrangements for dinners, he tries to be in the good graces of his mistresses.[108]

Here it seems clear that the hiring of prostitutes went along with the normal preparations for a banquet, along with the purchase of wine. Moreover, in making these arrangements in a timely manner, one would be pleasing one's mistress (παλλακίς) rather than one's wife (γαμετή), whose concerns are mentioned in the next clause. Likewise, when Plutarch narrates a story concerning Larentia, a well known courtesan, he relates of her employment by a keeper of the temple of Hercules for his preparation of a feast for the god. After feasting with her on a couch, the keeper then locks her in a room, supposedly for Hercules to enjoy.[109]

The *Epigrams* of Martial also contain banquet imagery with courtesans, as in this picture of first century Roman opulence:

> Whoever can endure to be the guest of Zoilus should dine among the wives by the Walls and drink, though sober, out of Leda's broken jar. . . . Garbed in green, he lies on a couch he alone fills, and with his elbows thrusts off his guests on either side, propped up as he is on purple and on silken cushions. There stands a catamite by him and offers his belching throat red feathers, and slips of mastick (i.e., toothpicks), and a concubine (*concubina*), lying on her back, with a green fan stirs a gentle breeze to cool his heat.[110]

Here Martial introduces one of the seamier characters from the anonymous world of Rome whose name he invents.[111] The wealthy Zoilus, who represents the degenerate party-goer, lies on a dinner couch, dressed in green (a sign of effeminacy),[112] sprawled over silken cushions. He is surrounded by a recumbent concubine, a catamite, and (later on) a young boy, all of whom could be possible sexual objects for Zoilus, as homosexuality was also not uncommon in συμπόσια settings.[113] Besides the one clearly identified courtesan, however, Marital also mentions the presence of "wives by the walls." This is also surely a reference to prostitutes, not only on account of Martial's own language in other epigrams, where prostitutes stand beside walls and archways,[114] but also because the most common location of streetwalkers was under archways and leaning against the walls of buildings in public places.[115] It is not clear whether Martial is also intending to

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[108] Plutarch, *Quomodo Adul. Amic.* 64F. Text and translation by Frank Cole Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia*, v. 1(LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1969), p. 345.

[109] *Rom.* 5.1-4.

[110] *Epigr.* 3.82.1-10. Text and translation by Walter C. A. Ker, *Martial. Epigrams*, v. 1 (LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1957), pp. 215-217.

[111] F. A. Wright, "Introduction," *Martial. The Twelve Books of Epigrams*, J. A. Pott and F. A. Wright, trans. (London: George Routlege and Sons; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1920), pp. x-xi.

[112] Ker, p. 215.

[113] Keuls, pp. 274-299; Licht, pp. 449ff.

[114] *Epigr.* 1.34.6; 12.32.22.

[115] Ker, p. 50; also Bullough, p. 50; Licht, p. 332ff.

slander matrons who might be present at such a party, in that he calls these women *uxores*. In another epigram, Martial also connects the images of loose women, *convivia*, and archways.[116]

The last reference to courtesans from the first century CE comes from the graffiti of Pompeii. In the ruins of Pompeii there are several references to a woman named Novellia Primigenia, who was no doubt a high class courtesan of some sort, and a wealthy and well known one at that.[117] An early translation of one distich addressed to Novellia found in a tomb reads:

> Would that I were the jeweled goblet from which you drink at dinner. Better still that I stayed with you alone! Then I should thus give you kisses which I now send you![118]

In this instance we have a reference to a real woman, a real courtesan who is being connected to the pleasures of conviviality. In Pompeii during the late first century, then, actual women who were courtesans were still associated with that setting most indued with sexuality, the banquet.

This association continues into the second century as well, particularly in the writings of Lucian, one well known for his parodies of Greco-Roman culture. In his work, *Dialogues of the Courtesans*, it becomes clear that even in the second century a key role of the courtesan in the Greco-Roman mind was as an escort of young men at dinner-parties. There are many comments in Lucian that make it clear that these courtesans he describes spent much of their time drinking and eating with men as well as sleeping with them, and that such women would also recline beside the men on couches.[119] Several of the dialogues relate the women's frustrations with the men they dance and drink with. In two dialogues, women express their dismay over the way that their escorts dance and consort with other women present at parties, particularly the flute-girls whom these higher class courtesans seem to see as beneath their station.[120] In this instance, one courtesan, Joessa, complains about her recent love, Phaon:

> But ever since you realised that I doted on you, and you had me under you thumb, you've been having jokes with Lycena, before my very eyes, to annoy me, or at other times praising Magidium, the harp-girl, when we were dining together. These things make me cry and feel insulted. Only the other day, when you were drinking with Thraso and Diphilus, the company also included the flute-girl Cymbalium, and Pyrallis, whom I loathe! As you know that, I didn't worry particularly about you kissing Cymbalium five times. To kiss a woman like that was an insult to yourself! But oh! The way you kept on making signs at Pyrallis, and would lift up your cup to her when you drank![121]

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[116] *Epigr.* 7.79.

[117] Text and translation (with emendations) from Michele D'Avino, *The Women of Pompeii*, (Napoli: Loffredo, 1967), p. 81.

[118] Ibid., p. 78.

[119] *Dial. Meret.* 1; 3; 6; 11; 12; 15. Text and translation by M. D. Macleod, *Lucian.*, v. 7 (LCL; Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1961).

[120] Ibid. 3.12.

[121] Ibid. 12.311.

The scene is clear, and is not unlike images of earlier Greek συμπόσια. There are several women present at a drinking party of young men, several are musicians, such as the harp and flute girls, and several are the companions of the men, the higher class ἑταῖραι, who have a stonger tie to the men than the other women. There is no mention of wives, and it is clear that the women pictured are all prostitutes of some sort, and the hetaerae see themselves as being of a higher quality than the musicians. The scene is very sexual, particularly with all the kissing and other frivolity going on during the meal. Although the scene is fictitious, it was undoubtedly familiar to those who read Lucian in the second century CE.

Lucian's *Dialogues of the Courtesans* also contains a telling conversation between a mother, Crobyle and her daughter, Corinna. Crobyle has decided to encourage her daughter to become a courtesan as they have been left without financial support upon the death of Crobyle's husband. Crobyle worked for awhile after his death but now she wishes her daughter to make money "by associating with young men, drinking and sleeping with them."[122] Crobyle also instructs Corinna to mind her manners when out, and exhorts her to not drink too much or talk too much while at a party.[123] By the selling of her daughter's body then, Crobyle hopes to become rich. In a way, Corinna's mother is similar to a retired hetaera who switches to procuring to make a living, and so trains up a young girl to become a prostitute.

The association of prostitutes with public meal settings in the context of both literature and art can therefore be charted well into the second century CE. Such representations are still reminiscent of earlier Greek banquets scenes and still carry sexual connotations. It is no wonder, then, that even during the Roman period, the appearance of women at public meals would still elicit a certain degree of social criticism, depending on the type of meal that a woman attended, and the company she chose to dine with. It was not unreasonable to expect the presence of matrons at a dinner party, albeit in small numbers, but should they remain for the συμπόσιον or participate in frivolous or drunken behavior they could be characterized as prostitutes, women known for eating and drinking with men. It is no wonder that foreign meal practices were often commented on for the inclusion of daughters and mothers in these sorts of activities.[124] In fact, many of the matrons of the late Republic and early Empire elicited precisely such criticisms, and were in fact likened to prostitutes by critical contemporaries. Most of these women are those usually noted by modern scholars for their "liberated" behavior during these years. It is not a coincidence that the first accusations of immorality leveled against Roman women date at the same time that their "emancipation" began.[125]

The outrageous behavior which characterized the late Republic and early Empire is well known, particularly the flamboyant behavior of the women of the Roman

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[122] Ibid. 6.293.

[123] Ibid. 6.294.

[124] For foreign meal practices that the Romans thought surprising see Livy 1:57 (Etruscans); Macrobius, *Sat. Conv.* vii; Herodotus, 5.18; Plutarch, *Art.*; Quintius Curtius, 5.1 (Persians); Athen. *Deipn.* 1.23 (Tyrrhenians); Tacitus, *Germ.* 18-19 (Germans).

[125] Kiefer, p. 45.

aristocracy.[126] Even though the accounts of such behavior may be exaggerated,[127] it is clear that many during the Roman period objected to the behavior of certain women, and their reaction against such behavior was quite strong.[128] Certain historians see this as a reaction against the partial freedom of women which developed during the late Republic and early Empire.[129] Freedom for women was seen as leading very swiftly into debauchery and sexual licentiousness.[130] The writings of Virgil, Livy, Tacitus, and Juvenal all indicate that during this period of time there occurred in Rome a revaluation of the attitude toward women which caused a shift in the general outlook of women's roles.[131] Marylin Arthur concludes that this shift in outlook can be correlated with both political and social developments during these years, particularly the new focus on the importance of the nuclear family for the good of the state.[132] The new independence of women was therefore only tolerated as long as it did not interfere with the real world of male politics.

But just how "free" were Roman women? Eva Cantarella argues that there were women who claimed greater freedom and enjoyed a certain degree of privilege at Rome, and that the number of these women certainly increased between the first and second centuries. However, the majority of these women belonged to a single social class, the aristocracy, and even then, their "emancipation" was limited.[133] Peter Brown calls this "emancipation" of women during the early Empire a "freedom born of contempt," allowed only as long as it had no political impact, and restricted when it was seen as destructive to the male political order.[134] This "emancipation" should therefore be seen as somewhat relative, and not the sweeping "liberation" that has often been pictured.[135] Like the Greeks before them, Roman men also eventually sought to restrict women's liberties, and put them back "under their thumbs."[136]

This was accomplished in several ways: first through legislation which limited the partial freedoms women had begun to exercise, and secondly by a new insistence on the importance of women's traditional virtues.[137] Aline Rouselle suggests that the true purpose of the Augustan marriage laws was to limit the new sexual freedom

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[126] Balsdon, p. 16; Grimal, pp. 146ff.; Judith P. Hallett, "The Role of Women in Roman Elegy: Counter-Cultural Feminism," in *Women in the Ancient World: The Arethusa Papers*, John Peradotto and J. P. Sullivan, eds. (Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 1984), p. 245ff.; Kiefer, pp.39ff.; Anna Lydia Motto, "Seneca on Women's Liberation," *The Classical World* 65 (1972), p. 156; Pomeroy, p. 189; Sanger, pp. 82ff.; Treggiari, "Libertine Ladies;" Veyne, p. 75-76.

[127] Balsdon, 271-272; Kiefer, pp. 47ff.; Pomeroy, p. 189.

[128] Arthur, pp. 84-85; Cantarella, pp. 142ff.; Kiefer, pp. 45ff. Van Bremen, p. 234ff.

[129] Arthur, pp. 84-85; Cantarella, pp. 142ff.; Motto, p. 156ff; Van Bremen, pp. 234-245.

[130] Kiefer, pp. 45ff.; Motto, p. 234.

[131] Arthur, pp. 84-85.

[132] Arthur, p. 85.

[133] Cantarella, pp. 142-143.

[134] "Late Antiquity," *History of Private Life. I.*, pp. 247-248.

[135] Cantarella, pp. 140-141.

[136] Cantarella, p. 143.

[137] Cantarella hints at this on p. 143.

of Roman women.[138] The new laws restricting adultery therefore set out to prevent free respectable women, such as daughters of good families, wives, widows, and divorcees, from having casual sexual relationships, and to prevent husbands from allowing their wives any degree of sexual freedom or from keeping a wife that had committed infidelities.[139] Should a woman be convicted of such conduct, she would lose her status as matron[140] and be forced to wear the clothing of a prostitute.[141] Husbands who would not repudiate errant wives for adulterous behavior could be prosecuted for *lenocinium*, "procuring."[142] Concurrent with such legislation was the development in the literature of the Augustan period of a contrast between the ideal wife and the immoral assertive woman.[143] Women were characterized as "wanton" and in need of control, and more importantly, such "liberated" women were maligned as "prostituting" themselves.[144] In fact, to protest against the new legislation restricting their freedoms, many Roman women actually registered as prostitutes so as to avoid being accused of adultery.[145] This practice was forbidden under Tiberius.[146] In description then, the distinction between many Roman matrons and prostitutes was slight[147] or at least uncertain[148] and these women were seen as imitating the hetaerae of Greek fame.[149]

Rhetoric concerning such women can be shown to reflect imagery usually connected to prostitutes. Although it is clear that many women of the upper class were known for their education and pursuit of philosophy,[150] descriptions of liberated (and therefore libertine)[151] ladies characterize these women as being overly talkative and chatty, particularly at meals.[152] Juvenal's well known invective against matrons who are barely seated at the dinner table before they begin to pour out their knowledge of the classics and Greek grammar is certainly explicable in light of the

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[138] Rouselle, p. 87. On Augustan marriage laws see Balsdon, p. 217; Pal Csillag, *The Augustan Laws on Family Relations* (Budapest: Academiai Kiado, 1976); Kiefer, pp.36ff.; Pomeroy, pp. 159ff.; Amy Richlin, "Sources on Adultery at Rome," *Reflections of Women in Antiquity*, Helene P. Foley, ed. (New York; London; Paris: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1981), pp. 379-404.

[139] Rouselle, p. 85-87.

[140] Rouselle, p. 81.

[141] Rouselle, p. 94.

[142] Rouselle, pp. 82ff; pp. 103ff.

[143] Arthur, p. 84.

[144] See for example Tacitus, *Ann.* 2.85; Suetonius, *Tib.* 35.2.

[145] Rouselle, p. 94; Pomeroy, p. 160.

[146] Pomeroy, p. 160.

[147] Sanger, p. 77.

[148] Kiefer, p. 59. Kiefer is therefore careful to distinguish in his discussion between real prostitutes, i.e., women who consciously sought to earn a living from selling their bodies, and new "free living" women.

[149] Cantarella, p. 131; Grimal, pp. 146ff; Kiefer, p. 44.

[150] Balsdon, pp. 272-273; Edward Best, "Cicero, Livy and Educated Roman Women," *Classical Journal* 65 (1970), pp. 199-204; Susan G. Cole, "Could Greek Women Read and Write?" in *Reflections of Roman Women*, Helene P. Foley, ed., pp. 219-245; Friedländer, p. 251; Pomeroy, pp. 172ff.

[151] See Treggiari, "Libertine Ladies."

[152] Friedländer, p. 253; Kiefer, pp. 43ff. Pomeroy, p. 172.

tradition linking such skills to courtesans in banquet settings.[153] Another good example, is the description of Sempronia, wife of the consul in 77CE, which was later used by Tacitus to describe Poppaea:

> She was well-read in Greek literature as well as in Latin; her singing and dancing were rather too professional for a lady, and she had many other accomplishments which made for dissipation. Self retraint and chastity ranked lowest in her scale of values, and it was hard to say which she thought less of squandering, her money or her reputation. . . . Yet she had a good brain; she wrote verses; she was amusing; and whether in the language of the drawing room or the brothel, she was a good talker, full of wit, even of charm.[154]

Note that Sempronia has all the qualities of a courtesan: charm, wit, and skills in singing and dancing. She is learned, and quite capable of carrying on a conversation about literature and philosophy. However, she is also "unchaste," has a bad reputation, and uses the vocabulary of brothels right alongside that of the drawing room. This is not as biting a description as that of Juvenal, but its intent becomes clear in light of other invectives against liberated/libertine women of the time.

"Liberated" women were also known for their drinking habits. Traditionally, respectable women in the Republican period were not allowed to drink alcohol.[155] Later, such prohibitions were relaxed, but proper women still drank moderately, if they drank at all.[156] Even well trained courtesans were to watch their alcohol consumption,[157] but some Roman women got drunk, and were therefore behaving like the lowest of prostitutes.[158] Moreover, the religious rituals that many Roman women attended were also suspect,[159] and women who participated in other strange religions besides Christianity were accused of prostitution, particularly those involved in the Isis cult. It has been said by Grimal that the Isis cult triumphed in Rome precisely at the time that there was more of an acceptance of emancipated behavior on the part of women.[160] It is interesting that both women participants in the Isis cult and women proselytes of Judaism were also eventually accused of meretricious behavior.[161]

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[153] Juvenal, *Sat.* 6.

[154] Sallust, *Cat.* 24.3- 25.5. Text by J. C. Rolfe, *Sallust* (LCL; London: WIlliam Heinemann Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 43-45; translation is by Balsdon, pp. 47-48; Tacitus, *Ann.* 13.45; see also Kiefer, pp. 43-44; Pomeroy, p. 171.

[155] Cantarella, p. 118.

[156] Balsdon, p. 272.

[157] Balsdon, p. 272; Lucian, *Dial. Meret.* 6.

[158] Cantarella, p. 144. See epigram, n. 69 above.

[159] Balsdon, p. 247; Cantarella, pp. 151ff.; Pomeroy, pp. 217ff.

[160] Grimal, p. 305.

[161] On Poppaea, who was possibly a convert to Judaism, see Balsdon pp. 125f. and Tacitus, *Ann.* 13.45, which is based on Sallust's description of Sempronia (see n. 154 above); Balsdon, p. 247; Cantarella, pp. 156-57; See esp. David L. Balch, "The Origin, Form and Apologetic Function of the Household Duty Code (Haustafel) in 1 Peter" (PhD Diss. Yale University, 1974), pp. 118-123; 126 on Judaism in particular, and all of chapter 5 on the criticisms leveled against eastern cults which were eventually inherited by Judaism and later Christianity. A key criticism of both

The social background of the women so described by Roman writers is disputed. Many have suggested that these women were not in fact matrons, but rather wealthy freedwomen, who would have been classified as prostitutes anyway.[162] However, this suggestion has been challenged, and these women would rather be of any class: courtesans, or freedwomen, or upper class wives, widows or divorcees.[163] Treggiari argues more forcibly that there is no evidence that Roman freedwomen were more licentious than Roman matrons, and that in fact, the emphasis of most writers was on the sexual immorality of the upper classes, rather on those not freeborn.[164] In light of these observations, it is interesting to note that the women welcomed to Epicurean circles also had diverse backgrounds. Many were courtesans, but many were also married.[165]

It is not surprising, then, that the attendance of women at banquets was therefore suspect, given the association of drinking and revelry with prostitution. Therefore, women known for their forwardness in other areas were also known for their attendance at men's banquets, as were the women who consorted with Gaius Verres.[166] Such settings were considered enticing, due to the fact that traditionally meal settings were associated with free sexuality.[167] So, although wives might be

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the Isiac religion (and the Dionysiac religion before it) and Judaism was the supposed opportunity for sexual promiscuity on the part of women participants, particularly in the context of nocturnal wine feasts (p. 119). Balch also shows that like Christian writers, Jewish writers also utilized the Haustafel in order to argue that their women were indeed in their proper place, and no threat to the politeia.

[162] Many prostitutes were in fact slaves (Keuls, pp. 199-200; Pomeroy, pp. 139ff.) and were owned outright by their brothel-keepers (Bullough, p. 34). Some female slaves undoubtedly plied the trade of prostitution in order to earn their freedom, particularly if that was their occupation to begin with (Pomeroy, p. 195ff.). Moreover, female slaves were always sexually available to their masters and legally could not marry or have the status of matron, although many slaves did establish strong, stable relationships (Cantarella, p. 114). Often, a wealthy free man (either freeborn or a freedman) would free one of his favorite female slaves, and make her his concubine. Such a freedwoman would have the status of a matron, unless she left her patron to marry another (Rouselle, p. 97). It has often been argued that the women men took to banquets during the Roman period were freedwomen who were also often actresses and the like (Veyne, p. 187). The well-known "libertine ladies" and subjects of the erotic Roman elegies of the early Imperial period would therefore be freedwomen, rather than upperclass matrons. Treggiari has argued against this assumption ("Libertine Ladies;" *Roman Freedman During the Late Republic,* p. 142). Clearly the status of women slaves needs more attention, particularly as many early Christian groups had slave members. Moreover, many of the sources in this paper also mention the slave status of prostitutes, or compare the ideal matron as one "free-born" to one base-born (see *Anth. Graec.* 7.403, n. 73 above; Cicero, *Verr.*II.1.24.62ff., n. 62 above; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 4.96-98, n. 80 above; Philo, *Sac.* 26-27, n. 232; *Spec. Leg.* 3.170-71, n. 236 below).

[163] Treggiari, "Libertine Ladies;" Pomeroy, p. 171.

[164] Treggiari, "Libertine Ladies," p. 198.

[165] Smith, "Social Obligation," p. 57.

[166] See n. 63 above; Balsdon, p. 272; Cantarella, p. 161; Friedländer, p. 247. See also Smith, "Social Obligation," p. 31-32 for the flamboyance of Roman banquets.

[167] More could be written on the banquet as a setting indued with sexuality,

expected to be in attendance at a meal, guests were to stay away from the wife of their host, and were warned against reclining next to married women, lest they be tempted to accost them.[168]

Married women were therefore also warned against dining with strangers, and the attendance of banquets without their husbands or without their husband's permission was frowned upon. Eventually such behavior was considered grounds for divorce.[169] An early invective against such behavior is found in Cicero. In 56 BCE M. Caelius Rufus was brought to trial for various charges brought against him at the instigation of his former lover, the infamous Clodia, also called "Lesbia" by the poet Catullus.[170] Clodia was a well-born woman from a highly respected Rebublican family, a woman recently widowed at the age of 35.[171] Following the death of her husband, and her affair with Catullus, she became enamored of the young Caelius, then 23 years old. After their two year liaison soured, it is thought that Clodia instigated the fantastic charges brought against him.[172] Cicero defended Caelius with one of his more persuasive speeches, in which his primary line of defense was an invective against the licentious behavior of Caelius' true accuser. Cicero portrays her as having lived like a prostitute, and depicts her as the antithesis to the ideal Roman matron. Her behavior is "meretricious" and Cicero's speech emphasizes her sexual promiscuity.[173] Included in her meretricious behavior, however, is her habit of eating with strangers:

> If a woman without a husband opens up her house to all men's desires, and publicly leads the life of a courtesan; if she is in the habit of attending dinner parties with men who are perfect strangers; if she does this in the city, in her park, amid all those crowds at Baiae; if, in fact, she so behaves that not only her bearing but her dress and her companions, not only the ardour of her looks and the licentiousness of her gossip but also her embraces and

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which of course has its roots in the image of the symposium as a scene for erotic happenings. For the sensual atmosphere of meal settings, see Achilles Tatius, 1.4.4-5; 5.4-6; 6.2-5; where Clitophon sits near Leucippe at dinner, sees her beauty, and after falling in love with her has lustful dreams (Hock, p. 14); In Musonius Rufus, frag, 3, women who take up philosophy must exercise sexual self control (Hock, p. 32); Pseudo-Lucian, *Amor.* 42-43 in which a woman's day includes flirting with men at dinner and then indulging in adulterous unions (Hock, p. 16); Ovid. *Met.* 185-220, where a guest at a wedding banquet becomes consumed with lust for the bride; Ovid, *Amor.* 4, where a husband and wife who recline together on a couch are described in a most sexual way. Even cookbooks contained sexual imagery (Hock, p. 29).

[168] Lucian, *Asin.* 5; graffiti at Pompeii, D'Avino, *The Women of Pompeii*, p. 73; Clement of Alexandria, *Paid.* 2.7; *Sirach*, 9.9ff.

[169] Cantarella, p. 161.

[170] Cicero, *Pro Caelio*, Introduction, pp. 398ff.; Text and translation of *Pro Caelio* by R. Gardiner, *Cicero. The Speeches: Pro Caelio, De Provinciis, Consularibus, Pro Balbo* (LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1958). Balsdon, pp. 54ff.; Cantarella, pp. 131-32; Grimal, pp. 148-156.

[171] Balsdon, p. 54.

[172] Ibid.

[173] Balsdon, pp. 54-55; Mary R. Lefkowitz, "Invective Against Women," in *Heroines and Hysterics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp. 32-40.

> caresses, her beach parties, her water parties, her dinner-parties, proclaim her to be not only a courtesan, but also a shameless and wanton courtesan.[174]

Again the dichotomy of the categories of public and private come into play. Cicero openly names Clodia, in itself an insult to a Roman matron, and describes her "public" behavior. She attends dinner parties with strange men in open air places ("in the park," "in the city," "amid crowds") and invites men into her home for revels, as would the wealthy hetaerae of ancient Athens.[175] She dresses the part of a courtesan, which would mean that she wore the toga, or dressed in bright colors as did prostitutes.[176] Her topics of conversation are also "licentious," as were Sempronia's who spoke in the language of the brothel.[177] Cicero also compares Clodia to one of her own ancestresses, Claudia, for whom the famous epitaph was written.[178] Claudia was also beautiful, but unlike Clodia, she was the ideal Roman matron. She kept house, worked in wool, bore children and loved her husband.[179] Cicero describes Clodia as doing none of these things, as her children are not mentioned, she roams public places rather than being at home, and her true vocation is that of a prostitute.

The enumerations of women's virtues and vices in this manner is not at all uncommon in literature and inscriptions of the Greco-Roman world.[180] What is interesting, however, is that during the Imperial period, women's absence from banquets becomes one of characteristics of the ideal woman as well, and dining without one's husband becomes a vice. Livy compares two women in this manner, one who attends a banquet without her husband, and another who remains home spinning wool alone.[181] Tacitus praises the chastity of German women, and comments that because they have "no dinner tables with their provocations to corrupt them," they also have fewer instances of adultery.[182] In contrast to this foreign practice, Athenaeus records the surprising practice of the Etruscans, whose women "dine, not with their own husbands, but with any men who happen to be present,

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[174] Cicero, Cael. 20.44-49.

[175] Blümner, pp. 172ff.

[176] Blümner, p. 173; Kiefer, p. 63. Sanger, p. 75.

[177] See n. 154 above.

[178] Lefkowitz, p. 32ff; Cantarella, on Clodia, pp. 131-132, on Claudia, pp. 132-133.

[179] Cantarella, p. 133; Lefkowitz, p. 32.

[180] Arthur, pp. 83-84; Cantarella, pp.129ff.; Wicker, "Mulierum Virtutes;" Pomeroy, pp. 161ff.; Marjorie Lightman and William Zeisel, "Univira: An Example of Continuity and Change in Roman Society," *Church History* 46 (March 1977) 19-32; R. Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* (Illinois Studies in Language and Literature 28; Urbana: Univ. of Il. Press, 1942), pp. 290ff.; Friedländer, pp. 264ff; Karen Torjesen, "Tertullian's 'political ecclesiology' and Women's Leadership," *Studia Patristica* (forthcoming); "Women's Virtues and Vices: Mechanisms for Social Control," unpublished manuscript.

[181] Livy, 1.57-60.

[182] Tacitus, *Germ.* 19. Text and translation by William Peterson, *Tacitus. Dialogus, Agricola, Germania* (LCL; London: William Heinemann; New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1925), pp. 290-291.

and they pledge with wine any whom they wish."[183] Finally, Friedländer cites an epitaph of the wife of an Imperial slave (unfortunately without a source) from Lower Moesia whose husband gives her the highest praise:

> She was the patron-saint of my home, my hope and my life. Her wishes were mine; her dislikes mine. None of her secret thoughts was concealed from me. She was a busy spinner, economical, but generous to her husband. She did not delight in eating, save with me. She was a good counsellor, prudent and noble.[184]

It would seem then that a woman's dining habits would also show her true character, as would the other ideal virtues enumerated in such epitaphs, such as devotion to home, motherhood, modesty and the like. Such glorifications of women in the Augustan age were indicative of the shift back to the importance of ideal roles for women during this period.[185] This proscription against attending banquets with non-relatives eventually becomes law by the time of Justinian.[186]

It is therefore not surprising that Clement of Alexandria gives a very conservative instruction for the attendance of women at banquets late in the second century. Raised a pagan, being well versed in the Greek culture of his time, Clement certainly should be expected to show an interest in table etiquette and the impression Christians might make at a public banquet. He warns young people, both men and women, to stay away from large festivals, which were known for settings in which members of both sexes might be carried away by sexual passion, particularly since it was one of the main occasions that young people would have the opportunity to meet. Young virgins were particularly vulnerable in such settings.[187] As for banquets, he would rather that even married women not be present at all, but if they are they must be well clothed. He warns men against reclining next to them, particularly since the influence of wine might lead one to lust:[188]

> But if any necessity arises, commanding the presence of married women, let them be well clothed—without by raiment, within by modesty. But as for such as are unmarried, it is the extremest scandal for them to be present at a banquet of men, especially men under the influence of wine.

Young women, those who are unmarried, again should not be present at all.[189] Predictably, Clement also goes on to exhort the women present at such settings to be silent, and to abstain from drinking too much.[190] This limitation of women's activity by Clement shows a domestication of morals that some historians would

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[183] *Deipn.* 12.517D. Text and translation by Charles Burton Gulick, *Athenaeus. The Deipnosophists*, v. 5 (LCL; London: William Heinemann Ltd.; New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1933), pp. 328-329.

[184] Friedländer, p. 266.

[185] Arthur, pp. 84-85.

[186] Cantarella, p. 161.

[187] Clement of Alexandria, *Paid.* 2.7; Hock, pp. 13-14.

[188] Clement of Alexandria, *Paid.* 2.7. 54, 2. Text in Otto Stählin, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, v. 1 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1936), p. 190, 17-21. Translation from ANF, v. 2, p. 252.

[189] See nts. 44, 45 above.

[190] *Paid.* 2.7.

argue is independent of Christian teaching.[191] If this is the case, then the impetus for Clement's teaching has its roots in a larger cultural trend, rather than in a specifically Christian morality.

It is clear that women who were associated with banquet settings were seen in the popular imagination as prostitutes. Certain Greco-Roman women did in fact attend dinners with their husbands, but the practice may not have been all that common, even in the associations, and its pervasiveness outside the upper classes is difficult to determine. Areas still influenced by Greek ideals and practices would also still adhere to a certain extent to the exclusion of women from some meals, and certainly from those meals characterized as συμπόσια. Women who did attend such parties would have engendered a great deal of social criticism, particularly after the time of Augustus, when the interest in the maintenance of the nuclear family as a means to insure the political stability of the Empire caused a shift in the social consciousness which reemphasized ideal women's roles. Absence from public banquets became part of that complex of ideas which eventually determined a women's social classification, and eventually limited her ability to participate in the public sphere in the centuries that followed.

But what about Jewish women? What about Palestine during the early first century? How did Jews under Roman rule fit into this cultural pattern? Leonard Swidler automatically concludes that women in formative Judaism were simply excluded from all meals with men, and moreover were not even allowed to serve men at table.[192] However, the sources he uses to prove this are very late and may not be helpful in determining real Jewish practice earlier.[193] Swidler's portrait of Jewish women's table customs would fit in well with generalizations concerning the "low" status of Jewish women in the Greco-Roman world.[194] However, keeping in mind Bernadette Brooten's suggestions for approaching the issue of Jewish women's history[195] it is more appropriate to allow for the possibility of the diversity of Jewish women's experience during these centuries.[196] Jewish women also lived in the changing environment of the Greco-Roman world, and it is inconceivable that they were completely unaffected by the social developments in the world around them. Certain Jewish women benefitted from the economic and legal changes of the Hellenistic world, as there is evidence that some Jewish women had the right to divorce their husbands as did their Roman sisters,[197] were leaders and patronesses of their

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[191] See Averil Cameron, "Redrawing the Map: Early Christian Territory After Foucault," *Journal of Roman Studies* 76 (1986), pp. 266-271; see esp. p. 267.

[192] Leonard Swidler, *Women in Judaism. The Status of Women in Formative Judaism* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1976), p. 125.

[193] Swidler uses 3rd century rabbinic texts and modern Palestinian (not Israeli!) practice to score his point.

[194] See for example, Lèonie J. Archer, "The Role of Jewish Women in the Religion, Ritual and Cult of Graeco-Roman Palestine," in *Images of Women in Antiquity,* Averil Cameron and Amélie Kuhrt (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983), pp. 272-287; Swidler, *Women in Judaism.*

[195] Bernadette Brooten, "Jewish Women's History in the Roman Period: A Task for Christian Theology," *HTR* 79 (1986), pp. 22-30.

[196] Brooten, "Jewish Women's History," p. 25.

[197] See Brooten, "Jewish Women's History," p. 23, n. 3 for the literature on the debate over Jewish women's right to divorce in antiquity.

synagogues,[198] and were educated in philosophy.[199] Even some girls in Palestine received a Greek education, in spite of the fact that certain rabbis found this objectionable.[200] Moreover, Greco-Roman women found Judaism attractive, as well as Christianity and the Isis cult, as the evidence for female proselytes to Judaism attests.[201] We have also seen that Judaism, like the Isis cult, was accused for the sexual immorality of its women, and that at least one Roman woman proselyte was also accused of meretricious behavior.[202] It is therefore more likely that Jewish women were also affected by the cultural undercurrents of the late Republic and early Empire, particularly as Palestinian Jews came under Roman domination during this period, and prior to that had been part of the "Hellenistic" world for almost two centuries, as had the Jews in the Diaspora.[203] In fact, even Rabbinic literature from early Jewish Palestine shows a wide knowledge of the literature and cultures of the Hellenistic cultural world, including a knowledge of literary banquet motifs replete with male and female prostitutes.[204] Moreover, rabbinic literature also reflects the fact that although rabbis continually had to warn townspeople not to adopt certain Hellenistic customs, there were also many Hellenistic manners, customs and superstitions that they tolerated, or even legalized.[205]

It therefore should come as no surprise that Jewish meal customs during this period were in form quite similar to those in the rest of the Greco-Roman world.[206] Jewish formal meals were patterned after the Greco-Roman formal meal, and included the normal order of a meal proper, followed in this case by a time for religious ritual.[207] Even the meal habits of the community of Qumran can be shown to match those of the the broader Greco-Roman world.[208] In fact, the literary form

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[198] Bernadette Brooten, *Women Leaders in the Ancient Synagogue: Inscriptional Evidence and Background Issues* (Brown University, 1982); Shaye J. D. Cohen, "Women in the Synagogues of Antiquity," *Conservative Judaism* 34 (1980), pp. 23-29; Ross Kraemer, "Hellenistic Jewish Women: The Epigraphical Evidence," *Seminar Papers of the Society of Biblical Literature*, no 26, Kent Richards, ed. (Decatur, GA: Scholars Press, 1986), pp. 183-200.

[199] Philo describes women ascetics, the *Therapeutrides*, who dedicated their lives to the study of the Torah. See also Brooten, "Jewish Women's History," p. 26; and more recently Ross Kraemer, "Monastic Jewish Women in Graeco-Roman Egypt; Philo Judaeus on the Therapeutrides," *Signs* (Winter 1989), pp. 342-370. Kraemer also mentions the Jewish women in Acts 16, who were apparently gathered at a synagogue for the study of the Torah when Paul finds them (pp. 367f.).

[200] Liebermann, pp. 23-24.

[201] Brooten, "Jewish Women's History," p. 27; *Women Leaders*, pp. 144-147; Balsdon, p. 247; Cantarella, pp. 156-57.

[202] See n. 161 above.

[203] See Mack, pp. 45ff. for a nice discussion of the pervasive influence of Hellenic culture in Jewish communities at "all social levels."

[204] Saul Lieberman, *Greek in Jewish Palestine. Studies in the Life and Manners of Jewish Palestine in the II-IV Centuries C.E.* (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1942), pp. 47-50, pp. 153 ff.

[205] Lieberman, pp. 91ff.

[206] Smith, "Social Obligation," pp. 178ff; Klosinski, p. 92.

[207] Smith, "Social Obligation," p. 178.

[208] Klosinski, pp. 92-93.

of the Passover Seder liturgy itself has been shown to have been greatly influenced by the traditions of symposium literature.[209] Moreover, the posture at the Passover meal was recumbent. Both the Mishnah and the Talmud indicate that the meal is to be taken reclining.[210] Although evidence from the Mishnah and the Talmud may not necessarily clarify first century Jewish customs, there may be good reason to consider it more seriously in this instance. R. Horsley cites the comment of a colleague, E. Ferguson, that "It might be thought that this evidence is too late to confirm first-century practice; but the reason given for this posture in the Talmud, namely as a sign of freedom, is such a thoroughly Greek reason that one should conclude that the practice dates from the Hellenistic period."[211] Both the form of the meal, then, and the recumbent posture of the Passover Seder meal may indeed reflect Greco-Roman meal customs.

It is notable, therefore, that in these texts women were not only required to be present at the Passover meal, but they are also obliged to recline at their husband's side, particularly women of high standing (although one text makes reclining obligatory for ordinary housewives as well).[212] Instructions concerning the distribution of presents to women and children also make it clear that they were present for the proceedings.[213] The fact that women began to recline at meals in the early Imperial period would give further weight to Ferguson's suggestion that reclining at the Passover meal would reflect an earlier Hellenistic practice, and would furthermore position earlier Jewish customs squarely alongside those of their contemporaries.

Although Jewish women may have been present and recumbent at the Passover Seder meal, there are also instructions which exclude them from actual participation in the the Seder liturgy itself.[214] Stein correctly compares this to the Greco-Roman practice of excluding women from the conversation portion of a banquet, the συμπόσιον.[215] Although women might be present for such proceedings, many were of the opinion that they should be quiet while there.[216] There is no way of knowing, however, just how strictly this prohibition was adhered to in various Jewish communities of antiquity, particularly in the early part of the first century.

There is, however, additional evidence to confirm that Jewish men could expect to find married women at a public banquet, possibly even in Palestine. Sirach warns young men:

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[209] Gordon J. Bahr, "The Seder of Passover and the Eucharistic Words," *Nov. Test.* 12 (1970), p. 181; S. Stein, "The Influence of Symposia Literature on the Literary Form of the Pesah Haggadah," *JJS* 8 (1957) 13-44; Smith, "Social Obligation," p. 178.

[210] *Pesahim* 10; *b.Pesahim* 108a; Bahr, p. 190; R. Horsley, "Reclining at the Passover Meal," *New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity* 2 (Macquarie University, Australia: The Ancient History Documentary Research Centre, 1982), p. 75; Stein, pp. 17-18; 30-3.

[211] Horsley, "Reclining," p. 75.

[212] Stein, p. 31, see n. 71.

[213] Stein, p. 29.

[214] Stein, pp. 32ff.; see also more recently Judith Romney Wegner, *Chattel or Person? The Status of Women in the Mishnah* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 156-157.

[215] Stein, p. 31f.

[216] See nts. 48, 97-100 above.

> Never dine with another man's wife, nor be in the habit of feasting with her with wine; lest your soul be inclined (ἐκκλίνω) to her and in your spirit you be plunged into destruction.[217]

Sirach also gives other instructions for banquet etiquette, such as avoiding over-eating, watching one's wine consumption, speaking carefully, and not becoming too puffed up should one be given a high place at the table.[218] All such advice would fit in well with other Greco-Roman discussions of banquet etiquette. Notice, also, that sitting next to another man's wife in such a context would be tantamount to inviting a sexual liaison.

In Egypt during the first century, Philo discusses the dining habits of a Jewish monastic community, the Therapeutic society, which consisted of both male (*Therapeutae*) and female (*Therapeutrides*) members.[219] In his discussion of their table customs, Philo contrasts their communal meals to Greek banquets. The pleasure derived from the meals of the Therapeutic society is of a very different sort than that of the Greeks, which are known for their flute-girls, jugglers, and other "unrestrained merrymaking," as well as their focus on the passion for women, and even more shockingly upon the passion for men.[220] In contrast, the meals of the Therapeutic society are characterized by quiet solemnity,[221] and the absence of alcoholic refreshment.[222] In place of theatrical or musical entertainment, these ascetics instead join together in song and worship following their meal. Women, as well as men, fully participate in the after dinner proceedings, which as we have seen, would have been unusual.[223] As he is comparing the practice of the Therapeutic society to that of the Greeks, the presence of women in such a context may also be part of his comparison, and might have been considered surprising to some of his readers.[224] The dedication of these women to the study of philosophy might also have been surprising to some, as would their participation in the after dinner choirs.[225] Moreover, Philo clearly says that the women recline like the men do, the men sitting by themselves on the right and the women sitting by themselves to the left,[226] on either side of a double enclosure with a wall in between them which does not extend all the way to the ceiling.[227] This segregation is not inexplicable given the ascetic nature of the group and the sexuality governing meal settings. Philo is also careful to emphasize the chastity of the women present, which would also be in contrast to women known to frequent Greek banquets.[228] Here we do have a

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[217] *Sirach* 9:9. Text in *Septuaginta* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1979), p. 392. Translation RSV with emendations from *The Oxford Annotated Apocrypha*, Bruce M. Metzger, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 139.

[218] *Sirach* 31:12- 32:9.

[219] Here I am adopting the terminology of Ross Kraemer from her recent article, "Monastic Jewish Women," pp. 343-44.

[220] *Vit. Cont.* 58.

[221] *Vit. Cont.* 66.

[222] *Vit. Cont.* 73.

[223] *Vit. Cont.* 80.

[224] Kraemer, pp. 347ff.; Smith, "Table Fellowship," p. 616, n. 9.

[225] Kraemer, Ibid.

[226] *Vit. Cont.* 69.

[227] Kraemer, p.345.

[228] *Vit. Cont.* 68; see Kraemer (pp. 352ff.) where she suggests that these women

clear example of a Jewish communal meal which includes women, albeit a small minority of well-educated women with a relatively high economic standing from Alexandria.[229]

Although from this sort of evidence it is hard to determine the everyday meal practice of Jews in first century Palestine and the Diaspora, it seems that Jewish men might have expected to find married women at a banquet, that women may have been required to recline next to their husbands at the Passover Seder, and that certain wealthy Jewish women participated in the communal meals of an ascetic Jewish community in Alexandria. Such table practices would not have been unusual in any other Greco-Roman context. The exclusion of women from participating in the Seder liturgy itself is not unexpected, given the opinion of many that women ought to be excluded from after dinner activities, and that when their presence was allowed they were to keep quiet. The practice of the Therapeutic society, then, becomes all the more notable, given the fact that the women members remained for the duration of the meal, and participated fully in the worship liturgy.

Given that the evidence for Jewish meal practice seems to correspond to that of their Greco-Roman contemporaries, it is also not surprising that discussions of women and women's roles in Jewish literature also reflect the recurrent ideology governing the participation of women in banquet settings. Due to the sensuality connected with banquet settings, women present at such events would be targets for sexual advances, and so Sirach warns Jewish men against sitting next to women at banquets, and Philo is careful to de-sex the *Therapeutrides* and emphasize their chastity. At the Passover Seder, women are required to recline next to their husbands, rather than allowed to recline willy-nilly next to any man present. Even for Philo, the stererotypical female who attends dinner parties with men is a whore. Here in *The Sacrifices of Abel and Cain* he contrasts virtue (ἀρετή) to pleasure (ἡδονή) and uses the two images of the party-going prostitute and the respectable matron for his comparison:

> So pleasure comes languishing in the guise of a harlot (πόρνη) or courtesan (χαμαιτύπη). Her gait has the looseness which her extravagant wantonness and luxury has bred . . . her costly raiment is broidered lavishly with flowers . . . a strumpet of the streets she makes the marketplace her home. . . .[230]

Pleasure offers many things to those who pursue her, including:

> Sweet modulations of melodious sounds, costly kinds of food and drink, abundant varieties of delicious perfumes, amours without ceasing, frolics unregulated, chamberings unrestricted, language unrepressed, deeds uncensored, life without care, sleep soft and sweet, satiety ever filled. . . . I will join you in considering what food and drink would charm your palate, what

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may have been post-menopausal, rather than never-married virgins; Smith ("Table Fellowship," p. 616, n. 9) also comments that the presence of women in the meals of the Therapeutic society would be a point of comparison of their meals with those of the Greeks.

[229] Kraemer, p. 349.

[230] *Sac.* 21-22. Text and translation by F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker, *Philo*, v. 2 (LCL; London: William and Heinemann Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 107-113.

> sight would please your eyes, what sounds your ears, what perfume your nostrils.[231]

Virtue, on the other hand, who is "hidden from sight," yet within earshot, comes forward:

> with all the marks of a free-born citizen, a firm tread, a serene countenance, her person and her modesty alike without false colouring . . . her movements quiet, her clothing plain, her adornment that of good sense and virtue. And in her company came piety, holiness, truth, justice, religion, fidelity to oaths and bonds . . . continence, meekness, a quiet temper . . . . Ranged on each side with her in their midst, they formed her body-guard.[232]

Like other writers in the first century, Philo compares the ideal matron to the far from ideal courtesan. The courtesan is a "public" woman, an inhabitant of the streets, who is known for her flashy clothing, and association with revelry. The ideal matron, however, is hidden from sight, modest, quiet, plainly clothed, and does not go out unescorted.[233] That Philo categorizes women in this manner is not unexpected, given the fact that he, like other writers of the Greco-Roman world, held to the public/private dichotomy as far as womens' roles were concerned.[234] Marketplaces and council-halls were the domain of men, not respectable women, who were instead better suited for the indoor life.[235] A respectable woman:

> should not be a busybody, meddling with matters outside her household concerns, but should seek a life of seclusion. She should not shew herself off like a vagrant in the streets before the eyes of other men, except when she has to go to the temple, and even then she should take pains to go, not when the the market is full, but when most people have gone home, and so like a free-born lady, worthy of the name, with everything quiet around her, make her oblations. . . .[236]

Philo goes on to chasten women who argue with men in the streets, even those who do so in order to assist in the arguments of their husbands. From these remarks we may surmise that there were certain women of Philo's community who were behaving in a way that Philo felt was inappropriate.[237] Elsewhere Philo suggests that women were indeed secluded in Jewish households,[238] but Philo's own comments here, as well as documentary evidence to the contrary, undermine his description

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[231] *Sac.* 22-24.

[232] *Sac.* 26-27.

[233] During the Roman period, well-bred women rarely went out unescorted. At the least, they would take along a female slave. Veyne comments that the custom of requiring this "mobile prison" was the Roman equivalent of the Greek *gynecaeum* (Veyne, p. 73) and in fact had the same result: the isolation of women.

[234] Kraemer, p. 355-356.

[235] *Spec. Leg.* 3.169ff. Text and translation by F. H. Colson, *Philo*, v. 7 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1968), pp. 581-583.

[236] *Spec. Leg.* 3.170-71.

[237] Kraemer, pp. 355-56.

[238] *Flacc.* 89; Kraemer, p. 356.

of the Jewish community at Alexandria.[239] It is not unreasonable to assume that Philo saw those matrons who overstepped their private roles and entered the public realm of men as acting like the courtesan he describes in *The Sacrifices of Abel and Cain*, who is associated with public places and public banquets. Like other writers during the Roman period, then, Philo uses the contrast between the ideal matron and the courtesan to try to influence the behavior of those women in his community who were overstepping their womanly roles.

The Jewish materials therefore also fit well into the context of Greco-Roman ideology governing the participation of women in formal meals, and reflect a conflict between the actual meal practices of Greco-Roman women, and the ideology surrounding such practices. Central to this ideology is the continued association of sexuality with banquet settings and the connection between prostitutes and banquet revelry. Such ideology served to limit somewhat the actual participation of women in public meals, and rhetoric emphasizing the connection of free behavior with meretricious behavior could be used against those women who overstepped ideal womanly roles, and might have little to do with their actual social status or true occupation. Women in various religious groups had such accusations of sexual promiscuity leveled against them.

But what about the women around Jesus or the women in the Jesus movements? Were these women really prostitutes, i.e., women who made their living by exchanging sex for money? First of all, nowhere in the gospel tradition is it explicitly mentioned that Jesus was known for eating with prostitutes per se. The one reference to τελῶναι καὶ πόρναι occurs in Mt 21:31, where Jesus tells his opponents that "tax-collectors and prostitutes" will get into the Kingdom of God before they do. The phrase that is connected with Jesus' banquet company is rather τελῶναι καὶ ἁμαρτωλοί. This tradition is early, as it occurs in Q (7:34) as well as in Mark (2:15-16) and is taken over by the later evangelists Matthew (9:10ff.; 11:19) and Luke (5:27ff.; 7:34ff.; 15:15).

The connection τελῶναι καὶ ἁμαρτωλοί with Greco-Roman banquet imagery is clear, however, as in Q Jesus' table company is linked to banquet revelry, as Jesus is also accused of being a "wine-bibber" (οἰνοπότης) and a glutton (φάγος), while in Mark Jesus is accused of eating with such people (ἐσθίω) (and perhaps with drinking with them as well [πίνω], but the reading is questionable). There are several reasons to include prostitutes in the image these accusations are meant to invoke. Given the matrix of ideas surrounding the literary setting of a banquet in Greco-Roman literature, the image created by such a phrase would probably still include prostitutes of various sorts. Moreover, tax collectors, as stereotypically despicable people, were indeed connected in Greco-Roman rhetoric to those who trafficked in prostitution, particularly to brothel keepers. Finally, the paradigmatic "sin" in much of Greco-Roman literature usually involved sexual immorality, particularly on the part of women, who were always first accused of unchastity whenever they failed morally or overstepped their ideal roles.[240] Thus, when Cicero is attempting to thoroughly malign Verres,[241] he paints a rhetorical picture of his degenerate behavior at banquets with lewd women. "Sinners," would not necessarily include women

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[239] Kraemer, p. 356.

[240] Hock, pp. 35ff.; Dolores Osborne, "Women: Sinners and Prostitutes," (paper presented at the SBL Pacific Coast Region, Long Beach, CA, April, 1987).

[241] See n. 63 above.

"sinners," but one could argue that in the context of banquet imagery it would certainly evoke images at least of men who were known for eating and drinking with courtesans. This is borne out particularly in Luke, who most utilizes this image of Jesus' table company. For example, in Luke 15, after the Pharisees chide Jesus for the fact that τελῶναι καὶ ἁμαρτωλοί come to hear his teaching, Jesus tells the parable of the Prodigal Son, who is a wayward lad who wastes his father's money on "loose living" (ζῶν ἀσώτως) (v. 13) which includes squandering it on prostitutes (πόρναι) (v. 30). Moreover, it is more than likely that Luke is portraying the woman "sinner" in Luke 7 :36ff. ("a woman of the city," i.e. a "public woman") as a prostitute or at least as one guilty of sexual sin.[242] Matthew's shift to τελῶναι καὶ πόρναι (21:31), which may be redactional[243] is therefore understandable.

The accusation of Jesus eating with "tax-collectors and sinners" therefore has its roots in a common slur used rhetorically when one wanted to question the public morality of an individual, for whatever reason, and may have had little to do with the actual make-up of one's dining company or their actual behavior at meals, and should probably be seen as a rhetorical device used against Jesus by enemies among his contemporaries, and not necessarily indicative of any social reality. Even Matthew uses τελώνης in this pejorative way in 18:17, where he instructs his community to treat one not living according to his standards as a "tax collector and a Gentile." Τελῶναι καὶ ἁμαρτωλοί would therefore not necessarily be descriptive of either the actual participants at the meals of Jesus, or the women known to follow him. This raises the question as to what extent such a slur may or may not have been true when leveled against either the women followers of Jesus, or the women in the Jesus movements. Were these women in fact likely to have been deserving of such a slur? Given the recent discussion locating the Jesus movements, and perhaps Jesus himself more firmly within the larger Hellenistic milieu of Greco-Roman antiquity,[244] the Hellenistic evidence, Jewish as well as Greco-Roman, suggests that they may not have deserved it.

First of all, the definition of a "prostitute" was by no means limited to those women who earned their living by selling their bodies on the streets, or even to those who lived lives of high class "call girls." In fact, various types of women from diverse social classes would have been classified as being sexually available to more than one man, particularly women who were slaves, freedwomen or legal concubines. Moreover, even "respectable" women who exercised a degree of sexual freedom or who were seen by others as overstepping ideal societal roles could also be maligned as "prostituting" themselves or be accused of meretricious behavior. This was particularly the case when it came to women who were known for dining with those not of their immediate family, or without their husbands. Therefore, the accusation that several of the women known to follow Jesus and perhaps frequent his table were "prostitutes" may not have been grounded in social reality and may not tell us anything about their true occupations.

Several things remain troubling, in view of the earliness and longevity of this accusation against Jesus and his followers. First of all, given the pejorative nature of such an accusation, why was such a slur carried over into the gospel tradition?

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[242] Osborne, "Women: Sinners and Prostitutes."

[243] Robert H. Gundry, *Matthew: A Commentary on His Literary and Theological Art* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1982), p. 422.

[244] Mack, pp. 62-64; See also nts. 203-205 above.

What accounts for its longevity? Secondly, how and why did such an accusation become transformed into such a positive part of the self-understanding of various Christian groups? For example, a writer such as Luke found the accusation quite useful in his characterization of the early Jesus movement, which he now imagined in a romantic way, as a group made up of social outcasts, the poor, the lame and the downtrodden. Such a use would fit well into the utility of the banquet image itself during the Roman period as a way to imagine a romantically viewed past.[245] Finally, how are we to understand the way in which the Last Supper is portrayed in the gospels? Is the exclusion of women from these representations significant, and if so how?

But what of the women around Jesus? Who were they? Why were they attracted to the Jesus movement to begin with? Such questions may be unanswerable. At this point, the most we may surmise is that the women in these early Christian groups could have had diverse social backgrounds and could have come from various social classes. However, whether they were slaves or freedwomen, freeborn or married, Jewish or Gentile, they may have been equally undeserving of accusations of sexual promiscuity, as were other women who participated in other religions of their choice in the relative freedom of the early Empire. Moreover, certain distinctions in class or whether these women were Jewish or Gentile might also have made little difference in how they took their meals or whether they were excluded or not from various formal settings, as the ideology governing the participation of women in formal meals seems to have been constant and pervasive throughout the literature of the Greco-Roman period. Men from all sectors of Greco-Roman society sought to limit the participation of women in the public sphere, particularly when the relative freedom of women was viewed as threatening to the public order. Therefore, neither the inclusion or exclusion of early Christian women from meal settings nor the accusations of licentiousness leveled against them would necessarily differentiate nascent Christianity from its Hellenistic context, or from other religious movements of its time.

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[245] See Bendel, p. 58. Also personal correspondence with Dennis Smith, letter dated March 14, 1989.

Jesus' Action in the Temple and Evidence of Corruption in the First-Century Temple

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E. P. Sanders has recently argued that Jesus' action in the Temple was not a protest against dishonesty or improper religious polity, but a prophetic demonstration symbolizing the imminent destruction of the Temple.[1] Jesus' action came to be interpreted by the evangelists, as seen in Mark 11:15-17 and parallels, as a "cleansing" in order to tone down its militancy, a militancy which had begun to embarrass the early Church. In turning over the tables of the money-changers and in driving out a few of the sacrificial animals, Jesus intended to have his contemporaries understand that the Temple "made with hands" was about to be replaced with a Temple "not made with hands." Jesus' action, therefore, had nothing to do with corruption. In fact, Sanders goes on to say that he knows of no evidence of corruption in the first-century Temple.[2] Therefore, the traditional understanding that Jesus "cleansed" the Temple is unfounded and ought to be dropped.

Sanders's interpretation is certainly fresh and intriguing. But it is not, however, free from several difficulties. First, there is little evidence that the early Church, let alone the Marcan evangelist, was embarrassed over Jesus' critical stance toward the Temple. Second, there is evidence that there was significant enmity between Jesus and the Temple establishment. Third, there is no evidence whatsoever that a messiah or prophet or any other eschatological figure was expected to destroy the Temple as the necessary prelude to building a new one. The evidence that Messiah was expected to build a new Temple is itself poorly attested (especially for the pre-70 CE period), never mind build a new one when the old one was still standing, indeed, was undergoing expensive remodeling. Fourth, there is evidence that the first-century Temple establishment was widely regarded as corrupt and the Temple in need of purification. Fifth, and finally, there is evidence that some Palestinian Jews expected the Temple to be purified in the Eschaton, whether by the agency of the Messiah or by the agency of some other eschatological figure.

I have dealt with several aspects of these five difficulties in a previous publication.[3] In the present study I investigate more thoroughly the evidence that various groups in Jewish society, in Jesus' generation and in the generations that preceded and

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[1] E. P. Sanders, *Jesus and Judaism* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985) 61-76.

[2] Sanders, *Jesus and Judaism*, 367, n. 39.

[3] C. A. Evans, "Jesus' Action in the Temple: Cleansing or Portent of Destruction?" *CBQ* 51 (1989) 237-70. Other problems are raised in M. D. Hooker, "Traditions about the Temple in the Sayings of Jesus," *BJRL* 70 (1988) 7-19.

followed it, regarded the Temple establishment in various ways and to differing degrees as corrupt. This essay attempts to set forth this evidence and to probe the difficulties of assessing its relevance and meaning.

For centuries interpretation of the gospels' account of Jesus' action in the Temple has been marred, either by assuming without sufficient supporting evidence that the Temple establishment was thoroughly corrupt, or by the condescending assumption that Jesus and Christianity called for inner, heart-felt religion, as opposed to the external, ritualistic religion of Judaism. It is against the latter aspect that Sanders, in my judgment, has rightly complained. But with regard to the former aspect, Sanders errs in the opposite direction. He assumes without sufficient examination of the data that there is no evidence of corruption in the first-century Temple.

Evidence of Corruption in the First-Century Temple

Outside of the New Testament Gospels and other early Christian writings there is significant and, in my estimation, substantial evidence of corruption. This evidence is seen in Josephus, several Pseudepigraphal writings, Targumic traditions, and Rabbinic writings. My procedure is diachronic, moving from late to early materials. I shall examine (1) the relatively abundant post-70 CE traditions that reflect upon the first-century Temple, and then (2) the meager materials that specifically relate to the time of Jesus. The purpose here is not simply to catalogue and describe the evidence, but to study it comparatively and in context. My hope is that certain patterns or themes can be identified that will serve as an aid in identifying more accurately against whom criticisms are leveled, particularly with respect to Jesus' contemporaries.

I. Post-70 CE Reflection

Josephus. In addition to an interpretation of the Jewish catastrophe of 70, Josephus provides us with several items of information, some of which parallel other sources, which prove helpful to the present task. Although Josephus provides us with a fairly reliable account of the events of the first century, his biases must be taken into account. He tends to put the priestly aristocracy, as well as the Roman authorities, in a positive light. But he portrays charismatic leaders, prophets, and messianic claimants, who called for revolution, as impostors, deceivers, and brigands.[4] Nevertheless, although it is not his intention, Josephus does reveal things about the ruling priests that suggest that there was significant corruption.

In various places Josephus describes the opulence of the Temple and the incredible wealth of its treasury. He tells us that the building and its gates were overlaid with gold, and that over the entrance hung an enormous grape cluster ("as tall as a man") made of gold (*J.W.* 5.5.6 §222-224; 5.5.4 §210-211; *Ant.* 15.11.3 §395). He further reports that "no one need wonder that there was so much wealth in our Temple, for all the Jews throughout the habitable world, and those who worshipped God, even those from Asia and Europe, had been contributing to it for a very long time" (*Ant.* 14.7.2 §110; from §111 to §119 Josephus cites various ancient

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[4] This point has been recently underscored by R. A. Horsley and J. S. Hanson, *Bandits, Prophets, and Messiahs: Popular Movements at the Time of Jesus* (New Voices in Biblical Studies; Minneapolis: Winston, 1985).

historians who commented on the wealth of the Temple).[5] We are also told that "Crassus . . . carried off the money in the Temple, amounting to two thousand talents, which Pompey had left, and was prepared to strip the sanctuary of all its gold, which amounted to eight thousand talents" (*Ant.* 14.7.1 §105; see also 17.10.2 §264-265; *J.W.* 2.14.6 §293).[6] The families of the High Priests also possessed extraordinary wealth. Incredible sums were paid as dowries (*b. Ketub.* 66b) and allowances for perfumes and jewelry (*b. Yoma* 39b; *m. Kelim* 12:7; *m. Šab.* 6:5). The widows of High Priests were beneficiaries of extremely generous pensions, paid right out of the Temple treasury (*b. Ketub.* 65a, 66b; *Lam. Rab.* 1:50-51 [on 1:16]; *b. Git.* 56a). Obviously the mere fact of wealth does not prove the existence of corruption. But it does provide corroborating evidence, should other sources claim corruption.

From Josephus we also learn of the great political power of the Temple establishment. The Temple establishment and the Jewish ruling aristocracy were virtually one and the same, which in Josephus' opinion was ideal: "Could there be a finer or more equitable polity than one which sets God at the head of the universe, which assigns the administration of its highest affairs to the whole body of priests, and entrusts to the supreme High Priest the direction of the other priests? . . . for the appointed duties of the priests included general supervision, the trial of cases of litigation, and the punishment of condemned persons" (*Against Apion* 2.21 §185-187; see 2.22 §188).[7] Later, we are told that the High Priest used to "safeguard the laws, adjudicate in cases of dispute, [and] punish those convicted of crime. Any who disobey[ed] him . . . pay[ed] the penalty as for impiety towards God Himself" (2.23 §194).[8] The power of the ruling priests was by Roman design, for it was the best way to guarantee tranquility and taxation.[9] Again, such a political arrangement in itself is not evidence of corruption, but it certainly establishes a context in which political and economic abuses could flourish.

The High Priesthood in the Herodian/Roman period was dominated by four principal families (Boethus, Annas, Phabi, and Kamith). Although there was some rivalry between them, they were for the most part united in common purpose and polity. This unity, moreover, was also promoted through intermarriage (*Ant.* 17.6.4 §164 [Mattaiah, brother-in-law of Joazar]; John 18:13 [Caiaphas, son-in-law of Annas]; *Lam. Rab.* 1:50 [on 1:16] [Joshua ben Gamala, married to Martha, granddaughter of Boethus]). Although at the beginning of this period the family of Boethus was dominant, from the time of Annas (6-15 CE) on, the family of the latter

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[5] Translation from R. Marcus, *Josephus* (LCL 7; London: Heinemann, 1933) 505. See also 2 Macc 3:6: "The treasury in Jerusalem was full of untold sums of money, so that the amount of the funds could not be reckoned." Tacitus, the Roman historian, writes of Jerusalem: "In that place was a Temple of immense wealth" (*Hist.* 5.8.1).

[6] Translation from Marcus, *Josephus*, 503.

[7] Translation from H. St. J. Thackeray, *Josephus* (LCL 1; London: Heinemann, 1926) 367-69.

[8] Translation from Thackeray, *Josephus*, 371.

[9] See R. A. Horsley, "High Priests and the Politics of Roman Palestine," *JSJ* 17 (1986) 23-55, esp. 27-31; ibid, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence: Popular Jewish Resistance in Roman Palestine* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987) 9-15.

dominated. In fact, more than half of the 70 year history of the first century high priesthood was in the hands of the family of Annas.

It is also clear from Josephus that the Temple establishment got along fairly well with the Roman government. Richard Horsley has concluded that the four principal priestly families that controlled the Temple establishment of the first century CE "maintained a fairly consistent policy and practice of collaboration in the Roman system," especially so prior to the 40's.[10] Again, this is not evidence of corruption, but it does make it easy to understand how bitter resentment toward the ruling priesthood could develop. Indeed, such resentment did develop, manifesting itself in an especially violent manner when at the outset of war with Rome the rebels gained control of Jerusalem. The followers of Menahem, one of those who claimed messianic status (*J.W.* 2.17.8 §434), burned the house of Ananias the High Priest (2.17.6 §426). The priest himself was eventually caught and killed (2.17.9 §441). This was one of several acts of violence directed against the Jewish ruling aristocracy.[11] Evidence of economic oppression is seen in the burning of the Temple archives, containing the records of debts (*J.W.* 2.17.6 § 426-427).[12]

Bribery and violence at times characterized the Temple establishment's rule, especially in the 50's and 60's. Josephus tells us that former High Priest Ananias enhanced his reputation by supplying people (such as the newly-appointed Roman governor Albinus) with money. We are also told that when Jesus ben Gamaliel (=Joshua ben Gamala) gained the high priesthood (through bribery according to *b. Yebam.* 61a; *b. Yoma* 18a), a feud arose between the latter and his predecessor: "Ananias, however, kept the upper hand by using his wealth to attract those who were willing to receive bribes" (*Ant.* 20.9.4 §213).[13] Josephus himself was victimized by bribes accepted by the High Priest Ananus (*Life* 38-39 §193-196).

Describing the 50's and 60's, Josephus reports that the chief priests sent their servants to take by force the tithes from lower-ranking priests, "beating those who refused to give," with the result that some of the poorer priests starved to death (*Ant.* 20.8.8 §181, 20.9.2 §206-207; cf. rabbinic traditions below). Josephus also tells us that the High Priest Ananus, son of Annas (Luke 3:2), plotted the death of James, the brother of Jesus, and a few others during the interim following the death of the Roman governor Festus but preceding the arrival of Albinus, his replacement (*Ant.* 20.9.1 §197-200).

Josephus believes that Jerusalem and her Temple were destroyed because of Israel's gross sin and folly, and that the Temple was burned and leveled as a purification. The murders committed in the very precincts, indeed in one instance at the very altar, of the Temple constituted the most grievous of this sin (*Ant.* 20.8.5 §166; *J.W.* 4.5.2 §323). But Josephus does not regard the priestly establishment itself as corrupt, or as responsible for Jerusalem's destruction. The sinners were not the

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[10] Horsley, "High Priests," 31. See Josephus (*Ant.* 18.1.1 §3) where the High Priest Joazar persuades the Jews to cooperate with the Roman census of 6 CE.

[11] Horsley, "High Priests," 54: "In Jerusalem itself the aristocracy were regularly suspected of planning to surrender the city or to desert to the Romans. Thus they were either confined or executed for treason by the popular forces which had taken control of the city." See also Horsley and Hanson, *Bandits*, 223-29.

[12] See Horsley, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence*, 252-53.

[13] Translation from L. H. Feldman, *Josephus* (LCL 9; London: Heinemann, 1965) 503.

ruling priests, but the rabble who had called for liberation from Rome, and who had murdered many of the Jewish aristocrats who had opposed them. Others assessed these events differently.

Pseudepigraphal Writings. Several first and second-century CE pseudepigraphal writings reflect upon the tragedy of 70. Most of these writings blame Israel as a whole, or at least give no clear indication that one group is more culpable than another. According to the *Ladder of Jacob* 5:8-9 (late first-century), the patriarch is told: "And around the property of your forefathers a palace will be built, a temple in the name of your God and of (the God) of your fathers, and in the provocations of your children it will become deserted."[14] After seeing the destruction of the Temple, Abraham asks God why this has happened. He is told (*Apocalypse of Abraham* 27:7): "Listen, Abraham, all that you have seen will happen on account of your seed who will (continually) provoke me because of the body [cf. 25:1,5] which you saw and the murder in what was depicted in the Temple of jealousy, and everything you saw will be so" (late first, early second-century).[15] An interpolation in *Life of Adam and Eve* (in several MSS following 29:3) reads: "and again they will build a house of God, and the latest house of God shall be exalted more highly than before. And once again iniquity will surpass equity" (late first century).[16] Lack of equity implies criticism of the rulers, as opposed to the people in general. According to Pseudo-Philo's *Biblical Antiquities* 19:6-7 (first century) God revealed to Moses that Israel will forget His Law and be deceived, the result of which will be the destruction of their place of worship.[17] Large portions of 4 Ezra (i.e., 2 Esdras 3-14) are given over to lament for the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple. Writing *circa* 100 (cf. 3:1), the author wonders why God would allow Rome (see chaps. 11-12) to destroy God's dwelling place (see chap. 10, esp. vv 7, 20-23, 45, 48). The author concludes that the disaster was the result of Israel's sin (6:19; 7:72; 8:26-31; 9:32, 36; 14:31). Finally, according to *Sib. Or.* 4:115-118 (to be dated to just after 80 CE): "An evil storm of war will also come upon Jerusalem from Italy, and it will sack the great Temple of God, whenever they put their trust in folly and cast off piety and commit repulsive murders in front of the Temple."[18]

In one writing at least, however, the priesthood itself is directly blamed for the catastrophe. Lamenting the fate of Jerusalem, Baruch says: "You, priests, take the

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[14] Translation from H. G. Lunt, "Ladder of Jacob," in J. H. Charlesworth, ed., *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha* (2 vols.; Garden City: Doubleday, 1983-85) 2.409.

[15] Translation from R. Rubinkiewicz, "Apocalypse of Abraham," in *Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, 1.702. The description in chap. 27 of the destruction of the Temple is in reference to the Second Temple, and is part of the "early Jewish stratum" (p. 683). See also 25:4-5.

[16] Translation from M. D. Johnson, "Life of Adam and Eve," in *Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, 2.270, n. 29b.

[17] It is possible that the First Temple is in mind, for it is not known if *Biblical Antiquities* was written before or after 70 CE. See D. J. Harrington, "Pseudo-Philo," in *Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, 2.327, n. i.

[18] Translation from J. J. Collins, "The Sibylline Oracles," in *Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, 1.387. The references to folly, casting off piety, and committing murders are to the Jews, not to the Romans (*pace* Collins, p. 387, n. w).

keys of the sanctuary, and cast them to the highest heaven, and give them to the Lord and say, 'Guard your house yourself, because, behold, we have been found to be false stewards'" (*2 Bar* 10:18).[19] Although ostensibly describing the destruction of the First Temple, the author of this early second-century pseudepigraphon is describing the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE (cf. 1:4; 32:2-4).[20] It is significant that the priests are characterized as "false stewards," a characterization that coheres with some of Jesus' parables (cf. Matt 24:45-51 par; Mark 12:1-9 par; Luke 16:1-8). The same tradition appears in *4 Baruch* (early second century): "But Jeremiah, taking the keys of the Temple, went outside of the city and, facing the sun, he tossed them, saying, 'I say to you, sun, take the keys of the Temple of God and keep them until the day in which the Lord will question you about them. Because we were not found worthy of keeping them, for we were false stewards'" (4:4-5; see rabbinic parallels below).[21] *4 Baruch* is probably dependent on *2 Baruch*,[22] in which case the idea that it was specifically *the priests* (as opposed to the people in general) who were false stewards is original. In reference to Jerusalem, Baruch is warned: "I am going to destroy it for the multitude of the sins of those who inhabit it" (1:1, 8).

Targumic Tradition. The Targums also yield some evidence, principally from Targum Jonathan to the Prophets, that the first-century Temple establishment was remembered as corrupt. This is seen especially in 1 Samuel, Isaiah, and Jeremiah.

1 Samuel. Containing traditions that antedate, as well as post-date, the destruction of the Second Temple,[23] *Tg. 1 Samuel* yields some significant evidence of the belief that the priests of the Second Temple were regarded as corrupt. Chapter 2 contains many editorial insertions and expansions of an apocalyptic nature. Hannah's Song of Praise (vv 1-10) is transformed, in the Targum, into an apocalypse. She foresees Sennacherib's siege of Jerusalem (v 2), Nebuchadnezzar (v 3), the kingdoms of Greece (v 4), Mordecai and Esther (v 5a), Rome (v 5b), eschatological judgment of wicked and righteous (vv 6-10ab), and the appearance of the Messianic Kingdom (v 10c). The apocalyptic orientation of the narrative, however, does not end with Hannah's Song. In the verses that follow the sins of the sons of Eli the priest are described. We are told that they "robbed the sacrifices of the Lord" (v 17; Heb: "treated the sacrifices of the Lord with contempt"). They are later asked: "Why are you robbing my holy sacrificial offering and my offering that I appointed to offer before me in my temple?" (v 29; Heb: "Why do you kick at my sacrifices and offerings that I commanded?").[24] It is likely that the sons of Eli are to be understood as

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[19] Translation from A. F. J. Klijn, "2 (Syriac Apocalypse of) Baruch," in *Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, 1.624. There were literal keys of the Temple (cf. Josephus, *Against Apion* 2.8 §108), but they also had taken on a symbolic value (see also Matt 16:19; Rev 3:7). Further references are considered below.

[20] Klijn, "2 Baruch," 615-18.

[21] Translation from S. E. Robinson, "4 Baruch," in *Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, 2.418, 419.

[22] Klijn, "2 Baruch," 620; Robinson, "4 Baruch," 416-17.

[23] See D. J. Harrington and A. J. Saldarini, *Targum Jonathan of the Former Prophets* (Aramaic Bible 10; Wilmington: Glazier, 1987) 13.

[24] Harrington and Saldarini, *Former Prophets*, 107.

examples of the priesthood of the Second Temple, if not the priesthood of the first century (as in fact is the case in *b. Pesah.* 57a). The prophecy of the demise of Eli's sons and family gives way, in v 32, to a prediction of the demise of the Temple establishment: "And you will be seeing the sorrow that will come upon the men of your house because of the sins that you have sinned in my Temple. And afterwards prosperity will come over Israel" (Heb: "Then in distress you will look with envious eye on all the prosperity which shall be bestowed on Israel").[25] It is likely that the meturgeman is here alluding to the first-century priesthood, the priesthood that was destroyed. This is likely the case in light of the promise in v 35 to raise up a faithful priest who will serve the Messiah: "I will raise up before Me a trustworthy priest, who will minister according to my word, my will, and I will establish for him an enduring kingdom and he will serve my Messiah all the days" (Heb: "I will raise up for myself a faithful priest . . . and I will build him a sure house, and he shall go in and out before my anointed for ever").[26] After the corrupt priesthood has been swept away in judgment, a new and faithful priesthood will be established in the Eschaton.

Isaiah. There are at least three major passages in the Isaiah Targum where criticism is directed against the first-century priesthood. The first example is seen in the rewriting of Isaiah's Song of the Vineyard (5:1-7), where the focus has been narrowed from a threat against Judah at large to a threat against the Temple establishment. In place of the Hebrew text's "tower" and "wine press," the Targum reads "sanctuary" and "altar," respectively (v 2). Because of the moral failing of the ruling priests, God will destroy the "sanctuaries" and the altar.[27] This interpretive tradition carries over into the rabbinic literature, where the tower is specifically identified as the Temple, and the wine press the altar (*t. Me'ila* 1:16; *t. Sukka* 3:15).[28]

The second example is Isa 28:1-13, which has been paraphrased to reflect the leadership of the Herodian Temple.[29] Whereas the Hebrew of v 1 reads, "Woe to . . . the fading flower of its glorious beauty," the Targum reads, "Woe to . . . the foolish master of Israel [who] gives the headgear to the wicked of the sanctuary."

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[25] Harrington and Saldarini, *Former Prophets,* 108.

[26] Harrington and Saldarini, *Former Prophets,* 108. It is, of course, possible that none other than David and Zadok are in view (as is likely the case in the Hebrew). But judging by Hannah's apocalypse and the redaction of vv 17, 29 and 32 (including an explicit reference to the Temple), thus making the sins of the priests in Samuel's time conform more closely to those of the first-century priests, it is likely that here also the meturgeman is thinking of some future righteous priest who will faithfully serve the Messiah (compare also *Tg. Zech* 6:13); Chilton, *The Glory of Israel: The Theology and Provenience of the Isaiah Targum* (JSOTSup 23; Sheffield: JSOT, 1983) 23-24; S. H. Levey, *The Messiah: An Aramaic Interpretation* (MHUC 2; Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion, 1974) 36.

[27] Chilton (*Glory of Israel,* 18) is probably correct when he notes that the plural "sanctuaries" refers to the Temple and the synagogues.

[28] Chilton, *A Galilean Rabbi and His Bible: Jesus' Use of the Interpreted Scripture of His Time* (Wilmington: Glazier, 1984) 113. The Temple was referred to as a "tower" prior to the first century CE (cf. *1 Enoch* 89:56-67). See Mark 12:1-9 where Jesus criticizes the ruling priests, making use of this very passage from Isaiah.

[29] Chilton, *Glory of Israel,* 20, 23; ibid, *Isaiah Targum,* 55-57 (and notes).

The "foolish master" (i.e., the High Priest) will be trampled by the Romans (v 3).[30] In his place will arise the Lord's Messiah who will make the "house of judgment" (i.e., the Temple and/or the Sanhedrin) pass "true judgment" (vv 5-6). Similarly in 42:7 it is anticipated that Messiah will "open the eyes of the house of Israel, who have been blind to the Torah" (Heb: "to open blind eyes").[31] The first century priests and scribes have gone astray, not one of them is "innocent of oppression" (28:7-8). In vv 10-13 the meturgeman goes on to criticize the priests for disregarding the Law and for holding the Temple in contempt. This is probably the idea in 53:5, where Messiah "shall build the Temple, which was profaned because of our sins, and which was surrendered because of our iniquities."[32] The reference to "the service of idols" (28:10) is likely hyperbolic ("referring to cooperation with Gentile power"[33]), and is an attempt to criticize the first-century Temple establishment as sharply as possible.

The third example is seen in the oracle concerning the faithful priest Eliakim (Isa 22:20), who becomes in the Isaiah Targum a portrait of Israel's tragedy. Although he is "exalted" (v 20), and is appointed a "faithful officer ministering in an enduring place" (v 23; the Hebrew reads, "And I will fasten him like a peg in a sure place"), and into his hand is placed "the key of the sanctuary and the authority of the house of David" (v 22; the MT reads, "And I will place on his shoulder the key of the house of David"), he nevertheless "will be cut down and fall, and the oracle of the prophecy that was concerning him will be void" (v 25).[34] It is possible that the positive elements of the Eliakim oracle (vv 20-24) derive from the period before 70 CE, while the negative elements of v 25 reflect disillusionment following the destruction of the Temple.[35] In fact, it appears that most of the content in chaps. 22-24, according to Bruce Chilton, has been rewritten in view of the Roman defeat, with the criticisms leveled chiefly at the "Temple hierarchy" (see *Tg. Isa* 17:11: "you forsook my service . . . you put off . . . repentance"; 24:5: "annulled the feasts"; 24:6: "deceit" [cf. 5:23]).[36]

Jeremiah. In *Tg. Jer* 7:9 the religious leaders are explicitly called "thieves." In 23:11 the Targum accuses the priests of having "stolen their ways," instead of being "ungodly," as the Hebrew text reads. Frequently the Targum pejoratively refers to "scribe and priest," instead of "prophet and priest," as in the Hebrew text. On other occasions they are called "robbers of money" (8:10; 6:13: "robbers of wealth"). The reference to scribe and priest is noteworthy, for these are the very persons who take exception to Jesus' action in the Temple (see Mark 11:18). Commercialism seems to be the point behind the subtle change in *Tg. Jer* 14:18: "both scribe and priest

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[30] *Tg. Isa* 29:1 probably alludes to the Roman siege and destruction of Jerusalem, while *Tg. Isa* 25:2 seems to reflect the confidence and hope in the period between the two Jewish wars. See Chilton, *Glory of Israel,* 130, n.10; ibid, *The Isaiah Targum* (Aramaic Bible 11; Wilmington: Glazier, 1987) 57 (and notes).

[31] Levey, *The Messiah,* 60.

[32] Levey, *The Messiah,* 64.

[33] Chilton, *Glory of Israel,* 23.

[34] Translation from Chilton, *Isaiah Targum,* 44-45.

[35] See Chilton, *Glory of Israel,* 19; ibid, "Shebna, Eliakim, and the Promise to Peter," in J. Neusner, P. Borgen, et al., eds., *The Social World of Formative Christianity and Judaism* (H. C. Kee Festschrift; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988) 311-26.

[36] Chilton, *Isaiah Targum,* 36, 42-48.

devote themselves to trade" (MT: "both prophet and priest ply their trade"). In reference to coming judgment, *Tg. Jer* 23:33 says that the scribe and priest will be driven out (instead of being cast off, as it is in the Hebrew). The thrust of the passage seems to be directed primarily at the religious leaders (and not at the people, as it is in the Hebrew).[37] Robert Hayward suspects that these criticisms, which coincide with similar ones found in the writings of Josephus and Qumran, reflect attitudes in Palestine before 70 CE.[38]

There are other hints in the targumic tradition that are worth noting. In a messianic paraphrase, *Frag. Tg. Gen* 49:12 predicts the appearance of a Messiah who is pure "according to the Halakah, refraining from partaking of that which is taken by violence or robbery."[39] According to Deut 16:19, Israel's judges were not to accept bribes. *Frag. Tg. Deut* 16:19, however, reads, "you shall not take a monetary bribe." *Tg. Ezek* 22:26 claims that the priests "misinterpret" the Law (MT: the priests "have done violence" to the Law). This complaint may allude to the priests' interpretation of Lev 6:23, whereby they excused themselves from paying the Temple tax, and to Deut 14:22-23, whereby they excused themselves from paying tithes (see below). All of these traditions resemble the criticisms directed at the high priesthood of the first century. Finally, the eschatological hope for the appearance of "Elijah the High Priest" (*Tg. Ps.-J. Exod* 40:10; *Tg. Ps.-J. Deut* 30:4; *Tg. Lam* 4:22) may constitute an implied criticism of the priesthood of the Second Temple.

Tannaitic Traditions. On one occasion R. Simeon ben Gamaliel (*ca.* 10-80 CE) vigorously protested, because the price of a pair of doves had been raised to one gold denar, a price some twenty-five times the proper charge (*m. Ker.* 1:7). It should be remembered that the dove was the poor man's sacrifice (Lev 5:7; 12:8). Such a charge would be bitterly resented. In this instance, however, Simeon's protest apparently brought about an immediate reduction in the charge. R. Johanan ben Zakkai (first century CE) condemned the priests' claim that they were exempt from the half-shekel temple tax: "If a priest did not pay the shekel he committed sin; but the priests used to expound this scripture [i.e., Lev 6:23] to their advantage . . ." (*m. Seq.* 1:4).[40] It was "in the interests of peace" that no one insisted that the priests pay the tax. This statement probably alludes to the violence sometimes suffered by those who opposed the ruling priests. Horsley avers that the "half-shekel tax was almost certainly a late development in second Temple times, and its payment was controversial at the time of Jesus."[41] Such controversy is likely what lies behind Matt

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[37] R. Hayward, *The Targum of Jeremiah* (Aramaic Bible 12; Wilmington: Glazier, 1987) 37. He observes Targum Jeremiah frequently criticizes the priests: they are accused of robbery, being overly concerned about money, failing to enquire of God or showing compasison for the sick, and of having lack of concern for the people.

[38] Hayward, *Jeremiah,* 37-38, cf. 101, n. 14 (on 18:18), 189, n. 38 (on 51:53).

[39] Levey, *The Messiah,* 11. Reflecting a similar tradition, *Tg. Ps.-J.* Gen 49:12 says that the Messiah "will not tolerate as food that which is seized by force or taken by robbery" (Levey, p. 9).

[40] Translation based on H. Danby, *The Mishnah* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1933) 152.

[41] Horsley, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence,* 280, and 345, n. 7. See also S. Freyne, *Galilee from Alexander the Great to Hadrian* (Wilmington: Glazier, 1980) 277-81; W. Horbury, "The Temple Tax," in E. Bammel and C. F. D. Moule, eds., *Jesus and the Politics of His Day* (Cambridge: CUP, 1984) 265-86.

17:24-27, and perhaps also 4Q159 (which if true, then apparently the Qumran community also took exception to the tax).[42]

There is also Tannaitic tradition claiming that the family of Annas did not tithe their produce, and for this reason their property was destroyed three years before the rest of Israel. Their refusal to tithe was apparently based on an exegesis of Deut 14:22-23, an exegesis for which the rabbis had little sympathy (*Sipre Deut* §105 [on 14:22]). A similar tradition is found in *y. Pe'a* 1:6 and *b. B. Mes.* 88a-b. It is possible that the addition in *Tg. Isa* 5:10 ("because of the sin that they did not give the tithes") alludes to this failure to tithe. Apparently the high priestly families profitted in ways that the rabbis considered at best questionable (*m. Šeq.* 4:3-4) and at other times clearly oppressive (*Sipre Deut* §357 [on 34:1, 3]; *Mek., Amalek* 2 §83-87).[43]

The Tannaitic rabbis also preserve tradition, in part corroborated by Josephus (as noted above), that the office of High Priest was often secured through bribery. Commenting on Lev 16:3 ("with this shall Aaron come"), R. Berekiah (second century CE) is reported to have said: "But the verse [i.e., Lev 16:3] does not apply to the Second Temple [as it does to the First Temple], because in its time the priests used to outbid one another for the office of High Priest, so that there were eighty High Priests who served (in disorderly succession) in the Temple. Hence the first part of the verse, 'The fear of the Lord prolongs days' (Prov 10:27a), applies to the priests of the First Temple, and the conclusion of the verse, 'the years of the wicked shall be shortened' (Prov 10:27b), applies to the priests of the Second Temple" (*Pesiq. R.* 47:4).[44] The same tradition also appears in *Lev. Rab.* 21:9 (on 16:3), with a slight variation: "In the Second Temple, however, because they used to obtain the office of High Priest for money, or, as some say, because they used to kill each other by means of witchcraft . . . "[45] It is likely that this tradition particularly has in mind the Herodian/Roman period, for some 28 High Priests (only two of which were from families that had any legitimate claim) held office in little more than one century (from 37 BCE to 70 CE).

Early Amoraic Traditions. According to early Amoraic traditions, the High Priests of the first century were always wealthier than the other priests. The High Priest was expected "to be greater than his brethren in beauty, strength, wealth, wisdom,

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[42] For more on the Temple tax see Exod 30:13; 2 Chr 24:5; Neh 10:32; Philo, *Special Laws* 1.14 §77-78; *Heirs* 38 §186; Josephus, *War* 6.6.2 §335; 7.6.6 §218; *Ant.* 14.7.2 §110; 16.2.3 §28; 16.6.2-7 §163-173; 18.9.1 §312-313; *m. Šeq.* 1:3; 4:1-2.

[43] See R. Hammer, *Sifre: A Tannaitic Commentary on the Book of Deuteronomy* (Yale Judaica 24; New Haven and London: Yale University, 1986) 378 (and n. 4, p. 512), 380. Employing word-play, "Gilead" (Deut 34:1) is understood as a reference to Jerusalem; "Zoar" (34:3) is understood as a reference to the oppressive establishment in Israel.

[44] Translation based on W. G. Braude, *Pesikta Rabbati* (2 vols.; Yale Judaica 18; New Haven and London: Yale University, 1968) 2.808.

[45] Translation based on J. J. Slotki, *Midrash Rabbah: Leviticus* (London and New York: Soncino, 1983) 272. In this version R. Aha (third century CE) is given credit for the interpretation of Prov 10:27.

and good looks"; for this reason, the other priests on one occasion "filled up his woodshed with gold denars" (*t. Yoma* 1:6).[46]

The High Priests are accused of defiling the Temple: "'Depart hence, ye children of Eli,' for they defiled the Temple of the Lord" (*b. Pesah.* 57a). "Children of Eli" alludes to the evil sons of Eli, priest of Shiloh, who profited from the sacrifices, engaged in harlotry, and from those who resisted "they took it by force" (1 Sam 2:12-17). It was observed above that *Tg. 1 Samuel* 2 has rewritten the story of these sons, making their sins conform to those of which the first-century priesthood was thought guilty. The sentence, "they took it by force" (1 Sam 2:16), virtually functions as a refrain in the talmudic passage under consideration.

Although they are accused of many cultic violations, the most serious charge, so far as the present study is concerned, is that the High Priests took more than what was lawfully required. This is seen in a discussion of the distribution of the hides of the sacrificed animals. "At first did they bring the hides of Holy Things to the room of *bet happarvah* and divide them in the evening to each [priestly] household which served on that day. But the powerful men of the priesthood would come and take them by force. They ordained that they should divide it on Fridays to each and every watch. But still did violent men of the priesthood come and take it away by force. . . . Beams of sycamore were in Jericho. And strong-fisted men would come and take them by force" (*t. Menah.* 13:18-19; cf. *t. Zebah.* 11:16-17; *b. Pesah.* 57a).[47] Apparently the ruling priests (i.e., the "powerful men of the priesthood") were stealing the tithes (hides, in this case) to which the lower-ranking priests were entitled.[48] Because of this practice, it was not long "before the priests covered the face of the entire porch [of the Temple] with golden trays, a hundred by a hundred [handbreadths], with the thickness of a golden denar" (*t. Menah.* 13:18-19; cf. *b. Pesah.* 57a: "they covered the whole Temple with gold plaques a cubit square of the thickness of a gold denar"; *m. Šeq.* 4:4: "What did they do with the surplus of the heave offering? Golden plating for bedecking the Holy of Holies").[49]

In the passages under consideration, four sets of "woes" are recited concerning three of the four principal high-priestly families of the first century: "Concerning these and people like them . . . did Abba Saul ben Bithnith [first century CE] and Abba Joseph ben Johanan [first century CE?] of Jerusalem say, 'Woe is me because of the house of Boethus. Woe is me because of their staves. Woe is me because of the house of Kathros. Woe is me because of their pen. Woe is me because of the house of Hanin. Woe is me because of their whispering. Woe is me because of the house of Ishmael ben Phabi. For they are High Priests, and their sons [are]

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[46] Translation based on J. Neusner, *The Tosefta* (6 vols.; New York: Ktav, 1977-81) 2.186.

[47] Translation from Neusner, *Tosefta,* 5.161.

[48] It is probably against this inequity that *t. Yoma* 1:5 speaks: "But in the case of Holy Things . . . the High Priest and the ordinary priest are the same: each receives an equal portion." Translation based on Neusner, *Tosefta,* 2.186. Although the laws of the Pentateuch did not, with regard to the offerings and tithes, favor the ruling priests over the lower-ranking priests, from the time of Roman control the ruling priests had such control (Josephus, *Ant.* 14.10.6 §202-203 [44 BCE]).

[49] Translation from Neusner, *Tosefta,* 5.161. The talmudic quotation is from H. Freedman, "Pesahim," in I. Epstein, ed., *The Babylonian Talmud* (17 vols.; London: Soncino, 1935-48) 3.284; the mishnaic quotation is from Danby, *Mishnah,* 156.

treasurers, and their sons-in-law [are] supervisors, and their servants come and beat us with staves" (*t. Menah.* 13:21; cf. *b. Pesah.* 57a; see also *t. Zebah.* 11:16-17; *y. Ma'as. Š.* 5:15).[50] Greed, nepotism,[51] oppression, and violence, according to these rabbinic traditions, characterized the leading aristocratic priestly families. "Boethus" is probably the lower-ranking priest from Alexandria, mentioned by Josephus in Ant. 15.9.3 §320, who gave his daughter Mariamme to Herod as wife, and whose son Simon, in return, Herod appointed High Priest (22-5 BCE). The rabbis lament his family's "staves," with which they beat people. This lament, however, is also expressed in regard to the other families, as the concluding line quoted above indicates. (From Josephus, moreover, we learn that the beatings were not perpetrated by the family of Boethus alone [*Ant.* 20.8.8 §181 ; 20.9.2 §207].) The identity of "Kathros" is less certain. He may be the "Simon Cantheras," son of Boethus, of *Ant.* 19.6.2 §297 and 19.6.4 §313, who served as High Priest (41 CE). The rabbis lament his family's pen, "with which they wrote their evil decrees."[52] "Hanin" is none other than Annas of the New Testament (Luke 3:2; John 18:13, 24; Acts 4:6), who served as High Priest (6-15 CE) and whose five sons, a grandson, and son-in-law Caiaphas at various times served as High Priest (see *Ant.* 18.2.1 §26; 20.9.1 §198, where he is called Ananus). This family is particularly criticized by the rabbis (*Sipre Deut* §105 [on 14:22]; *y. Pe'a* 2:16; and possibly *m. Ker.* 1:7). In the present text, the rabbis lament his family's "whispering," by which they mean their secret conspiracies to effect "oppressive measures."[53] "Phabi" (or Phiabi) and his son "Ishmael" are mentioned in *Ant.* 18.2.2 §34. The family of Phabi is lamented by the rabbis (according to the parallel passage in *b. Pesah.* 57a) "because of their fists." Phabi's son Ishmael, the successor of Annas, served as High Priest (15-16 CE). Another Ishmael, son of Phabi II, served as High Priest (59-61 CE), and is specifically mentioned by Josephus as one of the High Priests whose servants beat the lower-ranking priests (*Ant.* 20.8.8 §179-181; see also 20.9.2 §207).

It is not likely that this rabbinic tradition has in mind only the excesses that took place in the years immediately preceding the war with Rome. The woes are pronounced against three of the principal families that served throughout the first century. The rabbis were also critical of the politics behind the appointment of the High Priests. "When [unacceptable] kings became many, they ordained the practice of regularly appointing priests, and they appointed High Priests every single year" (*t. Yoma* 1:7; cf. *Pesiq. R.* 47:4).[54] The passage goes on to describe the cultic violations and resulting death of one of the High Priests from the family of Boethus (1:8). Moreover, the gold plaques that covered the Temple may be related to the plates of gold that Josephus describes (*J.W.* 5.5.6 §222; cf. *m. Šeq.* 4:4). It is likely that the profiteering and extortion that resulted in the accumulation of so much gold

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[50] Translation based on Neusner, *Tosefta,* 5.161-62. The reading is modified slightly in light of the parallel passage in *b. Pesah.* 57a.

[51] The Temple treasurer and supervisor (or "captain") were second and third in authority to the High Priest himself. Tosefta's claim that these posts were awarded to relatives is confirmed by Josephus (*Ant.* 20.6.2 §131; 20.9.3 §208; cf. Acts 4:6).

[52] Freedman, "Pesahim," 285, n. 4.

[53] Freedman, "Pesahim," 285, n. 2.

[54] Translation from Neusner, *Tosefta,* 2.187. Tosefta's statement is hyperbolic. High Priests were not appointed "every single year" (cf. John 18:13). Some served less than a year, but most served for more than a year.

took years, and perhaps had something to do with the refurbishing of the Temple that continued throughout most of the first century.

According to the Tosefta tractate considered above, because of the greed and hatred of the powerful priestly families, the Second Temple was destroyed: "As to Jerusalem's first building, on what account was it destroyed? Because of idolatry and licentiousness and bloodshed which was in it. But [as to] the latter building we know that they devoted themselves to Torah and were meticulous about tithes. On what account did they go into exile? *Because they love money* and hate one another" (*t. Menah.* 13:22, my emphasis).[55] Whereas hating one another could refer to the bloody fighting between the rebel factions during the war, loving money undoubtedly refers to the greed of the high priestly families. Finally, echoing first-century tradition already cited, a rabbinic tradition reads: "This verse [Zech 11:1] refers to the High Priests who were in the Temple, who took their keys in their hands and threw them up to the sky, saying to the Holy One, blessed be He, "Master of the Universe, here are your keys which you handed over to us, for we have not been trustworthy stewards to do the King's work and to eat of the King's table" (*'Abot R. Nat.* A §4; see also B §7).[56]

All of this tradition, of course, is collected, preserved, and edited by the rabbis of a later time, whose criticisms may not always be justified nor accurately represent the facts. Nevertheless, even allowing for bias and exaggeration, there is no justification to regard it as wholsesale fabrication, for it comports well with what we find in the gospels and Josephus, and with many of the apocalyptic traditions considered above.

II. Tradition Specifically Reflecting the Time of Jesus

There is little material that can be assigned with any degree of certainty to the specific time of Jesus' adult life (i.e., the 20's and 30's). Our best historical source for the first century is, of course, Josephus, but his writings unfortunately say little about the 20's and 30's that is helpful for the present investigation. Some of the writings of Qumran, of course, may overlap with Jesus' time. Identifying those that do is not easily done. If some writings could be identified, to what extent they actually reflect Jesus' thinking is likewise uncertain. In the commentary on Habakkuk, and elsewhere, the High Priest is customarily referred to as the "Wicked Priest" (1QpHab 1:13; 8:9; 9:9; 11:4), who has robbed the poor (1QpHab 8:12; 9:5; 10:1; 12:10), has amassed wealth (1QpHab 8:8-12; 9:4-5), and has defiled the "Sanctuary of God" (1QpHab 12:8-9). Similarly, 4QpNah 1:11 refers to the "riches that he [the Wicked Priest?] heaped up in the Temple of Jerusalem." All these complaints certainly cohere closely with the criticisms and complaints that have been examined

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[55] Translation from Neusner, *Tosefta*, 5.162.

[56] Translation based on J. Goldin, *The Fathers according to Rabbi Nathan* (Yale Judaica 10; New Haven and London: Yale University, 1955) 37. This tradition is at times applied to the destruction of the First Temple, cf. *b. Ta'an.* 29a; *Lev. Rab.* 19:6 (on 15:25). It should be noted that comparison between the two Temples, their destructions, and the ensuing exiles, is not rare in the Targums and writings of the rabbis (see *Tg. Isa* 51:19; *Tg. Ezek* 24:6; *Tg. Ps.-J.* Gen 45:15; *t. Menah.* 13:22; *b. Ta'an.* 28b-29a; *Pesiq. R.* 47:4).

above. But do these criticisms refer to the first-century priesthood or to the Hasmonean priesthood of the last two centuries BCE? It is likely that the "Wicked Priest" originally did refer to a Hasmonean priest (whether Hyrcanus or someone else). Of course, because of its eschatological perspective, the first-century CE Qumran community may very well have understood the Habakkuk *pesher* to be referring to contemporary High Priests. If it was so understood, how representative was the Qumranian attitude toward Jerusalem's priestly aristocracy? Did Jesus share their attitude?[57]

The same thing can be said with regard to various pseudepigraphal writings. Although the original references may have been to figures and/or events of an earlier time (cf. *Jub.* 23:21 and *T. Levi* 14:1-6; 17:11, in reference to the second century BCE; *Pss. Sol. 17-18 and 1 Enoch* 89-90, in reference to the first-century BCE), later generations may have understood (and often probably did understand) their references to be to the "end times," that is, to their own respective times. There are at least three sources that directly relate to the time of Jesus.

Josephus and Philo. Other than referring to his appointment (*Ant.* 18.2.2 §35) and his dismissal (*Ant.* 18.4.3 §95), Josephus gives us little direct information about the High Priest Joseph Caiaphas, son-in-law of former High Priest Annas; Philo gives none. From Josephus we learn that Caiaphas was appointed by the Roman governor Valerius Gratus (16-26 CE) in either 18 or 19, held office throughout Pontius Pilate's administration (26-36), and was deposed by Vitellius in 36. From Josephus and Philo we learn of three outrages with significant religious implications that Pilate committed during the tenure of Caiaphas. First, Pilate brought into Jerusalem (and possibly into the Temple court) several busts of the emperor Tiberius (*Ant.* 18.3.1 §55-59; *J.W.* 2.9.2-3 §169-174). When the Jewish people discovered this, a "multitude" went to Pilate entreating him to remove the images, for such were contrary to their "laws" (i.e., Exod 20:4). Although at first he refused, the governor finally yielded. What is interesting is that the protest came from the people, not from Caiaphas or from any of the priestly aristocracy. Second, in making use of Temple funds to build an aqueduct in Jerusalem (itself probably not an offense, for Temple funds were often used for civic projects), Pilate apparently dipped into the "sacred treasury" reserved for the purchase of sacrificial animals (*Ant.* 18.3.2 §60-62; *J.W.* 2.9.4 §175-177). Again there is popular protest, but no mention of Caiaphas or, as one would surely expect in a case involving the treasury, the Temple treasurer. On this occasion Pilate did not yield, but had his soldiers beat and disperse the crowds. The third outrage committed by Pilate, according to Philo (*Embassy to Gaius* 38 §299-305), this time did provoke some of the ruling aristocracy to protest to Pilate. But their appeal to the governor seems more concerned with *preventing war,* rather than with the *religious concerns* to which the populace had given voice. Pilate's administration finally came to an end after he brutally quashed a Samaritan pilgrimage to Mount Gerazim (*Ant.* 18.4.1 §85-87). Vitellius, Legate of Syria, ordered Pilate back to Rome (*Ant.* 18.4.2 §88-90) and visited Jerusalem, where, "guided by [the Jewish] law," he returned the priestly vestments to the custody of the priests and deposed Caiaphas (*Ant.* 18.4.3 §90-95; elsewhere Vitellius shows

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[57] In my earlier study (Evans, "Jesus' Action in the Temple," 260-62), I suggested that Jesus may very well have held to an opinion approximating that of the Qumran community.

sensitivity to Jewish feelings; see *Ant.* 18.5.3 §120-123). Mary Smallwood suspects that Caiaphas was deposed, "because, as an associate of Pilate, he was unpopular with the Jews."[58] This is likely so, for later Vitellius "was greeted with special warmth by the Jewish multitude" (*Ant.* 18.5.3 §123).[59] I believe that Horsley is correct when he concludes that these examples suggest "acquiescence in, if not active cooperation with, Roman rule," on the part of the Jewish priestly aristocracy.[60] It is doubtless that the Jewish populace viewed the ruling priests with mistrust, if not outright contempt.

Another factor that likely would have alienated most Palestinian Jews from Caiaphas is the fact that he in all likelihood was a member of the Sadducean party (cf. Acts 5:17). Other High Priests of the Herodian/Roman period are identified as Sadducees: Simon, son of Boethus (*'Abot R. Nat.* A 5, where Sadducees are called "Boethusians"; so elsewhere in Rabbinic lit.), Ananus, son of Annas (*Ant.* 20.9.1 §199), and Ishmael, son of Phabi II (*b. Yoma* 19b; *t. Para* 3:8; though referred to anonymously). It is likely that many others were adherents.[61] The significance of this observation is seen in comments of Josephus. He tells us that whereas the Sadducees ("men of the highest standing"; *Ant.* 18.1.4 §17) have the confidence of the wealthy few and no following among the general population, the Pharisees enjoy the favor of the "multitude" (*Ant.* 13.10.6 §298). Josephus further states that the Sadducees were much more severe in the administration of justice than other groups (*Ant.* 20.9.1 §199). Nevertheless Sadducean office-holders often grudgingly followed the rules of the Pharisees, "since otherwise the multitudes would not tolerate them" (*Ant.* 18.1.4 §17). Indeed, apparently the Sadducees feared the Pharisees (*b. Yoma* 19b).

Testament of Moses. Although some have argued for a Maccabean date, the allusions to Herod and his successors in chap. 6 have led most scholars to conclude that the *Testament of Moses* was written sometime in the first century.[62] R. H. Charles dated the writing to just prior to 30 CE, a conclusion with which John Priest agrees.[63] Chapter 5 describes the corruption of the Hasmonean priests, chap. 6

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[58] E. M. Smallwood, "High Priests and Politics in Roman Palestine," *JTS* 13 (1962) 14-34, esp. 22; cited with approval by Horsley, "High Priests," 37.

[59] Translation from Feldman, *Josephus*, 85.

[60] Horsley, "High Priests," 37. Horsley ("'Like One of the Prophets of Old': Two Types of Popular Prophets at the Time of Jesus," *CBQ* 47 [1985] 435-63, esp. 451) notes the significance of the fact that when Jesus son of Hananiah prophesied the doom of Jerusalem and the Temple (*J.W.* 6.5.3 § 300-309) only the priestly aristocracy tried to silence him.

[61] I. Gafni ("The Historical Background," in Michael E. Stone, ed., *Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period* [Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum 2/2; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984] 24) states that "the priestly oligarchy [was] given to Sadducean influence."

[62] The allusions are obvious: According to 6:2-6 a "rash and perverse" man [Herod] will rule "for thirty-four years." According to 6:7 Herod "will beget heirs [Archelaus, Herod Antipas, Philip] who will reign after him for shorter periods of time." These heirs will be subdued by a "powerful king of the West," i.e., Rome (6:8).

[63] R. H. Charles, *The Assumption of Moses* (London: Black, 1897) lv-lviii; J. Priest,

describes the oppression of Herod the Great (for 34 years, see v. 6), and chap. 7 apparently describes the priesthood of the first century CE. The fragmentary chapter reads:

> When this has taken place, the times will quickly come to an end. [. . .] Then will rule destructive and godless men, who represent themselves as being righteous, but who will (in fact) arouse their inner wrath, for they will be deceitful men, pleasing only themselves, false in every way imaginable, (such as) loving feasts at any hour of the day—devouring, gluttonous.
>
> [Seven-line lacuna] But really they consume the goods of the (poor), saying their acts are according to justice, (while in fact they are simply) exterminators, deceitfully seeking to conceal themselves so that they will not be known as completely godless because of their criminal deeds (committed) all the day long, saying, "We shall have feasts, even luxurious winings and dinings. Indeed, we shall behave ourselves as princes." They, with hand and mind, touch impure things, yet their mouths will speak enormous things, and they will even say, "Do not touch me, lest you pollute me in the position I occupy . . ."

The passage is clearly directed against a wealthy, powerful priestly aristocracy. Since the passage apparently follows the demise of Herod's sons, the setting of this apocalyptic vision must be the first century, and probably some time in the 30's. If this is indeed the case, then what we have here is pre-70 evidence, possibly from the time of Jesus, of the belief that the priestly aristocracy was corrupt. It is significant, furthermore, that several of the complaints reflect the very ones that we observed in the post-70 literature surveyed above.

Conclusion

Taken together, the above evidence clearly demonstrates that various groups, such as some tannaitic and early amoraic rabbis, the zealots, Qumran sectarians, and Josephus viewed various priests, High Priests, or priestly families as wealthy, corrupt, often greedy, and sometimes violent.

Of course, just because the Temple establishment was viewed as corrupt, does not mean that it actually was. Our concern is with the public perception, for it is against this public perception that Jesus' action in the Temple would have been interpreted, and perhaps motivated. Had the Temple been generally regarded as free from corruption, and had a messiah, or some other eschatological agent, been expected to tear down and rebuild the Temple, then Jesus' action may very well have been understood as Ed Sanders has suggested. But there simply is no evidence for such a theory. Evidence that the Temple establishment was viewed as corrupt, however, is substantial. This evidence antedates the time of Jesus, is subsequent to the time of Jesus, and can even be traced to the very time of Jesus.

The evidence surveyed above also underscores two important aspects of the social-political and religious situation in pre-70 Palestine. Socially and politically "the fundamental conflict in Jewish Palestine was between the Jewish ruling groups and

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"Testament of Moses," in *Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, 1.920-21. Even if a Maccabean date is required, then chaps. 6-7 would have to be understood as a later, probably first-century, interpolation.

the Romans on the one side and the Jewish peasantry on the other."[64] With respect to the practice of the cultus itself, a serious "gulf had developed between the legitimating ideals in the Torah and the actions of the actual high priests and their practices in the Temple."[65] The evidence certainly appears to bear out these conclusions of Horsley and Hanson. In my view, Jesus' action in the Temple should be understood as a criticism of the Temple establishment (whether or not it should be called a "cleansing"). It was not, of course, a criticism of the laws and practice of sacrifice.

Several features in the gospels cohere with these conclusions. The Baptist's scathing prophetic criticism, "You brood of vipers! Who warned you to flee from the wrath to come?" (Matt 3:7b = Luke 3:7b), was likely originally addressed to the priestly aristocracy (and not to the "Pharisees," as in Matthew, nor to the "multitudes," as in Luke), and as such is completely in keeping with the social and religious conditions of Palestine.[66] Jesus' parables concerning poor stewardship also reflect these conditions. The Parable of the Wicked Vineyard Tenants (Mark 12:1-9) threatens the priestly aristocracy with the loss of their position and power. The abuses of power and privilege described in the Parable of the Faithless Servant (Matt 24:45-51 = Luke 12:42-46) probably reflect how the ruling aristocracy was perceived in the minds of Palestinian peasants. Jesus' comment regarding the poor widow and the others who were contibuting to the Temple's coffers (Mark 12:41-44) was probably a lament—not a word of commendation—and an implicit criticism of the economic oppressiveness and inequity of the Temple establishment. The condemnation of the "scribes" who "devour widows' houses" (Mark 12:38-40) may very well allude to Sadducean scribes and not, as is usually assumed, Pharisaic scribes (see Josephus, *Ant.* 18.1.4 §16).[67] In Jesus' lament for Jerusalem (Matt 23:37-38 = Luke 13:34-35) there are significant parallels to Jeremiah, the prophet who had severely criticized Jerusalem's First Temple (Jer 7:14, 34; 12:7; 22:5; 26:9), whose criticism Jesus may have had in mind when he took action in Jerusalem's Second Temple (Jer 7:11 in Mark 11:17).[68] Various other details during Passion Week cohere with the criticisms of the priestly aristocracy. The priests demand to know by what authority Jesus acted the way he did (Mark 11:27-33). The ruling priests cannot arrest Jesus immediately because of their fear of the multitude (Mark 12:12). Jesus is arrested by "servants of the ruling priests" who are armed with "clubs" (Mark 14:43-50; recall *t. Menah.* 13:21).

In view of the fact that there is no evidence that a messiah was expected to destroy

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[64] Horsley and Hanson, *Bandits,* 245; Gafni, "Historical Background," 24.

[65] Horsley, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence,* 287. During the revolt from Rome, there was an effort to bridge this gulf by replacing the illegitimate Herodian ruling priesthood with survivors of the legitimate line of Zadokite (*J.W.* 4.3.6 § 147-149). Horsley and Hanson (*Bandits,* 234) aver: "The parables of Jesus, along with his other sayings, indicate that the Jewish peasantry entertained ideals of a (restored) egalitarian theocracy (the kingdom of God)—inasmuch as it was members of the peasantry who not only heard such sayings, but also preserved and transmitted them [Matt 22:1-14 = Luke 14:15-24; Luke 6:20-26; and Mark 10:23-31 are cited as examples]. The Zealots, however, were now implementing such ideas."

[66] Horsley and Hanson, *Bandits,* 178-79.

[67] See J. Jeremias, *Jerusalem in the Time of Jesus* (London: SCM, 1969) 231.

[68] Horsley and Hanson, *Bandits,* 175.

(and then rebuild) the Temple, but was expected to purify Jerusalem,[69] and that the Temple was expected to be purified in the Eschaton, it is highly probable that the unified first-century testimony of the gospels, to the effect that Jesus "cleansed" the Temple, in all probability represents further evidence that in some Jewish circles the Temple establishment was regarded as corrupt and in need of purging. Therefore, it is questionable to raise objections to the gospels' interpretation of Jesus' action in the Temple on the grounds that there is no evidence of corruption in the first-century Temple establishment.

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[69]Horsley ("Popular Messianic Movements around the Time of Jesus," *CBQ* 46 [1984] 471-95, esp. 490) suspects that *Pss. Sol.* 17:26, 29, 36 (passages which speak of Messiah purging Jerusalem) may have lain behind Simon bar Giora's "messianic" actions during the siege of Jerusalem. See also Horsley and Hanson, *Bandits*, 125.

Was Jesus like a Philosopher? The Evidence of Martyrological and Wisdom Motifs in Q, Pre-Pauline Traditions, and Mark

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Introduction

This essay will argue that in an early stage of Q, martyrological motifs interpret Jesus' death, whereas wisdom motifs are used at a later stage to interpret the deaths of the Q prophets.[1] Martyrological and wisdom motifs combine, in a more sophisticated manner, to make sense of Jesus' saving death and resurrection in the pre-Pauline traditions and in Mark. While the three earliest strata of Christian literary remains are not using these motifs in just the same fashion, they are indeed using them. Thus, a certain "family resemblance" can be discerned amongst the first documentary legacies of Christianity, and speculation about the historical Jesus can be based upon it.

[1] An analysis of martyrology in Paul and an exposition of 1st century C.E. martyrological patterns of thought in the Greco-Roman world are contained in D. Seeley, *The Noble Death* (JSNTSup 18; Sheffield: JSOT, forthcoming) chs. 5-6. The martyrological patterns of thought involve: obedience, overcoming physical vulnerability, a military or combative setting, and vicariousness (the quality of acting on behalf of another person or persons). The discussion is based largely on Epictetus, Seneca, Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch, and Silius Italicus, but cf. also Cicero, *Tusc.* 2.21.49-2.23.54.

The wisdom motifs discussed in this essay mostly concern the "wisdom tale" as defined by G. W. E. Nickelsburg, "The Genre and Function of the Markan Passion Narrative," *HTR* 73 (1980) 153-84; idem, *Resurrection, Immortality and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism* (HTS 26; Cambridge, MA: Harvard; London: Oxford, 1972). The wisdom tale involves a righteous person who is unjustly persecuted but finally vindicated. Nickelsburg bases his analysis on the story of Joseph, the narrative of Ahikar, the Book of Esther, Daniel 3 and 6, Susanna, and Wisdom of Solomon 2. In the Hellenized version of the wisdom tale found in Wisdom of Solomon, the righteous one is actually killed and experiences a post-mortem vindication. This version shows influences of the martyr's noble death (cf. D. Seeley, "Transumptive Narration and the Structure of Wisdom 1-5," *Society of Biblical Literature 1988 Seminar Papers* (ed. D. J. Lull; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988) 245-48, and the article on which it was grounded, "The Story of the Righteous Man in Wisdom of Solomon," presently under consideration by *HTR*.

The Sayings Source Q

In Q, there are six passages which deal with the issue of violent persecution and/or death (Q 6:22-3, 6:27-9, 11:47-51, 12:4, 13:34-5, and 14:26-7). One of these, Q 11:47-51, has Jesus bemoan the deaths of the prophets and apostles. Another, Q 13:34-5, has Jesus mourn the deaths of the prophets alone.[2] These verses may tempt one to assert that Q must have seen Jesus' death in terms of a deuteronomistic prophetic pattern. It is important, however, to keep in mind that these verses do not explicitly refer to Jesus' death. Neither does Q 14:26-27 in a direct fashion, but the latter at least has the advantage of mentioning the cross. The fact that 14:27 speaks of "his own" cross shows that the disciple's martyrdom (rather than Jesus') is in view here, but *stauros* could hardly be cited under any circumstances without calling to mind Jesus' death. Therefore, Q 14:26-27 is particularly significant for the question of how Q might have interpreted that death. It comes the closest of any verse in Q to addressing the issue.

Q 14:26-27 bears a distinct resemblance to martyrological texts concerning Greco-Roman philosophers. Only there do we find the motif of following a teacher or model in suffering and even death. How does a student of philosophy come to be a good pupil or disciple? (We often forget that *mathetes* can be translated either way.) At the beginning of the *Encheiridion*, Epictetus puts it quite simply. Some things are under our control, he says, and others are not.

> Under our control are conception, choice, desire, aversion . . . not under our control are our body, our property, reputation, office . . . Remember, therefore, . . . if you think only what is your own to be your own, and what is not your own to be . . . not your own, then no one will ever be able to exert compulsion upon you . . . neither is there any harm that can touch you.[3]

Perceiving this distinction clearly and acting in accordance with it were considered the key to becoming a proper philosopher. Cynics and Stoics of the time were not, however, oblivious to the fact that such a course was easier said than done. The body, in particular, was a difficult item to regard as "not your own." The attitude seems to have been that if one could properly face physical sufffering and even death, then one was a true philosopher.

This attitude stands especially clear in the twenty-fourth epistle of Seneca. He tells his addressee that he will conduct him to peace of mind and a worry-free state. How? "Let your thoughts travel into any era of Roman or foreign history, and there

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[2] On the deaths of the prophets in Q cf. A. D. Jacobson, "The Literary Unity of Q," *JBL* (1982) 365-89; idem, "The Literary Unity of Q: Lc 10,2-16 and Parallels as a Test Case," *Logia: Les Paroles de Jesus – The Sayings of Jesus: Memorial Joseph Coppens* (BETL 59; ed. J. Delobel; Leuven: Peeters and Leuven University Press, 1982) 419-23; idem, *Wisdom Christology in Q* (Claremont: Ph.D. dissertation, 1978); O. H. Steck, *Israel und das gewaltsame Geschick der Propheten* (WMANT 23; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1967).

[3] Epictetus, *The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments* (LCL; 2 vols.; London: Heinemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1928) *Encheiridion* 1-3.

will throng before you notable examples of high achievement or of high endeavour."[4] What sort of "high achievement?" Enduring suffering and death. "Is there a worse fate that any man may fear than being burned or being killed?"[5] Rutilius, Metellus, Socrates, and Mucius are cited as examples for emulation. Seneca realizes that people may be sick of hearing about these examples of endurance. "'Oh,' say you, 'those stories have been droned to death in all the schools; pretty soon, when you reach the topic 'On Despising Death,' you will be telling me about Cato."[6] So, Seneca proceeds to do exactly that. Cato killed himself most nobly rather than face ignominious defeat.[7] But, Seneca is not "heaping up these illustrations for the purpose of exercising my wit," rather for the purpose of bringing his friend to a proper frame of mind—one worthy of Socrates or Cato.[8]

This look at Epictetus and Seneca is very brief, but through it I am suggesting that, for Cynic or Stoic philosophers of the time, following a teacher in suffering and death was an extremely important idea.[9] And, this is precisely the idea which appears in Q 14:27. Surely there must be some significance to the fact that 14:27, the Q verse which most nearly engages the issue of Jesus' death, has its closest parallels in contemporaneous Cynic and Stoic philosophy. Moreover, 14:27 contains an idea which is not peripheral to those schools of philosophy, but instead quite central.

The philosophical flavor of 14:27 is enhanced by 14:26, where family ties are roundly criticized. Preaching against family ties was a particularly characteristic aspect of Cynicism.[10] The overall cast of 14:26-27 thus indicates strongly that ideas from Greco-Roman philosophy are being used here.

Let us turn now to the task of placing 14:26-27 at some level of Q's formation. This passage appears to come from a relatively early level. There is no sign of communal awareness or the drawing of group boundaries. First century, lower Galilee can now be seen as interpenetrated—and not simply surrounded—by the Greco-Roman world.[11] Hence, the idea could have been adapted, during or shortly after Jesus' time, from any number of oral or written sources.[12]

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[4] Seneca, *Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales* (LCL; 3 vols.; London: Heinemann, N.Y.: Putnam's, 1925-43) XXIV.3.

[5] Seneca, *Ad Luculium* XXIV.3.

[6] Seneca, *Ad Lucilium* XXIV.6.

[7] Seneca, *Ad Lucilum* XXIV.6-7.

[8] Seneca, *Ad Lucilium* XXIV.9.

[9] For further evidence, cf. F. G. Downing, *Christ and the Cynics* (JSOT Manuals 4; Sheffield: JSOT, 1988) 21-25; Seeley, *The Noble Death* ch. 6.

[10] See Downing, *Christ and the Cynics* 75; idem, *Jesus and the Threat of Freedom* (London: SCM, 1987) 75; J. Kloppenborg, *The Formation of Q* (Studies in Antiquity & Christianity; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) 241 n. 278; cf. also Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.3.5.

[11] Cf., most recently, D. R. Edwards, "First Century Urban/Rural Relations in Lower Galilee: Exploring the Archaeological and Literary Evidence," *Society of Biblical Literature 1988 Seminar Papers* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988) 169-82; J. A. Overman, "Who Were the First Urban Christians? Urbanization in Galilee in the First Century," *Society of Biblical Literature 1988 Seminar Papers* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988) 160-68.

[12] Cf., *inter alia*, Edwards, "First Century;" S. Freyne, *Galilee, Jesus and the Gospels*

While a sign of communal awareness seems lacking in 14:26-27, it is certainly present in passages of Q which approach suffering and death from a prophetic perspective (Q 6:23, 11:49-51, 13:34-35). Social boundaries are being drawn. These passages suggest that the community has now gone through a period of "tussle and setback" in its relations with Judaism. It now needs to rationalize its own and Jesus' rejection in terms which allow it to continue making a claim on the very Judaism that has turned it away.[13] Setting the issues of rejection and death in a prophetic context would have allowed this.

The appearance of a wisdom motif in 11:47-51, alongside references to the prophets, is most intriguing.[14] It suggests a further elaboration on the theme of Jesus' death. However, this elaboration remains oriented toward the entire Q community. In Kloppenborg's words, "Q provides a framework for comprehending Jesus' death, but interprets his death corporately, by relying on the framework of the deuteronomistic understanding of prophetic activity."[15] Kloppenborg considers the possibility that Q may have employed the "wisdom tale" described by G. W. E. Nickelsburg, but concludes that there is no trace of "the individualizing interpretation of the wisdom tale or its application to Jesus' death."[16]

Apparently, the claim that the Q "prophets" were sent by Wisdom aided early Christians as group competition between the Q community and Judaism grew more intense. Such a step was a way of "upping the ante" in the game of claim and counter-claim which may well have been occurring at that time. To say that a quasi-divine figure has sent members of a group makes their mission grander and their rejection more dire. It seems probable, then, that those verses of Q which weave wisdom motifs into the prophetic deuteronomistic view became part of Q at a late point.[17]

What we arrive at, then, is a Q community which early on regarded Jesus' death in terms most similar to those employed by Cynics and Stoics. Interest centered on the relationship between master and pupil vis-à-vis suffering and death. Later, the focus of suffering and death moved in a more communal direction, and the motif of prophetic rejection was utilized. Finally, in a bid to nail down condemnation of Jewish opposition, the claim was made that Wisdom sent these prophets.

Now, the themes of straightforward (i.e., non-prophetic) martyrdom on the one hand, and wisdom on the other, do not appear together in Q. Indeed, they appear

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(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988) 167-71; H. Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament* (2 vols.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982) 1.40-42; B. L. Mack, *A Myth of Innocence* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) 65-6; Overman, "Who Were;" M. Wilcox, "Jesus in the Light of his Jewish Environment," *ANRW* (II.25.1; ed. W. Haase; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1982) 144-45.

[13] Mack, *A Myth of Innocence* 125; cf. also 87 n. 7.

[14] The presence of a wisdom motif in 13:34-35 has been cogently challenged by Robert J. Miller in "The Rejection of the Prophets in Q," *JBL* 107 (1988) 235-38.

[15] J. Kloppenborg, "'Easter Faith' and the Sayings Gospel Q," *Semeia* 51 (ed. R. Cameron; Atlanta: Scholars Press, forthcoming) 1. I have used a typescript of this essay.

[16] Kloppenborg, "'Easter Faith'" 12. On the wisdom tale, cf. Nickelsburg, "The Genre" and *Resurrection.*

[17] Cf. Kloppenborg, *The Formation of Q* 147.

separated, in the doubtlessly crude reconstruction we have mocked up, by at least one level (the prophetic deuteronomistic pattern, as in Q 6:23). In the churches Paul addresses, and in Mark, the motifs of martyrdom and wisdom came together powerfully to provide an interpretation of Jesus' death. That combination did not happen in the Q community. Its absence raises the question of whether it failed to take place because Q reflects such an early episode of Christian history, or because the Q community was simply on a different "trajectory" with different concerns.[18] This question cannot be answered here. However, it is clear that Q reflects a branch of early Christianity with just the mix of similarities and dissimilarities to other branches that we might expect from a diverse young religion in the process of inventing itself.[19] The same recipe was not used in every instance, but many of the ingredients matched.

Pre-Pauline Traditions

To investigate what early, Hellenistic-Christian churches prior to Paul may have thought about Jesus' death, I will examine a handful of the most strongly attested, pre-Pauline fragments.[20] These are Rom 3:24-26,[21] 4:25;[22] 1 Cor 11:23-26,[23] 15:3-5;[24] and Phil 2:6-11.[25] 1 Cor 11:23-26 is not particularly helpful. It associates Jesus' death with the observation of a communal meal, but as for the death itself, says little more than that it was *hyper* that community. Verse 26 seems to refer, all too laconically, to the Parousia. Rom 4:25a and 1 Cor 15:3 say Jesus died for our *paraptōmata* and *harmartiai* respectively, but what those assertions mean is not explained. Rom 4:25b states that Jesus was raised for our *dikaiōsis*, and 1 Cor 15:4, that on the third day he was raised according to the scriptures. However, Rom 4:25b is tersely ambiguous, and as for 1 Cor 15:4, a scriptural reference is not at all clear.[26] The vagueness of these verses is witnessed by the endless scholarly attempts to elucidate them. That leaves Rom 3:24-26 and Phil 2:6-11. Now, as it happens, Rom 3:24-26 shows the martyr's noble death being altered to involve the issue of sins. In addition, there is the hint of an exaltation component, suggesting the wisdom tale.[27] Phil 2:6-11, on the other hand, shows a fairly clear combination

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[18] Cf. Kloppenborg, "'Easter Faith.'"

[19] For further Cynic aspects of Q, cf. R. Cameron, "What Have You Come Out to See? Characterizations of John and Jesus in the Gospels," *Semeia* 51 (ed. R. Cameron; Atlanta: Scholars Press, forthcoming).

[20] My selection of passages can, of course, be debated. But for this study, I have tried to limit myself to the most obvious choices. Perhaps at a later date I can incorporate other passages whose claim to pre-Pauline status is weaker (e.g., Rom 5:9, 8:3, 8:32, and Gal 1:4).

[21] For scholarship on this issue, cf. Seeley, *The Noble Death* ch. 1, n. 2.

[22] Cf. Seeley, *The Noble Death* ch. 2, nn. 4-5.

[23] Cf. Seeley, *The Noble Death* ch. 1, nn. 88-90.

[24] Cf. Seeley, *The Noble Death* ch. 2, n. 33.

[25] Cf. Seeley, *The Noble Death* ch. 2, n. 75.

[26] Seeley, *The Noble Death* ch. 2.

[27] S. K. Williams has shown that *pistis* in Rom 3:25 can refer to Jesus' own faith (*Jesus' Death as Saving Event* [HDR 2; Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1975] 50; cf. also R. B. Hays, *The Faith of Jesus Christ* [SBLDS 56; Chico, CA: Scholars Press,

of a wisdom tale and a martyr's noble death.[28]

Can what has just been found regarding the composite nature of Rom 3:24-26 and Phil 2:6-11 now be turned back profitably onto 1 Cor 11:23-26, Rom 4:25, and 1 Cor 15:3? The answer is yes. The martyr's death lurking in Rom 3:24-26 and Phil 2:6-11 appears to have been the only sort of death considered vicarious in the Mediterranean basin during the 1st century C.E.[29] Therefore, that is what is most

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1983] 170-72; L. T. Johnson, "Romans 3:21-26 and the Faith of Jesus," *CBQ* [1982] 79-81; P. Perkins, *Reading the New Testament: An Introduction* [N.Y. and Ramsey, NJ: Paulist, 1978] 150; S. K. Williams, "The 'Righteousness of God' in Romans," *JBL* 99 [1980] 275). *En to autou haimati,* interpreted according to the "instrumental dative of price," means "at the cost of his [Jesus'] blood" (Williams, *Jesus' Death as Saving Event* 46-47). This emphasis on Jesus' faithful (i.e., obedient), bloody death provides a clearly martyrological cast to Rom. 3:24-26. Williams has also shown that *ho ek pisteos Iesou* in 3:26 should be taken to mean the one who shares Jesus' faith (*Jesus' Death as Saving Event* 54-55). The notion of imitating the obedience (i.e., faithfulness) of a person who died nobly and thereby benefitting from that death is a critical factor in Greco-Roman martyrology (Seeley, *The Noble Death* ch. 6). Thus it may be said that the motif of martyrdom is indeed present in Rom 3:24-26. However, references to a passing over of sins and to a *hilastērion* are more typical of Jewish thinking on relations with non-Jews. The sins that have been passed over are those of the Gentiles. The occasion for the formulation of Rom 3:24-26 was concern over the presence of Gentiles in the Christian community. The Jews had been expiating their sins through various methods; the Gentiles had not. How, then, was the latter's presence to be warranted? (Cf. Williams, *Jesus' Death as Saving Event* 33-34.) Intriguingly, the means by which the sins of the Gentiles who share Jesus' faith are said to be expiated is a bit reminiscent of the wisdom tale. The most natural meaning of *protithesthai* (Rom 3:25) is "set forth." This recalls the exaltation component of the wisdom tale, along with the attendant components of vindication and acclamation. If Jesus is "set forth," or, indeed, even displayed publicly in some manner, then is the wisdom tale not perhaps in the background? This interpretation preserves the basic meaning of *protithesthai* and yet offers a situation in which Jesus can be set forth other than as a crucified one. The setting forth of Jesus as crucified, though favored by W. Sanday and A. C. Headlam (*A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* [ICC; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1902] 87) is a strange and grisly notion which Williams is right to reject (*Jesus' Death as Saving Event* 34-35). Cf. Mack, *A Myth of Innocence* 105-13.

[28] The emphasis on obedience (Phil 2:8) is a constituent element of the martyr's noble death (Seeley, *The Noble Death* ch. 6). *Mechri thanatou* is echoed precisely by 4 Macc 5:37 and 17:10, two verses which themselves show the melding of the wisdom tale and martyrology. The first contains the component of exaltation, the second, of vindication, and both stress the bloody, tortuous deaths endured by the Maccabeean martyrs. Phil 2:6-8, for its part, contains the components of exaltation (2:9a), vindication (2:9b), and acclamation (2:10-11).

[29] Seeley, *The Noble Death, passim.* Ch. 1 finds implausible the thesis that Paul was using the Temple cultus as a background for Jesus' saving death. A similar conclusion is reached for Isa 53, the Akedah, and the Mysteries by chs. 2, 3, and 4, respectively. This in itself does not make it impossible that another besides Paul could have seen these items as providing the background for a person's vicarious

probably at issue in 1 Cor 11:23-25.[30] Paul's own comment in 11:26, however, does not contain the wisdom tale's vindication-exaltation-acclamation cluster, as we might have expected, but rather a proclamation of the death until what appears to be the Second Coming.[31] This indicates Paul's readiness to tie the martyrological motif in with apocalypticism. Such a connection seems not to have been characteristic of the pre-Pauline traditions. In the absence of wisdom tale components, 11:23-26 is thus left simply with a martyrological tone. This fact suggests how deeply indebted early, Hellenistic Christianity was to notions of martyrdom.

It must be assumed as well that martyrology lies behind the vicarious death mentioned by Rom 4:25 and 1 Cor 15:3.[32] Now, the reference to justification by Rom 4:25 recalls the wisdom tale's component of vindication. Thus, it likely represents an almost casual, shorthand combination of the martyr's noble death and the wisdom tale.[33] 1 Cor 15:3 does not mention justification. Yet, the notion of "appearance" fits with the wisdom tale's components of vindication-exaltation-acclamation. It, too, therefore, may well signal a combination of the martyr's noble death and the wisdom tale.[34] A supporting consideration for these conclusions is the fact that the only instances, outside the New Testament, of a martyr's noble death being combined with the cluster vindication-exaltation-acclamation involve the wisdom tale.[35]

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death, but it does make such a circumstance improbable. This improbability is supported by Williams, *Jesus' Death as Saving Event:* on the Temple cultus, cf. 102-7; on Isa 53, cf. 107-20; on post-exilic Judaism more generally, cf. 121-35.

[30] Mack, *A Myth of Innocence* 118.

[31] In ascribing 1 Cor 11:26 to Paul rather than to pre-Pauline tradition, I am simply following the consensus position. Cf. H. Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975) 201; W. F. Orr and J. A. Walther, *I Corinthians* (AB 32; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976) 273.

[32] Again, cf. Seeley, *The Noble Death* for a demonstration of the lack of influence exercised on these verses by the Temple cultus, Isa 53, and the Akedah.

[33] Mack, *A Myth of Innocence* 111.

[34] Mack, *A Myth of Innocence* 104.

[35] Wisdom of Solomon 1-5 and 4 Maccabees. 2 Maccabees 7, according to Nickelsberg's chart ("The Genre" 158-9), lacks the component of exaltation but possesses those of vindication and acclamation. On Wisdom of Solomon, see Seeley, "Transumptive Narration." That the martyr's noble death is present in 4 Maccabees is shown in Seeley, *The Noble Death* ch. 5. That the wisdom tale is present in 4 Maccabees is not argued by Nickelsburg in his article "The Genre." This is very odd, since he did include a short section on it in *Resurrection* (109-11), and since 4 Maccabees has so many of the "generic components" he uses to identify the wisdom tale (for these, cf. "The Genre" 158-59). There is the component of provocation, (4:24-26, 5:16-38, 9:1-9), of decision (6:17-23, 9:17, 9:29, 10:2-3, 10:14-16, 11:2-6, 11:20-27), of trust (9:8, 9:24, 10:18, 16:22, 16:25 17:4), of obedience, trial, and condemnation (*passim*, as with 2 Maccabees 7), of prayer (6:27-29, 12:17), of assistance (13:8-18, 15:12), of reactions (6:11-13, 6:24, 8:2, 9:10, 9:26, 10:5, 12:2), of rescue (9:8, 13:17, 15:3, 16:25, 17:5 17:12, 17:17), of vindication (6:10, 7:9, 9:8, 9:18, 9:31, 11:27, 12:14, 15:29, 16:14, 17:10, 17:12, 17:17), of exaltation (5:37, 9:30, 11:24, 17:15), of acclamation (17:23, 18:3), of reactions (17:24, 18:4), and of punishment (9:24, 11:3, 12:18, 18:5). That the martyr's noble death is

The Gospel of Mark

That Mark utilizes the martyr's noble death and the wisdom tale can be demonstrated with relative ease. The presence of the latter in Mark has already been pointed out by Nickelsburg.[36] The presence of martyrological motifs can be shown, as well.

Virtually the only passages in Mark which comment directly on Jesus' death are 10:45 and 14:24. Mk 10:45 employs the term *lutron*, meaning "ransom." This term is often taken to indicate a sacrifice for sin. However, a more natural context for the word would involve the release of slaves. But Mark, unlike Paul, never speaks of sin as an enslaving force, and in any case, sin is not actually spoken of here at all. Therefore, *lutron* remains enigmatic. Turning to the surrounding context, however, we find that Mk 10:35-44 suggests Jesus' death is an example for those who wish to follow his ethic of service to God and to other people. Now, the Greco-Roman philosophers conceived of their philosophy as an ethic of service to God and others. When they suffered a noble death, it was for the sake of following that ethic, and was offered as an example to others. Thus, Jesus' death here looks much like theirs. This resemblance becomes even stronger when one observes the common characterization of the Greco-Roman philosopher as both lord and servant.[37]

Mk 14:24 is interpreted sacrificially even more often than is Mk 10:45. However, I believe its appearance is misleading in this regard. Mk 14:24 is an allusion to Ex 24:8, which concerns offerings made by Moses for the covenant between Yahweh and Israel.[38] The offerings in question are burnt offerings and peace offerings. The first were for atonement, but the second were not. Ex 24 makes no distinction between them and says nothing of either being for any sin. Moses takes the blood

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present in 2 Maccabees 7 is shown in Seeley, *The Noble Death* ch. 5. That the wisdom tale is present in 2 Maccabees 7 is shown by Nickelsburg ("The Genre" 158-59 and *Resurrection* 93-109).

I offer several examples of a post-mortem exaltation for Greco-Roman philosophers in "Transumptive Narration" 248, but these examples fail to include the components of vindication and acclamation.

[36] Nickelsburg, "The Genre."

[37] See Musonius Rufus 31, Epictetus 3.22.63, 3.22.79-82, 3.22.93-96, 3.24.64; Dio Chrysostom 4.66, 6, 9.8-9; Seneca, Ep. 90.5. It is true that I have not explained the term *lutron* in Mk. 10:45. Neither has anyone else. I do not feel that this fact should militate against a serious consideration of the light I have thrown on the passage. It may be that *lutron* will never be accounted for satisfactorily. This should not, however, prevent us from making what sense we can from 10:45 and its context via other routes.

[38] Connections between 14:24 and the Passover are problematical because that festival involves neither the establishment of a covenant nor the forgiveness of sins. Cf. T. Horvath, *The Sacrificial Interpretation of Jesus' Achievement in the New Testament* (N.Y.: Philosophical Library, 1979) 22. Connections between 14:24 and Isa 53 appear problematical in light of the survey of post-Exilic interpretations of Isa 53 by Williams, *Jesus' Death as Saving Event* 111-20. Considering these disadvantages, the firmest and most obvious reference contained in MK 14:24 thus seems to be Ex 24.

in basins, throws half on the altar (symbolizing Yahweh), and the other half on the people. This shows that the two parties are now joined in a covenant agreement. If the blood were for sins, then one would be in the absurd position of saying that God had to have his sins sacrificed for. It seems more reasonable to say that Ex 24 and, in turn, Mk 14:24, are both talking simply about the establishment of a covenant agreement, and that in each case the blood is merely a sign to seal that agreement. Furthermore, in the verses directly succeeding Mk 14:24, we once again find the exemplary aspect of Jesus' death expressed. Jesus says, "You will all fall away . . ." But Peter insists, "If I must die with you, I will not deny you." The disciples do, of course, fall away, but the issue is clear: to be part of Jesus' new covenant means, most sharply, to follow him obediently to the death. This stress on imitation and obedience is unmistakably part of standard descriptions of the martyr's noble death.[39]

Conclusion

It has been demonstrated that all three of Christianity's earliest literary strata make important use of martyrological and wisdom motifs. In Q, martyrology is the basis for the most nearly direct comment on Jesus' death and its relation to followers. Wisdom motifs do not occur (as they do in pre-Pauline fragments and Mark) in connection with Jesus' death and the wisdom tale. Rather, they are associated with the death of the prophets in a deuteronomistic pattern. Still, they are present and playing an important role. Paul's letters suggest that the Hellenistic churches he wrote to had combined the martyr's noble death and the wisdom tale to arrive, astonishingly quickly, at a very high Christology and soteriology. Under Mark's hand, these two basic patterns of interpretation experienced further development. As differently as these various builders have constructed their hermeneutical edifices, the latter can now be seen to have had some important building blocks in common.

What speculation on the historical Jesus does this commonality between building blocks invite? First, that the historical Jesus was someone easily seen as a martyr. Next, that he could be seen also (though less directly) as the suffering Righteous One of a wisdom tale. Both of these considerations lend weight to the argument that Jesus was a philosopher-like figure. After all, martyrdom was connected above all with philosophers. Jewish texts like 2 Maccabees 7 and 4 Maccabees could describe Jewish martyrdoms in a way obviously indebted to Greco-Roman philosophical conventions.[40] But those Jewish martyrdoms take place in extraordinary circumstances, wherein the martyrs' religion is being persecuted. It is preposterous, in the literal sense of the word, to try to place the historical Jesus in that kind of position. He would not have been persecuted and killed for his "religious" position. The only religious position the gospels show him being charged with is the claim that he is the son of God, and it is unlikely he would have been killed for that. Far more probable is the proposition that Mark concocted the Jewish conspiracy against Jesus for his own, redactional reasons.[41] The death itself was probably just a mistake.[42] What may, however, have left people with a vague memory of Jesus' having died

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[39] On Mark's "toning down" of the sacrificial aspects of the meal, cf. Mack, *A Myth of Innocence* 298-304.

[40] Seeley, *The Noble Death* ch. 5.

[41] Mack, *Myth of Innocence* 247-312.

[42] Mack, *Myth of Innocence* 88-89.

as a martyr is the sense that he lived as a philosopher. If they were convinced of the latter, knowing that he had been executed by civil authorities might well cause them to jump to the conclusion that his death was a martyrdom. Indeed, they might simply assume: what else could it have been?

That the historical Jesus was like a philosopher is an argument recently made by B. L. Mack, who says that Jesus was essentially a Cynic,[43] and by F. G. Downing, who angles Jesus in a somewhat more traditionally Jewish direction, but still acknowledges his profoundly Cynic traits.[44] Their views cannot be recapitulated here, but they are backed by considerable evidence.

That Jesus struck people as a philosopher would enable us to go beyond explaining the martyrdom motifs and explain the wisdom motifs, as well. The "wise man" who appears as the Righteous One in the wisdom tale is the closest indigenously Jewish analogue to the philosopher. Both figures are noted for their insight into the human condition. Both have a special relationshiop with God. One could, perhaps, argue that the historical Jesus was more like a sapiential Righteous One than a martyr, and so try to reverse the sequence (i.e., claim that a Jesus like the Righteous One of the wisdom tale came to be remembered as a philosopher/martyr). However, the above survey suggests that the martyr is the simpler and more fundamental motif in early literary strata. The wisdom motifs seem to build upon and further mythologize the martyr-figure. Besides, what could a Righteous One have possibly looked like in historical terms during the 1st century C.E.? In Wisdom of Solomon, the *dikaios* does not even get a name. Clearly, the Righteous One was at that time a more stereotypical, mythic character than the philosopher/martyr. The Righteous One was less likely to have become associated with a flesh-and-blood individual. The evidence, then, leads our speculation in the direction of seeing Jesus as a philosopher. Perhaps it is time to consider the possibility seriously.[45]

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[43] Mack, *Myth of Innocence* 67-69.

[44] Downing, *Jesus and the Threat of Freedom* 126-60. Cf. also *Christ and the Cynics.*

[45] I wish to thank Ron Cameron of Wesleyan University and Burton Mack of Claremont Graduate School for help in conceptualizing this essay, and Robert J. Miller of Midway College for help in clarifying its articulation.

The Function and Meaning of Achior in the Book of Judith

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The book of Judith is one of the most beautiful as well as controversial books in apocryphal literature.* Except for the issue of the original language, on which there is a virtual consensus among scholars,[1] a serious controversy remains about most of the external aspects of the book, e.g. its date,[2] the place of its composition[3] and the author.[4]

The mystery involves not only the origin of the book, but also its content. The book contains many historical and geographical contradictions or errors, inconsis-

* I am grateful to the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture for the financial assistance given to me in order to pursue this research. I owe my thanks, also, to Prof. Michael Stone and Rabbi Dr. Theodore Friedman for their assistance.

[1] It is agreed that there was originally a Hebrew *Vorlage*. However, it has been argued recently by T. Craven that Judith could have been composed from the outset in an "elegant hebraicised Greek" (*Artistry and Faith in the Book of Judith* [SBLDS 70; Chico: Scholars, 1983] 5). The text is extant in Greek (LXX) and in many other translations (Latin, Syriac, Coptic, Ethiopic and Armenian). There are also at least five medieval Hebrew texts. On all these matters, see C. Moore, *Judith* (The Anchor Bible, 40B; New York: Doubleday & Comp., 1985) 66-67, 91-108.

[2] The various theories may be classified into three categories: 1. "Persian period" (J. Grintz, *The Book of Judith* [Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1957; repr 1986] 3-55) (Hebr.); 2. "Two-stages composition"—the first composition in the Persian period and the rewriting of it in the Hellenistic period—(G. W. E. Nickelsburg, "Stories of Biblical and Early Post-Biblical Times," *Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period* [CRINT 2.2; ed. M. Stone; Assen/Philadelphia: Van Gorcum/Fortress, 1984] 51); J. C. Greenfield, "The Jewish Historical Novel in the Persian Period," *The History of the People of Israel* [ed. H. Tadmor & I. Ephal; Jerusalem: Am Oved, 1983] 209 [Hebr.]); 3. "Hasmonean period" (P. Winter, "Judith, Book of," *IDB* II, 1025; O. Eissfeldt, *The Old Testament. An Introduction* (Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1974) 587; E. Schürer, *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ* III/1 [ed. and rev. by G. Vermes, F. Millar and M. Goodman; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986] 218-219; Moore, *Judith*, 67-70; M. Enslin and S. Zeitlin, *The Book of Judith* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972) 26-31.

[3] For example, Antioch (Zeitlin, *Judith*, 31-32; B. Z. Luria, "Jews of Syria in the Days of Antiochus Epiphanes and the Book of Judith," *Bet Miqra* 62 (1975) 328-341 [Hebr.]) or Palestine (Moore, *Judith*, 70-71).

[4] E.g. Pharisee (Moore, ibid.) or Sadducee (H. Mantel, "Ancient Sadducean Piety" [ibid., *The Men of the Great Synagogue*, Dvir, 1983] 134-145 [Hebr.]). Cf. Craven, *Artistry and Faith*, 118-122.

tencies and improbabilities,[5] which have troubled scholars and exegetes for centuries.[6]

The present paper should be considered as part of this broader concern with perplexing problems. Our study will focus on one of the greatest mysteries of the book: Achior the Ammonite.

Achior appears in both parts of the book.[7] His first appearance is in chap. 5 (Part I). Holofernes, the commander of the Assyrian forces, surprised by the resistance offered by the Jews of the city of Bethulia to his army, asks many questions about their nature (5:1-4) and Achior, the leader of the Ammonites, who had joined the Assyrian forces in order to take part in the destruction of Israel, comes forward to supply the required information. He does it by surveying the sacred history of Israel (5:5-21). His words, especially his recommendation (vs. 20-21), do not please Holofernes and his generals (5:22-6:9), and he is therefore expelled from the Assyrian encampment and left tied near the city of Bethulia (6:10-13). Subsequently, he is released by the Jews and brought into the city, where he tells what happened to him (vs. 14-17). Finally, he is praised by the people, and Uzziah, one of the leaders of the town, takes him to his house (vs. 20-21).

He appears again in 14:5-10 (Part II).[8] Here, he is summoned by Judith in order to identify the head of Holofernes which she brought back with her to Bethulia. Upon seeing the head and hearing "all which the God of Israel had wrought, he believed in God with all his heart and got the flesh of his foreskin circumcised and was added to the house of Israel unto this day" (14:10).[9]

From this brief summary, a number of surprising elements emerge. Achior is the only secondary character in the story whose role is developed.[10] He knows the sacred history of Israel exceedingly well despite being a pagan. He is ready to suffer for Israel's faith as a martyr even though he belongs to the people of Ammon, a traditional enemy of the Jews.[11] And, most surprising of all, he converts to Judaism though such conversion contradicts the prohibition in Deut. 23:3-4. Who indeed is Achior? How is one to account for these curious aspects of his role? What is his function in the story? Does he have any concealed significance?

Oddly enough, few scholars have dealt with the figure of Achior and attempted to resolve, even partially, the problems he presents. For example, H. Cazelles[12] as

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[5] See many examples in Moore (*Judith*, 46-49) and in J. Licht ("The Book of Judith as a Literary Work," *Sefer Baruch Kurzweil* [Tel Aviv, 1975] 170-172 [Hebr.]).

[6] Most recently, it has been proposed that irony could be the "key" to the eccentricities of the book. On this see Moore, *Judith*, 78-85.

[7] The book is usually divided into two parts: Part I (chap. 1-7) and Part II (chap. 8-16). On the structure of the book, see Craven, *Artistry and Faith*, 47-64.

[8] In 11:9-10 Achior is only mentioned by Judith as the background for her speech to Holofernes.

[9] All the quotations follow, unless otherwise noted, the translation of Enslin, *Book of Judith*.

[10] Cf. Licht, "Book of Judith," 179.

[11] Cf. 1 Sam 11; Jer 41. It is all the more unusual if we take into consideration that the Jews of Bethulia were ready to surrender to the Assyrians: see 7:23-28.

[12] He argues that Achior is used by the author as a type "pour communiquer à leurs lecteurs un développement théologique sur le rôle de la justice et l'élection des

well as J. Steinmann[13] clarified some obscure aspects of Achior, though they fail to see his over-all complex function, and to integrate it into the structural framework of the story.

An important breakthrough on the subject is made by C. Moore:

> . . . Achior is a crucial character for uniting both sections of the book. For Achior has one foot solidly planted in the first part (chaps. 5-6) and his second foot resting in the other (11:9-19; 14:6-10). Achior is a splendid study in contrasts and an effective foil for several of the book's characters. For example, in comparison to the wicked Holofernes, Achior is "the Righteous Gentile" who was saved by the Jews. . . . When compared with Judith, Achior is the honest but ineffective advisor. An experienced soldier, Achior fainted when he saw the head that Judith had cut off with her own two hands. Yet Achior had more faith in the character and ways of Israel's God than did the magistrates of Bethulia.[14]

Nevertheless, even Moore does not pay attention to the fact that there is an especially intriguing structural relationship and a subtle complementarity between Achior and Judith which must be explained.[15]

In the light of the omissions just mentioned, I shall attempt in this paper to uncover the complex function of the structural relationship that exists between Achior and Judith; and to understand the significance of this literary phenomenon within the narrative.

The research consists of two parts. The first deals with the description of Achior's and Judith's respective functions. This is done by breaking up the appearances of both characters in the course of the story into five stages, and by pointing up in each of them their parallel or opposite construction and/or complementarity. The second part presents the explanation of the findings and the conclusion.

I. Description of the Functions of Achior and Judith

First Stage: Opposite Roles and Location

To begin with, Achior and Judith are thematically and functionally completely different. It is obvious from the information given about Achior in chap. 5 that he

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Gentiles" ("Le personnage d'Achior dans le livre de Judith," *RSR* 39 [1951], 134). Also, he dwells largely in his article on the origin of the character. He maintains that Achior the Ammonite is a new ethnic transformation of the ancient and famous Assyrian sage Ahikar, from whom he inherited his central feature—that of being a good and righteous pagan who is persecuted by evil powers. The "Ahikar theory" has been accepted by Moore (*Judith*, 163) and E. Haag (*Studien zum Buche Judith* [Trier: Paulinus-Verlag, 1963] 32-33), but strongly rejected by J. Steinmann ("Achior, prosélyte et prophète" [ibid., *Lecture de Judith*, Paris: Gabalda, 1953] 55) and Grintz (*Judith*, 110).

[13] He makes important observations on the function of Achior in chap. 5 as a "prophet" and "proselyte," and on the opposition Achior/Uzziah. See "Achior," 55-62.

[14] *Judith*, 59. cf. also Licht, "*Book of Judith*," 177.

[15] Scholars have already noted the thematic relationship between Judith and Holofernes, (e.g. T. Craven, "Artistry and Faith in the Book of Judith," *Semeia* 8 (1977) 93), but as far as I know, this is the first time that the relationship between Judith and Achior is emphasized.

is a man, more specifically, the leader (ὁ ἡγούμενος)[16] of the Ammonites, who had joined the army of Holofernes as a soldier so as to take part in the destruction of Israel. It is not clearly stated that he is a pagan, although it is taken for granted by the author.[17] His first appearance in the story is at the encampment of the Assyrians.

Judith, on the other hand, is described in contrast with Achior in full detail (8:1-8).[18] It is stated that she is a very beautiful and rich woman;[19] more specifically, an Israelite widow (vs. 4), who maintains a secluded way of life, removed from public affairs (vs. 5-6). She is described as particularly beautiful, rich and pious (vs. 7-8). Her first appearance is at the city of Bethulia.

Second Stage: Parallel Roles and Processes

Both characters, who in the first phase of the story stand in total opposition, show a startling similarity on a structural level in the second stage. There are all kinds of thematic and functional symmetries between them, either identities or antitheses.[20] Likewise, Achior and Judith as well undergo in this stage a basic change in their fundamental traits. These changes are essential for their later roles.

Achior delivers a speech (5:5-21) in which he gives Holofernes the information requested by him about the nature of the inhabitants of the city of Bethulia. Its content is largely a review of the sacred history of the Jews (vs. 6-19). At the center of his speech, there stands a spiritual lesson as seen "by an outsider":[21] "And whilst they (i.e. the Jews) did not sin before their God, good things were theirs because God who hates iniquity was with them. But when they strayed from the path which He had appointed for them, they were utterly destroyed in many wars . . ." (vs. 17-18ab). He ends his speech with a suggestion/advice (vs. 20-21). Although he flatters Holofernes by such words as "thy slave" (vs. 5) and "most sovereign lord" (vs. 20-21), his words arouse the anger of the Assyrian commander and his generals (5:22; 6:2). Surely, they feel that Achior has undergone a kind of transformation in the course of this speech from a pagan Ammonite at its beginning, at its end he spoke like a "Jew."[22]

Having heard of the people's protest against Uzziah and the oath taken by him (8:9), Judith summons the elders of the city in order to deliver a speech to them (8:11-27).[23] First of all, she criticizes them very strongly (vs. 11-16), and

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[16] All the quotations in Greek follow, unless otherwise noted, the Cambridge edition (Alan Brooke, Norman McLean and H. St. John Thackeray, eds. *Esther, Judith, Tobit.* The Old Testament in Greek, Vol. III, Part I [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940]).

[17] If not, his conversion at the end (14:10) would be senseless.

[18] Actually, this is the only description of a character in the narrative. Undoubtedly, this is because Judith is the pivotal character in the book.

[19] The contrast man/woman is not an artificial one, but an essential tension in the story. It is not accidental that the males are the principal characters of Part I, while a female, Judith, plays the principal role at Part II.

[20] On this literary feature in the book, see Craven, *Artistry and Faith,* 53-59.

[21] For Licht's distinction between Achior's spiritual lesson and Judith's (cf. below), see "Book of Judith," 177.

[22] Since Achior does not behave according to the pagan's stereotype.

[23] This action is already a change in her previous tendency to self-seclusion and

subsequently, she suggests to them to wait for God's deliverance and to call upon Him for succor (vs. 17). She supports her proposal by recalling the sacred history of Israel (vs. 18-19). From that history a spiritual lesson as seen "by an insider" emerges: "But as for us, we have known no other God save Him; whence we hope that He will not despise us or any of our people" (vs. 20). She ends her speech with a recommendation (vs. 24-25) based again on the lessons of the past (vs. 26-27). Though she criticizes the elders of Bethulia, her words arouse excitement and wonder (vs. 28-29). At the end of this stage, it is evident that Judith like Achior has undergone a notable change during and just after her speech—from a non-active, secluded and pious widow at the beginning, at the end she stands out as a "heroine" (vs. 32-34) and a "sensual women" (10:3-4)—so as to save Bethulia from destruction.[24]

Third Stage: Change of Places

In this phase, both characters change their locale in an inverted way.[25] This is a clever literary device used by the author not only in order to move the plot forward, but also, and especially, to complete the incipient transformation of Achior/Judith at the end of the last stage.

Achior, whom we first meet at the encampment of the Assyrians, is expelled by Holofernes and left tied near the city of Bethulia (6:7-13). Later, he is released by the Jews and brought (ἀπήγαγον) into the town and taken into the presence of the rulers of the city (6:14).

Judith, whom we first meet at the city of Bethulia, leaves it voluntarily (10:6-10). Afterwards, she is met by the Assyrians and brought (ἤγαγον) into into the presence of Holofernes (10:11-23).[26]

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non-involvement in public affairs: see 8:4. Also notable is the fact that this public appearance of Judith and her speech contradict the stereotype of woman's function in ancient Jewish society. Cf. Philo, *On the Special Laws* III, 31 [171]. On this matter in general see Theodore Friedman, "The Shifting Role of Women, from the Bible to Talmud," *Judaism* 36(4) (1987) 479-487.

[24] Again, this attitude stands against the cultural stereotype. For example, Philo says: "And so in wars and campaigns and emergencies which threaten the whole country they (i.e. women) are not allowed to take their place according to the judgement of the law, having in view the fitness of things, which it was resolved to keep unshaken always and everywhere and considered to be in itself more valuable than victory or liberty or success of any kind" (*On the Special Laws* III, 31 [172]; Loeb Classical Library, VII, 583).

[25] It is important to bear in mind that Achior and Judith are the only two central characters in the story that do this.

[26] From a structural point of view, the coming of Judith to the Assyrian encampment makes it possible to maintain the balance of the two locales. The encampment of the Assyrians had expelled one person (Achior) and the city of Bethulia gained a new inhabitant. Therefore, it was necessary for literary reasons to regain the balance between the two places by removing one character from the Jewish town (Judith) and placing her in the Assyrian encampment.

Fourth Stage: Change of Roles

Here both characters accomplish in their new surroundings their radical transformation initiated at the end of the second stage. However, the result is somewhat paradoxical. Once again, they play totally opposite roles, but unlike the first stage, in a reversed way.

Now Achior, heretofore the pagan soldier and enemy of Israel, appears as a betrayer of Holofernes (6:17) and a peaceful friend of the Jews in the city of Bethulia (6:20-21), while Judith, heretofore the secluded and pious Jewish widow, becomes a "liar" (e.g. 11:11-14), a "betrayer" (10:13; 11:16-19), a "mistress" (12:13-19). And most extraordinary of all, she behaves like a "brave soldier" (13:6-8) in the encampment of the Assyrians.[27] It would seem as if Achior plays, as it were, Judith's role at his new place, while Judith takes on Achior's.

However, this opposition is a ficticious one. Strictly speaking, only Achior has changed his fundamental traits, while Judith has undergone a pseudo-transformation in order to deceive Holofernes.

Even though they play "opposite roles," from a structural point of view Achior and Judith function in the same way in their new environment and elicit the same reactions from their hearers.

Achior discloses Holofernes' plans to the inhabitants of Bethulia (6:17).[28] In consequence of this, he is highly praised by the people and is brought to Uzziah's house (6:20-21).

Judith, on the other hand, reveals "Israel's plans" to Holofernes (11:11-14). Like Achior, she pleases the Assyrians (11:20-23), and is invited to stay at the encampment (12:1ss.)

Many elements of Judith's speech to Holofernes (11:5-19) resemble very much that of Achior:

Achior/Holofernes

1. At their first encounter, Achior delivers a speech to Holofernes (5:5-21) in answer to the latter's questions (5:2-4);
2. He opens his speech with words stressing truth (5:5);[29]
3. His advice to Holofernes (5:20-21), in the light of the development of the story, is completely truthful;
4. Achior's speech is regarded by Holofernes as a prophecy (6:2);[30]
5. Holofernes' (6:2) and his generals' (5:22) reaction is highly negative.

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[27] About this role see above note 24. However, this behaviour recalls strongly Jael's (Jd 4:17-21).

[28] The appearances of Achior are, from a functional point of view, essential for the development of the story. As a result of his speech (5:5-21) Holofernes issues an order to wage war against the children of Israel (7:1-7), while after he disclosed Holofernes' plans to the inhabitants of Bethulia Judith made her appearance as "the Saviour" (chap. 8).

[29] "I will tell thee the truth (ἀναγγελῶ σοι τὴν ἀλήθειαν)"; "no lie shall come forth (οὐκ ἐξελεύσεται ψεῦδος) from the mouth of thy slave."

[30] On the function of Achior as prophet in chap. 5 see Steinmann, "Achior," 56. On the relationship between Balaam "the prophet" and Achior, see Moore, *Judith*, 166.

Judith/Holofernes

1. At their first encounter, Judith delivers a speech to Holofernes (11:5-19) in answer to his question (11:3);
2. She opens her speech with words stressing truth (11:5);[31]
3. Her advice to Holofernes (11:17-19), in the light of the development of the story, is totally misleading;
4. Judith presents herself as a "prophetess" (11:16-19);
5. Holofernes' and his people's reaction is highly positive (11:20).[32]

Fifth Stage: Meeting and Transformation of the Characters

In spite of the thematic and functional symmetries between the two characters in the narrative, their first encounter takes place almost at the very end of the story (14:6-10).[33] Theoretically, they could have met before.[34] Although Judith knows about Achior (11:9), the author did not want them to meet until this point in the story.

Having killed Holofernes, Judith comes back to Bethulia (13:10-13). Upon returning to the Jewish town she does not immediately reassume her previous status, but for a while plays the role of a commander (14:1-4). It is at the peak of this role playing that she finally meets Achior. This is accomplished by summoning Achior to identify the head of Holofernes (14:5).[35]

At this meeting, Achior completes his radical transformation begun in the second and fourth stage. At the beginning he is as a leader and a soldier. Now, at the end of the tale, he behaves like a civilian. When Achior sees the head of Holofernes "he fell upon his face and became as one dead" (14:6) as if it were the first time in his life he saw this kind of thing.[36] Moreover, at the beginning he is a pagan Ammonite, but after hearing "all which the God of Israel had wrought, he believed in God with all his heart[37] and got the flesh of his foreskin circumcised and was added to the house of Israel unto this day" (vs. 10). After this conversion,[38] Achior does not appear again.

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[31] "I will tell my lord nothing false (οὐκ ἀναγγελῶ ψεῦδος)." Cf. 10:13.

[32] This fact is a result of the implicit irony of the narrative. See Moore, *Judith*, 83.

[33] This is in accordance to the author's technique by which he resolves in the second part of the story situations constructed in the first, such as: the siege of Bethulia by the Assyrians/the defeat of the Assyrians by the Jews; the boasting of Holofernes/the killing of Holofernes; etc.

[34] For example, between the coming of Achior to Bethulia (6:14) and the departure of Judith out of the city (10:6).

[35] He was the only person in Bethulia who could testify as to the identity of the head.

[36] The ironical contrast between Judith's commander-soldier role and Achior's civilian role is apparent.

[37] For the traditional biblical motif "The recognition of the greatness of God by a Gentile," see: Ex 18:1-11; Josh 2:9-11; 1Sam 5:7, 6:5; 1Kg 5:21, 10:9; 2Kg 5:15; 2Chr 32:23; Dan 3:28-32, 6:26-28, etc.

[38] "Here we clearly see conversion for the first time: belief in the true God accompanied by circumcision and a change in identity" (Sh. J. D. Cohen, "Conversion to Judaism in Historical Perspective: From Biblical Israel to Post-Biblical Judaism,"

On the other hand, Judith gradually resumes her former conduct after the meeting with Achior and the defeat of the Assyrians (15:1-7). first of all, her piety (15:14-16:19), after that, her retirement (vs. 21), and finally, her widow's weeds (vs. 22).[39]

Now, let us summarize the above-mentioned details in a table in order to present them clearly before proceeding to the second part.

ACHIOR	JUDITH
First Stage: Opposite Roles and Location	
Man (5:5)	Beautiful woman (8:7)
Ammonite/enemy of Israel (5:5)	Israelite (8:1)
Leader and soldier (5:5)	Secluded widow (8:4-6)
Pagan	Jewish (8:8)
Encampment of the Assyrians	City of Bethulia
Second Stage: Parallel Roles and Processes	
Delivery of a speech (5:5-21)	Delivery of a speech (8:11-27)
history of the Jews (5:6-19)	history of the Jews (8:18-19, 26-27)
spiritual lesson (5:17-18ab)	spiritual lesson (8:20)
suggestion/advice (5:20-21)	suggestion/recommendation (8:17, 24-25)
flattering words (5:5,20-21)	criticism (8:11-16)
Anger as reaction (5:22;6:2)	Wonder as reaction (8:28-29)
Transformation into a "Jew"	Transformation into a "heroine" (8:32-34) and a "sensual woman" (10:3-4)
Third Stage: Change of Places	
Expelled from the Assyrian encampment (6:7-13)	Left Bethulia voluntarily (10:6-10)
Brought into Bethulia and taken into the presence of the rulers of the city (6:14)	Brought into the presence of Holofernes (10:11-23)

Conservative Judaism 36(4) [1983] 35). Achior's conversion is one of the most difficult issues in the story. On this matter, see Moore, *Judith,* 235-236; Grintz, *Judith,* 45; Zeitlin, *Judith,* 24-25; Nickelsburg, "Stories," 49, 51 n.99.

[39] However, it must be noted that the resumption is not absolute. Cf. 8:4-6.

Fourth Stage: Change of Roles

Betrayer of Holofernes (6:17)	"Liar" (e.g. 11:11-15); "betrayer" (11:16-19); "mistress" (12:13-19)
Peaceful friend of the Jews (6:20-21)	"Brave soldier" (13:6-8)

Function and Reactions

Disclosure of Holofernes' plans (6:17)	Disclosure of "Israel's plans" (11:11-14)
Praised by the people and brought to Uzziah's house (6:20-21)	Praised by the people (11:20-23) and invited to stay at the encampment (12:5)

Speech

Achior/Holofernes	Judith/Holofernes
A speech (5:5-21) in answer to Holofernes' questions (5:2-4)	A speech (11:5-19) in answer to Holofernes' question (11:3)
Opening words stressing truth truth (5:5)	Opening words stressing truth truth (11:5)
Truthful advice (5:20-21)	Misleading advice (11:17-19)
Speech regarded as a prophecy (6:2)	Judith as "prophetess" (11:16-19)
Negative reaction of Holofernes and his people (5:22; 6:2)	Positive reaction of Holofernes and his people (11:20-23)

Fifth Stage: Meeting and Transformation of the Characters

	Commander role (14:1-4)
Meeting with Judith (14:6-10)	Meeting with Achior (14:6-10)
Transformation into a civilian (14:6) and a Jew (14:10)	Transformation into a pious (15:14-16:19) and secluded widow (16:21-22)

II. Explanation and Conclusion

The first part of this paper sought to demonstrate that Achior is much more than "un personnage episodique,"[40] or "a splendid study in contrasts and an effective foil for several of the book's characters."[41] He is designed thematically as well as functionally as the parallel and complement to Judith, being a kind of double or "alter

[40] Cazelles, "Achior," 134.

[41] Moore, *Judith*, 59. Cf. also Licht, "Book of Judith," 177.

ego." In some way, the Ammonite leader is the masculine/pagan version of the feminine/Jewish Judith.

What has been said above is true till virtually the end of the narrative when both characters meet each other for the first time. Here, the thematic and functional similarity and/or complementarity between Judith and her double reaches a resolution.[42] Since the motif of widowhood is highly important in the book,[43] the writer could not resolve it by marrying them to each other. Therefore, the only way he could find to break the equilibrium was to blur the last two essential differences between the two, viz. by converting Achior into a civilian and a Jew, and thus bringing him as close as possible to Judith.

But if our analysis is correct, one faces a serious question: Why did the author portray Achior who is a soldier and pagan Ammonite as the thematic and functional counterbalance of Judith, the Jewish heroine of the book? It may have been done for purely literary reasons. Or was it because the unknown writer tried to tell us something through this literary device?

Obviously, no definitive answer to this question is possible. Nevertheless, Achior's role in the story might be understood as a result of the ideology of universalism that underlies the book.[44] The author wanted, presumably, to teach us through this very sophisticated technique that a righteous pagan is, essentially, the parallel and complement to a complete Jew by birth, and that he is able to perfect his condition by believing in God and joining the people of Israel through conversion.[45]

This teaching—the essential complementarity between a convert and a Jew—may also explain the literary fact that the traditions about Abraham (5:6-9) function as a model for both Judith and Achior.[46]

Abraham is described in this brief section as a great believer, who is ready to suffer for his faith, and who stands in contrast to the pagan Chaldeans as well as to the Exodus generation.[47] His attitude anticipates Judith's. Judith like Abraham is described as a great believer in God, who denies the divinity of Nebuchadnezzar,

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[42] For this reason, the author did not bring them together before this.

[43] Cf. 8:4-5; 16:22. About "widowhood" as a literary motif and as a religious value, see P. Sandevoir, "Viudas," *Vocabulario de Teología Bíblica*; (ed. X. Leon-Dufour; Barcelona: Ed. Herder, 1980) 961-962.

[44] I agree with Cazelles ("Achior," 134, 137) and Steinmann ("Achior," 62) that underlying the national, almost nationalistic, atmosphere of the book, there is, paradoxically, a universal trend. (Against this, see Moore, *Judith*, 235-236). However, see the qualification of this general statement in the next note.

[45] It must be borne in mind that even this universal stance is not "presque évangélique" (Steinmann, "Achior," 62. cf. Cazelles, "Achior," 134.) but has a nationalistic undertone, since his conversion is meant to prove the main thesis of the book: the superiority of the Jews and their beliefs over the world of the Pagans.

[46] A finding that indirectly confirms our thesis of the parallelism and complementarity between them.

[47] The opposition between Abraham and the pagan Chaldeans is obvious; see 5:8. The contrast between Abraham and the Exodus generation is more subtle. If we compare the Abraham section (5:6-9) with the Exodus-generation section (vs. 10-14a), which appears in the same literary context of Achior's speech (5:5-21), it can be seen that the author seeks to demonstrate the superiority of Abraham's faith. (I hope to prove this statement in a forthcoming paper).

and who fiercely opposes the pagans. Yet, Judith also stands in contrast to the Jews of Bethulia. While she has a strong faith in God and is willing to suffer for it (8:24-27), the Jews of Bethulia were ready to surrender to the Assyrian army (7:23-28). Likewise, Abraham is also the model for Achior. Both (1) believe in God (5:8ab//14:10), (2) are expelled because of their faith (5:8c//6:11), and (3) convert to a new faith (5:8ab//14:10).[48]

That is to say, according to the book of Judith, the righteous pagan who converts to Judaism is equal to the Jew even in the fact that both have Abraham as their model or "father". Such a doctrine strongly recalls the teachings of Philo[49] and the Rabbis[50] some centuries later.

To sum up, our present paper has attempted to demonstrate that Achior is a very skilfully crafted character, who is described thematically as well as functionally throughout the narrative as the parallel and complement to Judith, being a kind of double or "alter ego," and that this role is to be understood as the literary expression of the ideology of universalism that underlies the book.

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[48] We have to bear in mind that the traditions about Abraham are contained in Achior's own speech. He opens his review of the sacred history of Israel with the description of Abraham as the first "convert" at 5:6-9 (Part I), while he closes the circle when he converts to Abraham's faith in 14:10 (Part II). On this technique in the book, see above note 33.

[49] Cf. *On the Virtues*, 219. About his teachings, see J. S. Bosch, "La figura de Abrahám en Pablo y en Filón de Alejandría" (*Salvación de la Palabra. Targum-Derash-Berith. En memoria del Profesor Alejandro Diez Macho* [ed. D. M. León; Madrid: Ed. Cristiandad, 1986] 677-688, especially 687).

[50] See C. G. Montefiore and H. Loewe, *A Rabbinic Anthology* (New York: Schocken Books, 1974) 574 [1599], 577-578 [1608].

Character Construction and Community Formation in the Book of Judith

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Exegetical studies of the text of Judith have kept pace with its peripatetic heroine. At first they were located, like Judith on her roof, in the relatively rarified atmosphere of historical investigation. Then, just as Judith summoned the Bethulian leaders, so convincing works have called upon predominant forms of literary analysis. And, like Judith trodding that dangerous path to the alien camp, so recent studies have made forays into the alien territories of feminism, psychoanalysis, and folklore studies. Regardless of the approach, however, Judith the character is usually identified as a representation of or as a metaphor for the community of faith. Although her name, widowhood, chastity, beauty, and righteousness suggest the traditional representation of Israel, the text's association of these traits with an independent woman and with sexuality subverts the metaphoric connection between character and androcentrically determined community. This paper explores how Judith the Jew/ess (Ιουδιθ) both sustains and threatens corporate determination as well as how that threat is averted through her reinscription into Israelite society.

All women are other, as de Beauvoir declares: woman "is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her. . . . He is the Subject, he is the Absolute—she is the Other."[1] But this generic otherness itself neither problematizes Judith's potential to prepresnt Israel nor threatens Israelite society. The community is traditionally represented by female figures ranging from the virgin (2 Kgs 19:21//Isa 37:22; Lam 1:15; 2:13; Jer 14:17) to the bride (Jer 2:2-3; Hos 2:15b) to the whore (Hos 1-4; Ezek 16) to the widow (Lam 1:1; Isa 54:4-8). Rather, Judith's being an other who nonetheless speaks and acts in the world of Israelite patriarchy creates the crisis. Apart, ascetic, and asocial, she is merely a curiosity. Present in the public sphere, sexually active, and socially involved, she endangers hierarchical oppositions of gender, race, and class, muddles conventional gender characteristics and dismantles their claims to universality, and so threatens the status quo.[2] Judith relativizes the normative cultural constructions of the

[1] Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex* (New York: Bantam, 1961) xvi.

[2] Jonathan Z. Smith, "What A Difference A Difference Makes," *"To See Ourselves as Others See Us": Christians, Jews, "Others" in Late Antiquity* (ed. J. Neusner and E. S. Frerichs; Chico, CA: Scholars Press) 36: "The 'other' emerges only as a theoretical issue when it is perceived as challenging a complex and intact world view." At this point, the different becomes both alien and dangerous. Cf. James G. Williams, *Women Recounted. Narrative Thinking and the God of Israel* (Sheffield: Almond, 1982)

community. Yet her ultimate return to the private sphere and therefore her reinscription into androcentric Israel alleviates the crisis precipitated by her actions and reinforces the norms revealed by her otherness.

Judith appears at first to be a classic metaphor both for the nation and for all women. Not only does her name mean "the Jewess," but also she "is a widow, for the Jewish nation is living at the time of grave danger and affliction, like a forlorn widow."[3] Judith is the text's only named woman character and thus the only woman recognized by its male-defined world.[4] Further, because her name is a generic, its applicability can easily be extended beyond the individual. The women of Bethulia are all like Judith in that each is a "Jewess." Through her name, Judith is associated with gentile women as well. Judith the daughter of Merari evokes and rehabilitates Judith the daughter of Beeri, the Hittite wife of Esau who "made life bitter for Isaac and Rebecca" (Gen 26:35).[5]

But this metaphoric identification of Judith with the Jewish community as well

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78: Judith "captivates Holofernes and the Assyrians in a fashion reminiscent of the wisdom tradition's warnings against . . . the 'alien woman' (Prov 6.24-25; Sir 9.8-9; 25.21)." While Smith notes that "Difference most frequently entails a hierarchy of prestige and a concomitant political ranking of superordinate and subordinate" (4-5), he does not classify women among his proximate others. Feminist criticism, which posits gender as a prime matter of inquiry, suggests that by her very difference, woman challenges traditional methodological and epistemological perspectives. See, among others, Elaine Showalter, "The Feminist Critical Revolution," *The New Feminist Criticism* (ed. idem; New York: Pantheon, 1985) 3-10; Gayle Greene and Coppélia Kahn, "Feminist scholarship and the social construction of woman," *Making a Difference: Feminist Literary Criticism* (ed. idem; London and New York: Methuen, 1985) 1-36.

[3]L. Alonso-Schökel, "Judith," *Harper's Bible Commentary* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988) 810; cf. his "Narrative Structures in the Book of Judith," *Protocol Series of the Colloquies of the Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture* 11 (ed. W. Wuellner; 1974) 14-15: "As a widow, [Judith] can represent the Jewish people in her affliction"; "as a weak woman lacking the support of her husband, she can show and reveal better the force of God (9:10-11; 13:14-15; 16:6)." The analogy is common, from Luther's comment that "Judith is the Jewish people, represented as a chaste and holy widow" (cited by, among others, T. Craven, "Artistry and Faith in the Book of Judith," *Semeia* 8 [1977] 77). On the connection of Israel/the Jewish nation and Judith see also Craven, *Artistry and Faith in the Book of Judith* (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983) 85; D. R. Dumm, "Judith," *JBC* 626. On the name's allegorical potential see Williams, *Women*, 76, representing literary-critical reading; Coote, "Comment on 'Narrative Structures in the Book of Judith,'" *Colloquies*, 21-22, on the significance of the name for the female warrior; and C. Moore, *Judith* (AB 40) 179.

[4] Jdt 8:1 breaks the pattern of the first seven chapters, in which a plethora of male names and so individual male subjects appear. Alonso-Schökel sees the break caused by the genealogy in terms of plot rather than gender: it interrupts the campaigns of Holofernes and Nebuchadnezzar ("Narrative Structures," 4).

[5] Noted by E. Bjørkan, "Subversion in Judith: A Literary-Critical Analysis" (Senior Thesis, Swarthmore College, 1987) 53. One should add to Bjørkan's work the further between the two women: neither has any children.

as beyond to gentile women breaks down. Judith the woman can only incompletely represent Israel. The community is historically active; women are not. Judith is thus both part of and apart from her people. Her rhetoric further unties the lines identifying her with both Israel and other women. The initial prayer in chapter 9 identifies the rape-victim Dinah by a generic term; she is called simply a "virgin" (. . . παρθένου, 9:2). Unlike "Judith," however, this generic does not function as a proper name. Dinah has been robbed of her personhood. Further, Judith equates Dinah's rape with the siege of Bethulia, and the association is reinforced by the resonance between the name of the town and the Hebrew for "virgin," בתולה.[6] Judith, however, assumes the man's role of protector-avenger associated with her ancestor (cf. 9:2, . . . τοῦ πατρός μου Συμεων). Indeed, she identifies with the man to the extent that she expresses no sympathy for the Shechemite women. That the deity "gave their wives for a prey and their daughters to captivity" (9:4) Judith interprets as a sign of divine justice. Mention of these victims occurs in the context of social egalitarianism—the deity "strikes slaves as well as princes" (9:3) and is called the "god of the lowly, helper of the oppressed, upholder of the weak, protector of the forlorn, savior of those without hope" (9:11)—but Judith herself does not recognize gentiles as in need of protection. Were Judith fully to embody Israel, then the traditional representation of the deity as the (male) savior of the female-figured community would be challenged. Were all women to be like Judith, not only Holofernes would lose his head. Were Judith to represent gentile women, then the paradigmatic identification of Israel as chosen from among the nations would be compromised. Such separation of Judith from corporate Israel, from Jewish women, and from gentiles preserves the text's patriarchal ethos.

Metaphoric connections between the heroine and the community extend beyond Judith's name to gender-determined categories. Yet gender alone does not define their common characteristic. Israel's traditional representations as virgin, continent bride, adulterous whore, and celibate widow also share a sexual thematic. Faithful Israel is sexually controlled; her faithless antitype is sexually loose. Consequently, the chaste widow Judith—like the virgin Dinah (Jdt 9:9-10)—represents the holy community.

While Judith's widowhood conforms to the traditional representation of Israel as a women in mourning and while both she and Bethulia are draped in sackcloth, Judith's particular representation—her status, rhetoric, wealth, beauth, and even her genealogy—aborts the metaphor. This widow is hardly the forlorn female in need of male protection. Given the negative associations of her husband's name, Manasseh, his absence is almost welcome; he shares the name of the king held responsible for the Babylonian exile (2 Kgs 21:12-15; 23:26-27; 24:3-4). Moreover, the circumstances of his death, heatstroke while watching the binding of barley sheaves, graphically anticipate the decapitation of Holofernes. The phallic imagery of the bound sheaves prefigures the general's dismembered head; both symbolize castration.[7] The psychosexual suggestiveness of this imagery is complemented by

[6] Inter alia, Alonso-Schökel, *Harper's*, 806, and his less sanguine comments in "Narrative Structures," 18-19.

[7] On the relationship between decapitation and castration see Alan Dundes, "Comment on 'Narrative Structures in the Book of Judith,'" *Colloquies*, 28-29. The tie between decapitation and genital mutilation adds another dimension to the well-known trope connecting Holofernes with Shechem, and Judith with Dinah/Simeon.

barley meal's ritual function; it is the offering required of a man who suspects his wife of infidelity even "though she has not defiled herself" (Num 5:15). Linguistic parallels make the ties between Manasseh and Holofernes even more pronounced. While the general is decapitated by Judith, Manasseh is cut down when the burning fever attacks his head (καὶ ὁ καύσων ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ). Each man takes to his bed (καὶ ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ τὴν κλίνη αὐτοῦ [8:3]; καὶ Ολοφέρνης προπεπτωκὼς ἐπὶ τὴν κλίνη αὐτοῦ [13:3]), and each dies. Manasseh's absence is necessitated by the demands of Israelite patriarchy: Judith's actions would have subjected him, had he been alive, to sexual disgrace[8] Only Holofernes realizes the danger of humiliation: "It will be a disgrace if we let such a woman go without enjoying her company, for if we do not embrace her she will laugh at us" (Jdt 12:12). By her sexually charged presence, the widow Judith therefore threatens the masculine ethos of the Assyrian army.

The specified length of Judith's mourning has been claimed "to heighten the picture of her loyalty and devotion" to her dead husband,[9] but the reference to "three years and four months" or forty months (8:4) is overdetermined. The length of her mourning and the meaning of her widowhood extend beyond concern for the absent spouse. First, the period recapitulates the forty years Israel spent in the wilderness. From the time of the Passover/the barley harvest, Judith undergoes a period of testing and purification. But this analogy does not require her to mourn for Manasseh any more than the generation in the wilderness needed to mourn for Egypt. Second, the three years and four months structurally parallels the thirty-four days of the siege (7:20). Third, the detailed description of Judith's mourning stresses her otherness. Upon her husband's death, Judith removed herself from Bethulian society and, specifically, from men.

Judith had to be a widow—that is, sexually experienced but unattached—in order for her to carry out her plan. And she had to stay a widow. Upon completing the festivities in Jerusalem, she "went to Bethulia, and remained on her estate. . . . Many desired to marry her, but she remained a widow" (16:21-22). Remarriage for levirate purposes would create a new lineage and consequently challenge the power structure of Bethulian society. Further, as a widow safely returned to her proper place, the private sphere, Judith preserves her identification with Israel: no longer active, she no longer subverts the metaphor. A utilitarian reading would even claim that Judith remains a widow both because she had nothing to gain by marriage and because no man was worthy of her. Only the text's females act in a fully efficacious manner;[10] only Judith displays well-directed initiative; only her maid competently follows instructions. The men are weak, stupid, or impaired: Manasseh dies ignominiously; Holofernes is inept; Bagoas is a eunuch; Achior faints at the sight of Holofernes's head. Uzziah, who shares Judith's ethnicity and elevated social status and who, because he is descended from Simeon, might even be able to claim levirate privileges, is the biggest disappointment. Judith must correct his naive theology, and she stands firm while he wavers in his faith (cf. 7:30-31). The only fit male companion for Judith is the deity, and it is with him she communes in prayer on her

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[8] See W. Shumaker, "Critique of Luis Alonso-Schökel on *Judith*," *Colloquies*, 32.

[9] M. S. Enslin, *The Book of Judith* (Leiden: Brill, 1972) 111.

[10] Commenting on 15:11, Craven, *Artistry*, 104 n. 73, observes: "The text reads τὴν ἡμίονον, "mule" in the singular. . . . Could it be that Judith's female donkey, like Judith herself, can do what it usually takes a team to do?"

roof. Yet given the lack of his direct presence in the text, this relationship is a bit one-sided. Indeed, Coote has argued that Judith "represents a kind of reversal of the type of rescue pattern underlying the exodus story, in which a male hero (the Lord) rescues a female figure (Israel) from captivity."[11] Rather than conform to the traditional image of widow, Judith's representation follows both divine and male paradigms.

Like her name, gender, and widowhood, Judith's genealogy betrays her metaphoric function. This list is not an invention designed to mock the elaborate pedigrees fabricated by post-exilic aristocrats (so Bruns), nor is its purpose primarily to indicate Judith's Samaritan origins (so Steinmann).[12] On the one hand, the genealogy anchors Judith to Israelite history. The reference in 8:1 to "Israel" reinforces the symbolic value of Judith's own name. Further, as the connection to Israel (=Jacob) signals Judith's talents for deception and for crossing boundaries, so names like Gideon, Elijah, Nathaneal, Joseph, and Merari portend her abilities to function in such roles as judge, prophet, ambassador, and priest. She is the telos of her genealogy and so her generation's representative of "Israel." On the other hand, because neither the Israel of 8:1 nor any of the others listed in her family tree have made their mark in history—they, unlike Judith, have not lived up to their names—their inscription in history is due entirely to her. She is the one who also reinscribes the branch of her family that had been written out (Jdt 9:2; cf. Gen 49:7 as well as the silence in Jdt 8:1-2): the line of Simeon. Thus, while Judith's genealogy situates her within the historical community and makes her its representative, it is Judith herself who confers value, meaning, and legitimacy to those whom she represents. The relationship between the representation (i.e., Judith) and the represented (i.e., her historical community) which undergirds any metaphoric identification is, consequently, rendered problematic.

In terms of her relationship to the present generation of Bethulians, Judith is marked as other by her wealth, beauty, and religiosity. Rich, gorgeous, pious, as well as independent, Judith is particularly distinguished from the women of Israel. The women in Bethulia are weak from thirst, robbed of their voice by their husbands (cf. 4:12), and controlled by the town leaders (7:32b). Even Judith's make lacks her freedom. These distinctions are first established through a geographical notice with attendant value hierarchies. Judith is defined spatially as superior to the rest of Bethulia: the "women and young men" are associated first with the "streets of the city and . . . the passages through the gate" (7:22); she is on her roof (8:5). They are unsheltered and in need of protection; she is in a tent and is, additionally, either unaware of or unconcerned with the danger below: she distributes neither her wealth nor her water. Instead, her wealth allows her to enhance her beauty and so further distinguish herself. She has water for bathing while the people are fainting from thirst (7:22). The text even dwells on the material goods available for her adornment: "She bathed her body with water, and anointed herself with precious ointment . . . and put on a tiara, and arrayed herself in her gayest apparel . . . and put on her anklets and bracelets and rings and her earrings and all her ornaments . . ." (10:3b-4). Originally she was "beautiful in appearance, and had a very

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[11] "Comment," 21. Such a reversal endangers both the tradition and the status quo.

[12] J. E. Bruns, "The Genealogy of Judith," *CBQ* 18 (1956) 19; M. Steinmann, *Lecture de Judith* (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1953) 72.

lovely face" (8:7); now she rivals Helen of Troy. Chabris and Charmis notice "How her face was altered" (10:7), and to the men in the Assyrian camp she was "marvelously beautiful" (10:14). Even Judith herself acknowledges the striking "beauty of her countenance" (16:7). The enemy soldiers "marveled at her beauty, and admired the Israelites, judging them by her . . ." (10:19). Although they mistakenly perceive Judith as representing her contemporaries—only Judith possesses such striking beauty—the soldiers' judgment supports Judith's identification as a traditional metaphor of Israel.

Judith's piety also supports her metaphoric identification with Israel even as it severs her connection to the Bethulian population (8:5-6, 28-29, 31; 9:1-14; 10:2, 8; etc.). No fanatical ascetic, the truly observant widow demonstrates her faith both by fasting and by eating at appropriate occasions (a trait that will serve her well in Holofernes's camp). This religiosity is distinguished from the bad theology and related practices of the Bethulian leaders. The men return to their posts (8:36), but Judith engages in devotional activities "at the very time when that evening's incense was being offered in the house of God in Jerusalem" (9:1). As a woman, she is technically marginal to the operation of the official cult. But on her roof, she can participate in devotions without endangering the status quo. Close to the deity in spirit and in physical location, she is removed from the people both religiously and spatially. The summary verse of her introduction (8:7-8) confirms her various unique attributes and retains the emphasis on her piety. While her beauty plus the "gold and silver, and men and women slaves, and cattle, and fields" left to her by her husband would be sufficient to distinguish her from other Bethulians, "no one spoke ill of her because (ὅτι) she feared God exceedingly" (8:8).

When the woman of whom the community spoke chooses herself to speak to them, she unleashes otherness into the public sphere. By sending her *female* slave out of the female-defined household into the male-dominated public sphere, Judith weakens the gender divisions defining Israelite society; by conveying Judith's summons to the town leaders, the female *slave* inverts social hierarchies. These inversions continue throughout Judith's contact with men in positions of power. By accepting Judith's theological program, the Bethulian leaders both reinforce her metaphoric potential to represent the faithful community and acknowledge her potentially subversive voice. When they endeavor to redirect her discourse toward private piety (8:31), she makes public her intent to act; they are reduced to accepting her words (8:33-34; 10:9). And those words subvert the metaphoric understanding of language in the public sphere—the sharing of a common code—just as her actions subvert her metaphoric identification with Israel. Judith promises "to do a thing which will go down through all generations of our descendants" (8:32), but her "thing" (πρᾶγμα) is a sign lacking any definitive referent. In the Assyrian camp, Judith continues to transgress linguistic expectations. Her use of double entendres (e.g., the double referents to "lord" [κύριος] in 11:5, 6, 11; 12:14) furthers her subversive intent.

Exploitation of conventional expectations is indicated by more than Judith's rhetoric. According to Alan Dundes, when Judith removes "the garments of widowhood and mourning (10:3) to wear attractive alluring garb [she] appears to move metaphorically from death to life."[13] Yet this is one more metaphor Judith undercuts, for the "life" into which she moves is of a very peculiar sort. The private widow becomes a public woman; she undergoes a total inversion from ascetic chastity to

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[13] "Comment on 'Narrative Structures,'" 28.

(the guise of) lavish promiscuity. Nor does she simply enter the life of the community either through association with her neighbors or through Levirate marriage; rather, she leaves town. Finally, she moves not directly from death to life but rather from death of one sort, that of the widow separated from her besieged and dying society, to death of another, that of the assassin active among a doomed population. The Assyrian camp is the realm of the dead: characterized by killing and populated by the castrated Bagoas, the beguiled, the besotted, and the beheaded. That Holofernes's "god" is the "historically dead" Nebuchadnezzar and that the army represents the "historically conquered" Assyrian empire further denies the gentiles any association with life. Only when Judith returns to her people and celebrates with them in Jerusalem does she both create and enter the realm of life. But at that moment, tainted by death as well as confirmed as a dangerous other active in the public sphere, she threatens the structure of the very life she engenders and upholds.

Upon her return, the seeds of Judith's threat begin to flower in Israel. By her actions and by her presence, she offers those previously marginal to or excluded from the power base—Jewish women, Achior the gentile, the maidservant—a role in society and cult. The conditions under which gender-determined, ethnic, and class-based integration occur, however, differ according to the text's treatment of women, proselytes, and slaves. Before Judith entered the public sphere of Israel, the Jewish women were separated from their husbands and from the place of action by their leaders' command (7:32). In 15:12-13, "all the women of Israel" (πᾶσα γυνὴ Ισραηλ) gather to see her and bless her; some even dance in her honor. In turn, she distributes branches (θύρσα) to her companions.[14] These women, who then "crowned themselves with olive wreaths," reveal their transformation into active agents. Last, Judith leads "all the women" (πασῶν τῶν γυναικῶν) while "every man" (πᾶς ἀνὴρ Ισραηλ) followed them. Thus the female population of Israel, like the sword-brandishing (13:6-8) and head-bearing (13:15) Judith, become both graphically and by their actions phallic women.[15] Such inversions of male/female leadership patterns are permitted if not necessitated by the extraordinary circumstances of Judith's deed and Israel's rescue. However, they cannot be allowed to continue unchecked. Only by remaining unique and apart can Judith be tolerated, domesticated, and even treasured by Israelite society. The women consequently must return to their homes and their husbands.

Just as Judith transforms the social roles of the Israelite women, so she transforms the life of the gentile Achior. Like Rahab before him and like Judith herself, Achior's name and reputation remain alive among the people (14:10). However, because Achior is male, his new social and religious position can be marked on his flesh as well as in his new community. The gentile man's incorporation into Israel is the inverse of the Jewish woman's position in the Assyrian camp. He becomes a Jew

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[14] The combination of the θύρσα with the decapitated head and the women's celebration is strongly reminiscent of the *Bacchae*, another story in which gender-roles are muddled and in which an "other" is both dangerous and desirable.

[15] J. LaPlanche and J.-B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Norton, 1973), define the phallic woman as one "endowed, in phantasy, with a phallus." In one such phantasy, she "is represented . . . as having an external phallus or phallic attribute" (311). The identification is often applied to threatening women manifesting "allegedly masculine character-traits" (312). I thank Laura Lomas for pointing out this reference to me.

first by sharing a meal with the leaders of Bethulia and second, primarily, through his circumcision. Judith too is physically altered (10:7) in preparation for incorporation into the alien community, but her mark of difference is not permanent: the makeup is washed off each night. Similarly, Judith refrains from becoming "like the daughters of the Assyrians" (12:13) by refusing Holofernes's food. While Judith remains other to both Jew and gentile, Achior the convert mediates between the two.

Although gender-determined and ethnic integrations occur during the course of the narrative, incorporation of Judith's servant does not. On the one hand, she appears to be Judith's double: linguistically, ἄβρα is related to ἁβρός—"graceful, beautiful"—which could serve as Judith's other name. Similarly, Judith adopts for herself in 11:5-6 titles of subservience—slave (δούλη) and handmaiden (παιδίσκη [which can connote "prostitute"])—used elsewhere for her maid (παιδίσκη [which can connote "prostitute"])—used elsewhere for her maid (παιδίσκη in 10:10; δούλη in 12:15; 13:3). Yet, on the other, the patriarchal culture can deal with only one woman who speaks and acts; as the exception, Judith proves the rule of strictly defined gender roles. Another such exceptional individual would too severely compromise the status quo. Thus, until Judith's death, her "favorite slave" must remain silent and in service.

The relationship between Judith and her make is ironically paralleled by that of Holofernes and his eunuch. In Jdt 12:11, Baboas is described as in charge of Holofernes's personal affairs; we have already been told that the maid oversees Judith's estate. Further, Bagoas summons Judith just as the maid summoned the leaders of Bethulia. In 13:3, both maid and eunuch receive the same instructions. But the parallelism is dramatically incomplete. Bagoas is the only named character in the text who is not somehow brought into Judith's community. Incorporation of gentiles is accomplished if the act of severing—from the past, from the gentile community, from one's foreskin—is brought about by the Jews themselves. The form of incorporation in turn supports the text's concern with gender roles. Rather than to undifferentiated integration, circumcision and that for which it substitutes, castration, both call attention to sexual difference. This difference is necessary for social orgaqnization and so for preservation of the status quo, as the removal of Judith from the public sphere and the return of the Bethulian population to their normative lives indicate. Achior, who as circumcised accepts sexual difference, fits into the community. So does Holofernes—as long as he is dead—since his (symbolic) castration denies that difference. The eunuch, who as castrated but alive problematizes sexual difference, does not.

Judith, who muddles sexual difference through her inversion of gender roles, cannot as easily as Bagoas be erased from the story. She must somehdow be domesticated, and this is done through representations of the other which evoke Judith yet which lack her subversive force. Achior's conversion, the presence of Holofernes's head, the maid's freedom and, especially, the stories people tell about the pious widow all substitute for Judith.[16] They serve to maintain her presence in the public sphere while concurrently displacing her threat. The future is thereby protected. To

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[16] Cf. Coote, "Comment," 26: "It is often patriarchal societies, where male and female roles are sharply distinguished and women have a passive role, that in fantasy produce myths of a female savior." In fantasy, the danger woman poses to the status quo is limited. Woman does in myth what she cannot do in the real world.

preserve the status quo and to restore the sexual difference that determines it, Judith's actions must also be rendered kosher. Her concluding psalm reinforces traditional gender roles first by stressing the irregularity of conquest by the "hand of a female" (θήλεια),[17] and second by giving full glory to the deity. Next, Judith submits to priestly ministrations (16:18); at this time, she also gives up the evidence of her time in the Assyrian camp: "Judith also dedicated to God all the vessels of Holofernes, which the people had given her; and the canopy which she took for herself from his bedchamber she gave as a votive offering to the Lord" (16:19). This celebration in Jerusalem (16:18-20) is a rewriting of the parody of sacrifice in 13:6-9. The initial ritualized killing, which included the purification and festive garbing of the celebrant, her sexual abstinence, the painless slitting of the victim's throat (he being "overcome with wine" [13:2]), the aid of the assistant in disposing of the parts, the retention of a portion of the sacrifice for the community, and the efficacy that such an offering brings to Israel as a whole is given its full value only when the account—and the vessels, the canopy, and the general's head—become part of the communal celebration. Similarly, the sacrifice in Jdt 16 makes proper the parody in 13: Judith's victim is an inappropriate offering; she is not a priest, and the killing required two strokes. The heroine's direct links to the divine, coupled with her Temple-oriented piety suggests she plays the man's role of priest as well as of warrior. But, because such subversion of gender roles threatens Israelite society, her sacrificial and military actions must be constrained and contained.[18] Through the rewriting of her sacrifice as well as the sacrifice of the tokens of her deed, the signs of her transgressions are erased.

Then, Judith herself must leave the public sphere, and life must return to normalcy. No longer the united "people" (cf. ὁ λαός in 16:20) comprised of men and women, now "each man (ἕκαστος) returned home to his own inheritance, and Judith went to Bethulia and remained on her estate" (16:21). The women, so prominent during the celebration, are completely erased. The inversion of gender roles is ended, and the status quo is reinforced. Judith's only remaining public appearance will be her burial; not surprisingly, the text explicitly notes that "they buried her in the cave of her husband, Manasseh" (16:23). In death, she is made to conform to her traditional role as wife. All that remains of the intrusion of her otherness into the public realm is her "fame" (16:23). That is, her deed has become incorporated into public memory and public discourse, and it is thereby made harmless. As Jew/ess, both representing the community and exceeding that representation, Judith remains the exception that proves the rule of Israel's gender-determined norms.*

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[17] On the use of "female" rather than "woman" (γυνή) cf. 9:10, 13:15; 16:5; Craven, *Artistry*, 91 and n. 40; and esp. P. W. Skehan, "The Hand of Judith," *CBQ* 25 (1963) 94-109.

[18] Judith's appropriation of Holofernes's sword is to be equated not only with her assumption of male markers but also with castration. Castration is suggested also by Judith's comparison in 16:7 to figures who castrate their fathers: the young men, the sons of the Titans, and the giants in 16:7. Judith, like Medusa the archetypal phallic woman, castrates with "the beauty of her countenance" (16:7e). Consequently, she must be disarmed, and her disarming presence must be removed from the public sphere.

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In the Steps of Jael and Deborah: Judith as Heroine

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My paper today addresses the question of the use of the story of Jael and Deborah as a model for the story of Judith. Leading female characters are rare enough in Israelite literature to be constantly compared with one another, and Judith has often been likened to Miriam, Deborah, Jael, the wise women of Tekoa and Abel-beth-Maacah, and Esther.[1] And this is not an exhaustive list! I would like to argue that the comparison to Jael and Deborah is neither superficial nor coincidental, but that the author of Judith had the story of Jael and Deborah in the front of his mind as he wrote his story.[2] In fact, in my judgment the author of Judith used the story of Jael and Deborah as the model for the story of Judith.

The first parallel to draw between our stories is the obvious one: a heroine slays an enemy of Israel singlehandedly, by attacking his head. This is, in fact, the correspondence that drew me to the two stories in the first place. However, as I began to investigate the stories, I noticed that many other exact similarities were present, in plot, character and actions. Many of these parallels have been noted by other commentators before me.[3] However, no one, as far as I have been able to verify, has brought them all together. When they are drawn together, I think that it will be plain that the author of Judith used the story of Jael and Deborah in Judges 4 and 5 as a model, and that the actions of the heroine, Judith, parallel the actions of the two heroines in Judges 4 and 5, Jael and Deborah. In this paper I will demonstrate exact similarities in the structure and plot of the stories, the characters of the stories, and certain elements common to both, particularly the song of victory.

At this point I should make it clear that I am assuming that the author of the book of Judith knew Judges 4 and 5 as a single unit. Today scholars, using source

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[1] For example, see George W. E. Nickelsburg, *Jewish Literature Between the Bible and the Mishnah* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981) 106.

[2] The author of the book of Judith is anonymous, and may have been either male or female. Unfortunately, the English language does not have a graceful way to express a neuter human subject; therefore, when it is unavoidable I will use the masculine pronoun to describe the author. This is in no way to be taken as indicating the (proven) gender of the author.

[3] For example, Carey A. Moore, *Judith* (AB 40; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1985); Morton A. Enslin and Solomon Zeitlin, *The Book of Judith* (Jewish Apocryphal Literature VIII; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971); John Craghan, *Esther, Judith, Tobit, Jonah, Ruth* (Old Testament Message 16; Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1982), et al.

criticism, isolate Judges 5, the Song of Deborah, as a very ancient poetic piece, while placing the prose narrative of Judges 4 at a later date[4] This is no doubt correct; however, the author of Judith did not use source criticism, and therefore did not separate the chapters. The author read them as one story, and this reading is reflected in the story of Judith.

Let me begin by summarizing the story of Judges 4 and 5. The plot is typical of the book of Judges: Yahweh, on account of the people's sin, allows Jabin the king of Canaan to oppress the Israelites. The people cry out for deliverance, so Yahweh stirs up a judge to save them. Here, however, comes an interesting twist: the judge is a woman, Deborah. Deborah sends for her general, Barak, to rouse him for battle against Jabin's general, Sisera. Barak and Deborah lead some of the tribes to battle against Sisera, and manage to defeat him. Now comes the most interesting part of the story. Sisera flees on foot and comes upon the tent of Jael, identified as the wife of Heber the Kenite, an ally or friend of Jabin. Jael invites Sisera into the tent, covers him with some sort of covering, gives him milk to drink, and, when he has fallen asleep from exhaustion, drives a tent-peg into his skull and shatters it. Afterwards, when Barak arrives, she takes him into the tent and shows him Sisera's dead body. Finally, Deborah and Barak sing a great victory hymn, in which Jael's deed is lauded. This is the story as the author of the book of Judith knew it.

I would like to start my comparison by looking at the structure of the two stories. The story of Jael begins with a political struggle (which has religious implications) between the Israelites and a foreign power, moves to a climax in a private scene between the heroine Jael and Israel's enemy Sisera, which ends in his death, and concludes with a triumphant victory song. Turning to the book of Judith, we see precisely the same structure. Toni Craven, in her article "Artistry and Faith in the Book of Judith," makes the following statement about the structure of the book: "The form and content of Part I sketch a religious/political struggle over true sovereignty and true deity; the form and content of Part II detail the resolution of this struggle by the hand of the widow Judith."[5] This is true enough; however, I would add the fact that the book of Judith contains a victory hymn at the same point as the story of Jael. In other words, the story begins with a political and religious struggle between the Israelites and a foreign power, moves to a climax in a private scene between the heroine Judith and Israel's enemy Holofernes, and ends in a triumphant victory song. So the overall structure of the two stories is precisely the same.

Now let us move to an investigation of the details of plot and character, beginning with the major characters of Judith and Holofernes, then filling in the details with the other characters. In that way I hope that the detail of the parallels between Judith and Jael and Deborah will be clear.

Judith enters the story at a late point in the plot, as has been noted many times.[6]

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[4] See, for example, Robert G. Boling, *Judges* (AB 6A; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975) and J. Alberto Soggin, *Judges* (Old Testament Library; trans. by John Bowden; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1981).

[5] Toni Craven, "Artistry and Faith in the Book of Judith," *Semeia* 8 (1977) 75.

[6] J. C. Dancy, for example, says "Now at last with the introduction of the heroine the narrative gets into full stride . . ." (*The Shorter Books of the Apocrypha* [The Cambridge Bible Commentary on the New English Bible; Cambridge: University Press, 1972] 95).

Craven states that this is not because of lack of skill on the part of the author, but because he has prepared for Judith's entrance by creating an almost unbearable state of suspense through an account of the enemy's seeming invincibility.[7] This is true; but I would also suggest that the author's artistic decision was influenced by the fact that Jael enters the scene quite late in her story, after the battle and defeat of Sisera's army.[8] Once the heroines appear, the stories move fairly quickly to their climaxes, given the relative length of each. Of course, the story of Judith is much longer and richer in detail than the story of Jael, as befits a free-standing novella.

Once the heroines enter, they are identified. Judith is identified as the widow of Manasseh, while Jael is described as the wife of Heber the Kenite. I will not enter here into the discussion of whether *'ĕšet heber* means wife of an individual or female member of a certain clan.[9] I would suggest that, whatever the original meaning, the author of Judith would have understood the phrase to mean "wife of Heber." The important thing to notice is that both Judith and Jael are identified as married, but their husbands are, for one reason or another, absent. The same is also true of Deborah, who, in 4:4, is identified as the wife of Lappidoth,[10] an absent spouse. Women, in patriarchal Israelite society, received their identity first from their fathers and then from their husbands, but these women receive their identity from their actions, and, in fact, give identity to their husbands, thus turning the stereotype on its head. In addition, Judith, Jael and Deborah are all, as far as we know, childless, again an unusual state in their societies. Finally, Judith and Jael, by the former's status as a widow, and the latter's membership in a non-Israelite clan, are marginal members of Israelite society. This fact emphasizes the theme in both stories of the weak triumphing over the strong with the hope of Yahweh.[11]

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[7] Toni Craven, *Artistry and Faith in the Book of Judith* (SBLDS 70; Chico, CA: Scholars, 1983) 58.

[8] This has also been noticed by Alonso-Schökel: "The delayed appearance of Judith may be compared to the late appearance of Jael . . ." Luis Alonso-Schökel, "Narrative Structure in the Book of Judith," *Protocol Series of the Eleventh Colloquies: The Center for Hermeneutical Studies* 11 (1974) 4. Of course, when Jael enters the scene the Israelite army has already won the battle; when Judith appears the Israelites are on the verge of being utterly defeated.

[9] For a complete discussion and further bibliography, see Mieke Bal, *Death and Dissymmetry: The Politics of Coherence in the Book of Judges* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1988) 211-212.

[10] The question of whether Lappidoth is meant as a proper masculine name has been rasied by some. If it is not the name of Deborah's otherwise unknown husband, what is it? Judah J. Slotki lists four midrashic interpretations: 1. It is a nickname for Barak ("Lightning"). 2. It indicates her inflammatory speeches and war-like spirit. 3. It symbolizes the divine inspiration which created sparks and flames. 4. She prepared wicks for the lamps in the sanctuary. Judah J. Slotki, "Judges," in *Joshua and Judges* (ed. A. Cohen; London: Soncino, 1950) 186. The first two interpretations are the ones most often suggested by commentators today.

[11] Mieke Bal, *Murder and Difference: Gender, Genre and Scholarship on Sisera's Death* (trans. by Matthew Gumpert; Bloomington: Indiana University, 1988) 20-21; Craghan, 89. The notion underlying both stories is that these are unusual roles for women. As P. R. Sayday notes, in most cultures "women give birth and grow children; men kill and make weapons" (Sanday, *Female Power and Male Dominance:*

After describing Judith, the author tells us of her reaction to the bargain struck between Uzziah and the people of Bethulia. She is appalled, and berates the elders for their lack of faith in God. We have no parallel to this speech in the actions of Jael. In fact, one of the major differences between the two stories is that we know everything about Judith's motivation for her action, and nothing about Jael's. Here, however, I think the character of Deborah becomes the model. In Judges 4, Deborah makes a speech to Barak, giving him his marching orders and assuring him that Yahweh will be with him. However, she notes in 4:9 that Yahweh will triumph by "the hand of a woman." This motif of the hand is used throughout both stories.[12] In Judges 4:21, Jael takes the hammer *in her hand,* and in the vistory song in Judges 5 we are told that "she put her hand to the tent peg, her right hand to the workman's mallet" (v. 26). In her speech to the elders, Judith says, "The Lord will deliver Israel by my hand" (Jdt 8:33), parallel to Deborah's statement about the hand of a woman. She repeats the statement in her prayer in chapter 9. Then, at the end of the climactic scene, she tells the people of Bethulia to praise God, who "has destroyed our enemies *by my hand* this very night" (Jdt 13:14). The motif of a woman's hand creates another similarity between the two stories.

After her speech to the elders, Judith goes to prepare herself for her mission. This is without parallel in the story of Deborah and Jael (although Zeitlin, among others, has compared this to the story of Esther[13]). Once prepared, Judith summons her maid and they set out for the "Assyrian" camp. Face-to-face with Holofernes, she begins a dialogue that is laced with doublt-talk and irony. Immediately the parallel with Jael comes to mind. Jael welcomes Sisera into her tent and promises to protect him, all the while intending to kill him. Jael has been taken to task many times for violation of the law of hospitality, while Judith has been condemned for lying.[14] While Jael does violate the law of hospitality, the act should be seen, as Soggin puts it, "in the context of a complex conflict of loyalites."[15] Where does one's loyalty lie? Jael clearly places herself on the side of the Israelites, and the text celebrates her for that action. As for Judith, her language is deliberately ambiguous. For example, in 11:6, Judith says to Holofernes, "And if you follow the words of your maidservant, God will accomplish something through you, and my lord will not fail to achieve his purposes." "My lord" in Greek is *ho kyrios mou.* Holofernes assumes she is addressing him, but every Greek-speaking Jew of the period would have heard the Greek translation of "Yahweh" in her words. This use of irony is meant to bring a chuckle of recognition from the reader.[16]

On the Origins of Sexual Inequality (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981) 5. The violation of these cultural norms by these women may be perceived as dangerous; this is particularly true in the case of Deborah, who has the charisma of Yahweh (this was suggested to me by Dr. William Poehlmann in a private conversation).

[12] Patrick W. Skehan, "The Hand of Judith," *CBQ* 25 (1963) 94-110. The following comments are heavily dependent on Skehan's article.

[13] Solomon Zeitlin, "Introduction: The Book of Esther and Judith: A Parallel" in Enslin and Zeitlin, *The Book of Judith,* 1-37.

[14] For example, Wayne Shumaker, in Alonso-Schökel, p. 50, says "I have compunctions about her (Judith's) methodology." For the questions of Jael's violation of the law of hospitality, see Boling, Soggin et al.

[15] Soggin, *Judges,* 78.

[16] For more on the use of irony in the book of Judith, see Moore, *Judith,* 78ff.

The correspondences now come think and fast in the climax of the story. On the fourth day in the Assyrian camp Judith is invited to a banquet in the tent of Holofernes. Likewise, Jael invites Sisera into her tent. Holofernes drinks too much wine at the banquet, and passes out drunk. Jael gives Sisera goat's milk to drink, which, as has been widely pointed out, has a soporific effect.[17] When the men are asleep, the women murder them by attacking their heads, Jael by shattering Sisera's skull, Judith by beheading Holofernes. Boling suggests that the word in Judges 4:21, normally translated as "temple," *raqqāh*, should be translated as "neck."[18] I am not convinced that there is enough evidence to support the translation "neck"; clearly, though, some vulnerable portion of the skull, not necessarily the temples, is meant. In any case, both Sisera and Holofernes meet their death by means of a head injury. Finally, Judith pulls down Holofernes' bed-canopy (*kōnōpion*) and takes it with her. The mention of the canopy or curtain here recalls the action of Jael when she covers Sisera with a *śĕmîkāh*. The word *śĕmîkāh* is a *hapax legomenon* in Hebrew, and has been variously translated. LXX^{A} has *derrei* (skin), while LXX^{B} has *epibolaiō* (covering, wrapper). In English it has been translated as a "rug" or a "woolly covering," or identified as the curtain of goatskin which separates the inner portion of the tent from the outer portion.[19] If this latter translation is correct (and there is no conclusive proof one way or the other), then we have a close parallel to the *kōnōpion* of the Judith story. In any case, we do have a covering motif (a symbol of deceptive security?) in both scenes.

The sexual theme in the book of Judith, recognized by many,[20] is strong in this scene. Holofernes declares his intention of having sexual intercourse with Judith (12:12). Judith responds to his invitation to the banquet by saying "Who am I, to refuse my lord?", clearly a double entendre! Holofernes, at the sight of Judith, is described as "ravished." Wine is served, and then, at the end of the banquet, the other guests tactfully withdraw, leaving Judith and Holofernes alone. If this were a movie, the screen would be fading to black. However, this is not a movie, and Holofernes soon meets his gory end.

Mieke Bal has argued that the scene between Jael and Sisera is implicitly sexual.[21] Sisera enters Jael's tent. She covers him with a *śĕmîkāh*. She offers him a special drink, and then covers him again. As he drifts off to sleep (all passion spent?), she murders him. A tie between sex and death is well-known in ancient literature, including the biblical literature.[22] For example, the story of Samson and Delilah

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[17] As Boling puts it, "she duped him and oped him" (*Judges*, 98).

[18] Boling, *Judges*, 93, 98.

[19] Soggin, *Judges*, 62.

[20] For a discussion, see Bal, *Murder and Difference*, 105.

[21] Bal, *Murder and Difference*, 105.

[22] Stith Thompson titles this folk-lore motif "Death from intercourse," motif T182 (Stith Thompson, *Motif Index of Folk-Literature: A Classification of Narrative Elements in Folktales, Ballad, Myths, Fables, Mediaeval Romances, Exempla, Fabliaux, Jest-Books, and Local Legends* [vol 5; Bloomington: Indiana University, 1955-58] 362). It has been noticed before that the influence of folk-lore motifs is prominent in Judith. For example, Mary P. Coote notes "In its basic pattern and motifs the story of Judith strongly resembles a type of traditional rescue story in which a female figure assumes the role of the hero and saves a male figure (or a social group) from captivity" (in Alonso-Schökel, 21). For a further discussion of the folk-lore influence, see Moore, *Judith*, 78.

presents an instance in which sexual intercourse is closely linked with the death of the man. So even though Judges 4 does not specifically state that sexual intercourse took place between Jael and Sisera, the inference is plausible. I would suggest that what is implied in the story of Jael and Sisera, the author of Judith makes explicit. Sensing the sexual innuendos behind the actions of both Jael and Sisera, he chooses to make those innuendos overt in the actions of Judith and Holofernes.

After making her way out of the camp, with the head of Holofernes safely stored in her food bag, Judith returns to Bethulia, where she triumphantly displays the head to the people of the city. Then Achior is shown the head of Holofernes and is so astonished and awe-struck that he promptly converts to Judaism. The character of Achior is loosely modelled on the character of Barak in Judges 4 and 5. He is a secondary male character who acts as a foil for the leading female character, Judith, as Barak acts as a foil for Deborah, and later Jael. In the first part of the book of Judith, Achior informs Holofernes that the Jews cannot be defeated because their God protects them, thus enraging Holofernes and setting in motion the central plot of the story. Similarly, Barak's response to Deborah's call sets the action of the story in motion in two ways: when he states that he will not go forth to battle without Deborah, he gives her the opportunity to predict that Sisera will fall by the hand of a woman, thus foreshadowing the action of Jael,[23] and, by leading the Israelites to the confrontation with Sisera, he begins the chain of events that allows Jael's deed to take place. After their initial appearances, both characters leave the stage, only to return after the heroine has completed her action. The parallel is quite clear here. Judith displays the head of Holofernes to Achior, just as Jael displays the body of Sisera to Barak. These events confirm Yahweh's use of a weak, marginalized member of the society in order to save it. Achior is a more fully drawn character, as we would expect in the book of Judith, and he is also a foreigner, which adds an interesting twist to the story. But his function in the story is the same as that of Barak.

Finally, at the end of her story, Judith leads the victorious Israelites in a triumphant hymn to Yahweh. Many commentators have suggested that this hymn is modelled on victory hymns found in the pre-exilic literature, most notably Exodus 15 (the Song of Miriam) and, of course, Judges 5.[24] It seems to me that the parallel is clearest with Judges 5, especially if it is realized that the author of Judith used not only Jael as a model for his leading female character, but also Deborah. If this premise is accepted, then the correspondence is obvious The structure of the hymns is similar; as Dancy notes, "One notable feature in common between Judith's and Deborah's songs is the way that in both of them the heroine sometimes speaks in the first person, sometimes is spoken of in the third."[25] Again, I would argue that this feature is not accidental. Let us look at the structure of the hymn more closely.

Both hymns begin in the first person, with a call to bless Yahweh. I should mention in passing that the language of the Song of Deborah is notoriously difficult and I do not wish to enter into the translation debate here. Unless otherwise stated, I will be using the translation of the *Revised Standard Version*. For further information

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[23] It is not germane to our purpose to determine whether or not Barak's refusal to go without Deborah is the result of fear. For a discussion of this question, see Bal, *Murder and Difference*, 45ff., 115.

[24] Craven, Moore et al.

[25] Dancy, *The Shorter Books*, 124.

on the subject of the translation of the Song of Deborah, I would refer the reader to the excellent studies by W. F. Albright and Frank Moore Cross and David Noel Freedman, and the commentaries.[26] To continue, after the initial call to praise, each song continues with a poetic description of the events recounted in the prose narrative.[27] In verse 6 of the Song of Judith the person of the verb changes from first to third, to describe the action of Judith. In Judges 5:12 the person changes from the first to the second (referring to Deborah), leading eventually to a description of the actions of Jael in the third person.[28] Finally, each hymn ends with the destruction of the enemies of Israel: "So perish all thine enemies, O LORD!" (Jud 5:31), and "Woe to the nations that rise up against my people!" (Jdt 16:17).

Moving from structure to theme, John Craghan has noted the theme of the disruption of nature which appears in both songs: in the Song of Deborah the mountains quake when Yahweh marches from Seir (vv. 4-5), and in Jdt 16:15 the mountains shake and the rocks melt at the presence of Yahweh.[29] Patrick Skehan has also noted that verses 13-17, an anthology of praise, contain material found in Judges 5.[30] For example, in verse 13 Judith, having switched back to the first person, sings "I will sing to my God a new song." This is similar to Deborah's "I, to Yahweh even I will sing, I will sing to Yahweh the God of Israel" in Judg 5:3.[31] So the hymns contain structural and thematic similarities. The most important parallel to note, however, is the position of each hymn, coming at the end of the prose narrative, followed by a brief epilogue.

The epilogue in Judges 5 is indeed brief: "And the land had rest for forty years," a typical ending from the Book of Judges.[32] The ending of the book of Judith, though longer, has a similar message: "And no one ever again spread terror among the people of Israel in the days of Judith, or for a long time after her death" (16:25). So Judith, like Jael and Deborah, brings peace to the land for a generation (forty years indicating a generation in the book of Judges). In fact, there are other similarities between the book of Judith and the book of Judges as a whole. The book of Judith seems to embrace the theology of the book of Judges (which is the theology of the Deuteronomist). In his speech to Holofernes, Achior states "As long as they (the Israelites) did not sin against their God they prospered, for the God who hates iniquity is with them. But when they departed from the way which he had appointed for them, they were utterly defeated in many battles and wre led away captive to a foreign country; the temple of their God was razed to the ground, and their cities were captured by their enemies" (5:17-18). The theology of the book of Judges, of course, is clear from its structure: the people sin, which brings on punishment; the people repent, causing God to raise up a judge to save them; during the

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[26] W. F. Albright, "The Earliest Forms of Hebrew Verse," *JPOS* 2 (1922), 69-86; Frank Moore Cross, Jr. & David Noel Freedman, *Studies in Ancient Yahwistic Poetry* (SBLDS 21; Missoula, MT: Scholars, 1975).

[27] I would reiterate my earlier statement that the author of Judith knew the story of Jael and Deborah in its final form, as it now appears in the book of Judges; he did not separate it into sources.

[28] The Song of Judith shifts back to the first person in verse 11.

[29] Craghan, *Esther, Judith*, 124.

[30] Skehan, "The Hand of Judith," 95.

[31] Translation by Cross & Freedman, *Studies*, 13.

[32] Cf., for example, 8:28.

lifetime of the judge the people obey Yahweh, and the land is at peace. This "obedience brings reward, disobedience brings punishment" theology is exactly the theology of Achior's speech. A second commonality between the book of Judith and the book of Judges is the impermanence of the role of Judith. She comes forward for a specific task, and, when that task is completed, retires from the stage. This model is drawn from that of the judges, e.g., Othniel, Ehud, and Shamgar. Finally, and this is a very minor point, neither the book of Judges nor the book of Judith is placed in a time of kingship. Judges, of course, is part of the premonarchical history of Israel, while in Judith the ptople seem to be under the authority of a high priest in Jerusalem.[33]

Now I would like to point out some parallels not mentioned in the synopsis of the plot. First is the entire absence of miracle in the prose narratives of both stories.[34] Judith and Jael perform their deeds in completely realistic ways; they seize the chance given to them by the moment. At no point in the narrative, up until the climactic scene, is the audience assured that "everything will be all right." Only the awesome assurance of Deborah and Judith, made clear in their speeches, gives that comfort, and that is a matter of faith, not empirical proof. Second, the deeds of Jael and Judith are not explicitly commissioned by Yahweh. They act on their own; salvation is achieved by human initiative, although Yahweh is credited with the victory. Especially in the book of Judith the heroine's reliance on the guidance of Yahweh is made clear in her speeches and prayers; yet nowhere is it stated that Yahweh told Judith to take precisely that course of action. This is even more so the case with Jael, about whose thoughts and motivations we know nothing.

Finally, I would like to mention two correspondences which did not figure directly into the comparison of Judith with Jael and Deborah. The first concerns the male characters Nebuchadnezzar and Holofernes. Nebuchadnezzar is a king, who appears at the beginning of the story, leaves the action, and never reappears. Holofernes, the leading male character, is Nebuchadnezzar's general but wields considerable power on his own, and it is his defeat which frees the Israelites from the threat of Nebuchadnezzar. The male characters in the story of Jael have similar roles and functions. In the final form of the story, Jabin, the king of Canaan, is mentioned at the beginning of the story but plays no role in the story itself. The leading male character, Sisera, is described as Jabin's general, but he acts as his own agent, and it is his defeat which frees the Israelites from the oppression of Jabin.[35] The fact that this obvious parallel occurs outside of the main plot is further support for the argument that the author of Judith had the story of Jael in mind when he wrote his story. Second, the battle in both stories is followed by a rout of the respective enemies. These routs occur at different points in the narrative; the rout of the Assyrians takes place after the death of Holofernes, while that of the Canaanites happens before the death of Sisera. It is true, of course, that these scenes are common to battle stories. However, a minor similarity like this one points to an overall scheme of parallels that show the author of Judith adhering very closely to his model.

To conclude, in this paper I have argued, by citing the corresponding elements of the two stories, that the author of the book of Judith used the specific story of

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[33] Moore, *Judith*, 50.

[34] Enslin and Zeitlin, *The Book of Judith*, 42.

[35] James D. Martin, *The Book of Judges* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1975) 54.

Jael and Deborah as the model for his story. The comparison begins with the fact that both stories have heroines who save the Israelites by murdering the commander of the enemy forces, and this murder is accomplished by destroying the head of the victim. But the parallels go beyond this central fact to correspondences in structure, plot and character. The sheer number of both large and small parallels makes the theory of the Jael model highly plausible. Nor would this model have passed unnoticed by the readers of the book of Judith. This modelling technique is a good example of the use of earlier biblical literature in the literature of the Second Temple period, and demonstrates the high esteem in which it was held at this time.

Why Wasn't the Book of Judith Included in the Hebrew Bible?

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It is not surprising that for two thousand years Jews and, especially, Christians[1] have been mentioning Queen Esther and the widow Judith in the same breath. After all, both women are Jewish heroines in popular books named after them. Both women were very beautiful, resourceful, and brave. Finally, the books bearing their names are among the most interesting and skillfully written of the Bible.

Nonetheless, these two books experienced drastically different fates. Today, Esther is sacred scripture for both Jews and Christians while Judith is regarded as noncanonical, or apocryphal, by Jews and Protestants but as deutero[i.e., second] canonical by Roman Catholics.[2] That Jews accepted Esther but rejected Judith becomes very puzzling when one realizes that Judith is obviously a religious book while Esther, at least on its surface, is not,[3] neither God nor such distinctive Jewish themes and institutions as the Law, covenant, prayer, sacrifice, the Temple, or *kashrût*[4] being so much as mentioned in it. By contrast, these and many other

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[1] The three earliest allusions to the book of Judith among the Church Fathers are intimately tied up with the story of Esther, namely, in *1 Clem.* 55, dating from the first century A.D.; *Stromata* 4.19 of Clement of Alexandria (150?-?215); and the *Constitutions of the Holy Apostles* 5.3.20 (ca. 380). In all three, the bravery of Judith and Esther is noted. Moreover, the books of Esther and Judith are mentioned *side by side* (regardless of whether they were regarded as canonical) in the biblical lists of Athanasius of Alexandria (293?-373), Augustine (354-430), Innocent I (reigned 401-417), Pseudo-Gelasius, Cassiodorus 485?-?585), Anonymi *Dialectica Timothei et Aquilae,* Junilius (fl. ca. 542), Isidorus of Miletus (560-636), *Liber sacramentorum,* Nicephorus of Constantinople (758?-829), and Ebedjesu, as well as the Council of Carthage (397) and LXX^B.

[2] Protestants include in their Old Testament only those books found in the Hebrew Bible. For Roman Catholics, Judith's canonical status, like that of other deuterocanonical books, was re-affirmed by the Council of Trent in 1546. For details on Judith's earlier canonical status among various eastern and western Church Fathers, see my Anchor *Judith,* AB 40 (New York: Doubleday, 1985) pp. 90-91.

[3] For a discussion of this and related problems in the book of Esther, see my "Eight Questions Most Frequently Asked About the Book of Esther," *BR* 3 (1987): 16-31.

[4] Fasting is the only distinctively religious practice mentioned in Esther (cf. 4:16; 9:31).

religious beliefs and practices characteristic of biblical Judaism *are* inextricably woven into Judith—and in quite orthodox fashion. Why, then, was the "orthodox" book of Judith not included in the Jewish canon?

The So-Called "Council" of Jamnia[5]

Certainly, the old scholarly answer (i.e., that in *ca.* A.D. 90 the Jewish Council of Jamnia closed the Hebrew canon, firmly and finally, rejecting in the process what is known as the Old Testament apocrypha,[6] including Judith) won't do. I use the word "old" because the Jamnia theory, which was first broached in 1871 by H. Graetz[7] who posited the *Council* of Jamnia as leading to the closing of the canon to A.D. 189, received its first popular presentations by F. Buhl in 1892[8] and by H. E. Ryle in 1904.[9] As the theory generally stands, shortly after the destruction of the Jewish temple and nation, the rabbinic "synod" or "council" at Jamnia, somewhere around A.D. 90, finalized the canonization of the Hebrew Bible, closing the Jewish canon *for all time*. Moreover, it was believed by scholars that the rabbis had resolved to exclude from their canon Jewish/Christian apocalyptic and apocryphal works appearing in the Septuagint,[10] especially those books composed originally in Greek.[11]

Up through the first-half of the twentieth century, the theory that the "Council of Jamnia" closed the Hebrew canon and, in effect, rejected the apocrypha was *the*

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[5] Jamnia (Heb. *Yavneh*), nine miles N-NE of Ashdod and four miles inland from the Mediterranean Sea, is where the rabbis first assembled after the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70.

[6] S. Zeitlin says, "There must have been opposition to other books of which we have no historical records. On the other hand there must have been many in favor of the inclusion of a number of the books in the canon which are now commonly called apocrypha, particularly those books which bore such titles as Enoch, Ezra, Wisdom of Solomon, Baruch, etc.," ("Jewish Apocryphal Literature," *JQR* 11 (1950), p. 23. Cf. also B. Metzger, *An Introduction to the Apocrypha* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957) p. 8; see also C. T. Fritsch, "Apocrypha," *IDB* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1962) 1:163.

[7] *Kohelet oder der salomonische Prediger*, Leipzig, pp. 165-66; see also his "Der Abschluss des Kanons des Alten Testaments," *MGWJ* 35 (1886) 281-298.

[8] *Canon and Text of the Old Testament*, tr. J. Macpherson (Edinburgh, 1892) p. 24.

[9] *The Canon of the Old Testament* (London: MacMillan) pp. 182-83.

[10] It was through this pre-Christian Greek version of the Jewish scriptures, which later also contained other Jewish/Christian religious books, that the Christian Church came to know the Jewish scriptures.

[11] First proposed in modern times by J. S. Semler, *Abhandlung von freier Untersuchung des Canons* I (Halle, 1771). Scholars who subscribed to the "Alexandrian Canon hypothesis" (see n. 33) could call attention to the fact that for a Jewish scroll to be canonical (literally, "to make the hands unclean") it had to be not only divinely inspired (literally, "be spoken by the Holy Spirit" [*Tos. Yadaim* 2.14; *Bab. Megillah* 7a]), but also be written on parchment, in ink, *in the original Hebrew or Aramiac language*, and in the square script (*M. Yadaim* 4:5).

prevailing scholarly view,[12] and it still has its adherents today.[13]

But starting in the early 1950's, some scholars, such as H. H. Rowley,[14] began to have reservations about the role of Jamnia, especially as to whether it actually had the binding authority that the word "council" or "synod" has had in Christian church history:

> It is, indeed, doubtful how far it is correct to speak of the *Council* of Jamnia. . . . discussions . . . took place there . . . but *we know of no formal or binding decisions that were made,* and it is probable that the discussions were informal, though none the less helping to crystallize and *to fix more firmly the Jewish tradition* (italics added).[15]

Today, thanks primarily to the works of D. N. Freedman, [16] J. P. Lewis[17] and S. Z. Leiman,[18] scholars like B. S. Childs,[19] R. Beckwith,[20] and S. J. D. Cohen[21]

[12] Scholars subscribing to this theory included as W. O. E. Oesterley, *The Books of the Apocrypha* (London, 1915) p. 173; M. L. Margolis, *The Hebrew Scriptures in the Making* (Philadelphia, 1922) pp. 84-89; R. H. Pfeiffer, Jr., *Introduction to the Old Testament* (New York: Harper, 1941) p. 64; R. Meyer, "The Canon and the Apocrypha in Judaism," in G. Kittel, ed. *TDNT,* vol 3, pp. 978-987; A. C. Sundberg, Jr., *The Old Testament of the Early Church,* in *HTS* 20 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1964) pp. 113, 127; and O. Eissfeldt, *The Old Testament: An Introduction,* tr. P. R. Ackroyd (New York: Harper and Row, 1965) p. 568.

[13] M. Avi-Yonah, "Yavneh," in *Encyclopedia Judaica* (Jerusalem: Keter, 1971) 9:1177; E. Robertson, "Jamnia," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* 1970, 12:871; and G. W. Anderson, "Canonical and Non-Canonical," in *The Cambridge History of the Bible,* ed. P. R. Ackroyd (Cambridge: University Press, 1970) 1:133; and J. A. Sanders *Torah and Canon* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972) pp. 94-95, although in his *Canon and Community: A Guide to Canonical Criticism* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984) pp. 9-12, 35, Sanders takes a more cautious and qualified view.

[14] *The Growth of the Old Testament* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1950) p. 170. See also G. W. Anderson, *A Critical Introduction to the Old Testament* (London: Duckworth, 1959) pp. 12-13.

[15] Ibid., pp. 12-13. Sundberg (op. cit. p. 127) seems to suggest something similar.

[16] "Canon of the O.T.," *IDBSup* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1962), pp. 134-36. Freedman's words in private correspondence with me are very apropos: "What do we really know about the Council of Jamnia? Everybody quotes everbody else about this famous or infamous Council, but what are reasonable inferences about its activity? Personally, I think it was a non-event, and not much happened, unlike the Council of Nicaea for example. It would be refreshing if someone cited actually ancient sources for this Council and its work."

[17] "What Do We Mean by Jabneh?" *JBR* 32 (1964): 125-32. This issue and related ones are also treated by Lewis in his soon-to-be published "Jamnia After Twenty-Five Years," presented at the 1988 Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature in Chicago.

[18] *The Canonization of Hebrew Scripture: The Talmudic and Midrashic Evidence* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1976).

[19] *Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979) 53, 66.

[20] *The Old Testament Canon of the New Testament Church: And its Background in Early Judaism* (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdman, 1985) pp. 276-77.

[21] *From the Maccabees to the Mishnah* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1987) pp. 174-95, 226-31.

are putting far less emphasis on Jamnia's central role, arguing that there's a lack of evidence for most of it. The so-called "council" or "synod" of Jamnia (beginning perhaps as early as A.D. 75 or as late as A.D. 117)[22] is better understood as an academy, school, assembly, or, even, a court.[23]

The canonization of the Hebrew Bible, scholars now say, was not an event, done once-and-for-all by an elite group of rabbis. Rather, it was an extended, three-stage,[24] *dynamic* process[25] engaged in by the Jewish community, whereby, first, the Law, or *twrh*,[26] then the Prophets,[27] or *nby'ym*, and, lastly, the Writings (*ktwbym*), or Hagiographa,[28] were canonized.

Although the approximate dates for the canonization of the Law[29] and of the Prophets[30] are still debated by scholars, it is relevant for our purposes to note that recent studies suggest that the Hagiographa was canonized in either the first[31] or

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[22] Cf. Leiman, op. cit. pp. 120-24.

[23] Lewis, *JBR* 32 (1964), 127-28.

[24] The earliest attestation to the existence of the three sections of the Hebrew canon, however, is the prologue to Ecclesiasticus, which may be dated to *ca.* 132 B.C.

[25] Childs (op. cit.) rightly observes that "One cannot assume that one canonical section was *tightly closed* [italics added] before another was formed because of the lack of solid evidence from which to draw such a conclusion" (p. 53).

[26] I.e., the Pentateuch.

[27] I.e., the Former Prophets (Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings) and the Latter Prophets (Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the twelve minor prophets).

[28] According to an ancient Jewish tradition (*Baraita Baba Bathra* 14*b* of the Talmud), the order is Ruth, Psalms, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Solomon, Lamentations, Daniel, Esther, Ezra-Nehemiah, and 1-2 Chronicles. This source, however, is not as ancient as the "list" of, say, Josephus (cf. *Against Apion* 1.7 or 1.37-43 [see Beckwith, op. cit. pp. 206-07]) who gives a slightly different order. But in the ancient Hebrew and Greek lists there was some fluidity in the book listings of the Writings as well as the Prophets (cf. Beckwith, op. cit. pp. 181-234).

[29] Canonization dates for the Law and for the Prophets vary greatly among scholars. For example, whereas Leiman (op. cit. pp. 20-24) concludes that pre-Josianic written and canonical law corpora existed prior to *ca.* 621 B.C., and Freedman (op. cit. 99. 131-32) would date the Law *and the Former Prophets, in some form,* to *ca.* 550 B.C., most scholars date the canonization of the Law to about a century later; and the Prophets, still later.

[30] Although T. N. Swanson (*The Closing of the Collection of Holy Scriptures: A Study in the History of the Canonization of the Old Testament,* diss. Vanderbilt University, 1970) argues for the Prophets' canon being open well into the Christian era, Ben Sira 46:1-49:13, dating to the early second century B.C., knows all the prophetic books *in their canonical order*).

[31] "Jewish sources such as the Apocrypha, Philo, and Josephus, as well as Christian sources reflecting Jewish practice, such as the New Testament and the church fathers, support the notion of a closed biblical canon in most Jewish circles through the first centuries before and after the Christian era. . . . Critical analysis of the book of Daniel, evidence from the Apocrypha, and the newly discovered biblical texts in Hebrew and Greek (from Qumran, Nahal Hever, and elsewhere) suggest the possibility and likelihood that the biblical canon was closed in the Maccabean period. The talmudic and midrashic evidence is entirely consistent with a second century dating for the closing of the biblical canon" (Leiman, op. cit. p. 135).

even the second[32] century B.C.(!)In other words, most, if not all, of the Hebrew Bible had, in effect, already been canonized *prior* to the Jamnia Council, although the canonicity of several biblical books (notably, Esther, Qoheleth, and the Song of Songs) was still being disputed by some Jews into the third or fourth century A.D.

As for the old Alexandrian Canon hypothesis[33] (i.e. that the apocrypha of the Greek Old Testament had originally been approved by the supposed "Sanhedrin in Alexandria" and that the Jamnian rabbis had rejected the apocryphal books because of their having been originally composed in Greek or in Egypt[34]), Hebrew and/or Aramaic copies of some of those very books have been found among the Dead Sea Scrolls (e.g., Tobit,[35] Jubilees,[36] and Enoch[37])!

Although, to date, no copy of Judith in Hebrew or Aramaic[38] has been found at Qumran, the internal evidence for a Hebrew *Vorlage* for its Greek version is quite strong, if not conclusive.[39]

In any event, the judicious conclusion of Lewis[40] some twenty-five years ago regarding the Jamnia Council is worth repeating:

> Of the apocryphal books, only Ben Sira is mentioned by name in rabbinic sources. This would be true of both pre-and post-Jabneh sources . . . . Though it is ofen assumed that the apocrypha were excluded at that time [i.e., at Jamnia *ca.* A.D. 90], *no text specifically attributes a discussion of the apocryphal books to Jabneh.* That the apocrypha were discussed by the gathering

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[32] Cf. Beckwith (op. cit. pp. 152, 164-66), who dates the separation of the division of the Prophets and the Writings from the Law to 164 B.C., when Judas Maccabeus "gathered together for us all those writings" (2 Macc 2:14f.).

[33] For a detailed description as well as a refutation of it, see Sundberg, op. cit. pp. 51-79.

[34] So J. E. Grabe, *The History of the Seventy-Two Interpreters,* tr. T. Lewis (London, 1715); and W. R. Churton, *The Uncanonical and Apocryphal Scriptures* (London, 1884).

[35] One Hebrew and four Aramaic texts (J. T. Milik, "La Patrie de Tobie. *RB* 73 [1966], pp. 522-30).

[36] For details, see J. C. VanderKam, *Textual and Historical Studies in the Book of Jubilees,* in *HSM* 14 (Missoula: Scholars Press 1977); E. Schürer, *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C.–A.D. 135),* rev. G. Vermes, et al. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1986) 3:1.

[37] Eleven Aramaic copies; see J. T. Milik and M. Black, *The Books of Enoch: Aramaic Fragments of Qumran Cave 4* (Oxford, 1976).

[38] As recently as 1954, E. J. Bruns ("Judith or Jael?" *CBQ* 16: 12-14; cf. also his "The Genealogy of Judith," *CBQ* 18 [1956] 19-22) insisted on an Elephantine and Aramaic *Vorlage* for Judith; but, unfortunately, he offered no philological or linguistic evidence for this view.

[39] G. W. E. Nickelsburg (*Jewish Literature Between the Bible and the Mishnah* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981], p. 109) evidently subscribes to a Hebrew archetype, but T. Craven (*Aristry and Faith in the Book of Judith,* [SBLDS 70; Chico: Scholars, 1983]) believes "the Greek text could have been written from the outset in elegant hebraiced Greek" (p. 50). For examples of Hebraisms in Judith, see F. Zimmermann, "Aids for the Recovery of the Hebrew Original of Judith," *JBL* 57 (1938) 67-74; see also my Anchor *Judith,* pp. 66-67.

[40] *JBR* 32 (1964) 131.

is a conjecture incapable of proof. For that matter, no book is mentioned in the sources as being excluded from the canon at Jabneh.[41]

Thus, the old, easy argument that the Council of Jamnia, somewhere around A.D. 90, omitted Judith from the Hebrew canon because it was composed in Greek is no longer persuasive.

The Composition Date of Judith

If the third section of the Hebrew canon was closed as early as the first or even the second century B.C., then Judith's date of composition may be the principal reason for its not being included in the Hagiographa. Despite the tale's explicit late Persian setting,[42] the book was redacted in the Hasmonean Period, as its striking parallels with the days of Judas Maccabeus clearly indicate.[43]

Recently, Cohen[44] has dated Judith's redaction to the second century B.C. Putting a new twist on Zeitlin's old argument[45] that Jamnia rejected Judith for *halakahic* reasons (i.e., although Achior the Ammonite believed in God and was converted to Judaism by being circumcised [Judith 14:10], Achior was not baptized/immersed in water nor did he offer a sacrifice in the Temple, all of which were rabbinic requirements by the second century A.D.), Cohen points out, however, that we do not really know what all the first and second century B.C. requirements for conversion were; for *there are no second temple texts attesting to immersion and sacrifice as required rituals of conversion*. To be sure, both Qumran and Christianity had their baptisms, but this does not necessarily mean that both rituals were required by Jews a century or so earlier. According to Cohen then, Achior's being circumcised is not only fully in keeping with *the* ritual practice during the crisis in the early days of

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[41] Lewis (ibid., p. 132) also rightly concluded that Talmud *Yadayim* 2:13 ("The Gilyonim and the books of the Minim [heretics] do not defile the hands. The books of Ben Sira and all the books which were written since that time do not defile the hands" [cf. also Jer. *Sanh.* 10:1, 28]), the principal text invoked for arguing that Jamnia excluded the apocrypha, is a passage without date or occasion. The *Gilyonim* refers to the Gospels, not the apocrypha. Ibid. p. 132.

[42] For example, major and minor characters have names common in the Persian period, and there are allusions to certain Persian campaigns, accomplishments, practices and terms. For details on these and other types of examples, see Pfeiffer, op. cit. pp. 293-95; and my Anchor *Judith*, pp. 49-50, 55.

[43] As Nickelsburg (op. cit.) has so well but briefly said, "The story of Judith has striking similarities to the time of Judas Maccabeus. Nebuchadnezzar may be understood as a figure for Antiochus IV. . . . The defeat of a vastly superior invading army parallels Judas's defeat of the Syrians. Especially noteworthy are the similarities between this story and Judas's defeat of Nicanor. . . . Nicancor's subsequent threat against the Temple, his defeat and decapitulation, and the public display of his head in Jerusalem all find remarkable counterparts in the story of Judith (cf. 1 Macc 7:33-50)." pp. 108-09.

[44] Op. cit. pp. 50-55.

[45] "Proselytes and Proselytism During the Second Commonwealth in the Early Tannaitic Period," in Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume, 1965. H. M. Orlinsky (*Essays in Biblical Culture and Bible Translation* [New York: KTAV, 1974] pp. 279-81) also regards Achior's not being baptized as the *balakahic* reason for the rabbis' rejecting the book.

the Maccabean Revolt but no mention of either Achior's baptism or sacrifice *may* be an argument (albeit it *from silence*) for Judith's being dated to the second century B.C.

Beckwith[46] sees in Judith's immersing herself rather than just washing her hands before prayer (cf. Judith 12:5-9) as evidence of the book's being written or redacted in the second century B.C. By the latter half of the second century B.C., the Pharisees had substituted the washing of one's hands, Beckwith maintains, for immersion (cf. Epistle of Aristeas 305). One might counter that here, as T. Craven's superb rhetorical analysis of the book of Judith has shown so often elsewhere,[47] literary rather than ritualistic considerations may have been foremost, that is, for Judith and her maid to make good their escape, they *had* to establish a pattern of going outside the camp to bathe (cf. Judith 12:5-9; 13:9-10). Beckwith[48] also argues that the book of Judith is more of Pharisaic than Essene origin because festival observance of Fridays (cf. Judith 8:6) was part of Pharisaic tradition (cf. *M. Taanith* 4.2; *M. Hagigah* 3.7).

If one does accept a second century B.C. date for the composition of Judith, then it might be argued that just as the book of Daniel (generally dated to *ca.* 164 B.C.) was accepted into the Palestinian canon, so Judith may also have been accepted and then, for whatever reason/s,[49] subsequently excluded. Certainly there is no reason, in principle at least, why this could not have happened among one or more Jewish groups,[50] although, it must be emphasized, there is no evidence of such a debate about Judith in *any* rabbinic literature of the first or second century B.C. or A.D.

I would further counter that while Jewish communities in Palestine could easily maintain that Daniel had been actually composed during the late exilic or early post-exilic period, no such argument could be made for Judith, its Persian setting notwithstanding, because of the story's striking similarities to, if not certain dependence upon, Judas Maccabeus's victorious struggle over General Nicanor (*ca.* 161 B.C.). Cohen and Beckwith may very well be correct that Judith was composed or at least redacted in the second century B.C.; but as I have argued elsewhere,[51] a more likely date is some time during the reign of either John Hyrcanus I (135-104 B.C.), possibly after his annexation and "integration" of Samaritan territory in 107 B.C. or, less

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[46] Op. cit. p. 17

[47] See n. 39.

[48] Thus far, no Semitic or Greek text of Judith has been found at Qumran.

[49] For example, given the hostility existing between Jews and Samaritans—so clearly expressed in, say, the Gospels of the New Testament—later Jews may have disapproved of the book's accepting attitude toward the towns of Samaria, in general (4:4,6; 15:4), and, especially, of making a Samaritan woman and her kinsmen the "saviors" of Jerusalem and its Temple.

[50] In fact, S. M. Zarb (*De Historia Canonis Utriusque Testamenti* [Rome: Pont. Institutum 'Angelicum' 1934] pp. 58-63) argues precisely that for Judith as well as for Tobit and Maccabees, but Beckwith (op. cit.) characterizes the attempt as "without the slightest success" (p. 376). It should be remember that according to Origen (Letter to Africanus 13), the Jews did not include Judith or Tobit even among the "apocrypha," i.e., books stored away.

[51] Anchor *Judith*, pp. 67-70.

likely, of Alexander Janneus (103-76 B.C.). *If* a Hasmonean date is correct, then Judith was composed too late to have been included in the Writings.

Some Other Considerations

But even *if* Judith was composed early enough to have been included in the Writings, it wasn't. Space here does not permit my presenting, in detail, other possible reasons for its not being part of the Hagiographa. Elsewhere,[52] however, I have suggested that early critics of the book could have found any number of objections, or "flaws," to it (although the book's critics have often said as much about themselves and their times as they have about her).[53]

Briefly, there is the book's questionable historicity or veracity, especially with regard to those historical and geographical anachronisms, inconsistencies, and errors abounding in its first three chapters. [54] Or, the tale's "pro-femininist stance" may have been simply too radical for the males who determined the Hebrew canon.[55] Then too, many people—past and present, Jewish and Christian—have viewed Judith herself as deficient in character[56] and immoral in her conduct.[57] In any event, Judith was, ironically, the saint[58] who murdered for her people.

Failure to recognize irony as *the* quintessential characteristic of the book is the primary reason for so many of the misinterpretations of it and may just be the clue to many of its historical, geographical, and moral problems[59] as well as the reason why it, in contrast to the "secular" book of Esther, did not enter the Hebrew canon. Judith herself is most ironic. Although shapely, beautiful, and wealthy, she lived an abstemious and celibate existence, one filled with prayer and self-denial. Childless, she gave new life to her people. She not only prayed for a deceitful tongue,[60] but actually begged Israel's merciful God for strength to cut off a defenseless man's head. The ultimate irony, of course, is that a deeply religious woman became revered, not for her piety but her murderous act. Such ironies can fascinate one reader and repel another.

Why was Judith not included in the Hebrew canon while the "godless" book of Esther was? Many plausible reasons can be offered, but the simple fact is that we

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[52] Most recently, "Why Was Judith Left Out?", now scheduled to appear in the last 1989 issue of *BR*. A number of the issues mentioned below have been also discussed in my Anchor *Judith*.

[53] For details, see my Anchor *Judith*, pp. 64-66.

[54] Ibid. pp. 121-145.

[55] So Craven, op. cit. pp. 117-18.

[56] Judith's conversations with Holofernes prove she was a shameless flatterer (11:7-8), an equivocator (12:14, 18), and a bold-faced liar (11:10, 12-14, 18-19). Her double entendres and her ironic and ambiguous statements in her conversations with Holofernes are not her pious efforts to avoid lying but an expression of her (or, better, the author's) sense of humor.

[57] Judith was a ruthless assassin (13:7-8), with no respect for the dead (13:9-10, 15).

[58] By the standards of her day, Judith lived a saintly life (cf. 8:4-6,8; 12:4; 16:22-24).

[59] See my Anchor *Judith*, pp. 78-85.

[60] Prior to Judith's leaving for the enemy camp, she prayed, "Grant me a beguiling tongue for wounding and bruising those who have terrible designs against your covenant and your sacred house, even against Mount Zion and the house your children possess" (9:13).

don't know. While scholars naturally look for *the* reason, maybe there isn't just one. Rather, just as in secular elections where the individual voters cast their ballots for or against a particular candidate for one or more reasons, be those reasons valid or not, so the "voting" of the Hebrew people for or against a particular book's inclusion in the Jewish canon may have been the result of a number of considerations. It was, ultimately, the Jewish community, sometimes over a long period of time, that determined which Jewish books "defiled the hands." For better or worse, the book of Judith was not included among them.

Finally, the story of Judith has as its basic ingredients four motifs about which people can feel very strongly and differently: God, power, sex, and death. Moreover, the tale embodies two of the most popular but controversial aphorisms of many who call themselves Jews or Christians:

> All's fair in love and war.
> The end justifies the means.

Small wonder this little book has been so popular—and so controversial!

Characterization and Christology in Matthew: Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew

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This is a study of the narrativization of the proper name (hereafter = PN) "Jesus" in the Gospel of Matthew as it relates to educating the reader to construct the character "Jesus."[1] The study is intended to be only a beginning of reflections on the PN Jesus in light of current poststructuralist theories of language and reading.[2] The PN Jesus densely populates the linguistic field of Matthew's narrative. Of the 150 possible occurrences of Jesus as a PN in Matthew, 127 of the occurrences are undisputed (85%) and have the definite article.[3] In the disputed passages the tendency

[1] On the concept of educating the reader, see Burnett, 1985. Hereafter I will not put the PN "Jesus" in quotation marks, but it should be understood as having them.

[2] It would be most unpoststructuralist to attempt to define "poststructuralism." However, generally what I mean by the term entails those views which argue that the idea of structure itself is a metaphor, which itself has a rhetorical (not ontological) status, i.e., there is no structure which is "there" objectively in a text and which can be deduced rationally and empirically verified. Structures "appear" to readers because readers operate already within a discursive system of reading conventions which allows certain readings (meanings) to be actualized and others to be excluded. To put it differently, signifiers are allowed to become signifieds (and structures deduced) within certain discursive limits. Poststructuralism shifts the emphasis from signifieds to the signifiers themselves primarily by showing that any signified is itself only another signifier (including any deduced structure). In other words, once the rhetorical status of arriving at signifieds (meanings) is exposed so that the signifieds themselves are shown to refer to larger discursive practices, which practices themselves refer to other discursive practices, and so on, then meaning is endlessly deferred and there is no "outside" standpoint from which to view either the deduced structure or its alledged "center." However, the material effects of the discursive practices which arrive at signifieds are not necessarily minimized by poststructuralists, and there are many calls to examine discursive practices, particularly the ways in which certain voices are excluded in the disciplinary process of signification (see Burnett, "Postmodern Exegesis"; Phillips; Fowler; and, Moore).

[3] 2:1; 3:13,15,16; 4:7,10,17; 7:28; 8:4,10,13,14,18,10; 9:2,4,9,10,15,19,22, 23,27,28,30,35; 10:5; 11:1,4,7,25; 12:1,15; 13:1,34,53,57; 14:1,12,13,29,31; 15:1,21,28,29,32, 34; 16:6,8,13,17,24; 17:1,4,7,9,17,18,19,22,25,26; 18:1,22; 19:1,14,18,21,23,26,28; 20:17,22,25,30,34; 21:6,16,21,24,27, 31,42; 22:1; 22:18,29,41; 24:1,4; 26:1,4,6,10,17,19,26,31, 34,36,49, 50 (twice),51,52,55,57, 59,63,64; 27:1,11 (twice), 20,22,26,27,46,50,54,55,57,58; 28:5,10,16,18.

is to add the article to the name,[4] to add the name to the article,[5] or to add both the name and the article.[6] The tendency is clearly to have the article and the name together, and the PN is distributed evenly throughout the narrative.[7] Of the 127 undisputed places where Jesus occurs with the article, 103 (81%) have Jesus as the *subject* and 81.5% (or 84 times) of these have Jesus in the act of speaking, answering, or having just spoken.[8] From this survey it is clear that (1) *ho Iesous* is clearly the narrator's favorite term for the protagonist, and that (2) it is used predominately as the *speaking* subject.

Given the statistical importance of the PN Jesus in Matthew, it is surprising that to my knowledge no study has focused upon it *as a proper name.* Most studies have concentrated upon the christological titles as an explication of the PN Jesus.[9] It will be argued below that although the narrative function of the PN Jesus is to provide referential stability for the reader,[10] it also functions as a signifier which impels the reader to read for a signified (usually for the titles). However, although the PN provides the reader with the illusion of presence (or of a "transcendental signified") which the titles explicate semantically, the PN itself remains a *signifier,* i.e., it remains an undecidable which can never itself be captured into a dominant signified or group of signifieds.[11] In this sense the narrative function of the PN Jesus both motivates and undercuts the reading project of finding a dominant christology or "key" to understanding Jesus in Matthew.

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[4] 4:1; 8:34; 16:21; 17:8; 20:32; 21:1,12; 23:1; 26:75; 28:9.

[5] 8:5,22; 9:12; 14:16; 15:16; 17:11,20; 22:37; 24:2.

[6] 4:12,18,23; 8:3,7; 12:25; 13:36,51; 14:14,22,25,27; 15:30; 18:2; 22:20,43.

[7] Contrast Mark where 56 of the 80 occurrences (=70%) are after Peter's confession in 8:29 (Nevius:225).

[8] 3:13,15*,16; 4:7*,10*,17*; 7:28*;8:4*,10*,13*,14,18*; 9:2*,4*,9*,10, 15*,19,22*,23* (cf. 24),27,28*,30*,35*; 10:5*; 11:1*,4*,7*,25*; 12:1,15* (cf. 16); 13:1* (cf. 3), 34*,53*,57*; 14:13,31*; 15:21,28*,29,32*,34*; 16:6*,8*,13*, 17*,24*;17:1,4,7*,9*,17*,18*,19,22*,25*,26*; 18:1*,22*;19:1*,14*,18*,21*, 23*,26*,28*;20:17*,22*,25*,30, 34; 21:6*,16*,21*,24*,27*,31*,42*; 22:1*; 22:18*,29*,41*; 24:1,4*; 26:1*,6,10*,26*,31*,34*,36*,50a*,52*,55*,63,64*; 27:11a, 11b*,46*,50*; 28:10*,16*,18*. (The asterisk indicates the 84 times that Jesus is or was in the act of speaking.)

[9] Usually it is suggested that the use of the article with the proper name *could* itself suggest an honorific title (Black:70). However, the necessity of the article's use with the PN is still disputed (Moulton:81, 83; BDF:#260). The only one to my knowledge to suggest that the PN Jesus might itself be a christological title in Matthew is John R. Donahue, but there has been no systematic study of this possibility.

[10] BDF (#260) attempt to explain the use of the article as a *narrative* use, i.e., "to express the relation between frequent references to the same person."

[11] A "transcendental signified" is a term which does not point beyond itself. It is a term which stops signification for the reader because it is taken to be the *final* term to which all other terms within the linguistic system refer. In that sense a transcendental signified is believed to exist independently of the system, and, consequently, is not itself subject to further signification (Derrida, 1972:250; cf. Silverman:33-34, 256).

Narrativization of Proper Names

Although there has been a great deal of discussion about PNs among philosophers of language, discussions of the narrative function of PNs, especially in relation to characterization, is in its infancy. Generally speaking, theories of PNs generated by philosophers emphasize that PNs function primarily for identification or for reference; PNs do not give information. John Searle is usually quoted in this regard: "What then is the difference between proper names and other singular referring expressions? Unlike demonstratives, a proper name refers without presupposing any stage settings or any special contextual conditions surrounding the utterance of the expression. Unlike definite descriptions, they do not in general *specify* any characteristics at all of the objects to which they refer" (Searle: 215 cf. 217). In biblical studies this view has been expressed as "a proper name is a word with denotation but no connotation, reference but no sense" (Caird: 45). However, Searle and other philosophers are primarily talking about the use of PNs in ordinary language. Their conclusions have limited utility for understanding the function of PNs in narratives generally and for biblical narratives in particular (Jefferson; Bal; and, Gibson: ch. 3).

The PN and Characterization

A "character" is a paradigm of traits constructed by the reader from linguistic indicators which are strewn along a textual continuum. The PN is the most important linguistic indicator by which readers construct characters, and it is the PN which, by drawing all semes to itself, spins the illusion that the character is a real individual. That is: "The proper name enables the person to exist outside the semes, whose sum nonetheless constitutes it entirely" (Barthes, 1974:191).[12] The PN, especially in classical (or "readerly") literature like Matthew, is the stabilizing signifier for the reader because it remains unchanged throughout the course of the narrative, and, because of its repeatability, it guarantees a consistent response from the reader (Barthes, 1974:94-95; Docherty:45-46; Hamon:107 cf. Bal: 106-107, 129).

Narratives, then, unlike the use of PNs in ordinary language, transform PNs "so that they not only refer but also signify," i.e., the PN "acquires a meaning which one might sum up" in a semantic definition (Jefferson:74). More than that, PNs in narratives provide the semantic motivation for the reader to transform "anonymity" into "eponymy," i.e., to transform the absence of meaning or characteristics by which a PN could be summarized as a sign into a semantic summarization (Genette: 23 in Jefferson:75). In this view reading is a process of nomination by which connotations are given to textual indicators by the reader (Barthes, 1974:190; Garvey; Chatman; and, Rimmon-Kenan). Reading, then, is ultimately the "desire to construct meanings for names," i.e., the "desire to abolish the arbitrary nature of all linguistic signs by providing some [semantic] motivation for them" (Jefferson:76). As Derrida has put it: "this desire is at work in every proper name: translate me, don't translate me. On the one hand, don't translate me, that is, respect me as a proper name, . . . And, on the other hand, translate me, that is, understand me, preserve me within the universal language, follow my law, and so on" (1985:102). The first occurrence of a PN in a narrative, then, is crucial for this semantic motivation, and it is to Matt 1:1-25 that attention must now be turned.

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[12] See Burnett ("Characterization") for a more complete discussion of theories of characterization as they relate to reader construction in the Synoptics.

Matthew 1:1-17

Matthew's narrative begins with "the book of the genealogy of Jesus Christ, son of David, son of Abraham" (1:1). Although *christos* may seem to be a PN here, it really does not fit the philosophical definitions of a PN since, as a general title in Matthew, christos does connote. It has definite meanings in the narrative in connection with both of the other terms in 1:1 ("son of David" and "son of Abraham"),[13] it is clearly used as a title in apposition to the PN Jesus (1:16; 27:17, 22 cf. 24:5, 23), and there is no question that the PN Jesus is to be the focus in Matthew of the reader's attention (see nn. 3-8). Any connotations of *christos* as a PN in 1:1 are subsumed quickly to a titular identification of Jesus (Schenk:300).

In Barthes' terms *christos* functions as a delimiting metalanguage for the PN Jesus. In other words, together with "son of David" and "son of Abraham," *christos* has the effect of inscribing the PN Jesus within salvation-history. The genealogy functions as a supplement to the terms in 1:1 to efface the narrator's authority by suggesting that the PN Jesus has its own true history, i.e., that the character has a historical lineage (cf. Docherty:62-63). Whichever phrase is used in 1:18 ("Jesus [the] Christ"), there is little question that it also functions with the same semantic content as verses 16 and 17 (Schenk:298). Although there could have been other possible inscriptions for the PN Jesus (cf., e.g., Luke 3:23-38; John 1:1-14), it is now interpellated as a subject for the reader of Matthew into a particular history (cf. Pêchaux:64, 107). Thus to say "Jesus Christ" is not exactly the same thing as saying "Jesus" (cf. Barthes, 1981:139-140). "Jesus Christ" indicates that Israel's entire salvation-history culminates in Jesus (Kingsbury, 1984:8).

Matthew 1:21-25

In this section the PN Jesus is singled out and given both a signified and a narrative role for the reader. Since 1:21 gives the semantic *causality* for the name, this verse functions as a kind of "name etymology" (cf. Gibson:135). The phrase "for he will save his people from their sins" inscribes Jesus in some sense into the narrative as the savior.[14] This interpellation of Jesus as savior will make the PN Jesus the cause of its own narrative result, i.e., "the subject of discourse [is] as the origin of the subject of discourse" (Pêchaux:108-109). The narrative will unfold the story of Jesus as savior, and the subject will return to its own discourse at the end of the narrative. In this sense the PN Jesus becomes the "father" of its own narrative outcome (cf. Derrida, 1981). At the end of the narrative the subject will re-cognize itself as what it was at the linguistic beginning (cf. Pêchaux:120). It is this chain of signification which has encoded everything in advance for the PN Jesus. The subject (the "I") is

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[13] *Christos* means (1) the *fulfillment* of all the generations from Abraham (1:17 cf. 1:2), (2) the "king of the Jews" (2:2, 4; 27:37), (3) the eschatological one (11:2-3), and, perhaps, (4) the "son of God" (16:16, 20; 26:63, 68). See Kingsbury, 1984:8.

[14] I say "in some sense" because the "he" could refer to God instead of to Jesus. At this point it is ambiguous for the reader, but as the narrative progresses *sōzō* is related specifically to the actions of Jesus rather than to those of the Father (Davies:210). Furthermore, it was certainly not a contradiction in almost any form of Jewish thought to relate the saving action of God to the Messiah so that "his people" could refer to the messianic community (Luz:104 cf. Gundry:23).

now subservient to the "character" Jesus as savior, which character, in turn, will become the "absolute monarch to repress the unpredictable 'I' and control the production of the imaginary" (Cixous:384).

The PN Jesus has received a narrative role as savior. What is represented (the PN Jesus) is already precluded within the frame of representation (Jesus as savior). Thus anything which is *outside* this frame is excluded as im*PROPER* (e.g., Jesus is not the savior). The connotation of savior determines what will be *proper* for the reader to attach to the PN Jesus. But even more, the "*will* save" ties the PN Jesus to time (chronology), i.e., the narrative destiny of the PN is given here. The bond between PN and narrative destiny in Matthew is close to a *mise en abyme*, i.e., "a microstructure that contains a summary of the overall fabula in which it functions" (Bal:75 cf. 74; and, Foucault:3-16). For Barthes this moment (or "site") in the textual network should be carefully marked since it provides the reader with the occasion to speak teleologically about the PN "as though he existed, as though he had a future, an unconscious, a soul" (1974:94). What readers are actually doing, however, is "developing connotations" around the hero's PN. During the rest of the reading process this established *propriety* will, almost in economic terms for Barthes, allow "the substitution of a nominal unit for a collection of characteristics by establishing an equivalent relationship between sign [PN Jesus] and sum [Jesus as savior]" (Ibid:95). The PN's function as an instrument of exchange (i.e., as a Sign for *PROPER* characteristics) is "the structural function of the Name," and in readerly literature like Matthew this exchange allows the reader to fill the sign with characteristics (adjectives) to produce the illusion of a person (or presence). The PN, then, provides both a destiny for the narrative and the quest by the reader to attach *PROPER* characteristics to the name (cf. Jefferson:77). It is precisely the quest for such characteristics, and particularly for those like a dominant christological title, which both serves to efface the fact that the PN is a linguistic convention, thus providing an illusion of presence for the reader, and to undermine any reading. This is because the PN can be dissolved into many characteristics and the characteristics can themselves be returned to textuality by returning them to the PN, which is only a linguistic convention pointing away from itself to the characteristics.[15]

The semantic inscription of the PN Jesus becomes even more pronounced in 1:23-25. Here the PN Jesus, as a signifier, is given a signified, viz., "God with us" or "with us is God." The reader is given clearly the interpretation of the name by the narrator (1:23). The symmetry of meaning as "God with us" is clear between Emmanuel and the PN Jesus (cf. Jefferson:49, 53). Both the PN Jesus and Emmanuel are semantically related to "God with us" by the repeated emphasis on "his name" and by the command (*kalesis*)-obedience (*ekalesin*) structure of 1:21-25 (cf. Meier:9).[16]

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[15] For Barthes this is precisely the difference between narratives like Matthew and modern fiction: "All subversion . . . thus begins with the Proper Name. . . . What is obsolescent in today's novel is not the novelistic, it is the character; what can no longer be written is the Proper Name" (1974:95).

[16] The parallelism is clear:

1:21: *kaleseis to onoma autou Iēsoun*

1:23b: *kalesousin to onoma autou Emmanouēl*

1:25b: *ekalesen to onoma autou Iēsoun.*

Now the reader not only has a translation for the PN Jesus, but its very ambiguity—is Jesus equivalent to God or just to the active presence of God?—impels the reader, as mentioned above, to construct a pattern of meanings for the PN based upon this signification of "God with us." The question for the reader is: "Is God present when Jesus is present?" The question itself seems to entail the meanings that through Jesus God will both act and be revealed. This semantic charging of the PN Jesus gives the PN a metatextual character because (1) the semantic charge will extend beyond the immediate textual site of its first use (cf. Gundry:24, 43, passim), and, unless changed, (2) it will continue to be a stable point for the reader (the primacy effect) so that *in each occurrence* of the name this semantic determination will impel the reader to determine its meaning (Perry cf. Bal:74-75).

Lacan's insights are relevant here. Jesus has received his PN from before birth and it has inscribed "him" into a narrative role (as savior) with a semantic content (God's presence). "Jesus" has received his narrative identity from the "Other," i.e., from inscription into a preexisting linguistic system rather than from "his" own subjectivity. The inscription of the PN into the preexisting linguistic system is enough to shape his place, his destiny, and his speech. Lacan's point is that the subject "if he can appear to be the slave of language is all the more so of a discourse in the universal movement in which his place is already inscribed at birth, if only by virtue of his proper name" (Lacan:148 cf. 68). Jesus' narrative identity is given to him; it is not something which "he" achieves. Jesus' subjectivity, then, is reduced to a minimum (cf. Calloud:93). His subjectivity is created through the discourse (cf. Silverman:196 passim). As a character Jesus will never seize his own subjectivity in the narrative, i.e., what may have been *excluded* by the inscription of the PN. He will remain obedient to his inscribed function as a signifier of God's presence. As we shall see, at the crucial place in the narrative where he has a chance to seize his own subjectivity, he cannot or will not give his own identity when asked for it (26:63-64; cf. Docherty:55). There is little question in terms of the "politics of the PN" that the character will accept "an anterior authority which gives it a name" and will not revolt against the patriarchal heritage in order "to be the authority behind his or her own existence and name." The Son will remain the voice of his absent Father (Derrida, 1985:51-52). In these terms the reader is lured into an "Oedipal quest" for the God who is somehow present in Jesus (cf. Docherty:137). In that sense God becomes the "unconscious PN" of Jesus for the reader (cf. Derrida, 1985:106).

The Gospel of Matthew becomes, then, an unfolding of the characteristics (adjectives, titles, semes, themes, and so on) which refer to the PN Jesus (cf. Ibid:161). In Frege's terms "it is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from sense to the reference" (63). In other words, the christological titles and other semes which could be connected to the PN Jesus all have the same reference (Jesus) but different senses. As noted above, for characterization it is the PN which provides the reader with a stable locus for "unifying, integrating, individualizing the disparate manifestations of the character" (Docherty:222 cf. 59-60). In this respect Kingsbury is certainly correct: "Of significance is the circumstance that Matthew places christological titles in apposition to the names of 'Jesus' and 'Jesus Christ' and to the name and title *christos* in order to apprise the reader of the identity of Jesus" (1984:22-23). The whole *récit* of Matthew could be seen as a translation of the PN Jesus (cf. Derrida, 1985:160).

Matthew's narrative, then, provides the descriptive criteria and/or semantic content for the PN Jesus. Consequently, our reading is *parasitic* upon the descriptions provided by the text *and* by the conventions of reading which we as SBL readers

generally adopt. The important point here is that it seems to be generally assumed that comprehensive knowledge of the referent (Jesus) could be obtained if all of the totality of designations about it were specified. As Frege puts it: "the sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the language or *totality of designations* [my emphasis] to which it belongs" (57-58). This means that one would have to use *all* of the readings of those descriptions. In this sense Frege says: "Comprehensive knowledge of the reference would require us to be able to say immediately whether any given sense belongs to it. *To such knowledge we never attain* [my emphasis]" (58).

On this point one of Frege's strongest critics agrees with him. Using the example of the PN "Aristotle," Donnellan points out that if one wants to produce the descriptions which commonly backup the name "Aristotle," then one must ask: "Commonly attributed by whom? By contemporary speakers? One thing seems certain: the speakers in question cannot be *all* those who have ever used the name "Aristotle' to refer to Aristotle" (362). His point, then, is: "Using this *total* class of those who have ever spoken of Aristotle is a practical impossibility and can hardly form the basis for our use" (362).

Reading for descriptions like christological titles, then, never produces a totality of descriptions which gives a comprehensive knowledge of the referent. Reading is necessarily constrained by reading conventions like those of SBL. Our readings are not only parasitic upon Matthew's descriptions but upon each others' descriptions of Matthew. Other readings of Matthew, e.g., of TV evangelists, are of necessity excluded because they violate our generally accepted conventions for reading Matthew's descriptions. What any of our readings describe, then, is, of course, not Jesus himself but Matthew's descriptions of the PN Jesus as mediated through SBL's descriptions of Matthew.[17] Matthew 1:23-25 provides the reader with the meaning of the PN Jesus (God's presence), and this impels the reader to read for meaning, i.e., to make the signified present, within the conventions of one's own reading community.

As a PN, however, Jesus also *points away from itself* to its signified (God's presence). In most conceptions of meaning when the signified is reached, then a terminus has been reached. For example, the *dialectic* which is established by the PN Jesus and the signified (God's presence) is usually resolved by their unification into a dominant third term (e.g., son of God; cf. Derrida, 1972:43). This kind of movement in reading deduces the cause of the sign from its effect. As Silverman puts it: "In other words, the distinction between signifier and signified can only be rigorously maintained if one term within the realm of signification is believed to be final, incapable of referring beyond itself to any other term. If there is no such term, then *every signified functions in turn as a signifier* [my emphasis], in an endless play of signification" (34). Such logocentric reading "forgets" that the PN Jesus (the signifier), in which the dominant third term is grounded, was already preceded by a signification, i.e., "the so-called 'thing itself' is always already a *representamen*" (Derrida, 1976:49). Reading, then, which moves from effect (son of God) to cause (the PN Jesus) has followed the movement of the Sign (=God's presence) as an illusion. It has tracked the trace (son of God) of a trace (the PN Jesus) of a prior and absent signification

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[17] Here I mean the *linguistic* referent, i.e., the *PN* Jesus. It is fallacious to invent what seems to be a linguistic referent when it is actually a *concept* (e.g., a reader's dominant concept about Jesus' identity).

(God's presence). One has tracked down "tracks" of the Sign (Derrida, 1973:158 cf. Taylor). This is because "the self-identity of the signified conceals itself unceasingly and is always on the move" (Derrida, 1976:49).

This movement of the Sign (and its effect on reading) with respect to the PN is that the PN's function, particularly in a readerly text like Matthew, is to gain more and more presence by its dissemination throughout the text (Derrida, 1985:76-77). The PN Jesus, with its textual density in Matthew (150 times), and particularly as subject, creates enormous desire in the reader for the presence of the signified. In Lacan's terms the repression of the privileged term (God's presence) only increases the reader's desire for the signified (God) to be present-ed. The christological titles and other semes only extend the signifying network and thus increase the desire for presence. As Silverman explains it, desire "is created by absence—not only by the signifiers which 'name' a missing signified, but by the other signifiers which replace those signifiers in the event of an additional metaphoric or metonymic elaboration" (114 cf. 120).

The readerly desire to which the Matthean text appeals is, e.g., metonymically like the desire of the character Satan in chapter 4. "Satan's attitude," as Calloud says, "is strangely similar to our own attitude toward a signifier from which we demand the immediate revelation of its signified and which we are ready to send back into the darkness of meaninglessness if we do not obtain satisfaction" (83). Jesus' refusal to make the signified present thus *retains priority for the signifier* (Ibid: 82). If the signified were ever present-ed in terms of semantic content or description, then the signifier—either the PN Jesus or a title like son of God—would, of necessity, disappear. If the signifier ever fell into the realm of decidable meaning, then there would be no motivation to read any longer for that meaning. There would be no longer a "gap" between signifier and signified (Ibid:86-87). Another way to put this is to say that the reader can only grasp who Jesus is by what or who he *is not*. The PN Jesus derives its identity from its inscription in the discourse of an Other, an Other which always transcends the signifier yet determines its entire narrative history (cf. Silverman:194, 265).

The Matthean text lures the reader, then, into two opposing tendencies. On the one hand it must retain the PN Jesus as a signifier and not let it be reduced to any one signified. On the other hand the text must promise presence (a transcendental signified) to the reader or the process of reading will not be motivated. In the process the PN gains more and more presence by the dissemination of itself and of its signifying network throughout the text so that by the end of the narrative (28:20) the promised presence seems to have arrived.

Matthew 28:20

Most readers of Matt 28:16-20 have noted that it seems to form an inclusio which returns the reader to the beginning of the narrative, particularly to 1:23 (see Burnett, 1985:101-102). Gaston's conclusions are typical and instructive on this point. He notes that 28:16-20 really changes very little for the reader. Jesus has always had the authority that he now claims (cf. 11:25-27), and the presence that he now promises has in some sense been there all along (cf. 1:23; 18:20). Gaston does say, however, that "the name Emmanuel, God-with-us (1:23), takes on a new meaning. Jesus is given no title in this final scene, but it is appropriate that he be worshiped" (93).

The final words of Jesus in Matthew are a promise of his presence. The only other promises of his presence in the narrative have been *in connection with his name* (*to onoma*). In 18:20 the presence of Jesus (cf. 18:1) is promised with the first person pronoun (*eimi*), just as it is in 28:20 (*egō eimi*). First person pronouns are usually treated by philosophers of language just as PNs are treated, viz., as semantically "empty," and the problem of the relation of the first person pronoun to the PN has not yet been solved (e.g., Gibson:161, 162 n. 5). What does seem to be clear, however, is that although first person pronouns are signifiers without conventional signifieds, *in particular instances of discourse they designate the speaker*, i.e., the signifier "I" implies a speaker to whom it refers (Benveniste:218-230). This means that the "I" in 28:20, as in 18:20, must refer to the PN Jesus, and that the reader is referred back to 1:23 (cf. Gundry:597).

Yet in 28:20 the statement is stronger than ever before in the narrative. In 1:23 it was a promise and a command which determined Jesus' narrative identity in advance, and in 18:20 the promise is to be "in the midst of" two or three "of them." In 28:20, though, the promised presence is personalized ("to you") and emphatic (*egō*). In our terms the PN Jesus has realized or re-cognized its identity which was inscribed from the beginning. The reader too has arrived at narrative presence, and whatever descriptions, characteristics, and titles have been appended to the PN Jesus are "collected" at this textual site. Also the name has recouped some of the presence of the absent father. The son, who has been the voice for the absent father all along, now delivers in some sense the presence which was promised in 1:23 (cf. Hubbard: 96-97). That presence, however, which was the signified of the PN Jesus, is still mediated through the "I" which, in turn, refers to the PN Jesus.

In poststructuralist thought an "I am" statement has no immediate presence, i.e., the Ego which uses the word "I" (the subject of enunciating) is not present with the "I" in the statement itself (the subject of the enunciation). There is a "phenomenological gap" between the two subjects which is too easily filled by logocentric thought. Indeed, unless this equivalency and reversibility between the subject positions is accepted, communication would be difficult if not impossible. When the equivalency and reversibility are accepted and erased, however, it gives the reader the illusion of total presence, or the illusion that the subject is present to itself *and* to the addressees (the "you"; cf. Benveniste:223-230).[18]

In the narrative itself there is a hint of this loss of presence. In 28:17 those who see Jesus ("him") worship him but some also doubt. Unquestionably the doubt refers semantically to the theme of "little faith" throughout the narrative, but it is also true that the *presence* of Jesus *occasioned* doubt rather than certainty about the presence (and authority) of God in Jesus (cf. Patte:398). The *WORDS* of Jesus in the promise of presence apparently restore presence to the characters but certainly to the reader because the "I" seems to make the speaker present to himself and to the addressees. The words which give presence do so precisely because they close the gap between the subjects, i.e., the words do not address the gap opened by the question of doubt itself (cf. Gundry:594).

The whole Matthean narrative which has promised to make present the signified of Jesus' identity finally renders that identity an undecidable. The presence of Jesus

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[18] As Derrida puts it: "When he writes himself to himself, he has no immediate presence of himself to himself" (1985:88). In other words, when the PN Jesus says "I am present," he has no immediate presence, else the words themselves would be unnecessary.

is promised through his *words*, and so much so that competent readers have come to see *the WRITTEN words*, the Book itself, as both the content of what is to be proclaimed in Jesus' name *and* as somehow mediating Jesus' presence (Burnett, 1981:283-291 cf. Kingsbury, 1975:131). The *spoken* words, in which the subject seems to be present with itself, are here rendered as *written* words. The very fact that the written words exist attests to the absence of the subject and to the absence of the promised signified (God's presence). The place of the spoken words of Jesus has been taken by a written code which, because it is fixed and "permanent," has rendered the spoken words expendable. *The BOOK of Matthew has now become the Sign of the PN Jesus* (cf. Jacobson:138-142; and, Derrida, 1981). What the reader finds at the conclusion of the narrative is not an "object" or a "thing" but a *CODE* (a message to deliver). The promised signified has itself turned into another signifier which motivates more readings ad infinitum (cf. Silverman:164-165; and, Jacobson:146). As we have seen, though, this elusiveness has been the structure of the PN all along ("translate me/don't translate me").

The Son of Man in Matthew

In light of what has been said about the PN Jesus, viz., that it impels readers to read for a signified, one christological title seems to function in Matthew in a way similar to the PN Jesus. Jack Kingsbury has argued correctly that of all the titles and descriptions of Jesus in Matthew, "son of Man" (hereafter = SM) does not function to identify who Jesus is. Kingsbury gives basically five reasons for this. First, SM never stands in apposition to the PN Jesus. Second, only Jesus uses the term SM as a self-designation; no other character in the narrative identifies him as SM. Third, SM never occurs in a predication formulation to identify who Jesus is. Fourth, in 26:64 where Jesus responds to the high priest with SM and "so you have said," Kingsbury reads this as an affirmative response to 21:37, i.e., to the claim Jesus made to be the son of God. Jesus' answer with SM in 26:64, then, conveys nothing of Jesus' identity to his accusers. And, finally, although SM is usually connected in Matthew with Jesus' use of God's authority, paradoxically Jesus "also asserts his authority by embracing the life-style of 'itinerant radicalism' (8:19-20)" (1984:29-30 cf. 22-32). Kingsbury has used these points, of course, to argue that the dominant identification of Jesus in Matthew is as the son of God. However that may be, his point about the SM title stands: it does not identify who Jesus is.

As mentioned above, Matt 26:63 is crucial in the narrative for the place where Jesus can assert his own subjectivity. When the high priest pushes for a signified in 26:63, Jesus answers with SM. The high priest seems to be attaching the titles "Messiah" and "son of God" to the description given by the accusers in 26:61 who imply that Jesus is able to destroy the temple. It is to that description and to the the high priest's application of the titles that Jesus is asked to answer (26:62). "So you have said," then, does not seem to be an affirmation of his sonship but a descriptive acknowledgment of what the high priest has said. Thus I agree with David Hill that in 26:64 "it is as if Matthew wishes to show Jesus distancing himself from the language and titles used by immediately appealing (with a strong adversative) to the Son of man designation and imagery" (46). This answer conveys to the reader that, like the PN Jesus, SM points away from itself towards the parousia when the SM will be signified by the Judgment and the presence of God's kingdom. The exaltation language in 26:64 seems to confirm this point.

By his use of the SM title Jesus has created for himself a fictional self as his own Other (cf. Docherty:65). Jesus stays obedient to the absent signified, the father, i.e., he does not seize his own subjectivity. As Jesus remains obedient to the absent father, so the reader is to be obedient to the PN Jesus and *not* seize Jesus' identity. Jesus' use of the SM in the story world *reflects* the narrator's use of the PN Jesus: they always point towards some other description but can never be captured in any one signified themselves either by readers (for the PN Jesus) or by characters (for the SM title).[19] Like the PN Jesus, SM is always definite in form, and just as SM occurs only in Jesus' mouth, so the PN Jesus occurs only in the narrator's discourse. Thus, SM functions as Jesus' story world counterpart to the narrator's use of the PN Jesus: it points away from transcendental signification of the protagonist for the characters as the PN Jesus does for the reader.[20]

All of this shows that SM functions like a PN in Matthew, i.e., it is a signifier which points away from itself and refuses to be signified (made present). SM is more like the PN Jesus, then, than all of the other christological titles. The "paradox" of Jesus expressing his own authority in a "life-style of 'itinerant radicalism'" in narrative terms means that the *life-style* of the *itinerant* Jesus in the story is metonymic with the "life-style" of the itinerant PN "Jesus" and the itinerant title SM (cf. Kingsbury, 1984:29-30). Both are "sliding signifiers" (Lacan:154) which are "homeless" in terms of a transcendental signified for either the reader or the other characters.[21]

The Significance for the Study of Matthean Christology

As we have seen, the PN Jesus motivates the reader to read for its signified, and the narrative itself will either supply descriptions for the reader to attach to the PN and/or the reader will infer such nominations. In readerly texts like Matthew the inscription of THE NAME is crucial because it presupposes an overall *pattern* of names for which the reader now reads. To read is to name, and when the overall pattern of names has been ascribed to THE NAME, classified, and a hierarchichal pattern established, then the *Being* of the "thing itself" has been named (cf. Foucault: 115-120). In Matthew this translates into reading for the identity of the PN Jesus, ascribing the *PROPER* descriptions or titles to the PN, and arranging the descriptions into a taxonomy of names.

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[19] This seems to explain *in narrative terms* the "curious phenomenon" to which Kingsbury points, viz., "that Jesus can, on the one hand, openly speak of himself as the Son of man in the full hearing of the Jewish leaders, the crowds, and the disciples and yet, on the other hand, never be identified or even addressed by these groups as such" (1984:28-29).

[20] This is what Donnellan calls a "'referential' definite description," i.e., it is a "close relative of proper names" because like PNs it does not describe or identify (378).

[21] In more traditional historical-critical terms Hill is correct when he says that SM certainly does not identify Jesus but that "it does inform him [the reader] of *who Jesus says he is.*" And then: "One begins to suspect that a literary reading of Matthew is going to be unable by itself to solve the puzzle of this designation. It looks as if Matthew knew something more about the use and meaning of 'Son of man' than a purely narrative reading of his story is now able to supply" (49). In spite of his teleological assumption for narrative readings, I think that Hill is essentially correct, and that a poststructuralist reading reveals what that "more" entails.

It almost goes without saying that this kind of reading has been the dominant praxis in Matthean scholarship. Jack Kingsbury speaks for all of us when he says: "There is *as yet* [my emphasis] no agreement in scholarly circles as to where the center of this christology lies" (1984:3).[22] Kingsbury cites the diversity of scholarship about Jesus' identity as proof of the disagreement, but he still retains a presupposed telos for scholarship (the "as yet") and the notion of a "center" or a dominant description by which the identity of Jesus in Matthew can be finally understood.[23] The multiplicity of rival and even competing descriptions for the PN Jesus is not seen as a *dispersal* of Jesus' identity; they are usually seen, rather, as "an accumulative glorification of Jesus" into one grand taxonomy (Hengel:41). What I have tried to show, however, is that the signified of the PN Jesus in Matthew will always be an undecidable, even though 28:16-20 gives the reader the illusion of presence and decidability.

The presence which is achieved by a disciplinary consensus makes the discourse of the discipline, with its conventions for such arrival at presence, the ground of its own presence. In other words, the pattern of names for which we read is not "there" except in our own discursive practices. The *spoken words* "I am with you always" are represented as *written words*. The written words attest both to the absence of Jesus and of God (cf. Jacobson:138). Any "presence" of Jesus or of God is provided by the written, fixed code so that the *Book* of Matthew now becomes the Sign of the PN Jesus. The presence which the reader experiences is his or her own parasitic discourse upon the Sign of the Book. What the reader finds at the end of the narrative is not an object, but, much like the women at Jesus' empty crypt, a code, a message which points interminably away from itself to the narrative's beginning and to the absent Other into which the PN was first interpellated (cf. Ibid:146). Readers who, by their desire for a transcendental signified, force the signifier Jesus to become present in a dominant, phenomenal concern only alienate themselves further from the "real" of the narrative (the absent Other). The readings themselves (signifieds) only function as further signifiers (more codes) for other readers to track to empty

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[22] Perhaps there is no causal connection other than an intertextual one between Kingsbury's "as yet" about no agreement about a dominant christology in Matthew and Moulton's "not yet" conclusion about the PN: "Scholarship has not yet solved completely the problem of the article with proper names" (83).

[23] One does not have to try to assign a dominant christological title like son of God in order to read for a transcendental signified for the identity of Jesus. One may, as Barthes would put it, actualize other "semes" in the narrative and seize on those. From 1:23, e.g., readers might actualize the eschatological seme ("will save") and argue that eschatology is the center of the narrative. Others might actualize the "his people" seme and argue that ecclesiology is Matthew's dominant concern. Or, one might seize on the meaning of Jesus as savior and as God's presence by defining that in terms of Jesus' apparent narrative role as the Revealer. That role, in turn, could be presented in terms of another frame, e.g., Jesus functions as Revealer in his role as the Wisdom of God, and that frame can then be exalted to encompass the christological titles themselves, as I have done (Burnett, 1981).

I do not wish to enter the debate here over whether or not christology is Matthew's dominant concern. I am talking about how readers read in order to determine the identity of the protagonist. My point is that our reading conventions in general are logocentric.

tombs which lead in turn to more messages to track. It is a tracking, a Writing, however, which Absence impels us to do, and a tracking which materially affects lives.

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Depth of Characterization and Degrees of Faith in Matthew

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> I want the character to do his job. If someone is raking leaves in the background while the hero and heroine are having their tragic conversation in the autumn park, I am content that he should be simply someone raking leaves. People do after all rake leaves, and so long as he looks like someone raking leaves, that is enough for me. I positively do not want him "round"; in fact, I do not even want him "flat." More than that: unless his raking those leaves adds something to what is going on, I want him to quit raking them and just disappear. He should never have existed in the first place.
>
> Elder Olson

Aristotle's analysis of tragedy is often remembered for its emphasis on plot, with characters serving mainly to propagate the action (*Poetics* 1450a-b). Perhaps less well-known is his observation, in the *Rhetoric* (1356a), that *ēthos* (the orator's character) may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion.[1] If it be true that authors cannot avoid making persuasive appeals to their readers,[2] then those who are interested in narrative rhetoric would do well to attend carefully to characterization. The relatively scant investigation of this subject by biblical critics is scarcely surprising: because of its conceptual difficulty, the study of character has been slighted even among "secular" literary theorists.[3]

This essay will explore certain aspects of characterization in the First Gospel.[4] In pondering this dimension of Matthew's narrative, my principal partner in conversation will be Jack Dean Kingsbury, whose literary-critical scholarship has significantly

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[1] Given Aristotle's stress on the persuasive power of *logos* (*Rhetoric* 1391b-1403a; 1417b 20b), this admission is all the more impressive.

[2] Thus Wayne C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (2d ed.; Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1983) esp. 67-209.

[3] This state of affairs appears to have ameliorated somewhat in the past decade. See, for instance. Mark Spilka, ed., "Character as a Lost Cause," *Novel: A Forum on Fiction* 11 (1978) 197-217, and Rawdon Wilson, "The Bright Chimera: Character as a Literary Term," *Critical Inquiry* 5 (1979) 725-49.

[4] My focus is intentionally narrow; plot, atmosphere, tone, "quality of mind," and other components of narrative will be considered tangentially, if at all. A useful guide to a broader range of literary elements in both the Old and New Testaments is provided by Wesley A. Kort, *Story, Text, and Scripture: Literary Interests in Biblical Narrative* (University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988).

influenced the currents of Matthean interpretation.[5] My procedure will unfold in this fashion: first, a review of Kingsbury's assessment of the characters in Matthew's story; second, a reconsideration of that subject in the light of recent examinations of character among literary theorists; third, some concluding reflections on this critical perspective and its exegetical implications.

I. Kingsbury's Appraisal Revisited

Methodological Assumptions

In his study of characterization within Matthew's narrative, Kingsbury acknowledges his indebtedness to four literary critics. From M. H. Abrams, he draws a definition of "characters": "the persons who appear in a narrative work such as Matthew's Gospel."[6] Following Abrams and David Rhoads, Kingsbury associates "'characterization' . . . with the way in which an author brings character to life in a narrative," either by "showing" to the reader the characters in speech or in action, or by "telling" the reader about them.[7] Beyond these presuppositions, Kingsbury derives his fundamental concept of character from the theories of Seymour Chatman and E. M. Forster. With Chatman, Kingsbury proposes that characters can be differentiated on the basis of their "traits," those distinctive and persistent qualities exhibited by the character.[8] Moreover (as Forster suggests), characters may be distinguished by the number and variety of their traits: "round" characters posssess an abundance or diversity of traits, creating the impression of "real people"; characters that display only a few traits are "flat," or highly predictable in their behavior.[9]

Exegetical Assessments

Based on the foregoing assumptions, Kingsbury sketches five principal characters in Matthew's narrative.[10] These précis, in turn, are elaborated throughout the balance of *Matthew as Story,* in chapters that track the convergent story-lines of the First Gospel.[11]

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[5] Although other pertinent works by Kingsbury will be cited, his *Matthew as Story* (2d ed., revised and enlarged; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988) is the key work with which the present study will interact.

[6] Ibid , 9; cf. M. H. Abrams, *A Glossary of Literary Terms* (3d ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971) 21.

[7] Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story,* 9-10; cf. Abrams, *A Glossary of Literary Terms,* 21-22; David Rhoads and Donald Michie, Mark as Story: An Introduction to the Narrative of a Gospel (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982) 101-03.

[8] Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story,* 10; cf. Seymour Chatman, *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978) 119-34.

[9] Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story,* 10; cf. E. M. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* (San Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1927, 1955) 65-82.

[10] Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story,* 11-28.

[11] The following paragraphs present only a spare synopsis and the general tendencies of Kingsbury's analysis. More details of his exegesis, as well as of my own, will be provided, below, in Part II.

1. In Kingsbury's judgment, *Jesus* is the protagonist of Matthew's story. the focal character around whom all of the action revolves and by whom the qualities of all other characters are evaluated. For Kingsbury, two features of the Matthean Jesus seem especially noteworthy. First, from start to finish, the First Gospel presents Jesus as "the supreme arbiter of the will of God," "God's supreme agent who is in complete accord with God's system of values. Other than God himself, therefore, Jesus is the one major character whom Matthew always puts in the right."[12] Second, Jesus in the First Gospel evinces a multiplicity of positive, indeed "righteous," traits; because of this, "he is in Forster's terms a 'round' character."[13]

2. Collectively, *the disciples* may be evaluated as a single character. "Like Jesus [reasons Kingsbury] they are 'round,' but whereas this is the case with Jesus because of the great number of traits he possesses, this is the case with the disciples because they possess not only numerous traits but also traits that conflict."[14] As the story of Matthew progresses, the position of the disciples unevenly regresses from loyal obedience to ignominious apostasy.[15] Nevertheless, reconciliation, not failure, is the note on which Matthew concludes (28:16-20): albeit subject to "little faith," the disciples (in Kingsbury's estimation) confidently undertake the worldwide mission for which the risen Lord has commissioned and empowered them.[16] Through an encounter with the disciples' vacillation, and by identifying with or distancing oneself from their conflicting traits, Matthew's reader is invited to plumb Jesus' dictum in Matt 10:25a: "It is sufficient for a disciple to be like his teacher . . . ."[17]

3. Like the disciples, *Israel's religious leaders* can be treated as a single character within the Matthean narrative. However, in literary terms, those who occupy positions of religious authority are unlike the disciples in at least three ways (according to Kingsbury). First, whereas the disciples do not actively sway the Matthean plot, the religious authorities are second only to Jesus in their exertion of influence on the flow of Matthew's story.[18] Second, the Pharisees, Sadducees, chief priests, elders, and scribes constitute a united front that is opposed to Jesus. Third, while Jesus and the disciples are "round" characters, the religious leaders in Matthew coalesce into a "flat" character: "The many traits ascribed to them are in essence manifestations of a single 'root trait' ['evilness'], and they give no evidence of undergoing change in the course of the story?"[19] On the contrary, in portraying their capacity as leaders and their interaction with other characters, "Matthew's characterization of them [is] uniformly, even monotonously, negative."[20] Indeed, "a singularly villainous role" is assumed by the religious leaders, who "think the things of men" and are thereby

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[12] Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story,* 11, 64; cf. 52-55.

[13] Ibid , 12.

[14] Ibid , 13.

[15] Ibid., 13-17, 129-45; cf. idem, "The Figure of Peter in Matthew's Gospel as a Theological Problem," *JBL* 98 (1979) 67-83.

[16] Idem, *Matthew as Story,* 17, 144.

[17] Ibid., 14, 17.

[18] Ibid., 116: "The story of the religious leaders develops in concert with the story of Jesus."

[19] Ibid., 18; cf. 19.

[20] Ibid., 19.

quintessentially opposed to Jesus, who "thinks the things of God" (cf. Matt 16:23b).[21] As the account of their growing enmity unfolds, "Matthew makes it exceedingly plain that, whether directly or indirectly, the issue of authority underlies all the controversies Jesus has with the religious leaders and that it is therefore pivotal to his entire conflict with them."[22]

4. Like that of the disciples and the religious authorities, the characterization of *the Jewish crowds* in Matthew evolves through their interaction with Jesus; moreover, for Kingsbury, the crowds exhibit traits similar to those of the other two groups. Like the disciples, yet unlike the religious leaders, the crowds are generally well-disposed toward Jesus; amazed and astonished, harassed and helpless, leaderless and hungry, the crowds are the object of Jesus' compassion (cf. Matt 9:33-36; 14:14; 16:32). Like their leaders, yet unlike the disciples, the crowds are "blind, deaf, and without understanding" of the one whose crucifixion they ultimately ratify (13:1-2, 10-13; 27:25). In Kingsbury's assessment, the crowds, like their leaders, constitute a single, "flat" character: "They are not rich in traits, and the ones they possess tend not to change until the end of Matthew's story, when they suddenly appear with Judas to arrest Jesus (26:47, 55)."[23]

5. Almost without exception, *the minor characters* that proliferate within the pages of Matthew are (to use Kingsbury's terms) "stock" characters, possessing only a single trait. Although these "persons" sometimes do little more than blend into the setting or expedite the action of a scene, they function principally as "foils" for the story's major characters. Occasional references to their perceptive faith in Jesus contrasts sharply with the blind unbelief of Israel's leaders and populace at large (cf. Matt 2:1-12; 8:5-13). Similarly, and more often, these minor characters' faith in and service to Jesus are foils for the disciples' "little faith" and defection (cf. 14:28-36; 27:55-28:1). Thus the minor characters exemplify the values advocated by the protagonist (Jesus) and the implied author of Matthew's story.[24]

II. Matthean Characterization Reconsidered

Methodological Assumptions

At the outset let the reader understand: in my opinion, both the employment of literary techniques for interpreting the Gospels, as well as the particular species of criticism practiced by Kingsbury, are valid in principle and potentially fruitful for exegesis. To be sure, a text like the First Gospel is amenable to exegetical strategies other than those of literary critics; further, Kingsbury's approach by no means exhausts all of the types of literary criticism.[25] Nevertheless, the kind of investigation

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[21] Ibid., 115.

[22] Ibid., 125.

[23] Ibid., 24-25 (quotation, 24).

[24] Ibid., 10, 25-28. The "impled author" refers to the inferred core of norms that informs a narrative, shapes its style and construction, and thus influences what the reader reads (Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, 66-77; cf. 421-25). Throughout this paper, the traditional appellation, "Matthew," is employed in reference to the implied author of the First Gospel.

[25] As Kingsbury himself acknowledges (*Matthew as Story*, 1).

conducted by Kingsbury can illumine certain features of Matthew's Gospel that might remain enshrouded if our only methodological recourse were conventional forms of historical criticism.[26] To study Matthew as a story is to take seriously the narrative form selected by an ancient author to convey certain religious beliefs.

My questions stem, not from Kingsbury's critical perspective, but from what I regard as certain lacunae in his assumptions concerning literary characters and their characterization. First, *Kingsbury's working definition of "character" seems inadequate to describe the complexity of that phenomenon in the First Gospel.* In accordance with his prior decision to concentrate on Matthew as a unified narrative, apart from the historical, traditional, or theological concerns of other interpretive methods, Kingsbury settles for a cautious, and perhaps overly restrictive, definition of character as the "persons" brought to life in a narrative.[27] Such a definition is not so much incorrect as insufficient: it does not provide an adequate foundation for Kingsbury's painstaking inquiry into the capacity of characterization to impart the implied author's evaluative point of view.

In an informative study of women in the novels of Henry James, Mary Doyle Springer proposes an alternative definition of "character" that might prove more conceptually serviceable for the sort of project undertaken by Kingsbury:

> A literary character is an artificial construct drawn from, and relatively imitative of, people in the real world. The identity of a character becomes known primarily from a continuity of his or her own choices, speeches, and acts, consistent with the kind of person to be presented. Secondarily, identity is reinforced by description, diction, and in incidents of apposition to other characters. The choices, acts, and habits that constitute a character are limited by, consistent with, and suitable to the governing principle of the whole work of which the character is a part.[28]

Springer's formulation incorporates some important aspects of Kingsbury's definition (literary characters as relatively imitative of "real persons"; characterization as developed through action, speech, and interaction with other characters).[29] Moreover, it articulates two ideas that are tacit in his assumptions but writ large throughout his analysis: (a) in narrative, a shaping principle governs characters and their acts; (b) the values attending this governing principle are implied by the choices made by those characters. As I shall argue momentarily, both of these concepts may enrich our understanding of characterization in Matthew.

Second, *even on literary-critical premises, Matthean characterization and Matthean theology are intricately interwoven and need not be heuristically separated.* In Springer's view, an author's evaluative beliefs and creation of characters are virtually impossible to segregate: "characters will be as lifelike, or as fleshless and stylized, as they have

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[26] Cf. Norman R. Petersen, *Literary Criticism for New Testament Critics* (Guides to Biblical Scholarship, NT Series; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978) 9-48.

[27] Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story*, 9.

[28] Mary Doyle Springer, *A Rhetoric of Literary Character: Some Women of Henry James* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1978) 14 (italicized in the original). Quite valuable is Springer's general attempt at "Defining Literary Character" (ibid., 11-44).

[29] Cf. W. J. Harvey, *Character and the Novel* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1965) 11-29, 52-73, et passim.

to be to do their job, Provided that the artist knows *his* job. . . . [All] characters have a discoverable formal job—to serve under 'the governing principle of the whole work.'"[30]

Of course, such an observation moves critical inquiry back by one step: How might we conceptualize the shaping principle of Matthew's Gospel? Here we may receive some assistance from Martin Price, who has identified three principal functions that may be served by a novel: a *formulaic* function, whereby the reader's enjoyment arises from the pure form of the work (as in a detective mystery); an *expressive* function, whereby the feelings of the author and reader are engaged and molded; and a *cognitive* function, through which, by precept or example, fresh insight into the world or into ourselves is communicated.[31] Insofar as Price's observations are pertinent to narratives other than novels, Matthew's Gospel functions to some degree in all of these ways. Nevertheless, the third arguably predominates: the First Gospel purports to be a source of knowledge about matters of ultimate importance, couched in a biographical narrative and colored by religious beliefs. The characters within that story are governed by, and evocative of, those confessions.

Although Kingsbury's general presentation comports with this perspective,[32] Matthew's "shaping principle," the implied author's cluster of reigning theological convictions, is needlessly muted in Kingsbury's methodological reflections on character. If characters reveal their author's commitments, and if Matthew's commitments are in some sense theological, how might Matthean theology and characterization be more firmly yoked?

Third, *the meaning and significance of Matthew's "roundness" or "flatness" of characterization are subject to reassessment.* Literary-critical reflection has been so captivated by Forster's distinction between characters "round" and "flat"[33] that its adoption by Kingsbury for interpreting Matthew is in no way surprising. Nevertheless, several caveats should be entered with respect to this conceptual approach and its exegetical consequences.

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[30] Springer, *A Rhetoric of Literary Character,* 18.

[31] Martin Price, *Forms of Life: Character and Moral Imagination in the Novel* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983) 1-23.

[32] Various deductions regarding Matthean theology, drawn in *Matthew as Story* (among others. the centrality of a Son-of-God Christology; the Son of man as a "public" designation; Kingsbury's definition of "the gospel of the kingdom": see 49-57; 61-62; 95-103), are identical to those underscored in his earlier, redaction-critical investigation, *Matthew: Structure, Christology, Kingdom* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975) N.B. 40-83; 113-22; 128-37.

[33] On the prevalence of Forster's theory within modern literary-critical circles, see (among others) Harvey, *Character and the Novel,* 192; Abrams, *A Glossary of Literary Terms,* 21; Chatman, *Story and Discourse,* 131-34; Wilson, "The Bright Chimera," 739-40. The present essay is offered in the conviction that, with modifications beyond those indicated by Kingsbury, Forster's reflections can contribute to our understanding of Matthean characterization. Although limitations of space preclude their examination here, other theories of character might shed light on different aspects of this phenomenon. For further methodological ruminations, consult *New Literary History* 5.2 (1974), an entire issue devoted to "Changing Views of Character," as well as the works cited in n. 3.

(a) For Kingsbury, "roundness" of characterization is suggested by the abundance or variety of traits, and "flatness" by their paucity or homogeneity. This is not unfaithful to Forster's conception, which identified "flat" characters as "types, and sometimes caricatures . . . constructed round a single idea or quality."[34] However, Kingsbury omits mention of Forster's test of characterization:

> The test of a round character is whether it is capable of surprising in a convincing way. If it never surprises, it is flat. If it does not convince, it is flat pretending to be round.[35]

In contemplating Matthew, we shall need to consider the persuasiveness, on Forster's own terms, of Kingsbury's denotations of particular characters as "round" and "flat."

(b) *Pace* Kingsbury, more recent theorists have expressed increasing dissatisfaction with what they regard as the simplism of this theoretical distinction in its unmitigated form. For example, Thomas Docherty has complained that Forster's view is reductionistic: even in "flat" characters, rejoins Docherty, a dynamism exists, without which such characters would emerge as static or even lifeless.[36] Correlatively, we might ponder the degree to which "round" characters exhibit a kind of regularity, or habitual pattern, without which we could not properly recognize that "person's" character, or constellation of relatively stable traits.[37] In both cases, some qualifications of Forster's theory for construing Matthean characterization are warranted.

(c) Though never explicitly formulated in this respect, Kingsbury's appraisal of Matthew's characters apparently shares one of Forster's assumptions: namely, that "round" characters are more perfectly realized as literary creations than their "flat" counterparts. In *Aspects of the Novel,* this is intimated by Forster's generous praise of Austen and his rather tepid commendation of Dickens;[38] in *Matthew as Story,* it is suggested by Kingsbury's claim that Jesus and the disciples become, for the reader, "real persons" and mouthpieces for the values espoused by the implied author.[39] Even if a modified version of Forster's theory of characterization is retained, this implied valorization of "round" and "flat" characters in the First Gospel demands reconsideration. The point is not that Matthew favors Jesus over the religious authorities and, for that reason, renders their respective characterizations as "round" and "flat"; at issue, rather, is a more flexible interaction of Matthew's characters and their narrative world. Given the exigencies of a story's particular "governing principle," more or less "flat" characte? may achieve for their creators certain effects, and convey to their readers certain insights, that are different from those associated with their more "rounded" counterparts. Wallace Martin has revised Forster's postulate in a perceptive exegesis that merits citation in full:

> Because of his simplicity, Huck Finn might justly be called a flat character; his pangs of conscience, in two short passages in the novel, are prized by those who think round, "deep" characters are better, and often they cannot

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[34] Forster, *Aspects of the Novel,* 67.

[35] Ibid., 78.

[36] Thomas Docherty, *Reading (Absent) Character: Towards a Theory of Characterization in Fiction* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) 47-48.

[37] Springer, *A Rhetoric of Literary Character,* 27-36.

[38] Forster, *Aspects of the Novel,* 71-75.

[39] Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story,* 10-14.

> conceal their disappointment with his failure to grow. But the prejudice, violence, credulity, conformity, and even the humanity of the world he inhabits would not even be visible if we did not see them through the transparency of Huck's amoral eyes, which strip away the conventions of "sivilization" to reveal what we civilized readers would not otherwise see. If Huck were round, American literature would gain a slightly more interesting character but lose a world.[40]

Fourth, *while an appreciation of the type and multiplicity of its characters' traits can inform the literary analysis of Matthew, the choices made by those characters may be more clearly indicative of that Gospel's governing principle.* Some forms of structural analysis focus on the functions performed by "actants" within a narrative;[41] alternatively, by compiling a comprehensive taxonomy of traits, Kingsbury invites us to explore the *ēthoi* evinced by Matthew's characters. While both of these approaches afford legitimate entrées into literary character, to many critics it is evident that action and *ēthos* stand in a reciprocal relationship. As Henry James mused over a century ago, "What is character but the determination of incident? What is incident but the illustration of character?"[42] With this, I suspect, Kingsbury would probably concur, inasmuch as the traits of the First Gospel's characters are manifested to some degree in his exposition of the Matthean plot.[43] Still, one wonders: how smoothly does Kingsbury's prolegomenon on persistent character traits meld with his account of those characters' actions, concantenated into a plot that is animated, at least in part, by theological considerations?[44]

For readers of Matthew, Springer's reflections may be of service once again. In her judgment, character is, indeed, the kind of person that is suggested by a visible set of traits; those traits, moreover, are the expression of regular or habitual *actions*, which are committed in accordance with certain antecedent *choices*. It is in the choices made by characters that the *values* shaping a narrative are revealed.[45] With this theory, therefore, a tighter bond among Matthean characterization, plot, and religious perspective might be forged: from their traits, we may be able to infer the choices made by Matthew's characters under conflicting circumstances. From those choices, in turn, it may be possible to deduce those theological principles that govern

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[40] Wallace Martin, *Recent Theories of Narrative* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986) 118; cf. Harvey, *Character and the Novel*, 94-95.

[41] For example, A.-J. Greimas, *Sémantique structurale: Recherche de méthode* (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1966) esp. 168-82.

[42] Henry James, "The Art of Fiction" (1888), cited by Martin, *Recent Theories of Narrative*, 116. On the complementarity of plot and character in narrative, consult Chatman, *Story and Discourse*, 108-19.

[43] Cf. Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story*, 9-28; 43-93; 115-45.

[44] To take one example: in his recital of the events of Matthew's story, Kingsbury observes that Jesus undergoes internal struggle at Gethsemane (26: 36-46; *Matthew as Story*, 3). However, in his ensuing treatment of characters, Kingsbury judges the Matthean Jesus to be in complete accord with God's values (ibid., 11). The tension between these two assessments may owe, in part, to Kingsbury's conceptual distinction between "narrative events" and "trait-based characters."

[45] Springer, *A Rhetoric of Literary Character*, 27-35; cf. Price, *Forms of Life*, xii et passim.

the First Gospel. Naturally, the test of such a theory demands that we return to the characters in Matthew.

Exegetical Assessments

Critically building on the foundation laid by Kingsbury, let us explore some additional aspects of characterization in the First Gospel, particularly the degree to which its characters are crafted in the service of certain theological convictions.[46] What I shall argue is that, *through the choices narrated or implied in the traits of its characters, the reader of Matthew is confronted with various and conflicting degrees of fidelity to God and obedient adherence to God's righteous sovereignty.*[47]

1. We might begin with a Matthean character that Kingsbury neither denotes as such nor considers separately: *God.* Throughout his treatment, Kingsbury consistently refers to God an an "actor," who occasionally but dramatically participates in Matthew's story: at Jesus baptism (3:13-17), transfiguration (17:1-8), and resurrection (28:1-7). Through these events, God's normative perspective on Jesus is enunciated and reaffirmed.[48]

With Kingsbury I concur that, in Matthew, God's evaluative point of view is established by the implied author as normative; however, Kingsbury may be unnecessarily reticent in acknowledging God's status as a character in that Gospel. If God is an "actor" within the story, then *in some sense* God is a character, whose traits and actions betoken certain choices and normative commitments. Admittedly, God's

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[46] Limitations of space forbid an examination of the so-called "minor characters" in Matthew. This omission is regrettable: in the light of my thesis, presented below, I suspect that many of these characters exert a major impact that is out of proportion to their brevity of presentation. (For instance, one thinks of John the Baptist, who anticipates and later fulfills Jesus' exhortation for righteousness, yet wavers while in prison in his estimation of Jesus [Matt 3:1-15; 11:2-3]; the Gentile centurion and Canaanite woman, who display inordinate greatness of faith [8:5-13; 15:21-28]; the Galilean women who endure to the bitter end with Jesus and proclaim the resurrection to the disciples [27:55-56, 61; 28:1-10].) *Pace* Kingsbury, "ficelles," rather than "minor characters," may be a more useful description of such characters: i.e., typical, though rather well-defined and individualized, characters that reveal the protagonist (and, often, the values of the implied author; cf. Harvey, *Character and the Novel,* 58, 62-68; Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction,* 102-02). In any case, further research into such Matthean characters is needed.

[47] By "faith" or "fidelity" in the First Gospel, I refer primarily to trust that is manifested in obedience: faithfulness to God's demands as revealed in the law and interpreted by Jesus (Matt 8:5-13; 9:27-32; 17:20-21; 21:21-22; cf. Gerhard Barth, "Matthew's Understanding of the Law," in Günther Bornkamm, Gerhard Barth, Heinz Joachim Held, *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew* (trans. P. Scott; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963) 112-16.

[48] Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story,* 34; 51-52; 79; 90-91; idem, "The Figure of Jesus in Matthew's Story: A Literary-Critical Probe," *JSNT* 21 (1984) 3-36. *Pace* David Hill, who disputes the normativeness of God's point of view in the First Gospel ("The Figure of Jesus in Matthew's Story: A Response to Professor Kingsbury's Literary-Critical Probe," *JSNT* 21 [1984] 37-52, esp. 37-42), I argue below that such an interpretation is supported by a literary-critical reading of Matthew.

activity differs from that of other characters in both quality and degree; the Almighty in Matthew is not personified as are the Olympians in Homeric epic.[49] Nevertheless, God in Matthew's Gospel functions as what some literary theorists designate as a "framing character": a character, demonstrably active at the story's beginning or end, or both, whose relative externality affects the reader's perception of that story (much as a frame, though extrinsic to the picture, influences our sense of what it frames).[50]

Similarly, God is "relatively external" to Matthew's story. Through the teaching of Jesus, God's supremely accredited agent (Matt 1:22; 3:17; 17:5), the reader is constantly reminded of God's own character. God is "the heavenly Father," whose righteous love is unmitigated, and whose salvific fidelity to his creation is wholeheartedly devoted, "mature" or "perfect" (*teleios*, 5:48; cf. 5:21-47; 6:25-34; 7:7-12; 18:23-35; 20:1-16). By sending his beloved Son in a manner consistent with his past interaction with Israel (as suggested by the genealogy in 1:1-17, the echoes of Torah in 1:18-2:23, and the prophetic "formula quotations" throughout),[51] God's own integrity, or inherent faithfulness, is subtly but unmistakably conveyed. Within this context, Gethsemane and Golgotha arguably constitute a critical decision, not only for Jesus, but also for God: in both cases there is every indication that the Son of God is captured, deserted, and crucified, not through some error of the protagonist's judgment, but by God's own will (26:36-46, 56; 27:46; cf. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1453a). Yet God's seeming abandonment of Jesus is overturned by the resurrection (Matt 28:5-7): notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary, God ultimately keeps faith with his Son and, in a sense, with himself (cf. the predictions made or suggested in 16:21; 17:22-23; 20:17-19; 26:56).

In brief, through the framing character of God, Matthew communicates the quintessential values that govern his story of Jesus: the salvific righteousness, loving faithfulness, and transcendent authority of God. Banal though it may sound, in Matthew's narrative God never disappoints; God, after all, is indivisibly and predictably perfect (*teleios*). In that respect *and by Matthew's design*, God is, in Forster's terms, a "flat" character: the portrayal of unconflictive, absolute righteousness.

2. Diametrically opposed to God is *the devil*, or *Satan*, who is depicted in Matthew's Gospel as the virtual negation of all that characterizes the heavenly Father. Whereas God is perfectly righteous, the One whose name is to be consecrated (Matt 5:48; 6:9), Satan is the transcendently "Evil One," the personification of hypocrisy and deceit (4:3, 6; 6:13; 13:19, 38). Whereas God and his agents actuate health and wholeness, the devil and his minions promote disease and demonism (cf. 4:23-24; 8:1-17; 9:1-8, 18-35; 10:1-8; 12: 22-32). The archenemy of the Son of man (13:25, 37-39), the devil presides over a nefarious domain at war with the kingdom of heaven (13:36-43). Prior to the eschatological consummation and the attendant destruction of his kingdom (25:41), Satan's pernicious power suborns those of "this generation" who have been confronted with the call to God's

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[49] Cf. *Iliad* 4.1-140; 5.1-518; 14.153-401; 21.385-513; 22.225-366.

[50] Thus Springer, *A Rhetoric of Literary Character*, 113-26, who identifies Douglas (of *The Turn of the Screw*) and Alice Staverton (of *The Jolly Corner*) as "framing characters" in James's fiction.

[51] Matt 1:22-23; 2:15b, 17-18, 23; 4:14-16; 8:17; 12:17-21; 13:35; 21:5; 27:9-10. A valuable *Forschungsbericht* on Matthew's use of Jewish scripture is provided by Graham Stanton, "The Origin and Purpose of Matthew's Gospel: Matthean Scholarship from 1945 to 1980," *ANRW* 2/3 (1985) 1930-34.

righteous *basileia* (12:39, 45c; 13:24-30, 38-39; 16:4, 23; cf. 5:37; 7:15-20; 15:19; 18:32; 24:12; 25:26).

Notwithstanding his perceptive discussion of "the arch-adversary of Jesus Messiah, the Son of God,"[52] Kingsbury no more identifies Satan as a "character" in the Matthean narrative than he describes God as such. Again, the reasons for this remain unclear to me. To be sure, we must exercise care in delineating this particular character: not unlike God, though arguably to a lesser degree,[53] Satan assists in "framing" the story of Jesus in accordance with one of Matthew's governing, theological principles. In a narrative that chronicles the necessity and difficulty of subordination to God's righteous sovereignty, Satan personifies the attraction of humanity toward behavior that is self-serving, faithless, and arrogant—just those diabolical temptations endured by Jesus in the wilderness (Matt 4:1-11). The characterizations of God[54] and of Satan in that pericope establish the antipodal extremes, anticipated in the nativity account (1:18-2:23), between which the action of the ensuing narrative will swing: the countervailing power exerted by good and evil, the "magnetic pull" of allegiance either to God or to Satan.[55] As Kingsbury observes, the Matthean narrative is driven by conflict: the supernatural clash between God and Satan, portrayed in the teaching of Jesus (5:33-37; 6:24; 7:15-23; 12:25-37, 43-45; 13:18-30, 36-43, 47-50; 25:31-46) and dramatized primarily through the surrogate altercation of Jesus with the religious leaders (9:10-13; 12:1-45; 15:1-20; 16:1-12, 21; 19:3-9; 20:18-19; 21:12-46; 22:15-46; 23:1-26; 26:1-5, 47-68; 27:1-2).[56]

Therefore, with respect to narrative function, the devil in Matthew's story is analogous to God in one sense: both are essentially "flat," framing characters that typify the behavioral alternatives of fidelity and faithlessness, between which every other character must choose. The unqualified, ever-flowing fountainhead of evil, Satan comprehensively defines the perfidious disobedience, intrinsically antagonistic to the will of a categorically righteous God, by which all other characters are tempted and to which some ultimately succumb.

3. Perfect righteousness and fidelity to God are among the theological values that shape Matthew's story; moreover, the character of God, portrayed directly or allusively, functions chiefly to frame those normative principles. However, among

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[52] Jack Dean Kingsbury, *Matthew* (Proclamation Commentaries; 2d ed., revised and enlarged; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986) 77; cf. 75-78; idem, *Matthew as Story*, 55-57.

[53] The wickedness of Satan is not presented by Matthew as utterly coextensive with the righteousness of God; nor is Matthew's story triggered by a contest between God and Satan (as is the case in the Book of Job). At the risk of overworking Springer's metaphor, the figure of Satan might be regarded as a "matte," which complements the character of God in "framing" the story of Jesus.

[54] It is worth noting that, throughout his temptation, Jesus' rebuttals to Satan are centered, not on himself, but on responsible fidelity to God (Matt 4:4, 7, 10).

[55] Similarly, though not theocentrically, Aristotle suggests that the distinction between "virtue" and "vice" is fundamental for conceptualizing both humanity and characterization (*Poetics* 1448a).

[56] Cf. Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story*, 56: "In Matthew's scheme of things, the world is the scene where two kingdoms, or spheres of power, are locked in cosmic battle (13:36-43)."

the major characters who advance the Matthean plot, without question it is *Jesus* who most closely approximates those values. Jesus exemplifies all of the traits summarized by Kingsbury: compassion empowered by the authority to save; integrity of word and deed; complete steadfastness to God and to his disciples; fearless confrontation of evil forces; utterly self-giving service and love for humankind (cf. Matt 1:21; 4:23; 8:23-34; 9:1-8, 35-36; 14:13-21; 16:13-21; 17:22-23; 20:17-19, 25-28; 28:20).[57] Kingsbury's judgment is apt: "Matthew establishes Jesus as the thoroughly reliable exponent of God's evaluative point of view."[58]

This otherwise cogent assessment of Jesus' characterization in Matthew might benefit from some minor modifications. First, Kingsbury contends that, because of his multiple traits, Jesus emerges from the First Gospel as a "round" character. On the contrary (in my judgment), the characterization of Jesus in Matthew is generally "flat," since the many traits ascribed to him are manifestations of a single, "root trait," which might be described variously as "righteousness," "obedience," "faithfulness," or simply "goodness."[59] Second, the overall flatness of Jesus' character is neither accidental nor symptomatic of Matthew's deficient literary creativity. Rather, it precisely squares with the implied author's governing theological principles: if kinship is expected between child and parent, even as a disciple should resemble the teacher (Matt 10:24),then Jesus, the Son of God (3:17; 17:5) and incarnation of God's wisdom (11:27), naturally would embody the perfection (*teleiosis*) that characterizes his heavenly Father (5:48). Very rarely does the Matthean Jesus surprise the reader acculturated to the norms of the First Gospel: from beginning to end, Jesus is predictably, statically, unchangeably obedient to the Father's purposes.[60] On the whole, the character of Jesus is "flat," and deliberately so; as such, he personifies the wholesouled righteousness that looms large in the scheme of values undergirding Matthew's story.[61]

Though its full exploration is impossible here, another element of Matthean characterization deserves mention: the righteous character of Jesus, revealed by his choices, is proximate to, but not completely interchangeable with, the characterization of God as ultimately righteous. Matthew's christology is indubitably high: Jesus serves as Emmanuel, "God with us" (Matt 1:23; cf. 11:27), and thus receives human veneration (2:8, 11; 8:2; 9:18; 14:33). Nevertheless, discriminations between the Son and the Father are subtly introduced and maintained throughout Matthew.

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[57] Ibid., 12-13; 45-48; 59-93.

[58] Kingsbury, "The Figure of Jesus in Matthew's Story," 6.

[59] Here I am extending, to Matthew's characterization of Jesus, an idea suggested by Kingsbury with regard to the religious leaders: namely, that a single root trait may be manifested in a variety of traits (*Matthew as Story,* 18-19). Matthew's association of "goodness" with rigorous fidelity to God's will may account for the abrasiveness and harsh vituperation attributed at times to a "good" character like Jesus (cf. Matt 15:21-28; 23:13-36).

[60] Cf R. Alan Culpepper's similar, literary-critical assessment of the Johannine Jesus (*Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel: A Study in Literary Design* [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983] 103).

[61] Cf. Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story,* 111: "It is [Jesus] in Matthew's story in whom the greater righteousness comes to perfect expression: Single-hearted in his devotion to God, he loves the neighbor as self (5:48; 22:37-40)." With Kingsbury's exegesis I concur; it is with his evaluation of this as "rounded characterization" that I differ.

(a) The story of Jesus in the bulk of the First Gospel is carefully framed by miraculous events initiated, not by Jesus, but by God (the nativity: 1:18-2:23; the resurrection: 28:1-20; cf. 16:21; 17:22; 20:19). (b) Likewise, Jesus' teaching in Matthew focuses, not on himself, but on the kingdom of the heavenly Father (5:16, 44-48; 6:1-18, 25-33; 7:7-12, 21-23; 10:20, 31-33; 12:50; 13:10-50; 15:3-6; 18:1-4, 10-35; 19:10-15, 23-30; 20:1-16; 22:1-10, 15-22, 29-40; 25:1-13, 31-46). (c) At least some differentiation between the prerogatives, service, and knowledge, proper to the Son and to the Father, is explicitly acknowledged by Jesus himself (19:17; 20:23, 28; 23:9-10; 24:36). In this connection, the crises at Gethsemane (26:36-46) and Golgotha (27:33-50) should be taken at their suspenseful face value: despite prior indications of his resolve (4:1-11; 16:21; 17:22; 20:17-19), Jesus' own will is sorely challenged by his Father's (N.B. the anguish suggested by 26:37-38); Jesus *could* have aborted the mission to which he was called (N.B. 26:39, 42; cf. 20:28) and, on the cross, expressed abandonment by God when he chose not to do so (27:46). As revealed by his choice of ministry, therefore, Matthew's Jesus emerges as *largely* "flat," or proximate to God's own faultless fidelity; nevertheless, Jesus is not *completely* "flat," nor is he flatly identified *as* God.[62] To the contrary: "'Call no one your father on earth, for you have one Father, who is in heaven'" (23:9).

4. As depicted in the First Gospel, *the religious authorities*[63] reflect the dark mirror image of Jesus: the latter exemplifies authentic righteousness and insight into the intention of God (cf. Matt 5:1-7:28), whereas the former display only the patina of righteousness and incomprehension of God's will (cf. 15:14; 16:1-4; 23:16-19, 24-28). "'Seeing, they do not see, and hearing, they do not hear, nor do they understand'" (13:13): the Messiah, who by the authority of his heavenly Father bestows on Israel new life, is generally regarded by the leaders as a blasphemous "deceiver," or messianic fraud, who at the behest of Beelzebul threatens the destruction of Israel (9:3, 34; 12:24; 15:1-2; 26:59-65; 27:63-64). The irony is stunning: by treacherously imputing them to Jesus, the religious leaders adopt for themselves these very attributes (12:30-37; 15:3-9, 19; 21:33-44; 22:29; 23:4-39; 27:41-43, 62-64;

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[62] Again, the Fourth Gospel offers an interesting parallel: for the Fourth Evangelist, as for the First, Jesus is the center of interest, insofar as he directs the believer to an ultimate understanding of God (cf. C. K. Barrett, "Christocentric or Theocentric? Observations on the Theological Method of the Fourth Gospel," *Essays in John* [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982] 1-18, N.B. 4).

[63] Here I follow Kingsbury's lead in focusing on the Jewish religious elite, who are among the more frequently recurring and sharply etched characters in the First Gospel. However, for Matthew, the primary point of contrast between them and Jesus may be neither their Jewishness nor their religiosity (since both Pilate and Herod "the king" [sic] are similarly pitted against Jesus). Matthew evinces distrust of any *leaders*—whether they be Jewish, Gentile, or proto-Christian—who do not manifest righteous faith (2:1-18; 18:10-35; 19:28-30; 20:26-28; 27:11-24). In this context it is significant that the centurion's faith is measured by the subordination of his authority to Jesus' own (8:5-13). For an astute examination of this dimension of the Matthean perspective, consult Amy-Jill Levine, *The Social and Ethnic Dimensions of Matthean Salvation History* (Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity 14; Lewistown, Queenston, and Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 1988) esp. 89-130; 241-71; cf. also Edgar Krentz, "Community and Character: Matthew's Vision of the Church," *SBL 1987 Seminar Papers* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987) 565-73.

28:11-15). Indeed, practically all of the leaders' traits, as itemized by Kingsbury, are exactly antithetic to those of Jesus in Matthew: Jesus demonstrates manifold goodness (genuine obedience, perspicacity, truthfulness, candor, fearlessness, innocence, and compassion), while on the contrary the religious leaders exhibit various forms of evil (legalistic error, blindness, calumny, manipulative deception, fearfulness, malicious conspiracy, injustice, and cunning heartlessness: cf. 9:10-13, 36; 12:1-14, 22-32; 15:1-20, 32; 21:33-46; 22:15-33; 23:4-7; 26: 1-5, 55, 59-62; 27:11-24, 63-64; 28:11-15).[64] Matthew's characterization of the religious leaders is, therefore, commensurate with that of Jesus: each rather flatly inverts the other.

For much of this analysis, my indebtedness to Kingsbury is evident. Still, it is possible to procced somewhat further along the trail that he has blazed. First, although Kingsbury is doubtless correct in assessing them as "flat," the religious authorities in Matthew nicely evidence the kinesis that Docherty discerns in such characters: the leaders' hostility toward Jesus does not remain fixed but steadily escalates as the story progresses (cf. 9:3-4, 11; 12:1-14; 21:23-22:46; 26:3-5, 59-68; 27:1-2).[65] Second, this kinetic development is disclosed, not merely by the sheer identification of the authorities' traits (*pace* Kingsbury), but more evidently by the *choices* that those characters make throughout the narrative. The same deeds and words of Jesus are seen and heard by both the crowds and their leaders; the former respond with astonishment and the potential for faith, while the latter opt to accuse Jesus of blasphemy and to align him with the prince of demons (9:2-8, 32-34; 12:22-24; 22:23-34).[66]

A third observation requires more discussion, which can be only adumbrated here. Kingsbury correctly identifies the affinity that exists between the religious leaders and Satan (Matt 12:34; 13:38-39);[67] it is interesting, however, that Matthew does not simply equate the former with the latter. Had the author intended such an equivalence, it would be virtually impossible to account either for Jesus' occasional concession of the scribes and Pharisees' righteousness, provisional authority, and scrupulosity (5:20; 23:2-3, 23), or for particular Jewish leaders whose admirable traits betoken commendable choices (the scribe in 8:19; the ruler in 9:18; Joseph of Arimathea [perhaps] in 27:57-60).[68] In these anomalous passages Matthew seems

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[64] Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story*, 17-24.

[65] In a correlative expression of "kinetic flatness," Jesus' response to the scribes and Pharisees becomes correspondingly vitriolic (Matt 5:20; 15:1-20; 23:13-36). I do not wish to imply that Kingsbury is unmindful of the development of basically "flat" characters (intensifying animosity, in the case of the religious authorities); after all, he has charted, with great clarity, "The Developing Conflict between Jesus and the Jewish Leaders in Matthew's Gospel: A Literary-Critical Study" (*CBQ* 49 [1987] 57-73; cf. idem, *Matthew as Story*, 116-27). That for which I am searching is a broader yet responsible concept of character that will help us to construe a seeming literary paradox in the First Gospel: the discernible evolution of essentially static characters.

[66] In Matthew 23 the first woe (vv 13-14) is addressed to the scribes and Pharisees' decided refusal to enter the kingdom or to permit that option for others. Likewise, the remaining woes are predicated on willful choices made by Israel's leaders (23:16-39).

[67] Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story*, 19, 116-18.

[68] The scribe's willingness to follow Jesus (in Matt 8:19) may intimate a measure

to suggest that, while the religious elite exhibit some faithfulness to God, and certainly more than Satan (who is inherently demonic), that fidelity is severely truncated and requires amplification: thus the righteousness of scribes and Pharisees must be exceeded, and the zealous observance of legal minutiae must be consummated in concern for the weightier matters of justice, mercy, and faith.[69] Again, Matthew's characterization of the religious authorities parallels that of Jesus: though he is not interchangeable with God, by his choices Jesus tends toward righteousness that is utterly faithful; though they are not equatable with Satan, by their choices Israel's leaders exhibit an inclination toward faithless and diabolical behavior.[70]

5. By and large, Kingsbury's appraisal of *the crowds*[71] in Matthew's story is convincing: receptive to Jesus yet imperceptive of his full significance (cf. 4:25; 7:28-29; 8:1, 18; 13:13, 53-58; 19:2; 20:29-31; 21:9), they typically offer a contrast, on the one hand, with their leaders (who generally reject Jesus), and, on the other hand, with the disciples (who accept Jesus as their master). On the basis of their paucity of character traits, Kingsbury deems the crowds to be a "flat" character. However, if we consider the choices that they make, and the degrees of faith implied by those choices, another assessment of the crowds is possible. Throughout most of the narrative, the crowds evince sympathy for Jesus, even when their leaders react with antipathy (cf. 9:2-8, 32-34; 12:22-24; 22:23-34; cf. 15:10-12; 23:1-39); yet in the passion narrative the masses willfully align themselves with their chief priests and elders in expediting Jesus' arrest, sentencing, and execution (26:47, 55; 27:1-2, 15-26, 39-44). Their bloodthirsty defection is startling, though in retrospect not without anticipation: as portrayed by Matthew, the depth of their commitment to Jesus has always been in question. Amazement is not the same as allegiance (cf. 7:28; 9:33; 15:31; 22:33; cf. 13:53-58); physical "following" is not on a par with costly

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of presumption or myopic arrogance; still, I am less certain than Kingsbury of the harsh repudiation suggested by Jesus' oblique response in 8:20 ("On Following Jesus: The 'Eager' Scribe and the 'Reluctant' Disciple (Matthew 8.18-22)," *NTS* 34 [1988] 45-59). Elsewhere (*Matthew as Story*, 67-68), Kingsbury acknowledges the difficulty presented by 23:2-3, 23 for construing Matthew's outlook on the scribes and Pharisees as totally disapproving.

[69] In this context, Matthew's description of the leaders as "hypocrites" is significant (15:7-8; 22:18; 23:13, 15, 23, 25, 27, 28-29; cf. 6:2, 5, 16; 7:5; 24:51). The term may connote, not only a pious outward appearance covering an inward lack of righteousness (Ulrich Wilckens, "*hypokrinomai, k. t. l.*," *TDNT* 8 [1972] 566-68), nor merely false and irresponsible interpretation (David E. Garland, *The Intention of Matthew 23* [NovTSup 52; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1979] 111-17), but also a superficial fidelity that is woefully diminished (cf. Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story*, 19-20).

[70] If this reading be accepted, then the religious leaders in the First Gospel would emerge as neither relentlessly flat (*contra* Kingsbury) nor homogenously evil (*contra* Sjef van Tilborg, *The Jewish Leaders in Matthew* [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972]).

[71] With Levine (*The Social and Ethnic Dimensions of Matthean Salvation History*, 265-68), I doubt that Matthew systematically differentiates *hoi ochloi* ("the crowds") from *ho laos* ("the [ethnic] people of God"; cf. the terms' apparent interchangeability in, for example, 4:23-25; 26:47; 27:15-26). However, as my discussion will suggest, I am less confident than she (ibid.) that the reaction of certain crowds to Jesus is clearly correlated with particular provenances (such as "Galilee" vs. "Jerusalem").

discipleship (cf. 4:25; 8:1, 10; 12:15; 14:13; 19:2; 20:29 vs. 4:20-22; 8:22; 9:9; 10:38; 16:24; 19:27-29);[72] the acclamation of Jesus as "a prophet" is not tantamount to confessing him as Christ, the Son of God (cf. 16:13-14; 21:11, 46).[73] In each of these cases, the commitment to Jesus exhibited by the crowds is genuine but insufficient and ultimately evanescent; like seed sown on rocky soil, the crowds endure for a time[74] but instantly fall away with the onset of tribulation (13:20-21). For this reason, and insofar as they may be analyzed collectively, I propose that the crowds be regarded as rather "round" characters: albeit their minimalist representation, they are rather lifelike in their unpredictable vacillation and divided loyalty to Jesus.[75] However, to be, in this manner, characteristically "round" is no compliment in the implied judgment of an author who decidedly favors flatly perfect, unalloyed devotion to God's kingdom and God's Messiah.

6. In contrast with Jesus and the religious leaders, but like the crowds, *the disciples* in Matthew do not so much initiate action as react to the decisions of others. As Kingsbury suggests, their characterization is "round": throughout the narrative their traits conflict, their loyalties shift, their choices unfold in unexpected ways. In the person of Simon Peter, Andrew, and the Zebedee brothers, the disciples first demonstrate their unquestioning obedience to Jesus' summons (Matt 4:18-22; cf. 9:9; 10:2-4; 21:1-7; 26:17-19). In place of this world's quotidian security (19:27, 29), and contrary to the bulk of Israel (11:2-3, 16-19; 13:53-58; 21:9-11), they perceptively receive the secrets of the kingdom of heaven (13:11, 51; cf. 16: 12; 17:13) and recognize their leader to be the Messiah and Son of God (14:33; 16:16-17; cf. 11:25-27). Consequently, the disciples are esteemed as the foundation of a new people of God (16:18; cf. 18:17; 19:28; 21:43), "brothers" of Jesus and of each other (12:49; 18:35; 23:8; 25:40; 28:10), and adoptive "sons of God," insofar as they do the Father's will (5:45; 13:38; cf. 6:9; 7:21). By virtue of their elect position, they are vested with missionary authority that is derived from Jesus' own (10:1, 5-15, 40-42; 28:18-20; cf. 16:19) and thus are subjected to attacks akin to those experienced by their master (9:14; 10:16-25; 12:1-2; 15:2; 24:3-25:46; 26:69-75; 27:64; 28:11-15).

Concurrent with their faithful obedience to God's kingdom, mediated through

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[72] Jack Dean Kingsbury, "The Verb *Akolouthein* ('To Follow') as an Index of Matthew's View of His Community," *JBL* 97 (1978) 56-73.

[73] Here Kingsbury's point is well-taken (*Matthew as Story*, 24-25); however, it remains hard to see why one title ("Son of God"), however prominent in the First Gospel, must be regarded as the most exalted or preeminent descriptor, under which all other christological affirmations must be subsumed (ibid., 52-58, 102; cf. idem, *Matthew*, 33-65). For critical discussion, see John P. Meier, *The Vision of Matthew: Christ, Church, and Morality in the First Gospel* (New York, Ramsey, and Toronto: Paulist Press, 1979), 68, 217-19; David Hill, "Son and Servant: An Essay on Matthean Christology," *JSNT* 6 (1980) 2-16.

[74] Therefore, *pace* Kingsbury (*Matthew as Story*, 24-25), I am not persuaded that the crowds are entirely without faith in Jesus. Cf. the alternative exegesis of Matt 21:8-11 by Meier, *The Vision of Matthew*, 145-46; note also Paul S. Minear, "The Disciples and the Crowds in the Gospel of Matthew," *ATR* Sup 3 (1974) 28-44.

[75] Thus Levine (*The Social and Ethnic Dimensions of Matthean Salvation History*, 266): "Matthew cannot state whether the crowds will eventually number among the disciples because the futute era of the church is both new and open."

Jesus, the disciples also prove to be irresolute (8:21-22; 26:33-35, 69-75; cf. 10:34-39), fearful (14:26, 30), unperceptive (15:16; 16:9-11, 22-23; cf. 26:22), and insufficiently trusting (8:25-26; 14:16-17, 28-31; 15:33; 16:8; 17:19-20; 21:18-22). Indeed, as the plot advances toward the crisis in Jerusalem, their will, already enervated, collapses altogether: resisting Jesus' example of discipleship as self-sacrificial service for others (16:21-28; 19:13-15; 20:20-28; cf. 26:6-13), the disciples eventually betray their calling and desert Jesus in the time of greatest trial (26:14-16, 20-25, 30-56, 69-75).

With Kingsbury's treatment of the disciples' characterization in Matthew, I am in basic agreement. There can be little doubt that the implied author of the First Gospel encourages the reader to identify with the disciples and, by so doing, to adopt a certain evaluative perspective on discipleship (either in alignment or contradistinction with the disciples' evolving conduct and point of view).[76] Likewise, in suggesting that Matthew's depiction of the disciples serves to confront the reader with a choice between undivided fealty to God and feckless capitulation to Satan's authority, Kingsbury is surely correct.[77]

To the preceding assessment I would append three codicils. First, the choice between obedience and infidelity constitutes a governing principle of the Matthean narrative; therefore, *all* of the characters in the First Gospel guide the reader in exploring the rewards and hazards of that choice. Second, precisely as "round" characters, the disciples reveal, in Matthew's implied judgment, a theological response that is *undesirable*, or at least inadequate. On balance, they are *oligopistos*, "of little faith" (Matt 6:30; 8:26; 14:31; 16:8; 17:20): their fealty to the heavenly *basileia* is greater than that of either Satan, most of the religious leaders, or the preponderance of the crowds; however, it does not achieve the flat, rigorous perfection demanded of a disciple who would be like his teacher, Jesus (5:48; 10:24-25; cf. 18:15-17).[78] Third, I am less confident than Kingsbury that Matthew's Gospel ends on an unequivocally triumphant note of happy resolution, in which the reunited disciples "undertake the worldwide missionary task to which [the risen Christ] commissions them . . . ."[79] Does the narrator actually say this? Although Jesus confers on the Eleven his ever-sustaining authority to make disciples, to baptize, and to teach among all nations (28:18-20), (a) their decision to accept and to exercise this commission is left unreported, and (b) their anticipatory response to that charge is characteristically divided: to the mountain they go and worship Jesus, *but some doubt* (28:16-17; cf. 14:22-33). Confronted, at the Gospel's conclusion, by the

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[76] "It is through such granting or withholding of approval on cue, therefore, that the reader becomes schooled in the values that govern the life of discipleship in Matthew's story" (Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story*, 14). Cf. also Ulrich Luz, "Die Jünger im Matthäusevangelium," *ZNW* 62 (1971) 141-71; Schuyler Brown, "The Mission to Israel in Matthew's Central Section (Mt. 9:35-11:1)," *ZNW* 69 (1978) 73-90; Richard A. Edwards, "Uncertain Faith: Matthew's Portrait of the Disciples," *Discipleship in the New Testament* (ed. and with an introduction by Fernando F. Segovia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985) 47-61.

[77] Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story*, 131-42.

[78] Interestingly, after the desertion of the Twelve and Jesus' crucifixion, a more perfect discipleship is suggested by an ostensible leader (Joseph of Arimathea) and certain members of the crowd (the women from Galilee; Matt 27:55-61).

[79] Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story*, 17; cf. 130, 144.

unwavering fidelity of Jesus and the checkered faith of the disciples, is not the reader faced, for the last time, with the fundamental choice[80] that presides over the entire narrative: under whose sovereignty will you ultimately serve (cf. 6:24)?[81]

Summary. Characterization within the First Gospel does not stand as an independent, literary entity; rather, the varying depth of Matthew's characters is informed and governed by a salient theological principle: obedient faithfulness should be rendered to God, whose own fidelity has been decisively manifested in Jesus Christ. Whereas a modern novel might track the evolution or devolution of a central character, Matthew takes another tack: its narrative portrays the constancy and instability of trust, the waxing and waning of faith, through many different characters. By probing the dynamics of faith through characters both "historical" and "supernatural," the narrative world of the First Gospel emerges as a rather complex mixture of the representational and the illustrative: Matthew's story purports to be mimetically correlative with "the real world" of first-century Galilee and Judea, yet it is to a high degree theologically stylized.[82] God and Satan, and in somewhat lesser measure, Jesus and the religious leaders, are flatly transparent to the poles of righteousness and disobedience between which the Gospel's story suspensefully unfolds; the disciples and the crowds display some of the rounded complexity of human life, torn between the summons to faithfulness and temptations to infidelity. To shift metaphors, Matthew evinces a talent for chiaroscuro. The light and shade of the First Gospel's characterizations are as subtly or starkly rendered as is needful to communicate the tenor and force of their creator's confessions.

III. Some Residual Queries and Reflections

Obviously, the present essay is no more than a preliminary inquiry into an area whose investigation has only commenced. Continued study in this vein could enhance not only our appreciation of the First Gospel as a literary product but other areas of research as well. Three of these I would mention in closing.

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[80] My phraseology here is intended to contextualize, not to resolve peremptorily, any debate over the itinerant or domiciliary character of Matthean missiology (cf. also 10:5-11:1). With Kingsbury (*Matthew*, 103-04; *Matthew as Story*, 156-57), I concur that the evidence is ambiguous: prophets and teachers appear to have practiced both within and beyond the Matthean community (7:15-20; 10:41; 23:8-12, 34).

[81] Elsewhere in Matthew, prior to the Gospel's conclusion, some responses to particular charges by Jesus are negative (19:21-22) or left unreported (8:21-22). Moreover, Jesus' predictions of the disciples' missionary activity are by no means uniformly approbative of their anticipated behavior (10:21-22; 24:10; cf. 25:31-46). Therefore, one might say of Matt 28:16-20 what Robert Tannehill has observed in Mark 16:1-8: "It is not clear how the story sill develop from this point. . . . A positive development is indicated but negative possibilities are also suggested. The Gospel is open ended, for the outcome of the story depends on decisions which the church, including the reader, must still make" ("The Disciples in Mark: The Function of a Narrative Role," *JR* 57 [1977] 404).

[82] On the relation between the "real" and fictional worlds, see Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, *The Nature of Narrative* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) 82-88.

1. How might the study of Matthean characterization inform our assessment of the *Sitz im Leben* of the First Evangelist?[83] To what degree, for instance, do the convoluted responses of the disciples and crowds mirror the mixed reception that was accorded to the *kerygma* of the Matthean community, both within and beyond its own walls? Is the flat, uncompromising rigor of the Matthean proclamation the *cause* or the *result* of a *corpus mixtum* that Matthean Christians encountered among the Jews and Gentiles whom they missionized (cf. Matt 13:24-30, 47-50)? Do the characterizations in the First Gospel afford us any clues in answering, or more helpfully framing, that question?

2. Could the study of characterization benefit historians in their attempt to reconstruct Jesus or other figures within the First Gospel? Although its answer is yet unclear, such a question, I suspect, is not entirely farfetched. After all, as Wallace Martin has observed,[84] there is arguably more that unites than divides the genres of history and fiction (and, one might add, religious biographies like the Gospels). In all cases, similar literary conventions are employed in order to naturalize stories and render them credible to us: rather than separating us from reality, characters and plotted narratives actually *create* the reality that we experience, whether in historical reportage of the so-called "real world" or in its fictional and religious counterparts. Would it not be ironic if the tools of literary criticism, which has typically bracketed out historical issues pertaining to the Gospels, proved serviceable to historians in their reflection on, and construction of, the critical narratives in which they are interested?

3. Finally, the theological dimensions of characterization, and of other literary conventions, is a field of Gospel research that is ripe for harvesting. One may justifiably dissociate the techniques of literary analysis from the *methods* of ordinary redaction criticism; however, to neglect the redaction-critical *perspective*, with its salutary emphasis on the Evangelists' theological concerns, is to risk distorting the kind of narrative that the Gospels present.[85] Common to both literature and religious belief is their capacity to gather the threads of the past into a coherent weave for the future, to render perspicuous the dark and joyful jumble of life.[86] To paraphrase Forster, theology, like fiction, is truer than history, because both move beyond the evidence.[87] Criticism of the Gospels that reckons with literary features

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[83] Cf Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story*, 147-60.

[84] See his penetrating discussion of "Narrative Conventions in History" in *Recent Theories of Narrative*, 71-75.

[85] I have elaborated on this issue, and my understanding of its significance, in another context: *The Disciples according to Mark: Markan Redaction in Current Debate* (JSNTSup 27; Sheffield: JSOT, 1989) 223-48.

[86] The interplay of narrative and characterization with the social and moral values of a society are explored, from different critical perspectives, by Charles Child Walcutt, *Man's Changing Masks: Modes and Metaphors of Characterization in Fiction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), and Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (2d. ed.; Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). On the more specific convergence of narrative and theology in Christian communities, see Stanley Hauerwas, *A Community of Character: Towards a Constructive Christian Social Ethic* (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).

[87] Forster, *Aspects of the Novel*, 63; cf. Price, *Forms of Life*, 298-301.

like characterization apart from their theological implications is by no means illegitimate. It is, in my judgment, ultimately impoverished.[88]

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[88] My thanks are due to Professors Beverly Roberts Gaventa and Amy-Jill Levine for their thoughtful critiques of an earlier draft of this paper.

Philo's Psychology of Prophetic Inspiration and Romans 10:20

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The introductory formula to the quotation of Is. 65:1 in Rom. 10:20 reads, Ἡσαΐας δὲ ἀποτολμᾷ καὶ λέγει, which may be rendered, "Then Isaiah is so bold as to say (RSV)."[1] Two basic ways to construe ἀποτολμάω have been proposed. One takes it as descriptive of the prophet's state of mind, and the other takes it as an indication by Paul of the importance he attaches to the prophet's message without any reference to the prophet's actual awareness.[2] But there may be reason to consider whether these alternatives might not be somehow compatible.

Now it may be freely granted that Paul's main concern is to stress the astonishing nature of the revelation mediated by Isaiah. Paul is at pains to adduce Is. 65:1 in a manner which deliberately draws out an exact correspondence with the citation of Dt. 32:21 in 10:19.[3] Indeed, even the introductory formula there (πρῶτος Μωϋσῆς λέγει) anticipates the citation of Is. 65:1 that follows, because, as Michel remarks, "Dem πρῶτος müsste ein δεύτερος entsprechen."[4] In Paul's hands both texts are made to disclose an eschatological application to the unbelief of Israel which opens the way to the advancement of the Gentile mission. It is central to Paul's entire argument up to this point to impress upon his audience the stunning nature of such a development.

At the same time there seems to be no compelling grounds for supposing that Paul

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[1] G. Fitzer disputes the original reading of ἀποτολμᾷ in 10:20, noting its absence from D* G E F, and d g e f, and urging that "materially, stylistically, and textually ἀποτολμᾷ καὶ is to be regarded as a later addition . . . probably on the basis of a 2nd cent. original (*TDNT* 8, 185, n. 23)." However, it is the more difficult reading, has excellent textual attestation, and its omission is more easily explained as an effort to smooth the construction. Also, its uniqueness as an introductory formula in Paul might have encouraged a copyist to drop it. For the construction in Greek see Liddell and Scott, and BAGD, *s.v.* All quotations of Philo are from the edition in the Loeb Classical Library.

[2] For the former position see Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*, 300, and for the latter, Michel, *Römer*, 1966, 263, n. 5, and, Käsemann, *Romans*, 1980, 297, who takes the verb's force as supporting the provocative nature of the prophecy.

[3] See Käsemann again, 296f., for an analysis of the organization of these verses.

[4] *Römer* again, 263, n. 5, and see Sanday and Headlam, 538f., against R. Bentley, construing πρῶτος with what follows than with what precedes.

might not also be alluding to Isaiah's conscious state. It is difficult to imagine that Isaiah would not have had to summon up considerable courage to deliver the unpopular pronouncement Paul relates. To utter so emphatic a declaration without the attendant state of mind one might otherwise appropriately expect would be unusual, not to say, surprising. There is no need to go so far as Sanday and Headlam and claim that Paul was projecting on Isaiah the sort of courage required of him to sustain the preaching of a controversial message which was often rejected.[5] It is thus permissible to regard Paul's use of ἀποτολμάω as intended to evoke a psychological awareness on Isaiah's part of the startling nature of the revelation as a way to reinforce its importance in the eyes of the letter's intended recipients.

Clearly, it would be helpful to such an interpretation if evidence could be found that would support such an interest in the psychological state of the bearer of revelation. Philo's psychology of prophetic inspiration may well offer some assistance here. However, before this possibility may be pursued, it is necessary to examine the use elsewhere of ἀποτολμάω and cognates, along with related terminology.

Regarding the verb itself, its presence in 10:20 is a NT *hapax legomenon*, and it does not occur in the LXX or the Apostolic Fathers.[6] Paul otherwise prefers to use τολμάω, or parallel formulations involving παρρησία, such that the prefixed ἀπό probably is intended to intensify the sense of "daring."[7] Whereas in other respects

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[5] *Romans*, 300, "St. Paul's position in opposing the prejudices of his countrymen made him feel the boldness of Isaiah in standing up against the men of his own time."

[6] The stem, τολμάω, is used occasionally in the various recensions of the Greek OT, where it bears the ordinary senses of "dare," whether pejorative or not: Job 15:12, 39:35 (Sym.), Prov. 7:13 (Sym.), Eccl. 8:11 (Aquila), Judith 14:13, Esther 1:18, 7:5, II Macc. 4:2, III Macc. 3:21, and IV Macc. 8:18. The parallel usage of another intensive form, κατατολμάω, is instructive, which occurs twice, II Macc. 3:24 and 5:15. In both instances it refers to sacrileges against the Temple, and is thus restricted to especially extreme cases of effrontery. Other cognates are as rare and again involve similar kinds of usage: τολμηρός (Sir. 8:15, 19:2, 3), τόλμη (Job 21:27, 39:20, Judith 16:10, II Macc. 8:18, III Macc. 6:34), εὐτολμία (II Macc. 13:18). Even the distribution of the word-group in the Greek OT may be significant, since there seems to be no occurrences in the Pentateuch or Prophets, only the historical works and writings. A single instance of the word-group occurs in the Fathers, τόλμα (I Clem. 30:8), bearing the typical sense, "arrogance." Thus the relatively plentiful and more varied usage of the word-group in Philo assumes special importance for comparisons with Pauline usage.

[7] Paul employs no other intensive form of τολμάω, which is found in Rom. 5:7, 15:18, I Cor. 6:1, II Cor. 10:2, 12, 11:21, and Phil. 1:14. Rom. 15:18 is notable, οὐ γὰρ τολμήσω τι λαλεῖν, because it approximates to 10:20, but means simply "venture" or "presume," and seems from the context to be tied to his sense of apostolic mission which was confirmed by the presence of phenomena associated with ecstatic behavior. The only remaining member of the word-group used by him is τολμηρότερος, Rom. 15:15, which likewise seems connected in the context to his apostolic calling and authority, permitting him to write "very boldly" (against G. Fitzer, *TDNT* 8, 186). Related to this mode of address is his use of θαρρέω (II Cor. 10:1, 2; cp. Heb. 13:6), and the παρρησία word-group (παρρησία, II Cor. 3:12, Philemon 8, and cp. Eph. 3:12, and esp. 6:19, whereas other exx. may involve nothing more than *confidence*: παρρησιάζομαι, I Thess. 2:2, and cp. Eph. 6:20).

his use of the cognates and parallel formulations appears to be consistent with that of the NT generally, which compares broadly in turn with that of secular Greek and Josephus.[8] The preponderance of all instances may be categorized in three ways: (1) the taking of direct initiative of some sort, (2) the manifestation of courage or its lack, and, (3) the manifestation of a pejorative kind of audacity, whether recklessness, presumption, or even arrogance (*hubris*).[9]

Passing on to Philo, his use of the word-group is sparing, but it does seem to exhibit a similar breadth.[10] One particular use of τολμάω distinguishes itself, which refers to the *venturing* of hypotheses or theories.[11] This usage clearly arises from Philo's preoccupation with speculative pursuits. As far as the use of ἀποτολμάω is concerned, there seems to be just six cases, and these merit individual attention.

Two cases do not involve God somehow in their immediate frame of reference, so these may be taken first. One regards the episode of Joseph and Potiphar's wife

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[8] See the discussion by Fitzer, *TDNT* 8, 181ff. His treatment suffers from a lack of evidence from Philo, which may now be remedied thanks to the entries in *Index Philoneus* (G. Mayer, 1974), which was published after Fitzer prepared his article (the complete concordance to Philo by Borgen and Skarsten was unavailable in the preparation of this paper). Of special note in Josephus is the oft-recurring use of τολμάω with kinds of *speaking*, pejorative or not: Bell. I. 83, 530, 545, perhaps IV. 264; Ant. IV. 202, 326, VI. 72, XVII. 117, XVIII. 110, XIX. 67, 112 (τολμηρῶς ἐξεῖπειν), 332; Vita 277, 356; Ap. I. 236, 318, II. 169. In sharp contrast to the roughly 200 times he uses τολμάω, he rarely uses two intensive forms, κατατολμάω and ἀποτολμάω. The former occurs in Ant. III. 61 and XX. 90, where it reinforces the sense of reckless daring on the part of particularly savage aggressors, on the one hand, or audacious challengers of the power of God, on the other. The latter occurs just four times, once of a rash pride (Ant. VII. 178), and three times in relation to speech-acts (Ant. V. 242, an act of revilement; Ant. XV. 355, the lodging of baseless charges; Ap. II. 180, and the arrogant disputes by philosophers of divine matters beyond their understanding). Thus Josephus does seem to use the intensive forms discriminatingly for special emphasis, although this should not be pressed.

[9] The shades of meaning for τολμάω and cognates can vary so subtly from context to context as to make precise distinctions often rather difficult, but these three categories appear to account for all exx., at least in what their primary meanings seem to be in any given place.

[10] Philo appears to use only one intensive form, ἀποτολμάω, which is treated below. His use of εὐτολμία, εὔτολμος, τόλμα, τόλμη, τολμάω, τόλμημα, τολμηρός, and, τολμητής, clearly reflects all three categories. As far as the verb is concerned, most cases involve acts of daring whether pejorative or not: Op. 160, Leg. All. II. 67, Cher. 63, 67, 70, 96, Conf. 133, 152, Migr. 83, Her. 72 (ἐτόλμα γὰρ τόλμημα, great presumption, as compared with Mos. I. 140, τόλμημα τολμῶσιν, great boldness), Somn. II. 83, 122, 130, Abr. 231, Jos. 197, 225, Mos. I. 124, II. 198, 206, Dec. 88, 90, Spec. Leg. 56, II. 94, 167, 249, III. 6, 42, 88, 172, IV. 14, 146, Virt. 94, 202, Quod. Omn. 10, 104, Cont. 6, 75, Flacc. 40, 160, Leg. 28, 56, and, 178. Philo uses the verb several times in conjunction with speech-acts: Leg. All. III. 179, 198, Mut. 61, Somn. II. 182, Spec. Leg. II. 6 (some others immediately above might also be cited). These often involve a construction like ἐτόλμα λέγειν, but sometimes Philo prefers the alternative mode, θαρρεῖ λέγειν (Somn. II. 78).

[11] See Op. 26, 45, Mig. 136, and perhaps Somn. I. 54.

recounted in Gen. 39:1ff. Scorned by him, she would avenge herself through Potiphar by accusing Joseph, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμοῦ ἀπετόλμησεν αἰσχῦναι τὸ σῶμα (Jos. 50). This use of the intensified form of the verb is appropriate to a scene of high drama filled with passion. The second regards the ill-fated embassy by Herod Agrippa to Caligula attempting to dissuade him from erecting his effigy in the Temple. Herod would put his petition in the most favorable light by suggesting that he might have requested much more, Roman citizenship for the Jews and remission of tribute! He says, θαρρήσας ἂν ἴσως αἰτήσασθαι τῇ πατρίδι . . . οὐδὲν ἀπετόλμησα τοιοῦτον αἰτήσασθαι (Leg. 287). He employs the intensified form here to suggest that such a request might nevertheless border on presumption, whereas his actual petition is far more modest, or so he would have Gaius believe. In any event the verb is used judiciously between a vassal king and his emperor and touches upon affairs of state of the highest order, being juxtaposed with his use of θαρρέω.

Of the four remaining instances of ἀποτολμάω in Philo the first to be considered occurs in Leg. All. I. 38. In explanation of the creation of humankind related in Gen. 2:7 Philo argues that the divine inbreathing was essential to endow human beings with a capacity to conceive of God. Without it such an effort would have been an act of futility, of sheer, reckless arrogance (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπετόλμησε τοσοῦτον ἀναδραμεῖν ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ὡς ἀντιλαβέσθαι θεοῦ φύσεως) The second example occurs in Post. 42. Philo is criticizing the philosophical dictim, "man is the measure of all things," and attacks any who hold it as "impious" and "atheistic," relegating them to the "race of Cain." Philo contends that what they have done is to put themselves in the place of God (εἴ γε ἔχετε παρ' ἑαυτοῖς τὸν ἀντίθεον νοῦν, 37), and if attacked for it they defend themselves "boldly" (ἀπολογούμενοι θαρρεῖτε, 38). As Philo sees it, the irony is that even while lacking self-control the Cain-type has the temerity to imagine that s/he is in full control of everything (ὃς μηδ' αὑτοῦ κρατεῖν ἱκανὸς ὢν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἀπετόλμησεν ὡς εἰπεῖν ὡς ἔχοι τὴν παντελῆ κτῆσιν). In Philo's eyes such audacity is nothing short of folly, because "eternal death" awaits those who embrace it (39). What both preceding examples have in common is the element of *hubris* which brings humans to trespass on domain reserved for God alone, for which the intensified form of the verb is well-suited. Moreover, the case of Post. 42 is especially instructive, because it contrasts with the "bold" defense mounted by those whom Philo criticizes in the immediate context (38). Such a defense may be an act of audacity which compounds their folly, but it does not begin to approach the magnitude of the offense to God entailed by merely subscribing to the principle attributed to Protagoras, that "man is the measure."

The last two instances of ἀποτολμάω in Philo also involve God within their immediate frames of reference. The first occurs in Leg. 77 and is descriptive of the mania of Gaius who "no longer considered it worthy of him to abide within the bounds of human nature (οὐκέτι ἠξίου μένειν ἐν τοῖς τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ὅροις) but overstepped them in his eagerness to be thought a god (75)." Philo proceeds to say that soon afterwards the emperor began to express his beliefs publicly, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἅπαξ ἐθρασύνατο καὶ ἀπετόλμησεν εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐξενεγκεῖν τὴν ἀθεωτάτην ἐκθέωσιν αὑτοῦ). Once again the intensive form expresses the reckless effrontery to God of one who would take God's place, and once again its use contrasts with the simpler act of presumption (ἐθρασύνατο). The final case from Philo is found in Quod Omn. 43. In explanation of Ex. 7:1, "See, I make you as God to Pharaoh (RSV)," Philo says of Moses, "The legislator of the Jews in a bolder spirit went to the further extreme and in the practice of his 'naked' philosophy, as they call it, ventured to

speak of him who was possessed by love of the divine and worshipped the Self-existent only (τὸν ἔρωτι θεῖῳ κατεσχημένον καὶ τὸ ὂν μόνον θεραπεύοντα οὐκέτ' ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ θεὸν ἀπετόλμησεν εἰπεῖν), as having passed from a man into a god, though, indeed, a god to men, not to the different parts of nature, thus leaving to the Father of all the place of King and God of gods."[12] Philo hastens to qualify the sense in which Moses can be "God" to Pharaoh precisely because of the patent risk of impropriety. In fact, Philo returns repeatedly to the text of Ex. 7:1 to show how this ascription attests to the high esteem in which God held Moses.[13] Only Moses can call himself "God" and not blaspheme. Although it gives every appearance of presumption on Moses' part, the use of the intensive here deftly stretches the sense of "audacity" to the limits of the permissible without actually transgressing those limits.

The license for Moses to speak thus is granted by virtue of his being the "arch-prophet" (ἀρχιπροφήτην, Mut. 125), according to Philo. Philo goes to lengths in his discussion of Moses' prophetic office like he does for no other biblical hero.[14] It may be suspected that the honor conferred upon Moses by Num. 12:6-8 in distinction from other prophets is largely responsible (see Leg. All. III. 103 and Her. 262). Philo takes the opportunity of his sustained treatment of Moses as prophet in Mos. II. 187-291 to distinguish the three types of oracle constitutive of the entire Pentateuch: (1) first-person statements by God, (2) dialogue between prophet and God, and, (3) inspired statements by Moses in his own person.[15] In addition, Moses is repeatedly depicted as performing signs and wonders, foretelling the future, and demonstrating the most searching wisdom, insight, and discernment, always under the guidance of divine inspiration.[16] It is therefore no exaggeration to say that for Philo the figure of Moses is normative for his concept of prophetic inspiration.

In point of fact Philo rarely overlooks any chance to draw attention to the possession of Moses by the divine Spirit. It so happens that he regularly prefaces his recounting of one biblical episode after the next in which Moses appears with some sort of assertion about Moses' inspiration.[17] What is intriguing is that the biblical

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[12] The translation by F. H. Colson thus would seem to be very pale here, altogether missing the exceptional circumstances which occasioned such a bold pronouncement by Moses.

[13] See esp Leg. All. I. 40, Sac. 9, Det. 39f., 161f., Mig. 84, 169, Mut. 19, 125ff., and Somn. II. 189, for further discussion by Philo of this distinctive epithet.

[14] In contrast, Philo's treatments of Abraham and Joseph as prophets shows they are inferior to Moses in this regard. Philo dedicates the entirety of Mos. II. 187-291 to demonstrate the importance of Moses' prophetic office, whereas that theme is only of occasional interest to him in his discussions of the patriarchs (e.g., Her. 259f.). See E. R. Goodenough, *By Light, Light,* 192ff., and, H. A. Wolfson, *Philo.* II, 3ff.

[15] See Mos. II. 188-91, for the three categories. For the whole contents of the Pentateuch as oracular, see Mos. II. 188.

[16] As much is inescapable even from a casual reading of the last four books of the Pentateuch, but see also the discussion of the evidence from Moses I and II just below. As mediator of the divine *Logos,* see P. Borgen, "Philo," 271f. (*Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period,* M. E. Stone, ed.). See also G. Delling, "Wunder-Allegorie-Mythus bei Philon von Alexandreia," in his *Studien zum Neuen Testament und zum hellenistischen Judentum,* 72-129.

[17] An exception is Mos. I. 57, which follows the episode to which it refers.

text itself usually makes no such mention. In Mos. I. 175 Philo paraphrases Ex. 14:13 in this manner, and in I. 177, Ex. 14:21, similarly. Philo does the same in I. 182f. in elaboration upon the episode at Marah in Ex. 15:22f., where Moses is actually described as interceding on behalf of the people and receiving inspiration by God in response. In I. 201 there is likewise an elaboration of Ex. 16:1f., followed shortly in 210 with a divinely-initiated striking of the rock cited in Ex. 17:5f., which is mentioned by the biblical text itself. In Mos. II. 66-71, 74, 76, etc., Moses' priestly function is augmented by his prophetic function in receiving the design of the Tabernacle via inspiration, as would have been suggested to Philo by Ex. 24:18 and 25:40. Something like prophetic discernment would seem to be operative in the way Philo treats Ex. 32:6f. and the episode of the Golden Calf. In II. 250f. there is a kind of doublet to I. 175, including further elaboration also in II. 272f. In II. 258f. Moses under inspiration foretells and interprets the Manna of Ex. 16:4f. In II. 280f. the rebellion of Korah (Num. 16:25-30) is the occasion for God to guide Moses' prophetic response. And, lastly, Philo concludes the book with two references involving the inspiration of Moses, but which lack any supporting narrative based on the biblical text: (1) Moses' testament in Dt. 33, and, (2) the account of his death disclosed to him in advance (II. 288f.).

Why Philo should repeatedly highlight the inspiration of Moses in these two books begs for an explanation. Perhaps he is seeking to impress upon his audience the nature of Mosaic authority as absolute, demonstrating that God confirmed it over and over. This emphasis would serve Philo's purposes well, because at the very least his fellow Alexandrian Jews were always under pressure from their pagan environment. Furthermore, Philo may have especially desired to gain a hearing from those Jews who had seriously compromised their obedience to the Law, not to mention from non-Jewish inquirers or adversaries. The books evidence a pronounced apologetic tendency in this respect even if they can no longer be classified amongst his apologetic works proper.[18]

On this view there may be incentive to turn again to reconsider the use of ἀποτολμάω in Quod Omn. 43 examined earlier. It appears that Philo used the intensive form there to stress the boldness Moses exhibited in speaking of himself as "God," albeit in his capacity as a prophet delivering an oracle in the mode of direct address from God (Ex. 7:1). The construction ἀπετόλμησεν εἰπεῖν may now be approached in terms of a fuller appreciation for Philo's understanding of the role of prophetic inspiration behind the words of Moses. As always, Moses speaks solely at the bidding of God, such that provocative or seemingly presumptuous speech on his part must be imagined all the more to be expressive of some special divine truth. Hence, Philo is invited by Moses' self-stylization as "God" to find in it various hidden meanings which for the modern interpreter can only have the appearance of rationalizations after the fact.[19]

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[18] See Borgen again, 235 and n. 10, and, J. Morris, "The Jewish Philosopher Philo," 855 and n. 183 (*The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ*, III.2, 1987, G. Vermes, et al., edd.), for brief discussion of the history of the problem. As Morris concludes, nevertheless, "It can, however, be said that Philo envisaged an exoteric audience for his work." Regarding the authority of Moses and his inspiration, see Morris again, 875f., who quotes Mos. II. 188, οὐκ ἀγνοῶ μὲν οὖν, ὡς πάντ' εἰσὶ χρησμοί, ὅσα ἐν ταῖς ἱεραῖς βίβλοις ἀναγέγραπται, χρησθέντες δι' αὐτοῦ. See also Kolenkow's view below in n. 24.

[19] For Philo's treatment of Ex. 7:1 see the passages cited above in n. 13. Among

Something basically similar may be the case for Paul in Romans 10:20. It may be seen at once that ἀπετόλμησεν εἰπεῖν is apposite to Ἡσαΐας δὲ ἀποτολμᾷ καὶ λέγει.[20] Paul might be using the intensive form of the verb to call attention to the special, divinely-prompted truth vouchsafed to the prophet, which would otherwise scarcely be imagined to be found on the lips of anyone but an enemy of God and the people Israel.[21] As Paul might have it, nothing short of what would be an extraordinary visitation by the Spirit even for an Isaiah could account for the shocking thought that the unbelief of Israel should be an indispensable part of God's End-time plan to save the nations.

It may be possible to go still further. "Bold speech" is a charism at a premium in the Pauline community, and elsewhere in the early Church.[22] There may be a convergence here of certain phenomena associated with Hellenistic manifestations of ecstatic behavior, such as glossolalia.[23] It may be recalled as well that Philo is clearly

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these Mig. 84 is noteworthy, because it refers to the hermeneutic of Philo. When Moses is called "God" and Aaron is called his "prophet," Philo construes this allegorically of the intimate relationship of a prophet with the source of prophecy, God, τὸ γὰρ ἑρμηνεῦον τὰ θεοῦ προφητικόν ἐστι γένος ἐνθέῳ κατοκωχῇ τε καὶ μανίᾳ χρώμενον. The hermeneutical presupposition Philo follows is, of course, "like by like." As Morris remarks, 876 and n. 16, Philo believed that every word Moses wrote might possess special significance, so that any difficulties in the text only encouraged him to probe them for deeper meaning (citing Cher. 55, Agr. 1, and Fug. 54).

[20] It may be that somewhere in the literature these two passages have been compared in these terms, but the search so far has not produced any example.

[21] In addition to the observation by Morris in n. 19 above, it may be instructive to call attention to the way Philo treats Balaam, the spiritual arch-rival of Moses (see Conf. 159). The Balaam episode is situated by Philo squarely in the midst of his first book on Moses (263ff.). In accordance with the declaration by the angel of the Lord who accosted Balaam while on his way to curse Israel (Num. 22:35), Balaam is depicted as being repeatedly inspired to bless Israel instead (274, 277, 283, and 288). But the biblical text only mentions possession by the Spirit once, at 24:2. Thus Philo's treatment of Balaam closely resembles the way he treats Moses elsewhere, as just discussed previously. Philo is concerned for apologetic reasons to show that the Spirit worked in a powerful way to override the will of a renowned, hostile prophet. Similarly, when faced with such a controversial oracle as Is. 65:1, Paul might wish to affirm its divine origins overriding, or constraining, the will of the prophet, who might otherwise demur from making so sweeping a statement.

[22] See the references above in n. 7, and the connection of inspired speech with "boldness" in Acts 4:8, 13, 29 and 31. See also Acts 9:27f., 13:46, 18:26, 19:8, and esp. 14:3f. See the analyses by J. D. G. Dunn, *Jesus and the Spirit*, 225-48, G. Dautzenberg, *Urchristliche Prophetie*, passim, U. B. Müller, *Prophetie und Predigt im Neuen Testament*, passim, D. Hill, *New Testament Prophecy*, esp. 94-140, and, D. E. Aune, *Prophecy*, esp. 248-270.

[23] See, for example, Aune, 72, 191f., 199, 230 and esp. n. 239, and 248f. For the place of "mantic frenzy" in philosophical as well as popular thought see Aune, esp. 36-43. Compare the occasions when the demons are pictured in the Gospels as crying out in garbled sounds (Mk. 5:5, 9:26, Lk. 9:39), or with cogent statements (Mk. 1:23, 3:11, 5:7), and for the pagan parallels see W. Grundmann, *TDNT* III,

influenced from this direction in his own conception of prophecy, and he is not alone, as may be seen from Josephus.[24] Philo likewise resembles Paul in holding out for the reality of contemporary prophetic experience of a first-order nature, towards which he may have been guided by Alexandrian wisdom theology.[25]

Moreover, Paul introduces the quotation of Is. 10:22f. in Rom. 9:27 with Ἡσαΐας δὲ κράζει, which has its Rabbinic parallels, and may be further evidence of the sort of ecstatic behavior associated with inspired speech.[26] Both of the formulae in 9:27 and 10:20 contrast starkly with the rest of the formulae Paul uses in Rom. 9-11 with their parallels elsewhere in Pauline literature.[27] Thus some good

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898f. Perhaps the Johannine picture of the Baptist (Jn. 1:15) and Jesus (7:28, 7:37f., 11:43, and 12:44f.) also has inspired speech in view.

[24] Recent studies of prophecy in the Greco-Roman world generally in relation to post-biblical Judaism/early Christianity put increasingly greater importance not on their differences but on their strong affinities. In addition to Aune, see also, for example, J. S. Hanson, "Dreams and Visions in the Greco-Roman World and Early Christianity," *ANRW* II, 23.2, 1980, 1395-1427, and, A. B. Kolenkow, "Relationships between Miracle and Prophecy in the Greco-Roman World and Early Christianity," *ANRW* II, 23.2, 1470-1506. So, Kolenkow understands that Philo is compelled to protect Moses from being regarded as a sorcerer by emphasizing his personal ethical conduct and the advance reception of divinely-inspired dreams concerning those negative acts of judgment he will be asked to perform (1488f.). Compare the absence of exorcisms from the portrait of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel. D. Hill, *Prophecy*, 33, notes that Philo's terminology for inspiration "is almost entirely derived from non-biblical Greek," and his indebtedness to Plato is particularly clear here (so R. Meyer, *TDNT* 6, 822f., who concludes saying, "It is true that Philo uses the language of the Greek sages here, but materially there is no radical distinction between Philo and similar phenomena in Palestinian Judaism, though there is a fairly broad difference in vocabulary." See 812-28 for his review of Palestinian Judaism, and 828ff. for the early Church). For Josephus in particular see esp. D. Hill, *Prophecy*, 25-31, and, D. E. Aune, *Prophecy*, 139-144, as well as G. Delling, "Die biblische Prophetie bei Josephus," (*Josephus-Studien*, O. Betz et al., edd.) 109-121. As far as his understanding of dream- and oracle-interpretation is concerned, Josephus shows himself to be at one with his Hellenistic environment.

[25] For the rapprochement between Philo and Paul on the ongoing availability of prophetic experience (cp. Her. 259 and I Cor. 12-4) against the alleged cessation of prophecy see now F. E. Greenspahn, "Why Prophecy Ceased," *JBL* 108, 1989, 37-49, esp. 41). For Philo's indebtedness to Alexandrian theology (Wis. 7:25f., and chaps. 10-19) see esp. B. Mack, *Logos und Sophia*, passim.

[26] In addition to the evidence above in n. 23 must be considered that from the Rabbis in which Isaiah, Solomon, one of the prophets, or the Holy Spirit, "calls out" (Strack-Billerbeck, III. 275). See esp. the discussion by Grundmann, *TDNT* 3, 900, who also cites Philo, Ebr. 98, Josephus, Ant. X. 117, and I Enoch 71:11. He states, "The phrase came to be used as a formula to introduce quotations adduced by the Rabbis in support of the views expounded and championed by them." Whether the convention can be dated to the time of Paul, still the force of the verb alone indicates that some peculiar significance in the quotation was being affirmed likewise by Paul.

[27] In Romans 9-11 we find, *as it is written* (9:13, 33, 10:15, 11:8, 11:26), *Moses writes* (10:5), *Isaiah predicted* (9:29), *she was told* (9:12), *for* (10:13, 11:34), or,

reason exists to suppose that Paul may intend such exceptional formulae to appeal to certain vivid images which his audience may have concerning ecstatic behavior. As in Philo's books on Moses, there is a strong apologetic motive in Rom. 9-11 anchored in the witness of Scripture which Paul may be vigorously exploiting in Rom. 10:20 especially, in order to impress upon his audience that the idea fundamental to his argument bears all the marks of genuine prophecy inspired by God.

To return to the discussion with which the paper began, it may be observed that Paul's use of the intensive, ἀποτολμάω, does seem intended to emphasize the significance of the contents of the prophet's message. However, the verb is not used to express merely Paul's judgment as to the importance of Is. 65:1, but invites his readers to scrutinize the oracle to ascertain whether it merits such an unusual introductory formula. He expects that they are in a position to see for themselves that it does.

What they have to go on is the oracle's tone, structure, and substantive content. As to tone, God is speaking out of hurt, insult, frustration, and self-assertion, underscored by the extreme terms of paradox. God has been forced by circumstances, as it were, to take heroic measures and intervene. Such vigorous language compares well with any of the most intense outbursts to be found elsewhere in Isaiah or any of the prophets. As to structure, the members in parallel in 65:1a have been reversed by Paul, a feature which may or may not have escaped his audience, but the point remains the same. The idea is repeated for the sake of emphasis that God has had to take the initiative once again. As to substance, God has had to do the unexpected thing. Now on these grounds alone Paul is perhaps justified in characterizing the oracle as "bold speech," even before the question be raised as to whom God is addressing.

There is no extant evidence from contemporary Judaism that the identity of the people to whom God was speaking was ever in doubt, Israel, as the parallel with 65:2 made likely. But later conjectures do allow a measure of ambiguity to attach to the absence of any explicit reference to Israel which could be exploited, something which Paul does not hesitate to do.[28] From his perspective of the success of the Gentile mission the degree of ambiguity in the oracle can be convincingly resolved. On this view Isaiah's boldness may be measured by the oracle which just barely stops short of making Paul's application undeniable. Paul may even be suspected of deliberately reversing the order of the members of 65:1a to reflect

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someone/-thing says: Isaiah (10:16, 21), Moses (10:19), David (11:9), the promise (9:9), Scripture (9:17, 10:11, 11:2), righteousness based on faith (10:6, 7, 8), God (9:15, 25), and, oracle (11:4). Actually, most of the other introductory formulae in Romans are distinctly less colorful with the exception of 4:6, "David pronounces a blessing." Apart from a few, simple conjunctions, they all involve either *someone/-thing says* (4:3, 9, 18, 7:7), or, *(as) it is/was written* (1:17, 3:4, 3:10, 4:17, 23, 8:36, 12:19, 14:11, 15:3, 9, 21). A scan of I and II Corinthians for introductory formulae discloses comparable forms to those in Rom. 1-8/12-15. It turns out that the variety and density of introductory formulae in Rom. 9-11 is exceptional for the Pauline corpus, which only serves to vest those in 9:27 and 10:20 with even greater likelihood that they have been put to special use.

[28] Rabbi Tanchuma applied 65:1a to Rahab and Ruth (Strack-Billerbeck, III. 285), possibly as anti-Christian polemic.

stages in the reception of the Gospel by Gentiles.[29] God "finds" them when they come to faith, and "appears" to them when they join the fellowship and experience communion with Christ.

Be that as it may, the outcome of the use of the intensive, ἀποτολμάω, is to alert the reader to recognize that the oracle possesses extraordinary significance. It thus represents a kind of rhetorical technique. However, as discussed at the outset, the possibility that it somehow was also intended to refer to the prophet's subjective experience remains to be considered. In as much as Paul, like Philo, might well presuppose a general familiarity on the part of his audience with Hellenistic associations of ecstatic behaviors and inspired speech, he could be counting upon his addressees to discern in his mention of Isaiah's boldness an allusion to an inspired state of mind. Indeed, the unusual introductory formula might be intended to suggest that the prophet was emboldened to deliver the oracle he did through an unusual visitation of the Spirit. Hence the prophet's subjective experience might be supposed to have been commensurate with the extraordinary significance of the oracle given to him. Accordingly, the verb would have little or nothing to do with any personality trait on Isaiah's part, or any special show of courage in the face of potential opposition to his message, as suggested at the start of the investigation. On the contrary, if there is any intended allusion to the prophet's state of mind, the preceding analysis would point directly to the forceful dynamics widely assumed to have been operative in one to whom some kind of prophetic knowledge had been imparted.

There seems to be a fair probability that such an allusion was intended by Paul. The evidence for Philo's use of ἀποτολμάω in Quod. Omn. 43 gives reason to conclude that Paul's use had a similar motive, to convey the divine compulsion under which Isaiah delivered his provocative oracle. The work of the Spirit is envisaged as overriding any possible reluctance on the prophet's part to relate such a message. From Paul's perspective the degree of inspiration was such as to make the prophet's meaning almost transparent, leaving it to the success of the Gentile mission to divulge its actual application.[30]

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[29] Such a technique would be consistent with the apocalyptically oriented reading of the Scriptures evidenced by the Essenes, certain of their contemporaries, and NT authors. For a fuller discussion see W. L. Schutter, *Hermeneutic and Composition in I Peter*, WUNT II/30, 1989, esp. 100-23.

[30] For the enigmatic content conventionally ascribed to prophecies in the Hellenistic period see Aune, 51f., who notes, "The ambiguity of oracular speech undoubtedly contributed to the widespread belief that an oracle would always be fulfilled, even if in a totally unexpected manner. The obscurity of oracles meant that any particular interpretation was regarded with some skepticism until the fulfilment was obvious." It would seem pointless to deny that Paul's treatment of Is. 65:1a rested decisively on the same assumptions.

Idols, Demons, and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion: Biblical Traditions Informing Ethics

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The recent revival of interest in the relationship between the Bible and religious ethics has revealed just how a serious gulf exists between biblical scholarship and contemporary ethical reflection. Biblical scholarship is so sophisticated and refined in its methods and now so diverse and specialized that it is impossible for even for a religious ethicist with training in a theological seminary to be conversant with changes and advances in the field. Similarly religious ethical reflection has become so sophisticated and has recently shifted ground so much that biblical scholars have no way of understanding the issues, let alone the intellectual presuppositions, of the current ethical debates. Despite the highly sophisticated recent discussions of hermeneutics, when it comes to the relation of the Bible to ethics, both biblical scholars and ethicists often still seem stuck at the elementary stage of "what does the Bible say about" a certain issue. Recent work attempting to bridge the gap between the fields has not really accomplished all that much bridging. Ogletree's *The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics*, and Birch and Rasmussen's *Bible and Ethics in the Christian Life*, to take just two examples, offer a rehash of the results of contemporary biblical scholarship alongside the writers' ethical positions. Hauerwas, for example in *The Peaceable Kingdom*, calls for Christian ethics to be shaped by "the story of God," but has apparently not attended very closely to the actual biblical narratives. The most provocative work relating the Bible and ethics has perhaps been done by scholars from more conservative or evangelical traditions, such as Stephen Mott's *Biblical Ethics and Social Change*, although some of this work is bound by the particularity of the traditional assumptions about how the scripture is to be read and applied.

Needless to say, further efforts are needed to bridge the gulf between ethics and the bible. We have trained respectively in religious ethics and biblical studies, but we have listened to and learned from each other over the years. We are now presuming to project yet another book attempting to bridge the gulf between ethics and the Bible. The following paper is one of our first steps toward the formulation of such a book, and the sections below are brief statements of what must be developed into chapter-length discussions, with only one of them fleshed out a bit for this discussion.

Ethics and Hermeneutics

The style of thought known as hermeneutics has become the object of much discussion in recent years, particularly as it applies to the interpretation of the Judeo-Christian scriptures. Controversies abound between the partisans of modernism and post-modernists, between structuralists and existentialists, and between de-constructionists and nearly everyone else. One feature that all these disputes have in common, however, is that they take place in almost total isolation from ethics, and particularly from (Christian/religious) social ethics. The one major exception is the hermeneutical group often called Marxist or materialist. At work among the other schools or trends is a type of interpretation that neatly insulates both text and reader from effectively drawing ethical implications for social action. This common factor is most simply described as a bias in favor of limiting the hermeneutical circle to the text and the individual reader considered primarily in terms of interiority. Although this bias is sometimes rather obvious, but it is often convealed very well, even from its practitioners. By far the most common additional ornament used with these two terms is that of some timeless criterion or being to which we are connected by the text and the tradition from which we receive the text. We wish to identify this trend of interpretation and to argue against it. One of our primary tasks is thus de-constructing the fundamental constructions of Western thought, which would put us squarely in league with most contemporary styles of hermeneutical thought. But we clearly also want to challenge these other styles and to suggest that they, whatever their intentions or self-images, cohere more than they either know or desire with the very constructions which they would dismantle.

Our own self-critique includes recognition of the position and interests from which we write and consideration of the interests of others. We intend to learn from modes and forms of knowing that have been subordinated or subverted by the dominant Western (and Christian) culture (Welch; West). And we wish to speak with and, to the degree we are able, on behalf of sisters and brothers who have been marginalized by the dominant social formations. This is motivated partially by the prophetic imperative that we find to be central to the biblical tradition and to the Christian community that claims to be shaped by that tradition.

How do we read?

Biblical literature is concerned with the whole of life, and not simply some supposedly separable "religious" dimension. Hence it seems seriously reductionist when the Bible is read as if it were primarily concerned with matters of religion, particularly individual piety or salvation. It is ironic perhaps that biblical studies have been concerned so much with "theology," for when God is mentioned in biblical stories, songs, or prophecies, the focus is almost always on God's will for the social relations among people, between rulers and their subjects, or between nations. Hence to have been dealing with biblical literature as if it pertained (or were addressed) to individual religious faith and ethics seems not only inappropriate but distorting. But (to offer one pertinent historical illustration) while theologians were retreating to a secure refuge of individual piety and morality beneath the onslaught of the critical reasoning of the Enlightenment, advocates of the ratification of the US Constitution two hundred years ago were looking to narratives of early Israel as offering an example to all the world of how civil government should be formulated.

Besides recognizing that we as readers have a particular historical standpoint and

social-economic interests, it is important to recognize that the human authors of biblical literature had particular historical standpoints and social-economic interests. Although historical-critical biblical studies have made us aware of the different viewpoints of biblical writers, these have not necessarily been assimilated in the hermeneutical process. Recognition of the "biases" of biblical writers, however, is only in accordance with long-standing Judeo-Christian beliefs in the fallibility of people, in this case as mediators of "revelation," and in particular as agents of God's will in the historical process. In contrast to Islam, which understands the Qur'an as the very words of God "recited" by Muhammad, Jews and Christians understand the Bible as the word mediated through fallible human words and actions in ways appropriate (and relative) to particular situations. Thus it seems not only fitting but necessary to be consistent in our recognition of the particular position, interests, and viewpoint from which particular biblical literature was written. For example, virtually all biblical literature was written by men with patriarchal presuppositions (Schüssler Fiorenza), and virtually all biblical literature presupposes master-servant relations as paradigmatic for the divine-human relationship. Although biblical writings have incorporated much material that originated with ordinary people or even material that challenges ruling institutions, nearly all books in the first testament have been composed or edited by a literate elite employed or supported by ruling institutions. The Deuteronomic history expresses Jerusalemite interests and a somewhat simplistic covenantal (almost "moralistic") point of view. Recognition of Paul's sexism (in practice) and megalomania does not lessen the importance of his role in catalyzing communities of Jesus-followers and articulating what became "orthodox" formulations of Christian faith. Perhaps recognition that the great prototype of the Messiah was not only a shrewdly ambitious professional warrior but an adulterer and premeditated conspirator of murder as well—and that nearly one half of one biblical book is devoted to narratives of popular rebellions against him and his subjugation of his people with his private mercenary troops—would serve as a check on certain tendencies toward an imperial Christology among N. Atlantic theologians. Indeed, it seems that once we have "discovered" the particular biases and interests articulated in biblical literature, there is no turning back from the necessity of a recognition—and *critical* appropriation—of the implicit and covert conflicts of sexism, class, and race as well as the explicit and overt conflicts of class and nations inherent in the Bible.

1. Disengaged Ethics and the Split between Reason and Value

Traditionally there have been three major questions and focuses in ethics: the question of the right, centering on the act itself; the question of the good, focused on the consequences of the act; and the question of the character of the agent, discussed in terms of virtues. Most of twentieth century Anglo-American ethics has been dominated by the first two questions and by debate over which is more decisive. Deontologists of various stripes, taking the nature of the act to be the major question, have concentrated on the nature of obligation and the correct procedure for decision making. Teleologists, on the other hand, viewing consequences as definitive of the rightness of action, have shaped their theory of choices accordingly. The one strives to have individuals make decisions according to a set of uiniversal duties, the other views individuals making decisions in order to maximize certain goods. Both presuppose an abstract, ahistorical, isolated, and atomistic individual,

and neglect the historical situation of the agent. In striving for a secure universal basis for decisions, both approaches alienate agents from concrete ethical situations.

The dominant way of dealing with the Bible, whether in biblical studies itself or in the use ethicists made of the Bible, was highly similar to these approaches to ethics. Attention focused on biblical *teachings*, particularly those of the prophets and of Jesus and Paul. Whether in the earlier phase of "liberal theology," or in its neo-orthodox and existentialist successors, Jesus was understood primarily as a teacher. Correspondingly, to make Jesus' or the prophets' "teachings" useable for ethics, they were simply abstracted from their original historical situation in order to be applied as universal rules or values, even though they had been interpreted by biblical studies at least in terms of historical language usage.

A strong reaction has set in against the abstract and individualistic deontological and teleological approaches to ethics. The cultivation of virtue is emerging as an alternative focus, one that takes better into account the contingent, historical realities of our lives. The ethics of virtue or character development makes the self and self-creation central, focusing on how people shape not only situations but themselves as well in particular ways and according to particular views of the world.

Although the ethics of virtue takes better into account the whole life of the self and the contingent, developmental character of our lives, it still appears individualistic and somewhat detached from (and presupposes a somewhat naïve/superficial analysis of) the concrete context and realities of historical life. For example, a principal spokesperson for ethics of virtue finds the demand for ethical absolutes rooted in the moral chaos and fragmentation of contemporary culture (Hauerwas, *Peaceable Kingdom*). Such analysis which focuses on the fragmentation and pluralism of the contemporary ethical situation rings true in a sense, yet it leaves us without rational, analytical grasp of the deeper historical contingencies that determine our lives. Underlying the cultural and ethical pluralism is the utter separation that now prevails between value and reason. Reason has come to be understood primarily in terms of the "rational" pursuit of predetermined ends. But on the question of value or of ends, reason is silent. Values are inherent only in, or are even understood as created by individual human decisions. Such moral-philosophical analysis, however, may simply obfuscate and prevent our recognition that values are really inherent in and determined by the political-economic apparatus of production and control.

2. The Ethos of Manupulation

The separation between value and reason is not simply a cultural matter that provides an important topic for discussion by intellectuals. It is a split that runs throughout contemporary social life between the individual on the one hand and the dominant social institutions on the other. There has emerged "the bifurcation of the contemporary social world into a realm of the organizational in which ends are taken to be given and are not available for rational scrutiny and a realm of the personal in which judgment and debate about values are central factors" (MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 34). Reason, reduced basically to "instrumental reason," is the principal means used in the "bureaucratic" pursuit of predetermined ends which are not questioned, certainly not subject to "evaluation." Values, on the other hand, are understood as a strictly individual personal matter inaccessible to rational discussion and agreement (hence the apparent pluralism on the surface of things). Instrumental reason, impervious to values, or perhaps rather as the *means* which has dissolved the

ends into itself, has come to control life and to limit possibilities, even in what we imagine are close interpersonal relations.

Thus, however contradictory it may sound, autonomy and control go together, are two aspects of the same fundamental reality in contemporary bureaucratic life. Not surprisingly, "the politics of modern societies oscillate between a freedom which is nothing but a lack of regulation of individual behavior and forms of collectivist control designed only to limit the anarchy of self-interest" (MacIntyre 35). However paradoxical it may seem, we have learned to view the self as an autonomous moral agent yet we are all regularly manipulated in any number of ways by other people and institutions. Any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative behavior has apparently been obliterated. But if unquestioned and unquestionable predetermined ends, i.e., arbitrary will, thus determines our lives, it would seem to be an ethical as well as political issue of some importance to inquire whose or what arbitrary will that is. That is, unless the practitioners of (religious) ethics are to function somewhat like the typical "characters" of "emotivism" (MacIntyre), the bureaucrat and the therapist, adjusting us to the ends already determined by the mammoth institutionalized forces of contemporary life, then ethics must include some critical analysis of the forms of domination in our highly industrialized, technologized, and bureaucratized society. (Needless to say, to include such a critical analysis of the determinative institutionalized forces in consideration of the contemporary "ethical situation" is a significant departure from the ways ethics has been "done" in the three major approaches sketched and criticized above.)

Consideration of the current "ethical situation" is not completed, however, with critical analysis of the society in which we live, because that society itself has a larger context that is more and more determinative, whether it is acknowledged or not. Americans, especially those in the professional class, with a "quality" higher education and advanced degrees (and ever more the white males) understand themselves, consciously or unconsciously, to be at the center of the political and cultural universe. Supported by what is still the most productive economy and protected by the most powerful military in the world, we sit at the pinnacle of the most sophisticated professions in the world, be it medicine or finance, or the social sciences or even religious ethics. But we are feeling increasingly threatened. We have the distinctly uneasy feeling that the center cannot hold. We are increasingly aware not only that the economic standard of living is declining or that the US cannot simply exert its will internationally by force of arms, but that the established cultural traditions are slipping as well. There have been conflicts before. But we now have the uneasy sense that the center can no longer dictate the terms of discussion or struggle, as the heretofore dominant cultural traditions and assumptions are not simply attacked but abandoned or transformed by Black, feminist, and various third-world challenges. The dominant cultural traditions are apparently losing their hegemony. Thus as we feel threatened that the center is slipping away from us there is a deepseated anxiety and a defensiveness that can be discerned in a variety of manifestations, such as a conservative swing politically and economically toward ensuring individual and collective security, or a reactionary nostalgia for the vaguely defined ideals of the classics of the Western tradition.

(In contrast with instrumental reason, which has become simultaneously reductionist and controlling, we will attempt to rely on dialogical reasoning, based on relationships of mutuality between interdependent selves as the proper matrix for values and real freedom.)

3. Virtue and the Bible

With its emphasis on character development, and the sense that the cultivation of virtue is comparable to being in a middle of a continuously unfolding story, the ethics of virtue has been a major stimulus to religious ethicists' interest in the Bible. In its religious or Christian form, of course, the ethics of virtue no longer views the Bible as a source of revealed rules or obligations, but as narratives that can inform and shape character. Thus Christians should "conform" their lives to "the stories of God" in scriptural narratives (Hauerwas).

Some of the difficulties of this proposal are immediately obvious when we turn to biblical narratives themselves. The ethics of virtue still conceives of the ethical situation in individualistic terms, and correspondingly focuses on individual imitation of biblical exemplars such as Jesus (or even the abstract "prophet, priest, king"—Hauerwas). Thus the ethics of virtue, like deontological and teleological ethics alike, proceeding without analysis of the broader ethical situation, still abstracts both the individual's "character" and biblical narratives from their concrete historical situation.

But there are far more serious problems with the recent discussions of biblical and other sources for the cultivation of virtue. There has been little analysis of whether and how biblical narratives might conceivably be understood or used in such a way as to support the contemporary cultivation of character. In fact, at least two crucial considerations appear to have gone unexamined. (a) It is difficult to imagine how an ethics of virtue which stems from aristocratic Greek traditions can be informed and supported from biblical narratives which, except for a few "Pauline" passages, are innocent of any such concept of virtue and which would appear to be sharply critical of the kind of social relations in which the cultivation of virtue was traditionally based. (Indeed, what theologians view as fundamental virtues or means of cultivating character may be called into question by biblical stories.)

(b) As can be seen from analysis of how they functioned in classical Greek society, the virtues cannot possibly function outside of a common understanding of "the good" (*telos*) which they serve and from which they derive their intelligibility. But a primary feature of our contemporary ethical situation is the utter lack of any common understanding of a *telos*, a concept of the good for mankind. In contrast with the religious ethicist Hauerwas, the moral philosopher MacIntyre faces this problem. He suggests that it is necessary to have a common *tradition* out of which can develop a common sense of the good for mankind (from which the virtues can derive their intelligibility). But—perhaps not surprisingly given the very limited intellectual resources on which moral philosophy draws—he then turns to Aristotle as the principal source of this tradition. Aristotle and classical Greek culture generally, of course, denied barbarians, resident aliens, slaves, and women the rights and status of "citizens" and excluded them from "political" life, and even held that such people were by nature incapable of virtue. Equally as problematic, Aristotle had little or no sense of history and abhorred conflict of any sort, hence attempted to control, deny, or simply deny it. In contrast with Aristotle, however, the Bible celebrates the liberation of people, insists on an historical orientation to reality, and is full of conflict, through which people learn what is good for human life. Hence the Bible could serve as (the source of) a tradition that could inform the cultivation of a common sense of the good, a *telos* in which contemporary ethical practice could be rooted. However, since, following the biblical narratives, the good consists in living according to the kingdom or the will of God, which is the political-economic-religious liberation of people so that they are enabled to pursue the good life for

mankind, it is difficult to see in virtue anything more than a by-product of engaging in the liberative politics of God.

4. Whose Story? The Hermeneutics of Suspicion

Recent discussion of "story" or "narrative" in theology, ethics and biblical studies has involved a good deal of vagueness or even confusion. Myths that express the regular cycle of the cosmic order, moralistic fables, fairy tales, individual biographies, and diversionary mystery novels all take a certain "narrative" form. Certain particular narratives in the Bible may well have been intended, or became used, as paradigmatic stories for individual imitation. Biblical narrative in general (including much non-narrative material) is clearly historical narrative, dealing with particular peoples in concrete situations of conflict and struggle. (Thus much of the commentary on or use of biblical narrative in recent discussions which ignore its historical character is clearly reductionist.) It is obviously important to achieve greater clarity on just what sort of narrative or story is important, if not determinative, for religious (Christian) ethics.

We should take a critical stance toward the use of "story" as a methodological or heuristic device in recent theological ethics. There is a tendency to treat the Christian story as the self-authenticating and authoritiative foundation of theology and ethics—that in terms of which all else is judged, itself being judged by none. The Christian story, moreover, is discussed, as it were, as a story delivered complete and whole to humans from outside history. Indeed, the story even becomes invested with ultimacy. The effect is a new "fundamentalism:" i.e., in the place of a reification and mystification of individual "verses" (propositions) taken as divinely revealed truth (in God's own King James English), we get an idolatry of the Christian biblical story.

But what version of the story are we getting? Or rather, whose story are we hearing? "Americans" identify themselves as a "biblical" people. And indeed the biblical story was directly determinative in the formation of this society, from the Mayflower Compact and dozens of other covenantal communities established on the North Atlantic seaboard to the later liberation of slaves from bondage. Thus when Americans retell the biblical story, it has likely been influenced by peculiar or distinctive American experiences. But the story being told undoubtedly reflects the conscious or unconscious needs and interests of the retellers as well. The story can even be turned into an ideology by which to legitimate the control of some groups of people by others. It is difficult to imagine that anyone can still speak naïvely of the Christian story after the last few decades of the sharply and creatively critical critiques from the Black and Women's liberation movements. Those critiques must be heard and heeded, and not just assimilated in the sense of coopted or "taken into account." Besides these critical perspectives from within our society, moreover, it will be important to listen to the viewpoint of voices from the third world, from the "periphery," that is often dominated from our "center."

It is clearly necessary to pursue a "hermeneutics of suspicion" (Ricoeur), in the tradition of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. And this suspicion must be directed not only at the biblical narrative itself, but more importantly on the various versions of the story and their tellers. Some of the most articulate proponents of the ethics of virtue have become critical of the Enlightenment as a highly problematic source of the ills of contemporary pluralistic culture. We believe it is important to retain the Enlightenment ideals of tolerance, critical (scientific) inquiry, freedom, and

especially (genuine) democracy. This involves self-criticism as well as a critical stance toward the various versions of history. It is important to bring particularly the unconscious needs and interests that have determined the various versions of history to consciousness. Historical inquiry (including biblical studies) does this by relating stories (including texts) to their historical contexts, including the position and the social-economic intrests of the classes whose members produced them. It will then be far more adequate to view the biblical or Christian "story" as our predecessors' attempt to respond to the powers that confront humanity in history as under the sway of one Power, and as constantly being reformulated and reinterpreted in changing historical situations (each of which involve those particular unconscious needs and interests) by an imagination informed by both textual tradition and historical criticism. This will enable us, as necessary, critically to combat a repressive amnesia or to unmask the partiality of certain accepted versions or to deconstruct the official version—and to witness to the truly liberating story.

A final hermeneutical concern, then, is to take our own situation into account in a critical appropriation of the story or the tradition. In particular we must be aware of the way the interpreter/ethical agent receives a message, the language and categories and interests in terms of which we hear any message. One factor here, of course, is the effects that the story or tradition have already had on us (Gadamer's "prejudice"). This must be taken into account as we prepare the ground for a hearing and application of the text in our contemporary situation. Our proposal for an adequate hermeneutics involves a clearing for authentic dialogue, the formation of a character whose affections are truly moved by the beautiful and the holy, and taking the biblical message seriously in its political-economic as well as religious dimensions.

5. Biblical History, the Traditional Politics of God

Corresponding to the attempt to move beyond the abstract and individualistic deontological and teleological ethical approaches will be an attempt to avoid abstracting biblical "teachings" from historical context in order to have universal principles or what is a product in the same spirit: "what the Bible says about x." But we also want to avoid reductionist readings of biblical history in terms of "exemplars" for individualistic imitation, which has characterized the ethics of virtue. Perhaps most serious is the obstacle of what has until recently been "consensus" New Testament exegesis/theology: the assumption that Jesus and Paul spoke from and to some sort of inward religious dimension relatively unrelated to a concrete, historical (political and economic, as well as religious) situation and existence. But biblical narrative is concerned with the whole of life, political and economic dimensions as well as religious, and how those dimensions are inseparable, in contrast with the peculiar situation of modern Western societies, in which "religion," "politics," and "economics" are, to a degree, institutionally differentiated (and a split has developed between "spiritual" life and values on the one hand and institutionalized political and economic life on the other, as explained above).

It is also important to recognize how much of biblical narrative focuses on or is concerned with the plight of the marginalized, or even expresses the viewpoint of those on the periphery, the ancient equivalent of the "third world." The most obvious examples are: the central story of the Old Testament, the liberation of the Hebrew refugees who became oppressed in Egypt; the independent Israelite tribes attempting to resist the encroaching domination by the Canaanite city-states,

particularly the Philistines; the attempt to reestablish their rule by a client colonized elite in Ezra and Nehemiah and/or the attempt to resist Western imperial domination by the Danielic visionaries and the popular revolt led by the Maccabees; the attempt to renew local community life by Jesus and his disciples over against the hegemony of the Jewish high priestly and Roman provincial rulers; and the attempt by Paul and other apostles to establish communities of the "new age" among the resident aliens and other non-citizens resident in cities subject to the *pax Romana.* Such a recognition of the subject of biblical narrative is important for those who, (however uneasily now) situated at the center, have long been accustomed to reading the biblical story as if it were our own. (The Brechtian "Verfremdungseffekt"?)

Biblical narratives and prophetic materials generally, while shaped and edited and even composed by a literate elite, emphasize liberation of people from situations and relations of oppression, injustice, and despair by a gracious God who wills justice in social relations, and judgment against people and particularly rulers who fail to establish or maintain viable human community. Attention is focused on successively new life situations, with the memory of past deliverance and/or failings and revitalizations providing motivation for present love and justice or informing hope for future vindication or liberation. (The emphases of biblical literature/history and their implications for contemporary ethics will be explored further below with focus on certain significant issues.)

6. Critical Theory and Liberating Practice in the Contemporary Politics of God

Knowledge of the liberating activity (kingdom/rule/politics) of God in biblical literature/history can inform our sensitivity to the ways in which God may be active in contemporary situations. Then also, critically aware of the "ethical situation" in which we stand, we may be able to participate in God's contemporary "politics." Besides having a critical understanding of that ethical situation, we need a sense of how to participate as citizens according to the current "will of God." Believing that they are rooted in Biblical history, we do not reject but affirm and desire to continue the "modern" quest for human solidarity, economic and social democracy, and the full development of each person's full potential by the removal of what is oppressive and repressive. The underlying biblical vision that animates this quest is a historically dialectic one that affirms what is creative and rejects what is destructive. Insofar as the central symbol of the biblical understanding of the good for mankind is (seeking) "the kingdom (ruling) of God," then ethics would appear to deal basically with "the politics of God," and that (as in the Bible) in the most comprehensive sense. Ethics would thus be understood as part of a practice that is comprehensive, self-transformative (therefore self-reflective), and shaped by a *telos* that requires a universal community of equal participants.

This project can only be pursued by combining a liberating practice with a critical theory, which must be the agenda of contemporary ethics. Thus we will attempt to utilize rather than reject the post-Enlightenment "modern" heritage of Freud, Marx, Weber, and others, i.e. de-mystifying critical analysis of current cultural forms and political-economic structures, policies, and practices. Similarly, it seems clear that faithfulness to the biblical tradition as well as to the tradition of the American and French revolutions and the original goals of a "liberal education" (i.e., liberative from domination by institutions and ideas) requires engaging in a liberating practice. The way has been shown by the civil rights and women's movement

in the US and by popular revolutionary movements abroad, some of which are ostensibly non-religious but some of which have been directly and intensively informed by the biblical tradition.

In the remaining sections we will focus successively on four interrelated sets of issues. In each case we will examine its treatment in biblical materials, then explore the implications for a liberative practice in the contemporary ethical situation. Sections 7 and 8 focus on the most important cultural and social forms of domination in biblical history and the divine liberative action or prophetic critique in response to them. Section 9 focuses on a problem that this society generates both within itself and in its own exercise of imperial domination abroad. Section 10 focuses on the means of resistance and change, critically examining the biblical heritage, which has been partly ignored (on resistance) and partly misrepresented (on violence), and attempting to place the issue in broader perspective.

7. Idols and Demons

Idols as the Gods of Security and Domination

Captivated by the intellectually liberating reason of Hellenistic enlightenment, culturally sophisticated Jewish and Christian theologians of late antiquity proclaimed the gospel of spiritual monotheism. Philo of Alexandria and some of those filled with *gnosis* whom Paul addressed in Corinth insisted that "an idol has no real existence" and that "there is no god but one" (1 Cor 8:4). The apostle Paul, with his more parochial ("third world") education as a Judean Pharisee, while trying to adjust to such language, could not agree in substance, insisting that in reality "indeed there are many gods and many lords" (1 Cor 8:5). But what really bothered Paul were the ethical implications of such spiritual enlightenment. The wise and sophisticated (*teleios*) Corinthians who were feasting on the spiritual food of wisdom (1 Cor 2:6–3:4; 10:1-4) knew that they were personally liberated from traditional superstitions and silly restraints, such as the traditional Jewish taboo on eating meat offered to idols (1 Cor 8): "all things are possible for me" (1 Cor 6:12; 10:23). For Paul what mattered was not personal ethical freedom but relations among members of the community (1 Cor 3:1-4; 8-10; 12-14). Philo and the Corinthians who had perhaps been listening to Apollos, also a sophisticated scriptural theologian of Alexandria, had found their wisdom in the scripture. But while they were reading the text as spiritual truths and ethical principles, Paul was reading the Law and Prophets historically, more precisely, as events "written down for our instruction" (1 Cor 10:11).

The Old/First Testament has often been read to abstract theological truth or ethical principles. In recent generations the evolution of biblical thinking was seen to climax in the "ethical monotheism" of the prophets and, finally, of Jesus. The biblical critique of pagan gods as "no gods" or mere idols figured prominently in this theological enterprise. Texts ranging from the Decalogue prohibition of "graven images" to the ridicule of the manufacturing of idols in Deutero-Isaiah were understood in terms of the contrast between the true spiritual God and the delusionary deification of material realities or that between a truly transcendent deity and the pagan gods of nature. The biblical critique of gods and idols, however, appears to be far more comprehensive and profound.

First of all, it is clear in most biblical material dealing with gods and idols that Paul was closer than the Corinthians: idols did have "real existence," certainly for

other peoples and often for Israelites as well. We must apparently distinguish between the particular mocking style of the critique in passages such as Isa 44 and Jer 10 and the sense of the realities involved. Biblical "theology" has no illusions about the reality of idols. Idols are understood as gods that people actually serve in passage after passage (e.g., Exod 22:19 (20); 32:1,4,8; 34:17; 1 Sam 5:1-5; Isa 44:15,17; Jer 50:1-2; Dan 3:2-12). Moreover, the gods embodied in or represented by such idols include the heavenly bodies or certain forces of "nature" that were being worshipped (e.g., 2 Kings 21:3-5; 23:4-6; Jer 44:17-23). What is involved is a serious struggle with objects or forces viewed and served as gods. This suggests that (the critique of) "idolatry" and/or (the prohibition of graven) "images" cannot be separated from the broader issue of the service of or loyalty to God and other gods. (Accordingly the range of biblical materials should be broadened to include passages such as 1 Sam 4-6; 1 Kings 18; Jer 7 & 26; 27-28; and perhaps narratives of the exodus.)

In this connection we must correct the misleading old discussion of Yahweh as the God of history in opposition to the ancient Near Eastern gods of nature. That conceptualization was doubly inappropriate. For one thing, the gods such as Lord Storm, Sea, River, Sun, etc. were conceived of as controlling social-political affairs, even if in a somewhat different way than Yahweh. More importantly, such gods are inappropriately and incompletely described as gods of nature, i.e., as deified natural forces. We can discern in ancient Near Eastern myths and other characterizations that such gods were really the personified and deified forces of civilization. In the Mesopotamian *Enuma Elish,* for example, *Anu* is clearly Authority as well as Sky, Enlil (Marduk) is clearly Executive Force (King/Emperor) as well as Storm, Ea is clearly Wisdom and Irrigation Water (both civilizational, not natural, forces). And in many myths, the interrelations among the gods are clearly models of and for the monarchies and ruling aristocracies of ANE city-states and empires. A certain degree of mystification may well be involved in that the names of the gods are those of natural forces, but it is clearly civilizational forces that are deified and served.

Why would people worship these gods? Several biblical passages provide explicit or implicit explanations. According to Jer 44:17-19, for example, some of the Judeans who had fled to Egypt had burned incense to the queen of heaven because they believed she provided bountiful food, prosperity, and protection against conquest. According to the Deuteronomic historian(s), the Israelites believed that the presence of the ark would guarantee the presence and favor of Yahweh, hence victory in battle (1 Sam 4:1-10; cf. Num 10:35-36). The same author(s) suggests that Jeroboam installed the calves in Bethel and Dan in order to consolidate the loyalty of Israel to his own kingship (1 Kings 12:25-33; cf. Num 23:8,21-22; 24:8). Beside or underneath whatever defense of the official Jerusalem cult is involved in Exod 32, the narrative suggests that the Israelites recently escaped from Egypt, (reacting to the prolonged absence of their leader Moses?) unable to persist in the difficult struggle to establish a covenant society, sought security in the golden calf as "the god who would go before them" (32:1-4). Biblical literature thus confirms what we know of ancient Near Eastern civilizations generally, that people served as gods those forces that they believed provided agricultural productivity, social order, and political security.

In contrast with much ancient Near Eastern literature, which portrays the exploits and interactions of such gods, however, Biblical narratives and prophecies are sharply critical of such gods and their service. Passages such as certain prophecies of Hosea provide windows onto what was so objectionable. Apparently it was not

so much the representation itself as what was represented that was being condemned. It is possible that the calf(ves) utilized by Jeroboam was a traditional symbol of Israelite Yahwism, understood either as a pedestal on which Yahweh was conceived as standing (like the ark upon which Yahweh sat), or as a symbol of El, with which Yahweh was identified (see Exod 32:1-4 and Num 23:8, 21-22; 24:8). Several generations later, however, after a more securely and elaborately "established" Omride monarchy had constructed a new capital at Samaria and imposition of Baal (Lord Storm) onto the realm (at least under Ahab), the "calf of Samaria" represented something very different. The calf represented the god(s) of the powerful and wealthy monarchy (Hos 8:4-5a; 9:9,15; 10:5,9; cf. Amos 6:1-7; 7:13) that had constructed lavish altars to which the people brought sacrifices, wine for libations, and other produce (8:11-13; 9:4; 10:1-2; cf. Amos 4:4-5; 5:21-22) as well as palaces and fortresses defended by professional chariot forces (8:14; 10:13-14; cf. Amos 3:9-11). For some, at least (apparently the wealthy creditors), sacrifices also involved ritual intercourse with hierodules (4:14; cf. Amos 2:6-8). "The calf of Samaria," whether referred to as Yahweh or Baal, clearly represented (symbolized) the *interests* of the monarchy and ruling class. The service of the god, with tithes, sacrifices, and other produce, not only legitimated but virtually constituted the interests of the rulers. But that was seen as contrary to the will of Yahweh as expressed in the (Mosaic) covenant as well as to the interest of the people.

Without further elaboration from biblical or other texts, we would like to risk suggesting a theory or conceptualization of "gods" or the divine in the world of the Hebrew Bible and the ancient Near Eastern culture generally. That is, gods represent the interests of certain people, generally of those in charge of their service. Correspondingly, the critique of gods/idols would be criticism or of resistance to the interests represented by those gods/idols. And conflict between gods could be discerned as the conflict of interests between the servants of the respective gods. This theory enables us to comprehend all or most aspects of biblical references to gods, idols, and images. For example, the prohibition of loyalty to or service of any god other than Yahweh means that Israelites would be expected to serve no one else's interests, only their own family's, village community's, and people's interests. Or, when the Deuteronomic historian condemns Jeroboam for installing golden calves in Bethel and Dan—after declaring that Israel's revolt against the Davidic monarchy (in which Jeroboam was acclaimed king) was inspired by Yahweh—he rejects the interests of the northern monarchy in defending the interests of the later centralization of power in Jerusalem and its temple. Or, in condemnation of the service of other gods and idolatry, covenantal materials and prophetic oracles declare in effect that some interests are simply not acceptable, i.e., those of rulers who exploit and oppress the people, and perhaps it could be said, those of rulers in general.

The sarcastic caricatures of gods/idols in late prophetic passages such as Jer 10:1-16 and Isa 44:9-20; 46:1-7 contribute an important additional dimension to the biblical treatment of gods. The claim that idols/gods are merely the products of carpenters and goldsmiths provides important encouragement to those subjected or captive to foreign rulers. Such a critique, a portrayal of the foreign gods in ridiculous terms, enabled the Judeans to understand that it was the Babylonians' own political-military might that enabled them to conquer Jerusalem, and not the divine power of their gods. But this critique of the gods comes awefully close to an awareness that the gods themselves are the products of human culture. This possibility seems all the more credible when we recognize that the ridicule of the gods as products of craftsmen in Jer 10 and Isa 44 & 46 have affinities with certain ancient

Near Eastern texts or inscriptions (e.g., from mid-ninth century Babylon concerning Shamash) portraying that portray the rituals in which representations of the gods were transformed—perhaps we should say transubstantiated—into the living gods themselves. The ritual includes oaths by the carpenters and goldsmiths swearing that not they but the gods of the carpenters and goldsmiths really made the statue: "The fact that the statue is the work of human hands is ritually denied and thus magically made non-existent, nullified" (Jacobsen, 23-24). Then follows a ritual of the birth of the god from other gods (Water and Wood). Finally the newly-born god is installed in its temple ready to receive lavish sacrifices, tithes, and offerings. That is, the newly enlivened god is ready actively to represent the interests of the (king, high priest, or) ruling class for which it was produced. But what is denied or nullified through the religious rituals in Babylon was brought sharply into consciousness by the Judeans subject to such alien rulers. In rendering up taxation or tribute, they were aware that they were not serving living gods, but were rather subject to the political power of their rulers whom they ridiculed as serving lifeless statues of wood and metal.

The situation of life in the ancient Near Eastern and biblical temple-states, monarchies, and empires can be reconstructed something like this: The focus is on the care and feeding of the gods, who are personified, deified (natural-) civilizational forces, such as Storm-Executive Force and Sky-Authority. The gods are the principal agents in political-economic-religious affairs, whether within a kingdom or "internationally." The power, wealth, or territory of a god is expanded by military conquest and taking of tribute, with the losers being taken over or subordinated to the winners. The "great ones," kings, high priests, etc., are the chief servants of the gods, acting on their behalf, as agents of the principal agents. Offerings and sacrifices for the gods, of course, are produced by the ordinary servants/slaves (peasants) and are managed by the chief servants, who also thus happen to be the chief beneficiaries. The system thus serves the interests of the rulers or chief servants of the gods. Often the ordinary servants whose role is to produce what is offered to the gods were originally servants of other gods that have become subordinate to the dominant god(s).

Although the Davidic monarchy became just such a system ostensibly serving Yahweh (who was worshipped primarily as world-orderer in some of the official liturgies in the royal Jerusalem temple), most biblical literature rejects such gods and advocates an alternative. In most narratives and covenantal legal stipulations of the Torah and in the early books of the Deuteronomic history, Yahweh the god of Israel opposes these other gods, does battle against their chief servants and warriors, and liberates or protects Israel from their chief servants such as Pharaoh and Canaanite kings. (Yahweh is not usually portrayed as doing battle with the gods themselves.) The prophetic books and the later books of the Deuteronomic history criticize even Israelite and Judean kings and royal officials for having served other gods or having made Yahweh into such a god of domination. Whatever its failure to become critically self-conscious about its own interests, such biblical literature articulates a critical consciousness not only that the service of other gods means domination and oppression for the Israelite peasantry, but even that those gods are themselves the products of human culture and labor.

In attempting to utilize the Bible as one source that can inform contemporary ethics we suggest that the biblical view of the gods be applied to contemporary life in broadly analogous terms. It has long been recognized that the modern concept

of a "fetish" is similar or parallel to the biblical concept of an idol. That may be the clue of where to begin.

Theologians often suggest that atheism, or lack of belief in God, is a significant issue in contemporary life. But that may be because they have not attended, in biblical fashion, to (the representations of) the gods that people actually serve. In a "secular" age we should be especially attentive to the possibility that the civilizational forces people serve may not appear as religious, as gods. Marx and others have pointed out that money and commodities are treated as fetishes, dead objects, even (like idols) the products of human labor, that have taken on a life of their own. With the increasing alienation of the God-endowed right of property, however, in the development of a highly centralized capitalist economy, money and commodities may be minor deities or sacred objects in comparison with large-scale "private property" and particularly huge corporations. It may be that most people today, directly or indirectly, serve these huge corporations (or large blocks of private property/money/securities, i.e., capital), which function analogously to the gods in the biblical world.

The modern analogy to the ancient gods can be similarly reconstructed: The focus in modern societies is on the care and feeding of investments, who are personified civilizational forces centered in the stock-market. (As one of the very cornerstones of our capitalist economic system, corporations are treated as persons by the courts, whose principal role is to protect private property, which now has become heavily centralized in huge corporations.) Such corporations are the principal agents in political-economic (religious?) affairs, whether within a nation-state or "internationally." The power, wealth, and property of a god is expanded by "return" on investments or profits, supplemented more recently by "take-overs" or "mergers" (with military conquest functioning only in blatantly imperial situations), with the losers being taken over or absorbed by parent companies. Powerful businesmen are merely the officers of the corporations (servants of the gods), acting on their behalf, as agents of the principal (corporate) agents in political-economic affairs. Profits for the corporations or investments, of course, are produced by the workers/employees and are managed by the chief officers of the corporation, who also thus happen to be the chief beneficiaries (and often part "owners" or big stockholders). The system thus serves the interests of the investors and officers of the corporations. Often the workers or employees whose role is to produce profits for the corporation originally servants other corporations, some of which may have been taken over by a larger corporation.

The principal question then posed by biblical material for ethics in the contemporary situation would be whether the gods of contemporary life are so dominant and oppressive of the people who are induced to serve them that they should be resisted or condemned. Large numbers of people in the third-world, including many Christians and liberation theologians argue that the huge corporations are hopelessly oppressive. Christian ethical analysis of the implications of serving these "gods" of contemporary life is as yet in a rudimentary stage of development. And the inclination of first world Christians will likely continue to be toward attempts to humanize the capitalist system through various reforms. But we should mention one recent line of ethical analysis because of its parallel or analogy to prophetic criticism of service of the gods. Just as women's sexuality was coopted and exploited in the form of hierodules' ritual intercourse with wealthy men in ancient Samaria, so women's affect and nurturing emotions are turned into commodities serving the needs of prominent men in the jobs of secretaries and airline hostesses (see Lorentzen).

Demons, Diversion and De-Mystification

The conception of Yahweh as the God/Lord of history is problematic for New Testament materials as well as misleading in opposition to the ancient Near Eastern gods (as if they were the deification of only the natural and not also civilizational forces). First, God can be conceived as the (sole) Lord of history only by the winners of the historical struggle. In biblical literature, Yahweh/God is usually seen as acting in historical events (not by the winners in history but) by those who have been delivered from oppression under other peoples and gods (e.g., Exodus; Judges), by those who are calling down judgment against oppressors (e.g., Amos; Jeremiah) or by those who are crying out for future deliverance or vindication from a new situation of oppression (e.g., Isaiah 40-55; Daniel 7-12; Paul; Revelation). Second, one of the key problems with which synoptic gospel traditions, Paul's letters, and the book of Revelation struggle is the dominating presence of superhuman powers in historical experience and whether God is indeed acting against such powers. Paul's gospel includes the declaration that God has outsmarted "the rulers of this age" so that the one who was crucified is now secretly reigning and will overcome "every rule and every authority and every power." But such statements of anticipated redemption and vindication were made from situations of persecution and suffering. (If that is not remembered, then the gospel of Christ as reigning can be abused as an imperial christology, as was done not only in the original establishment of Christianity in the late Roman empire but also by modern day Christians of the North Atlantic First World.) The "principalities and powers" were still operative in, indeed basically in control of historical life in the world of the New Testament writers.

One could argue that somewhat the same civilizational forces as were seen to be deified in the First Testament, while still more or less personified, are now viewed as simply superhuman powers. Paul knows that for others some of those former gods or powers are still lords, and not simply dead idols or "nothings," but neither he nor other New Testament authors refer to the powers as gods in anything but a metaphorical way ("the god of this world," 2 Cor 4:4). A more complete treatment of these superhuman powers in the New Testament will eventually be required in order to place particular powers into broader comparative context. At this point, however, we wish to focus only on demons (or rather possession by and exorcism of demons) in synoptic gospel traditions.

The demons operative in the synoptic gospels are distinctive forces, quite different from the "principalities and powers" in Pauline literature (*vs.* Wink, who conflates the two). The demons are simply not the same as either "the powers" or human "rulers." Nor is there anything in the Gospels like "the demonic" that has Rome under its sway in the way that Rev 12 portrays Rome and the Beast or in the way we view Nazi Germany. An adequate approach must understand the demons not only contextually, in the political-economic situation of Roman Palestine, but relationally as well, and not as if they were discrete entities in themselves. Also, our approach should be careful not to collapse or merge the ancient Palestinian situation and conceptualization too quickly into those of contemporary psychology and therapy, although the latter may provide some useful questions and insights.

Biblical studies have often discussed demons and Satan the prince of demons as part of apocalypticism, which is usually seen as alienated from history. But virtually the opposite would appear to be the case. Jewish apocalyptic literature was produced largely by literate Palestinian Jews (scribes, sages) whose principle problem was precisely how to understand their own historical situations. They saw themselves

as faithful observers of the Covenant, which made it all the more difficult to understand how they could be suffering such persecution and oppression at the hands of alien, and even apostate Jewish, rulers. The forces ranged against them were overwhelming. But God could not be blamed. Hence it was necessary to believe that hostile superhuman powers were responsible for the desperate historical situation. The Qumranites, for example, saw that not only the Wicked Priest of the Hasmonean dynasty but the Kittim/Romans as well were ranged against their wilderness community of the New Covenant. The broader understanding, however, was that there were two transcendent forces struggling for control of historical life, the Prince of Light or Angel of Truth and the Angel of Darkness or Belial/Satan. Indeed, besides struggling for control of historical events, these two forces were battling in the hearts of individual people such that personal behavior as well as community life was determined by their relative portion of the two spirits.

The views of the vast majority of Palestinian Jews, including Jesus and his first followers, were surely nowhere near as systematic and rigidly dualistic as those of the Qumranite intellectuals, but the synoptic exorcism stories indicate that demons and demon-possession were realities in their world. The view that demons were active in their lives was both a revelation about and a mystification of the concrete situation in which Palestinian Jews lived. The possession of some people by demons or "unclean spirits" merely reflects and (directly or perhaps rather indirectly) symbolizes the concrete political-economic possession or subjection of the whole people effected by Roman military might and terrorism. The presence of hostile superhuman forces provided an explanation for their otherwise inexplicable suffering, and enabled them not to further blame themselves. Believing that God was not to blame (angry, rejecting) and would eventually act against the demonic forces enabled the people to persist in their traditional ways rather than to allow their social forms simply to disintegrate or to assimilate to the dominant culture. Alternatively, focusing their fear and resentment on demons enabled the people not to strike out in frustration at overwhelming Roman military might and go down fighting. Belief in demons, however, also mystified the situation. It diverted attention from the concrete realities and the actual political agents of the people's malaise, blaming hostile superhuman/spiritual agents instead. (The explicit link between the possessing demon and the occupying romans in Mark 5—the unclean spirit's name was "legion"—is the exception to the usual situation in which focus on the demons diverted attention from the political realities.) Resistance was thus diverted into ways that did not disrupt the repressive pax Romana. In fact, ancient Jewish rulers or their agents could use belief in demons as a means of social control, accusing disruptive persons of "having a demon" or "casting out demons by the prince of demons."

Gospel interpretations indicate clearly that Jesus' exorcisms were liberative in several interrelated dimensions. In the first instance suffering individuals were freed from possession by the alien forces and restored to their expressive creative selves. The dialogue/sayings in Mark 3:24-26 and Luke (Q) 11:14-20, make the claim that precisely in those individual exorcisms the kingdom of God was being manifest, i.e., that the dominion of Satan and the demons was being overcome in Jesus' actions. That the kingdom of God was being manifested in the exorcisms, however, clearly entails significant new possibilities socially-politically as well. "If by the finger of God . . ." is a direct reference to the exodus, suggesting that a new exodus is underway in the successful struggle against the demons/Satan. The kingdom of God (the renewed society, the restored Israel) is "at hand," or "has come upon you," or "is among you." (The synoptic tradition's presentation of) Jesus' demystified sense of

political-economic relations is surely related to the exorcisms of demonic forces in which the kingdom was being manifested. Jesus' declarations of God's judgment against the high priestly rulers, the Temple, and the ruling city (in the forms of prophetic parable, demonstration, and lament, e.g., Mark 12:1-9; 11:15-17; 14:58; Luke 13:34-35a; etc.) and the (synoptics' portrayal of) direct political confrontation between Jesus and the Jewish and Roman rulers stand out in stark contrast with the spirit-dualism and demonization of the establishment in Qumran literature. For Jesus and the Gospels the concrete political-economic-religious conflict between the Jewish (and Roman) rulers and the people provide the context for the operations of and struggle against the demons, in contrast with Qumran literature, in which human affairs are caught up in the higher context of the conflict between Spirits.

The ethical implications of the Gospel narratives of demon possession and exorcism (understood in context) are potentially many, making the rigor with which we pursue analogies critically and comprehensively all the more important. Most readily evident, perhaps, are the clear implication for understanding the effects of, and projecting responses to, violent oppression and repression in the imperial situations of third world countries. The parallels and analogy are vivid, e.g., in Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth,* in which the native Algerians were more afraid of the *djinn* than of the French and the liberation from those fears came with participation in the resistance movement. The Gospel portrayal of how rulers could abuse demon-beliefs as a means of social control and even repression—and our further memory of how that was done on a massive scale by a threatened religious elite allied with the nascent political rulers in the great European witch hunts (see Horsley)—may heighten our critical sense to periodic current diversionary schemes and attempts at mystification or even "demonization." Recognition of the integral importance in Jesus' ministry of the exorcism of alien forces that had taken control of people so that they could not be themselves should make clearer the importance today of "ejecting he oppressor from within," the necessity of which several liberation movements have made clear.

Minimally, with the prophetic de-demonization and de-mystification of the fundamental political-economic conflict being both implicit and explicit in Jesus' ministry, it would seem only appropriate to exercise a consistent prophetic criticism of any and all attempts by those in positions of power to demonize others, particularly to propound cosmic-ethic dualism. It may be understandably analogous to ancient biblical and extra-biblical apocalypticism then third world peoples today, e.g., in the Middle East, view the United States, in its aggressive imperial behavior, as the great Satan. But in the great witch hunts, the Holocaust, the "Cold War," and the recent renewal of the Cold War, we have several experiences in Western "Christian" history of the massively destructive, "demonic" results when those in positions of power divide the world into Divine and Satanic, Good and Evil, and demonize the other or the enemy. In that connection—although we are no longer in a "third world" situation analogous to that of Jesus ministry in Palestine—it would be important to remember that in the Gospels demons are possessing spiritual forces that divert attention from the actually destructive political-economic forces. The real or greater threat of destruction (of the earth and humanity) is not from an evil "-ism" but from "defensive" nuclear weapons, or the poisoning of the earth and distortion of the economy involved in their manufacture.

8. The Tower of Babel and the "Cleansing" of the Temple

In the ancient Near East, the state, then basically a monarchy, exerted centralized control of the all principal aspects of life, certainly economic, political, and religious. To ensure that there was enough productivity to feed all the people, to carry out desired "development" projects such as temples and palaces, and to ensure that the monarchy could defend itself adequately against foreign enemies—or even was able to conquer other peoples and force favorable trade agreements benefitting the elite—the monarchy would demand certain levels and types of production and deployment of labor. This centralized control became so intolerable to what had previously been a relatively independent Israelite peasantry that, under inspiration and blessing from Yahweh, the people revolted against the Davidic monarchy and reestablished a popularly acclaimed king who they expected would not exert such centralized control (2 Sam 15-20; 1 Kings 4-12). The tower of Babel stands as a symbol of such attempts of such governing classes to control the productivity and accomplishments of their own and other societies.

In the New Testament Jesus critizes in no uncertain terms the Pharisees, the middle and lower level bureaucrats of the Temple establishment, for their attempts to direct the people's social-economic lives. The climax of his ministry was then his demonstrative protest and prophetic proclamation against the high priestly government in Jerusalem (Mark 11:15-17; 12:1-9; 14:58). Indeed, one of the charges for which he was tried and executed was his threat against the Temple, the religious-economic basis of the high priestly power. The divine judgment against such centralized control of people's lives seems clear, particularly when it involves forceful or more subtle forms of manipulation of the people.

In modern times bureaucratic control takes somewhat different forms. Because of the their development toward centralized state control of economy and society, the socialist states of Eastern Europe appear in many ways more similar to the Solomonic monarchy and ancient Jewish temple-state. But the Western "democracies" have also developed centralized bureaucratic control of society and economy through large-scale corporations that dictate the level and kind of production and control consumption through their control of the communications media. Thus the possibilities and forms of modern life are simply dictated and controlled by centralized institutions, probably as much or more so as in biblical times. This is an issue important enough for the creative expression of human potential not to leave it for the irrational manifestations of reactionary groups who may have highly legitimate and biblically warranted reasons for their concerns. For analysis of bureaucratic control of life and life possibilities in contemporary society we would turn to the school of critical social thought that includes Weber, the Frankfurt school, and Habermas. This school offers a critical analysis of forms of life which are based on and perpetuate domination and instrumental relationships, an analysis that appears to correspond with the critical perspective of Jesus and the prophets on ancient forms of domination.

9. The Poor and Hungry; Aliens and Refugees

It is well known that the paradigmatic biblical story of the exodus tells of God's care for and liberation of the poor and oppressed. It will help also to consider the

strong tradition in the Old Testament that it is the state's (the king's) responsibility to protect and, if necessary, make provision for the poor, hungry, homeless, etc. (Of course, the monarchy had a self-interest in the protection of its productive base against the depradations of its high-level officers.) It is also by now a standard generalization that Jesus offered the kingdom of God to the poor, hungry, and distressed, although the political implications of this have often not been considered. Paul insists on the concrete care of the poor both within and among the new communities. James is even more adamant. Luke has highlighted this theme in his gospel. Now besides this repeated and emphatic expression of concern for the poor, hungry, etc. in biblical history, the ancient biblical prophets have a remarkably astute analysis of how poverty and oppression resulted from the anxieties, policies, and actions of the ruling groups. Although without the same social analysis, Jesus, James, Luke, and the Apocalypse to John place responsibility for poverty and hunger in the actions of the ruling groups.

Closely related is the biblical concern for aliens and refugees. The Hebrews whom God liberated from hard servitude in Egypt were aliens and refugees, both before and after the exodus. In Covenantal legal stipulations, God insists that the Israelites welcome and make provision for "sojourners," i.e., refugees or (illegal) aliens, reminding them that they themselves had been sojourners in Egypt. The original "Babylonian" deportation and exile was of the ruling elite of ancient Judah. But that "story" has been taken over as their own by numerous forcibly deported and exiled peoples, such as Jamaican rastafarians (some of whose reggae musicians sing a powerful version, for example, of Psalm 137). The early churches, of course, were comprised largely of people who had no citizenship in their local cities of residence, let alone in the Roman Empire, hence were in effect aliens without certain human rights. This is also a prominent historical factor in the origins, formation and subsequent settlement of the United States. Hence whether it be in the Old Testament, New Testament, or in their own history, the ancestors of "Americans" were themselves refugees and aliens seeking freedom to create an adequate life of their own. And in the biblical narrative, at least, it was out of such folk that God formed biblical history. (Ogletree takes this important theme from biblical tradition as an organizing metaphor for Christian ethics.)

Now it is obviously important to continue the programs, both voluntary and governmental, to alleviate the symptoms of poverty, such as hunger and homelessness and disease. Biblically informed ethics will want to go further however. To suggest that self-consciously religious/Christian people should voluntarily become poor and powerless (Hauerwas and others) seems simplistic and reductionist of biblical narrative. Such an ethical strategy seems to have mistaken, as a paradigm for modern life, the biblical narrative that reflects a much simpler agrarian society that did not yet have a government (at least ostensibly) of and by the people and that did not yet have an economy with the productive capacity and problems of capitalist industry. Moreover, if the ancient biblical prophets had astute analyses of the causes of poverty and oppression, contemporary political and economic analysis is much more sophisticated. Some of the most blatant causes of domestic poverty and of third-world poverty and refugees fleeing economic distress and political repression are readily evident: the practices of US-based multi-national corporations and the policies and practices of the US government (ostensibly of and by, if not for, the people). North Atlantic Christians have the analytical means to understand their own roles and responsibilities in the deeper causes of poverty and, for example, in the flow of refugees from SE Asia and Central America. North Atlantic Christians

also have the possibility and capability of affecting and changing the political and economic policies and practices that cause poverty, world and domestic hunger, and the refugee phenomenon. This is an important issue not only because of its intrinsic and evident significance for the biblical tradition but also because there is widespread agreement among Christian denominations and theological tendencies that it is a world-wide problem that must be addressed. Such agreement offers a unique opportunity which is manifestly failing to meet the most basic needs of millions of the world's people.

10. Violence and Resistance

The issue of violence *vs.* nonviolence has been heavily confused with the question of the politics or nonpolitics of Jesus in Christian ethical discussion. Perhaps the most vivid image of this in the old principial style of ethics was pacifists' appeal to Jesus' admonition "love your enemies," for which they had supplied their own context as well as content (i.e., relations with political and/or foreign enemies). At stake in the whole recent discussion of "Jesus and the Zealots" has been the concern by many biblical interpreters to preserve their preferred image of Jesus as a sober prophet of nonviolence and even political non-involvement. We are finally recognizing that those "Zealots" never existed historically as the organized movement advocating violent revolt against the Romans, as usually imagined by modern interpreters. There is virtually no basis in the teaching and practice of Jesus for the Christian ethical stance of nonviolence, let alone that of non-resistance. Indeed, if one takes one's biblical narrative whole, the partiality of God is unmistakeable, as is the divinely initiated liberative or punitive violence unleashed against unjust rulers and imperial oppressors. This includes the divine violence within the apocalyptic perspective assumed by both Jesus and Paul in the New Testament.

In contrast to recent discussions of violence and nonviolence that have focused narrowly on individual overt acts of violence (usually against the established order!) and on our own anxiety about our own propensity toward violence or on others' violence that might threaten our position in life—it is important to broaden our understanding of violence to include structural or institutionalized violence, as has been done for some time in international church circles (both Roman Catholic and World Council of Churches). A more comprehensive understanding of the violence, including institutionalized injustice and repressive violence) perpetuated by our economic system domestically and abroad and by the first (and second) world against the third world economically and politically should help place in proper perspective and context the struggles for liberation and their question of violent *vs.* nonviolent means. And the latter struggles can be placed in the perspective of a great deal of revolutionary activity narrated in the Bible, including two massive revolts against the prototypical messiah, David, as well as the divinely inspired fomenting of revolution undertaken by Elijah and Elisha. (The "Bible" simply does not provide any definitive ethical answers, let alone any secure universal ethical rules, on the issue of violence and nonviolence.)

On resistance to injustice, including oppressive and repressive violence, however, the Bible is full of narratives: the exodus, the struggles led by the "judges," the prolonged resistance to Philistine depradations, the widespread popular revolts against king David, Israel's revolt against the Davidic monarchy after Solomon's heavy demands, the prophets' catalyzing of revolt and pronouncement of divine punishments against the monarchy and temple, the resistance by the wise against

imperial oppression in Daniel and the popular revolt led by the Maccabees, virtually the whole "ministry" of Jesus, and finally the dramatic events in Jerusalem resulting in martyrdom/execution for his cause. The concrete historical circumstances, rationales, and strategies of such cases can be studied in a critical appropriation of the biblical tradition of resistance to injustice. It is worth noting also that although allegorical-spiritual and other interpretations of the Bible may have dominated in establishment Christian history, there also developed a tradition of the use of the biblical tradition of resistance to injustice and oppression: e.g., among the Hussites in 15th century Bohemia, in the great peasants' revolt of 16th century Germany, in the Puritan revolt of 17th century England, in (pre-)Revolutionary War preaching in 18th century N. America, in the Taiping Rebellion of 19th century China, in anti-colonial movements of early 20th century Africa, and in "base-communities" of late-20th century Latin America.

There is thus a substantial tradition upon which to draw for contemporary liberation movements and practice when faced with intransigent institutional or personal exercise of political-economic (or religious!) power. Further discussion would have to take into consideration statements such as those by the US Catholic Bishops' Conference or the World Council of Churches, and could focus on a few contemporary cases of resistance, such as domestic movements of civil-disobedience or the "base-communities" in El Salvador which joined the rebellion. Our discussion would also deal with varieties of the Christian tradition in ethics which have some points in common with our point of view but would diverge on major issues, such as the "just war" traditiion and the pacifist position of the traditional "peace churches." The nuclear threat, of course, besides being an ethical issue in itself, functions to modify any theological thinking about violence and resistance to injustice.

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