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# Contents


S3 Q Bibliography Supplement II: 1991
*David M. Scholer* ..... 1

S19 The Book of Isaiah: A Complex Unity
Synchronic and Diachronic Reading
*Rolf Rendtorff* ..... 8

S19 The Servant, God's Call, and the Structure of Isaiah 40-48
*Roy F. Melugin* ..... 21

S21 Indicators of Social Organization and Status in Matthew's Gospel
*Stephenson Humphries-Brocks* ..... 31

S23 The Jewish People and the Death of Jesus in Luke-Acts:
Some Implications of an Inconsistent Narrative Role
*J. Bradley Chance* ..... 50

S23 The Role of the Jewish People in Luke's Passion Theology
*Richard P. Carlson* ..... 82

S25 A Review of Previous Research on Philo's *De Virtutibus*
*Earle Hilgert* ..... 103

S25 Underneath Cohn and Colson: The Text of Philo's *De Virtutibus*
*David T. Runia* ..... 116

S25 Metanoia in the Writings of Philo Judaeus
*Jon Nelson Bailey* ..... 135

S27 Intertextuality and the Genre of the Apocalypse
*David E. Aune* ..... 142

S27 Reading the Apocalypse as an Apocalypse
*Gregory Linton* ..... 161

S32 Christ as a Pharmakos in Pauline Soteriology
*Bradley Halstead McLean* ..... 187

S32 The Unutterable Symbols of Ge-Themis Reconsidered
*Louis Roberts* ..... 207

S33 In What Sense Blasphemy?
Jesus Before Caiaphas in Mark 14:61-64
*Craig A. Evans* ..... 215

S33 The (A)Historicity of Jesus' Temple Demonstration:
A Test Case in Methodology
*Robert J. Miller* ..... 235

S42 The Institutional Setting of the Late Formation
of the Pentateuch in the Work of John Van Seters
*Thomas B. Dozeman* ..... 253
Some Observations on "The Institutional Setting,"
by T. Dozeman
*John Van Seters* ..... 264

S60 Jesus and the Domination System
*Walter Wink* ..... 265

S60 The Humor of the Absurd in the Parables of Jesus
*D. Wayne Sandifer* ..... 287

S63 Philo's Practical Application of Δικαιοσύνη
*Dorothy I. Sly* ..... 298

S63 Philo and the Higher Law
*John W. Martens* ..... 309

S63 Philo's Concept of Generic Virtue
*Daniel N. Jastram* ..... 323

S69 Repentant Eve, Perfected Adam:
Conversion in *The Acts of Andrew*
*Kenneth C. Wagener* ..... 348

S70 Text, Context, Conquest, Quest:
The Bible and Social Struggle in Latin America
*Leif E. Vaage* ..... 357

S70 The Bible and Social Transformation in South Africa: A
Work-In-Progress Report on The Institute for the Study of the Bible
*Gerald West* and *Jonathan A. Draper* ..... 366

S76 Retrospect and Prospect in Luke-Acts Interpretation
*Jacob Jervell* ..... 383

S77 Direct and Indirect Phraseology in the Gospel of Matthew
*Mark Allan Powell* ..... 405

S77 Named and Unnamed Disciples in Matthew:
A Literary/Theological Study
*Michael J. Wilkins* ..... 418

S82 Triple-Form and Space/Time Transitions: Literary Structuring Devices in the Apocalypse
*Barbara W. Snyder* ..... 440

S82 The Sweet and the Sour: Epics of Wrath and Return in the Apocalypse: The Apocalypse as a Macro-Genre
*Edith M. Humphrey* ..... 451

S111 Technology and the Constructs of Social World Studies
*James W. Flanagan* ..... 461

S111 Artist/Technologist: Eiffel's Tower, Technology and the Social Construction of Meaning
*Miriam R. Levin* ..... 482

S111 The Use and Significance of Models for Historical Reconstruction
*Richard A. Wood* ..... 488

S115 The Guard at the Tomb (*Gos. Pet.* 8:28-11:49 and Matt 27:62-66; 28:2-4, 11-16): A Case of Intertextuality?
*Susan E. Schaeffer* ..... 499

S115 The Protevangelium of James as an Historia: The Insufficiency of the Infancy Gospel Category
*John L. Allen, Jr.* ..... 508

S115 A Perfect Fit: The Major Interpolation in the *Acts of John*
*Paul G. Schneider* ..... 518

S115 Thomas Tradition and the *Acts of Thomas*
*Gregory J. Riley* ..... 533

S118 The Death of Jesus and the Rending of the Temple Veil (Luke 23:44-49): A Window into Luke's Understanding of Jesus and the Temple
*Joel B. Green* ..... 543

S118 The Divine Hand and the Divine Plan in the Lukan Passion
*Robert L. Mowery* ..... 558

S118 The Cup, The Bread, and the Salvific Effect of Jesus' Death in Luke-Acts
*Bart D. Ehrman* ..... 576

S119 Proclaiming the Lord's Death: 1 Corinthians 11:7-34 and the Forms of Paul's Theological Argument
*Troels Engberg-Pedersen* ..... 592

S119 Death in Us, Life in You: The Apostolic Medium
*Steven J. Kraftchick* ..... 618

S148 The New Religionsgeschichtliche Schule: The Quest for Jewish Christology
*Jarl Fossum* ..... 638

S153 Repeated Language in Matthew: Clues to the Order and Composition of Luke and Mark
*David B. Peabody* ..... 647

S153 Intercalation in Mark and the Synoptic Problem
*Tom Shepherd* ..... 687

S156 The Language of Community: Metaphors, Systems of Convictions, Ethnic, and Gender Issues in Luke 10:25-37 and 10:38-42
*Pamela L. Thimmes* ..... 698

S167 Pistis and Pauline Christology: What is at Stake?
*Richard B. Hays* ..... 714

S167 Once More, Pistis Christou
*James D. G. Dunn* ..... 730

S168 Pseudepigrapha in Syriac Literature
*David Bundy* ..... 745

S168 The Flood According to Enoch in Early Christian Literature
*Rochus Zuurmond* ..... 766

S172 The Minor Agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark and the Two Gospel Hypothesis: A Study of These Agreements in their Compositional Contexts
*William R. Farmer* ..... 773

S172 The Beatitudes: Salt and Light in Matthew and Luke
*Adrian M. Leske* ..... 816

# Introductory Note

The papers in this volume were prepared for discussion at the One Hundred Twenty-seventh Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, convened at the Allis Plaza Hotel and the Kansas City Convention Center, Kansas City, Missouri, 23-26 November 1991. They represent, in most cases, experimental and initial research on a subject. Therefore, they should not be considered finished works but works in progress. The Society encourages this type of publication to stimulate discussion which may lead to the refinement and precision necessary in a journal article or monograph.

The Seminar Papers Series serves the program efforts of the SBL. Younger scholars and veterans are able to prepare their research for distribution in advance of the annual meeting. This frees time otherwise allotted for the reading of papers and permits significant discussion to occur at the annual meeting.

In keeping with their purpose, the papers in this volume have been printed substantially as they were received. Authors were encouraged to submit electronic manuscripts, and those versions have been reformatted and printed with only minor editorial corrections. No effort has been made to attain a consistency of format or style among the papers.

The editor expresses appreciation to the staff of Scholars Press for their able supervision in the production of this volume. On behalf of the whole society, the editor thanks the chairs of all annual meeting program units for their assistance in developing a stimulating program.

Eugene H. Lovering, Jr., Editor
*Assistant Executive Director*
*Society of Biblical Literature*

# Q Bibliography Supplement II: 1991

*David M. Scholer*
*North Park College and*
*Theological Seminary*

### Introduction

This brief listing supplements, and in some cases corrects, the "Q Bibliography: 1981-1989," which appeared in the *Society of Biblical Literature 1989 Seminar Papers* (ed. D. J. Lull; SBLSPS 28; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), 23-37; and the "Q Bibliography Supplement I: 1990," which appeared in the *Society of Biblical Literature 1990 Seminar Papers* (ed. D. J. Lull; SBLSPS 29; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 11-13. One hundred eight items appear in this Supplement. The intention is to complete in 1991 (or 1992) a comprehensive Q bibliography through 1990 (or 1991). Users of this supplement may wish to consult the entries under "Q" in the Keyword Index of T. R. W. Longstaff and P. A. Thomas, *The Synoptic Problem: A Bibliography, 1716-1988* (New Gospel Studies 4; Macon: Mercer University Press; Leuven: Peeters, 1988).

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Hoover, "Sayings....": *NTA* 33.1102

Lührmann, "The Gospel of Mark....": *NTA* 33.1104

# The Book of Isaiah: A Complex Unity. Synchronic and Diachronic Reading

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> "Today scholars are beginning to move from analysis to synthesis in the interpretation of the Book of Isaiah. The established practice of separating the book into several discrete parts, each of which is viewed in isolation from the whole, is giving way to exploratory efforts to understand the overall unity and the theological dynamic of the Isaiah tradition. Indeed, it is an illuminating experience to lay aside most of the commentaries of the past and read through in one sitting the Book of Isaiah with a kind of 'second naiveté'" (Anderson, 17).

This quotation expresses some of the basic elements that build the starting point of the consultation on "The Formation of the Book of Isaiah." Last year Marvin Sweeney presented a lecture on "The Unity of the Book of Isaiah in the History of Modern Critical Research" in which he showed how "current discussion of the unity of the book is rooted in earlier discussion of its disunity."[1] The intention of the present paper is first of all to review the contributions to the ongoing discussion with regard to their methodological approaches, and to highlight some of the questions that seem to be the major topics now to be dealt with.

"The question of the unity of the Book of Isaiah was reopened by Brevard Childs' canonical approach in *Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture*" (Anderson, n. 1), in which book "Childs' most spectacular success is with the book of Isaiah" (Brueggemann, 89). Almost at the same time and independently from one another Peter R. Ackroyd's article "Isaiah I-XII: Presentation of a Prophet" (1978) appeared which could be characterized as the other fundamental and influential contribution to this newly reopened debate. The comparison of these two works shows important basic agreements between the two scholars, in particular in the pronounced interest in the final form of the text; on the other hand each of them approaches this question in a totally different way. In his powerful claim for the canonical unity of the Book of Isaiah, Childs concentrates on the book as a whole and on the canonical interrelation between its three commonly assumed parts. Ackroyd on his part scrutinizes the question "Why is there so substantial a book associated with the prophet Isaiah?" (1978, 19) and finds "the clue ... in the actual structure of i-xii" (27) which he elaborates in detail.

Here a number of methodological problems appear that since then have been much more diversified by the contributions of several other scholars. In addition, in retrospect it is visible that through the years time and again the question of the

[1] I gratefully used Sweeney's paper, in particular its excellent bibliography.

unity of the Book of Isaiah had been raised by individual scholars some of whose observations and reflections now are taken up in the new broader framework.[2]

## I

The common starting point among scholars interested in the formation of the Book of Isaiah is the conviction, or at least the assumption, that the present shape of the book is not the result of more or less accidental or arbitrary developments but rather that of deliberate and intentional literary and theological work. Apart from details, the question arises how to define the leading methodological interest in exploring this work and its results. Childs speaks of "The Canonical Shape of the Book of Isaiah" (325). Other scholars, too, explicitly use the terms "canon," "canon-criticism," "canonical critical" and the like.

All of them are aware of certain possible misunderstandings or misinterpretations. Ackroyd writes: "I do not for one moment fear that anyone will suppose that I am thereby disclosing myself as a biblical fundamentalist, though I may have to accept the dubious distinction of being misquoted as having abandoned one of the key points of critical scholarship" (1978, 17). And he sums up: "Canon-criticism, as a distinct area of discussion, involves a sensitive appraisal of both the final stages of the according of authority to the biblical writings, and the awareness of the different levels at which this has operated in the eventual determining of the texts which have come down to us, stamped with the hallmark of experiential testing in the life of the community to which they belonged" (47f.). It is indeed of particular importance to emphasize "the sensitive appraisal of both" instead of playing off the awareness of the different levels against the keen interest in the final stage or stages. Childs writes: "To hear the different notes within the one book is an essential part of taking seriously the canonical shape" (330), and similarly other scholars using canon terminology are expressing their "indebtedness to historical analysis..., which seeks to locate the text at prior historical moments" (Seitz 1988, 105).

Clements raises an objection against this terminology: "Our problem is a literary and theological one of redaction-criticism, not the larger and more problematic one of canon criticism, which we may set aside for discussion in the realm of hermeneutics" (1985, 97). He argues that "the reasons why the book of Isaiah acquired its present shape" have nothing to do with the final "canonization" of the Hebrew Bible, and he even declares that "it appears to be methodologically wrong to attempt to resolve these problems (i.e. of the Book of Isaiah) by an all-embracing hermeneutical appeal to the perspective of the canon" (n. 10). The question raised here has two different aspects. The one is the understanding of the term "canonical." In the framework of the current debate on the Book of Isaiah (as well as on other books of the Hebrew Bible) the term is mainly applied to the final shape of the respective book in which it eventually became part of the canon as a whole. Therefore it might be possible to discuss several aspects of the formation of the Book of Isaiah without using the term "canonical." Yet the more fundamental aspect of the question is that of the intention why scholars try to understand the final form of a biblical book, in particular of such a central one as the Book of Isaiah which at the same time is such a complicated one to be under-

[2] I refer in particular to the works of Jones (1955), Liebreich (1955-56), Eaton (1959), Schreiner (1967), Becker (1968), Lack (1973), and Melugin (1976). For the history of research see also J. Vermeylen 1989, 11-27.

stood as a whole. For a number of scholars it is even the "canonical" question that led them to this kind of exegetical work. For them it would not make sense to set this question aside and make such a strict distinction and even separation between exegesis and hermeneutics as Clements proposes. Therefore, the relevance and function of the "canonical" aspect in the framework of the consultation (or perhaps seminar) on the formation of the Book of Isaiah has to be discussed further.

## II

The next set of questions concerns the three main parts of the Book of Isaiah as they have been accepted by almost all Old Testament scholars during the last century. Even today the exploration of the formation of the Book of Isaiah always starts from a point where the existence of (Proto-)Isaiah (chap.1-39), Deutero-Isaiah (chap. 40-55), and Trito-Isaiah (chap. 56-66) is either taken for granted or explicitly discussed. This problem, again, has two major aspects. One is concerned with the prophetic figure behind each of the three parts of the book; the other with the literary unity and independence of either part. Both aspects are interrelated to each other.

At this point the above mentioned methodological differences between Childs and Ackroyd are particularly obvious. Childs does not question the original existence of the three parts of the Book of Isaiah (calling them First, Second, and Third Isaiah). With regard to Second Isaiah he assumes that there originally existed certain elements showing the historical context of this prophecies, which later had been eliminated so that these chapters lost "their original historical particularity." Here Childs' canonical approach did not touch the classical assumption of the earlier existence of several (at least two) independent parts of the Book of Isaiah. Childs sees changes happening only at the level where "the canonical editors of this tradition employed the material in such a way as to eliminate almost entirely those concrete features and to subordinate the original message to a new role within the canon." (325f.)[3] Accordingly, he views the canonical editing of First Isaiah as a "coupling of collections" after which "a large amount of later material is scattered througout the entire collection. Moreover, both its older and newer elements have been structured into a clear theological pattern which is integrally connected with Second Isaiah" (330f.).

Ackroyd's approach is different. From the outset he questions the independent existence of chaps. 1-39, in particular as a collection of sayings of a prophet of the eighth century who was primarily a prophet of doom. In chaps. 1-12 he finds "a presentation of the prophet," "the messenger of doom, now fulfilled, as he is also presented as messenger of salvation" (1978, 45). These chapters are composed of smaller units such as 1:2-2:5, 2:6-4:6, 5:1-11:16 (including 6:1-9:6), each of them containing oracles of doom and salvation. The psalm in chap. 12 "provides an interpretative comment on what precedes, drawing out in a final poetic statement the broadest significance of the prophet's person and message" (34-40). In his conclusion Ackroyd declares: "It is not my intention to try to sort out either the genuine from the nongenuine, or the possible situations ... to which this or that passage may belong, or in which reapplication has been made" (44).

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[3] I do not fully understand the relation between the above quoted and Childs' question "if the material of Second Isaiah in fact ever circulated in Israel apart from its being connected to an earlier form of First Isaiah" (329).

"Whether the prophet himself or his exegetes were responsible, the prophet appears to us as a man of judgement and salvation" (45).

The comparison of these two approaches shows a basic methodological problem with regard to the formation of the Book of Isaiah: Has the final form to be seen as the result of connecting or merging two (or three) originally independent parts (or books) by (one or more) redaction(s)—or has the originally independent existence of those parts no longer to be taken for granted? Among scholars working towards an understanding of the Book of Isaiah as a whole both positions are clearly represented.

With regard to the first position some qualifications are necessary. The question of Trito-Isaiah recently again has become subject of discussion (see below); therefore some scholars rather speak of relations between chaps. 1-39 and 40-66. With regard to the first part, some scholars set aside chaps. 36-39 as a later addendum, speaking of chaps. 1-35. But also chap. 35 is taken by some scholars as not having been part of the original collection of Proto-Isaiah but added as a redactional bridge between First and Second Isaiah.

The common conviction of these scholars remains that a collection of First Isaiah sayings containing major parts of chaps. 1-39 had existed before having been combined with chaps. 40-66. For most of them this conviction includes a redactional reworking of certain parts of chaps. 1-39, be it in one or more redactional stages, even before their combination with chaps. 40-66. Widely accepted is the thesis of one (or two) redaction(s) in the time of Josiah and later after the fall of Jerusalem (Barth; Clements 1980b, 1980c). For Clements this is an important stage in the redactional history of the Book of Isaiah: "Once the connection between the prophecies of Isaiah and the destruction of Jerusalem is recognized as a factor in the way the Book of Isaiah came to be developed, we have the single most essential clue towards understanding why the prophecies of chapters 40 and following came to be incorporated into the book" (Clements 1982, 127).

Steck (1985) identifies chap. 35 as another crucial point for the connection between the two formerly independent collections. In a scrutinizing exegesis he shows this chapter's interrelations into both directions, forward to chap. 40, and backward to chap. 32-34. He concludes that chapter 35 had been formulated in order to be written in "at the join between the end of the complex of sayings of First Isaiah (Isa. *1-34) and the beginning of those of Second Isaiah (Isa. *40-62)." He emphasizes that until then both parts had been independent from each other and that each of them had been formulated in an unalterably fixed form (101).[4]

Both scholars represent characteristic examples of an approach to the Book of Isaiah that on the one hand strongly emphasizes the deliberate formation of the book as a whole, on the other hand firmly holds to the original independence of the first and the second part of the book from each other. From this point of view the final shape of the book is the result of a redactional process. The original parts are not touched themselves by a "canonical" idea.

The most pronounced counterexample is given by Seitz (1988). His provocative thesis is: "The whole notion of Second and Third Isaiah depends in no small part on there being a clear First Isaiah. Such an Isaiah is not to be found" (111). He emphasizes that "Isaiah 1-39 is an extremely complex collection of material, with a diverse background," and he claims that this has already been shown by

[4] Similar Clements 1982, 121, who calls chap. 35 "a summarized 'digest' of the main content of the prophecies of chapters 40-55*."

several recent studies that "demand a complete rethinking of the relatively simple formulation 1, 2, 3 Isaiah" (n. 14). Indeed, the extremely complex character of chaps. 1-39 is conceded by almost all exegetes. The question is whether these divergent materials have been brought together before and independently from the joining of chaps. 1-39 with chaps. 40ff.

Steck, e.g., declares explicitly that the main corpus of chaps. 1-39 before its connection with the following chapters did exist in a fixed form whose formulation no longer could be touched ("in der Formulierung nicht mehr antastbar[]" 1985, 101). According to his view, chap. 35 had been carefully worked in so that it could build the bridge between the two now preceding and following parts of the book. Some more texts share this bridging function with chap. 35, such as Isa. 11:11-16 and 27:(12,)13 (as well as 62,10-12 in the second part) as expressing "the same redactional view."[5]

Clements also mentions texts in chaps. 1-39 that express the ideas of chaps. 40ff. Similar to Steck he finds, in addition to chap. 35, in Isa. 11:12-16; 19:32; 27:12-13 "summarizing assurances of the return of Yahwe's people to Zion..., which are based upon the prophecies from chapter 40 on" (1982, 121). Chaps. 36-39, according to Clements, also have been added to chaps. 1-35 "at a time when much of the material of chapters 40 and following had already been joined to this earlier prophetic book" (123). Chaps. 24-27 are "a very late section" which "should ... not be regarded" as "to be read in isolation of the rest of the book" (122). Those observations lead him to the suggestion "that the linking of the prophecies of chapters 40 and following with the tradition of Isaiah's prophecies belongs more fundamentally to the structure of the book" (123). That means that the junction of chaps. 1-39 and 40-66 appears not merely as one act of redaction at one certain point, but rather as a process by that elements of an earlier tradition ("Isaiah") had been intertwined with those of exilic and postexilic traditions.

From this point of view the difference between the positions of Clements and Seitz seemed to be reduced to the question whether there remains an identifiable "First Isaiah" when lacking all the elements rather belonging to the structuring of the book as a whole. Here, of course, the discussion has to go into details. In particular Ackroyd's concept of a "presentation of the prophet" has to be taken into account as questioning the existence of a definable "First Isaiah."

Another important point in Seitz's argumentation is the fact that "The literary boundaries between 1, 2, 3 Isaiah are not marked in any special way" (109). Indeed, in Isaiah 40 no hint is given that now a new chapter begins and that it is a different prophet who is speaking from now on; and there is no evidence of a loss of any superscription or introduction. This problem is related to the question, which text had been read immediately before chap. 40 at the time when the two supposed collections had been combined. One argument for the clear definition of a new begin in chap. 40 is the change of tone and content from doom to comfort. This seems to be true if chap. 40 was preceded by chaps. 36-39. But many scholars believe that these chapters had been inserted much later into the Book of Isaiah, probably as "one of the latest steps to occur in its formation" (Clements 1980, 277), "thereby separating the different collections" (275). But if it is chap. 35 that has to be read before chap. 40, there is no change in tone and content. The close relationship of chap. 35 to, or even dependence upon, Deutero-Isaiah has been noted by many scholars. In Clements' concept the argument turns the other way round: Not the difference, but the similarity between the end

[5] See the chart, Steck 1985, p. 80.

of First Isaiah (now chap. 35) and the beginning of Second Isaiah (chap. 40) made the connection possible or even more plausible.

Here again chaps. 36-39 have to be taken into account. Ackroyd (1982) has convincingly shown a number of interrelations between these chapters and chaps. 1-12, in particular 6:1-9:6. "Both these narrative or partly narrative sections ... are evidently concerned with themes of judgement and of deliverance" (19). And these sections "alone in the book provide a full contextual setting for the activity and message of Isaiah" (ibid.), so that not only chaps. 1-12 but also chaps. 36-39 could be called "presentation of a prophet" (16). From chap. 39 it is obvious that God's words of judgement against Israel will not become reality through the Assyrians in the days of Hezekiah; but the last words of the chapter make it clear to the reader that it is only a sparing of Hezekiah and his generation and that the judgement will come in the days of the Babylonians.[6] Seitz summarizes his reading of chaps. 36-39 as follows: "A theological and a readership problem are solved in one fell swoop by the inclusion of chapters 36-39. God's word of judgement over Israel's sins, declared in the Assyrian period by Isaiah, is to be fulfilled in the Babylonian period. At the same time, the reader is prepared for the words of comfort that appear in Isaiah 40ff., words that only make sense once the sentence of judgement, the 'time of service' of Isa. 40:2, has been carried out" (1988, 111).

## III

This discussion shows a changing approach to the question of earlier collections of material now combined in the Book of Isaiah. For some scholars the starting point still is the more or less unquestioned existence of two or three "books" that had been brought together by redactional work. With regard to chaps. 1-39 this includes a mainly diachronic reading of the texts led by the question at which stage of the redactional history a specific text had been formulated, reformulated, inserted, and the like. Other scholars are developing a different approach reading the texts within chaps. 1-39 in its given form as parts of the book as a whole (Ackroyd; Seitz).

The latter reading, which I am sympathetic with, does not mean a denial of diachronic questions but a change—and perhaps a reversal—of scholarly priorities. The first and main question is no longer, What was the "original" meaning of this text? and also not, When and how had this text been incorporated into its present context? but, What is the meaning of the text in its given context? This does not exclude the first two questions to be asked for additional information and clarification. But the priority is now clearly given to the interpretation of the text in its given context.

This changed approach in the Book of Isaiah has its first and most fundamental influence on the reading of chaps. 1-39. Most scholars would agree that "Isaiah 1-39 is an extremely complex collection of material" (Seitz 1988, 111). Up to now most scholars would try to find out the original words of Isaiah, or the texts that formed the first, original collection of words by Isaiah, and then continue to define the stages of redaction through that other texts had been added to it. But if one reads chaps. 1-12 as deliberately composed "presentation of a prophet," the direction of view changes. Chaps. 1-12 then will be understood as a meaningful composition in itself comprising materials of different types and

[6] Cf. already Melugin 177.

from different times depicting Isaiah as a prophet of judgement and salvation (Ackroyd 1978, 45). The diachronic question is not at all to be excluded but can help to understand the interrelations between some of the texts that are now part of this composition.

Another example of results of a changing view is the understanding of the oracles against other nations chaps. 13-23. Particularly important is the fact that this composition begins with an oracle against Babylon chap. 13-14. This shows that Yhwh's words of judgement spoken in times of the Assyrian rule will be realised by the Babylonians. Thereby, already at this point the borders from the times of First Isaiah to that of Second Isaiah are crossed (cf. Seitz 1988, 112). From now on the reader is aware that the prophetic message of the Book of Isaiah is not restricted to the times of Assyrian rule but embraces a time span going beyond that period into the Babylonian era. Then the transition from chap. 39 to chap. 40 does not come as a surprise to the reader. And even the further step from exile to return, i.e. from the Babylonian to the Persian era, has now been prepared.

Actually, this reading of the Book of Isaiah as embracing a long period of time with changing political events and experiences begins in the first chapters of the book. It has long been observed that chap. 1 forms a composition representing a summary of the prophetical message of "Isaiah" (Fohrer). This chapter contains elements that—at least by later readers—can be understood as speaking from a point after the divine judgement had come over Israel. Verse 1:9 is taken by many interpreters "to be a late, exilic, addition in which the condition of Jerusalem after 587 was read back into Isaiah's prophecy of 701" (Clements 1980, 32). It is now a question of approach whether this reading back is taken as a late addition or as an integral element of the canonical presentation of the prophet. The same is true for the word on Jerusalem's fate in 1:21-28, in particular for its ending in vv. 27f. that "evidently supposes that Jerusalem had suffered severe setbacks" (35); and it is true, of course, for the vision of the eschatological role of Mount Zion in 2:1-5. Ackroyd summarizes his reading of 1:2-2:5 "as an appeal and a promise: Jerusalem the unfaithful and judged city of God, over which the lament of 1:21ff. is pronounced, is to be the true and faithful city, the centre of the religious life of the world" (1978, 42).

This kind of observations and reflections must necessarily lead to a new definition of "First Isaiah." In this context it has to be taken into account that the person of the prophet appears rather rarely and not before chap. 6. Compared with a number of other prophetic books, such as Jeremiah and Ezekiel, but also Amos and Hosea, the person of the prophet Isaiah remains elusive, as "Second Isaiah" and "Third Isaiah" do as well (cf. Seitz 1988, 120). The consequences of this peculiarity of the Book of Isaiah have to be reflected, together with the other aspects mentioned before.

## IV

The impact the changing approach has to Isa. 40-66 is different from that it has to chaps. 1-39. At the first glance, there seems to be no influence from chaps. 1-39 into the later parts of the book. Yet already the beginning of "Second Isaiah" in 40:1ff. poses questions that are not to be answered without looking back to what precedes. The opening of this chapter without any introduction or superscription, and with the call for comfort referring back to Jerusalems "service" and her sins, obviously adresses readers that know something of what had been said in the preceding part of the book. In addition, the well-known

parallels between Isa. 40:1-8(11) and 6:1-11 have been recently re-examined by different scholars particularly looking for interdependences between these two texts pivotal in either part of the book (Melugin 83f., Ackroyd 1982, 5f., Rendtorff 1989, 79ff., Albertz 242ff., Seitz 1990). Albertz is mainly interested in the adoption and continuation of Isaianic motifs in Deutero-Isaiah, and he recalls the idea of an "Isaiah-school" as it had been raised earlier by Mowinckel and others. Other scholars reflect the possibility of a reciprocal influence on the level of composition or redaction (Rendtorff, Seitz). In any case, the opening verses of chaps. 40-66 have to be read in the context of the Book of Isaiah as a whole.

The same is true for other texts and motifs. Childs emphasizes that the "former things" in Deutero-Isaiah in the context of the book as a whole "can now only refer to the prophecies of First Isaiah" (328f.; cf. Seitz 1988, 110). But then the question arises what this expression might have pointed to at an earlier stage when chaps. 40-66 had not yet been combined with chaps. 1-39. Did the "former things" then mean anything different from earlier prophecies of judgement? And if not, which prophecies did they refer to? So the question remains whether conscious references to chaps. 1-39 could or should be assumed in chaps. 40-66. This question is also dealt with by Clements (1985), who mentions several topics by which he wants "to show that the evidence that the prophecies of "Second Isaiah" reveal a conscious dependence on earlier sayings of Isaiah of Jerusalem is firm and reliable" (109).

Finally, in the course of looking at the Book of Isaiah as a whole the interrelations between "Second" and "Third Isaiah" are re-examined under different aspects. The most decisive step has been taken by Steck (1989) who, in the context of broad methodological reflections, denies the existence of a prophet or author "Trito-Isaiah" and sees chaps. 56-66 as literary texts that never existed as a separate collection but have stepwise been added to chaps. 40-55 (so chaps. 60-62) or to a "Greater Isaiah" (*Großjesaja*), i.e., to the now emerging collection that included great parts of chaps. 1-39 and of chaps. 40-55. At the latter point this thesis is related to Steck's earlier assumption (1985) that chap. 35 had been formulated in order to build the bridge between chaps. 1-39 and 40-55 at the time they were combined first (see above).[7]

Beuken's approach is different. He is also interested in Third Isaiah's relations to First and Second Isaiah which he describes as "Isaianic legacy" (1986). But he sees in Trito-Isaiah "a literary and theological personality in his own right" (1986, 64), who is the successor of Deutero-Isaiah and, in a certain sense, also of Proto-Isaiah, and who "has used the prophecies of F(irst)I(saiah) and S(econd)I(saiah) for his particular message, in a situation that was quite different" (ibid.). Beuken's conviction of the unity and originality of Trito-Isaiah finds its specific expression in the developing of "The Main-Theme of Trito-Isaiah," that of "the servants of YHWH," that he finds as a "theme" during the whole of chaps. 56-66, even where the expression itself does not appear (1990).

These two approaches differ under two main aspects: a) unity of chaps. 56-66, and personality of the "prophetic" author, and b) relations of chaps. 56-66 to the Book of Isaiah as a whole. Beuken's position with regard to the book as a whole is only touched in his articles, while for Steck this is one of his main concerns. With regard to chaps. 56-66 this concern leads him to a principal denial of one of the basic hypotheses of classical *Literarkritik* in the field of prophetical literature,

[7] The existence of an independent "Trito-Isaiah" is also denied by Vermeylen (1989, 42ff.), though his concept of the history of chaps. 40-55 is totally different from Steck's.

the existence of "Trito-Isaiah." Stecks own answer is mainly orientated towards a growth of the Book of Isaiah as a whole. The later stages of redaction in chaps. 56-66, after the first combination of chaps. 1-39 with 40-62, he sees interrelated to certain stages in the redactional history of chap. 1-39.

Here a new and interesting debate is beginning, and we expect further work in this field. With regard to the Book of Isaiah as a whole, of particular interest would be the question how developments in chaps. 40-66 are related to those within chaps. 1-39. E.g., certain interrelations between chaps. 1 and 66 have been observed by several scholars. And could it be possible that "those responsible for the last forming of the third part also contributed to the composition of the final shape of the book" (Rendtorff 1984, 319)?

## V

According to the arrangement of arguments in this report, some contributions to the topic of the Book of Isaiah as a whole have not yet been mentioned, in particular those which are not built up on questions of the structure of texts but on certain themes, topics, expressions, etc. My own first article in this area (1984) tried to show a number of topics and themes that are characteristic for the Book of Isaiah and at the same time appear in all—or at least in more of one—of the different parts of the book. My approach was basically influenced by Melugin and Ackroyd, and many of the observations and questions of that article have been absorbed in the following discussions. My more recent article (1991) discusses the different meanings of the word *sᵉdaqah* in the context of the Book of Isaiah as a whole, including chaps. 56-66.

Another contribution to be named here is that of Anderson. He faces the Book of Isaiah as a whole, but he writes that "Instead of reading the Isaiah tradition forward from the standpoint of the seminal preaching of Isaiah of Jerusalem ... I propose to consider it from the viewpoint of its final apocalyptic *relecture* or rendering" (18). That brings texts from all parts of the book in relation to each other in a new and often surprising way. Anderson keeps the diachronic aspects in mind so that his essay can be easily and fruitfully related to questions of the redactional or compositorial history of the texts.

In general, I believe that a changing view on the Book of Isaiah should allow, and even require, studies on topics, themes, expressions, and even ideas characteristic for the book as a whole or considerable parts of it, without at the same time discussing the questions of redaction or composition. A synchronic reading, if carried out with the necessary sophistication, should have its own right.

## VI

The discussion of the last decade revealed the unity of the Book of Isaiah. Of course, it is not a simple unity but a highly complex one. Yet scholars have now begun to realize this complex unity and to interpret it. The methodological approaches are different, as explained in detail in this paper. But it seemed to me to be remarkable that nevertheless in certain crucial points a basic agreement can be reached.

In my view, one of the crucial points is the question of an independent book or collection of "First Isaiah," containing major parts of chaps. 1-39. The scholarly discussion shows that there is broad agreement on the "secondary" character of elements like chaps. 13-23, 24-27, and also of smaller units like 2:1-5, 4:2-6, 12:1-6

and others. That makes it hardly possible to read the "original" parts (in whatever sense) of chaps. 1-39 as a continuous "book." Nevertheless, some scholars continue to speak of a "First Isaiah" thereby including some of the "secondary" elements. Other scholars prefer to read the non-uniformed and composed chapters 1-39 from the outset as a part of the Book of Isaiah as a whole.

The first mentioned position is led by a consistently diachronic interest. Many of these scholars try to define a number of redactional stages, some of those to be dated before the combination of chaps. 1-39 with chaps. 40-66, others after this point. In my view, many of these stages, and in particular their datings, are highly hypothetical. In addition, these scholars have to assume a number of anonymous redactors, editors, etc., whose intentions they try to understand. The result is, on the one hand, an extremely complicated hypothetical redactional history, from the prophet Isaiah in the eighth century down to the Hellenistic era. On the other hand, it is not possible to read the Book of Isaiah in its continuity at any point before the final ("canonical") shape of the text.

The other position reads the Book of Isaiah mainly in its given "canonical" shape, though in full awarness of its (diachronic) complexity. In my view, it is the great advantage of such a sophisticated synchronic reading, that the interpreter is able to read the text in its given continuity. To choose one example: Ackroyd (1978) reads chaps. 1-12 as a complex unity, while according to Steck (1985, 80) 4:2-6, 11:11-16, and 12:1-6 were added at different times, 12:1-6 only "after 302/1." Only now the reader has the whole text before him or her.

The main difference between these two approaches might be expressed by the following two questions: 1) (Synchronic) What does the text (in all its complexity) mean in its given final shape? 2) (Diachronic) In what stages did the text reach its final form? Certainly, these two questions are oversimplifying the complex character of the problems. Yet by this simplification I am intending, on the one hand, to point to a crucial difference between these two approaches, on the other hand to stimulate a discussion on the agreements and disagreements between these two positions.

Therefore, I want to give another example in order to show an important agreement between scholars of different positions. Steck's interpretation of Isa. 35 as written with the explicit function of connecting chaps. 1-39 and 40-66 (in Steck's view: 40-62) with each other is, in my view, one of the most important contributions towards an understanding of the Book of Isaiah as a whole. As shown above, Steck takes a strictly literary-critical position that with regard to chaps. 1-39 seems to be hardly compatible with that of Ackroyd, Seitz a.o., including myself. Nevertheless, I believe that his study on Isa. 35 will be appreciated by most scholars as a milestone in the research into the problems of the Book of Isaiah as a whole.

By these examples I want to show that there are clearly definable differences between the methodological approaches that should be studied seriously, but that at the same time the common progress in the understanding of the Book of Isaiah as a whole as made during the last decade is remarkable and promising.

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# The Servant, God's Call, and the Structure of Isaiah 40–48

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## I

Critical scholarship has generally viewed Isaiah 40-48 as the product of an exilic prophet or prophetic school whose work was later attached to an emerging book of Isaiah. Isa 40:1-8 was commonly seen as language associated with the commissioning of the prophet "Second Isaiah," who produced the utterances contained in chapters 40-55.[1] Recently, however, there has been an increasing tendency to look upon Isa 40-55, not as the work of an exilic prophet or prophetic school whose independent work was later incorporated into a developing book of Isaiah, but rather as material which was consciously created to build upon the earlier First Isaiah tradition. According to this view, Isa 40ff. was created intentionally to manifest continuity with the message of the eighth-century Isaiah.[2] If one considers Isa 40ff. to have been formulated as an extension of the First Isaiah tradition, how likely is it that Isa 40:1-8 reflects the call of an individual prophet?

A. A recent study of Isa 40:1-8 by Christopher Seitz proposes a tantalizing hypothesis concerning the function of these verses in the *book* of Isaiah.[3] Seitz argues that Isa 40:1-8 does indeed involve the language of commissioning in the context of the heavenly council. Linguistic similarities between Isa 40:1-8 and the commissioning of Isaiah in chap. 6 support the belief that Isa 6 and 40:1-8 share the conventions associated with a commissioning in the setting of the divine council.[4] But Seitz does not mean simply that Isa 6 and Isa 40:1-8 reflect a common generic pattern. He argues rather that Isa 40:1-8 *presupposes* chap. 6. The book of Isaiah consciously brings the ministry of the eighth-century Isaiah to a close in chap. 39 and, by means of 40:1-8, causes the reader to "reenter the divine council where Isaiah was first commissioned." A conscious distance between the time of Isaiah ("the former things") and the exilic period ("the new things") is

1 See, for example, C. Westermann, *Isaiah 40-66* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969), 40-43. Lack of space necessitates brevity in documentation.

2 R. Clements, *VT* 30 (1980), 421-36; idem., *Int* 36 (1982), 117-29; idem., *JSOT* 31 (1985), 95-113; P. Ackroyd, *SJT* 27 (1974), 329-52.

3 Seitz, *JBL* 109 (1990), 229-47.

4 *Ibid.*, 238-41.

achieved by employing the language of commissioning once again to introduce the period of the "new things."[5]

Let us present Seitz's arguments in a bit more detail. First of all, he contends that the imperatives in Isa 40:1-8 appear to be directed to a "plural audience of divine attendants."[6] 1 Kings 22 and Isa 6 both exhibit commissioning which take place in the divine council. In Zechariah also "comforting words" (Zech 1:13) go forth from God, as God authorizes in Isa 40:1. Typical of this kind of speech is the command to "cry out" (Isa 40:6; Zech 1:14, 17), as well as the question "how long?" sometimes asked by the prophet (Isa 6:11) and sometimes by the messenger in the heavenly council (Zech 1:12).[7]

A second move by Seitz is to argue that Isa 40:1-8, though based on the language of commissioning in the context of the council of Yahweh, does not exhibit the commissioning of an individual prophet, as in Isa 6. While the divine attendants and the prophet are named explicitly in Isa 6, in Isa 40:1-8 the scene is not so clearly delineated. The reason for this, Seitz contends, is that the commissioning of Isaiah in chap. 6 intentionally serves as the backdrop by means of which the reader of Isa 40:1-8 reenters the scene of the heavenly council in which the eighth-century Isaiah was commissioned. Isaiah is not recommissioned in Isa 40, nor have we a commissioning of a new, exilic prophet. Instead, Isa 40:1-8 takes up again for a new age the activity of Yahweh's word. The complete devastation announced in Isa 6 was delayed until after Hezekiah's time (Isa 39:5-8) and became actualized in the Babylonian exile.[8] Thus the reactivating of the Isaianic commission in the time of the "new things" (40:1-8) picks up material from the First Isaiah tradition: "fading flower" (Isa 28:1,4; 40:7), "grass" (Isa 37:26; 40:6-8); Cyrus replaces Assyria as the instrument of Yahweh; the destruction of 587 is a return to the chaos described in Isa 24-27. The "new things," just about to take place, are declared beforehand to Zion (41:27), signifying that the judgment from the "former day" of Isaiah is over to be replaced by a new time.[9]

Seitz follows MT in translating Isa 40:6 ("and he said") rather than LXX and Qumran ("and I said"). He thinks that the first-person reading in LXX and Qumran may be a secondary attempt to bring an original third-person formulation into line with other first-person prophetic objections (Isa 6:5; Jer. 1:6). The third person reading ("and he said") is not to be understood as a literary portrayal of an objection by Isaiah himself to a new commission, for the text, Seitz contends, presents Isaiah as a voice from the past to be distinguished from the "new things" represented by Isa 40:1ff. The third person formulation ("and he said") refers to an anonymous member of the divine council. Thus the prophet Isaiah is not recommissioned, but Yahweh does speak again from the divine council as in the days of Isaiah. The enduring word of Yahweh, which was once addressed to Isaiah, once again "rises up" for a new time (cf. 40:8).[10]

Following the interchange in the council of Yahweh, the divine word goes forth to commission the herald of good tidings (Isa 40:9-11). The herald of good tidings, however, is but one of the many whom God addresses in Isa 40ff. Seitz

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5 *Ibid.*, 243-44.

6 *Ibid.*, 229-231. See also F. Cross, *JNES* 12 (1953), 274-77.

7 Seitz, *op. cit.*, 232-34.

8 *Ibid.*, 240-45.

9 *Ibid.*, 242-43.

10 *Ibid.*, 245.

thinks especially of the servant in Isa 40-48 and Zion in chaps. 49-54. Nowhere is there a first-person prophetic speech until 48:16b and 49:1-6.[11]

According to Seitz, Isa 40-48 never abandons the concerns of a conventional call narrative. These chapters, he argues, persistently raise the question, "Who will accept the call God has issued in 40:1-11?" Will Israel the servant respond to God's call (cf. 41:8; 42:1; 43:1; 44:1,2; 45:4; 48:20)? No one steps forth until 48:16. And, in 49:1-6, the one who spoke in 48:16 clearly makes reference to the language of commissioning. Indeed, this "servant" (49:3) has its objection (49:4) overridden by Yahweh, who gives new assurance and extends the scope of the call (49:5-6).[12]

B. Seitz's essay is a clear step forward. He has shown that Isa 40:1-8 and chaps. 40ff. as a whole must be read as a part of the *book* of Isaiah rather than as the work of an individual prophet whose call is reflected in Isa 40:1-8. Even if some of the "units" is Isa 40-55 were originally independent of their present context, as I argued some years ago,[13] Seitz is still correct that the *form* of Isa 40-55 as a whole is the result of "scribal" activity which shaped the *book* of Isaiah.

Whether Seitz's understanding of Isa 40:1-8 and 48:16b and 49:1-6 as a frame for reading chaps. 40-48 is workable becomes an important matter for consideration. I find his hypothesis intriguing, for I have long believed that material in Isa 40 points forward to 49:1-6. The attempt to persuade Israel that their way is not "hidden" from Yahweh or that God has not overlooked their "justice" (40:27-31) finds its counterpart in 49:1-6 with the servant's recognition that God's "justice" was present and in the servant's confession of having been "hidden" until the time of the mission for which the call had been given.[14]

We must nevertheless ask about the viability of Seitz's contention that the commissioning in Isa 40:1-8 and the servant's acceptance of a commission in 49:1-6 are the basic key for interpreting Isa 40-48. Is it really true that throughout chaps. 40-48 the question is, as Seitz claims, "Who will accept the call God has issued in Isa 40:1-11?"[15] Let us suppose for the moment that one were to argue otherwise: The commissioning language in Isa 40:1-11 is not *clearly* followed in chaps. 40-48 by concern about who will answer the call given in 40:1-11. Instead, the text moves immediately into disputation speech designed to overcome doubt that Yahweh can and will save (40:12-31). Indeed, the need to respond to doubt that Yahweh is God and that Yahweh is the god who "stirred up" Cyrus is a major thrust of Isa 40-48 (41:1-7, 21-29; 48:12-15). Moreover, speeches of salvation are more prominent in Isa 40-48 than genres associated with commissioning. Although language about the servant's commissioning is by no means absent from Isa 40:12-48:22 (cf. 42:1-4, 5-9), it does not take up the lion's share of the space in Isa 40-48.

Seitz's hypothesis therefore needs to be tested. Do Isa 40:1-8(11) and 49:1-6(13) frame 40:12-48:22? Is 49:1-6 a response to the commissioning language of 40:1-11? Does the textual material in 40:12-48:22 relate to the commissioning language of 40:1-11? And does 40:12–48:22 move organically toward the servant's acceptance of Yahweh's commission in 49:1-6?

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11 *Ibid.*, 245-46.

12 *Ibid.*, 246.

13 R. Melugin, *The Formation of Isaiah 40-55* (BZAW 141: Berlin: de Gruyter, 1976).

14 *Ibid.*, 92-93,146.

15 Seitz, *op. cit.*, 246.

## II

A. *Isa 40:1-11.* Vv. 1-8 undoubtedly involve commissioning in the heavenly council. Seitz's comparison with the language of Isa 6, 1 Kings 22, and Zech 1 shows that the verbal exchange takes place in the council of Yahweh.[16] The members of the divine council, addressed by plural imperatives, are summoned first to "comfort" Jerusalem and to "cry" to her (Isa 40:1-2). The mission of the heavenly council involves speech to Jerusalem; to "cry" to Jerusalem surely means to transmit the word of Yahweh (cf. v. 8). Speech is not, however, their only task. They are told to prepare a highway in the desert (vv. 3-5)—a way with all obstacles removed, so that a new Exodus will not have the limitations of the old.

The command to "cry" returns in v. 6, this time in singular rather than plural. The addressee is unnamed; to whom is the command directed? If vv.1-5 are spoken to the heavenly council, should one imagine that a single (or *any*) member of that body is addressed (Seitz)?[17] Certainly no prophet is explicitly named. It is as if the interchange continued to take place in the divine council, as in 1 Kings 22:19-23. Yet all this must be inferred, for the text leaves these matters unexplained.

The one who is commanded to "cry" objects, complaining that "all flesh is grass" which withers when Yahweh's breath blows upon it. How can one utter a cry when Yahweh has blown upon a people who are like grass? The answer: hope is not in the power of the people; hope is in the word of Yahweh which "rises up forever."

A prophetic message is without doubt commissioned here. And the typical objection to the commission is voiced. But the emphasis in on Yahweh's *word* and not on a particular prophet. The *word* of Yahweh, active in Isa 1-39, is once again sent forth. It is indeed that *word* and its efficacy which is again and again at issue in Isa 40-48 (41:21-29; 42:9; 43:12; 44:7; 45:21; 48:1-11, 14-15, 16).

What is in the effect of the commissioning? As Seitz has seen, no one in Isa 40 says, as in chap. 6, "Here am I; send me."[18] A herald of good news is instructed to proclaim a message (40:9-11), but no one is reported to have accepted the call.[19] Instead, the text proceeds immediately with a disputation whose function is to persuade doubters that Yahweh is both able and willing to save (40:12-31). Why is there not an immediate acceptance of the call? Why must we wait for 48:16b and 49:1-6 to hear such a response? The answer in brief is this: The call cannot be taken up until a foundation has been laid for it. The doubt that Yahweh is God must be answered. Yahweh must be put on trial and Israel's *mišpāṭ* must be vindicated. The character of the servant's mission must be prepared for; Yahweh's purpose both to restore Israel and save the nations must be shown. The relationship between Israel's sinful past and its new future must be discussed. And the place of Cyrus in Yahweh's purpose must be exhibited and debated. Only then can the servant respond to the call.

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16 *Ibid.*, 229-34.

17 *Ibid.*, 245.

18 Seitz notes that, in Isa 6, the prophet takes up his commission (p. 240). But in Isa 40:1-8, no one takes up the commission; no one accepts the call until 48:16 and 49:1-6 (pp. 245-46).

19 Seitz, *op. cit.*, 245.

B. *Isa 40:12-31.* No sooner has the herald of good tidings been instructed (40:9-11) than the text suddenly begins to ask questions about the power of Yahweh (vv. 12ff.). Can any among the nations do what Yahweh can do? Are there any who can be compared to Yahweh? If Yahweh is indeed incomparable, then Yahweh surely *can* save. Israel therefore need not complain, "My way is hid from Yahweh, and from my God my right (*mišpāṭî*) passed over" (40:27). Has Israel not heard that Yahweh is eternal, "creator of the ends of the earth" (v. 28)? Do they not know that Yahweh does not "faint" or become "weary" but *gives* strength to the "faint"?

The answer to doubt expressed in Isa 40:12-31 builds on 40:1-11 and anticipates what is to follow. The complaint, "my way is hid from Yahweh," expresses doubt about the promised way in the desert which the divine council is called to prepare (40:3-5). Indeed, the theme of the way in the desert appears throughout chaps. 40-48 (40:3-5; 41:17-20; 42:15-16; 43:16-21; 48:20-21). Moreover, the disputation on Israel's complaint (40:27-31) reminds us of the objection and its overcoming in 40:6-8. Finally, the language of 40:27-31 prepares for the speech of the commissioned servant in 49:1-6: in the latter the servant gets beyond the complaint of being "weary" and spending "strength" for nothing. Indeed, the servant's *mišpāṭ* is with Yahweh (49:4) rather than having been "passed over" (40:27). Although 40:27-31 in itself gives no indication that its addressee Israel is Yahweh's commissioned servant, it *does* anticipate the speech of that commissioned servant in 49:1-6.[20] Such a correspondence is surely not coincidental. It remains to be seen, however, whether the material *between* chap. 40 and 49:1-6 reflects the concern of commissioning and thus leads up to 49:1-6.

C. *Isa 41:1-42:13.* This compositional unit consists of two trial speeches (41:1-7, 21-29), followed by speeches concerning Yahweh's servant (41:8-20; 42:1-9), and closes with a brief hymn (42:10-13). The two clusters consisting of trial speech followed by utterances about Yahweh's servant (41:1-7 and 8-20; 41:21-29 and 42:1-9) build upon Israel's complaint that its *mišpāṭ* has been passed over (40:27). The first cluster opens with a trial speech (41:1-7) and continues with three salvation speeches for the servant Israel (43:8-13, 14-16, 17-20).[21] The issue of Israel's legal claim is addressed initially by a trial speech whose purpose is to establish before a fictive court of law that Yahweh is indeed God, i.e., to show that Yahweh is capable of providing *mišpāṭ* for Israel. If, as this trial speech seeks to demonstrate, Yahweh is the god who has "stirred up" Cyrus (41:2), Israel's *mišpāṭ* has therefore not been passed over (cf. 40:27). The salvation speeches (41:8-13, 14-16, 17-20), taken together, portray Yahweh's deliverance as victory over military opponents (vv.12b, 15-16), but enemies in warfare are also spoken of as if they were legal opponents: "those who *contend* against you shall become as nothing and shall perish" (v. 11b).[22] Thus the complaint in 40:27 that Yahweh has passed over Israel's "just cause" finds an answer in the salvation-speech tradition of Isa 41 by the promise that Israel's legal opponents will come to nothing.

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20 Melugin, *op. cit.*, 92-93, 146.

21 See the form critical analyses of: J. Begrich, *ZAW* 52 (1934), 81-92; idem., *Studien zu Deuterojesaja* (BWANT 25; Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1938), 6-18; H. E. von Waldow, *Anlass und Hintergrund der Verkündigung des Deuterojesaja* (Diss. Bonn, 1953), 12ff; C. Westermann, *Ev Th* 24 (1964), 355-73; idem., "Sprache und Struktur der Prophetie Deuterojesajas," *Forschung am alten Testament* (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1964), 117-24; Melugin, *op. cit.*, 13-27.

22 Melugin, *op. cit.*, 97.

The next cluster in Isa 41:1-42:13 involves a trial speech (41:21-29) followed by two speeches by Yahweh concerning the servant (42:1-4, 5-9). The trial speech challenges the gods to prove their divine power: "tell us the former things ... make us know the things to come ... do good ... do bad..." (41:21-23). The case for Yahweh is argued by claiming that Yahweh alone "stirred up" Cyrus. Yahweh alone declared this creative word to Zion, whereas the gods have not spoken (41:25-28). Therefore they are nothing (v. 29). The text then turns to speech concerning Yahweh's servant: Yahweh first presents the servant (42:1-4), emphasizing the servant's task as bringer of justice and torah to the nations and focusing on the servant's perseverance in carrying out his mission; he will allow nothing to prevent his bringing justice and torah to the nations. In vv.5-9 the servant is commissioned directly—to be a "covenant (to) people, a light to the nations."[23] Why? So that no other god will get the credit: "my glory to another I will not give" (42:8; cf. 41:1-7, 21-29).

The commissioning of the servant in Isa 42:1-9 builds upon Isa 40:1-8. In chap. 40 the commissioning in the divine council involves comfort for Jerusalem (40:1-2), new Exodus (vv.3-5) with divine glory for "all flesh" to see (v. 5). In 41:1-42:13 there is, correspondingly, salvation for Israel (41:8-20), Exodus-wilderness language (41:17-20), and torah and light for the nations (corresponds to "all flesh"). The fact that 41:1-42:13 culminates with commissioning language (42:1-9) shows that the commissioning theme of 40:1-8 remains central to the purpose of 41:1-42:13.

The trial speeches in 41:1-7, 21-29, building upon the complaint in 40:27 that Yahweh has passed over Israel's "just cause," respond to that complaint by demonstrating that the nations and their gods, when summoned to trial where justice is administered, fail the test. The case of Israel the servant, however, is upheld by Yahweh, who "called" them from the ends of the earth (41:9). Yahweh "strengthens" Israel (41:10); Yahweh makes Israel victorious in battle (41:12b); Israel's legal opponents will vanish (41:11b).

Israel not only *gets* justice but also *gives* justice. The servant gives justice to the nations (42:4). This two-sided distribution of justice delineated in Isa 41:1-42:13 corresponds to the twofold character of the mission of the servant in Isa 49:1-6: a mission to restore Israel and to be a light to the nations. The commission in Isa 40 to create a highway in the desert so that *all flesh* will see the glory of God parallels the salvation of Israel and the gift of light and justice to the nations expressed in 41:1-42:13 and 49:1-6. The commission in Isa 40:1-8, then appears thus far to introduce a theme which is important to Isa 40-48 as a whole.

D. *Isa 42:14-44:23.* This compositional unit continues to speak of Israel as Yahweh's servant (42:19; 43:10; 44:1, 21) and as one who has been "called" (43:1). Yet the emphasis of 42:14-44:23 is not on the servant's *mission*. The focus is rather on the relationship between the servant's disobedient past and the servant's future deliverance. The servant in the past was blind, deaf, and unwilling to walk in the "way," whereas the servant of the future, though blind and deaf, will be "redeemed" and led in the "way." Throughout this compositional unit there is proclamation of future salvation for Israel the servant, but the proclamation leads into exhortation: at the end of the unit (44:21-22) there is exhortation to "remember these things" because God has formed Israel as servant and "blotted

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[23] Westermann, *Isaiah 40-66*, 92-101; Melugin, *op. cit.*, 64-69, 98-102.

out" their crimes. They are further exhorted to repent on the ground that Yahweh has "redeemed" them (44:22b).[24]

Limitation of space necessitates a brief discussion of Isa 42:14-44:23. The compositional unit opens with a subunit (42:14-17) in which Yahweh announces that the time of divine silence is over, that God will gasp and pant like a woman in travail. These birth pangs will produce a new creation (42:15) in which Yahweh will lead the blind in a "way" they have not known. The themes of blindness and new Exodus continue on from Isa 40 and 41:1-42:13 into 42:14-44:23. The theme of worship of idols reappears also: "They shall be turned back and put to shame, those who trust in images..." (42:17). Are the blind to be equated with the worshippers of idols? Are those whom Yahweh will lead in the "way" (new Exodus) an *Israel* who has trusted other gods? The text is not explicit about this; it does not consistently specify to what extent the blind or worshippers of images are Israelites or foreigners. But the composition *does* contrast a blind, sinful Israel of the past who have been punished for their sins with a future Israel who will be "redeemed" through a new Exodus.[25]

Isa 42:18-25 elaborates on vv.14-17. Here it is argued that God's servant Israel is deaf and blind—robbed, plundered, hidden in prisons—because of their sins, their refusal to walk in God's "ways" or to obey God's "torah." Therefore Yahweh punished them with the divine anger and the heat of battle—a fire which burned Israel. But punishment is not the final event; in Isa 43:1-7 Yahweh promises a new future for Israel, whom God "created," "redeemed," and "called by name." Israel will walk through fire (cf. 42:45) but will not (again) be burned (43:2). They will go through waters (a new Exodus) without being overcome (43:2). Indeed, Israel's offspring will be gathered from the ends of the earth and presumably, as in the Exodus, be brought home (43:5-6).

Doubt nevertheless remains. The concern about idolatry at the beginning of the composition (42:17) emerges again in the form of a trial speech (43:8-13), in which Yahweh is "proven" to be God rather than the foreign gods. But this trial speech calls Israel, God's servant, as witnesses for Yahweh (43:10, 12). They are summoned as witnesses *for their own sake*: "that you may know and have faith in me and understand that I am he" (43:10). Yet serving as Yahweh's witnesses in the presence of the foreign peoples (cf. v. 9) is analogous to being a "light to the nations" (42:6; 49:6), a bringer of torah to the Gentiles (42:4), so that Yahweh's glory may not be given to another god (42:8).

No other god can save (43:8-13); only Yahweh can save. For Israel's sake, Yahweh the "redeemer" will send to Babylon and break down the bars (43:14-15). Moreover, Yahweh, who once led Israel through the sea, will create a new Exodus (43:16-21).[26] The "former things" are not to be remembered; there is exhortation to focus on the new (43:18-19). This new Exodus and release from Babylon, accomplished on the one hand for Israel's sake (43:14), is nonetheless done for a people who have been created for *Yahweh's* sake: "that they might declare my praise" (43:21).

Israel, however, has not "called" upon Yahweh (43:22-28), the God who had "called" them by name (43:1). Yet Yahweh nonetheless blots out their sin (43:25). Is Yahweh not demonstrating the rightness of the divine case? Can Israel prove otherwise? Let Israel argue its case; let Israel and Yahweh conduct legal disputa-

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24 Melugin, *op. cit.*, 122.

25 *Ibid.*, 106-114, 122.

26 Westermann, *Isaiah 40-66*, 126-29.

tion (43:26).[27] Yahweh's case is that Israel's "former father" sinned and that, because of this, Israel has been punished. Punishment is not, however, the last word. "Now" (44:1) Yahweh, who blots out Israel's sin (43:25), promises to restore (44:1-5). Yahweh the creator will moisten the dry ground and will pour out spirit on Israel's offspring so that they will multiply like plants showered with water (44:3-4), with the result that Yahweh's name will be well known as they multiply in the land and call themselves by Yahweh's name (44:5). If one surveys the entire compositional unit up to this point, one recognizes that those who worship idols will fail (42:17), for the new Exodus will result in so many of Israel's offspring calling themselves by *Yahweh's* name that idolatry cannot possibly prosper.

This compositional unit, having opened with a proclamation of judgment against idolaters (42:17), addresses the topic once more (44:6-8, 9-20). Once again a trial speech[28] makes the claim that only Yahweh has spoken the "new things" from of old (44:8); once again Israel is said to be Yahweh's witnesses (44:8; cf. 43:10). And ridicule is heaped upon the making and worship of idols (44:9-20).

Finally the compositional unit comes to a close (44:21-22). Building upon a verb used elsewhere, Israel is exhorted to "remember" (44:21; cf. 43:18, 25, 26). They are to "remember" because they are Yahweh's *servant*, because they will not be forgotten by Yahweh, because Yahweh has "blotted out" their sin. They should therefore "return," for Yahweh has "redeemed" them. Isa 42:14-44:23, having announced again and again that Yahweh has redeemed sinful Israel, exhorts the servant to repent. Disobedient, potentially idol-worshipping Israel, doubtful that Yahweh is truly God, is redeemed and summoned as Yahweh's witnesses to "prove" that Yahweh is God. Therefore, heavens, earth, mountains, and forest can be called to rejoice (44:23). Yahweh has not only "redeemed" Jacob but will be "glorified" in Israel (cf. 40:5; 42:8).

E. *Isa 44:24–48:22*. This compositional unit opens with a series of subunits which focus on Cyrus as Yahweh's agent to deliver Israel (44:24-45:13) and closes with a command to leave Babylon (48:20-22). The themes of deliverance through Cyrus (44:24-45:13; 48:12-15) and the fall of Babylon (chap. 47), together with the confession by the defeated nations that Yahweh alone is God (45:14-17), shape Isa 44:28-48:22 in a significant way. The trial between Yahweh and the gods (45:18-21; 48:12-15) and the motif of Israel's disobedience (46:8, 12; 48:1-11, 17-19) also contribute to the compositional unit. The theme of the commissioning of Yahweh's servant is largely absent from 44:24-48:22, although Israel is twice said to be "called" (48:1,12) and is twice designated as Yahweh's servant (45:4; 48:20). Yet, near the end of the compositional unit, someone steps forward and declares, "now the lord Yahweh has sent me and his spirit" (48:16). Should we conclude, with Seitz, that the one who speaks here is Yahweh's commissioned servant who is also to be identified as the speaker in Isa 49:1-6? Should we agree also that Isa 40-48 has been preparing the way for this person to speak out and take responsibility as the one whom Yahweh has commissioned?

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[27] Begrich, *Studien zu Deuterojesaja*, 18, 24-26; Westermann, *Isaiah 40-66*, 130-33; Melugin, *op. cit.*, 48-50. See also H. J. Boecker, *Redeformen des Rechtslebens in Alten Testament* (WMANT 14; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1964), 48-56.

[28] Begrich, *Studien zu Deuterojesaja*, 18-19; Westermann, *Isaiah 40-66*, 138-42; Melugin, *op. cit.*, 62.

I have argued that Isa 41:1-42:13 builds upon Isa 40:1-8 by emphasizing Israel as Yahweh's commissioned servant (42:1-9). Moreover, a two-sided portrayal of Israel as recipient (41:8-20) and giver (42:1-9) of salvation in 41:1-42:13 corresponds with the double mission of the servant in 49:1-6. I have also contended that Isa 42:14-44:23 develops the servant theme by focusing on Israel as Yahweh's witnesses, even though the *task* of Yahweh's servant is not the primary emphasis of 42:14-44:23. Now we must turn to 44:24-48:22 to examine its relationship with its larger context.

Isa 44:24-48:22 begins with speeches associated with the commissioning of Cyrus as Yahweh's "anointed."[29] It is clear that Cyrus is commissioned for Israel's sake. Isa 45:1-7 says explicitly that Yahweh chose Cyrus for the sake of Israel (45:4), though he is also elected so that all people from east to west might know there is no god but Yahweh (45:6). The double purpose in the commissioning of Cyrus—the restoration of Israel and the universal recognition of Yahweh as God—corresponds to the dual mission of the servant in Isa 41:1-42:12 and 49:1-6. Thus Isa 44:24-48:22, dominated as it is by a focus on Cyrus (44:24-45:13; 46:10-11; 48:12-15), contributes to the comprehensive picture of Yahweh's commissioning activity and its double purpose as it unfolds in Isa 40-48 from its beginning in 40:1-8 and its culmination in 49:1-6.

After the commissioning of Cyrus (45:1-7) and a closing hymn (v. 8), we encounter a disputation against those who question Yahweh about Cyrus as God's instrument for freeing the exiles (vv.9-13). Indeed, the need to persuade is apparent throughout this compositional unit in disputation and trial speeches (45:18-21; 46:5-11; 48:1-11, 12-15).[30] Much of the language of persuasion appears in connection with the confession of the nations that Yahweh alone is God (45:14, 24) and with the contrast between Yahweh who carries and saves and the idols who must be carried by others and therefore cannot save (45:20; 46:1-4). The commission in the heavenly council, to the servant, and to Cyrus regarding the deliverance of Israel (40:1-2, 41:8-20; 45:1-4) and the nations' recognition of Yahweh and their receipt of light and torah (40:5; 42:4, 6; 45:6) come to fruition in the duality of the Gentiles' confession of Israel and the promise of Israel's salvation (45:14 and 17; 45:22-24 and 25).

Isa 44:24-48:22 culminates in several speeches to sinful Israel (48:1-11, 12-15, 16, 17-19). Jacob, "called" by the name Israel and by the name of the holy city (48:1-2), was told of the "former things" *before* they came to pass lest they should claim, "my idol did them" (48:3-5). The "new things" are announced only *now* lest Israel defiantly contend that they knew them already (48:6-8). Yahweh acts on Israel's behalf for the deity's own sake (48:9,11), that the glory of Yahweh not be given to another god (48:11; cf. 42:8). The trial speech in 48:12-15 involves a summons to Jacob-Israel, who have been "called" to hear the case. The divine "call" which created heavens and earth (48:13) is said to be expressed also in the word which has "called" Cyrus (48:15), through whom the divine "purpose" will be accomplished (48:14).

Once again the audience is called to hear: "Draw near to me, hear this" (48:16; cf. vv.1, 12, 14). And, as argued elsewhere (45:19), Yahweh seeks to elicit confidence in the divine word by claiming that even from the beginning God had never spoken in secret (48:16). But v. 16 closes with a *human* voice which says,

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29 Westermann, *Isaiah 40-66*, 152-62; Melugin, *op. cit.*, 123-24.

30 M. Sweeney, *Isaiah 1-4 and the Post-Exilic Understanding of the Isaianic Tradition* (BZAW 171; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), 78-81.

"and now the lord Yahweh has sent me and his spirit." Who *is* this human voice? The same commissioned servant who speaks in 49:1-6? A comparison with analogous speeches in Zechariah (Zech 2:13, 15; 4:9; 6:15) might lead us to view the human speaker in Isa 48:16 as the prophet who authored most of the literature in Isa 40-48 instead of the servant Israel who speaks in 49:1-6.[31] The apparent identification of "former things" and "new things" with Yahweh's *word* might give additional support to the contention that the human speaker in Isa 48:16b represents the words of an exilic prophet who prophesied the "new things" in Isa 40-48. Still, in Isa 49:1-6, the reference to the *mouth* of the servant Israel (v. 2) hints at a prophet-like commission for *Israel*.[32] Moreover, in 50:4-11, the servant has a "voice" which is heard by some but not by others (50:10). Does this mean, as I have suggested elsewhere, that the servant Israel and the prophetic speaker of the "new things" cannot be clearly distinguished?[33] Can the prophetic message of Isa 40-48, which a human is sent to deliver (48:16b), be so completely identified with the mission of the servant Israel that no individual prophet is clearly recognizable? Or have we a "corporate person" whose prophetic word embodies Israel and its mission?[34] Although Seitz correctly plays down the text's portrayal of an individual prophet, does the text's preoccupation with the call of Israel the servant *completely* blot out *any* attention to a prophet who is portrayed as both individual and as Israel?

## III

This essay has attempted to show that Isa 40-48 does indeed concern itself centrally with commissioning. Not only does the text begin with commissioning language (40:1-8), but chaps. 40-48 are closed by a speech of the servant which narrates that servant's dual commission to restore Israel and to serve as a light to the nations (49:1-6). Moreover, I argued, the structure of Isa 40-48 as a whole reflects Yahweh's purpose that Israel might be delivered and that the nations might be given light and come to know Yahweh as God—through Yahweh's commissioned servant Israel and through Cyrus.

This essay also supports the contention of Seitz that the commissioning in Isa 40:1-8 has to do with the reactivating of Yahweh's word for a new age rather than the commissioning of an individual prophet. To conclude that the text of Isa 40ff. portrays *nothing* of the ministry of an "individual" prophet may, however, overstate the case. Passages such as Isa 48:16 and 50:4-11 cannot be easily accounted for without presupposing textual interest in some kind of prophetic ministry of speaking and hearing in a context in which some obey the speaker's voice and some do not. Precisely how this hint of an "individual" prophetic call is related to the commissioning of the servant Israel deserves further study. However strongly one argues that Isa 40ff. were shaped as a sequel to Isa 1-39, one must nonetheless consider the possibility that the portrayal of an "individual" prophetic voice is somehow a part of the concern of Isaiah 40ff.

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31 Melugin, *op. cit.*, 138.

32 Westermann, *Isaiah 40-66*, 208, but see Melugin, *op. cit.*, 75.

33 Melugin, *op. cit.*, 153-155.

34 O. Eissfeldt, *ExpT* 44 (1932-33), 261-68; H. W. Robinson, *The Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality* (BZAW 66; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1936), 48-62.

# Indicators of Social Organization and Status in Matthew's Gospel

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We begin with the problem. Pheme Perkins reminds us of the fundamental starting point for social-historical reconstruction from the First Gospel:

> Suppose we begin instead from the fact that Matthew has not composed either a community rule or an interpretation of a prophetic text. Matthew has presented us with a narrative work. (2)[1]

> Finally, there remains an unresolved question of method that might be put to all of our discussions thus far. What weight ought to be given to the literary composition of Matthew? . . . Matthew has created an "implied author" and "implied audience" whose respectable opposition to Pharisaic excesses could deceive no one but the *ethnē*. (7)

We must take seriously Perkins's admonition and begin our discussion of social-historical reconstruction of the community of the First Gospel with the frank admission that we gain access to that community only through a text designed for an unknown empirical audience by an unknown empirical author. When it comes to community reconstruction, classicists have the profound advantage over biblical scholars in knowing the author, date, and original place of performance of many Greek comedies and tragedies. They can say with fair reliability how *The Bacchae* played to an Athenian audience of the fifth century.[2] We cannot, especially for Matthew, do the same.

The purposes of this paper are more limited in scope than the reconstruction of the community of the First Gospel; rather it examines only the indicators of social status and organization found in the emplotment of the First Gospel and suggests what influence their detection might have on future research into the interpretation of the First Gospel and the reconstruction of the empirical worlds that produced it. But before engaging the text of the First Gospel directly, let us clarify the method that informs our work for this paper.

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[1] I am indebted to Marshall D. Johnson, Editorial Director of Fortress Press, for making available to me the essays by Antoinette Wire, with response by Pheme Perkins, and by Alan Segal prior to their publication in August 1991 in the volume entitled *Social History of the Matthean Community*, ed. David Balch. Unfortunately, the page references are to the manuscripts, which may make cross-referencing to the published volume difficult.

[2] See for example the essays in Winkler and Zeitlin, and Euben.

## Method

The paper adopts no specific "school" or "methodology." But, because the problem is both textual and social-historical, methods derived both from the study of texts and the study of human culture are appropriate. The volumes listed at the end of the paper provide an index of the major influences on the work.

### *The Three Cultural Worlds Evidenced by a Text*

Aristotle perceptively describes the process of communication in narrative; most modern literary theories remain in his debt. Aristotle in the *Poetics* implies that the process of *mimesis* (representation of action or organization of events) involves a dynamism between the culture out of which the text is created and in which the text is performed (1448a1, 1449b32-1450a10, 1450b3; Ricouer: 34, 46). An author constructs a text which then deploys itself by performance through reading, hearing, seeing to an audience. Therefore, "the act of reading . . . is the final indicator of the refiguring of the world of action under the sign of the plot" (Ricouer:77). Such a process implies that in any text that contains an identifiable plot, three cultural worlds are in evidence, using the term "cultural world" in the sense of cultural anthropology (Geertz): the empirical author's, the text's, and the empirical audience's.[3] But unlike Aristotle, whose *Poetics* approach the problem of the production of text, we enter the evaluation of the First Gospel through the textual world after it has been disjoined from both its empirical author and intended empirical audience. 1. We encounter upon the performance of the text a unique cultural world with its own cultural dimensions and values. 2. This "textual linear manifestation" (Eco:45) implies, on the one side, an empirical author, or authors, with a discrete cultural world, who created the text. 3. On the other side, the text presents itself and its "emplotted" culture to an empirical audience for whom it was designed. The text may therefore contain evidence of the perception of the empirical author about the empirical and intended audience. Let us look more carefully at each of these cultural worlds.

1. *The Cultural World of the Text*

The creation of a plot gives a text its own cultural world because:

> The unity of a plot does not consist, as some suppose, in its having one man as its subject. An infinity of things befall that one man, some of which it is impossible to reduce to unity; and in like manner there are many actions of one man which cannot be made to form one action. . . . The truth is that, just as in the other imitative arts one imitation is always of one thing, so in poetry the story, as an imitation of action, must represent one action, a complete whole, with its several incidents so closely connected that the transposition or withdrawal of any one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole. For that which makes no perceptible difference by its presence or absence is no real part of the whole. (Aristotle, *Poet.* 1451a16-35)[4]

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[3] Rabinowitz (1977, 1987) contributes the basic theory of audiences adopted here. Modifications to his theory become apparent both in the theory and the interpretation which follows.

[4] All translations of Aristotle are from Barnes.

Therefore, the emplotment of a story differs from empirical history in that it limits the "infinity of things" present in historical sequence. Among those infinity of things may well be issues of social organization and status in which we are interested. The text of the First Gospel contains, therefore, only a selection of things from the life of Jesus. The purpose of plot is not the mere recounting of episode but the exposure of causality and therefore, the universal.

> Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars. By universal statement I mean one as to what such or such a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do—which is the aim of poetry, . . . . (1451b5-9)

First, a plot carries with it a new insight into the structure of reality.

> The universals a plot engenders are not Platonic ideas. They are universals related to practical wisdom, hence to ethics and politics. A plot engenders such universals when the structure of its action rests on the connections internal to the action and not on external accidents." (Ricouer:41; cf. *Poet.* 1451b33-35, 1452a4; 1451b27-32)

Second, by reference to characters in the same context as the discussion of universals we have a clue as to how the character "Jesus" may be read in the First Gospel. Aristotle makes four main points with regard to characters (1454a16-26): (1) they shall be good; (2) they shall be appropriate; (3) they shall have verisimilitude; (4) they shall be consistent with their own behavior throughout the plot. Characters carry the values of the text through their "emplotment" (Ricouer:46-59, 64)

2. *The Cultural World of the Empirical Author*

> Poets find not only an implicit categorization of the practical field in their cultural stock but also a first narrative organization [*mise en forme*] of this field. (Ricouer:47)

In the case of the First Gospel the world of the empirical author includes, but is not limited to, the traditions, oral and written, incorporated by the author into the text, each with their own discrete cultural worlds. New Testament scholarship investigates these worlds by means of source, and form criticism. The world of the empirical author also includes among other things the author's distinctive viewpoints. The method of redaction criticism focuses on this world. In the main traditional historical criticism has as its object the recovery of the empirical author and the culture from which the empirical author derives the material included in the First Gospel. This paper does not directly concern itself with the empirical author.

3. *The Cultural World of the Intended Empirical Audience*

The third cultural world forms the boundary of performance with the cultural world of the text. It constitutes one side of the process ". . . by which a work lifts itself above the opaque depths of living, acting, suffering, to be given by an author to readers who receive it and thereby change their acting" (Ricoeur:53). We as interpreters and historians reconstruct at least a minimal audience for the first Gospel and refer to them as "original audience," "original readers," or "Matthew's community." Such constructions, while important theoretically, also

become a control on possible interpretations of the text. We should remember that our only access to the audience presupposed by the text is through the act of reading by which we, as empirical readers never presupposed by the text, seek to become an ideal "textual" audience. It is yet another move of historical imagination to attempt to reconstruct from the textual audience the empirical original reader. We are stuck in an eternal loop between the text and its audience. Based upon this perception I will refer to the text and the textual audience, then seek to describe specific possible empirical audiences as we proceed.

The text extends or deploys its culture to an audience in the act of performance (Ricouer:50). This performance to an audience constitutes one boundary between poetics and politics (Ricouer:47) Naturally and most importantly for our purposes the extension of a text to an audience carries with it indications of social organization and status whether or not it is the explicit intent of the poet/author to do so. Therefore, the text has more evidence about its cultural world and communicates more to the audience than even the empirical author might have been able to describe.

And so we must theorize, however briefly, about the means by which a text deploys itself and with it its culture to an empirical audience. This it does by "asking" the empirical audience to join the textual audience, the audience for which it is ideally designed and who is theoretically capable of noting and appreciating the entirety of its rhetorical choices embodied in its syntax, organization, and grammar. It is the audience who knows everything that the text presents in its emplotment. It is the audience who attempts to read according to the intent of the text. By postulating the axis text—textual audience rather than an author—authorial audience (Rabinowitz, 1987:22) we recognize that our interest lies in the communication of text to audience. We also clearly disjoin literary criticism of the First Gospel from any attempt to understand the text as an extension of the "private psyche" of an author. Rather we emphasize the ability of the text to construct for itself an interpretative social community which may or may not conform to the intent of any author, implied or empirical. At the same time, the textual audience may never conform to any empirical manifestation of audience or social system. Nevertheless, the two audiences may not be thoroughly disjoined, otherwise communication becomes impossible. Communication requires preconceptions.

### *Genre*

The problem of the interpretation of any text always is context (Talbert: 54). The genre of a text functions in interaction with the presuppositions about that genre carried to the text by the empirical audience that are part of its cultural world. The empirical audience can only successfully join the textual audience if both textual audience and empirical audience share certain assumptions about the function of the text. Genre predisposes the empirical audience toward the textual world. We may, therefore, presume that the First Gospel was directly tied to the cultural world in which it was produced if for no other reason than that it interacted with the presumptions of its original empirical audience mediated to that audience by its collective history which included social status. These observations apply no less to the modern empirical audiences of the First Gospel.

Therefore, the First Gospel by its narrative deployment joins within a cultural system called genre that carries with it certain preconceptions about reading (Rabinowitz, 1987; Talbert). Genre may be defined ". . . in the sense of a literary grouping tied to a particular time, place, and cultural milieu" (Talbert:54). Within

the available genres, it appears that almost any first century Mediterranean audience would regard the First Gospel as a biography and would understand its primary concern "to depict the essence of a significant person" (Talbert:59). Hence, an ancient Mediterranean audience shares with Aristotle the preconception that it is the purpose of biography, as it is the purpose of tragedy, not to recount episode or historical detail, but in some sense to lay bare essence or truth and thereby to change, augment, or support the presuppositions about action in the world. In his conclusion on the purpose of tragedy as depicted in *Poetics*, Stephen G. Salkever writes:

> As we have seen, for Aristotle a *paideia* relative to the goals of the regime (*politeia*) is the best way of disposing any group of citizens to participate in the way of life or order that characterizes that regime; tragedy is the most effective *paideia* appropriate to the best democracy. (301)

Salkever's insight applies as well to the First Gospel, perhaps rephrased in this way: for the First Gospel a *paideia* relative to the goals of the kingdom of heaven is the best way of disposing any group of children of the kingdom to participate in the way of life or order that characterizes that kingdom; biography is the most effective *paideia* appropriate to the best *ekklēsia*. What follows examines a bit of that *paideia* with regard to social organization and status deployed by the First Gospel and then raises questions about the possible relationships between textual world and empirical world in which it was originally performed. Can we responsibly reconstruct an original empirical audience, i.e., the Matthean community, from the narrative of the First Gospel?

We may conclude these preliminary observations by noting that there is a cultural world shared by empirical audience and author that is transformed and shaped by the text itself, which has its own cultural world or horizon. If we want to know about the cultural world of the empirical audience of the empirical author of the First Gospel, then we can only infer its culture by the evidence of the cultural world of the text. The problem is not simply that a text belongs to a horizon, or social world or that:

> What one reads in the text is inevitably a product of that social world and the developments within it. The text itself reflects many of the social dynamics and developments which are acting upon the people behind the text. (Overman, 1989:6)

The problem is more complex: the text of the First Gospel reflects and transforms many of the social dynamics acting upon the people behind *and in front of* the text as the subjects or audience of the text's rhetorics. Taking our cue from Aristotle, we will investigate the First Gospel with special attention to characters and their depiction in the plot for clues to the textual audience's evaluation of the universals that constitute their world.

## Social Status in the Greco-Roman World

Our remarks on genre bring us to the boundary between textual world and the world of historical reconstruction. Moses Finley draws attention to the complex problem of social status in the ancient Mediterranean world with particular emphasis on evidence drawn from Hellenistic and Roman sources. Class as a conceptuality or category for analysis does not fit the evidence of ancient thinking and remains too elusive and general a category in contemporary social theory

to be analytically relevant (50-51). We can detect within the ancient Mediterranean social structure, however, *ordines* (orders or estates),

> . . . a juridically defined group within a population, possessing formalized privileges and disabilities in one or more fields of activity, governmental, military, legal, economic, religious, marital, and *standing in a hierarchical relation to other orders*. (45; italics original)

Such a conceptuality works as well for classical Athens as it does for imperial Rome. We may presuppose that the Mediterranean world under Roman rule consisted of the following orders: senatorial aristocracy, equestrian, provincial city elites, plebs or citizens, freedmen, and slaves (Meeks:53; Gager:96-106). In addition other factors such as public offices or honors, ethnic origin (in the ancient Mediterranean world this category could mean city or country of origin), personal liberty, wealth, occupation, age, and sex establish status (Meeks:55). Status categories ultimately intersect and modify each other, thereby making the attitudes of any particular social group difficult to predict (Finley:51). Or as Wayne Meeks says with regard to status inconsistencies among the mobile non-elite:

> Depending on the number of categories in conflict, the relative importance of those categories in widely held attitudes, the distance traversed in each category from one level to the next, and so on, such a criss-crossing produces feelings and reactions of varying power, both within the mobile person or group and in others, especially actual or potential competitors. (23)

Such feelings result in shifts in religious expression, both individual and institutional (Meeks:23). We must remember that these categories are measures of general societal patterns; they may not be predictive of the opinions or predilections of specific individuals or groups:

> Neither in Cicero's Rome nor in any other complex society did all men behave according to the accepted canons. One is driven to repeat such a platitude because of the prevalence of argument by exception. (Finley:52)

Ultimately status indicators in any culture are rooted in perceptions of exchanges of power. In the patriarchal structure of the ancient Mediterranean world such exchanges are dominated by the control of males of higher status. In any given status category, and frequently across categories, adult males command the center of power. The First Gospel accepts this phallocentricity and then subverts it by emplotment.

A survey of the characters developed in the episodes reported in the First Gospel shows the presence of representatives of status that generally parallel the *ordines* evident in early imperial society. In order of power they are:

> Urban Elites—Herod the King, Archelaus, Herod the Tetrarch, Herodias, the daughter of Herodias, the chief priests and scribes/elders of the people, Pilate and his wife;
>
> The Free of the Cities—all others, except;

Slaves—the centurion's boy[5], the slave of the high priest, two slave/servant girls in the courtyard of the high priest.

In addition, the textual world differentiates according to ethnicity, wealth, sex, age, and health particularly among the free of the cities. In the case of the text of the First Gospel as well as the Pauline churches, "The extreme top and bottom of the Greco-Roman social scale are missing from the picture" (Meeks:73).

## Plot, Characters, and the Genre of First Gospel

Jack Kingsbury's three-part division of the First Gospel calls attention to the act of unified textual performance for the textual audience (1988). In order to appreciate the cultural world of the text fully we must dispense with outlines all together. Outlines necessarily further the tendency to read only parts of the text, in isolation from the whole. This tendency, when manifested in the analysis of the cultural world of the empirical author, results in bizarre and often contradictory results even within the work of a single critic.[6] The point of view that biography presupposes such a strategy for the ancient Mediterranean audience lacks evidence. The empirical audience, however, may be predisposed to note plot, characters, and genre. The text depends on such an ability from its textual audience, as the following investigation shows.

The text of the First Gospel contains emplotment and characterization that creates ironic tension between the normal status categories predictable for an ancient Mediterranean audience and the status categories of the textual audience. In other words, the empirical audience experiences ironic tension as it joins the textual audience. Irony frequently is employed as the strategy of the oppressed for the preservation of their integrity against an overwhelming power structure. It aids in constituting an alternative world that remains hidden from those in power, for when it becomes apparent, it leads to revolution or co-optation and the usually concomitant destruction of the identity of the oppressed group. This hypothesis, if it proves to have merit, accounts for the heightening of the marginality of foreigners, women, the ill, and children in the text of Matthew while at the same time proclaiming the elimination of all marginality as the effect of the kingdom of heaven. Obviously a full demonstration of the hypothesis lies outside the confines of the present paper. Here, let us sketch those episodes that give initial evidence for the hypothesis. Using Aristotle as a guide, the investigation focuses on plot, characters, and genre.

### *Plot and Characters*

Within the elements of plot and characters the First Gospel confronts the preconceptions of the empirical audience with the text's own original contributions. Character depends on appropriateness. Appropriateness is constructed for the textual audience by the arrangement of episodes within the whole. One way in which the First Gospel constructs appropriateness for the textual audience is by

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[5] Unless one accepts the suggestion by Levine that the *pais* is the centurion's son (108). The evidence seems to me meager and I have preferred here the more usual designation in the New Testament.

[6] Günther Bornkamm's work illustrates the problem of disjoining episode from plot for the sake of historical reconstruction. He arrives at at least three different social configurations for the Matthean community (1954, 1963, 1968, 1971; see discussion in Meier:9-13 and Humphries-Brooks, 1987:21-22).

the juxtaposition of characters of various statuses within episodes or between episodes in closely associated contexts. What effect does such juxtaposition have on the *paedeia*?

The text of the First Gospel accomplishes the destruction of the status assumptions of patriarchy by interweaving episodes into plot whereby characters with lower status displace those of a higher status in the consciousness of the textual audience as the more dependable witnesses to and members of the kingdom of heaven and its earthly manifestation, the *ekklēsia*.

*Powerful Urban Elite*

The strategy becomes almost immediately apparent when we consider the episodes that contain characters drawn from the urban elite. In Matt 2:1-18 Herod the king and the "chief priests and scribes of the people" are presented as characters who are ethnically from Jerusalem, who have high status as regards public office, and who are opposed to the birth of "the child who has been born king of the Jews" (v. 2). Their audience knows of their concern by the alignment of Herod's fear with that of all of Jerusalem (v. 3). They are clearly male and they exercise their power, and the power of their fear, by the murder of "all the children" (v. 16) in and around Bethlehem. Children here are shown at the mercy of a phallocentric regime. The narrative juxtaposition of statuses clearly makes the point that children in the world of the power elite have no status. Similarly, when the text mentions Archelaus as ruling over Judea a few episodes later at 2:22, the textual audience imputes to him the same murderous intentions against Jesus as his father and realizes the wisdom of Joseph's emigration to Nazareth.

The text confirms this evaluation at 4:8-9 by aligning the urban elite with Satan who owns the "kingdoms of the world." The depiction of the urban elite in the text remains consistent throughout the Gospel from 2:1 onward. They are both in conflict with the legitimate claims of Jesus to royal status through adoption by his earthly father Joseph and they are at war with the kingdom of heaven that arrives in the proclamation of Jesus. The textual audience recognizes in the characters who belong to the highest *ordines* that a two-level drama is being worked out in the text: the particular and the universal. The textual audience sees the universal world of conflict between the kingdoms of the world ruled by Satan and the kingdom of heaven arriving in the work and person of Jesus as present under the episodes of history through linear biography.

Those episodes in the plot that are concerned with the provincial or city elite continue the pattern begun in the Birth Narrative. Herod the Tetrarch in conjunction with Herodias, his wife, is shown to be responsible for the death of John the Baptist (14:1-12). John, of lower status, previously was depicted as a religious figure in the wilderness with little to no property (3:1-6). Of special interest is Herodias' daughter. She is unnamed, a motif used throughout the First Gospel for characters who have no power relative to others in the immediate episode. Her age is also unspecified. She is both an object of her stepfather's lust and the means of accomplishing Herodias' murderous intent. The text deftly exposes the stupidity of phallocentricity and its false valuing of personal status by showing Herod acquiescing to her unjust request so as to preserve his personal power in the eyes of those (men?) assembled.

Finally, "Pilate the Governor" who, along with his wife, is the only character in the Gospel from the ranks of the Roman urban elite, confronts us (27:15-23). His disregard of his wife's warning merits attention. The wife of Pilate functions as a reminder to the textual audience of the innocence of Jesus. She alone of all

the characters defends the innocence of Jesus at his trial. She bases her intervention on a dream; the only other dreams recounted in the text are to Joseph in Matt 2 and they are revelatory of divine will. The woman reveals the truth that Pilate refuses to act upon. The character of higher status is shown to be at best cowardly, at most murderous, while the woman of lower status is shown to be aware of divine will, of the truth.

*The Free of the Cities*

This order describes best the majority of characters in the narrative portion of the First Gospel. Differentiation between various characters within the plot occurs by reference, implicit or explicit, to the status indicators of ethnicity, wealth, sex, age, and health.

In addition to the question of the use of status indicators in the textual world, we are also interested in the depiction of social organization in the context of status relationships. Therefore, we shall concentrate upon the characterization of Pharisees and disciples, two groups who occupy much scholarly discussion about the organization of the Matthean community (e.g., Kingsbury, 1988; Overman, 1990; Wilkens).

The Pharisees

The text designates the Pharisees as of high status with regard to public religious office. Although the first reference to "their synagogues" is unclear at 4:23, the situation is clarified by 9:35 that the synagogues belong to the Pharisees. Jesus undermines their religious authority, culminating in his diatribe of Matt 23 which, despite the ironic disclaimer of 23:2, condemns them not only as hypocrites and blind guides, but also murderers of the prophets. Such behavior aligns them specifically with the earlier activity of Herod the Tetrarch and the text follows up on this latent association by explicitly aligning them against Jesus with "the Herodians" (22:15-22). Anything or any one associated with the male elite of the city of Jerusalem in the narrative may be considered by the end of narrative as confined within the kingdoms of the world that belong to the Satan. The text confines the Pharisees by associating them with the social status and behavior of the elite. While their public power is enhanced by their association with the elite of Jerusalem (15:1; 21:45-46; 22:15-20; 22:34-45), their religious authority is destroyed vis-a-vis the ultimate reality of the kingdom of heaven by Jesus.

The text mentions few other indicators of social status. The Pharisees are Israelite. Geographically, while they are found in Galilee and at the Jordan, the text exclusively associates them with Jerusalem by the end of the narrative, probably as part of the motif identified above. They manifest mobility and freedom equal to that of Jesus and his disciples; they appear to circulate within the same social circles and share many of the same status assumptions as the disciples. They are healthy, male, adults.

Disciples

The disciples are shown by the text to displace the Pharisees as the dependable public religious authorities (Kingsbury, 1988:129-145; Overman, 1990:127-128; Wilkins). The *ekklēsia* functions as the institutional equivalent to the synagogue, designated by Jesus at 16:18 as "my *ekklēsia*"; the opposition to "their synagogues" makes this clear not only linguistically but also organizationally. The internal organization of the *ekklēsia* is to be different and to involve none of

the traditional synagogue titles (18; 23:8-10). To Peter first, and then to all of the disciples, is given the power of interpretation and adjudication (16:19; 18:18). To the eleven, is given the community-founding commission with the sign of proselyte baptism (28:16-20); the textual audience does not miss the comparison to the proselytization carried on by the Pharisees (23:15). In short, the disciples are designated by the text as those who occupy the same social status depicted for the Pharisees in the synagogues of the world, but transferred with distinctions to the *ekklēsia* of the kingdom of heaven. They will in the eschatological assizes adopt the status of the powerful elite, i.e., they will become the judges of Israel (19:28). The disciples will be assimilated to the position of patriarchal authority currently occupied by the chief priests and scribes/elders of the people.

As to ethnicity, the disciples are clearly Israelite. Where there is specific information they are associated with the cities outside of Jerusalem, particularly Galilee (Kingsbury, 1988:152). Geographically, they return to their Galilean homeland to meet the resurrected Jesus. As to wealth, the only explicit designation comes in reference to Joseph of Arimathea who is not one of the twelve nor is he designated by the noun "disciple." To the textual audience he appears as a conclusion to the discussion held by Jesus and the disciples on the occasion of the one other character designated according to relative wealth, the "young man" of Matt 19:16-26. The discussion that takes place between Peter and Jesus points out that Peter and the others have given up everything for Jesus, therefore, they had something to give up. What Jesus describes are exactly the possessions of a free householder. The statement confirms the earlier depictions of disciples and Jesus as free householders (4:12-13, 18-22; 8:14). The textual audience learns that wealth is no barrier to discipleship. The textual audience finds out that the abandonment of wealth does not give one special status in the kingdom of heaven. The disciples display a high degree of personal mobility and freedom. Like the Pharisees, their counterparts, they are healthy, adult, males..

If the text stopped here, then we would be compelled to conclude:

> If the actual reader uncritically adopts the patriarchal worldview represented by the narrator and Jesus, she assumes a worldview which abridges the full humanity of female and male. The reading experience is destructive. (Anderson:23)

The text, however, in its narrative arrangement of episodes constructs a critical textual audience that evaluates characters not only from the perspective of Jesus and the narrator but from a perspective within the kingdom of heaven, which is under the control of neither Jesus nor the narrator. Therefore, I would amend the insight of Janice Capel Anderson (23) and argue that the textual audience learns to evaluate characters *including Jesus* against ordinary status markers and thereby receive its status within the kingdom of heaven. Consider briefly two portions of narrative: Matt 8:1-20:29; Matt 26:1-28:20.

Matt 8:1-20:29

The narrative sections from Matt 8:1-20:29 contain emplotment of episodes that draw a sharp distinction between the disciples and those of lower status markers including those who are inferior as to ethnicity, sex, health, and age (cf. Levine:6). The text makes this manifest in one way by refusing them names. The consistent pattern is for the text to indicate that the position of those inferior in social status is preferable to that adopted by the disciples. The disciples by com-

parison have "little faith," "doubt," or are preoccupied with their place and status within the kingdom of heaven.

*Matt 8:1-12:50.* This section establishes the pattern for the textual audience. The faith of the supplicants is explicitly mentioned in the episodes of centurion (8:10-13),[7] the paralytic's friends (9:2), the woman with the hemorrhage (9:22), two blind men (9:29); it is implied in the story of the leper (8:2). The centurion is a foreigner and a Roman soldier and the text directly comments on these facts. There is one woman. In no wise are they comparable in normal status indicators to either the Pharisees or to the disciples.

In the middle of this episodic arrangement the text presents the stilling of the storm (8:23-27). Unlike the supplicants mentioned above, the disciples do not emerge from the crowd of uncertain social status. Like the leper and the centurion they address Jesus as "Lord." But unlike them, Jesus perceives in the actions "little faith" (v. 26). The textual audience learns from the plot not that faith has no regard for social status, but that faith is to be found in great measure among those with none. The faith of the disciples is not to be trusted. The text depicts Jesus as discovering faith in the words and actions of other characters.

*Matt 14-20.* A second set of episodes bears out this pattern and further educates the textual audience as to how to regard the disciples in relationship to lower status groups. Matt 14-20 contrasts the disciples, especially Peter, with women and children. Matt 14:28-33 singles out Peter, "You of little faith, why did you doubt?" (v. 31). The character Jesus perceives this from Peter's action. By contrast the story of the Canaanite woman shows that Jesus as a character can initially be blinded by social status himself. He comments directly on the woman's utter lack of any status whatever by designating her as a dog (v. 26), only to be made aware, by deft argument, of the faith of a non-Israelite woman. The woman here proves to be a better theologian than Jesus, illustrating her utter abasement and need by willingly identifying herself as the crumb-lapping dog and implicitly recognizing God, in Jesus, as her master. I would read the plural *tōn kyriōn* in v. 27 as a reference back to the confessional *kyrie* of the same sentence. This confession is what prompts Jesus' recognition of the woman's faith, not, her "conformity to the heavenly plan of salvation history" (Levine:152).[8] Has Jesus learned something here? Does revelation come in the faith given to those of no status?

We move with the textual audience to the episodes of Matt 16:13-23. We should first of all be mindful that prior to this scene the disciples as a group are shown by the text to lack understanding (16:5-12), an attribute to be expected of those to whom the keys of the kingdom will be given. We have already referred to Matt 16:13-20 above and there we made the patriarchal error of reading episode disjoined from its context. Peter, who is the rock, who keeps the keys, who is given the formal authority of a new "rabbinate," is described as "Satan" by Jesus. He is placed in the same position as the power elite (cf. 4:10). Has Jesus,

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[7] See the carefully nuanced redactional analysis by Levine:107-130.

[8] Levine's discussion of this episode depends to a large extent on evidence derived from a redactional analysis of the text by comparison with Mark. While such a procedure may tell us much about the empirical author, it is precluded by our current interest in the textual audience, who is nowhere shown by the text to know the Gospel of Mark.

from the viewpoint of the textual audience made a mistake parallel to that he made with the Canaanite woman? Approving of Peter's theological proclamation did Jesus give away the institutional hierarchy of his *ekklēsia* only to realize almost immediately that such a gift placed the *ekklēsia* and Peter in jeopardy? It is important to consider the answers to these questions in light of the fact that the careful instruction about non-hierarchical community organization comes *after* this episode. The instruction of Matt 18; 23:10-12 is rendered necessary to the plot by virtue of the Jesus' lack of anticipation of the action of Peter. Here I believe the text educates the textual audience into the ironic perception that disciples may not be trusted with the hierarchical authority given them and the text has prepared the audience for this perception by allowing them to discern Jesus himself learning about the behavior of various status groups.

This line of interpretation is further born out by a consideration of Matt 18, which completely explodes all status in the *ekklēsia* by demanding that the authoritarian and patriarchal structures represented by the disciples as male, adult, householders, be abandoned within the kingdom of heaven. Jesus, in 18:1-5, does this by placing an unnamed child in the midst of them and then stating that they must become like children. For the textual audience "children" are of the lowest and most powerless status. They are the objects of Herod's murder. And they have no voice even to ask for healing. They are utterly controlled by the patriarchy. Therefore, the irony is heightened but there should be no surprise for the textual audience (or for Jesus) when the disciples attempt to prevent the children in a subsequent passage (19:13) from approaching Jesus. The disciples are shown to be undependable in discerning the members of the kingdom of heaven. Should the textual audience trust them with the keys?

Matt 26-28

As we have already observed, the Pharisees are assimilated to the social status of the powerful elites of Jerusalem in the text as the textual audience approaches the passion in the narrative sequence (21:45-46; 22:15-22; 23). Similarly the disciples are transformed by the text into the new religious leaders parallel to the power of the Pharisees but constituting the leadership of the *ekklēsia*. But those episodes that we have previously examined create serious questions on the part of the textual audience about the ability of the disciples to learn from the instruction of Jesus. Beginning with 26:1 the opponents of Jesus, now identified with the most powerful status in the Gospel text, come together to ensure his death. Correspondingly, the text concludes the characterization of the disciples but does not resolve for the textual audience the problems already identified as to their reliability and authority. Rather, the sequence of episodes leaves the textual audience in extreme ironic tension concerning the disciples and their role in the *ekklēsia*.

Consider the following episodes: the woman at Bethany (26:6-13), the betrayal of Judas (26:14-16), the desertion of the disciples (26:47-56), Peter's denial (27:69-75), the women at the crucifixion (27:55-56) and at the tomb (28:1-10); the appearance of the Eleven in Galilee (28:16-20).

In the episode of the woman at Bethany the pattern established earlier continues: an unnamed woman shows that she has superior understanding of the person and destiny of Jesus than do the disciples. They inappropriately apply the rule of charity when they should apply the understanding given by Jesus on three previous occasions (16:21; 17:22-23; 20:17-19) that he is about to die. She needs no such prediction. Jesus links her act inextricably with the proclamation

of "this gospel" (26:13). The woman, while retaining her marginalized status, is elevated to a position within and associated with the gospel that is never explicitly given to any male, disciple or otherwise, in the rest of the text. Jesus also recognizes her "good service." The phrase links her with the first woman to be healed in the Gospel, Peter's mother-in-law (8:14). The textual audience knows that, unlike the disciples, faithful women possess divinely provided insight.

Next, three events contrast the disciples negatively over against the act of this woman and establish for the textual audience the proleptic context for understanding the actions of the named women and "the eleven" at the end of the narrative. Judas betrays Jesus (26:14-16, 47-50), the disciples desert (26:56), and Peter denies (26:69-75). Judas hangs himself, thereby he is eliminated from the text's world in a horrible if ambiguous way (27:3-10). Is this an act of repentance or madness? The scene of Peter's denial involves the interaction of characters of lower status, the two slave girls, who function to convict Peter of his denial. In the process Peter even utters an oath, in direct contradiction to the teaching of Jesus in 5:33-36. The oath also links him with Herod the Tetrarch (14:7). If the principle of the text be applied by the textual audience to its evaluation of Peter, then by his fruits he is to be identified as one of the false prophets (7:15-20) and by association with the evil of the urban elites.

Peter and the disciples are never rehabilitated by the text for the textual audience. Certain salient features about the introduction of the women, beginning at the crucifixion and culminating in the appearance episodes, bring out this point. First, they are apparently free, from Galilee, and are credited with following and providing for Jesus. Their social status is to be seen as comparable in terms of wealth and freedom to that of the disciples. Second, two are named: Mary Magdalene is mentioned for the first time in the First Gospel; Mary, the mother of James and Joseph, according to 13:55 must also be Mary the mother of Jesus. These are the only two women named in the First Gospel aside from Herodias. Third, the mother of the sons of Zebeddee is also present. With this last character the textual audience learns that a woman can be instructed by Jesus and also change her acting (see 20:20), an attribute never shown for the disciples. The text narrows down the character field to only the two Marys when the episodes at the tomb are depicted (27:61; 28:1-10). The textual audience must consciously compare their response to the appearance of Jesus with that of the disciples because the text records the responses in almost identical fashion. Of the Marys the text says:

> And they came to him, took hold of his feet, and worshiped him. (28:9b)

Of the eleven:

> When they saw him, they worshiped him: *but some doubted.* (28:17)

Several points derived from the text establish the probability that this verse is constructed so as to continue the irony that has attended the characterization of the disciples throughout the narrative. First, the text reminds the textual audience that the only character said to doubt previously in the plot is Peter (14:31). Does this verse imply that Peter still doubts? Second, the verse reminds the textual audience of the pattern of each episode of "little faith" on the part of the disciples (8:26; 14:31; 16:8; 17:20) and each episode of faith and worship on the part of the marginalized. The text gives the textual audience no reason to suspect that the eleven will fulfill the commandment of Jesus which follows. The disciples have never been shown to be effective interpreters, teachers, or missionaries

within the text. The textual audience might well ask: Is this perhaps why the disciples are never shown to fulfill the commission of ministry to Israel (Matt 10:5-6)? For the textual audience the disciples are never rehabilitated. The text will not allow for the conclusion that in 28:19 the authority of Jesus is transferred to the disciples. The text, by ironic emplotment, subverts and destroys any positive evaluation by the textual audience that would allow for the conclusion that the disciples and/or their institutional heirs possess the rights of free, male, householders with patriarchal or hierarchical authority over Gentiles, women, children or other supplicants within the *ekklēsia*. The text remains true in its emplotment and characterization to a vision of the kingdom of heaven that decenters, that de-marginalizes, that in short abandons all -archic, -centric structures with their attendant systems of status. And so I would agree in part with the conclusions of Amy-Jill Levine:

> Rather than establish a new center—which always presupposes a periphery—Matthew reinforces the egalitarian structure of the church by refusing to locate it spatially. By shifting from both an institutionalized, centralized, and geographically fixed cult and a synagogue system directed by a self-appointed elite to a church lacking a physical center and based on the activities of the divinely commissioned eleven, the evangelist both reinforces the egalitarian character of the Christian community and distinguishes the church from all previous institutions, both Jewish and gentile. (7)

My dispute with Levine's vision is her retention of the "divinely commissioned eleven," as somehow authoritative or normative for the *ekklēsia*. The text uses its cultural world to educate the textual audience to be chary of any claim associated with the eleven by name or tradition. It is, therefore, the audience and not the disciples who are to become "scribes trained for the kingdom" (13:52). The work of the commission of 28:19-20 is left to those in the empirical audience of the gospel who accept the role and education provided them by joining without reservation the textual audience. They behave not like the disciples, but like those characters of the lowest social status as depicted in the textual world. We should not fall into the trap of identifying too easily the characters of the First Gospel with the preferred social manifestation of the the Matthean community. It is a patriarchal trap that succeeds in subverting the subversive irony of the Gospel emplotment and therefore must be resisted by those who find themselves transformed by joining the textual audience of the gospel. We must also be clear and note that the disciples, even though they are not rehabilitated, also are not assimilated to the character of the Pharisees either. They are left as ironic example for the textual audience. The commission does not transfer Jesus' authority to them. Rather, Jesus remains with them (v. 20). Jesus reserves his own complete power to himself.

*Jesus*

Having briefly surveyed the development of characters within the plot of the First Gospel, perhaps we should conclude with a few remarks about the character Jesus, whose biography the text presents by the arrangement of episodes in order to reveal his essence. As a character, Jesus develops for the textual audience during the textual linear manifestation. The textual audience knows more than Jesus.

The status of Jesus changes during the textual linear manifestation. First, he is the "hidden" heir to the throne of David by virtue of his adoption by Joseph (1:1-25). Therefore, he constituies a legitimate threat to the claims of the powerful urban elite, even when he is a powerless child. Second, the text depicts him as a free, male, householder who takes up residence in Capernaum (4:13; 9:1). Contrary to this depiction, however, Jesus identifies himself as homeless (8:20). This homelessness and lack of status is preserved in the text by the designation of Mary as the mother of his brothers (27:56). Corresponding to the downward trend of his particular status is elevation of Jesus to universal status as possessing all authority/power (28:18). The particular and universal levels of the text's portrayal of Jesus resolve in favor of the kingdom of heaven.

Finally, we should note that only Jesus of all the characters in the First Gospel is directly called a "Jew" in the title "king of the Jews" at 2:2; 27:11, 29, 37. The term is used of a group from the perspective of the narrator in 28:15 but this group occurs nowhere else and is never developed as a "character."

*Genre*

My colleague, Victoria Vernon, characterizes Umberto Eco's *Foucault's Pendulum* thus:

> Like the protagonists, the readers of the novel are captive to a narrative process. Walking a similarly thin line between attention and absorption, readers may lose sight of the point at which pretending to believe (attending to the events described in a fictional world) becomes believing (mental participation in those events). (8)

The insight applies equally well to the narrative strategy of the text of the First Gospel. The function of the genre "biography" as we have earlier described it may mislead somewhat when we consider our discoveries about the First Gospel. The "biography" as told in the text functions to reveal the essence of Jesus, true enough. This should not lead, however, to the conclusion that the text is primarily a christological document. Rather, the text tells the story of a character named Jesus who proclaims and bears witness in his teaching and action to the kingdom of heaven. The narrative form is adopted because only by emplotment can the confrontation between the kingdom of heaven and the current world order be seen clearly through the story of Jesus Christ, Immanuel, Son of God, Son of Man. The text, while it may at times teach the audience to align itself with the viewpoint of narrator and Jesus, ultimately constructs an audience aligned with the kingdom of heaven and thereby able to subject all characters in the story to evaluation by the ethics and politics of that Kingdom. The text designs the insight that the disciples, and by implication anyone who appeals to their tradition, are in error if they seek to reformulate the hierarchical privileges of the Pharisee-led synagogue. Neither ethnicity, nor public office, nor sex, nor age are appropriate indicators of status within the Kingdom. That these are singled out for special comment by the emplotment of the text indicates the probability that the *empirical* author recognizes these developments at least on the horizon, if not already present within the empirical audience. That the disciples are portrayed ironically indicates that the empirical author may be of less status and power than those within the *ekklēsia* who prefer patriarchal and phallocentric relationships in organizing a community. The text stands as a whole experience that with every reading or performance lays before the empirical audience the question as to whether or not reality is constituted as the text

describes it. If so, then the empirical audience can do nothing else but change its ethical and political assumptions, behaviors and structures.

Indeed, as Charles Talbert reminds us, the adoption of the biographical genre by early Christian authors bears no profound theological weight (67). But the particular type of appropriation evidenced by the canonical gospels stands "against all attempts to understand God, Jesus, and discipleship in ways that lose the wholeness and balance present in the narratives taken as wholes" (68). To paraphrase Talbert's more general conclusion about the canonical gospels as a group, the biography of Jesus represented by the empirical author of the First Gospel stands in its emplotment of episodes "against all attempts to take individual traditions out of their narrative contexts in order to interpret them in light of some other context" (68). Unfortunately the dominant strategies adopted by the interpreters of the First Gospel in the early Christian centuries read against the textual audience and their culture.

## Textual Audience Vs. Empirical Audience

Why does the textual audience lie latent, seldom if ever recognized and never, so far as we know, historically actualized in the Christian communities of the late first century onward? Why does the strategy of emplotment and the adoption of biography as a holistic performance experience akin to theater or tragedy not work? Two suggestions: First, the interpreters of the gospels generally and the First Gospel in particular are comparable in their social status to the depiction of the disciples in the text. They are a naive audience rendered incapable of joining the textual audience and becoming aware of the ironic strategy of the text by their own cultural status. Second, and concomitantly, the strategy of patriarchal reading and use in which the leaders of Christian communities were schooled included the hierarchicalized strategy of allegorical interpretation (as taught by the Stoics) and the deconstructive strategy of episodic performance (as eventually canonized by the liturgy). The peculiar adaptation of biographical genre by the empirical author of the First Gospel was ignored in favor of fragmentary readings or performances which lifted from their plot the individual sayings or episodes of Jesus' biography. The interpreters of the Gospels were "gentlemen" and "gentlemen ignore what does not suit."

Finally, if the lineaments of the textual audience as discovered in regard to the social status of characters and their interactions in episode, particularly in the emplotment of narrative, prove to be consistent with the emplotment of the parables and speeches of Jesus in the text, then the hypothesis lies near to hand that the rhetorical structure that deploys a culture for a specific textual audience also is an intentional structure developed by the the empirical author. If the liberationist structures identified here should in future work prove supportable throughout the First Gospel, then there are several implications for the reconstruction of the community of the First Gospel. I shall mention three for our discussion and reflection:

1. The *ekklēsia* of the First Gospel is a community that has consciously separated from the synagogue structures led by a power elite usually associated with what has recently been dubbed "formative Judaism" (Overman, Segal).

2. The community at the writing of the Gospel is on the verge of if not already establishing a patriarchal structure which appeals to a teaching

and juridical tradition going back to the eleven and especially emphasizing Peter.

3. The strategy of the empirical author is to subvert any attempt to claim special public religious office or status for the patriarchal leadership in favor of a charismatic process within a status-free community system.

Finally, I must conclude that the empirical author lost. But the text with its latent structures of liberation has remained to bear witness to a Kingdom that constitutes itself from the marginalized and oppressed and reclaims territory from every form of power elite including those that are unseen, "Blessed are the poor in spirit for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."

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# The Jewish People and the Death of Jesus in Luke-Acts: Some Implications of an Inconsistent Narrative Role

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### Introduction

This paper is presented in two major sections. In the first section I shall offer a reading of the Lkan[1] passion narrative which is not thoroughly novel, but not normative either. I shall argue that the passion narrative does not hold the people as actively responsible for the death of Jesus. The Jewish leaders killed Jesus. This first section will be developed in two stages. First, I shall examine the narrative itself from the perspective of the implied reader. I use the term implied reader to mean the reader as defined by the narrative.[2] Guided by the narrative of Luke 23, and immediately surrounding texts, who, would the reader conclude, is responsible for the execution of Jesus? Second, I shall attempt to confirm this implied reading by more traditional redaction critical methods, assuming either the two-gospel or two-source hypothesis to be correct. Through this examination I shall attempt to discern the editorial activity of the real author to see if such activity is consistent with my reading of the passion narrative. It will come as no surprise to the readers of this essay to see that I conclude that such consistency is indeed present.

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[1] I shall use "Lk," "Lkan" etc. when I wish to denote the *narrative* of the gospel or Acts. I shall use "Luke" when I wish to denote the *author* of these documents. I offer no conclusions on the actual name or identity of this real author.

[2] I define "implied reader" as do David Rhoads and Donald Michie, *Mark as Story: An Introduction to the Narrative of a Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), p. 137. The implied reader is "an imaginary reader with the ideal responses implied by the narrative" (137). It is a "reader" who takes his/her cues from the narrative world itself. Stephen Moore, *Literary Criticism and the Gospels: The Theoretical Challenge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), refers to the implied reader as "the reader presupposed or produced by the text as (in some theories) its ideal interpreter" (46). Moore notes the theoretical caveat offered by the discussion of Wolfgang Iser; namely that no reader can be wholly produced by the text—real readers are very much a part of reading (*Literary Criticism*, 101). Hence, the "implied reader" reading offered in this paper is, in fact, my reading of the implied reader's reading. When on occasion I refer to "my reading" this is what I shall mean.

The second part of the essay reflects on some of the implications of my reading for the reading of Lk-Acts as a whole. First, I explore the implications of my reading on the issue of authorial competence, consistency, and unity. I believe that while such explorations are worthwhile, they proved more fruitful a generation ago than today. Second, I explore some implications of my reading for other holistic readings of Lk-Acts: those of James Dawsey, Jack Sanders, and Robert Tannehill. Other good and influential readings could have been chosen with equally interesting and, I would hope, fruitful results. I was simply resonating with these readers at the time this essay was written.

## An Analysis of the Passion Narrative

*An analysis from the perspective of the implied reader*

*Lk 23:1-5.* In Lk 23:1 the reader is told that τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν ἤγαγον αὐτον ἐπὶ τὸν Πιλᾶτον. The issue for 23:1 concerns the identity of τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν. One could read the phrase as primarily pointing forward to the group of 23:4, the group consisting of the chief priest and the crowds. Examples of interpreters who read Lk this way include Jerome Neyrey and Jack Sanders.[3] Both of them also understand the ὄχλοι of v. 4 as referring to the Jewish people.[4] Understanding τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν as being inclusive of a group larger than just the Jewish leadership does make the appearance of the ὄχλοι (understood as denoting the Jewish people) in 23:4 less startling.

The reader might understand τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν of 23:1 as primarily referring back to the Jewish leaders in whose hands Jesus has been since his capture in 22:47. Many interpreters offer this reading.[5] This would perhaps seem the most viable reading given that the narrator has followed so closely the activities of the group of Jewish leaders since Jesus' capture in 22:47. A potential weakness of this reading lies in the sudden appearance of the crowds in v. 4 (assuming one understands the "crowds" to denote the Jewish people).

Of the various interpreters who read τὸ πλῆθος of 23:1 as a reference back to the Jewish leaders of the preceding narrative, Jane Via and David Tiede offer a reading of 23:4 which avoids the problem of the sudden appearance of the people (ὄχλοι) in 23:4. Each of them understands the ὄχλοι of v. 4 to designate those Jewish leaders not denoted by the more specific οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς.[6] Hence, the "people" are not yet even on the Lkan stage.

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[3] Jerome Neyrey, S.J. , *The Passion according to Luke: A Redaction Study of Luke's Soteriology* (New York: Paulist, 1985) 76 and Jack T. Sanders, *The Jews in Luke-Acts* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) 222.

[4] This is the logical implication of Neyrey's reading, ibid., 76-77. Sanders, ibid.

[5] So Tyson, *The Death of Jesus in Luke-Acts* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1986) 129; I. Howard Marshall, *Commentary on Luke*, New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978) 852; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke*, The Anchor Bible, vols. 28, 28A (Garden City: Doubleday, 1981,1985), 2: 1471, 1474; Donald Senior, C.P., *The Passion of Jesus in the Gospel of Luke* (Washington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1989) 106; David Tiede, *Luke*, Augsburg Commentary on the New Testament (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1988) 403; E. Jane Via, "According to Luke, Who Put Jesus to Death?" in *Political Issues in Luke-Acts*, ed. Richard J. Cassidy and Philip J. Scharper (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1983) 130.

[6] Via views the "crowds" as the rest of the contingent of the group identified in 22:52 and 66 (the elders, chief priests, and scribes), i.e., the "crowds" are the elders and scribes.

I believe that they offer a reading worthy of further consideration. The last explicit reference which the reader had encountered to an ὄχλος was in 22:47: "While [Jesus] was still speaking—behold, a crowd (ὄχλος). And the one who was called Judas, one of the twelve, was leading them." Here, as in the identification of the πλῆθος of 23:1, the reader must decide how to understand the crowd which has come with Judas. Lk 22:52 makes it quite clear that at the very least the crowd *included* "chief priests and officers of the temple and scribes." According to a number of interpreters this crowd which came out against Jesus is also to be viewed as consisting of the Jewish people, or at least a significantly representative portion of them, for the narrator has rather consistently denoted the people not only with the word λαός, but the term ὄχλος as well, with the most recent such designation being found in 22:6 (cf. 22:2).[7]

In proposing that the ὄχλος of 22:47 was inclusive of the Jewish people, Joseph Tyson notes that their appearance on the scene marks the beginning of the turning of the people away from Jesus.[8] He proposes that Judas has engaged in some off-stage maneuvering to move the people to side against Jesus. Hence, by the time that Jesus appears before Pilate in 23:1ff., the people have already turned.

Despite the fact that narrator does regularly use ὄχλος to denote the Jewish people, I do not believe that the reader should so understand its usage in 22:47. First, aside from the appearance of the ὄχλος in 22:47, the precise definition of which is under dispute, the reader is given no indication in the narrative that Judas has had any access to the people or that he has had any means or opportunity to sway them to side with him and the leaders. This is an argument from silence and possibly even question begging. It is true, of course, that one cannot expect the narrator to tell the reader everything. Readers will often be driven to fill in the gaps in order to allow the action to move with some semblance of causality.[9] If, indeed, the reader knew the ὄχλος to denote the people, then the assumption of off-stage maneuvering is virtually necessary. But I am not sure that the reader does know this, and even if s/he does assume that, at least initially, 22:52 would offer the reader some correction.

Second, the reader has explicitly been told in 22:6 that Judas will betray Jesus "to them [the Jewish leaders (see 22:4)] in the *absence* of the multitude (ὄχλου)" (22:6). The reader now would expect the fulfillment of this statement in some scene which depicts Judas delivering Jesus to the Jewish leaders in the absence of the people. Luke 22:47-53 fulfills this expectation if the reader understands the

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Tiede is not quite as precise in defining the "crowds." "Clearly this crowd [the speakers of 23:5] is the priestly party whose 'fear of the people' has been a motive force since Jesus arrived in Jerusalem ..." (*Luke*, 406). Tiede says later with reference to 23:13, "This is the first time that **the people** have been on the scene since they were listening to Jesus teach in the temple (21:38)" (ibid, 409).

[7] Tyson, *Death*, pp. 37-38; 120-121. Cf. also Marshall, *Luke*, 838, who says that the arresting party "includes some of [the authorities]"; Via, "According to Luke," 130, who says that the Jewish leaders are "among" the crowd of 22:47. For a discussion of the ὄχλος as regularly denoting the Jewish people as a whole see Robert C. Tannehill, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts: A Literary Interpretation. Volume 1: The Gospel according to Luke* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986) 143.

[8] Tyson, ibid.

[9] The issue of causality is discussed by E. M. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1927) 86 and Seymour Chatman, *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978) 45-46.

ὄχλος of 22:47 as a reference to the group of people accompanying Judas who are explicitly identified in 22:54 as the chief priests and other leaders.

Third, it is curious that if, indeed, the people have turned on Jesus, he offers no comment to them at all. He speaks to Judas who has betrayed him (22:48), the disciples (presumably) who react with the sword (22:49-52), and the Jewish leaders (22:52-53) who have been after him since arriving at the temple (19:47-48). But nothing to the people who have turned on him! Again, this is a curiosity which disappears if the reader understands the ὄχλος of 22:47 to be a reference to the group of persons who are accompanying Judas who are later identified as the Jewish leaders.

Finally, while it is true that ὄχλος does often denote the "people" the narrator can, and, in point of fact does, use ὄχλος in a generic fashion to denote a group of persons—any group of persons—about whom s/he happens to be speaking at any given moment in the narrative. In Lk 5:29 the narrator speaks of ὄχλος . . . τελωνῶν καὶ ἄλλων. In Lk 6:17 the reader encounters ὄχλος . . . μαθητῶν. This more generic use of ὄχλος dominates the narrative of Acts. In Acts this word represents many groups of people: disciples (1:15), priests (6:7), and the inhabitants of any number of cities and regions throughout the Mediterranean world.[10] The use of ὄχλος in Acts renders it virtually certain that the narrator used the word primarily in a generic sense as a way of referring to a group of people about whom s/he wished to speak in the narrative.

There is no compelling reason to understand, therefore, the ὄχλος of 22:47 as denoting the Jewish people, now aligned with Judas and their leaders. The crowd which accompanies Judas the Mount of Olives is the Jewish leadership into whose hands Judas had promised to deliver Jesus apart from a crowd of Jewish people. It is this crowd of Jewish leaders which seizes Jesus and leads him to the house of the high priest (22:54), mocks him (22:63-65), makes up the assembly of the Sanhedrin and interrogates Jesus (22:66-71), and leads him to Pilate and charges him with crimes of sedition (23:1-2). And, according to the readings of Via and Tiede, it is to the chief priests and the crowds of rest of the leaders that Pilate says "I find no guilt in this man."

The reading of Via and Tiede should be followed for three reasons. First, the group which responds to Pilate in v. 5 is described as being "urgent." If the group responding is the Jewish leaders, designated by the chief priests and crowds in v. 4, such urgency makes narrative sense. The Jewish leaders have plotted with one of Jesus' followers to arrest Jesus in the absence of people (22:2-6). They have accompanied Judas to the Mount of Olives (22:39) where they have arrested Jesus (22:47-53). They have brought him before their high priest (22:54), gathered together their assembly (22:66), and interrogated him until they could find a charge that would stick (22:67-71). They then led Jesus to Pilate charging him with crimes which would surely get Pilate's attention (23:1-2), which Pilate summarily has rejected after a one question inquiry (22:3-4). After all of this work which is now so close to coming to naught, urgency is an understatement. Hence, they "urgently" press their case by adding yet an additional charge.[11]

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[10] Samaria (8:6), Antioch of Syria (11:24, 26), Antioch of Pisidia (13:45; note they are contrasted with the Jews), Lystra (14:11-19 [again contrasted with the Jews]) Philippi (16:22), Thessalonica (17:8), Beroea (17:13), Ephesus and Asia (19:26, 33, 35), and Jerusalem (21:27, 34, 35; 24:12).

[11] Tyson reads 23:5 as a fourth charge (*Death*, 130). Fitzmyer, *Luke*, 2:1476, believes that 23:5 offers the representative gist of 23:2b. It is something of a moot point, for either reading would convey the sense of urgency which those responding to Pilate feel.

Second, the group which responds to Pilate says that Jesus "stirs up the people." If we understand the ὄχλοι of v. 4 to be the people, does it seem appropriate that these people would respond with "he stirs up the people"? The people are being talked about in this clause by some third party, it does not appear that they are talking about themselves. The content of the response to Pilate makes it appear clear that it is the *leaders* who are doing the talking.

Third, Tyson offers a helpful reading of the final phrase of the charge ("from Galilee even to this place" [ἕως ὧδε]). He argues that "this place" is a reference to the temple, the place at which Jesus had finished his teaching work. A charge against Jesus which focuses on what he has done in the temple would most appropriately come from the priests, specifically the chief priests who are identified for the reader in v. 4.[12] In conclusion, it would appear that the parties who are conversing with one another consist of Pilate and the leaders. If this reading is followed, therefore, the people are not yet even on the Lkan stage. Thus, the people have not yet turned on Jesus. The reader still does not lay any blame for Jesus' situation at the feet of the people.

Even if one were to insist that the ὄχλοι denoted the Jewish people and not the rest of the Jewish leaders, the content of v. 5 ("But they were urgent saying, 'He stirs up the people teaching through the whole of Judea, having begun from Galilee even to this place'") would still appear to have the Jewish leaders in focus. Perhaps, following this alternative understanding of ὄχλοι, the Jewish people are present, but still, it is the Jewish leaders who are actually responding to Pilate for the same reasons cited above. Following this reading, the people are now present, but it is not they who are responding to Pilate—it is only their leaders. Hence, the conclusion concerning the role of the people to this point remains the same: they are taking no active role to this point in the plot against Jesus. The distancing between the two groups (the leaders and the people) which has been prevalent to this point[13] continues.

*Lk 23:6-12.* The only relevant comment to note in this context comes from 23:10-11. In v. 11 the reader is told that both Herod and his soldiers treated Jesus with contempt. In v. 10 the reader is told specifically that the chief priests and the scribes were "vehemently accusing him." The participle the narrator uses to

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[12] Tyson, p. 109: "In view of the mention of Judea and Galilee, it is plausible to interpret *heōs hōde* as a reference to the city of Jerusalem. But in this context, following the long description of Jesus' teaching in the temple (Luke 19:45-21:38), it is likely that the verse includes a specific reference to the temple. Thus, here Jesus is being charged with teaching something perverted, not only in Galilee and Judea but, what is worse, in Jerusalem and specifically in the temple. Therefore, it appears that, for Luke, an underlying issue has to do with the *refusal of the chief priests* (emphasis added) to accept Jesus and to recognize the role he claimed for himself as teacher." Even if one were to interpret "this place" as a more general reference to Jerusalem, Luke does not, despite arguments to the contrary, sharply distinguish between the two. See Michael Bachmann, *Jerusalem under der Tempel: Die geographisch-theologischen Elemente in der lukanischen Sicht des judischen Kultzentrums*, Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten und Neuen Testament, Sechste Folge, Heft 9 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1980) 13-66; 132-70. Hence, even if "this place" is Jerusalem, it is still appropriate for the Jewish leaders to be offering the response to Pilate.

[13] For the Lkan tendency to distinguish between the people and the leaders see J. Bradley Chance, *Jerusalem, the Temple, and the New Age in Luke-Acts* (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1988) 67-72. Cf. also Robert L. Brawley, *Luke-Acts and the Jews: Conflict, Apology, and Conciliation*, SBLMS 33 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987) 137. He does view the crowd of 23:4 as now aligned with the leaders, but it is not to be construed as the same crowd which has been supportive of Jesus.

denote the action of accusation (κατηγοροῦντες) is clearly reminiscent 23:2, where the reader was told that the whole company (πλῆθος = chief priests and scribes [22:66]) ἤρξαντο . . . κατηγορεῖν αὐτοῦ. Note in both verses that the persons making "accusation" against Jesus are identified either explicitly (23:10) or implicitly (23:2) as "chief priests and scribes."

*Lk 23:13-16.* Here it is quite clear that the people are now on the scene (23:13) regardless of how one has read ὄχλοι in 23:4. If one understands the people's presence here to denote their first appearance since 21:38, the appearance is a bit surprising. Lukan tradition did place the people at the scene before Pilate, but that does not help the implied reader who would want to understand how the people are functioning in the story. Two questions arise. One, where do the people come from? Two, whose side are they now on?

With respect to the first question, the narrator simply does not say. If interpreters such as Tyson are correct that the ὄχλος of 22:47 denotes a crowd consisting of the *people* and the *Jewish leaders*, one *could* assume that the people have been accompanying the Jewish leaders all along from 22:47 to this point. This does not appear to be a very plausible reading. Even Tyson who suggests this reading of 22:47 does not suggest this. Those who understand the ὄχλοι of 23:4 to denote the Jewish people would not question their presence here in 23:13, though such readers would have to ask at that point in the narrative the same question my implied reader is now asking: "Where did the people come from?" But the answer would be the same as I offered above: the narrator does not say. The reader has become used to seeing the Jewish leaders and the people on the scene together (cf. esp. the "summaries" of 19:47-48; 21:37-38),[14] so perhaps it would not be that surprising after all.[15]

The second question is more important: Whose side are the people now on? Up to this point (following the reading I am proposing) the people have been on the side of Jesus and not on the side the Jewish leaders (cf. e.g., 19:48; 20:6, 19, 26, 26; 22:2, 6). At this point in the narrative do the people begin to change sides? This question cannot be fully explored until the discussion of v. 18. At this point some preliminary observations concerning vv. 14-16 need to be made.

In 23:14 the reader is told that Pilate spoke πρὸς αὐτούς. How is the reader to understand the antecedent of αὐτούς? Though it might appear that Pilate is addressing the leaders and the people the content of Pilate's words do not seem to carry this meaning. Pilate's words seem more appropriate if understood as addressed to the leaders.

First, Pilate says προσηνέγκατέ μοι τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτον. Thus far in the narrative only one group has brought Jesus to Pilate: the Jewish leaders. In 23:1 the

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14 A good discussion of these summary texts may be found in Francis David Weinert, "The Meaning of the Temple in the Gospel of Luke" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Fordham University, 1979) 45-74. He does assume the two-source hypothesis and relies heavily on that hypothesis in his study of Lukan redaction.

15 The last of the summary texts noted above (21:37-38) states that Jesus came daily to the temple and that the people, even from early in the morning, were there to hear him. The reader can assume that the people are here, as they have been here during the past few days, to hear Jesus. Of course, they would not have found Jesus at the temple, as they might have expected, but the narrator does not leave the impression that the events transpiring in the city are all that far from the temple. The people would have had no trouble finding him. I am engaging, I will acknowledge, in some causal gap filling. See above, n. 9. I do not, however, think this gap in causality is as large as that suggested by Tyson.

reader was told that "after the whole company of them arose they led him to Pilate." I argued above that it made best sense to understand the "whole company" as a reference to the chief priests and elders of 22:66. Hence, Pilate is addressing here those who initially led Jesus to him—the leaders.

Second, Pilate reminds his hearers of 23:14 that they had charged Jesus with the attempted perversion of the people (ἀποστρέφοντα τὸν λαόν). This phrase clearly echoes 23:2, 5 where those making charge against Jesus had said that he perverted the nation (διαστρέφοντα τὸ ἔθνος, v. 2) and stirred up the people (ἀνασείει τὸν λαόν, v. 5). In 23:2-5, I have argued above, the leaders are the ones making the accusation against Jesus.

Third, Pilate makes reference to the fact that his audience had made accusations against Jesus (κατηγορεῖτε κατ' αὐτοῦ, v. 14). Verse 15 further indicates that those whom Pilate is addressing also made charges against Jesus before Herod.[16] This is most important, for it makes clear that those whom Pilate is addressing consist of the persons who had previously made accusations against Jesus both to him [Pilate] *and to Herod*. Pilate's reference to previous accusations makes allusion to 23:1-2 where the reader is told that the "whole company" (probably stands for "the leaders," see above) made accusations against Jesus before Pilate (ἤρξαντο δὲ κατηγορεῖν αὐτοῦ) and to 23:9 where the reader is told *explicitly* that the chief priests and scribes made accusations against Jesus before Herod (κατηγοροῦντες αὐτοῦ). These allusions make quite clear that Pilate is talking to the leaders in 23:14.

The people may be on the stage now, but they are not the objects of Pilate's concern. Pilate is clearly making statements which, in the story world, would be appropriately addressed only to the leaders. In 23:13-14, the people are present but the recipients of Pilate's words are the leaders only. In short, the antecedent of αὐτούς (23:14) may be in a literal and strict sense τοὺς ἀρχιερεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ τὸν λαόν. The people are certainly there to hear what Pilate is saying. But the content of his words makes clear that he is addressing only τοὺς ἀρχιερεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας. The many allusions to what these leaders have done direct the primary attention of the reader to them; the people offer only a backdrop.

*Lk 23:18-25*. The previous discussion is all quite crucial for identifying the implied subject of v. 18: ἀνέκραγον δὲ παμπληθεὶ λέγοντες and for answering the central question raised above: Whose side are the people now on? The consensus is to identify the implied subject as including the people.[17] But, again, close reading indicates that such does not seem to be implied by the narrator.

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[16] It seems clear that the best way to read ἀλλ' οὐδὲ Ἡρῴδης is to supply for it the same complete predicate which followed ἐγώ in the preceding clause. This would render "I did not find this man guilty of any of your charges against him; neither [did] Herod [find this man guilty of any of your charges against him]."

[17] Marshall, *Luke*, 860: "Luke . . . leaves it unclear who is responsible for the shouts." Despite this statement, Marshall assumes that the people are implicated. See his comments on v. 20 (860) and v. 23 (861). Fitzmyer, *Luke*, 2:1489. He acknowledges the ambiguity but concludes that "it would be naïve to think that he [Luke] refers merely to the leaders." Fitzmyer does note, presumably only to reject, the possibility that παμπληθεί, derived from πάς and πλῆθος, may allude to 23:1: ἅπαν τὸ πλῆθος. Sanders, *Jews*, 225 states that here and in 23:5, 18, 21, and 23 the people join in the accusations and cries against Jesus. Such participation confirms the blanket condemnations offered by Jesus in the gospel and prepares the reader for the condemnation of the Jews in the speeches of Acts which show forth the Jews for what they really are: those who reject the ways of God. Tannehill, *Narrative Unity*, 1:164, says that παμπληθεί makes clear "that the people, not just the leaders, are participating." Also reading 23:18 in a similar vein are

The narrator reports in 23:20 that "Pilate addressed them (αὐτοῖς) *again* (πάλιν)." Whoever is meant by the pronoun αὐτοῖς, it is a group whom Pilate has addressed before. The most reasonable conclusion is that the group whom Pilate is again addressing is the same group whom he had tried to convince of Jesus' innocence in 23:14-16. That group, I have argued, was the leaders. The same reading could be offered for 23:22. The antecedent of the pronoun (αὐτούς) whom Pilate addressed yet a third time is the persons whom he addressed in 23:19 and 23:14-16. The plural third person personal pronoun, in its various cases, therefore, in vv. 20, 22, and 23 (αἱ φωναὶ αὐτῶν) denotes the leaders. If this is accepted, then the same conclusion must hold for pronoun ἡμῖν in v. 18. Finally, if the leaders are represented by the plural third person personal pronouns in vv. 20, 21 and 23, the text can only be read sensibly to indicate that the leaders are the subjects of the third person plural verbs ἀνέκραγον (v. 18), οἱ ἐπεφώνουν (v. 21), and οἱ δὲ ἐπέκειντο and the participles λέγοντες (vv. 18, 20), and αἰτούμενοι (v. 23).

It is interesting that the narrator continues to use indefinite subjects and pronouns for the verses which follow 23:23. If the reader continues to assume that the leaders are the referents of the pronouns and the subjects of the third person plural verbs then it was to the leaders' demand that Pilate submitted (v. 24); it was their request which was granted in the release of Barabbas (v. 25a); it was to their will that Jesus was handed over (v. 25b). "They" led Jesus away and seized Simon, forcing him to carry Jesus' cross; "they" are the ones to whom

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Tyson, *Death*, 34 and Brawley, *Jews*, 137, though he wants to divide the populace into two groups (cf. also in this regard Via, "According to Luke," 131 and Tiede, *Luke*, 411). Senior, *Passion in Luke*, 116-17, follows the consensus reading also but adds "Luke is not rigid about these categories" (i.e., the categories of who rejects Jesus and who does not). Senior reads, as does Brawley, that there are segments of groups who do not join the rabble against Jesus. Still, the overall picture here, according to Senior, is to emphasize "that it is not just a mob which gathers, but all Israel, its leaders and the people" (116). Neyrey, *Passion*, 80-84, reads Lk as being most emphatic in wishing to indict "*all the Jews*" (82, emphasis his), for "all the Jews" choose Barabbas and reject Jesus. Hence, "*[t]he trial of Jesus becomes the trial of Israel*" (83, emphasis his). John T. Carroll also sees the Lkan emphasis here to show that "Israel crucifies its King!" See "Luke's Crucifixion Scene," in Dennis D. Sylva, ed., *Reimaging the Death of Jesus* (Frankfurt: Anton Hain, 1990) 110. Richard J. Cassidy, *Jesus, Politics, and Society: A Study of Luke's Gospel* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1978) 70, wants to implicate primarily the "the chief priests and their allies," but he too sees the people, in the end, as crying out against Jesus (see 171 n. 33). The apparent change of attitude of the people with respect to Jesus prompted Gottfried Rau to suggest that one should read τοῦ λαοῦ rather than καὶ τὸν λαόν. ("Das Volk in der lukanischen Passionsgeschichte, eine Konjektur zu Lk 23, 13," ZNW 56 [1965] 48). Rau has generally not been followed (but see Augustine George, "Israel dan l'oeuvre de Luc," RB 75 [1968] 503) due to lack of mss. evidence. His conjecture, however, offers testimony to the problematic reading offered by the apparent change of the people's attitude. The people's apparently surprising change concerning Jesus is simply taken as a given by David P. Moessner in his article "The 'Leaven of the Pharisees' and 'This Generation': Israel's Rejection of Jesus According to Luke" in Sylva, *Reimaging the Death of Jesus*, 79-107. Moessner argues that the pre-Jerusalem narrative has prepared the reader for the change of attitude by showing how Jesus has consistently held the whole multitude accountable for the doubts and questions of the few. Hence, the reader realizes even before this pivotal scene that Jesus does not view the people all that favorably. Further, this attitude, characterized by doubts and questions, is most exemplified by the Pharisees and their scribes. This attitude about Jesus—their "leaven"—has finally "carried the day" (105), as this scene so aptly demonstrates. They have won the people over to their side.

Jesus refers in v. 31—the ones who "do this when the wood is green."[18] "They" crucified Jesus and the criminals (v. 33). "They" are the objects of Jesus' prayer of forgiveness (v. 34a). "They" cast the lots for his clothes (v. 34b).

As peculiar as this reading might seem, it is confirmed by the comment made by the two men on the road to Emmaus: ... παρέδωκαν αὐτὸν οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἡμῶν εἰς κρίμα θανάτου καὶ ἐσταύρωσαν αὐτόν. Clearly, the subject of ἐσταύρωσαν is the chief priests and the rulers. One might surmise that this is an unreliable commentary from two unreliable characters who, after all, are saying all of this to the risen Jesus, oblivious as to his identity. Such a protest is not warranted,[19] for while Cleopas and his friend do not recognize Jesus, they do have their "facts" straight in vv. 19-24 concerning the things Jesus did and the time passed since the execution of Jesus. While some of the precise details of their précis concerning the women's discovery of the empty tomb do not match up with verbatim exactness, one would be hard pressed to argue that the two men offer an unreliable summation of the events of that morning.[20] Cleopas and his friend may not recognize the risen Jesus (yet), but they are not presented as stupid people who don't know what has been going on. The reader, at this point, therefore, may take the summation of the events of the preceding Friday as reliable commentary: "Our chief priests and rulers . . . crucified [Jesus]."

And what of the people? Even following the reading I have offered, they may not have cried out for his death, but neither do they rise up to protect Jesus. Why are they so impotent? Can this be explained from within the world of the narrative? Prior to Jesus' arrest, the people had been a most influential factor in preventing the arrest of Jesus. It is quite apparent in the Lkan narrative from 23:14 onward that the presence of the people does not protect Jesus from the leaders. If the people have turned on Jesus, that is explicable. But if the people have not turned, as my implied reader reads, then readers, real or implied, may marvel at the people's sheer inability to assist Jesus.

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[18] This is in dispute, even if one should grant the the leaders are the implied subjects of the other verbs. There are a number of indefinite subjects contained in Jesus' reply to the daughters of Jerusalem (23:28-21): εἰροῦσιν (v. 29), ἄρξονται (v. 30) and ποιοῦσιν (v. 31). The subjects of the first two verbs seem clearly to be the daughters and their children (see, e.g., Brawley, *Jews*, 125, Fitzmyer, *Luke*, 2:1498). There is some dispute concerning the subject of ποιοῦσιν. Fitzmyer, ibid., and Marshall, *Luke*, 865, believe God to be the most likely subject. Brawley, ibid., believes the subject to be those most immediately responsible for the death of Jesus, the leaders; Sanders, *Jews*, 226, implies that the Jewish people are the guilty ones as does Neyrey, *Passion*, 114.

[19] At least not at this point in the narrative. Upon further reflection, the commentary of these two men is shown to be deficient. More shall be said on this issue below. But at this point in the narrative, the two men are summarizing what the narrator thus far has told the reader.

[20] The two men report the following:

1. Some women were at the tomb early in the morning (v. 22, cf. 24:1).
2. They did not find Jesus' body (v. 23a, cf. 24:3).
3. They reported having seen a vision of angels who said that Jesus was alive (v. 23b). The narrator says that they saw two men in dazzling apparel who called to their remembrance that Jesus had predicted the resurrection. The narrator does not actually narrate what the women said (see 24:10), but the two men's summation of the women's unnarrated summation seems reasonable.
4. The tomb was visited by some acquaintances of the men (v. 24, cf. 24:12, about which there is textual dispute. It is omitted in D. It is included in $\mathfrak{P}^{75}$ *rell* ).

The reader has been given a number of clear indications that the people have, at least up to 22:2, *inhibited* their leaders from carrying out their designs against Jesus (see 19:48; 20:6, 19, 26). It is at this point (22:3ff.) that the narrator speaks of Judas' initiation of his plot to betray Jesus. Luke 22:6 is interesting, for it seems to imply that if the leaders can simply get their hands on Jesus they will be able to carry out their plans against him. There is no talk here of the necessity of turning the people against Jesus, only of having Jesus delivered to them "in the absence of the multitude." The leaders need the people to be absent in order to capture Jesus. But the same narrator offers no hints that the people will be able to offer any help to Jesus once he is in the hands of the leaders or that the leaders fear any reaction from the people once Jesus is in their custody.

But why not? Why might the leaders believe that once they have Jesus in their custody they can manipulate events to their favor? David Tiede offers a most interesting reading of the charge against Jesus offered by the Jewish leaders in 23:5, "he stirs up the people." As Tiede states it, those of the priestly party "have found a means for counting the loyalty of the people as evidence against Jesus. **The people** would also find it dangerous to object."[21] The leaders have brilliantly driven a wedge between Jesus and the people, for if the people do rise to his defense, the charge of sedition will appear valid. Furthermore, if the people should rise to Jesus' defense they too will appear as collaborators of this sedition, thereby endangering their own well being. And if the people, fearing the implications of their defense of Jesus do nothing? —the Jewish leaders will still have their way. Once the people do finally arrive on stage in 23:14, therefore, "Jesus' accusers have less to fear from **the people**. The chief priests and their crowds have implicated 'the people' for being 'stirred up' by Jesus (23:5), and Pilate opens with a restatement of that charge. The people would be in a poor position to defend Jesus against **the charges** their own leaders brought without confirming thereby that some kind of insurrection against authority was developing."[22] Following the reading I have offered, the people stand by silently and, following Tiede, fearfully while their leaders heap their demands upon Pilate, to whose will (23:25) Pilate eventually succumbs.

The ominous silence of the people will continue for the remainder of the narrative. The narrator does inform the reader in 23:27 that a "great multitude ... of women ... bewailed and lamented him." The reader can presume that some noise was being made, but no discourse, either direct or indirect, is offered by the narrator. The reader is told explicitly that the people watched the crucifixion of Jesus (ὁ λαὸς θεωρῶν). In that same context s/he is also told "the rulers scoffed at [Jesus], saying 'He saved others; let him save himself, if he is the Christ of God, his Chosen One!'" (23:35). This short text appears to make explicit what the narrator has only made implicit to this point: the people are present and witness *silently* all that happens to Jesus, but it is the leaders who take all the aggressive action and do all the talking (cf. 23:2, 5, 10, 18-23)—and all the killing. The last comment which is made about the people is found in 23:48. Here the narrator informs the reader that "all the crowds (ὄχλοι) who had come together to see this sight, once they had seen the things that had happened, began returning

21 Tiede, *Luke*, 406.

22 Ibid., 409.

[home?], beating their breasts." This is generally viewed as some a sign of grief or mourning.[23]

*Summary.* Throughout the scenes of the arrest, trial, and execution of Jesus the Jewish people and their leaders have remained divided. Prior to the arrest of Jesus, the narrator offered clear indications that the people had the power to prevent the arrest of Jesus, so long as he was in their midst. The narrator offered no clear words to suggest that, once arrested, the people would have had the power to prevent the leaders from carrying out their intentions. Hence, during the hearings and trials of Jesus, the people are impotent and even frightened. They are present, but they are persistently silent, with the exception of some bewailing women. The narrator consistently portrays the leaders as being actively responsible for the death of Jesus. Cleopas and his friend sum up well the narrator's position on the issue of who is responsible for what happened to Jesus: "... our chief priests and rulers delivered him up to be condemned to death, and crucified him" (24:20). It is the leaders who have killed Jesus, not the people.

*The Analysis of the Activity of the Author*

In discussing the redactional activity of the author, all with the aim of gleaning some insight on his[24] perspective, I shall limit the context of my discussion to what are considered the two most likely "solutions" to the synoptic problem, the two-gospel (neo-Griesbach) or the two source (Holtzmann) hypothesis. One may choose to ignore this section, if s/he is convinced that (real) authorial meaning and intention are either inaccessible or unimportant. Or one may prefer to note the comparisons and contrasts only as a means of noting Lkan similarities and peculiarities which can assist us as readers in setting the distinctiveness of the Lkan narrative into sharper focus.[25] The examination will limit itself to pertinent texts, i.e., those dealing with the activity of the crowd/people in the death of Jesus.

*Lk 22:6b.* The author explicitly states that Judas agreed to betray Jesus to the leaders "in the absence of the multitude." Neither Matt nor Mk offers this notation. Hence, according to either the two gospel or the two source hypothesis,

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[23] Even such grief or mourning, however, can have different nuances of interpretation, depending on how one has read the preceding material. Sanders, *Jews*, 228-29, takes it as a sign of sorrow. But "[a]re they sorrowing for Jesus or for themselves?" (228). And if the latter, are they sorry for what they have done or for what they know is inevitably coming to them? Tyson, *Death*, 36, believes that these crowds, along with the mourning supporters of 23:27, embody, like the chorus of Greek tragedy, "the emotions which the author wishes to evoke from the audience." Grundmann, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas* (Theologischer Handkommentar zum NT) Berlin, 1966, 435-36, believes it to denote repentance. Marshall, *Luke*, 876-77 believes this reads too much into it. Fitzmyer, *Luke*, 2:1520 believes it possible that it is "a sign of guilt and contrition," but opts for mourning as more likely. Tannehill, *Narrative Unity*, 1:166 views it as a sign of "remorse for sin." Such a reading allows for an acknowledgment of the people's guilt while, at the same time, setting the stage for the repentance of many of the people in Acts.

[24] I shall use the masculine pronoun to refer to the real author since I shall use the author's traditional name, Luke.

[25] This is what Tyson does. I am sympathetic with this, but am carrying it one step further, for I shall assume that either Matt or Mk was Luke's source. By reading Lkan distinctives through the lens of this assumption, such distinctives may take on more significance, for now such distinctives are viewed as conscious alterations and recreations of prior existing narrative worlds (Matt or Mk).

Luke added this comment. The conscious addition of this comment by the author would seem to confirm the reading offered above, namely that the narrator creates in the reader the expectation that Jesus will be delivered to the Jewish leaders in the *absence* of the crowd/people, an expectation fulfilled by 22:47-53 (assuming the "crowd" of 22:47 to be the Jewish leaders). The conclusion that the words of the narrator in 22:6 are the result of conscious authorial alteration of his source (whether Matt or Mk) allows the inference that the author indeed intended to have the narrator create an expectation that the crowds would not be present when Jesus was delivered to the Jewish leaders.

*Luke 22:47-53.* The preceding statement leads logically to an examination of the arrest scene. Both Matt and Mk indicate, as does Lk, that a crowd accompanied Judas to the scene of Jesus' capture (Matt 26:47 // Mk 14:42 // Lk 22:47). Both Matt and Mk differ from Lk in that they make clear that this crowd is "from" the Jewish leaders.[26] No indication is given by either Matt or Mk that any of the Jewish leaders are actually present. Luke not only strikes the reference, either from Matt or Mk, to the crowd being from the Jewish leaders, he also makes clear that the Jewish leaders are present. In 22:52 Luke makes definite the recipients of Jesus' words. Whereas Matt speaks of Jesus' addressing crowds (ὄχλοι, 26:55) and Mk speaks of Jesus' addressing "them" (αὐτοῖς, 14.48, referring back to the crowd of 14:43), Luke specifically wrote that Jesus spoke to the Jewish leaders ("the chief priests and officers of the temple and elders," 23:52). Following either Griesbach or Holtzmann, the conclusion appears clear that the author consciously changed his source to leave the impression that the "crowd" which came to arrest Jesus was the Jewish leaders, not sent *from* the Jewish leaders. This change is consistent with the fact that the author added to his source in 22:6 the statement that Jesus would be delivered to the Jewish leaders by Judas in the absence of the crowd. Matt's and Mk's portrayal of the arrest scene contradicted Luke's statement of 22:6, for in their portrayal Judas does not deliver Jesus to the Jewish leaders in the absence of the crowd but to a crowd sent by the leaders. Luke's alterations corrected that impression and allowed his narrator to leave the impression on the reader of Lk that the only "crowd" present at the scene of Jesus' capture was the Jewish leaders.

*Lk 22:54, 63-71.* Both Matt and Mk, as does Lk, note that Jesus was led away to the High Priest (Matt 26:57 // Mk 14:53 // Lk 22:54). Lk does not state, as do Matt and Mk, that the Jewish leaders were gathered there with the High Priest, presumably waiting for Jesus. Such a comment is unnecessary in Lk, given that the author had already written that the Jewish leaders were at the scene of Jesus' capture. It is these Jewish leaders, not the crowd, as in Matt and Mk, who are leading Jesus to the High Priest. The point is that the author seems to want to be careful to allow his narrator's voice to speak consistently, thus Luke strikes the comment about the gathered Jewish leaders from his source.

An additional comment should be made about this section of the narrative. Both Matt and Mk relate how the Jewish leaders brought forth false witnesses to testify against Jesus. The presence of such persons is consistent with the narratives of both Matt and Mk, for in both the crowd has already turned against Jesus, this turning being indicated by the crowd's presence at and active involvement in the capture of Jesus. Now that the crowd has turned, false

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[26] Matt 26:47 speaks of a ὄχλος πολὺς μετὰ μαχαιρῶν καὶ ξύλων ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχιερέων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων τοῦ λαοῦ. Mk 14:43 speaks of ὄχλος μετὰ μαχαιρῶν καὶ ξύλων παρὰ τῶν ἀρχιερέων καὶ τῶν γραμματέων καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων.

witnesses can be culled from the turned crowd. The reading of Lk offered in the first section of this paper argued that the crowd/people do not turn against Jesus—the leaders are the only Jews actively responsible for Jesus' death. It is reasonable and consistent, therefore, for the Lkan narrator to portray the hearing of Jesus before the council as involving only the leaders. The author allows the narrator to offer this portrayal by deleting from his source the account of the false witnesses. He may also have deleted the account because of a particular temple ideology, a fuller treatment of which can be found elsewhere.[27] If the temple ideology of the author is the cause of this material's deletion, then the resulting absence of any Jews, other than the leaders, from Jesus' hearing would perhaps have to be considered fortuitous.

*Lk 23:4-5.* These vv. are peculiar to Lk. Regardless of how one identifies the ὄχλοι of v. 4, the attitude (ἐπίσχυον) and response of the subjects of v. 5 seem appropriate to the leaders. His choice of ὄχλοι, however, might have been to call to mind the ὄχλος of 22:47 which consisted of chief priests and others. The word also could conjure up something of a tumultuous rabble in antiquity.[28] Luke's choice of this word to denote the Jewish leadership sets the stage for the forthcoming descriptions of their urgency (23:4), vehement accusations against Jesus before Herod (23:10), and the shouting out against and eventual crucifixion of Jesus (23:18ff.)

*Lk 23:6-12.* Luke adds, either to Matt or Mk, the entire scene involving Jesus before Herod. In this scene there is no mention of the people being present. He does specifically note, however, that the chief priests and scribes vehemently accused Jesus before Herod. This scene, added as it was by Luke to his source, does explicitly indict the leaders while the people, by virtue of the author's decision not to place them at the scene, are inactive with respect to any accusation against Jesus.

*Lk 23:13-16.* Again, like 23:4-5, there is no parallel in either Matt or Mk. The people are now present, but are they the audience whom Pilate is addressing? Once again, since there are no comparison texts by which to draw conclusions of authorial redaction and, hence, intention, no firm conclusions can be reached vis à vis redaction criticism.

*Lk 23:17-25.* Within this section of the narrative, two key texts from Matt have been deleted, assuming Matt to be the source. Matt 27:20 states that "the chief priests and the elders persuaded the people to ask for Barabbas and destroy Jesus." Thus, it is quite clear who is asking for Barabbas in Matt 27:21 and who is demanding Jesus' execution in vv. 22 and 23. The narrator of Matt emphasizes the guilt of the people by portraying Pilate as washing his hands of Jesus' blood and the people (πᾶς ὁ λαός) as saying "'His blood be on us and on our children" (v. 25). All of this has been struck by the author of Lk.

Assuming the two-source hypothesis, Luke has struck from the Mkan record a number of statements which specifically indict the people. Mk 15:8, which specifically designates the crowd (ὄχλος [which in the Mkan narrative is clearly distinguished from the leaders]) as taking on an active role in the proceedings, is struck by Luke. Mk 15:11 states that "the chief priests stirred up the crowd to have him [Pilate] release for them Barabbas." As in Matt, this statement makes it clear to the reader who is demanding Jesus' crucifixion in vv. 13 and 14—the crowd. Finally, Mk specifically states that Pilate released "for them" (αὐτοῖς)

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[27] See J. Bradley Chance, Jerusalem, the Temple, and the New Age.

[28] Liddell and Scott, s.v. ὄχλος and cognates.

Barabbas and delivered Jesus to be crucified, all in an effort τῷ ὄχλῳ τὸ ἱκανὸν ποιῆσαι. All of these statements have been removed by Luke.

*Lk 23:26-32.* This is found only in Lk. If one notes that Luke had either Matt or Mk in front of him and keeps in mind the portrait of the crowd/people offered by either of them, the contrast offered here is most striking. Whereas Matt and Mk have clearly accused the people of demanding Jesus' death, Luke portrayed the people and the women as following him (ἠκολούθει . . . πολὺ πλῆθος τοῦ λαοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν) with these women bewailing and lamenting him.

*Lk 23:35-38.* Luke distinguishes between the people and the leaders. He specifically states that the people stood by and watched, but (δὲ καί) the leaders scoffed. Matt and Mk do not explicitly indict the people here, but they do indicate specifically that there were others, denoted by both as οἱ παραπορευόμενοι, who, along with the leaders, blasphemed against Jesus. Luke altered a statement which *could* have been read as an indictment of the people to state specifically that the people said nothing.

*Lk 23:48.* Only Luke noted the grief-filled or mournful reaction of the bystanders. This reaction is very different than the impression left by either Matt or Mk who have portrayed the "passers by" and the rulers as commonly scoffing at Jesus.

*Summary.* Comparison with Matt and Mk indicates that, regardless of which narrative Luke was following, he would have been confronted with narratives which clearly indicted the people. In every instance where Luke found explicit statements indicting the people, he struck them.[29] In instances where Luke added to his source he portrayed the people either as present, though he offered no unambiguous indications that they cried out against Jesus,[30] or as mourning what was happening (or had happened) to Jesus, or as silent.[31] In one instance (Lk 23:6-12) he specifically added to his source a statement that the Jewish leaders accused Jesus. The alterations which Luke made to his source stand consistently with the reading offered in the first section of this paper, namely that the people were not actively involved in the execution of Jesus. It is the leaders who are actively guilty of killing Jesus.

## Some Implications for Interpreting Lk-Acts

*The Data of Acts*

The subtitle of this paper assumed that in the speeches of Acts the "people" are soundly condemned along with their leaders for the execution of Jesus. The texts merely need to be cited and some selective content briefly noted to establish this as a given: Acts 2:22a-23, 36; 3:12, 13; 10:39; 13:27-28. In Peter's speech of chapter 2, addressed to "Men of Judea and all who live in Jerusalem" (2:14), one finds such statements as "you crucified and killed [this man Jesus] by the hands of those outside the law ..." (2:23b) and "... this Jesus whom you crucified" (2:36b). Peter's speech of chapter 3 is addressed to the "people" (λαός) who are identified as "men of Israel" (3:11). Peter speaks of Jesus to this group as him "whom you handed over and rejected in the presence of Pilate, though he had decided to release him. But you rejected the Holy and Righteous One and you

29 See the above discussion of Lk 23:17-25; 23:35-38.

30 See the discussion above of 23:13-16.

31 See the discussion above of Lk 23:26-32, 48.

asked to have a murderer given to you and you killed the Author of life ..." (3:13b-15a). The précis of the role of the people in the speeches of Acts (other texts could be cited) and description of the their role in the passion narrative of the gospel are not, therefore, consistent.

What are the implications of this inconsistent narrative role on the interpretation of the narrative? What I shall offer is only suggestive. The following discussion shall offer some reflections on the implications for the interpretation of the Lk-Acts by centering the discussion around two major issues. First, issues of authorial competence, consistency, and unity will be explored. Second, issues of interpretation assuming narrative unity will be discussed. In this second section I shall examine how my reading of the role of the people in the narrative impacts other readings which have been offered.

*Authorial Competence, Consistency, and Unity*

Interpreters have been frustrated before by inconsistencies in the narrative of Lk-Acts. Prior to the emergence of the dominance of narrative criticism interpreters tended to deal with such inconsistencies by dealing with the author, or perhaps his sources or even his environment. A few examples will suffice for illustrative purposes.

The account of Jesus' departure/ascension in the gospel (24:44-53) appears to find a parallel account in the opening lines of Acts (1:1-12). The reference to the universal mission ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ Ἰερουσαλήμ (Lk. 24:47) offers an allusion to Acts 1:8. The disciples are instructed to stay in Jerusalem to await τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ πατρός in both Lk 24:49 and Acts 1:4. Thirdly, the phrase ἀνεφέρετο εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν (Lk 24:51b) alludes to the scene of Acts 1:9-11. Finally, Lk 24:53 concludes with the statement that they returned to Jerusalem (ὑπέστρεψαν εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ) and were continually praising God in the temple. In Acts the scene wraps up with ὑπέστρεψαν εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ, though they do not go to the temple, but to the upper room. The problem is that while there are enough similarities to view these as parallel scenes, there are enough differences to cause confusion. The chief difference is that the gospel account seems to assume an Easter day ascension while the Acts narrative explicitly indicates that this is all happening 40 days later (Acts 1:3). How does one account for the narrative inconsistency?

Some interpreters have accounted for the narrative inconsistency by denying authorial unity.[32] According to this view, the gospel ended originally at 24:49. The narrative then continued with Acts 1:6. Only later, when Lk and Acts were divided, was a more fitting ending appended to the gospel and a proper beginning added to Acts. Here the problem of lack of narrative unity is solved by appeal to lack of authorial unity. The fact of different and later authors (editors might be more appropriate) explains the disjunctures in the narrative. The problem created by the narrative is not so much interpreted as given causal explanation. There is a fracture in the narrative because later editors did a less-than-adequate job at splitting the text.

Others, such as Haenchen,[33] simply acknowledge and accept the fact of authorial inconsistency, allowing it to stand in the name of a greater issue, such as the making of a theological point. With respect to the twofold account of the

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[32] Ernst Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles: A Commentary* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971) 144-45, offers a good summary of those who propose this suggestion to address the lack of narrative consistency.

[33] Ibid., 146-47.

ascension Haenchen states: "Here we must remind ourselves that Luke does not set as much store as we upon consistency in the story. ... To Luke it is of the utmost importance that Acts should begin not with the disciples left to their own devices, but with the Lord, who visits and instructs them for forty days more. ... This Ascension after forty days is however suitable only for Acts, not for the end of Luke. There the normal gospel version is appropriate, according to which Jesus took his leave on the night of Easter Sunday. ... Exception to the variance of the two versions ... has been taken only by those scholars who hold the writer to account for each stroke of the pen and are not satisfied until each tiny stone exactly fits its neighbors."[34]

Haenchen finds the solution to the problem of lack of narrative consistency by asserting that it is simply not a problem—at least for the author. He was, apparently, constrained by larger, more important agendas, agendas which, implicitly, ought to become ours. He had to end the gospel in the "normal" manner, but could not begin the second narrative "with the disciples left to their own devices." Our author is competent—he knows what he is doing— and there is only one author; he is just not consistent because he has more important things in mind than narrative consistency. Explanation for the narrative inconsistency is found by appealing to the author's lack of interest in the matter of narrative consistency.

A second example of narrative inconsistency which has sparked conversation involves the conversion of Paul. These issues are also well known so only immediately pertinent matters dealing with narrative consistency will be noted in the following table.

| *Account One (9:1-19)* | *Account Two (22:6-16)* | *Account Three (26:12-18)* |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Paul falls to the ground (v. 4) | 1. Paul falls to the ground (v. 7) | 1. All fall to the ground (v. 14). |
| 2. Men with Paul hear the voice (v. 7) | 2. Men with Paul do not hear the voice (v. 9) | 2. No comment |
| 3. Men with Paul see no one (v. 7) | 3. Men with Paul see the light (v. 9) | 3. No comment |
| 4. Ananias told of Paul's mission (vv. 15-16). No explicit word that he relates it to Paul. | 4. Ananias tells Paul what his mission will be (vv. 14-15) | 4. Jesus tells Paul of his mission—Ananias not mentioned (vv. 16-17) |

Some have explained the lack of narrative consistency in the above accounts by appeal to Luke's use of sources. Luke was confronted with contradictory sources which he could only harmonize so well.[35] Apparently, our author respected the sources enough that he could not simply follow one, consistent, line of tradition. He was constrained by his respect for sources or even his own ability to harmonize them. As with his analysis of the ascension, Haenchen again simply acknowledges the lack of consistency but dismisses it by asserting that

[34] Ibid., 146.

[35] See Haenchen, ibid., 325-27 for various attempts to address this issue through the appeal to sources.

the author was not bothered by being inconsistent: "Luke is not troubled by the contradictions."[36] Luke's goal is one of emphasis—namely to highlight the conversion of Paul by relating it three times so as to make clear that the movement of the gospel to the Gentiles is not the result of "human evolution ..., but an act of God—and that alone!"[37] This does not exactly tell the reader (Haenchen's reader) why the author could not have been a little more consistent, but apparently one is to conclude that Luke is simply not interested in the kind of consistency which one would expect of one primarily concerned with *historical* veracity. The central *point*, not the *details*, is the concern of the author.

The final example of narrative inconsistency I shall note concerns not details of parallel accounts, but issues and ideas. Years ago, Stephen Wilson detected two differing, I shall call them inconsistent, strands in the eschatological material in Luke. He detected a "delay strand" (e.g., Lk 9:27; 19:11; 19:41ff.; 21:20-24; 22:69) and an "imminent strand" (e.g., Lk 10:9, 11; 12:38-40, 41-48; 12:54-13:9; 18:8; 21:32).[38] Wilson attributed the inconsistency to the historical situation in which Luke found himself. "The fundamental explanation of the two strands in Luke's eschatology is to be found in the pastoral situations with which he was faced. A Church faced with a delayed Parousia could easily lapse into one of two false extremes. The first is a fervent renewal of apocalypticism, which included false Messiahs who claimed that the End was near or already here. ... But yet another problem can arise from a situation where an expected Parousia fails to materialize, namely a denial that the Parousia would come at all. ..."[39]

Wilson noted in his reading of Acts no evidence of an imminent strand: "... in Acts there is no imminent expectation. ... It might also suggest that Acts was written a considerable time after the Gospel and that it is not improbable that Luke's views had developed in this time or perhaps, in the case of eschatology, the problems he faced had altered."[40]

In some manner or another the way of reading represented by the above discussion reveals that perceived lapses of narrative consistency could readily be explained by making conclusions about the *author's* lack of consistency, a lack of consistency caused by any number of factors: his skills in interacting with his sources, his reactions to his environment, or even consistency in his own dispositions. Such conclusions about the author then allowed for the relatively easy dismissal of any interpretative problems created by lack of narrative consistency. Perhaps he could not consolidate his sources very well. Perhaps he just didn't care about consistency within the story. Perhaps the environment to which he was responding (an environment accessible to us vis à vis an examination of how he responded to it) was complex or changing. Perhaps he just changed his mind. Or perhaps, in later years, others just could not keep their hands off the text.

Solutions to problems created by lack of narrative consistency could be found by focusing attention not on the text itself, but on the author (and/or editors) and the world that stood behind the narrative. The text was simply read referentially. And it was in that something on the back side of the text and to which the text was referring that satisfying solutions were to be found. Meaning, after all, lay in

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36 Ibid., 327.

37 Ibid., 328

38 *The Gentiles and the Gentile Mission in Luke-Acts*, SNTSMS 23 (Cambridge: University Press, 1973) 67-77.

39 Ibid., 83-84.

40 Ibid., 86.

the world on the backside of the text, whether that world be understood as the author's mind, his sources, his environment, or his successors. The inconsistencies of the narrative offered only a temporary barrier to real meaning.

Narrative inconsistencies left their smudges on the textual window, fingerprints left by someone or something living in the world on the other side of the glass. Explain the smudges, tell how the fingerprints got there, and there was no real need to explain the fingerprints themselves. In the explanation of origins and causes of the phenomenon lay sufficient explanation of the phenomenon itself. There was certainly no real need to worry about the fact that window itself was smudged. In fact, the smudges were our best clues to the world we were really interested in anyway—the world referred to by the narrative. Explaining *how* the fingerprints got there was the order of the day. *What* they were doing there—other than providing us clues to gain insight on the world on the backside of the glass—was not our problem.

It is interesting to examine these explanations of narrative inconsistency—they tell us much about how we all once read. And, frankly, no divine fiat has declared that such a way of reading is not still legitimate. We simply do not find such referential reading as satisfying these days.[41] Following the cues of our predecessors, one might appeal to the inconsistency of possible Lukan sources in order to explain the inconsistent portrait of the Jewish people in the death of Jesus. Vincent Taylor's hypothetical pre-Lukan passion source, for example, simply did not jibe with some of the sources of the speech material of Acts.[42] Or one might follow the example of Stephen Wilson and suggest that the "Jewish situation" had deteriorated in between the writing of Lk and Acts. When Luke penned the gospel, there was hope of Jewish conversion, so perhaps he needed to pin the blame for Jesus' death on as narrow a group as possible. By the time Luke penned Acts, something had changed—any number of speculations might be offered. But, for whatever reason, the author no longer felt compelled to minimize the guilt of the people—all the Jews are guilty. However, explaining the inconsistent narrative role of the Jewish people by appeal to contradictory sources, an authorial change of heart, or a changing historical situation which the author was addressing, is increasingly viewed as "copping out." If there are fin-

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41 See Edgar McKnight, *Post-Modern Use of the Bible: The Emergence of Reader-Oriented Criticism* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1988) esp. chaps. 1-2.

42 Vincent Taylor has offered a reconstruction of a pre-Lukan passion narrative in *The Passion Narrative of St Luke: A Critical and Historical Investigation*, SNTSMS 19 (Cambridge: University Press, 1972). See 127-32 for Taylor's translation of the end product of his research. One might note that it was this special source which placed the Jewish leaders at the arrest scene, portrayed the Jewish leaders as making the harsh charges against Jesus before Pilate, formed the basis of the Herod trial scene where the Jewish leaders made accusation against Jesus, and offered the description of the wailing women and the silent and mourning crowds. One who was so inclined might contrast this data with the research of Richard F. Zehnle, *Peter's Pentecost Discourse: Tradition and Lukan Reinterpretation in Peter's Speeches of Acts 2 and 3*, SBLMS 15 (Nashville: Abingdon, 1971). He found much of the content of Peter's speech of Acts 3 to contain material pointing to a pre-Lukan source. Among the texts which Zehnle argued contained non-Lukan (hence pre-Lukan) material was Acts 3:14-15 (see 47-53). This non-Lukan text contains one of the sharpest charges leveled against the Jewish people. Contrast this with Taylor's pre-Lukan passion narrative, which tended to implicate the leaders and portray the people and silent and mournful bystanders, and one might have the beginnings of a "discrepancy in the sources" explanation. In another era, this perhaps would have been the "proper way" to broach the issue.

gerprints on the glass, sense still needs to be made of glass itself, smudges and all.

Stephen Moore is not so enthusiastic about our assumptions or new ways of reading. Increasingly, we assume that a fracture in the text is not, to use Moore's words "The Ghost of Fragmentation Past."[43] These "crevices and interstices" are not, we assume today, the result of "the conflation of source material,"[44] but the result of persistent and consistent authorial artistry. To be sure, we are back to the author here—at least we are in the critics I shall examine in the next section. But our perspective of the author has changed. He is no longer prone to change his mind or be at the whim of his environment, as Stephen Wilson's Luke was. He, apparently, would be bothered by inconsistency and contradiction, unlike Ernst Haenchen's Luke. Or, at the very least, if one finds such inconsistency one should assume that the author put this in the narrative on purpose to show us something. And certainly, he did not simply throw sources together.

Whether we are right to be reading the way we now do, I do not know. But, then, one of the advantages of being admittedly post-modern is that we can say "I don't know." But I do know that if satisfying sense is to be made of the implications of the inconsistent narrative role ascribed to the Jewish people by my reading of the text, sense must be found in the world of the narrative—not the world on the backside.[45] With this admission, I proceed.

*Implications for Reading Assuming Narrative Unity: Three Examples*

Readers tend not to flock to readings merely because readings offer good possibilities for understanding a text. Even readings which are good and plausible will tend not to be followed if they cannot be shown to be viable readings within the context of a community of readers. Robert Brawley's very careful reading of Lk-Acts which he shares in his book *Luke-Acts and the Jews: Conflict, Apology, and Conciliation* offers a case in point. Brawley swims mightily against the stream of the community of readers on at least two issues in his book. First, he argues that the so-called Nazareth pericope serves to focus on the identity of Jesus as the rejected prophet and is not programmatic in the sense that it foreshadows the Gentile mission.[46] Second, he argues that Luke's portrait of Paul is just that: Luke's portrait of *Paul* and *his* mission. It is a mission to the diaspora that involves both Jew and Gentile. His mission is not, according to Brawley, representative of the mission of the church.[47] Brawley's reading is careful and provocative. It has not, however, I think, changed the way the community of readers has understood the Nazareth pericope or Luke's use of Paul. Is that because Brawley offers a reading that just does not make sense? I think not. I think it more likely that the community of readers is simply quite slow to move away from readings that have served it well for so long. And reading the

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43 Moore, *Literary Criticism*, 29-38. Moore offers a more detailed critique of the guild's fascination with the gospels as unified narratives in "Are the Gospels Unified Narratives?" 1987 SBLSP, ed., Kent Richards (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987) 443-58.

44 Literary Criticism, 34.

45 Perhaps I am guilty of the charge which Moore levelled against Tannehill's "confidence in Luke's power to rule." Such confidence, said Moore, "is a function of Tannehill's sociocultural situation and that of the guild to which he belongs" (ibid., 37).

46 Luke-Acts and the Jews, 6-27.

47 Ibid., pp. 68-83.

Nazareth pericope as programmatic for the Gentile mission and Paul's story in Acts as the narrative fulfillment of that mission has served us all quite well.[48]

The purpose of this section, therefore, is not to try to convince the three readers with whom I shall offer dialogue that they are wrong. I would like, however, to try to show the community of readers that my reading of the role of the people is *viable* in that it can complement and supplement readings of the whole of Lk-Acts which have already been offered and have been found to be worthy of serious consideration, if not unanimous acceptance, by the community of readers.

*James Dawsey and the absurd narrator.* In his book, *The Lukan Voice*,[49] Dawsey has argued that Luke distinguished between the various voices offered in the narrative—including that of the narrator. Dawsey focuses most of his attention on the differences between the narrator's voice and that of Jesus. He locates differences both with respect to style and content.

With respect to style, the narrator uses language reflective "of a specialized language of worship."[50] Jesus' language, however, is prophetic. Hence, "[w]hile the narrator speaks a language of worship, Jesus speaks a language of prophecy."[51] With respect to content, Dawsey notes that Jesus' voice when addressing such issues as christology, the kingdom of God, miracles, and his acceptance/rejection by the people of his generation contrasts with the word of the narrator on these issues. Given the focus of my own discussion, I shall concentrate my summary on the issues of christology and the rejection of Jesus.

According to Jesus' voice, Jesus is the prophet who becomes "the Christ after crucifixion."[52] There lies behind this pattern "a concept of consummation through suffering."[53] The narrator, however, never refers to Jesus as a prophet and views him as being the Christ from the beginning.[54] It would seem to follow from these contrasting christological conceptions that Jesus and the narrator would have different valuations of Jesus' suffering. Indeed they do. The narrator, who "has his eyes fixed on the image of the exalted Jesus and [who] filters the gospel story through his confession that Jesus is Lord ... tones down Jesus' view of complete rejection by associating the crucifixion primarily with the temple authorities and Satan and by introducing a divine plan of secrecy that keeps 'all the people' from fully perceiving who Jesus is. ..."[55] Jesus, on the other hand, views his rejection as coming from all Israel, not just the leaders. "To Jesus, most of the people, that is, 'the men of this generation,' reject him. To the narrator, however, Jesus is accepted by most of the people."[56] According to Dawsey, the narrator has chosen the term λαός to denote the people (as opposed to Jesus' favorite phrase "this generation") so as to allow the relevance of the story being

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[48] I, e.g., found both commonly accepted readings of these two issues quite serviceable in my own work. One only needs survey the literature to see how serviceable many interpreters find these readings.

[49] *The Lukan Voice: Confusion and Irony in the Gospel of Luke* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1986).

[50] Ibid., 29.

[51] Ibid., 41.

[52] Ibid., 46.

[53] Ibid., 47.

[54] Ibid., 88-94.

[55] Ibid., 123.

[56] Ibid., 77.

narrated to extend beyond the literal time of Jesus' generation and to allow "the universal Church, both Jews and Gentiles, a part in the story of salvation."[57]

Why this incongruity of voices in the narrative? Why, in comparison to Jesus, does the narrator offer an absurd[58] view of things? Dawsey explains the fact that the narrator speaks in a style conducive to that of a worshipping community to mean that the narrator does, in the narrative, speak for the worshipping community. But it is a community which "does not understand the humiliation of Jesus." [59] Apparently such a lack of understanding of Jesus' rejection, suffering, and humiliation had resulted in the community's substitution of cultic adoration for the demand of "following his path of humiliation."[60] This voice of a second generation Christian believer failed to view Jesus as "the prophetic messenger of God who has come to announce the rejection of Israel and call its outcasts into the kingdom. Jesus is the exalted Lord of 'all the people.'... It is also not surprising that a believer would experience some difficulty with the concept of a rejected Lord and attempt to make of the rejection something less than it really was."[61]

The author, Dawsey concludes, wished to challenge this community's perspective by setting up this incongruity of voices, one representing the community, the other speaking the word of Jesus. "One can imagine that the purpose of the irony at play in the views of the narrator and of Jesus would likewise be to chafe the audience into a change of perspective. ... To encounter the Lord means to meet the suffering Jesus, and it is in this confrontation of the community with the Jesus of the cross that the narrator plays his role."[62] The community has attempted to avoid this Jesus by downplaying the totality of the people's rejection of him. As a consequence, Luke's church, "like the church of every generation, categorized Jesus as Lord and was unaware of any complicity in his death. As the narrator speaks for his generation, Jesus dies at the hands of a few evil men and Satan. But in the Church, each new generation must come face to face with the suffering Jesus. The Lord who manifests himself is not the one the community exalts, but the one whom it has rejected."[63]

Dawsey also believes that the whole "narrative structure," as he calls it, stands in tension with the narrator's voice as well. With respect to the contribution of "narrative structure" to the issue of Jesus' rejection Dawsey notes: "The narrative structure of Luke supports Jesus' view of rejection in other ways also. Noticeably, the crowd turns against Jesus and joins the chief priests and the rulers in demanding Jesus' crucifixion and the release of Barabbas (cf. Lk. 23:13, 18, 21, 23)."[64]

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57 Ibid., 82.

58 Dawsey asks, "Was [the author] setting up his own narrator as an absurd character who sees but does not see?" ibid., 153. Moore speaks of Dawsey's absurd narrator under the modern rubric of "unreliable narrator." He is skeptical of this solution to the problem of inconsistency in part because the whole notion of "unreliable narrator" is a modern literary phenomenon. See *Literary Criticism*, 33.

59 Ibid., 152.

60 Ibid., 152.

61 Ibid, 123, 124.

62 Ibid., 154.

63 Ibid., 155.

64 Ibid., 120.

What implications does my reading of the role of the people in the Lkan passion narrative have on Dawsey's reading of Lk? Following my reading, the people do not turn against Jesus in the Lkan passion narrative. One implication that this has on Dawsey's reading is to allow the narrator to speak more consistently in the narrative. Dawsey insists that the narrator believes that people are generally responsive to Jesus. Yet Dawsey, in his analysis of "narrative structure," concluded that, in the end, "the crowd turns against Jesus ... (cf. Lk. 23:13, 18, 21, 23)."[65] Yet two of the verses cited by Dawsey (vv. 13 and 23) represent the voice of the narrator. The other verses represent the voice of characters in the story whose identity can be established only by appeal to what the *narrator* has told us. If the narrator has led the reader to identify those shouting for the death of Jesus to be the people, the narrator now sides with Jesus on this issue. If so, then something significant has happened—namely the narrator, representing the voice of the community, has "changed prospective" and experienced the needed conversion for which the author is calling. The narrator now recognizes the guilt of all the people. But Dawsey does not say this, so I can only conclude that this is not what is happening in his reading of the narrative. Dawsey has not called our attention to the conversion of the narrator. Hence, if the narrator is not converted, then his/her voice should maintain consistently in the narrative the relative innocence of the people. My reading of the passion narrative allows this conclusion.

If one were to follow my reading, one would, indeed, conclude that the Jewish leaders are the ones responsible for the death of Jesus in the passion narrative. Any ambiguity which all of the indefinite plural verbs and participles might have created[66] is immediately clarified in the words of Cleopas and his friend: "Our chief priests and rulers delivered him to a judgment of death and crucified him" (Lk. 24:20). The believer-reader enters the continuation of the story of in Acts with his/her perspective on the death of Jesus intact—the Jewish leaders did it, not the people as a whole. This is, to be sure, a perspective which has stood in tension with the word of Jesus. Still, the last word which the reader hears as s/he exits the gospel narrative seems, apparently, to resolve the issue: the leaders did it.

The speeches of Acts shatter this comfortable resolution. The Jews of Jerusalem as a people are guilty. There is no question. The credible voices of Acts make clear that the passive non-resistance of the people earns them the exact condemnation and guilt as the active antagonism of the Jewish leaders. And what are the Lkan readers to do with this unambiguous incongruity? Recall that such incongruities "were to chafe the audience into a change of perspective" and to lead it to break itself from the pattern which did not allow it to recognize its own complicity in Jesus' death. A narrative which made the point that passive non-resistance in the face of evil earned one the same condemnation as active participation in the evil would drive home this point with power.

In fact, it might drive home the point more forcefully. For Luke to achieve his goal he would have to guide his readers into identifying with "the people." Which reading of the role of the people in the passion narrative, Dawsey's or mine, would most likely lead the reader to identify with "the people"? One in which "the crowd turns against Jesus and joins the chief priests and the rulers in demanding Jesus' crucifixion and the release of Barabbas (cf. Lk. 23:13, 18, 21,

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[65] Ibid.

[66] See the discussion above, esp of Lk 23:18-31.

23)"[67] or one in which the people appear as hapless, sorrowful victims of their own rulers' evil scheming? If the author's intention was to suck the reader in to identify with "the people" so that the upcoming condemnations in Acts would be inescapable, I think my reading works better. Christian readers are not likely to identify with people who demand Jesus' death. They might very well identify with people who helplessly watch and mourn. This is the second implication which my reading has on Dawsey's reading: the hoped-for change of perspective on the part of the reader is more likely to occur if the reader is seduced into identifying with the people who, according the narrator at least, are not really guilty for Jesus' death. The sharp words of condemnation offered by the speaker of Acts, then, would hit the readers broadside, perhaps cutting them to the heart and prompting them to ask with the people of Acts "What should we do?" (Acts 2:37).

*Jack Sanders and the shrewd (but hateful) narrator.* Sanders offers a way of reading of the Lkan narrative which is actually quite similar to that of Dawsey. Like Dawsey, Sanders notes that one seems to find two perspectives on the issue of the Jewish people in the narrative. In some material, notably speech material, one finds a "blanket condemnation" of the people,[68] whereas in other material, notably the narrative material, one finds a story of "the gathering of Israel,"[69] through which the true Israel is called into existence based on its positive response to Jesus. Luke "has his main characters"[70] say one thing about the Jews, namely that they "generally are irredeemably resistant to God's will and his offer of salvation, and that they are the murderers of Jesus."[71] But in the story line and the narrative "... we find quite a different situation, for, in the narrative, the people are often pointedly set apart from their rulers. ... [T]hey 'hang on Jesus' every word' (Luke 19:48), they grant their favor to the apostles (Acts 2:47), and they both follow Jesus (Luke 12:1) and later are converted to Christianity (Acts 21:20) by the 'myriads.'"[72] The key to the solution to this problem of inconsistency is found in the problem itself: speech material says one thing about the Jews, narrative material another.

Sanders finds his inspiration in Lohfink who noted these differences and attributed them to differences in the sources.[73] Sanders, however, unlike our survey of interpreters in the preceding sub-section of this paper, cannot find the solution in an appeal to inconsistent sources. [74] Something clever and even devious is going on in the artistic planning of the author. "... a closer examination of the *plot development* in the narrative of Luke-Acts will show that only one mind is responsible for the narrative and for the speeches, that the apparent disharmonious juxtaposition of the good Jewish people in the narrative and the bad Jewish people in the speeches is quite deliberate and serves a definite purpose, and that

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67 Dawsey, *Lukan Voice*, 120.

68 "The Jewish People in Luke-Acts," in Joseph B. Tyson, ed. *Luke-Acts and the Jewish People: Eight Critical Perspectives* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1988) 58.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid., 61.

72 Ibid., 66.

73 Ibid., 55.

74 "Source and redaction theories, unfortunately, do not answer our question" (ibid., 58). I'm curious as to what is "unfortunate" about this.

our author finally—and quite skillfully, one might add—brings the two together in a successful resolution."[75]

Examination of this plot development reveals that "[i]n the gospel, up until the passion narrative, the people are distinguished from their leaders, who oppose Jesus, and are represented as responding quite favorably to Jesus. This portrayal of the Jewish people continues into Acts, where they respond positively to the apostles as they had before to Jesus. ..."[76] Sanders views the change on the part of the people in the passion narrative as mysterious and only momentary. For "the people are once again set apart from the religious leaders, so that, finally, the strolling companions of the resurrected Jesus on the Emmaus road say (Luke 24:20), 'Our chief priests and rulers delivered him and crucified him,' thus distancing themselves from the deed. ... Luke seems to want to involve 'the people' in guilt for the execution of Jesus while at the same time maintaining the image of the religious leaders as the primary actors."[77]

The summary of the two men in Lk 24:20 is not intended to absolve "the people," despite the fact that the people are not named in their account of what happened. For one thing, the focus of the whole narrative is the resurrection and the astonishment of the two men that Jesus is alive. Sanders does not say this, but I presume that he means that such a focus on the resurrection and its effects necessitates only a cursory "summary" of crucifixion events. Second, "Luke apparently intends to designate them [the Emmaus travellers] as Christians. ... Luke is ... describing Jesus' appearances to 'his people.' Such people, of course, did not execute Jesus."[78]

In accounting for the pattern of behavior on the part of the people Sanders marshalls chiefly two arguments. First, the Nazareth pericope offers a programmatic pattern which is duplicated in the larger narrative. Just as all the people respond favorably to Jesus only then to turn against him in this pericope, so "all the people ... respond favorably to Jesus up until Luke 23, when they suddenly join with the religious leaders in calling for Jesus' death. ..."[79] In Acts the pattern begins again with the people responding positively to the apostles then turning on the followers of Jesus beginning with the Stephen episode.

Second, as the plot gradually unfolds in Acts the true character of the people, a character made known to the reader from the beginning of the story through the speeches of the main characters, comes to light. In the development of the story "[t]he accusations are becoming historical reality."[80] Finally, in the "Pauline passion narrative" the people take the leading role against him (cf. 21:30, 36; 22:22, 30; 23:12). When Paul offers the final condemning word in Rome (Acts 28:25-28) "... the Jews have *become* what they from the first *were;* for what Jesus, Stephen, Peter, and Paul say about the Jews—about their hostility toward Jesus and the gospels, about their murder of Jesus—is what Luke understands the Jewish people to be in their essence. The narrative shows how existence comes to conform to essence. ..."[81] It is this gradual narrative unfolding of the Jews' essence which explains the somewhat ambiguous picture of the Jewish people in

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75 Ibid., 68.
76 Ibid., 68.
77 Ibid., 68.
78 Ibid., 69.
79 Ibid., 70.
80 Ibid., 71.
81 Ibid., 73.

the passion narrative. Luke had to make them just guilty enough so as to make the charges which Peter and the other characters of Acts hurl about them reasonable. But Luke could not make the people so guilty as to leave Acts anticlimactic. Luke wanted to hold the resolution of the tension between essence and becoming until the end of the narrative.

For James Dawsey, Luke's narrator was absurd, or in the parlance of contemporary literary language, unreliable. Sanders' narrator is patient, clever, and even devious, offering a portrait of the people which is not consistent with the portrait of the speakers. But the narrator knows where s/he is going. As early as the Nazareth pericope the word of Jesus and the voice of the narrator came together to portray a people bent on the rejection of Jesus.[82] The narrator, having established his/her credibility that s/he really did know what the Jewish people were, backed off and proceeded to show how only gradually, on the plain of event, did the true essence of the people come forth.

Luke (the real author) was, according to Sanders, "anti-Semitic."[83] He did not like Jews. His main characters did not like Jews. His narrator did not like Jews. The narrator held back complete judgment only, it would seem, so as to allow the reader to see for him/herself, gradually, step by step, just how bad these Jews really were. In short, "'[t]he Jews' are the villains. ..."[84] Can my reading of the role of the people in the passion narrative jibe with Sanders' reading of the whole of Luke-Acts? I believe so.

I begin with two specific observations. First, Sanders does not appear to offer a very satisfying explanation for why the two men going to Emmaus do not include "the people" in their statement of Jesus' executioners. Sanders' explanation that the purpose of the narrative is to focus on the resurrection really does not address the issue. Focus on the resurrection would not have prevented the two men from adding "and the people" to the list of Jesus' executioners. Sanders says, however, that most likely the omission of the people was because Luke was intending to portray the Emmaus men as Christians and "[s]uch people, of course, did not execute Jesus."[85] But, again, this does not really address the issue. The same author understood Peter and Paul as "Christians." But they did not hesitate to include "the people" in their account of Jesus' executioners. There is no reason why the two men to Emmaus could not have indicted the people as well. Following my reading, the summary of the men to Emmaus is consistent with what the narrator has led the reader to conclude. These men are not

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[82] This, of course, is the primary difference between Dawsey and Sanders. Sanders' narrator is "reliable." His/her "voice" is distinct from the characters not because s/he represents a point of view which needs conversion, but in order to *show* the reader precisely how the Jews come gradually through their behavior to manifest what kind of people they really are. Still, both do find significance in the fact that speakers say one thing while the narrative (or narrator's voice [Dawsey]) says another.

[83] Sanders is quite clear that only this word will do to describe Luke. He follows John Gager's definition of anti-Semitism as "a fundamental and systematic hostility toward Jews" (*Jews*, xvi). Sanders goes on to say, "It may be that Luke's hostility toward Jews was not exactly racial in the way in which we think of racial hatred today, but it was something very close to it" (ibid.). Sanders sees the portrait of the Jews offered by Lk-Acts as consisting of a kind of hostility sufficient to be called anti-Semitic. A terse sentence from Sanders' conclusion makes the point with chilling clarity: "In Luke's opinion, the world will be much better off when 'the Jews' get what they deserve and the world is rid of them" (*Jews*, 317).

[84] "Jewish People," 75.

[85] Ibid., 69.

inspired (the Spirit has not yet been given); these men have not yet had the meaning of the scriptures opened to them (that awaits Lk 24:27). Only in the context of full and complete spiritual understanding can one recognize the guilt of all the people. In short, by following my reading of the passion narrative one is simply not left to explain why the two men to Emmaus do not include the people in their indictment. And as Sanders' own exegesis shows, good explanations are hard to come by. Why? Because what the two men say happened is *not* a good summary of what happened if one reads the passion narrative to state that the people were actively responsible for the death of Jesus.

Second, Sanders finds partial explanation for the temporary alignment of the people with their leaders in the programmatic pattern of the Nazareth pericope. Here, too, the people initially heard Jesus positively (this corresponds to the gospel narrative up to Lk 23) only to reject him by the end of the story (corresponding to the passion narrative). This rejection of Jesus is tied to the issue of the divine intent to offer salvation of the Gentiles, as the programmatic Nazareth pericope makes clear.[86] This pattern is then *repeated* in Acts, with the people initially responding to the message of the apostles and later, beginning with Stephen, rejecting the Christian message.[87] This programmatic pattern of acceptance-rejection has been more fully explored by Joe Tyson, and his exploration deserves to be incorporated into this discussion.

Tyson has argued that the literary pattern of acceptance-rejection lies at the heart of the Lkan structure. In his words, the pattern displayed at Nazareth "presents in miniature the pattern that shapes the Lukan narrative in the gospel as a whole."[88] The first part of the gospel and even of the Jerusalem ministry is marked by acceptance. However, this changes as the passion narrative progresses. "[W]e find that, although Jesus is not without some popular support, the crowd as a whole is lined up with his opponents, who are led by the chief priests."[89] The pattern then begins over again in Acts, both with respect to the larger structure of the whole book, where one finds initial acceptance of the apostles' message, and even in sub-sections, e.g., Paul's journeys into various cities. Paul's arrival in Jerusalem marks the initiation of Paul's ultimate rejection.[90]

In his conclusion to this chapter of his book, Tyson offers a very important statement with respect to this pattern and its implications for interpreting the narrative. "The strength of this literary pattern may be seen in the fact that its use involves certain logical inconsistencies. In reading the two books consecutively we find that the same public that finally rejected Jesus initially accepted his successors. This logical inconsistency is created by the use of the same literary pattern first in the gospel and then again in Acts.[91] A little later Tyson states, "In the programmatic narrative of Jesus at Nazareth (Luke 4:16-30) the change from public acceptance to rejection occurred when Jesus, in his sermon, pointed out that Elijah and Elisha neglected Israelite widows and lepers but granted help to Gentiles."[92]

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86 *Jews*, 165-68.

87 "Jewish People," 69-70.

88 *Death*, 33.

89 Ibid., 34.

90 Ibid., 38-42.

91 Ibid., 42.

92 Ibid., 44.

These last two statements are most important for they clearly align Tyson and Sanders. Both see the literary pattern outlined in the Nazareth pericope as explaining the pattern of acceptance-rejection which is found *repeated* in Luke *and* Acts (rather than running consecutively through the narrative of Lk-Acts). And both see the issue of the Gentiles as the catalyst to spark the rejection. It is the recognition that the *Gentile* issue sparks the rejection that creates the problem for me.

It is clear that the Gentile question has much to do with the ultimate rejection of Jesus' followers in Acts, for the rejection of Jewish exclusivism and the acceptance of Gentiles in Acts does spark Jewish opposition with respect to the Stephen episode, in the cities where Paul preaches, and finally in Jerusalem itself.[93] But the Gentile issue is simply not the issue in the passion narrative. The issues in the passion narrative are that Jesus perverts the nation, forbids the payment of taxes, says he is the Messiah, and stirs up the people (Lk. 23:2, 5). The pattern of the Nazareth pericope actually finds narrative fulfillment *in Acts* where the Gentiles become *the* issue of contention between non-Christian Jews and Christian Jews (and even *within* the Christian community). That Luke could understand the rejection of Jesus' followers as the fulfillment of a programmatic pattern which narrated the rejection of *Jesus* himself (Lk. 4:29) creates no problem. In the narrative world of Lk-Acts what one does to Jesus' followers, one does to Jesus (Acts 9:5). In short, my reading of the passion narrative does not require that one explain away logical inconsistencies in the narrative by appeal to a "literary pattern." My reading of the passion narrative allows the programmatic literary pattern to be consistently applied to the whole of Lk-Acts: Jesus, represented by his followers, is rejected *by the people* when it becomes clear that his ministry and that of his followers brings an end to Jewish exclusivism and is inclusive of the Gentiles. That is not *the* issue in the gospel, hence the people as a whole do not yet reject Jesus.

To summarize to this point, my reading of the role of the Jewish people in the passion narrative allows for one to recognize that the précis of the men to Emmaus concerning the executioners of Jesus is consistent with what the reader has seen in the passion narrative itself. One is not left to explain why what they say happened is not, in fact, the whole truth. Second, my reading allows the programmatic Nazareth pericope to work more consistently, rather than creating narrative problems by, supposedly, pointing to the rejection of Jesus by the people in the gospel *due to the Gentile issue* when, in fact, that issue had nothing to do with the death of Jesus in the narrative of the passion events.

At the center of Sanders' resolution of the tension between what the narrative says about the Jews and what the characters say is his thesis that in the narrative the Jews become what the speeches have said from the beginning they were all along. Can my reading of the passion narrative stand with this holistic reading of Luke-Acts? Again, I believe it can.

Sanders' resolution to the tension is to present the narrator as one who patiently and gradually unfolds for the reader the "becoming" of the Jews as ones "irredeemably resistant to God's will and his offer of salvation. ..."[94] My reading requires a little more patience from the narrator. That seems most consistent, actually. Given that it has been made clear in the Nazareth pericope that the rejection of Jesus, ultimately, has to do with the admission of Gentiles, the narra-

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93 See Chance, *Jerusalem, the Temple, and the New Age*, 125-27.

94 "Jewish People," 61.

tor must be patient. S/he must withhold the narrative of the Jews "becoming" until that point in the narrative (Acts) when the catalyst of that becoming (the Gentile issue) begins to unfold.

But what about Sanders' point that the people must at least be guilty enough in the passion narrative so as to justify the charges hurled against them by the speakers of Acts? I would contend, as I did with my rereading of Dawsey, that the charges against the people in the speeches of Acts are to be read through the lens of the passion narrative. The reader is compelled to come to the conclusion that the passive non-resistance by the Jewish people as a whole renders them *just as guilty as the active participants*. This conclusion, when understood in the context of Dawsey's reading of the gospel, serves to call the reader to repentance. This same conclusion, when understood in the context of Sanders' reading of Lk-Acts, calls the reader to hatred. For in Sanders' reading, of course, Luke was anti-Semitic.

If, in fact, our author was anti-Semitic, my reading would seem perfectly consistent, in a perverted sort of way. What, after all, could be more anti-Semitic than to heap upon a people responsibility, blame, and punishment for what they did not even do? No further rationalization is needed but: "They are Jews. They are all villains by nature. They all killed Jesus!" One still hears such patently absurd and hateful assertions to this day. If Luke were half the anti-Semite that Sanders believes, my reading makes good sense. To blame people for doing what they, in fact, simply did not do is the fabric out of which anti-Semitism and all bigotry is woven. And to undergird such accusations with the words of the community's heroes (Jesus, Peter, and Paul), thereby rooting the hatred in an explicitly religious perspective, is also most characteristic of anti-Semitism. It seems particularly fitting, granting Sanders' reading, that Luke would not allow the Emmaus travellers to recognize the true guilt of the Jewish people. After all, only when one's heart burns, receives the true understanding of scripture, and has the gift of the Holy Spirit can one really "see" just how evil *all* the Jews really are!

*Robert Tannehill and the sympathetic narrator.* Tannehill's approach to the Lkan narrative differs sharply from the previous readings in that he does not assume a distinction of narrative voices—that of the the characters and that of the narrator. Tannehill emphatically rejects Dawsey's way of reading,[95] and, unlike Sanders, Tannehill does not place at the center of his way of reading Lk-Acts a distinction between speech and narrative.[96]

Tannehill believes that the Lkan story is to be understood as tragedy in the sense that the many hopeful expectations which are expressed in the opening chapters of the narrative (e.g., Lk 1:32-33, 54-55, 68-75; 2:38)[97] fail to find realization in the story itself. "A narrative may result in the nonfulfillment of expecta-

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[95] *Narrative Unity*, 1:7 n.4: "I am not convinced by the cases of conflict between the views of Jesus and the narrator presented by Dawsey."

[96] This is not to say that Tannehill never distinguishes between "voices." One must be careful not to accept statements from less-than-reliable characters as indicative of the implied author's (whom Tannehill equates with the narrator's *[Narrative Unity*, 1:7]) point of view. E.g., Tannehill does not take Festus' statement in Acts 25:24 "at face value." "Narrative criticism," Tannehill counsels, "should warn us against such hasty equation of the perspective of a character with that of the implied author" (*The Narrative Unity of Luke Acts: A Literary Interpretation. Volume Two: The Acts of the Apostles* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990], 313n13).

[97] "Israel in Luke-Acts: A Tragic Story," JBL 104/1 (1985) 72.

tions and purposes associated with central characters and still be unified story. Characters may have for themselves, and arouse in the reader, expectations of happiness, while the actual outcome is pain and loss. The more strongly the story arouses the expectation of happiness for a character, presenting this happiness as a possibility within grasp, the more tragic will be the failure to actualize the possibility. ... It seems to me that the narrative strategy of Luke-Acts takes on meaning if we assume that the author is guiding the readers to experience the story of Israel and its messiah as a tragic story."[98]

God has come to offer to Israel the fulfillment of his promises to her. Yet, Israel will reject this offer—a tragic pattern of behavior which has happened before as the Stephen speech makes so clear.[99] The rejection of God's offer unfolds slowly in the narrative. Tannehill traces very carefully how the narrator portrays a gradually increasing amount of negative response to Jesus himself in the gospel narrative.[100] Chapters 4-8 display an overall positive response, "although there are indications in chapter 8 that the crowd's response is superficial and inadequate."[101] In Lk 9:1-13:31 one finds increasing hints of tension, for in this section "we learn that an important segment of the crowds is rejecting Jesus and Jesus' warnings against failure to respond become more intense."[102] Furthermore, the characteristic distinctions between the scribes and the Pharisees, on the one hand, and the crowds, on the other, is not as sharply defined as the narrative progresses through this section.[103] The crowd seems to be slipping away.

In Lk 19:11-21:38 the reader finds that the distinction between the leaders and the people reemerges, though the condemnations of Jesus against the city as a whole (e.g., 19:41-44) allow the reader to know that things are not right. In such harsh statements of judgment against the city "... readers have been warned not to regard the people's support of Jesus, which prevents the chief priests and scribes from acting, as permanent and decisive for the plot. The readers have been prepared for the success of the conspiracy against Jesus and for some role of the people in Jesus' death, with tragic consequences for Jerusalem."[104]

In Lk 22-24 the people now make the fateful shift of loyalty, with the key moment being described in Lk 23:13-25. Here "[t]he people make one fateful misjudgment which brings disaster."[105] "No effort is made to provide a motivation for the this shift of position. We need not assume that all those flocking to hear Jesus in the temple now seek his death, but the narrator makes no effort to distinguish two groups with different attitudes."[106]

It is this failure of the people of Israel to claim their heritage and promise, a failure which only solidifies as one moves through the narrative of Acts, which brings to the reader a sense of tragedy. "A vivid presentation of great happiness, now enjoyed or within one's grasp, provides a standard for measuring the greatness of loss when that happiness is destroyed. However the reversal of fortune

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98 Ibid., 73-74.

99 *Narrative Unity* 2:89-92.

100 *Narrative Unity* 1:143-66.

101 Ibid., 145.

102 Ibid., 148.

103 Ibid., 150.

104 Ibid., 162.

105 Ibid., 165.

106 Ibid., 164.

comes about and however it is discovered, vivid presentation of a happiness that was present or possible produces a vivid sense of loss when that happiness is destroyed, which contributes to the emotions of pity and fear which Aristotle regarded a appropriate to tragedy."[107] As the narrative develops in Acts, the tragic sense continues. The speeches of Acts emphasize that God has acted on behalf of Israel (Acts 2:39; 3:25-26; 13:26, 46). Paul's defense speeches make clear "that he is on trial for the hope of Israel."[108] And yet, Israel rejects her own heritage.

In my reading of Dawsey and Sanders, I argued that my way of interpreting the guilt of the Jewish people in the Lkan passion narrative actually strengthened their readings of the whole of the Lkan narrative. Again, I believe that my reading of the passion narrative can enhance Tannehill's reading of Lk-Acts. At the very least, I believe it complements it.

Tannehill, like most other interpreters of Lk-Acts, views the Nazareth pericope as programmatic for the whole narrative.[109] Furthermore, he also recognizes that the issue of Gentile inclusiveness is very much behind the issue of Jesus' rejection. Tannehill notes how Jesus' harsh words of Lk 4:23ff. seem inappropriate given the people's initially favorable response to Jesus. "This surprising turn is functional if the narrative is suggesting that Jesus' response is not the normal human response ... but a response to hidden factors apparent only to those endowed by the Spirit with prophetic insight. ... Hidden in the hearts of his townsfolk are attitudes of which they, perhaps, are not yet conscious: resistance to God's purposes combined with jealous possessiveness. When they come to understand more fully the nature of Jesus' mission, he will not be acceptable to them."[110] The "jealous possessiveness" which cannot embrace the full "nature of Jesus' mission" conflicts "with serving the God who intends to reveal salvation for all flesh."[111] I would note, as I did above under my discussion of Sanders and Tyson, that the issue of the inclusion of the Gentiles does not really become an issue to spark rejection until the narrative of Acts.[112] While Tannehill is quite right that the gospel narrative has laid the groundwork for the ultimate rejection of Jesus by the Jewish people, this ultimate rejection does not come to actual fruition until Acts where the Jewish populace in general tends to become increasingly hostile to the message of Jesus' followers. Maintaining the passive role of the Jewish people, following my reading of the passion narrative, does not negate the foreshadowings of their rejection of Jesus which Tannehill so clearly has noted. My reading does however, require that such explicit rejection await the Acts narrative.

In the second place, my reading complements, I believe, Tannehill's "tragic" reading. My reading requires, as with both my reading of Dawsey and Sanders, that the reader conclude on the basis of the Acts speeches that passive non-resistance on the part of the people in the events surrounding the death of Jesus earns them as much condemnation and guilt as the active conspiring of their leaders.

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107 "Israel in Luke-Acts," 79.

108 Ibid. 78.

109 *Narrative Unity*, 1:68-73.

110 Ibid., 69.

111 Ibid., 70.

112 Tannehill recognizes that the whole Gentile issue represented by "the emphasis on Elijah and Elisha's ministry among Gentiles rather than Jews foreshadows the development of the Gentile mission in Acts" (ibid., 71).

Such a conclusion read in the light of Dawsey's reading was to inspire repentance and conversion; in the light of Sanders' reading, hatred. I would contend that such a conclusion could serve to inspire, in the context of Tannehill's reading, "the emotions of pity and fear which Aristotle regarded as appropriate to tragedy."[113]

The realization that the people will pay fully and completely for the actions of their leaders, that they are not allowed to excuse their own inaction by echoing the words of the two travellers to Emmaus ("our rulers crucified him"), can inspire within the reader just how pitiful the situation of the Jewish people is. They have only one hope: "Save yourselves from this crooked generation" (Acts 2:40). The people, whether they were actively involved in the murder of Jesus or not, will suffer the punishment to befall them and their city. From the perspective of the Lukan readers, Tannehill would say, and I would agree, the people *had already* suffered this tragic loss. Jerusalem had been destroyed. The only thing that could possibly have saved them would have been to have severed their ties completely with "this crooked generation"—the generation of the scribes and Pharisees whose "leaven" had permeated the whole of Judaism and laid it waste.[114] They did not respond to this plea. And so all that was left was to weep for the children. Nothing could be more tragic than for the children to suffer because their fathers and mothers did not repent of the sin that they had done—killing the author of life. Nothing except perhaps for the children to suffer because their fathers and mothers did not recognize that they and their children would be held fully accountable for what *their leaders* had done—killed the author of life. And what they did *not* do.

## Summary and Conclusion

I have tried to show that the Lkan passion narrative, when examined either from the perspective of an "implied reader" or redaction criticism, portrays the Jewish people as offering passive non-resistance in the face of the actions of their leaders. By the time the reader comes to the conclusion of the gospel the impression has been made that the Jewish rulers were responsible for the death of Jesus—not the people. The speeches of Acts, however, shatter this impression. No distinction is made between active conspirators and the passive onlookers and mourners. The reader is now confronted with an inconsistent narrative role with respect to the role of the people in the death of Jesus.

While the "solution" to this problem may be as simple as suggesting that the author was just not consistent in this thinking or could not figure a way to harmonize inconsistent sources, such solutions are not all that satisfying within the current holistic ethos of the guild. Other solutions must be found. On the surface, granting literary holism as the norm, one at the very least must conclude that the narrative of Lk-Acts posits the idea that the passive spectator of evil actions is just as guilty as the active aggressor. While the rulers may have been the ones to kill Jesus, the verdict falls on all the inhabitants of Jerusalem.

Can sense be made of this? I have not tried to offer an independent interpretation which makes sense of this reading. I have, however, tried to show that my

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113 "Israel in Luke-Acts," 79.

114 I find certain features of David Moessner's essay on "The 'Leaven of the Pharisees'" quite provocative and insightful (though I do not come to same conclusion as he concerning the role of the Jewish people in the passion narrative of Lk). See above, n. 17.

reading of the inconsistent narrative role of the people can make sense in the context of other and varied readings of the Lkan narrative. The acknowledgment of an inconsistent narrative role can enhance, I believe, Dawsey's reading which calls the reader to repentance. It can strengthen Sanders' anti-Semitic reading which calls the reader to hatred. And it can complement Tannehill's tragic reading which calls the reader to feel pity. I am claiming no panacea here. But unless one is out to start a revolution within the community of readers (I am not), a "minority reading" will never be given a serious reading unless one can show that such reading can function viably within the *current* standards of the community.

# The Role of the Jewish People in Luke's Passion Theology

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The first and foremost component of Luke's passion theology is that Jesus' death and resurrection unfold under the auspice of God's necessary, salvific plan. Intertwined with this chief component is that Jesus willingly goes to his death in obedience to his Father's plan.[1] Long before Jesus is seized by his enemies, the narrator (whom we will call Luke) deliberately shapes the reader's perspective so that the reader can discern God's purposes being accomplished in the events surrounding his death and resurrection.[2]

One way Luke depicts the passion as divine necessity is through the use of *dei* in direct discourse by Jesus (9:22; 13:33; 17:25; 22:37). Even after his resurrection Jesus continues to interpret this necessity through his use of *dei* (24:26,44). Similarly, the divine messengers at the tomb use *dei* to recall for the women the necessity of these events (24:6-7). Another way by which Luke presents Jesus' passion and resurrection as part of the divine plan is through references to scripture which must be fulfilled. Here Luke is not always concerned about which specific scripture is fulfilled but above all is interested in showing how that which takes place in the death and resurrection occurs in fulfillment of scripture (18:31-33; 22:37; 24:27,44-46). In a related way, scripture is used in the parable of the vineyard owner and the tenants (20:9-19) in order to present Jesus' divinely determined destiny in his death and resurrection.[3] This Lukan litany

[1] For a brief overview on God's guiding plan in Luke's story see Jack Dean Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke, Jesus, Authorities, and Disciples* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), pp. 11-13. On ways this is intertwined with Jesus' mission see David P. Moessner, "'The Christ Must Suffer,' The Church Must Suffer: Rethinking the Theology of the Cross in Luke-Acts," In *SBLSP 1990*, ed. David J. Lull (Atlanta: Scholars, 1990), pp. 169-83 and Donald Senior, *The Passion of Jesus in the Gospel of Luke*, The Passion Series, vol. 3 (Wilmington: Glazier, 1989), pp. 35-39.

[2] Our exegetical examinations shall draw on the perspectives for reading a text which have been offered by narrative criticism, particularly as it involves the "implied reader" (henceforth called "the reader") of Luke's narrative. For a description of this especially see Mark Allan Powell, *What is Narrative Criticism?* GBS, NTS (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), pp. 11-21. For some studies in Luke in which this methodology has been employed cf. Robert J. Karris, *Luke: Artist and Theologian, Luke's Passion Account as Literarture*, Theological Inquiries (New York: Paulist, 1985); Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke;* Mark Allan Powell, "The Religious Leaders in Luke: A Literary Critical Study," *JBL* 109 (1990): 93-110; and Robert C. Tannehill, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts, A Literary Interpretation, Volume 1: The Gospel according to Luke* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986); *Volume 2: The Acts of the Apostles* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990).

[3] See Kingsbury, *Conflict*, pp. 99-100.

established mainly through the voice of *the* protagonist, Jesus, leaves no doubt in the reader's mind. Jesus' perspective is to be the reader's perspective. His passion and resurrection are part of God's necessary plan with which Jesus is in full accord.

This same perspective dominates the second volume of Luke's narrative, Acts. In Acts, however, some of the ways by which Luke presents this have changed. For example, the use of *dei* is no longer a prevalent device communicating the passion's divine necessity.[4] Likewise in Acts, Jesus is not the character through whom this is communicated to the reader. Nevertheless, Luke continues to communicate this through the direct discourse of the principal protagonists in the narrative, namely, Peter and Paul.

Quite often their speeches not only confirm the main points of Luke's passion theology already presented in his gospel, they go on to offer scriptural interpretation of the passion and resurrection events themselves.[5] Hence not only was Judas' betrayal part of the divine plan, it was a necessary aspect of the fulfillment of the Psalms (Acts 1:15-26; Pss 69:26; 109:8). In his Pentecost speech not only does Peter claim that his hearers participated in the rejection of Jesus "according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God" (2:23), but he uses the Psalms to interpret how God's plan was played out through the passion and resurrection events (2:22-36; Pss 16:8-11; 132:11; 110:1). In Peter's next major speech (3:12-26) imagery and terms from Isaiah and Deuteronomy are used to interpret the claim that "God fulfilled what he had foretold through the prophets, that his Messiah should suffer" (3:18). As Jesus did in the parable of the vineyard owner and tenants (Luke 20:9-19), Peter interprets Jesus' rejection by the Jewish temple officials in terms of Ps 118:22 (Acts 4:10-12). Paul's most extensive scriptural interpretation of Jesus' passion and resurrection occurs in his speech to the Israelites and God-fearers in the synagogue at Antioch of Pisidia (13:16-41). Again, the rejection of Jesus in Jerusalem which brings about his death and resurrection is understood as fulfillment of that which has been written about Jesus (13:27,29,32-35; Pss 2:7; 16:10; Isa 55:3).[6] Less elaborate but similar scriptural ties to Jesus' death and resurrection are given in a description of Paul's missionary presentation in Thessalonica (17:1-3) and the thumbnail sketch of his constant testimony offered to King Agrippa (26:22-23). Finally another significant scriptural commentary on Jesus' passion comes not from Peter or Paul but is part of a prayer offered by the believers (Acts 4:23-30). Here Luke interprets the passion conspiracy against Jesus in terms of Ps 2:1-2 in such a way that Herod, Pilate, the Gentiles, and the peoples of Israel are indicted for opposing God and God's Messiah just as God had planned and predestined it to take place (4:25-28).

Hence we see that throughout his two-volume work Luke's overarching perspective is that the events of the passion and resurrection unfold in

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[4] It is linked with Jesus' passion events only in Acts 1:16 (Judas' role) and 17:3 (the suffering and resurrection of the Messiah). *Dei* is, however, linked to Paul's ministry in Acts 9:16; 19:21; 23:11 (and by implication in 14:22; 25:10,24; 26:9).

[5] David L. Tiede, *Prophecy and History in Luke-Acts* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), p. 103.

[6] For brief overviews on scriptural use in Acts 1:15-26; 2:22-36; 3:16-26; 13:13-52, cf. John T. Carroll, " The Uses of Scripture in Acts," in *SBLSP 1990*, pp. 516-25, 528; Jacob Jervell, " The Center of Scripture in Luke," in *The Unkown Paul, Essays on Luke-Acts and Early Christian History*, trans. Roy A. Harrisville (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1984), pp. 126-37; Donald Juel, "Social Dimensions of Exegesis: The Use of Psalm 16 in Acts 2," *CBQ* 43 (1981): 543-56; and Moessner, "Theology of the Cross in Luke-Acts," pp. 181-90.

accordance with God's plan and that Jesus is obedient to it. This divine plan is also more fully interpreted for the reader through scriptural allusions in Luke-Acts.[7] Consequently, any study on particular aspects of Luke's passion narrative must be done in light of this prime component in Luke's passion theology.

## Overview of Past Positions

The specific focus of this study is the role of the Jewish people in Luke's passion theology. It will seek to establish just what the people do (or do not do) in the passion narrative and how this relates to Luke's overall understanding of the passion unfolding according to God's plan. Such an assessment of the Jewish people's participation in Luke's passion narrative is not at all unique. Numerous scholars have made similar analyses and reached numerous conclusions. One such long standing conclusion has been that Luke camposed his passion narrative in such a way as to blame the Jews for the death of Jesus in order to exculpate the Romans in the matter of Jesus' crucifixion.[8] Going 180 degrees in the opposite direction, some scholars have argued that in Luke's passion narrative the Jewish people (though not necessarily their leaders) are not at all to be seen as the guilty party.[9]

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[7] Hence Tiede (*Prophecy and History*, p. 119) concludes, "Thus, the reading of Luke-Acts may be enhanced by the observation that Luke has constructed his two-volume work by seeding the narrative of the Gospel with the scriptural language and complex allusions which are then harvested in the explicit scriptural arguments in Acts and in accord with the hermeneutical warrants of Luke 24." Also see Tannehill, *Narrative Unity*, I:193-94.

[8] Bultmann and Conzelmann (and to a degree Büchele) link this to a Lukan attempt to commend the church the Romans. Rudolf Bultmann, *History of the Synoptic Tradition*, rev. ed.; trans. John Marsh (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 282; Hans Conzelmann, *The meology of St. Luke*, trans. Geoffery Buswell (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), pp. 90, 137-40; and Anton Büchele, *Der Tod Jesu im Lukasevangelium, Eine redaktionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zu Lk* 23, FTS 26 (Frankfurt am Main: Josef Knecht, 1978), pp. 26-61. Walaskay flips this around and sees this as part of Luke's attempt to present Rome to the church. Paul W. Walaskay, " The Trial and Death of Jesus in the Gospel of Luke," *JBL* 94 (1975): 81, 85-89. In either case, the conclusion regarding the Jewish people is the same. Luke deliberately puts them in the role of responsibility for Jesus' death in order to exonerate the Romans.

[9] The evidence to support such a claim is presented and interpreted differently. Rau conjectures that the inclusion of "the people" (*ton laon*) in 23:13 is actually a corruption of Luke's original text which read "the rulers of the people" (*tous archontas tou laou*) so that the people were never involved in the trial and rejection of Jesus in the first place. Gottfried Rau, "Das Volk in der lukanischen Passionsgeschichte, eine Konjektur zu Lc 23.13," *ZNW* 56 (1965): 47-50. Brawley argues that the multitudes at the trial are not the same multitudes that follow Jesus (23:27) and that the former were under the influence of the high priestly party. Robert L. Brawley, *Luke-Acts and the Jews. Conflict, Apology, and Conciliation*, SBLMS 33 (Atlanta: Scholars, 1987): pp. 136-37. Kodell, George, and Crowe play down any antagonism toward Jesus by the Jewish people during the passion in distinction to the vehement opposition of the Jewish leaders. James Kodell, "Luke's Use of *Laos*, 'People,' Especially in the Jerusalem Narrative," *CBQ* 3 (1969): 340-41, 43; Augustin George, "Israël dans l'oeuvre de Luc," *Rev bibl* 75 (1968): 501-4; and Jerome Crowe, "The *Laos* at the Cross: Luke's Crucifixion Scene," in *The Language of the Cross*, ed. Aelred Lacomara (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1977), pp. 95-96. Finally, in his assessment of the people in Luke, Minear virtually ignores the appearance of the people in 23:13-26 while claiming that "...Luke does not describe the *laos* as turning against Jesus and demanding his crucifixion." Paul Minear, "Jesus' Audience According to Luke," *Nov Test* 16 (1974): pp. 83-84.

Between these two poles of the Jewish people's innocence vs. Roman innocence, several nuanced positions have been put forth in which the Jewish people are understood as participants in the rejection (or death) of Jesus. Gaston, for example, sees the "violent wrenching of the *laos* from a positive to a negative position in the passion story" as part of a Lukan polemic whose context is "the agonizing relationship of his community with an outside group ... the synagogue ... "[10] In his analysis of the author's historical setting and literary designs, Tiede argues that the characterization of the Jewish people in the passion narrative "most closely approximates tragedy.[11] Yet it is a tragedy which is part of the author's "close identification with Israel" and is ultimately transcended into "a story of the vindication of God's reign through his servant messiah, proclaiming the giving of repentance unto forgiveness to Israel, and even to the Gentiles..."[12] Using a similar category of tragedy (but without a hope of anything other than a final Jewish rejection at the end of Acts), Tannehill claims that the "participation of the people in the rejection and death of Jesus is understood as a tragic error by a group which has, in part, been presented sympathetically. The people make one fateful misjudgment which brings disaster ... The narrator is not engaged in polemics against enemies but is working with the emotions of tragedy—pity and fear at blind tragic error."[13]

Such "tragic" views of the Jewish people have been vehemently rejected by Sanders who claims that the "tragedy of the Gospel is the execution of the last great prophet, who journeys through the pages of the Gospel toward his inescapable fate. 'The Jews' are the villains, not the victims."[14] Consequently, he concludes that in the passion narrative the author presents the Jewish people in an "ambiguous" or "desperate" role in order to fulfill two stereotypes within his narrative. "On the one hand, they must so behave that they deserve the later charge of having murdered Jesus ... But on the other hand, they must also so behave that the possibility of mass conversion in Acts 1-5 is a real possibility."[15] Nevertheless, in examining the entire narrative of Luke-Acts Sanders claims that such an "ambiguous role" does not remain. In their "quite unambiguous role in the Pauline passion narrative, we see better where the passion narrative was heading."[16] When understood in conjunction with the rejection of Jesus in Nazareth (Luke 4:16-30), the martyrdom of Stephen (Acts 7), and the Pauline passion narrative (Acts 22-28), their villainous role as murders of Jesus in the passion narrative is part of "their intransigent opposition to the purposes of God... The narrative shows how existence comes to conform with essence, the process by which the Jewish people become 'the Jews'..."[17]

In his detailed study, *The Death of Jesus in Luke-Acts*, Tyson links the role of the Jewish public in the death of Jesus to a larger literary pattern in Luke-Acts of

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10 Lloyd Gaston, "Anti-Judaism and the Passion Narrative in Luke and Acts," in *Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity, Vol. 1: Paul and the Gospels*, Studies in Christianity and Judaism, no. 2, eds. Peter Richardson and David Granskou (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986), p. 152.

11 Tiede, *Prophecy and History*, p. 111.

12 Ibid., pp. 116, 118.

13 Tannehill, *Narrative Unity*, I:165.

14 Jack T. Sanders, *The Jews in Luke-Acts* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), p. 82.

15 Ibid., pp. 82-83.

16 Ibid., p. 83.

17 Ibid., p. 81.

"initial acceptance and final rejection."[18] This literary pattern is repeated in (and controls) both Luke and Acts in such a way that "Luke claims that the Jewish public has heard but rejected the gospel. Thus the failed mission to the Jews is terminated in favor of the successful mission to the Gentiles."[19] Hence in Tyson's perspective the role which the Jewish public plays in Jesus' death is ultimately to be interpreted in conjunction with the Jewish "rejection of the Christian mission to the Gentiles and as a way of facilitating that very mission.[20]

Innocent bystanders or fall guys to establish the innocence of the Romans? Tragic participants or the villains? Participants in a larger literary pattern or characters in a historical polemic? Such a brief survey shows that the narrative has indeed been read quite differently by scholars and calls for another attempt to determine the "what" and "why" of the role Luke gives to the Jewish people in his passion theology.

## The People in Luke's Passion Narrative

*The Jewish People Prior to Jesus' Arrest*

*Laos* and *ochlos* are two words Luke uses for the Jewish people. At times the two terms are used interchangeably to depict a general, non-descript multitude of Jewish people in one locale or another.[21] On numerous occasions, however, Luke gives significant nuances to these terms which color his presentation of the Jewish people. While *ochlos* tends to remain "a more vague and general word" Luke does give *laos* "a religious coloration and refers to Israel as God's chosen nation."[22] Because it is a vague term, Luke will sometimes clarify who constitutes *ochlos* through the use of other designations so that not every *ochlos* in the narrative is simply a non-descript Jewish crowd or the Jewish people.[23] Such

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[18] Joseph B. Tyson, *The Death of Jesus in Luke-Acts* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1986), p. 171.

[19] Ibid., p. 43.

[20] Ibid., p. 45.

[21] For example, the *ochlos* of 3:7,10 seem to merge with the *laos* of 3:15,17,21. The *ochlos* of 8:40,42,45 are the same group as the *laos* of 8:47. The same interchangeable labels are found in 9:11,12,16 (*ochlos)* and 9:13 (laos) as well as in 18:36 (ochlos) and 18:43 (laos). For an overview of this see Nils A. Dahl, "A People for His Name," *NTS* (1958): 324. Also cf. Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke*, p. 29 and Tannehill, *Narrative Unity*, I:143.

[22] Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke*, p. 29. So too Minear, "Jesus' Audience," pp. 84-87. Perhaps it might be best to use "Jewish people" when *laos* has this understanding and "Jewish public" for the more vague understanding of *ochlos*. Cf. Tyson, *Death of Jesus*, pp. 31-32.

[23] In 6:17 *ochlos polus* is defined as *mathētōn autou* but in 6:19 *pas ho ochlos* includes the above mentioned large crowd of his disciples as well as a large multitude of the people from all Judea, Jerusalem, Tyre and Sidon. In 7:11-12 there is an *ochlos polus* that is accompanying Jesus and his disciples which encounters an *ochlos hikanos* from the city of Nain accompanying the widow. In 7:24 Jesus is speaking to the *ochlous*, but in the course of the narrative we come to see that the *ochlous* includes several subdivisions, *ho laos* and *hoi telōnai* as the crowd's favorable members (7:29) and *hoi Pharisaioi* and *hoi nomikoi* as the crowd's antagonists (7:30). In 19:39 the *ochlou* includes but is not composed of some Pharisees. In Acts 1:15 *ochlos* is defined by *tōn adelphōn* while in Acts 6:7 *ochlos* is defined by *hiereōn*, and in both cases the *ochlos* constitutes believers.

is not the case with *laos*. In Luke's gospel it always refers to Jewish people. Luke also shows a marked preference for *laos* when the setting is in Jerusalem but a marked preference for *ochlos* when the setting is outside of Jerusalem.[24] Such Lukan nuances will be important to note in the analysis of the passion narrative.

In his remarks to Mary, Simeon declares that the child Jesus "is destined for the falling and rising of many in Israel, and to be a sign that will be opposed so that the inner thoughts of many will be revealed" (2:34b-35a). As Jesus carries out his pre-Jerusalem ministry, the Jewish public along with tax collectors and assorted sinners tend to represent a positive response within Israel to God's salvation centered in Jesus in contrast to various religious leaders who tend to represent a negative response within Israel.[25] So, for example, the people and tax collectors justify God for having been baptized by John whereas the Pharisees and lawyers were not baptized by John and thus reject God's purposes for themselves (7:29-30; cf. 3:7-21a). In scenes of healing, Pharisees, scribes, or a synagogue ruler are Jesus' adversaries whereas the Jewish public glorify God and rejoice at what they see Jesus do (cf. 5:17-26; 13:10-17). It is the Jewish public not the religious leaders who flock continuously to Jesus and are taught by him (e.g., 4:42; 5:1-3,15; 6:19; 8:4,40-45; 9:11-16; 14:25) even to the point that Jesus warns thousands of them about the Pharisees' hypocrisy (12:1-3).

Nevertheless, their response to Jesus prior to his entry into Jerusalem is not on the same level as that of the disciples nor has it been entirely positive.[26] In stark contrast to the rest of Galilee, Jesus' hometown rejects him.[27] Some in the

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[24] Indeed in Luke-Acts *laos* refers to groups of Jewish people in Jerusalem 36 times (1:10,21; 19:47,48; 20:1,6,9,19,26,45; 21:23,38; 22:2; 23:13,27,35; Acts 2:47; 3:9,11,12; 4:1,2,17,21; 5:12,13,20,25,26,34; 6:8,12; 21:30,36,39,40) whereas *ochlos* only refers to crowds of some type in Jerusalem 9 times (Luke 22:6,47; 23:4,48; Acts 21:27,34,35; 24:12,18). Outside of Jerusalem, however, the ratio switches to the opposite proportions: *laos* only refers to groups of Jewish people outside of Jerusalem 13 times (Luke 3:15,18,21; 6:17; 7:29; 8:47; 9:13; 18:43; Acts 10:2; 12:4,11; 13:15,31) whereas *ochlos* refers to Jewish, Samaritan, or Gentile crowds outside of Jerusalem 49 times (Luke 3:7,10; 4:42; 5:1,3,15,19,29; 6:19; 7:9,11,12,24; 8:4,19,40,42,45; 9:11,12,16,18,37,38; 11:14,27,29; 12:1,13,54; 13:14,17; 14:25; 18:36; Acts 8:6; 11:24,26; 13:45; 14:11,13,14,18,19; 16:22; 17:8,13; 19:26,33,35). This further reinforces the observations made by Dahl over thirty years ago regarding Luke's distinctive, Septuagint-based understanding of *laos* as God's covenant people, Israel. Dahl, "A People for His Name," pp. 319-27.

[25] In that they are "well-disposed toward Jesus... in stark contrast to their leaders," the reader is to evaluate them positively. Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke*, pp. 29-31. The positive aspects of this contrast are almost exclusively stressed by Crowe, "*Laos* at the Cross," pp. 81-88; George, "Israël dans l'oeuvre de Luc," pp. 489-99; and Kodell, "Luke's Use of *Laos*," pp. 327-28. For scholarly depictions of the negative responses to Jesus on the part of the Jewish religious leaders (particularly the Pharisees) in this part of Luke's narrative see John T. Carroll, "Luke's Portrayal of the Pharisees," *CBQ* 50 (1988): 607-16; Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke*, pp. 83-97; Powell, "Religious Leaders," pp. 95-105; Sanders, *Jews in Luke-Acts*, pp. 164-210; Tannehill, *Narrative Unity*, I:167-87; and Tyson, *Death of Jesus*, pp. 49-72.

[26] For analyses that highlight the negative aspects of the Jewish public in these sections of Luke's narrative cf. Sanders, *Jews in Luke-Acts*, pp. 56-64 and Tannehill, *Narrative Unity*, I:144-58.

[27] The interpretative significance of the rejection of Jesus in Nazareth is a prime point of contention among scholars. On the one hand, Tyson (*Death of Jesus*, p. 33) sees this incident as presenting "in miniature the pattern that shapes the Lukan narrative in the gospel as a whole," namely, initial acceptance followed by rejection. In a somewhat similar vein, Sanders (*Jews in Luke-Acts*, p. 83) concludes that the "true role of the Jewish people is prefigured in the Nazareth episode, where Jesus' audience turns with one

crowd (but not the religious leaders) claim that Jesus is in league with Satan (11:14-23), and Jesus goes on to address them as "an evil generation" (11:29). When Jesus includes Zacchaeus in his saving, shepherding ministry for Israel, it is the Jewish public not the religious leaders who murmur their disapproval (19:7). Likewise, the disciples though far from perfect characters are distinctly called, commissioned, and receive inner teaching from Jesus in ways that the Jewish public does not.[28] Consequently up to the point of Jesus' entry into Jerusalem, the reader has come to expect a more positive response to Jesus from the Jewish public in contrast to their religious leaders, but the Jewish public is not on the same footing as the disciples. Indeed, the public themselves have been divided in their evaluation of Jesus and his ministry just as Simon predicted. It is a positive but not absolute response.

Upon entry into Jerusalem, however, there is a stark change in the picture. First, the term *laos* suddenly returns exclusively to the forefront. Second, the opponents are the chief priests and those who accompany the chief priests (e.g., scribes, leaders of the people, elders, Sadducees). Third, the divided response to Jesus is drawn in near absolutes. The people are completely open and undivided in their positive reception of Jesus and his teaching (19:47-48; 20:1,9,45; 21:37-38). Indeed, as Jesus carries out his authorized teaching ministry in the temple, the lines between the people and the disciples have blurred.[29] In direct contrast to the people, the chief priests seek to destroy him (19:47), demand his credentials (20:1-8), are shown to be those who will reject and kill him (20:9-18), try to lay hands on him to hand him over to the political authorities (20:19-20), and are finally silenced by him (20:40).

Consequently, while in Jerusalem the divided response of Israel is more pronounced than ever before in the narrative. The chief priests and company are categorically opposed to Jesus even to the point of seeking his death. As they rejected John who was sent by God, so now they are rejecting the beloved son sent by God (20:1-18). The *laos* are categorically receptive of Jesus and are on footing close to that of the disciples. Their role in this phase of Luke's narrative is not so much that of Jesus' protectors[30] as it is to be representatives of the positive

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accord against him." On the other hand, Brawley (*Luke-Acts and the Jews*, pp. 6-27) argues extensively that Luke 4:16-30 centers on "the Spirit-filled messianic identity of Jesus" rather than foreshadowing a pattern of Jewish rejection/Gentile acceptance of Jesus and the gospel. Also cf. Idem, *Centering on God: Method and Message in Luke-Acts*, Literary Currents in Biblical Interpretation (Atlanta: John Knox, 1990), pp. 76-78. From his perspective Tiede (*Prophecy and History*, pp. 19-22, 33-55) also stresses the Christological claims made in this narrative and relates them not to a rejection of Israel but a rejection of an exclusive interpretation of Israel's election.

[28] For an analysis of this see Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke*, pp. 18-21,31.

[29] Thus the people are on hand and listen as Jesus warns his disciples about the scribes in 20:45-47 and (evidently) when he commends the poor widow in 21:1-4. Even more significant, however, is that Luke does not present the destruction prophecies in 21:5-36 as private instructions to a handful of disciples (cf. Mark 13:1-2,3-37). Rather, the setting remains in the temple, and though the audience is rather nebulous (*tinōn legontōn*, 21:5; *autois*, 21:10), the clear impression is that the people are still on hand hearing his teaching (cf. 20:45; 21:37-38). The lines have not completely disappeared, however, because the people have not received him as their king who comes in the name of the Lord as the whole multitude of disciples have received him (19:37-38). Hence there still is a separation between disciples and people.

[30] The fact that the religious leaders feel helpless in light of Jesus' popular support (19:47-48; 20:19) does not really cast the people into the role of protector of Jesus as seems to be understood by Tannehill, *Narrative Unity*, II:69; Tiede, *Prophecy and History*,

response within Israel to God's authorized Son. As God sent John to make a people prepared for the Lord and the people have received John (cf. 1:17; 3:15,18,21; 7:29; 20:6), so now the people are continuously coming to the temple to be taught by the one who is glory for God's people Israel (2:32). Jesus, not the religious authorities in Jerusalem, is the authorized teacher and leader of the people of God. The people are clearly responding to him as their teacher (19:48; 20:1,9,45; 21:37-38).

Within this very positive reception of Jesus by the *laos* in Jerusalem, Luke has also painted one very dark, ominous cloud: the destruction of Jerusalem. Three times, Jesus had prophesied the destruction of Jerusalem (13:33-35; 19:41-44; 21:20-24).[31] He has linked this forthcoming destruction with the rejection of himself by Jerusalem (13:34; 19:41-42) and God's judgment against Jerusalem as a result of this rejection (19:42-44; 21:22-24). If Jerusalem were only to be understood in terms of the religious authorities opposing Jesus in Jerusalem, these prophecies would be readily understandable. Since these people who are so receptive also seem to constitute Jerusalem, however, the issue is not so easily resolved. Because the prophecy in 13:35 does have an element of hope to it (i.e., perhaps the people will acknowledge Jesus as the one who comes in the name of the Lord)[32] and because the people are part of the audience who hears Jesus' admonition to leave the city when the Gentile armies surround it (21:20-21), there does seem to be hope. Perhaps they will get the message and respond accordingly. Yet even at this point prior to the passion, it does issue a clear prophetic warning (and forecast of doom) to those who ultimately associate themselves with Jerusalem rather than with Jesus.[33]

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pp. 106, 112; and Tyson, *Death of Jesus*, pp. 37-38 and Idem, "The Jewish Public in Luke-Acts," *NTS* 30 (1984): 578. First, the people have no idea that they are defending or protecting Jesus from their religious leaders. There is no scene in which the Jewish people consciously stand against their religious leaders nor where they try to save Jesus as did the Pharisees when Herod sought to kill Jesus (13:31-33). Second, the passion will only begin under God's time frame which centers around the Passover since Jesus' passion and resurrection will be his exodus which he will fulfill in Jerusalem (cf. 9:31; 22:3, and especially the use of *dei* in 22:7). Third, it will be Satan who provides the key to the arrest of Jesus (22:3,53b), and it will be Jesus' obedience to God's will that allows his own arrest (cf. 22:42,47-53). Hence God (and to some extent Satan) rather than the protection of the people or the plotting of the chief priests is that which determines the timing of Jesus' arrest. Indeed, the chief priests and their cohorts feel thwarted by the people, but that is another aspect of their human point of view. For an overview of their point of view, see Powell, "Religious Leaders," pp. 98-100.

31 For a range of interpretations on this theme in Luke-Acts cf. J. Bradley Chance, *Jerusalem, the Temple, and the New Age in Luke-Acts* (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1988); Charles Homer Gibbin, *The Destruction of Jerusalem according to Luke's Gospel*, Analecta Biblica 107 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1985); Sanders, *Jews in Luke-Acts*, pp. 24-36; Tannehill, *Narrative Unity*, I:155-56, 159-63; and Tiede, *Prophecy and History*, pp. 65-96.

32 This hope is realized in the opening chapters of Acts in that thousands of the people and even a large number of priests call upon the name of the Lord Jesus Christ who is their salvation (Acts 2:36-47; 3:12-26; 4:8-12; 6:7). Of course as the narrative in Acts unfolds, many more in Israel refuse to do this, and they will experience God's judgment in the destruction of Jerusalem.

33 This is intensified in 21:23 through the prophecy of coming wrath against "this people" (*tō laō toutō*). Within the context of the prophecy itself, "this people" refers to people in the future against whom this judgment will stand (i.e., those inhabitants of Jerusalem at the time of the Gentile conquest). Because the people are part of Jesus'

*The People and Jesus' Arrest*

Whereas the people were continuously on hand during the course of Jesus' ministry in the temple (19:47-21:38), they are now removed from all the scenes in 22:1-46. The lines of conflict, however, are still clearly drawn. The antagonists include Satan who has been waiting for "an opportune time" (4:13, *kairou*) and who chooses this time to move against Jesus by entering into Judas (22:3). Prior to this, the chief priests and their circle have been helpless in their plots against Jesus (19:47-48; 20:1-8,9-20,40; 22:2).[34] Now the Satan-inspired Judas gives them a brand new opportunity by offering to betray Jesus to them (22:4). In joy, they offer Judas money for his services so that Judas seeks "an opportunity to betray him to them" (22:6, *eukairian*). None of this is a surprise to the reader. Luke had already identified Judas as the one who would be Jesus' betrayer (6:16). Jesus has already predicted that he would "be betrayed into human hands" (9:44) and that his chief Jewish antagonists would include the chief priests and scribes (9:22). All of this is part of God's plan which controls these events and the people involved in them.

On the other side of the conflict is Jesus who knows exactly what is taking place (22:7-13,14-18,21-22,31-34,37,40-46).This Passover is the time of his suffering and death in accordance with God's plan,[35] and Jesus remains fully obedient to it (22:15-20,21-22,37,42). Aligned with Jesus are the eleven apostles who are ignorant of the divine plan which is unfolding (22:9,23,24-27,31-34,35-38,45) but who remain the objects of Jesus' prayerful concern, instructions, and actions (22:15,19-20,26-27,28-30,31-32,35-36,40,46). Hence as God's plan unfolds, Jesus and the eleven apostles stand against Satan, Judas, and the chief priests and their associates.

The people are also involved in this drama even though they are not directly present in any of these scenes. Throughout his Jerusalem ministry Jesus has been teaching in the temple, where it is necessary for him to be (cf. 2:49; 19:45-47a; 20:1; 21:37-38). God's people have responded to him as their authorized teacher. The temple officials are being supplanted as the leaders of Israel by Jesus. Hence in conspiring against Jesus, the temple officials are in a battle with him over who will lead the people of God.[36] As part of this conflict, Jesus declares that it is his apostles not the temple officials who will ultimately be the leaders of Israel (22:28-30; cf. 20:15-16).[37]

The chief priests' and scribes' fear of the people (22:2; 20:19) is somewhat ambiguous. Do they fear that if they act against Jesus the people will stone them (cf. 20:6)? Do they fear that the people will prevent them from killing God's son as part of their effort to establish their primacy over Israel (cf. 20:13-15)? Do they

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audience (20:45), it may well include them if they do not respond appropriately to Jesus and his teaching. In Acts, many of them will respond appropriately.

[34] The description of their plotting in 22:2 not only recalls their earlier plots (19:47-48; 20:19), but they continue to be just as helpless to do anything to or against Jesus. It is only Satan and their own God-given role that allows them to act decisively against Jesus.

[35] Recalling the use of *eggizō* in 21:20,28 the use of *ēggizen* in 22:1 adds a note of rapt anticipation as the divine passion plan is getting closer to implementation. The references to Passover (*pascha*, 22:1,7) not only recall Jesus' exodus (9:31) but also Jesus' words of his necessary suffering (*dei ... polla pathein*, 9:22; 17:25).

[36] Frank J. Matera, *Passion Narratives and Gospel Theologies, Interpreting the Synoptics through Their Passion Stories*, Theological Inquiries (New York: Paulist, 1986), pp. 157-58.

[37] Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke*, pp. 28, 104.

fear that the people will not receive them as the people received Jesus in the temple? Luke does not clearly tell the reader what is behind their fear. What he does clearly tell the reader, however, is that Judas is seeking an occasion when the people are absent in order to hand Jesus to these religious authorities (22:6).[38] Only when the people who have been with Jesus everyday in the temple are not with Jesus, will Judas be successful in handing over Jesus to his enemies who desire to kill him. The opportune time is to be accomplished without the people on hand.

That is exactly what takes place in the scene of Jesus' arrest in 22:47-54. It is important to note that there is scholarly disagreement over just who makes up the crowd (*ochlos)* led by Judas in 22:47. Tyson, for example, sees it as being the same *ochlou* of 22:6, i.e., the people.[39] Hence Judas does not betray Jesus in isolation from the Jewish public, but Judas has isolated the Jewish public from Jesus.[40] Consequently, it is at this point, the arrest of Jesus, that the "crowd has deserted Jesus, and from now on it is part of the opposition."[41]

While it is certainly possible to equate the *ochlos* of v. 47 with that of v. 6, the narrative seems to give a different identity to the crowd led by Judas. As is often the case *ochlos* by itself is vague so that Luke will give it more specificity by using other designations. In v. 52 the crowd is specifically identified as "the chief priests and captains of the temple and elders who have come out against him."[42] Thus those conspiring with Judas against Jesus in 22:2,4-6 and those who subsequently interrogate Jesus (22:66-72) are the very ones Judas leads to Jesus. This is confirmed in Acts 1:16 where Judas is described as the one "who became a guide for those who arrested Jesus." Hence Judas succeeded in doing what he set out to do in 22:6. He found the opportune time when the people were not present and handed Jesus over to the chief priests and their circle. Of course this treachery remains part of the divine plan to which Jesus is obedient so that in a sense they do not simply arrest Jesus, but Jesus allows his adversaries to arrest him (22:48,49,52-53; cf. 22:21-22,42).[43] Nevertheless, Luke has still kept the people out of the action as the plot against Jesus in fulfillment of God's plan continues to intensify.

*The People and the Interrogation of Jesus*

Throughout the events of that same night the people remain absent. Though Jesus becomes more isolated by Peter's denial and is directly abused and mocked, the events still flow in fulfillment of God's plan (22:54-62 and 22:33-34; 22:63-65 and 18:31-32). At daybreak the people are not among those gathered together to interrogate Jesus. Rather, their elders (here identified as both chief

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38 As we noted above, Luke will sometimes define or clarify *ochlos* with another term. Thus in 22:6 it is clear that *ochlou* refers to *ton laon* of 22:2.

39 Tyson, *Death of Jesus*, pp. 38, 120-21. So too Gaston, "Anti-Judaism and the Passion Narrative," p. 145.

40 Thus Tyson (*Death of Jesus*, p. 121) writes, "Although Luke gives us no details about Judas' betrayal, there are significant hints that he accomplished a difficult feat offstage, that of driving a wedge between the crowd and Jesus."

41 Tyson, "Jewish Public," p. 579.

42 So too Sanders, *Jews in Luke-Acts*, pp. 219-20; Senior, *Luke*, p. 92; and Tiede, *Prophecy and History*, p. 112.

43 Matera, *Passion Narrative*, p. 169.

priests and scribes), are gathered and lead Jesus into their Sanhedrin (22:66).[44] Thus only the leaders, the religious officials who stand over the people, demand to know if Jesus is the Messiah, if he is the Son of God (22:67,69). The Christological focus of this interrogation does involve the people in that Messiah and Son of God are royal titles. For Luke, Jesus is the king, the royal ruler over Israel (1:32-35; 2:11; 19:12-15,32-40; 20:9-18,41-44). Hence the issue regarding who will rule over the people which was prevalent in Jesus' public temple-ministry is again at the forefront.[45] And just as before in Luke's narrative (likewise, just as in Psalm 2), leaders are gathered together against God and against God's royal Messiah, the Son of God.[46]

At his arrest the chief priests and company led Jesus away (22:54, *ēgagon*). When the elders of the people were gathered they led Jesus away into their Sanhedrin (22:66, *apēgagon*). Now after they have interrogated Jesus as to his royal identity their entire company lead Jesus before Pilate (23:1, *ēgagon*). It should be clear that their entire company (*hapan to plēthos autōn*) refers to the very same block of religious officials who have been leading Jesus from place to place. Luke does not include the people in this reference.[47] That means that the people are absent when these same opponents accuse Jesus of misleading the Jewish nation (22:2).

The charges which the religious authorities bring to Pilate against Jesus involve the people in ways similar to their questions of Jesus' royal identity in 22:66-71.[48] The charge that Jesus "misleads our nation" (v. 2, *diastrephonta to ethnos hemōn*), recalls similar charges against Moses (and Aaron) leveled by the King of Egypt (Exod 5:4, *diastrephete ton laon mou*) and by King Ahab against Elijah (1 Kg 18:17, *ho diastrephōn ton Israēl*). Just as these two monumental figures (with whom Jesus has discussed his exodus, 9:30-36) were falsely accused by evil kings of misleading God's people, so now these evil religious authorities falsely accuse Jesus of misleading God's people. Jesus is not only innocent of this

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[44] The use of *sunēchthē* in 22:66 may well anticipate the explicit use of *sunēchthēsan* in a quote of Ps 2:2 in Acts 4:26.

[45] Frank J. Matera, "Luke 22,66-71: Jesus Before the *Presbyterion*," *ETL* 65 (1989): 50-53.

[46] Tyson (*Death of Jesus*, p. 128) claims that this "session before the Sanhedrin is not dictated by Luke's interpretation of Psalm 2, which requires only the presence of 'Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel' (Acts 4:27)." But it seems to be the case that in Acts 4:25-27 the rulers (*hoi archontes*) of Psalm 2 refer to the religious authorities of Israel rather than to Pilate (cf. use of *archontes* in Luke 23:13; Acts 4:5). See Tannehill, *Narrative Unity*, II:71, n. 26. In any case, the Christological inquiries regarding Messiah and Son of God would have connections with Ps 2:2,7 since Luke uses Psalm 2 and their titles elsewhere (cf. Luke 3:22; 9:35; Acts 4:25-27; 13:33).

[47] Neyrey concludes that *hapan to plēthos autōn* "suggests that all of Israel is assembled before Pilate." Jerome Neyrey, *The Passion according to Luke, A Redactional Study of Luke's Soteriology*, Theological Inquiries (New York: Paulist, 1985), p. 76. The use of *autōn*, however, specifies the entire company as the religious officials in the Sanhedrin of the previous scene (22:66-71). Luke rarely uses *plēthos* by itself to designate a group of people (cf. Acts 15:30; 19:9). Instead, he uses the genitive to designate who or what makes up *to plēthos* (e.g., fish, Luke 5:6; the people, Luke 1:10; 6:17; 23:27; Acts 21:36; kindling wood, Acts 28:3; soldiers of heaven, Luke 2:13; disciples or believers, Luke 19:37; Acts 4:32; Jews and/or Greeks, Acts 14:1; 17:4; 25:24; or men and women, Acts 5:14). It is not a designation which stands alone or as a substitute for *laos*.

[48] For a discussion on these charges being "unreliable" but perhaps also expressing "at least a degree of the truth" see Brawley, *Centering on God*, pp. 130, 12.

charge,[49] but he has also established himself as the authorized ruler of God's people even to the point that he can rightly interpret political issues such as payment of taxes to Caesar (cf. 23:2; 20:19-26; 2:1-7).

The key difference between Moses or Elijah and Jesus is part of the third charge brought against Jesus. While being a prophet as were Moses and Elijah (cf. Acts 3:22-23; Luke 4:25-26; 7:11-17), Jesus is also the royal Messiah. Their third charge is false in that Jesus never expressly claimed to be Messiah King (and he is not the political king that would be a threat to the Romans), and yet Luke has continuously shown that this is part of Jesus' identity. Indeed, this charge is *the* charge that Luke highlights in that Pilate directly asks Jesus if he is the king of the Jews, and Jesus answers with an evasive, but affirmative, "You have said so." (22:3).[50] Jesus is the royal Messiah, and through his passion and resurrection in accordance with the divine plan God is enthroning him (cf. Acts 2:29-36). The religious authorities refuse to believe this and in a sense so does Pilate. When Pilate declares, "I find no crime in this man" (23:4), he is denying the revolutionary charges falsely brought against Jesus. Yet, ironically he is also denying Jesus' true royal identity.[51] Neither Pilate nor the religious authorities see Jesus as the one who rules God's people.[52]

Another interpretative issue is raised in 23:4 in that Pilate's declaration is addressed to the chief priests and the crowds (*tous ochlous).* With this reference to *tous ochlous* has Luke now brought some or all of the people directly into the setting so that they add a new voice of opposition to Jesus? A number of scholars answer in the affirmative,[53] but a careful reading of the narrative calls this into question. First, the most recent reference to *ochlos* (22:47) was clarified in 22:52 as meaning the chief priests, captains of the temple, and elders but not the people. Second, the entire company who led Jesus to Pilate in 23:1 included this generalized group of religious leaders (chief among whom are the chief priests), but there was still no mention of the people. Consequently there seems to be no reason to conjure them into this scene when Luke has given the reader other clearer handles for understanding the identity of *tous ochlous* to whom Pilate speaks. Hence in 23:4-5 the chief priests and their company remain the opponents of Jesus.[54] Likewise, the issue they press in 23:5 is essentially the same issue. The

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[49] Especially see the discussion of this issue presented by Sanders, *Jews in Luke-Acts,* pp. 6-7 in refutation of claims made by Daryl Schmidt, "Luke's 'Innocent' Jesus: A Scriptural Apologetic," In *Political Issues in Luke-Acts,* ed. Richard Cassidy and Philip Scharper (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1983), p. 119.

[50] Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke,* pp. 64-65 and Matera, *Passion Narratives,* pp. 176-77.

[51] Thus Tyson (*Death of Jesus,* p. 127) rightly notes that "if Pilate had known that he was king, he could not have regarded him as innocent."

[52] Within Luke's narrative there is a further irony in Pilate's address of Jesus as "this man" (v. 4, *tō anthrōpō toutō*). Aside from an indirect reference in 7:34, the term man (*anthrōpos*) as applied to/by Jesus is found in the title Son of Man (29 times prior to this). Indeed, as Son of Man this man Jesus has already predicted that he would be rejected by the religious authorities (9:21) and would be delivered to the Gentiles (18:32).

[53] E.g, Brawley, *Luke-Acts and the Jews,* p. 137; Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke,* pp. 30, 66, 149, n. 130; Sanders, *Jews in Luke-Acts,* p. 66; Senior, *Luke,* p. 111; and Tyson, *Death of Jesus,* pp. 34-35.

[54] David L. Tiede, *Luke,* ACNT (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1988), p. 406. Hence the subject in v. 5 would naturally be the chief priests and the multitudes of their associates. The multitudes are not the people, but they are also more than mere bystanders (as is understood by Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke,* p. 66 and Senior, *Luke,* p. 111). They are active

religious leaders who no longer lead the people bring accusations against Jesus who has truly led the people through his authorized teaching in the temple. Hence in the interrogation before Pilate the people are still not part of the characters in the setting who oppose Jesus, but they remain involved in the issue over who will rule them as God's people.

When Jesus is taken before Herod (23:6-12) his main adversaries, the chief priests and scribes, go along in order to continue their false and vehement accusations against him (23:10). The people remain absent from the scene. While scholars differ on the interpretative significance of this scene,[55] in Luke's passion theology, as clearly expressed in Acts 4:25-28, this is part of God's plan as spoken by David through the Holy Spirit in Ps 2:2.[56] In 22:66-71 the leaders of Israel were gathered together against Jesus as set down in God's plan of Ps 2:2. Now Pilate and Herod, representative figures of kings of the earth,[57] have set themselves against Jesus in accordance with that same Ps 2:2 plan.

*The People in Luke 23:13-25*

For the first time since Jesus was teaching daily in the temple prior to the Passover (22:37-38) Luke has brought the people directly into the setting as Pilate calls together the chief priests and the rulers[58] and the people in 23:13. Pilate then sets forth his evaluative point of view (23:14-16). The Jewish authorities brought this man Jesus to him because Jesus turns away (*apostrephonta*) the people (*ton laon*). Upon examining Jesus, he does not find Jesus guilty of the charges nor did Herod. Because Jesus is not guilty of a capital offense he will chastise (*paideusas*) and then release Jesus. This is Pilate's will.

Pilate's will is to be evaluated on two levels by the reader. On the one hand, Jesus is not guilty of the charges leveled against him and hence has done nothing deserving death. Here Pilate's point of view is correct, and in this respect Jesus should be released. On the other hand, this man is the Son of Man whose death God wills. Thus he must die. Likewise, Luke later tells us that Jesus does indeed turn away the people but in a way neither Pilate nor the Jewish opposition could yet comprehend. In the only other Lukan use of *apostrephō* Peter ends his speech to the people (*ton laon*) in Acts 3:26 by declaring, "When God raised up his ser-

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adversaries. That the chief priests are singled out in v. 4 is not at all surprising since that has been Luke's consistent pattern (cf. 19:47; 20:1,19; 22:2,4,52,66).

55 Some see this as a further enhancement of Jesus' innocence. For example, Frederick W. Danker, *Jesus and the New Age, A Commentary on St. Luke's Gospel*, rev. ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988), pp. 365-66; Neyrey, *Passion*, p. 79; Sanders, *Jews in Luke-Acts*, p. 225; Senior, *Luke*, pp. 114-15; Marion Soards, "Tradition, Composition, and Theology in Luke's Account of Jesus before Herod Antipas," *Biblica* 66 (1985): 363; and Charles Talbert, *Reading Luke: A Literary and Theological Commentary on the Third Gospel* (New York: Crossroads, 1982),pp. 216-17. Others depict it mainly as an attempt to show that Christ brings reconciliation, e.g., Karris, Luke, p. 85. Tiede (Luke, p. 407) claims it is intended to be read ironically.

56 Senior, *Luke*, p. 115 and Tiede, *Luke*, p. 403.

57 See Tannehill, *Narrative Unity*, II:71, n. 26, as well as the discussion above in n. 46.

58 Prior to this the rulers had not been introduced to us as a specific entity, but their inclusion here is not obtrusive since Luke has linked various groups of Jewish authorities with the chief priests prior to this. They are probably best seen as including, to some degree, the elders and the scribes. See Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke X-XXIV*, AB 28A (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1985), p. 1484. As has already been noted, their inclusion in the opposition to Jesus is interpreted according to Ps 2:1-2 in Acts 4:25-28.

vant, he sent him first to you, to bless you by turning (*apostrephein*) each of you from you wicked ways." Consequently Pilate's will does bear truth but not the whole truth of the divine plan. It must be evaluated in light of God's will for Jesus and not just Pilate's own evaluative point of view.[59]

Because the people are now specifically part of the scene and because they have continuously received Jesus in the temple as their authorized teacher, Pilate's address creates a moment of anticipation for the reader. What is expected by the reader is that the pattern of a divided response to Jesus (people, positive; religious leaders, negative) established since 19:47 would continue. Hence the expectation is that the people would testify before Pilate that indeed Jesus is innocent. At the very least, the reader might even expect some devious maneuvering of the people by the chief priests (cf. 19:47-48; 20:5-6, 19-20; 22:2,4-5,52-53,71; 23:2,5,10).[60] But the big surprise of the following verses is that there is no such response, no such underhanded maneuvering. Instead, Luke presents a stark picture of the people having formed a unified triumvirate with the chief priests and the rulers in continuous opposition to Pilate's will.[61]

To Pilate's first proposal to release Jesus (23:14-16), the Jewish triumvirate issues counter-commands that Pilate take Jesus away and then release for them Barabbas.[62] The clash of wills escalates when Pilate again wills to release Jesus, but the Jewish triumvirate orders Pilate to crucify Jesus (23:20-21). These two clash over what to do with Jesus for a third time when Pilate again testifies to Jesus' innocence of a capital crime and renews his intent to release Jesus after chastising him (23:22). The third response by the triumvirate proves to be decisive. Not only are they urgently pressing their case in great voices, not only do their voices keep prevailing, not only does Pilate decide to let their demand come to pass, but ironically the Jewish triumvirate presents God's will for Jesus through the use of the divine passive (infinitive) *staurōthēnai* (v. 23). This is an important signpost for the reader that the Jewish triumvirate unwittingly partici-

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[59] On the use of *paideusas* in the Roman legal system see Danker, *Jesus and the New Age*, p. 368 and Neyrey, *Passion*, p. 81. Its use here (also in 23:22) may have an ironical scriptural intent. In Ps 2:10 LXX the kings, i.e., those who judge the earth, are called to understand and to be chastised (*paideuthēte*) by God and God's royal son. Here Pilate, ignorant of God's will, intends to chastise God's royal son.

[60] Although our analysis has not utilized redaction criticism, it is pertinent to note that Mark 15:11 and Matt 27:20 specifically mention that the chief priests (and elders) instigate the crowd's response to Pilate. If Luke used either gospel as a source, he has knowingly composed a significantly different scene.

[61] To emphasize the continuous opposition of the Jewish triumvirate to Jesus, Luke contrasts Pilate's proposals in the aorist (*eipen*, v. 14; *prosephōnēsen*, v. 20; *eipen*, v. 22) with the triumvirate's responses cast in second aorist with modifiers (*anekragon pamplēthei legontes*, v. 18), in an imperfect with a modifier (*epephōnoun legontes*, v. 21) and in two more imperfects with modifiers (*epekeinto phōnais megalais aitoumenoi...katischuon*, v. 23). Luke's grammar underscores the united, persistent vehemence displayed by the triumvirate in opposition to Pilate's will that Jesus be released. The subject of these verbs is the triumvirate of 23:13 and not just the religious authorities themselves (rightly stressed by Sanders, Jews in Luke-Acts, p. 66). On 23:18-25 as "a naked struggle of wills," see Tiede, *Luke*, p. 411.

[62] On the request for Barabbas as a foreshadowing of "the Jewish revolt of 66 CE," see Tannehill, *Narrative Unity*, I:198, 164-65; Danker, *Jesus and the New Age*, p. 368; and Neyrey, *Passion*, pp. 82-83. That the request stems from the triumvirate rather than from Pilate or a Passover custom is so unique in the gospel traditions that a variant reading was introduced (23:17) to bring Luke into line with the other gospels. For a discussion on the Lukan handling of the Barabbas incident, see Büchele, *Tod Jesu*, pp. 36-38.

pates in something much larger than they can possibly imagine, namely, God's will is that Jesus be crucified as a necessary part of the salvific plan.[63] And so Pilate also becomes an ironic participant in God's will as he releases the revolutionary Barabbas and hands Jesus over to their will (23:24-25).[64]

Any attempts to soften the role of the people in 23:13-25 misread the thrust of Luke's narrative.[65] Though they are brought into the scene at Pilate's instigation, they stand fully united with the chief priests and rulers in demanding the death of Jesus. This Jewish triumvirate as representing all Israel has clearly rejected Israel's royal Messiah, Jesus the Son of God. Why? Because that is how God's salvific plan is meant to unfold. Again the clearest commentary on this aspect of Luke's passion theology comes in Acts 4:25-28. In fulfillment of David's Spirit-inspired prophecy, "Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, *to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place.*" The people were meant to be part of the unified rejection of Jesus. Yet it is God's plan, not the rejection of Jesus by the Jewish triumvirate, which drives Luke's plot at this point. To claim that if the Jewish triumvirate would not have objected to Pilate's desire to release Jesus, "Jesus would have been released,"[66] is to overlook that which controls Luke's passion narrative. Jesus will not be released because he must be crucified. God's will, not the will of the triumvirate nor Pilate's will, controls the action here. Likewise, though this scene does contrast Jesus' innocence with the triumvirate's desire to have Jesus crucified, Luke is telling the reader much more than how an innocent man was condemned to death.[67] The reader has always known that Jesus was innocent. That is not the key issue. Rather, here Luke shows that the innocent, royal Son of God goes to death after being rejected by all Israel (including the people who had previously received him) in accordance with God's salvific plan which must be accomplished.

*The People in 23:26-48*

In the scenes of 23:26-48, two aspects of Luke's passion theology dominate his presentation of the people. First, Jesus' death is carried out by the Jewish triumvirate and not by the Romans. In Jesus' prior predictions of his passion just who would crucify him has been ambiguous because Luke has focused more on the divine necessity of his death than on pinpointing who actively carries out the death sentence.[68] In Luke 24:7 the ambiguity remains for similar reasons.[69] In

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[63] 9:22; 13:33; 17:25; 18:31-33; 22:22,37,42; also cf. 24:6-7, 26-27,44-46; Acts 2:23-24; 3:14-18; 4:27-28; 8:30-35; 13:27-37; 26:22-23. So Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke*, pp. 35-36 and Tiede, *Prophecy and History*, p. 110.

[64] Matera, *Passion Narratives*, p. 179 and Senior, *Luke*, p. 119.

[65] Analyses of 23:13-25 which attempt to soften the role of the people include Richard J. Cassidy, *Jesus, Politics, and Society, A Study of Luke's Gospel* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1978), pp. 68-71, 171; Idem, "Luke's Audience, the Chief Priests, and the Motive for Jesus' Death," in *Political Issues in Luke-Acts*, p. 152; Karris, *Luke*, p. 25; and Kodell, "Luke's Use of *Laos*," p. 333.

[66] So argued by Tannehill, *Narrative Unity*, I:164 and Sanders, *Jews in Luke-Acts*, p. 9.

[67] The theme of Jesus as condemned yet innocent man is stressed by I. Howard Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke*, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), p. 858 and Talbert, *Reading Luke*, p. 217.

[68] In 18:32 Jesus says he will be handed over to the Gentiles but then there are two more passive verbs and an active participle before he says that they will kill him. It is unclear if the Gentiles are to be seen as the subject of *apoktenousin* especially since up to this point no Gentile has abused Jesus while Jewish captors have (cf. 22:63-65; 23:11). The

Acts, however, it is made clear to us that the people and the religious authorities not only rejected Jesus, but they also carried out the act of crucifixion (Acts 2:36; 3:13-15; 4:10; 13:27-29). This is the exact same picture Luke's narrative presents in 23:26,32-34. Because there are no explicit subjects to the third person verbs in these verses, some scholars have argued that the reader is to supply the Romans as the subjects, particularly with respect to *apēgagon* in 23:26.[70] Yet there has not been a single reference to a single Roman soldier in the passion narrative up to this point. Throughout 23:13-25 the subject of the third person plural verbs has been understood as the Jewish triumvirate. 23:25 ends with the emphatic *tō thelēmati autōn* which clearly refers to the will of the triumvirate. Since Luke has given the reader no other clues (and since he explicitly makes similar claims in Acts), the reader should naturally understand that the subject of the verbs in 23:26 remains the Jewish triumvirate. In other words, Pilate hands Jesus over to their will, and the triumvirate carries out their will which is to lead Jesus away to crucify him. Whereas the religious authorities were the antagonists who have led Jesus on three separate occasions (22:54,66; 23:1), now the people join them in leading Jesus away to be crucified.[71] Again, in carrying out their will they are unwittingly fulfilling God's will.

The second aspect of Luke's theology which seems to control his presentation of the people in 23:26-48 is that a divided response to Jesus within Israel is developing once again. This is seen first in 23:27 wherein Luke presents a large multitude of people following Jesus (*ēkolouthei de autō polu plēthos tou laou).*[72] There is some debate as to whether *tou laou* here in 23:27 is to be regarded as part of the triumvirate *ton laon* in 23:13-26.[73] Since Luke has used *laos* as a monolithic group throughout the scenes in Jerusalem, the reader would not readily understand the *laos* of 23:13 to be a completely separate group of people from the *laos* in 23:27. In the text the distinction between *ton laon* in 23:13-26 and *tou laou* in 23:27 is not that they constitute different groups. There are no clues in the text that they are

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closest we get to a direct party is in the parable of the vineyard owner and tenants (20:14-17) which is told against the chief priests and scribes but not against any Gentiles.

[69] Luke 24:20 is also difficult to pinpoint. Cleopas and the other disciple see their chief priests and rulers as the culprits, but at this point they are also unreliable witnesses ("foolish men," is Jesus' assessment of them, v. 25). While members of Israel here see their religious leaders as killing Jesus, it does not necessarily mean that Luke is blaming only the religious leaders while exonerating the people. Acts will provide the reader with more reliable witnesses than these two.

[70] E.g., Cassidy, *Jesus, Politics, and Society*, p. 71; Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke*, p. 66; Marshall, *Luke*, pp. 862-63; Marion Soards, "Tradition, Composition, and Theology in Jesus' Speech to the 'Daughters of Jerusalem,' (Luke 23:26-32)," *Biblica* 68 (1987): 226; and Tiede, *Luke*, pp. 411, 413.

[71] Other scholars who understand the subject of the verbs in 23:26 to be the same as the verbs in 23:13-25 include Fitzmyer, *Luke X-XXIV*, p. 1496; Gaston, "Anti-Judaism and the Passion Narrative," p. 149; Sanders, *Jews in Luke-Acts*, p. 226; Senior, *Luke*, p. 120; and E. Jane Via, "According to Luke, Who Put Jesus to Death?" In *Political Issues in Luke-Acts*, p. 131.

[72] It is possible to understand 23:27 to picture either the large multitude as including the people and women (so RSV) or that the large multitude of the people included women (so NRSV). For a discussion of this see Brawley, *Luke-Acts and the Jews*, p. 140.

[73] For example Tyson (*Death of Jesus*, p. 35) sees the crowd here as part of "Jesus' loyal remnant." Senior (Luke, p. 122) and Brawley (*Luke-Acts and the Jews*, pp. 136-37, 140) conclude that the crowd which was allied with the religious authorities is not the same crowd which now follows Jesus since the former had been hostile to Jesus while the latter is mourning Jesus.

totally unrelated. Rather, the distinction is that in 23:13-26 *ton laon* are presented as acting as a unified whole. The people joined the triumvirate and willed Jesus' death. Now, however, a significant number of the people (*polu plēthos tou laou*) are separating themselves from the triumvirate.[74] Here Luke has literally created a spatial separation. As the chief priests, Jewish rulers, and (some of) the people are leading Jesus to his death in rejection of him, a large number of the people are now following Jesus.[75] Hence Luke presented the people as full partners in the rejection of Jesus 23:13-26 because he is detailing the fulfillment of God's plan outlined in Ps 2:1-2. With a large number of the people now following Jesus, Luke is again presenting a divided response to Jesus in fulfillment of Simeon's oracle in 2:34-35.

Indeed the spatial separation (pointing to a divided people) and Jesus' act of turning from the Jewish triumvirate leading him to death and towards those "following him" help the reader see the dual function of Jesus' words in 23:28-31. There is still a strong note of prophetic judgment recalling scripture and Jesus' previous oracles in 13:34-35; 19:41-44; 21:20-24.[76] God's judgment against those in Israel who reject Israel's Messiah King (and who will also reject those sent to bear witness to him) will be played out in the destruction of Jerusalem. That is what will happen when the wood is dry.[77] But now the wood is green even as Jesus goes to his death because God's salvific plan for Israel is being realized in his death and resurrection. In that way there is an important call to repentance here,[78] a call to repentance which is only made possible through Jesus' death and resurrection (Luke 24:46-47; Acts 2:37-41; 3:13-21). Thus even *tou laou* who now follow Jesus will need repentance preached to them and forgiveness in Jesus' name offered to them because they were part of *ton laon* in 23:13-25 who rejected Jesus and willed his death.

This divided response to Jesus continues to be played out in the scene of Jesus' death.[79] On the one hand, the chief priests, Jewish rulers, and the people who have remained part of the triumvirate (i.e., those not constituting the large multitude of people who followed Jesus) are still to be seen as the subject of

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74 Fitzmyer, *Luke X-XXIV*, p. 1497.

75 In the passion narrative *agō* and its compounds have been used to show the action of the antagonists in supposed control over Jesus (22:54,66; 23:1,26; also cf. 23:32). In contrast, *akoloutheō* is not an antagonistic term for Luke (only expressly antagonistic in Acts 21:36). Those who follow Jesus are to be evaluated in a positive light by the reader (cf. 5:11,27,28; 7:9; 9:11,23,57-61; 18:28,43; 22:39,54).

76 On the use of scripture in 27:28-31 and the literary ties to the previous oracles in Luke, cf. Neyrey, *Passion*, pp. 11-21; Senior, *Luke*, pp. 121-26; Soards, "'Daughters of Jerusalem,'" pp. 228-38; and Tiede, *Luke*, pp. 414-15.

77 In this way *ti genētai* (23:31b) points us to divine action in the future (cf. the use of *ginomai* in 21:7,9,28,31,32,36). Conversely the subject of *poiousin* (23:31a) is not allusive but refers to the triumvirate in that very scene who have rejected Jesus and are now carrying out his death sentence (*tauta*). For overviews of the ways in which 23:31 has been interpreted see Fitzmyer, *Luke X-XXIV*, pp. 1498-99 and Soards, "'Daughters of Jerusalem,'" pp. 238-40.

78 Danker, *Jesus in the New Age*, pp. 371-72; Karris, *Luke*, pp. 93-94; Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke*, pp. 66-67; and Senior, *Luke*, pp. 125-26.

79 Scriptural allusions are prevalent throughout the scene of Jesus' death to help the reader understand how all of this is an integral part of God's plan. Direct scriptural references include Ps 22:19 (v. 34b) and 8-9 (v. 35); Ps 69:22 (v. 36); Amos 8:9 (v. 44); and Ps 31:6 (v. 49). On other ways Luke may well be using scriptural images or arguments in this scene (including Wisdom 2) see Karris, *Luke*, pp. 96-111.

verbs in 23:32-34. Consequently, as he will emphasize in Acts, Luke portrays Jesus as being crucified by Jews not by Roman soldiers.[80] Indeed, they also fulfill Ps 22:19 by casting lots for his garments (23:34b).[81] On the other hand, in 23:35 the divided response to Jesus becomes more pronounced. The people are no longer part of the triumvirate since they stand observing, but the rulers remain active antagonists toward Jesus by ridiculing him.[82] The focus of their taunts is again on Jesus' royal identity so that if he is Messiah, the Chosen One, he is supposed to save himself as he saved others.

The Roman soldiers not only arrive on the scene for the first time in 23:36 (*proserchomenoi*), they join in the mocking. Some scholars have understood the soldiers (*hoi stratiōtai*) in 23:36 to be Jewish soldiers rather than Roman soldiers,[83] and if that be the case then Luke has presented a crucifixion scene which completely removes the Romans from any negative involvement in Jesus' death. That Luke intends the reader to understand them as Roman soldiers rather than Jewish soldiers can be seen in a number of ways. First, the temple soldiers were *stratēgoi* in 22:4,52 (also cf. Acts 4:1; 5:24,26), and Herod's soldiers were *strateuma* in 23:11. The only other time the reader has encountered *stratiōtai* in the gospel was in 7:8 where it referred to the Roman soldiers under the orders of the centurion. The switch in terms for soldiers from those of 22:4,52 and 23:11 argues for a switch in types of soldiers. Second, in Luke and in Acts whenever the reader discovers a centurion linked with soldiers, the soldiers are thought of as Roman and the term for them is *stratiōtai* (cf. Luke 7:2,7; Acts 10:1,7; 21:32,35; 23:23,31; 27:31-32,42-43). This consistent picture indicates that the centurion in 23:47 is to be understood by the reader not as the lone Roman figure at the crucifixion (who stands in direct contrast to the Jewish soldiers) but as the commander of those Roman soldiers who mock Jesus. Thus one Gentile soldier stands in direct contrast to the other Gentile soldiers. Third, they mock Jesus with the Gentile perspective of royalty, "King of the Jews" (cf. 23:3) rather than with the Jewish perspective of royalty which focuses on Messiah (cf. 22:67; 23:2,35,39).[84] Fourth, in Acts 4:27 Luke involves Pilate along with the Gentiles as those aligned against Jesus in the passion. Luke 23:36-37 is the only place where Luke has placed characters who could (and should) be regarded as Gentiles. Hence in Luke's passion narrative the soldiers arrive on the scene only after Jesus has been crucified by his Jewish antagonists, but when they arrive they join in the mocking. Their mocking also focuses on Jesus' royal identity as they call on him to save himself (23:37). As Luke spells it out in Acts 4:25-28, this participation of the Gentiles is one more aspect of the fulfillment of God's plan according to Psalm 2. Hence the religious authorities of Israel, the people of Israel, the Gentiles, and the political

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80 Rightly noted by Sanders, *Jews in Luke-Acts*, p. 67. For a different perspective see Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke*, p. 67.

81 Because of the overwhelming nature of the manuscript evidence, we have chosen not to read 23:34a as part of Luke's passion narrative and have not included it in our analysis of the people's role in the passion.

82 So Danker, *Jesus and the New Age*, p. 375; Fitzmyer, *Luke X-XXIV*, p. 1504; Karris, *Luke*, pp. 99-100; Senior, *Luke*, pp. 130-31; and Tiede, *Luke*, p. 418. Sanders (*Jews in Luke-Acts*, p. 227) notes the separation of the two groups but goes on to argue that their failure to try to halt the crucifixion actually increases their guilt.

83 E.g., Gaston, "Anti-Judaism and the Passion Narrative," p. 149; Sanders, *Jews in Luke-Acts*, pp. 11-12, 15, 227-28; and Walaskay, "Trial and Death," p. 92.

84 Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke*, p. 66.

authorities (i.e., Pilate and Herod) were all gathered against God's Messiah as they were predestined to do in accordance with God's plan.[85]

The scene of the two criminals reacting to Jesus in 23:39-43 not only provides two contrasting responses to Jesus the crucified, royal messiah, it also serves as a transition for the overall responses to Jesus in 23:32-48. The first criminal utters the third challenge to Jesus' royal identity.[86] The other criminal's response not only stands in contrast to this, but it also is the first of three positive responses to the scene of the crucifixion.[87] The second response comes after Jesus dies in full trust that God will accomplish God's salvific plan (23:46). Seeing that which has happened, the centurion glorifies God and declares Jesus to be righteous (23:47).[88] The third positive response involves the people. The reference to all the crowds (*ochloi)* gathered and watching (*theōrēsantes)* this spectacle certainly points back to 23:35a where the people stood watching (*ho laos theōrōn*). They are now said to return beating their breasts (*tuptontes ta stēthē*). The reader is to evaluate this response positively because it harkens directly back to the tax collector's response in Jesus' parable of 18:9-14.[89] As Jesus told how the tax collector beat his chest (*etupten to stēthos autou*, 18:13) as part of the recognition of his sinfulness before a merciful God who declared him righteous, so now the very people who willed and even participated in the death of Jesus depart the scene recognizing their own sinfulness. The reader of Luke-Acts also understands that God's mercy will be enacted as the divine plan includes the resurrection of this Jesus whom they crucified so that forgiveness and repentance might be preached to all nations beginning in Jerusalem, beginning with these same people who participated in Jesus' death (24:44-47; Acts 2:22-39; 3:12-26).[90]

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[85] On the irony of the royal mockings of Jesus cf. Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke*, p. 67; Senior, *Luke*, p. 133; Tannehill, *Narrative Unity* I:198; and Tiede, Luke, p. 419.

[86] Tiede, *Luke*, p. 420. Also cf. Senior, *Luke*, p. 134.

[87] This is not to say that the three positive responses are of equal weight. Tannehill (*Narrative Unity* I:198-99) has noted the uniqueness of the repentant criminal's response. But it is to say that Luke has established a type of chiasm in the divided responses to Jesus in 23:35b-48 with three negative responses followed by three positive responses.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| A | | Jewish Rulers/v. 35b |
| | B | Roman Soldiers/ vv. 36-37 |
| | | C First Criminal/v. 39 |
| | | C′ Second Criminal/ vv. 40-42 |
| | B′ | Roman Centurion/v. 47 |
| A′ | | Jewish People/v. 48 |

For a somewhat similar assessment see Neyrey, *Passion*, p. 132. For a different structural assessment see Büchele, *Tod Jesu*, pp. 76-114.

[88] On *dikaios* as meaning "righteous" and not just "innocent" see Karris, *Luke*, pp. 109-11; Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke*, pp. 68-69; Frank J. Matera, "The Death of Jesus according to Luke: A Question of Sources," *CBQ* 47 (1985): 481-84; and Tiede, *Luke*, pp. 424-25.

[89] Among those scholars who also see this as a positive response which is linked to 18:13-17 are Brawley, *Luke-Acts and the Jews*, pp 140-41; Danker, *Jesus and the New Age*, p. 383; Karris, *Luke*, pp. 111-12; Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke*, p. 30; Matera, *Passion Narratives*, p. 188; Senior, *Luke*, pp. 147-48; and Tiede, *Luke*, p. 425. Marshall (Luke, p. 877) sees it only as a sign of mourning. Sanders (*Jews in Luke-Acts*, p. 68) sees their action as "a recognition of their desperate situation." Tyson (*Death of Jesus*, p. 46, n. 131) concludes that to interpret this act "as a symbol of Jewish corporate repentance is unsuitable to the Lukan context and literary structure."

[90] The preparations this provides for the opening of Acts have also been noted by Kingsbury, *Conflict in Luke*, p. 30; Matera, "Death of Jesus," p. 484; and Tannehill, *Narrative Unity* I:166.

Thus the final picture of the people which Luke presents is not one of rejection nor desperation. Rather, it is one in which they acknowledge their participation in Jesus' death and stand on the verge of the repentance that will come as God's plan continues to unfold. They have been unwitting participants in the divine plan, and they do not yet understand God's plan (nor do Jesus' disciples). Yet God's plan will result in thousands of these same people also becoming disciples of the Jesus they helped kill. Indeed, their response in 23:48 not only points the reader back to the tax collector's action in 18:13, it also points the reader back to Peter's recognition of his own sinfulness in 23:62.[91] Hence as Luke had previously aligned the religious authorities with Judas (22:2-6,47-53; cf. Acts 1:16), so here he has aligned the people with Peter. Thus it will become clear to the reader that when Jesus had commanded Peter to strengthen his brothers after he had turned back (22:32, *adelphous sou*), Jesus did not just mean the other disciples but also meant the people since Peter will address them as *adelphoi* (Acts 2:29; 3:17). Because of their unwitting participation in Jesus' death Peter will call on them to repent and so receive the forgiveness which comes in the name of Jesus Messiah whom they crucified in accordance with God's salvific plan for them (2:22-42; 3:17-26).[92]

## Conclusions and Implications

The people do not just play a role in Luke's passion narrative. As Luke presents his passion narrative, they are participants in the divine drama of salvation. God's plan included the necessary death and resurrection of the Messiah so that repentance and forgiveness in the name of Jesus Messiah would be preached to all nations beginning from Jerusalem (24:46-47). Part of that plan also included the rejection of Jesus by all components of Israel. Because of that, the people themselves become active partners in the Jewish triumvirate that not only willed Jesus' death before Pilate but also carried out that death. The chief priests, rulers and (by the time they get to the Skull, some of) the people made up the death squad and not the Roman soldiers. Yet Luke does not exculpate Pilate and the Romans. They too were predestined partners in the rejection of Jesus. As Luke's passion theology (bespoken by the Christian community and ratified by the Holy Spirit) interprets these events the religious leaders, Pilate, Herod, the people, and the Gentile (Roman) soldiers were all gathered together against God and God's anointed in the passion just as God had planned it in fulfillment of Ps. 2:1-2 (Acts 4:25-31).

Being unwitting participants of God's salvific plan does not absolve the people. They are guilty and are held responsible. They may have been ignorant of God's ultimate plans and so ironically fulfilled them (Acts 3:17-18), but they still must repent and receive forgiveness which comes only in the name of Jesus whom they rejected and crucified (Acts 3:19-21). Failure to do that will result in their exclusion from the people of Israel (Acts 3:22-26). As part of the process of their turning from their sinful rejection of Jesus, not only does Luke tell of Jesus' resurrection and ascension/enthronement, he also shows how the people are beginning to turn in the course of the passion narrative itself. A large group of the people follow Jesus rather than lead him to death (23:27). The people quit the

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91 So too Tiede, *Luke*, pp. 418, 425.

92 Note that when Peter's message cuts the people to the heart they address him and the apostles as "brothers" (2:37).

triumvirate, but the rulers press their antagonism by mocking the crucified Messiah (23:35). After Jesus' obedient death and the centurion's declaration of Jesus as the righteous one, they return giving evidence of their recognition of sinfulness which relies only on the mercy of God (23:48; cf. 18:9-14). They have not yet repented because that will only be possible when their brother Peter preaches to them repentance and forgiveness in the name of Jesus (Acts 2:22-42). Nevertheless, Luke closes his narrative in the gospel by setting the stage for his narrative in Acts not only in terms of Jesus' ascension and the posture of the disciples but also in terms of his presentation of the people.

That means that the people are not really presented in terms of initial reception and final rejection here in Luke. They have rejected. They have been active participants in carrying out Jesus' death. It is not just in Acts but also in Luke 23 that the Jewish triumvirate literally kills Jesus. But here in Luke 23, Luke also begins paving the way for the proper response of faith which thousands of the people will demonstrate in the opening of Acts.

Because the people's role in the passion is defined first and foremost in terms of God's salvific plan, they are not predominantly villainous or tragic figures. They do not really make one fatal error which leads to their downfall. In truth, their rejection of Jesus is not only part of God's plan, it leads to the ultimate goal of God's plan which means salvation in Jesus' name will be offered to them. That is good news not bad news. Still, not all of the people will respond appropriately. Many will spurn those proclaiming that salvific message and will set out to kill those messengers. Yet that too is not unique because God's people have a long, long history of being a stiff-necked, stubborn, rejecting people (Acts 7). God's rejection of stubborn Israel was not sealed in the passion rejection of Jesus, but it was revealed to the reader by Jesus prior to and in the midst of the passion narrative. Jerusalem will be destroyed as part of God's wrath. But not all the people will be obliterated with Jerusalem. thousands of the people will repent, will call upon the name of the Lord, will be saved, and will remain members of God's holy people Israel. To be held responsible for the death of Jesus is not the same as being blamed or punished for the death of Jesus in Luke's passion theology. All the people fit into the former role according to Luke, but Luke refuses to fit all the people into the latter role. To that end, he moves from the unified participation of the people in the triumvirate in 23:13-26 to the divided response and ultimate withdrawal from the triumvirate by the people in 23:27-48.

# A Review of Previous Research on Philo's *De Virtutibus*

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On approaching Philo's treatise *De Virtutibus* (*Virt*), one is immediately struck by the fact that its contents are not what might be expected of a Hellenistic author writing under Platonic and Stoic influence. Virt is divided into four sections, each devoted to one of four virtues—Περὶ ἀνδρείας (*De Fortitudine* [*Fort*]), Περὶ φιλανθρωπίας (*De Humanitate* [*Hum*]), Περὶ μετανοίας (*De paenitentia* [*Paen*]), Περὶ εὐγενείας (*De Nobilitate* [*Nobil*]). With one exception, however, these are not the four classic cardinal virtues of φρόνησις (prudence), σωφροσύνη (temperance), ἀνδρεία (courage), and δικαιοσύνη (justice) which indeed Philo elsewhere does extol (e.g., Leg All 1.63, where they are allegorized from the four rivers of Eden).

The reason for this difference seems clear from the relation of Virt to the treatise that immediately precedes it, *De Specialibus Legibus* (*Spec Leg*). In that work Philo has discussed the laws that are derivative from the Decalogue, and concluded with a disquisition on δικαιοσύνη. As he says in *Leg All* 4.135 (PLCL 8.93), "Of the queen of the virtues, piety or holiness, we have spoken earlier and also of wisdom and temperance." Thus only courage remains to be discussed, and it is with this virtue that he begins *Virt*.[1] At the same time, however, just as it is the Ten Commandments that control the topics under discussion in *Spec Leg*, so it is not the thematics of the four cardinal virtues that govern the present work, but the residue of biblical laws that he has not yet considered in the preceding treatise. These constitute the source material for *Virt* and control its focus.

Beyond this more structural basis for the content of *Virt*, Roger Arnaldez has seen an underlying internal unity in the four parts of the treatise. He says:

> Ainsi, bien que les quatre vertus étudiées dans le *De Virtutibus* semblent d'abord ne se rattacher à aucun ensemble, à aucun système de la morale classique des Grecs, elles reçoivent du texte sacré dont Philon les fait surgir, un lien qui les réunit fortement comme des expressions très voisines d'une même réalité: celle de la présence de Dieu à l'homme, ou, ce qui est la même chose, celle de la connaissance et de l'amour de l'homme tourné vers Dieu.[2]

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[1] F. H. Colson, *Philo* (LCL; Cambridge MA: Harvard, 1968) 8.x-xii.

[2] Roger Arnaldez in *De Virtutibus* (PM 26; Paris: Du Cerf, 1962) 25. Note also the remarks of Leopold Cohn in his introduction to Virt in his and Isaak Heinemann's *Philo von Alexandria, Die Werke in deutscher Übersetzung*, 2 (Breslau: Marcus, 1910) 317: "Senecas Ausführungen erinnern oft auffallend an die Lehren, die Philo an der Hand

## Title and Integrity

Issues regarding the title and integrity of the work we know as *De Virtutibus* arise from the fact of its being composed of four subtreatises, as noted above. This accords with our earliest evidence regarding its content, from Clement of Alexandria at the end of the second century. In *Stromata* 2.81-100 Clement draws heavily on *Virt* 9-219, working his way through all four subtreatises *seriatim* (this may be observed by following the citations from the Stromata in the footnotes of the Cohn-Wendland edition of *Virt*, or of those from *Virt* in Otto Stählin's edition of Clement in the GCS). It seems evident from this that shortly before 200 CE *Virt* existed at Alexandria as a unit in substantially its present form.

However, our earliest evidence for the title, from the fourth century in Eusebius' list of Philo's writings (HE 2.18), indicates only three subtreatises; Eusebius reports it as Περὶ τῶν τριῶν ἀρετῶν ἃς σὺν ἄλλαις ἀνέγραψεν Μωυσῆς. This tradition of three parts is carried on in our oldest manuscript, Seldenianus XII, from the tenth or eleventh centuries, which was "evidently copied from an uncial text";[3] there it is titled: Φίλωνος περὶ γ' ἀρετῶν, περὶ ἡμερότητος καὶ ἐπιεικείας, περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν ἐν ἡμέρα τῇ αὐτῇ θυεῖν μητέρα καὶ ἔγγονον, διατὶ ἔγκυον ζῶον προστάσσει μὴ θύεσθαι.[4] The words περὶ ἡμερότητος . . . μὴ θύεσθαι, which reflect the content only of the subtreatise Hum, are obviously an addition to the title signaling themes in the work that particularly impressed some medieval scribe. The manuscript, however, as its title indicates, contains only three of the four subtreatises, *Fort*, *Hum*, and *Paen*.

The plot thickens with the evidence from our second oldest manuscript, Parisinus gr. 435, from the eleventh century. This text maintains the tradition of only three subtreatises, but here they are *Hum*, *Paen*, and *Nobil*. The situation is further complicated by the appearance of a fifth subtreatise, Περὶ εὐσεβείας (*De Pietate*), in the titles of the majority of the remaining manuscripts. This work is a ghost in that while it is virtually ubiquitous in the titles, it never appears in the texts. That such a composition did exist is evident from the fact that several fragments found in the *Sacra parallela* are ascribed to it.[5] Yet another complexity arises from the way in which, throughout the manuscript tradition, the four subtreatises often appear quite independently of each other, as will be seen in the listing of manuscripts given in the next section.

Several questions thus emerge regarding the title and integrity of *Virt*: Was it originally one work? If so, why is the manuscript tradition so diverse as to its integrity? Which subtreatises did it contain? Were *Pietate* and *Nobil* written as independent works which in later times floated in and out of the main body of *Virt*? Is it reasonable to suppose that from an original five parts, by Clement's time in the second century *Pietate* had already disappeared? If so, whence come

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der biblischen Vorschriften entwickelt. Aber eins fehlt Seneca, was bei Philo eine wichtige Rolle spielt, das ist das religiöse Moment: Philo betont die enge Zusammengehörigkeit der Menschenliebe mit der Frömmigkeit, mit der Liebe zu Gott; die wahre Gottesverehrung schliesst auch die allgemeine Menschenliebe in sich, und die Menschenliebe führt umgekehrt auch zur Frömmigkeit."

[3] Howard L. Goodhart and Erwin R. Goodenough, *The Politics of Philo Judaeus ... with a General Bibliography of Philo* (New Haven: Yale, 1938) 151 (hereafter cited as G-G).

[4] G-G 151.

[5] Colson, 8.xiii-xiv, n. b (3); James R. Royse, "The Oxyrhynchus Papyrus of Philo," *BASP* 17 (1980) 162-163.

the fragments in the florilegia ascribed to it and the tradition found in the later manuscripts that it was a part of *Virt*? What was the original title of the work?

Scholars have proposed several solutions to these questions. Emil Schürer sought to reduce the presumably four original subtreatises to three by arguing that the supposition of a subtreatise *De Pietate* arose from the opening words of *Hum*.[6] These read: Τὴν δ' εὐσεβείας συγγενεστάτην καὶ ἀδελφὴν καὶ δίδυμον ὄντως ἑξῆς ἐπισκεπτέον φιλανθρωπίαν (Virt 51), which scribes understood to imply that a treatise Περὶ εὐσεβείας had originally stood between *Fort* and *Hum*, the place it indeed occupies in the manuscript titles.

Leopold Cohn, while recognizing that *Pietate*, if it ever was a part of *Virt*, must have been lost at an early stage, nevertheless took the evidence of *Virt* 51 seriously to indicate that such a work had once occupied a place immediately preceding *Hum*. He suggested that the tradition of three books be explained as follows:

> ...gemeint sind dann unter den drei Tugenden die Tapferkeit, die Frömmigkeit und die Menschenliebe. Denn der in dem Titel der Handschriftengenannte kleine Abschnitt über die Reue ... kann nicht als selbständiges Kapitel ... angesehen werden, er gehört noch zu den Auseinandersetzungen über die Menschenliebe.... Zu der Abhandlung über die Menschenliebe gehört ausserdem das Kapitel über den Adel.[7]

Cohn thus subsumed all five putative subtreatises under the three, *Fort*, *Pietate*, and *Hum*. He envisioned a continuity between *Hum* and *Paen* in that after those who yet are held by false beliefs and practice evil ways have been convicted by the arguments in *Hum*, they are then called on in Paen to repent. Then, in *Nobil*, Cohn saw Philo continuing the theme, turning now to his fellow Jews and urging them, on the Stoic principle ὅτι μόνος ὁ σόφος εὐγενής, not to stand apart on their Abrahamic birthright, but to accept proselytes as equals.

Colson expressed serious reservations regarding Cohn's reconstruction.[8] He rejected *Virt* 51 as indicating that a subtreatise *De Pietate* originally preceded Hum. Noting that in *Virt* 95 piety and humanity are coupled as "queens of the virtues," he declared: "It is not remarkable that here [i.e. §51], when he passes on from the less royal 'courage' to the more royal 'humanity' he should note its kinship to the undoubted queen [i.e. piety]."[9]

Colson inclined to agree with Cohn that *Paen* should not be considered a subtreatise in its own right, since "repentence is not a virtue but a necessary stepping-stone to the virtues."[10] He suggested the possibility, however, that the

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[6] Emil Schürer, *A History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1894) 2.3.346.

[7] Cohn, 2.316; see also his remarks in Cohn and Paul Wendland, *Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt* 5 (Berlin: Reimer, 1906) XXVI-XXVIII.

[8] Colson, 8.xiii-xvii.

[9] Colson, 8.xiii, n. b (1). Stephen Charles Mott, "Greek Ethics and Christian Conversion," *Novum Testamentum* 20 (1978) 23 notes: "Εὐσέβεια, however, was present in the earliest grouping of the four virtues. Aeschylus, *Sept* 610,...includes εὐσεβής: σώφρων, δίκαιος, ἀγαθὸς, εὐσεβὴς ἀνήρ.

[10] Colson, 8.xvi. Cohn had already made the point that repentance could not be considered a virtue ("nec μετάνοιαν proprie virtutem esse nemo est quin videat," Cohn and Wendland, 5.XXVII); Wolfson, however, while recognizing that "in Greek philosophy repentance is never held up as a virtue," argues that in the Hebrew Bible

original three subtreatises, rather than those proposed by Cohn, were *De Justitia* (Περὶ δικαιοσύνης, which now constitutes *Spec Leg* 4.132-238), *Fort*, and *Hum*. Colson also found little in *Nobil* to indicate that it is concerned primarily with proselytes, as Cohn had argued. His own proposal is that, Clement's copy to the contrary notwithstanding, this work was originally an independent treatise. He pointed out that in comparison with *Hum*, this composition is rhetorically inferior. He concluded with Oxbridge irony: "The *De Virtutibus* would gain much if we might suppose that the treatise [i.e. *Nobil*] was incorporated with it under the idea that εὐγένεια, as indeed in one sense it might, should rank among the virtues."[11]

While all solutions to this puzzle must remain conjectural, the notion of an originally independent treatise *De Nobilitate* does have in its favor a strong manuscript tradition that separates it from the rest of *Virt*. If it was indeed originally separate, however, it would seem likely that there were two manuscript traditions as early as Clement's time, one incorporating it and one leaving it on its own.

Further light on the question of a subtreatise *De Pietate* has been provided by James Royse.[12] He points out that a papyrus fragment from Oxyrhynchus, *P.Oxy. f.*10, was shown by Ludwig Früchtel to overlap a Philonic fragment of unknown provenance found in the *Sacra parallela*.[13] Royse traces this latter fragment to a unique manuscript of the *Florilegium Hierosolymitanum* at Thessalonica (*Thessalonicensis* Βλατέων *Monasterii* 9) in which the fragment is introduced by the lemma: Φίλωνος ἐκ τοῦ περὶ εὐσεβείας κεφαλαίου. Since the contents of this fragment may be identified with that of *P.Oxy.* f.10, it appears highly probable that the latter was once part of a copy of *Pietate* and thus constitutes an unusually valuable textual attestation to the existence of such a work.

Royse goes on to hypothesize that in another, much larger, papyrus codex of Philo (made up of *P.Oxy.* IX 1173, *P.Oxy.* XI 1356, *PSI* XI 1207, *P.Oxy.* XVIII 2158, *P.Haun.* 8), *Pietate* once stood as an independent treatise. Reconstructing the probable space occupied by the various treatises of which parts are extant in the papyrus, he finds a lacuna of fourteen pages unaccounted for. Guessing that *Pietate* might well have been of this size, he suggests that *P.Oxy. f.*10 may originally have belonged to this codex and that *Pietate* is the missing treatise. This reconstruction is, of course, highly conjectural. However, if it is correct and *Pietate* was independent of *Virt* at this early stage (the codex dates from the third century), it would help to account for the absence of echoes of the work in Clement's *Stromata* and for its apparent loss from the Philonic corpus. But the mystery of its presence in a majority of the manuscript titles remains unresolved.

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repentance is enjoined and in Judaism is considered a Mosaic commandment, and hence its practice a virtue. Philo's inclusion of repentance as one of four virtues is thus drawn from his Jewish, rather than his classical, heritage and is justified on that basis (Harry A. Wolfson, *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* [Cambridge MA: Harvard, 1948] 2.252-259).

[11] Colson, 8.xviii.

[12] Royse, 161-165.

[13] Ludwig Früchtel, "Zum Oxyrhynchus-Papyrus des Philon," *Phil Woch* 58 (1938) 1437-1439, cited by Royse, 161. See also the note by Roberto Radice and David Runia, *Philo of Alexandria: an Annotated Bibliography, 1937-1986* (Leiden: Brill, 1988) 15 #1802, to the effect that K. F. W. Schmidt had already cited this fragment in *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen* 180 (1918) 81-83.

In view of all these uncertainties, the question of the original title of the work must remain open. Wolfson offered the following judgment: "The title "On the Virtues"... is found in Eusebius and in the oldest manuscript....Hence it must have been used by Philo."[14] Though plausible, considering the lapse of centuries between Philo, Eusebius and Codex Seldenianus (10-11th c.), and the complex nature of the textual evidence, this judgment is too cavalier to be taken without reservation. The question is further complicated by the fact that Eusebius (*EH* 2.18.2) gives a fuller title (as noted above) than the simple Περὶ ἀρετῶν cited by Wolfson; he also twice refers to Gaium as Περὶ ἀρετῶν, a title which he says Philo gave his narrative of Caligula in irony (*EH* 2.6.3; 2.18.8). An alternative and likely preferable reading of *EH* 2.6.8 implies that Philo wrote two treatises under the title Περὶ ἀρετῶν.

## The Manuscripts

Following is a listing of the extant Greek manuscripts that contain all or parts of *Virt*. Not included are manuscripts of the florilegia, which offer fragmentary excerpts. The content of the manuscripts is indicated as follows:

a — *Fort*

b — *Hum*

c — *Paen*

d — *Nobil*

Each subtreatise is listed in the order in which it appears in the manuscript. When no separation is made between the letters (e.g. abc), these subtreatises follow immedately after each other. A slash (e.g. a/b) indicates that they are separated by other Philonic treatises. An asterisk (*) means that the subtreatise is only partially present. The siglum in the fourth column indicates the family to which the manuscript was assigned by Cohn-Wendland.[15]

| *Name Century* | *Content* | *Family* | |
|---|---|---|---|
| P.Oxy. f.1 | 3(?) | Piet(?)* | — |
| Seldenianus XII | 10-11 | abc | S |
| Parisinus gr. 435 | 11 | bcd | C |
| Venetus gr. 42 | 12 | a | B |
| Vindobonensis suppl. gr. 50 | 12 | a | V |
| Monacensis gr. 459 | 13 | a/bc* | A |
| Laurentianus plut. X,20 | 13 | a | M |
| Petropolitanus XX A a1 | 13-14 | b/a/d | P |
| Urbinas gr. 125 | 13-14 | a | — |
| Palatinus gr. 183 | 14 | a/bc* | A |
| Venetus gr. 41 | 14 | a/bc* | B |

[14] Wolfson, 2.255, n. 97.

[15] This listing is based on G-G, pp. 139-154, who in turn derived much of their information from Cohn and Wendland, 1.IV-XXXVII; 5.XXVI-XXVIII.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vaticanus gr. 379 | 14 | bc* | F |
| Venetus gr. 40 | 14 | bc*/a/d | H |
| Genuensis Bibl.Cong.Miss.Urbanae 39 | 14 | bc*/a/d | — |
| Laurentianus conv. soppr. 59 | 14 | a* | K |
| Laurentianus plut. X,23 | 14 | a | O |
| Parisinus gr. 1630 | 14 | c* | R |
| Venetus append.class. XI,31 | 14 | a | V |
| Vaticano-Palatinus gr. 248 | 14-15 | bc*/abd | G |
| Vaticanus gr. 380 | 15 | a | A |
| Vaticanus gr. 378 | 15 | bc* | A |
| Vaticanus gr. 382 | 15 | bc*/a/d | H |
| Venetus gr. 39 | 15 | bc*/a/d | H |
| Escurialensis Y,I,5 | 15 | bc*/a | H |
| Laurentianus plut. LXIX.11 | 15 | a | K |
| Neapolitanus II C 32 | 15 | d | N |
| Laurentianus plut. LXXXV.10 | 15-16 | abc/bc*/d* | F |
| Vaticano-Palatinus gr. 311 | 15-16 | bc*/a/d | H |
| Cantabrigiensis Coll. S. Trin. B9,6 | 15-16 | bc/a/d | — |
| Matritensis Est. 11, gr. 2a,40 | 16 | a/bc* | A |
| Coislinianus 43 | 16 | a | A |
| Vaticanus gr. 2174 | 16 | bc* | A |
| Monacensis gr. 124 | 16 | bc*/a/d | H |
| Parisinus gr. 434 | 16 | bc*/a/d | H |
| Leeuwardensis gr. 40 | 16 | bc*/abc/abc | H |
| Oxoniensis Coll. Novi 142 | 16 | b/d/a | H |
| Matritensis O,17 | 16 | a | K |
| Parisinus gr. 433 | 16 | bc*/a/d | L |
| Leidensis suppl. gr. 105 | 16 | a | V |
| Monacensis gr. 19 | 16 | a | V |
| Ottobonianus gr. 48 | 16-17 | bc*/a/d | H |

*Virt* is not preserved in either the Old Latin or the Armenian versions.

### The Printed Editions and Translations[16]

The Greek text of *Virt* first appeared in printed form in the *editio princeps* of Philo's works edited by Adrien Turnèbe at Paris in 1552 under the title, Φίλωνος Ἰουδαίου εἰς τὰ τοῦ Μωσέως, κοσμοποιητικὰ, ἱστορικὰ, νομοθετικά. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Μονοβίβλα. *Philonis Iudaei in libros Mosis, de mundi opificio, historicos, de legibus. Eiusdem libri singulares.* This edition presented the subtreatises as separate works,

[16] This material is drawn largely from G-G, pp. 187-213 and Radice and Runia, 10-44.

placing them in the order *Hum*, *Fort*, and *Nobil*, each with other treatises intervening. *Paen* apparently was not included in this edition. In 1560 at Basel the printer Oporinus issued a work by Lawrence Humphrey, president of Magdalen College, Oxford, and a fervant Puritan, entitled, *Optimates, sive de nobilitate*, to which was appended the Greek text of *Nobil* with a Latin translation prepared by the author. Again at Basel in 1581 there appeared another edition of *Nobil* with a Latin translation by Hermann Nehemius, who provided with it a "logica analysis, & brevis explicatio" of the work.

The first major edition of Philo's works to be accompanied by a Latin translation was published by the Genevan printer, Pierre de la Rouière, in 1613. The Greek text was based on Turnèbe's edition of 1551 with additions by David Hoeschel and other scholars, while the Latin version was prepared by Sigismund Gelenius. This work contained the same subtreatises of *Virt* as were published in Turnèbe's edition and in the same order. The Greek and Latin texts were printed in parallel columns. This publication was reprinted at Paris in 1640 and at Frankfurt in 1691.

An edition of *Nobil* in verse—the treatise was understandably a favorite of Renaissance scholars—was published at Cologne by Johannes Corverus under the title, *Philonis Iudaei liber de nobilitate e graeco conversus carmine*. He accompanied his poem with his own edition of the Greek text "ex collatione optimi exemplaris" and with Humphrey's Latin version. The year of this publication is uncertain: the title page bears the date 1664, which Goodhart and Goodenough follow with (1564?).[17]

The first complete printing of *Virt* did not appear until Thomas Mangey's great London edition of 1742, *Φίλωνος τοῦ Ἰουδαίου τὰ εὑρισκόμενα ἅπαντα. Philonis Judaei opera quae reperiri potuerunt omnia*. Mangey placed *Fort*, *Hum*, and *Paen* together, but separated *Nobil* as an independent treatise. This appears to have been the first publication of *Paen*. *Virt* was next issued as a part of Angelo Mai's *De Philonis Iudaei et Eusebii Pamphili scriptis ineditis ... dissertatio* at Milan in 1816. In the same year it also was published as Part I of his *Philonis Iudaei, Porphyrii Philosophi, Eusebii Pamphili opera inedita*.

The next comprehensive edition of Philo, that of C. E. Richter published at Leipzig, 1828-1830, *Philonis Iudaei opera omnia*, followed Mangey in separating *Nobil* from the rest of *Virt*. This edition was reissued by Karl Tauchnitz in 1851-1853, and by Otto Holtze, 1880-1893.

The four parts of *Virt* were not finally brought together into one treatise in any printed edition of Philo until Leopold Cohn and Paul Wendland issued their definitive text, *Philonis Alexandrini opera omnia quae supersunt*, 7 vols. in 8 (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1896-1930; reprint, Berlin: De Gruyter, 1962). Virt appeared in Vol. 5, edited by Cohn in 1906. In reconstituting the treatise in this way, they accordingly removed *τριῶν* from the traditional title, giving it simply as *Περὶ ἀρετῶν*....

All editions since Cohn-Wendland have treated *Virt* as one work. The Loeb Classical Library edition, under the title, *Philo, with an English Translation* (Cambridge MA: Harvard, 1929-1962), includes Virt in Vol. 8, translated by Francis Henry Colson and published in 1939. The Greek text is essentially that of Cohn, with occasional textual notes. The same can be said of the Greek text presented in the French edition, *Les Oeuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie*, edited by R. Arnaldez, Ch. Mondésert et al. (Paris: Cerf, 1961-). *Virt* constitutes Vol. 26 of this series, published in 1962. With a rather general introduction by Arnaldez, the

[17] G-G 190, #403.

translation is the work of three women scholars: *Fort* by Anne-Marie Verilhac, *Hum* by Paulette Delobre, *Paen* and *Nobil* by Marie-Rose Servel. The translations are equipped with notes dealing in large part with relationships between the text, the Old Testament, and classical literature.

In addition to the Latin, English and French versions of *Virt* already noted, a number of other translations have been published. Some part of the treatise—it is not clear from Goodhart and Goodenough just what,[18] but apparently *Nobil*, in a Latin translation by John Christophorson, appeared at Antwerp in 1553. This was just a year after Turnèbe's initial edition of the Greek text, and was apparently the first printed translation of any portion of *Virt* into any language. Gelenius' Latin translation of Philo's works, noted above as later included in the Turnèbe-Hoeschel edition of 1613, was next in line. Its initial publication, without a Greek text, appeared at Basel from the press of Nicolaus Episcopius, Jr., in 1554. It was reprinted frequently: Lyon, 1555; Basel, 1558; Basel, 1561; Lyon, 1561. Taken from the Turnèbe-Hoeschel edition, it was reprinted again at Antwerp in 1614.

*Nobil* was the first portion of any of Philo's works to be published in English. Lawrence Humphrey, who as already noted had produced a Latin version, issued an English translation at London in 1563 under the title: *Nobles, or of Nobilitye. The original nature, dutyes, right, and Christian Institucion therof three bookes. Fyrste eloquentlye written in Latine by Lawrence Humphrey ... late englished. Whereto, for the readers commoditye, and matters affinitye, is coupled the small treatyse of Philo, a Jewe.* The only other English translation of *Virt* beside that by Colson, discussed above, was by C.D. Yonge in his *The Works of Philo Judaeus* (London: Bohn, 1854-55). Yonge followed Mangey in treating *Nobil* as a separate work. This translation has now been superseded by Colson's.

The first German version of any part of *Virt* was that of Moritz Friedländer, who published a translation of *Hum* and *Paen* at Vienna in 1880 under the title: *Über die Philanthropie des mos[aischen] Gesetzes*. The only other German version is that produced by Ludwig Cohn in Vol. 2 (1910) of his and Isaak Heinemann's translation of Philo's works, *Philo von Alexandria, die Werke in deutscher Übersetzung* (Breslau: Marcus, 1909-1938; reprinted, Berlin, 1962; Vol. 7, 1964). Cohn's introduction to *Virt* is brief but cogent; the notes are sparse. Based on his and Wendland's text, all four portions of *Virt* are presented as constituting one treatise.

In 1817 there appeared at Milan two printings by the same publisher, Carlo Dova, of what appears to be one Italian translation of *Virt* by Luigi Rossi. The title page of one reads: *Trattato della virtù e delle sue specie, sia poi di Filone, oppur di Gemisto Pletone, giusta il testo greco discoperto e publicato dal Ch. Mai.* The title of the other printing differs slightly. The Italian edition currently in process at Milan has not yet included *Virt*.

The Spanish translation of Philo's works, *Obras completas de Filon de Alejandria*, by J. M. Trivino (Buenos Aires, 1975-76) includes *Virt* in Vol. 5 (1976). While providing access to Philo for Spanish readers, this edition reportedly offers little by way of critical resources.[19]

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18 G-G 199, #450.

19 Radice and Runia, 39, ##2301-2305.

### The Question of Audience

As with the writings of Philo in general, the question of the audience to whom *Virt* was directed has been debated. Cohn recognized the strongly apologetic character of the work, and thought that even if Philo had Jewish readers in the first instance in mind, he also certainly had an eye on Greeks, and particularly the "God fearers" who had abandoned polytheism and turned to the God of the Jews. For them *Virt* would provide great encouragement in their attachment to Judaism, and would also attract new adherents. Philo's scathing description of the "arrogant man" who holds himself (quoting Pindar) "to be neither man nor demigod, but wholly divine," which appears in the closing paragraphs of *Hum* (§172-174; *PLCL* 8.269-271), Cohn took to be an intentional reference to Caligula.[20] Such invective would have evoked a sympathetic response from any monotheistically oriented person. As we have already noted, Cohn understood *Paen* to be addressed particularly to outsiders urging their repentance, and *Nobil* especially to Jews, admonishing them not to hold themselves aloof from repentant Gentiles.

E. R. Goodenough followed the line suggested by Cohn, but elaborated it into an overall theory of Philo's intended audience. He argued that while the Allegorical Commentary was written for Jews, the Exposition of the Law (of which *Virt* is a part) was intended for Gentiles, and particularly for those interested in Judaism. These were, however, "uninformed outsiders" for whom it was necessary

> to tell the scriptural narrative in a form in which those who had never heard it would comprehend.... Philo went on ... to present the wonders of the Jewish Law in the treatises *On the Decalogue* and *On the Special Laws*. Sundry ethical details of importance were discussed in *On the Virtues*, and then the whole series was brought together in a book of conclusions entitled *On Rewards and Punishments*.[21]

This, then, explained for Goodenough the relative simplicity and the lack of allegory which characterizes *Virt*.

Colson, on the other hand, took issue with Cohn, arguing that the latter laid too much emphasis on a proselyte audience. He said:

> Conversion to the faith is the first necessity for those outside the faith, but the second half of this short sermon is, I believe, addressed to those within the fold. He speaks to the people at large, neither to the proselytes nor to those who have definitely apostatized. He calls on all members of the Jewish Church [!]."[22]

Dieter Georgi pointed to what he and many others have sensed in Philo's style to be "an affinity with orally delivered lectures, edificatory ones in particular." In view of this, he rejected Goodenough's view that the Exposition of the Law was intended particularly for Gentiles. Georgi noted the evidence in both *Paen* and *Nobil* that the focus is upon Jews. He concluded, therefore, that "All these difficulties disappear when one assumes that *both Jews and Gentiles* are being addressed throughout....This must have been the normal situation in

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[20] Cohn, 2.316-317.

[21] Goodenough, *Politics*, 42-43. Goodenough had previously set forth his theory in his article, "Philo's Exposition of the Law and his *De Vita Mosis*," *HThR* 26 (1933) 109-125.

[22] Colson, 8.xv-xvi.

Jewish Diaspora worship."[23] This appears to me to be a common sense conclusion, at least in regard to the treatises in the Exposition. Since we know little as to the capacity of a "grass roots" Hellenistic-Jewish congregation to appreciate the niceties of allegory, the question, I think, is more difficult to answer for the Allegorical Commentary.

## De Virtutibus and Classical Thought

### *Virt*, the *Timaeus* and Middle Platonism

David Runia, in discussing the themes of disease and health, of both body and soul, in Plato's *Timaeus* and in Philo, has pointed to *Virt* 13-14 as reflecting a significant point of contact. The passage is:

> Again diseases of the body, if the soul is healthy, do very little harm. And the health of the soul is to have its faculties, reason, high spirit and desire happily tempered, with the reason in command and reining in both the other two, like restive horses. The special name of this health (ὑγεία) is temperance, that is σωφροσύνη (PLCL 8.171).

Runia points out that the notion of "happily tempered faculties" (ε ὐκρασὶα δυνάμεων) constitutive of the soul derives from *Timaeus* 87a3-7, but is even more closely paralleled by *Timaeus Locrus* 71. Philo's idea that the body cannot be seriously harmed if the parts of the soul are thus tempered is also found in Apuleius, *De Plat.* 216. And the association of ὑγεία with σωφροσύνη derives ultimately from Plato's *Laws* 631c, 743eff., was developed by the Stoa and carried even further by Antiochus. He concludes in reference to *Virt* 13-14: "Thus this one Philonic passage not only combines the *Timaeus* with two other Platonic dialogues, but three times reinterprets Plato's doctrine in a manner parallel to Middle Platonist authors (and with assistance from the Stoa)."[24]

### The theme of *philanthropia*

Milo Van Veldhuizen has studied the theme of *philanthropia* in Philo's writings in a Notre Dame dissertation written under the direction of Jean Laporte. After discussing the philosophical context of the term in the LXX, Greek thought before Philo, and in Plutarch, Clement of Alexandria and the Hermetic Corpus, he devotes chapters to "God and Philanthropos" and "Philanthropia as a Gift of God." While the study does not focus on *Virt*, its conclusions are pertinent to an understanding of the subtreatise *Hum.* Van Veldhuizen sees Philo's notion of *philanthropia* as particularly dependent on Stoic thought and on Hellenistic ideas of kingship. The latter provides Philo with a model for his concept of divine beneficence. On the human level, the wise man is a king because he rules his passions, and in teaching such mastery to others, he expresses *philanthropia.* Philo departs from the classical pattern, however, in that for him it is God who is the source of all *philanthropia*; human expressions of it are possible only because of this. Moses and the Law show how *philanthropia* is appropriately expressed in human action. Ultimately, then, Philo's understanding of divine and human

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[23] Dieter Georgi, *The Opponents of Paul in Second Corinthians* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986) 181, n. 59.

[24] David T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the* Timaeus *of Plato*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: VU Boekhandel, 1983) 1.278.

*philanthropia* is controlled not by his philosophical milieu as much as it is by Scripture.[25]

Franz Geiger, in a study of Philo as a social thinker, addressed the relationship of *philanthropia* to *dikaiosyne*. He noted that the Stoics had already defined holiness (ὁσιότης) as *dikaiosyne* toward the gods (*SVF* II.304.22; III.165.41). At the same time, conversely, piety included right action toward other human beings. Thus the boundary between social and religious responsibilities ceased to exist. Philo's biblical counterpart to this formulation is found in his division of the laws into those to be fulfilled toward God and those toward humans. Similarly, the opening words of Hum declare: "The next subject to be examined is humanity (φιλανθρωπία), the virtue closest akin to piety (εὐσέβεια), its sister and its twin" (§51; PLCL 8.195; cf. §95, "those queens of the virtues, piety and humanity" [PLCL 8.221]).[26]

## De Virtutibus and the New Testament

A few scholars have drawn significantly on *Virt* to elucidate passages in the New Testament.

*Romans 12-15*

Goodenough, in his study of "Paul and the Hellenization of Christianity,"[27] contrasted the teaching of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount with Paul's ethical admonitions in the last chapters of Romans (12-15). Whereas Jesus radicalizes specific commands of the Law, Paul generalizes moral principles. Goodenough compared Paul's approach with that of Philo in *Virt*, where after discussing specific laws in *Spec Leg*, "he summarizes the special laws under the general topics of Courage, Humanity, Repentance and Nobility. Here the commands are elevated into reminders of the universal laws."[28] Goodenough concluded:

> When Romans 12-15 is compared to the Philonic writings in this way, it becomes clear that Paul's approach to the problems of ethics is as much like the *de Virtute* as his teaching ... is *un*like that of Jesus. Indeed the evidence from Philo and Paul strongly suggests that there was a general tendency (among gentiles as well as among hellenized Jews) to admire the Jewish law for its reflection of general principles of morality; both men often appear to me to be capitalizing on such a situation.[29]

*Paul's opponents at Corinth*

Dieter Georgi, in seeking to identify the characteristics of Paul's Corinthian opponents, studied the various self-designations that they appear to have used. Among these is the "Seed of Abraham" (σπέρμα Ἀβραάμ). Georgi discussed a

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[25] Milo Van Veldhuizen, *Philanthropia in Philo of Alexandria: a Scriptural Perspective*. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1982.

[26] Franz Geiger, *Philon von Alexandreia als sozialer Denker*. Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft 14 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1932) 7-9.

[27] Erwin R. Goodenough (with A. T. Kraabel), "Paul and the Hellenization of Christianity," in Jacob Neusner, ed., *Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough*. Studies in the History of Religions 14 (Leiden: Brill, 1968) 23-68, esp. 65-68.

[28] Goodenough and Kraabel, 66.

[29] Goodenough and Kraabel, 67.

number of passages in *Nobil* (§§187, 212-213, 214-217, 219) in which Philo emphasizes Abraham's Chaldaean origins. Thus he becomes the "standard of nobility for all proselytes" (§219). Georgi understood the designation "Seed of Abraham," then, to have signalled a self-conscious missionary zeal among Paul's opponents.[30]

*Titus 2:12*

Stephen Charles Mott, in comparing the list of virtues in Titus 2:12, σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς ζήσωμεν, with the classic virtues, drew on Philo's close association of εὐσέβεια with other virtues to provide a plausible context for its inclusion here.[31]

*The "divine man"*

Carl R. Holladay has made a detailed study of the meaning of θεῖος ἀνήρ in *Virt* 177.[32] The passage reads:

> For absolute sinlessness belongs to God alone, or possibly to a divine man; conversion from sin to a blameless life shows a man of wisdom who has not been utterly ignorant of what is for his good (PLCL 8.273).

Holladay addressed the question of the span of meanings of θεῖος in Philo's works, a term which he uses frequently. It may refer to philosophers, to that which is incorporeal or immortal, or perhaps to the Stoic ideal of the Wise Man. But only once in the Greek corpus of Philo, in this passage at Virt 177, does he employ the full expression θεῖος ἀνήρ. Whereas Plato often uses the term with the names of specific persons, Philo refrains from applying it thus, even to Moses, nor does he ever use it in the sense of a miracle-worker. Holladay explained:

> [Philo's] unswerving conviction that there is a vast chasm between Creator and creature as well as his view of man as composed of σῶμα/ψυχή, combined with his modified Platonic metaphysical view of the world,...all of which was formulated in terms of Biblical theology derived from the Greek Scriptures, made it impossible for him to conceive of Moses, or any other human being as θεῖος in any real, concrete sense of the term.... Deification, in Philo, takes place only insofar as detachment from the sensible world is possible.[33]

Thus Philo's concept of a "divine man" is not applicable to the heroes of Israel's history. Holladay suggested, rather, that his use of the term at *Virt* 177 is a reference to the Stoic Wise Man, intended to suggest, "perhaps half jestingly," that such an idealized person may "possibly" have reached a state of sinlessness.[34]

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30 Georgi, 56-59.

31 Mott, 22-48, esp. 23-28; cf. n. 9 above.

32 Carl R. Holladay, Theios Aner *in Hellenistic-Judaism* (Missoula MT: Scholars Press, 1977) 173-198.

33 Holladay, 196.

34 Holladay, 194-195.

In conclusion, it may be said that while Philo's teaching on virtue has attracted considerable attention, such studies have rightfully ranged over his whole corpus, inasmuch as ethical concerns permeate his work.[35] Little attention has been paid specifically to *Virt* (its literal character lacks the intrigue of his allegorical works and the excitement of his historical writings). To my knowledge no substantial study has yet been devoted to Virt as a treatise in its own right. The door of opportunity stands open.

[35] See, for instance, the important essay of David Winston, "Philo's Ethical Theory," in W. Haase, ed., *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2.21.1 (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1984) 372-416, or the debate as to whether virtue for Philo is an inner state of the soul or is achieved through action: Walther Völker, *Fortschritt und Vollendung bei Philo von Alexandrien*. TU 4.4.1=49.1 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1938) XII, 275-279; Goodenough, *An Introduction to Philo Judaeus* (2d ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) 119-120; Wolfson, 2.223, 303-305; Arnaldez, 12-18; Samuel Sandmel, "Virtue and Reward in Philo," in J.L. Crenshaw and J.T. Willis, eds., *Essays in Old Testament Ethics* (J. Philip Hyatt, in Memoriam) (New York: Ktav, 1974) 215-223.

# Underneath Cohn and Colson: The Text of Philo's *De virtutibus*

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1. Introduction
2. A brief history of the text of *De virtutibus*
3. The extent and quality of the direct tradition
4. The value of the indirect tradition
5. An evaluation of the available texts
6. The problem of the treatise's title and its original contents
7. Some concluding remarks

*1. Introduction*

Since by now—at least in the country hosting this conference—the vast majority of scholars have discovered the advantages of working with a micro-computer for their scholarly work, allow me to begin with an analogy drawn from the realm of computer technology.[1] When a scholar makes use of a word-processing program, he or she stands at a considerable remove from the workings of the machine itself. Basically the computer 'understands' and responds only to commands it receives in a sequence of zero's and one's, the so-called binary *machine language*. Because such lengthy sequences of numbers are extremely cumbersome and awkward to work with, early computer engineers converted basic sequences into more readable codes which programmers could more easily remember and work with, the so-called *assembly languages*. But even these languages involve the programmer in far too much routine work, so they in turn have been developed into *compilers*, such as Basic or C, which work in something resembling English language, and automatically convert the programmer's intentions into the binary language which formulates the basic commands to which the machine can respond. Through use of such compilers the software developers produce the complex *software programs* which scholars use in their everyday work. These programs, which can only be adapted and manipulated to a limited degree, are the final level in a hierarchy which separates the user from the electronic processes that take place in his machine.

Now consider what happens when the average Philonist studies the writings and thought of his favourite author. As likely as not, he or she will consult a translation in a modern language (Colson's Loeb, Lyon edition, German translation etc.). Hopefully, in the case of the first two translations, there will be some consultation of Greek text on the facing page. I surmise, however, that it will only

[1] For what follows see J. D. Bolter, *Turing's Man: Western Culture in the Computer Age* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1984), esp. 127-132.

occur relatively rarely that the scholar turns to the critical edition of Cohn-Wendland with its full apparatus criticus. As for the original manuscripts of Philo's writings scattered throughout the libraries of Europe, these are virtually inaccessible to our scholar and in normal circumstances will never be consulted. Just as in the case of our computer user, therefore, the Philonist generally *stands at a considerable remove* from the actual text of his author. Where the analogy breaks down, of course, is in the fact that the computer user can, if he really wishes, descend to the actual binary code of the program he is using and this code, furthermore, is essentially unambiguous, whereas the hapless Philonist can *never be certain* that his text represents the actual words that Philo wrote. This irremoveable constraint is due to the fifteen centuries of scribal transmission interposed between Philo's autographs and the first printed editions of his works.

This paper has been written as a modest contribution to the team effort of a group of scholars who are undertaking a fresh examination of the relatively neglected Philonic treatise *De virtutibus*. Its aim will be to examine the text of the treatise as it appears in the various texts and translations available to the contemporary Philonist. It will be important for us to make some judgment on the quality of the available text, for, as will become clear in the course of our investigation, in this area we remain enormously dependent on the efforts of previous scholars.

2. *A brief history of the text of* De virtutibus

The Philonic treatise *De virtutibus* as we generally know it today consists of the following parts:

a. Περὶ ἀνδρείας, *De fortitudine* (On courage) = §1–50
b. Περὶ φιλανθρωπίας, *De caritate* (On humane behaviour) = §51–174
c. Περὶ μετανοίας, *De paenitentia* (On repentance) = §175–186
d. Περὶ εὐγενείας, *De nobilitate* (On noble birth) = §187–227

It will perhaps come as a surprise to some readers that the treatise was not published in this form until the edition of Cohn in 1906,[2] and that this particular arrangement occurs in only one single manuscript. It is in fact primarily a scholarly construct, based on a reasoned reconstruction of Philo's intentions in composing his exegetical series which we know as the Exposition of the Law. I shall return to the question of the treatise's contents and title in section 6 below, where I shall argue that Cohn's arrangement is most likely correct. On this assumption we can follow the treatise's special history (i.e. aside from the more general account of the survival of Philo's writings) in the following stages.

a. The treatise is extensively cited and adapted in book II of the *Stromateis* of Clement of Alexandria, who must therefore have had access to a text of the work in Alexandria,[3] in the period before the archetype of all our mss. was taken to Caesarea as part of the library of Origen. The remaining *indirect tradition* is very limited in extent. The treatise is not among those translated into Armenian or Latin during the Patristic period. It was neither cited by Eusebius in his

[2] *Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt*, 6 vols. (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1896-1915) 5.266-335 (we refer to this edition henceforth as C–W).

[3] According to the chronology of A. Méhat, *Études sur les 'Stromates' de Clément d'Alexandrie* (Paris: De Seuil, 1966) 42-54, Clement wrote the first six books in Alexandria, before leaving for Jerusalem in 203, where he wrote the 7th book.

*Praeparatio Evangelica*, nor exploited by Ambrose in his exegetical works. Only some brief snippets are found in the *Sacra Parallela* of John of Damascus and other Byzantine anthologists.[4] This indirect tradition will be further discussed below in section 4.

b. The treatise is well represented in the *direct manuscript tradition* of Philo's works, which consists of some 120 mss. dating from the 10th to the 16th centuries. As we noted above, however, it is never found in exactly the reconstructed form with which we are now familiar. We shall examine this direct tradition, on which of course our text is primarly based, in greater detail in the following section.

c. The first printed text of *Virt.* is found in the *editio princeps* of Philo published in 1552 by Adrianus Turnebus (1512–1565).[5] The treatise is split up into three parts: *De caritate* is printed after *Mos.*, *De fortitudine* after *De iustitia* (= Spec. 4.136-237), *De nobilitate* after *Contempl.* The brief section of text *De paenitentia* is included, but is affixed to *De caritate* without any form of break or title. In his edition Turnebus, following the practice of his time, did little more than set in print a text based on three (inferior) Parisian mss.[6] He does try to establish an order for the treatises, basing it (not very successfully) on Philo's tripartition of the Mosaic writings at *Praem.* 1.[7] This text forms the basis of the so-called Vulgata reprinted in no less than 4 editions, in each of which the distribution and order of the parts of *Virt.* remain the same.[8]

d. The first edition of the text of *Virt.* which can in any sense be described as critical is that of Thomas Mangey (1688–1755) in his famous edition of Philo's *opera omnia* published in 1742.[9] Although Mangey did not undertake a complete examination of the manuscript tradition, he did recognize the importance of the Seldenianus ms. at Oxford, which he used to improve on the vulgate text. His text also contains a large number of emendations based on a good knowledge of Greek and a finely developed instinct for Philonic style.[10] The order of his text

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4 See app. crit. to text in C-W at §9, 117, 178. Note also that §212-216 is found as part of the late Byzantine cento *De mundo*, which was the first Philonic text to be printed (by Aldus Minutius in 1497); cf. C-W 2.vi-x and H. L. Goodhart and E. R. Goodenough, *A General Bibliography of Philo* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938) 187. This study, which is our chief source of information for the mss. and early editions and translations of Philo, will henceforth be referred to as G–G.

5 *Philonis Iudaei in libros Mosis, de mundi opificio, historicos, de legibus. Eiusdem libri singulares ex bibliotheca regis* (Paris, 1552), = G–G no. 391. On the distinguished French scholar Turnebus see J. E. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship* (Cambridge 1903-08, repr. New York: Hafner 1967) 2.185-186.

6 Cf. C–W 1.lxxi, G–G 147, 187-188.

7 Cf. C–W *ibid.*

8 Editions: Geneva 1613 (= G–G no. 398), Paris 1640 (= G–G no. 402) Frankfurt 1691 (= G–G no. 402), Frankfurt 1729. The last edition is not mentioned by G–G, but is referred to at C-W 1.lxxiv. A copy of this edition is in my possession. It is of interest because it adds a notice from the *Bibliotheca Graeca* of the encyclopedist J. A. Fabricius (1705-28), which remarks on the differing title of *Virt.* in the Bodleian ms. (= ms. S). From 1613 onwards a Latin translation by S. Gelenius (first published in 1554, = G–G 451) is printed beside the Greek.

9 *Philonis Judaei opera quae reperiri potuerunt omnia...* 2 vols. (London 1742), G–G no. 404. On Mangey, a famous English divine, see *Dictionary of National Biography* (London 1921-22) 12.916.

10 Many of these problematic texts are discussed in critical footnotes at the bottom of the page, which take the place of an apparatus criticus.

deviates from Turnebus in that he groups together *De fortitudine*, *De caritate*, and *De paenitentia* (which for the first time receives its own separate title), placing them in their natural position after *Spec. Leg.* IV; *De nobilitate*, however, is placed after *Praem.*[11]

e. We now come to a rather curious episode. In 1816 the famous classical scholar and prelate A. Mai published a text of *De virtute eiusque partibus* which he claims to have discovered and places among various *scripta inedita*.[12] It soon emerged, however, that the treatise was neither Philonic nor an *ineditum*, but was rather the (already published) work of the late Byzantine humanist, Gemistus Plethon,[13] as Mai himself had to admit in 1818.[14]

f. The definitive critical edition of *Virt.* was published in 1906 by Leopold Cohn (1856–1915) as part of the great *editio maior* of all Philo's surviving Greek works prepared by him together with Paul Wendland (1864–1915).[15] This edition is based on a critical comparison of virtually all extant mss., and has formed the basis of all further work on the treatise since the time of its publication. Important ground-work for the edition was laid by Wendland in an article on Philo and Clement of Alexandria.[16] Wendland argued that *De nobilitate* should be appended to *De paenitentia*, which was the sequence adopted by Cohn in his edition[17] and has been standard ever since. The motivations of the editor in choosing his text are further illuminated by an article on problems in the text[18] and by his translation of the treatise that forms part of the German translation of Philo.[19] We shall examine the principles on which Cohn's edition is based at greater length in sections 3 and 5 of this paper.

g. Finally we should mention more recent printings of the Greek text of *Virt.* In his English translation of Philo published in the Loeb Classical Library, F. H. Colson (1857–1943) basically follows the text of Cohn, giving only a handful of

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11 Hence the jump in marginal references to Mangey at C–W 5.324.

12 *De Philonis Iudaei et Eusebii Pamphilo scriptis ineditis... dissertatio* (Milan 1816), *Philonis Iudaei de virtute eiusque partibus...* (Milan 1816). Cf. G–G nos. 410-411, where full titles are given (non vidi).

13 Note that two Italian translations appeared in 1817, as reported by G–G nos. 504-505 (non vidi). The title of the second as reported by G-G already expresses doubt as to whether the work is by Philo or by Plethon.

14 The episode is briefly referred to by E. Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi* (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1909⁴) 3.678 n. 11.

15 *Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt*, 6 vols. (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1896-1915), = G–G no. 431. Text of *Virt.* at 5.266-335. The two men, the one a Jew, the other the son of a pietistic Lutheran minister, were personal friends. In 1887, at the suggestion of H. Diels, the Prussian Academy of Sciences announced a prize for an edition of Philo's *Opif.* Both men submitted an entry, and both received the prize, the contest thus becoming the starting-point of their joint edition. Both died rather young, within three months of each other, but their great work was as good as finished. See further the necrology of Wendland by M. Pohlenz, *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum* 19 (1916) 57-75, and the notice on Cohn in *Encyclopedia Judaica* (New York: Macmillan, 1971) 5.691.

16 P. Wendland, 'Philo und Clemens Alexandrinus,' *Hermes* 31 (1896) 435-456.

17 Even though the co-editors wanted to change the order of Mangey's edition as little as possible; cf. C–W 5.xxviii.

18 L. Cohn, 'Neue Beiträge zur Textgeschichte und Kritik der philonischen Schriften,' *Hermes* 43 (1908) 177-219, esp. 210-215.

19 *Philo von Alexandria: Die Werke in deutscher Übersetzung*, herausgegeben von L. Cohn, vol. 2 (Breslau: Verlag M. und. H. Marcus 1910; repr. Berlin: De Gruyter 1962) 313-377.

important mss. variants in a limited apparatus criticus.[20] But it is clear from his copious and most invaluable notes that Colson, who had a superb knowledge of Philo's Greek,[21] critically examined the text while making his translation, also comparing it with Cohn's own translation. In his preface Colson states:[22]

> I have been startled by the number of times in which I find myself in disagreement with him [Cohn], a disagreement extending beyond the translation to the text particularly in the cases where he seems to me to have printed unjustified emendations. Though it may sometimes seem disputatious, I have felt bound to record in the footnotes or appendix my reasons for differing from him, as what is only due to so high an authority.

By way of contrast, the volume devoted to *Virt.* in the French Lyon edition is a very mediocre piece of work.[23] It prints Cohn's text and makes one or two isolated comments on it, but is of no value for the study of the Greek text whatsoever.

*3. The extent and quality of the manuscript tradition*

The direct manuscript tradition of Philo's writings (from which we exclude excerpts in the catenae) is extremely rich, consisting of more than 120 mss. As the result of their extensive investigations Cohn and Wendland divided this mass into some 20 families, each of which have a single ms. as chief progenitor.[24] The text of our treatise is fairly well represented in the mss. There are, however, considerable complexities involved in collecting and assessing this evidence. This is caused by the fact, already noted above, that the treatise is divided into four sections, and these are scattered in various configurations throughout the mss. tradition. The following table indicates the locations of the various parts in the mss., which are listed in chronological order.

**Table 1: Mss. relevant to the text of *De virtutibus***

| ms. | name/location | G-G | date | contents |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S | Oxon. Seldenianus 12 | 107 | 10-11 | 1–227 |
| C | Parisinus gr. 435 | 49 | 11 | 51-186, 195-7 |
| V | Vindonensis suppl. gr. 50 | 113 | 12 | 1-50 |
| B | Venetus gr. 42 | 43 | 12 | 1-50 |
| E | Oxon. Lincolniensis 43 | 76 | 12-13 | 1-50 |

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20 *Philo in Ten Volumes, with an English Translation by F. H. Colson*, Loeb Classical Library, volume 8 (London: Heinemann, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939) 157-305. On Colson, a Cambridge-trained classicist and headmaster, see further *Who was Who 1941–1950* (London: A. & C. Black, 1952) 240.

21 Of Colson the then editor of the Loeb Classical Library, W. H. D. Rouse (*Philo in Ten Volumes* 10.vii) wrote: 'a translator more careful and more competent I never worked with.'

22 Colson, *Philo* 8.vii.

23 *Les Œuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie*, vol. 26, *De virtutibus*, introduction et notes de R. Arnaldez, traduction de P. Delobre, M. R. Servel, A. M. Verilhac (Paris: Éditions du CERF, 1962).

24 See the analysis in C-W 1.iv-lx and the lucidly presented overview in G-G 139-153. Only in the case of family F is another ms. in the same family of any importance (see n. 27 below). There is a large variation in the no. of mss. in a family. Some 'families' are represented by a single ms.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | Monacensis gr. 459 | 35 | 13 | 1-50, 51-181 |
| M[25] | Laurentianus plut. X,20 | 100 | 13 | 1-50 |
| P | Petropolitanus XX A 21 | 104 | 13-14 | 51-174, 1-50, 187-227 |
| R | Parisinus gr. 1630 | 106 | 14 | 175-177 (extract only) |
| O | Laurentianus plut. X,23 | 102 | 14 | 1-50 |
| K | Laur. conv. soppr. 59 | 96 | 14 | 1-46 |
| H | Venetus gr. 40 | 84 | 14 | 51-181, 1-50, 187-227 |
| G | Vaticano-Palatinus gr. 248 | 83 | 14-15[26] | 51-181 (= $G^1$), 1-50, 51-174, 187-227 (= $G^2$) |
| N | Neapolitanus II C 32 | 101 | 15 | 187-227 |
| F | Laur. plut. LXXXV.10 | 80 | 15-16 | 1-50, 51-181, 187-225[27] |
| L | Parisinus gr. 433 | 99 | 16 | 51-181, 1-50, 187-227 |

A second table shows how the various parts of the treatise are recorded in the chief mss. (again ordered in order of age).

**Table 2: Record of various parts of *De virtutibus* in the mss.**

| | |
|---|---|
| Περὶ ἀνδρείας (§1-50) | S A M P H G F |
| | V B E O K (joined to *Mos.*) |
| Περὶ φιλανθρωπίας (§51-174) | S C A P H $G^1$ $G^2$ F L |
| Περὶ μετανοίας (§175-186) | S C $G^2$ |
| | A P H $G^1$ F (break off at §181) |
| Περὶ εὐγενείας (§187-227) | S $G^2$ P H F |
| | C (only §195-7), F (§187-225) |

Of these various mss. a number are of special interest.
(a) The only ms. to contain the treatise in the form close to the way we know it is S. This ms., which only contains the text of *Spec.* 3.37-209, *Spec.* 4 and *Virt.*, is among the very oldest Philonic mss. we possess.[28] Although the order of the parts corresponds to the text presented by Cohn, it differs in the headings that it gives, not only for these four parts, but also additionally for a large number of subordinate sections of the treatise.[29] The text that it offers differs on countless occasions from what is found in all other mss. of Philo. These differences will occupy us at some length below, but now already we can say that many of these readings are without doubt authentic and correct, but that there are also quite a number very silly readings and patent errors. A further striking feature of the ms. is that at the end of *Virt.* it contains an incomplete commentary on Philo's views on the Decad of 12 folio pages in length (damaged at the end), which includes much Pythagoreanizing arithmological material.[30]

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[25] At one time Mediceus, hence the abbeviation.

[26] According to C-W 1.xxxiv 14th century, G-G 147 14-15th century.

[27] For the missing section at the end Cohn used the twin of this ms. Vaticanus gr. 379 ( = G-G 81)

[28] On this ms. see L. Cohn, 'Die Philo-Handschriften in Oxford und Paris,' *Philologus* 51 (1892) 266-270. On p. 267 he claims that it is by far the oldest of Philonic mss. But the palimpsest Vaticanus fr. 316 which he discovered later is probably older (cf. G-G 150; this ms. does not contain material from *Virt.*).

[29] Cf. app. ad §1, 82, 88, 90, 95, 97, 102, 105, 109, 116, 125, 134 (nota bene), 145, 148,

[30] Cohn 'Philo-Handschriften' 269f. publishes the first dozen lines. To my knowledge the remainder is as yet unpublished. One wonders what Philonic material the

(b) The ms. A, which is one of the fullest and most important Philonic mss., contains especially for §1-50 a number of independent and generally excellent readings.[31]
(c) V is not the famous Viennese codex derived from the Caesarean archetype (which only contains the first half of *Opif.*).[32] It is an unrelated 12th century ms. containing *Mos.* I-III,[33] *Virt.* 1.50, *Jos.* This particular placement of Περὶ ἀνδρείας, which gives a eulogy of certain themes in the Mosaic Law, is also found in the mss. B E K O. The text of these five mss. show many convergences for this section.

The mss. evidence on our treatise is, therefore, fairly copious but rather chaotically preserved. Although Cohn and Wendland can show that all the evidence in the Greek medieval mss. derives from the copies of Philo's works in the Caesarean library, it proved difficult for them to produce anything like a *stemma codicum* which shows the interrelation between the more important mss. In his edition of *Opif.* Cohn divides the mss. tradition into two distinct families, besides which some single mss. are placed,[34] but in the *editio maior* this idea is not further pursued,[35] and in the specific introduction to the treatise *Virt.* a stemmatic analysis of the mss. tradition is not mentioned at all.

The only other research into the mss. tradition which is at all comprehensive was carried out by Barthélemy in 1967.[36] He looked above all at two aspects of the evidence. Firstly he observed that certain passages in Philo's writings had been 'retouched' by an interpolator, who was certainly Jewish, and possibly can be identified with the Rabbi Hoshai'a who was the friend of Origen. Remarkably, the only treatise in which he finds this occurring outside the Allegorical Commentary is *Virt.* He notes that in ms. G at §66 and 69 the name Ἰησοῦς has been changed to Ἰωσοῦα in conformity with the Hebraizing Aquilan translation of the Pentateuch.[37] The reason why a Jew should wish to do this in a Christian setting is obvious. Moreover at §184 it is very likely that the biblical text of Deut. 26:17 has been altered (this passage will be further discussed at some length in section 4).[38] Secondly Barthélemy examined at the order of the various treatises in the different mss. Combining these two criteria he concludes that there were

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commentary is based on (did the author have access to *De numeris*?). The fragment published by Cohn includes a definition of number drawn from Nichomachus of Gerasa (2nd century AD), so this part at least is not authentically Philonic.

31 Cf. Cohn, 'Neue Beiträge' (n.18) 211.

32 On this codex and its 'cross' recording Εὐζόιος ἐπίσκοπος ἐν σωματίοις ἀνεώσατο see C-W 1.iii, J. Morris, 'The Jewish philosopher Philo,' in E. Schürer, *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ*, revised and edited by G. Vermes *et al.* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1973-87) 3.822.

33 *Mos.* is always divided into three books in the mss., but this is wrong as *Virt.* 52 shows.

34 See the stemma at L. Cohn, *Philonis Alexandrini libellus De opificio mundi* (Breslau: G. Koebner, 1889) xxi; also a similar attempt at F. C. Conybeare, *Philo About the Contemplative Life* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1895) 21.

35 Cf. the section De codicum auctoritate at C-W 1.xxxvii-xli.

36 D. Barthélemy, 'Est-ce Hoshaya Rabba qui censura le 'Commentaire Allégorique'? A partir des retouches faites aux citations bibliques, étude sur la tradition textuelle du *Commentaire Allégorique* de Philon,' in *Philon d'Alexandrie Lyon 11-15 Septembre 1966: colloques nationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique* (Paris 1967) 45-78.

37 Barthélemy, 'Hoshaya Rabba' 47, 57.

38 Barthélemy, 'Hoshaya Rabba' 50, 53; but the passage is not directly addressed.

two editions of the Allegorical Commentary made at Caesarea. The first, consisting of two sections (α–β) was tampered with by the unknown 'retoucher.' The second (ω) was left untouched. The text of *Virt.*, he claims, formed the hinge between the two sections α–β, the part Περὶ εὐγενείας coming either at the end of α or at the beginning of β. This conclusion is based on the fact that Περὶ εὐγενείας follows on *Conf.* in the mss. F and N, and precedes *Fug.* in G.[39] In fact Barthélemy's own table shows that the parts of *Virt.* are far more often surrounded by works from the Exposition of the Law (including *Mos.*) than the Allegorical Commentary. Nevertheless the same grouping with allegorical treatises occurs in the Athenian palimpsest about to be discussed, and, more significantly, also in the list of writings given by Eusebius.[40] It may be concluded, therefore, that very early on, in one line of transmission at least, *Virt.* became separated from its place in the Exposition of Law. But this is not a fact of great importance for our investigation.

Finally it may be asked whether Cohn omitted to consult or was unaware of any important ms. evidence in the preparation of his text. The mss. recorded by G–G as not known to C–W contain nothing of importance. Of more interest is a palimpsest, Atheniensis Bibl. Nat. 880. In 1961 P. J. Alexander discovered that underneath a 13th century parchment ms. of a Byzantine liturgical text was an older ms. containing a collection of Philonic treatises, namely *Sacr. Det. Post. Gig. Deus, Agr. Ebr. Sobr. Conf. Somn.* I, *Virt.*[41] The ink had been washed off the original ms. and the folios had been divided in half, so that the original text is not only completely jumbled, but also partly inaccessible on account of the binding of the renewed ms. Through a detailed examination of the writing Alexander argues that the original ms. is to be dated to between 965–1000, which would make it one of the very oldest Philonic mss.[42] For our purposes we note that it contains the text of *Virt.* 175-188, 202-215, 221-227 scattered over no less than 22 pages of the renewed ms.[43] This means that most likely it contained only *De paenitate* and *De nobilitate.* We note further that it does not contain any lost parts of the Philonic corpus. Alexander concludes by expressing the hope that the ms. will be rearranged in order to expose the Philonic material completely and then thoroughly collated. It could then be taken into account in a new edition of Philo.[44]

The papyri evidence on Philo's writings unfortunately contains no textual material from *Virt.* It has been suggested, however, that at least one papyrus fragment may derive from a missing part of the treatise. We return to this question below in section 6.

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[39] See Barthélemy, 'Hoshaya Rabba' 64, and the table at 63.

[40] *HE* 2.18.2, with the sequence *Agr. Ebr.,Sobr. Conf. Fug. Congr. Her. Virt.* Περὶ διαθηκῶν *Migr. Gig.–Deus Somn.*

[41] See the description by P. J. Alexander, 'A Neglected Palimpsest of Philo Judaeus: Preliminary Remarks editorum in usum,' in K. Treu (ed.), *Studia Codicologica,* TU 124 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1977) 1-15 (contents of ms. on 13-15).

[42] See above n. 28.

[43] On the basis of spot checks Alexander finds the text closest to U (Vaticanus gr. 381, = G-G 110; does not contain *Virt.*) and F. The similarity with the contents of F given by Barthélemy, 'Hoshaya Rabba' 64 is striking.

[44] Alexander, 'Palimpsest' 11; especially for *Post.* which is elsewhere only found in U.

*4. The value of the indirect tradition*

In his *apparatus testimoniorum* Cohn rightly points out a large number of passages in Josephus' description of the Mosaic πολιτεία in *Ant.* 4.196–302 which are reminiscent of Philo's treatment in *Virt.* These are not close enough to prove direct usage, and are of no value for textual purposes.[45]

Of quite inestimable value, however, is the witness of Clement of Alexandria to our text. In book II, §78–100, Clement makes an extensive and quite fascinating use of *Virt.* in order to expound the virtues of the Mosaic legislation. The borrowing is unacknowledged, and from our modern perspective Clement might stand accused of plagiarism, were it not that right at the end he refers to Philo in connection with another passage as ὁ Πυθαγόρειος Φίλων τὰ Μωυσέως ἐξηγούμενος.[46] This extended passage has been recently studied in depth by van den Hoek in her study on Clement's use of Philo, but, although she is very alert to the numerous changes and adaptations that Clement makes, textual questions fall completely outside the scope of her study.[47] As she aptly notes, Clement's method can be described as a 'cut and paste technique,' for he continually takes small pieces of Philonic material, adapts them to his own language and train of thought, and interweaves them into the text.[48] What we have, therefore, is a rather free paraphrase, with only a limited number of phrases taken word-for-word from Philo's text. But, because we still possess that original text, it is still on many occasions possible to discern the original text that Clement had in front of him when he made his adaptation. And this means that we have partial access to the Philonic text at only a century and a half's remove from the original autograph, at least a generation before the archetype of our textual tradition was taken to Caesarea by Origen. Clement's usage was noted by Mangey, but the first scholar to exploit its importance was Wendland, who devoted an entire article to the question.[49]

There are about 40 instances in which Clement's text can be related to significant variants in the textual tradition. First we should note a number of striking examples in which Clement supports the reading of S against the remainder of the mss. tradition:

(a) §106: the words based on the biblical text ὅτι πάροικος ἐγένου κατ' Αἴγυπτον are found in Clement 88.2 and added in the margin of S, but are omitted in all other mss.

(b) §109: S τὰς ἐλεπόλεις ἐφιστάντες (cf. *Spec.* 3.87, 4.222), Clement 88.3 τοῖς τείχεσιν ἐφεστῶτες ὥσιν ἐλεῖν τὴν πόλιν πειρώμενοι, other mss. ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐφιστάντες *vel sim.*

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45 Only in the following passages might one be tempted to recognize verbal reminiscence (ignoring parallels caused by reference to the LXX text): §28-30, cf. 4.298 τούς τε νεωστὶ δειμαμένους οἰκίας, φυτεύσαντας, πόθῳ, ἀπόλαυσιν; §96, cf. 4.274 κατ' ἐρημίαν πλανωμένοις; §115, cf. 4.259 ἐμπλησθεὶς τῆς ἐπιθυμίας. These similarities could be explained through coincidence, or just possibly long-distance reminiscence.

46 *Str.* 2.100.3; the reference is puzzling because the words attributed to Philo are nowhere found in his extant works.

47 A. van den Hoek, *Clement of Alexandria and his Use of Philo in the Stromateis: an Early Christian Reshaping of a Jewish Model*, VChrSupp 3 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988) 68-115. For a useful overview of Clement's borrowings see 71-72. The investigation is wholly based on comparison of the texts of C-W for Philo and Stählin-Früchtel for Clement.

48 Van den Hoek, *Clement* 73.

49 Wendland, 'Philo und Clemens' (n. 16).

(c) §111: S and Clement 89.1 *τρίχας*, other mss. *χαίτας*.

(d) §118: S and Clement 90.2 *ἔπεται*, *ἕψεται* G, *διέξεισι* C, *διέξειμι* others (!).

(e) §134: S *ἄλλο τίθησι διάταγμα συγγενὲς τοῖς προτέροις, ἀπαγορεύων ἡμέρᾳ τῇ αὐτῇ συγκαταθύειν μητέρα καὶ ἔγγονον*; Clement 93.2 *πάλιν αὖ ὁ χρήσος νόμος ἀπαγορεύει ἡμέρᾳ τῇ αὐτῇ συγκαταθύειν ἔκγονον καὶ μητέρα*; G *ἄλλο τίθησι διάταγμα συγγενὲς τοῖς προτέροις μὴ καταθύειν ἅμα μητέρα καὶ ἔγγονον*; AP *ἄλλο τίθησι διάταγμα συγγενὲς τοῖς καταθύειν τολμῶσι μητέρα καὶ ἔγγονον*; FL *ἄλλο τίθησι διάταγμα συγγενὲς τοῖς καταθύειν μητέρα καὶ ἔγγονον ἐθέλουσι*.

It must be conceded that these cases are rather remarkable, and they led Wendland to the conclusion that S should be given the preference over the readings of other mss. in all cases where there are no other grounds for decision.[50] It might be suspected, especially on the basis of the marginal notation in (a) that we have here a case of contamination, i.e., that S's text has been altered from Clement. But given the extreme paucity of the Clementine transmission (only a single ms. survives), this possibility must be ruled out.

On the other hand, Wendland's injunction fails to take into account the fact that on a large number of other—admittedly less spectacular—occasions, Clement agrees with other Philonic mss. against S. Again we give some examples:

(f) Clement 78.2 *αἴτιον*, §34 deleted by S, retained by all other mss.

(g) Clement 81.1 *ἀνενδεὲς τὸ θεῖον*, §9 *ὁ μὲν θεὸς ἀνεπιδής* SAVF etc., *ἀνενδεής* BEKM.

(h) Clement 81.3 *ἀναλαμβάνειν*, §18 S *ἀλλὰ λαμβάνειν*, other mss. as Clement.

(i) Clement 90.1 *ἄτμητον*, §90 S *ἄμητον*, CG *ἄτμητον*, AHP *ἀτίμητον*

(j) Clement 94.1 biblical quote beginning with *ἀλλ'*, §142 deleted in SC, retained in G (cf. *ἄλλο* in remaining mss.).

(k) Clement 95.1 *τέμνειν ἐᾷ*, §150 S *ἀποτέμνειν ἐᾷ*, other mss. as Clement.

(l) Clement 95.2 *παραβλαστάνον κωλύῃ τὴν αὔξησιν*, §156 S *παραναβλαστάνῃ τὴν αὔξην κωλῦον*, other mss. *παραβλαστάνῃ τὴν αὔξησιν κωλῦον* vel sim.

In examples (j) and (l)[51] Cohn chooses for S against the combined evidence of Clement and the other mss., which is surely dubious from the methodological point of view. Also the emendation *φιλανθρώπως ὁμοῦ ⟨καὶ στρατηγικῶς⟩* at §28 based on Clement's text is unpersuasive.[52]

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50 Wendland, 'Philo und Clemens' 456: 'An Stellen, wo innere Gründe die Auswahl unter den Lesarten nicht bestimmen, könnten wir leicht geneigt sein, die weit überwiegende Zahl der Zeugen vor S zu bevorzugen. Indem auch an solchen Stellen das Zeugniss des Clem. zu S hinzutreten ist, ergiebt sich der Schluss, dass überhaupt in allen solchen neutralen Fällen S der Vorrang gebührt, dass die Lesart von S. wo keine inneren Gründe gegen sie sprechen, stets als die richtige vorauszusetzen ist.'

51 For *παραναβλαστάνῃ*, but not *αὔξην* .

52 Cf. the long note by Colson at *Philo* 8.178f. who suggests, adducing *Spec.* 2.183, that the mss. reading *φιλανθρωπίαν ὁμοῦ* is the result of an incorrect word division and

These various textual differences may seem to the observer rather trivial, and not of great importance for our understanding of the contents of Philo's work. But this is certainly not always the case, as can be shown from my final Clementine example.

At *Str.* 2.98.2 Clement writes:

> καλῶς οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν μετανοούντων εἴρηται τὸ λόγιον ἐκεῖνο· «τὸν θεὸν εἵλου σήμερον εἶναί σου θεόν, καὶ κύριος εἵλετό σε σήμερον γενέσθαι λαὸν αὐτῷ.» τὸν γὰρ σπεύδοντα θεραπεύειν τὸ ὄν ἱκέτην ὄντα ἐξοικειοῦται ὁ θεός.

These words are derived in large part from the passage in Περὶ μετανοίας at §184 (I add the relevant mss. variants):

> ὅθεν εὖ καὶ συμφώνως τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐχρήσθη τὸ λόγιον ἐκεῖνο· «τὸν θεὸν εἵλου σήμερον εἶναί σοι θεόν, καὶ κύριος εἵλατό σε σήμερον γενέσθαι λαὸν αὐτῷ» (Deut. 26:17-18). παγκάλη γε τῆς αἱρέσεως ἡ ἀντίδοσις, σπεύδοντος ἀνθρώπου μὲν θεραπεύειν τὸ ὄν, θεοῦ δὲ ἀνυπερθέτως ἐξοικειοῦσθαι τὸν ἱκέτην καὶ προαπαντᾶν τῷ βουλήματι τοῦ γνησίως καὶ ἀνόθως ἰόντος ἐπὶ τὴν θεραπείαν αὐτοῦ.
>
> 1.1: τὸν θεόν S, τὸν κύριον CG; εἵλου S, ἀντηλλάξω C, ἀντηλλαξάτω G
> 1.2: θεόν S, εἰς θεόν CG; εἵλατο S, ἀντηλλάξατο CG; αὐτοῦ S, αὐτῷ CG
> 1.3: διαιρέσεως S, αἱρέσεως CG; τὸ ὄν S, θεόν C, θεω G

The differences here are very considerable indeed, and require some kind of special explanation. In all the significant variants S is supported by Clement against the other mss. The variation in the biblical text immediately points to the interposition of the Aquilan translation, as postulated by Barthélemy, and indeed the verb ἀνταλλάσσω is attested for Aquila in Deut. 26: 17.[53] Two other variants in the biblical text may reflect the Aquilan translation: (a) the replacement of θεόν by κύριον at the beginning of 26:17 (since the MT reads two different divine names in this portion of text);[54] (b) the reading εἰς θεόν for the second θεόν in 26:17.[55] But there is more. Going beyond the cited biblical text we find that Philo's description of man as suppliant (ἱκέτης) serving τὸ ὄν (cf. the famous description at *Contempl.* 2) has been changed to θεόν in the same manuscripts that contain the Aquilan variants. The change is most likely motivated by unease at Philo's blatantly philosophical description of God in terms of Platonic being, a discomfort that Clement does not share.[56] The suggestion supports Barthélemy's theory of a Jewish–Rabbinic tamperer, although obviously other explanations are

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should read φιλανθρωπίᾳ νόμου (the suggestion is described as brilliant by Nock in his review at *CR* 54 (1940) 170). Only the ms. A reads φιλανθρώπως.

53 Cf. J. Reider, *An Index to Aquila* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966) 22. For Barthélemy's theory see above at n. 36.

54 I.e. *Adonai* and *Elohim*. Κύριος is only recorded for the LXX in the Ethiopic and Armenian translations. The variant has not been recorded for Aquila, but he may have had a vested interest in giving a literal rendering of the MT because similar otiose repetitions of the divine name were exploited by Christian apologists such as Justin Martyr.

55 As suggested by Barthélemy, 'Hoshaya Rabba' 53.

56 Another interesting case of possible tampering is found at §164, where the Platonizing phrase ὅταν θεός, ὁ νοητὸς ἥλιος, ἀνάσχῃ καὶ ἐπιλάμψῃ, as recorded in S, is altered to ὅταν θεοποίητος ἥλιος... in C G (to which variants in other mss. appear to be related). Cohn rightly chooses for S.

possible.[57] This passage, therefore, discloses various interesting facets of the transmission of Philo's writings. But they can only be discovered by those who care to look at the variants tucked away in Cohn's apparatus.[58]

The indirect tradition, as witnessed by Clement, is also of importance for the vexed question of the original structure and contents of the treatise. We shall return to this subject in section 6 of our paper.

Regrettably Eusebius in his extensive extracts from Philo's writings does not cite any passages from *De virtutibus*. This is all the more a pity because the bishop, unlike Clement, gives *verbatim* quotations of his sources, so that he is an extremely valuable witness to the textual tradition.[59]

In their monumental edition Cohn and Wendland attempted as best they could to include the remaining indirect tradition scattered among the exegetical catenae of the Church fathers and various later Byzantine anthologies.[60] For *Virt.* the harvest was small.[61] The only snippet that is of any real interest is five lines of §117 found in the *Sacra Parallela* of Johannes Damascenus.[62] The text supports S in a number of places, notably in recording παραλιπών (also with Clement) against καταλιπών in all other mss. But it also has some unusual readings of its own (e.g. τελειότατον instead of τιμιώτατον found in all mss.). The remaining important pieces of evidence (for our purposes) in the *Sacra Parallela* are the fragments from a lost Περὶ εὐσεβείας found by Pitra and Harris. To these we will return in section 6 below.

*5. An evaluation of the available texts*

As emerged in our brief history of Philo's text, all study and analysis of *Virt.* since 1906 has been based on the critical edition of L. Cohn. Our attention, therefore, must above all be focussed on the merits and failings of this edition. Cohn was certainly well qualified to carry out his task. He was active during the heyday of the German philological tradition. In preparation for his work as an editor he had received not only the customary general training in classical philology, but had also devoted considerable time to learning the technique of collating manuscripts and the various aspects of editorial criticism.[63] His edition has some very obvious merits. Firstly it is extremely conscientious in the recording of manuscript variants. Not seldom the apparatus criticus takes up

[57] E.g., a Christian scribe might balk at the description τὸ ὄν. But the proximity to the intruded Aquilan variants gives support to Barthélemy's theory.

[58] It is to be agreed with M. Harl, *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit*, in Les Œuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie 15 (Paris: Éditions du CERF, 1966) 159ff., that the textual variants found in the various forms of transmission of Philo's writings should be taken more seriously than is generally the case.

[59] Cf. C-W 1.lxi-lxii. It should not be lost out of sight, however, that Eusebius represents part of the *indirect tradition*. He has his own axe to grind, and this can lead to subtle modifications in his recorded texts, as I will be showing in an article to appear in *Vigiliae Christianae*.

[60] Cf. C-W 1.lxiii-lxx, 2.xv-xvii, and esp. L. Cohn, 'Zur indirekten Ueberlieferung Philo's und der älteren Kirchenväter,' *Jahrbücher für Protestanische Theologie* 18 (1892) 475-492. See further Morris, 'Jewish philosopher' (n. 32) 3.825. We may be sure that there is more material than that exploited by Cohn and Wendland in their edition.

[61] Cf. above n. 4.

[62] See the apparatus at C-W 5.300-301. The ms. in which the fragment is located is Vaticanus fr. 1553 (= G-G 52), dated to the 12th century).

[63] Cf. M. Pohlenz's remark in his necrology of Wendland that Cohn 'über eine sichere Editionstechnik verfügte,' *Neue Jahrbücher* (n.18) 60.

nearly as much room as the text itself. Secondly Cohn is a careful editor, and may be been considered relatively conservative for his day, if we take into consideration that late 19th century scholarship was much more prone to introduce emendations and conjectures into the body of the text than occurs in modern editorial practice. A few of Mangey's proposed emendations are taken over,[64] but many others are rejected. Cohn adds some of his own, especially if required by accidence or syntax.[65] Quite often, however, he reserves his suspicions of and suggestions for the text for the apparatus, rightly preferring the original text to stand.[66] If there is a weakness, it would be that, as Colson points out on a number of occasions, he is sometimes inclined to give up on a difficult passage too easily and declare it corrupt.[67] Moreover it must recognized that from time to time he cannot resist introducing speculative emendations into the text which a modern editor would leave well alone.[68] The temptation here is the desire to improve on the text, i.e., to bring it into line with expectations based on knowledge of Philo's Greek, but also of extraneous factors, such as canons of sound Greek style etc. Of such intrusions the worst I found is at §91, where the readings δικαιότατος (S) and φιλοστοργότατος (other mss.) are conflated into φιλοστοργότατος καὶ δικαιότατος, a procedure that goes against sound editorial practice. Such attempts, it should be emphasized, occur less often than in most editions from the same period,[69] but nevertheless have to be taken into account by users of the text.

The main difficulty that Cohn encounters, however, is the need to *choose* between the textual variants in the mss. tradition. The number and divergence of these is quite staggeringly high, and accounts for the unusual length of the apparatus criticus. In §1-50 (Περὶ ἀνδρείας) a larger number of mss. preserve the text and there is a fair degree of consensus. But from §51 onwards the role of S (sometimes supported by CG) becomes more and more prominent, and is reinforced by the rather poor quality of the mss. outside the group SCG.

S is indeed by all standards a remarkable manuscript. Time after time it preserves readings that are radically different from the rest of the mss. tradition. As we saw in the previous section, on a number of important occasions these idiosyncratic readings are supported by Clement, and so have every chance of representing the original text. Wendland thus concluded on the basis of these results that S should always be given the benefit of the doubt.[70] Cohn for the most part takes over this advice. On numerous occasions, therefore, he chooses to take the reading of S, even though it is very different, and sometimes by no means superior, than what is found in the remainder of the tradition. I think it is necessary to place a question mark behind this editorial judgment. It seems to me, on the basis of the collations recorded by Cohn, that S is an extremely *erratic*

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64 E.g. at §25, 31, 34, 45, 216 (which must be correct, since Philo never calls ἐπιστήμη itself an ἀρετή). At §43 Mangey's conjecture is confirmed by A.

65 E.g. at §47, 53, 110, 123, 203 etc. These kind of emendations are indicated by *scripsi* in the apparatus.

66 E.g. at §15, 17, 34, 62, 67, 113, 125, 201 (here he adds a safe conjecture into the text and reserves a more daring one for the apparatus).

67 Cf. §38, 58, 185, 188 and Colson's notes ad loc.

68 E.g. §28, 104 (καὶ ἀγαπῶντος can be retained), 158, 171.

69 Compare his fellow-editor Wendland, who is much more speculative in his editorial work. Many of the emendations that Wendland suggests in his article cited in n. 16 are *not* taken over; e.g. §109, 209.

70 See quotation in n. 50 and text thereto.

manuscript. On a large number of occasions the readings it preserves must be right, as in the following examples:[71]

§51: *ὁ προφήτης τῶν νόμων* S rather than *ὁ πατὴρ τῶν νόμων* (neither phrase is found in Philo, but cf. *Mut.* 126, *Decal.* 175, *Legat.* 99).

§89: *ῥύσιον* S, *χρῆσιν* G, *χρυσὸν* other mss. (the context is lending money so the term 'surety' is much better than 'gold').

§160: the sequence is man, animals, plants, so *ζῴων ἀλογων* S G is obviously superior to *ζῴων ἀγονων* (other mss.).

Cf. further §114, 126, 132, 137, 147, 158, 193, 218, 224.

On an equal number of occasions, however, S is very clearly in the wrong:

§69: *τὸ φιλάλληλον καὶ φιλοεθνές* most mss.; S's *φιλόθεον ἐς* of course misses the point altogether, since Moses' exhortation to Joshua takes place at the personal–civic level (A reads *φιλοκενές*).

§102: S reads *τῶν μυθικῶν πραγμάτων* instead of *πλασμάτων*.

§145: S reads *βοῦν ἀλοῶντα μὴ κημοῦν*, the other mss. *φιμοῦν*. Strangely Cohn adds behind S's reading *fortasse recte*, but this seems to me most unlikely given the presence of the verb *φιμοῦν* in the biblical text at Deut. 25:4. Cf. also the etymology of Phinehas at *Post.* 182.

Other examples of evident mistakes at §141, 163-4, 165, 175, 180, 203, 212.

How can we explain this erratic nature of our oldest witness? There are certain indications that we may have to do here with that dangerous phenomenon, an independent and semi-intelligent scribe. To start with, there are the additional section headings which have been systematically added, as well as the commentary on Philo's use of the decad at the end of the ms.[72] Furthermore two textual variants are rather suggestive:

§139: all the mss. read *μὴ ἀποκτείνεσθαι μέχρις ἂν ἀποτέκωσιν vel. sim.* S's *φυλάττεσθαι* very much looks like an attempt to circumvent the awkward repetition of two verbs beginning with *ἀπο-* (which Philo may have introduced as deliberate contrast).

§176: *ἀγαθὰ γὰρ προηγούμενα ἐν μὲν σώμασιν ἡ ἄνοσος ὑγεία, ἐν δὲ ναυσὶν ἡ ἀκίνδυνος εὔπλοια, ἐν δὲ ψυχαῖς ἡ ἄληστος μνήμη τῶν ἀξίων μνημονεύεσθαι...* It seems that S found the good attributed to the soul somewhat banal, and so records *γνῶσις*, which *must* be wrong in the context. This forces him two lines later to change *καὶ ἡ λήθης ἐκγινομένη ἀνάμνησις* to *καὶ ἡ ἀληθὴς ἐκγινομένη ἀνάμνησις* which surprisingly is also found the brief extract in R (i.e., Parisinus gr. 1630, G-G 106).

We note additionally the interesting text at §58 where Israel is described as a *ποίμνη σποράδην* [S *ἐπ' ὄρους*] *ἀγελάρχην οὐκ ἔχουσα*. As Cohn observes in his article, S's reading adds an allusion to I Kings 22:17. Colson in his note on the passage is correct in pointing out that, since the reading of the other mss. is perfectly acceptable, the question to be answered is whether the allusion was originally inserted by Philo, or is rather the work of the scribe of S.

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71 In addition to the correspondences between S and Clement noted above.

72 See above the notes 29-30.

It seems to me probable, therefore, that S has introduced deliberate alterations into his text, and that some of these will have found their way into Cohn's edition as a result of the strong preference that he shows for the readings of this remarkable ms.

Fortunately the English translation of *Virt.* in the Loeb Classical Library furnishes us with a check on the standard German edition. It should be emphasized that Colson takes as his starting point Cohn's text. To his text on the left hand side of the page he appends only a handful of mss. variants, amounting to a fraction of all mss. alternatives recorded in Cohn's apparatus. What he checks, therefore, is so much not whether a better text is available, but whether the text as it stands makes sense and is consonant with Philonic thought and style. This results in a lengthy series of high-quality notes and observations on Cohn's text which every student of Philo must take into consideration when working on this treatise. At times Colson explicitly approves of Cohn's textual alterations (e.g. at §46, 78, (where an entire paragraph is declared spurious), 183 etc.), and many more are incorporated without comment in his text and translation. In the notes, however, he is very often able to show with considerable conviction that one can understand the Greek text in a different way to that done by Cohn, and some of the latter's proposals are not without their difficulties. This leads him to remark that in his view Cohn has introduced unjustified emendations into his printed text.[73] At the very least this excellent collection of notes squeezed into the uncongenial format of a Loeb text should serve to remind Philonists that the edition they use should be not uncritically accepted as a canonical expression of the *ipsa verba Philonis*.[74]

*6. The problem of the treatise's title and its original contents*

Finally we return to the questions of what the original title of *Virt.* was, and how this title relates to the contents of the treatise as reconstructed by modern scholars. Much energy and ingenuity has been devoted to the resolution of the difficulties involved in answering these questions,[75] and very recently an excellent *status quaestionis* has been given by J. Morris, which need not be repeated here.[76] We confine ourselves, therefore, to three observations.

(a) The evidence on the treatise's title amounts to the following:

(1) *direct tradition*

S: Περὶ γ' ἀρετῶν ἃς σὺν ἄλλαις ἀνέγραψε Μωυσῆς περὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φιλανθρωπίας καὶ μετανοίας

other mss.: Περὶ ἀρετῶν ἤτοι περὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ εὐσεβείας καὶ φιλανθρωπίας καὶ μετανοίας *vel sim.*

(2) *indirect tradition*

Eusebius *HE* 2.2.18.2: Περὶ τριῶν ἀρετῶν ἃς σὺν ἄλλαις ἀνέγραψε Μωυσῆς

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73 See the remark cited above at n. 22.

74 As regrettably occurs in the French translation of Delobre-Servel-Verilhac.

75 See esp. E. Schürer, *Geschichte* (n.11) 3.670-671 and esp. n.101 (this passage goes back to the 2nd edition of the work of 1886); L. Massebieau, 'Le classement des œuvres de Philon,' *Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études* 1 (1889) 1-91, esp. 39-41, 49-51; Wendland, 'Philo und Clemens' (n. 16); L. Cohn, 'Einteilung und Chronologie der Schriften Philos,' *Philologus* Supplbd. 7.3 (1899) 387-435, esp. 412-414; Colson, *Philo* xii-xviii, 440-441.

76 Morris 'Jewish Philosopher' (n. 32) 3.850-853.

Jerome *De vir. ill.* 11: de tribus virtutibus liber unus
*Sacra Parallela* Codex Rupefucaldinus (= G-G 57) fol. 212$^{v}$: ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τριῶν ἀρετῶν
*Sacra Parallela* other titles: ἐκ τοῦ περὶ ἀρετῶν[77]

The agreement between Eusebius and S is striking, but one has to take into account the very strong possibility of contamination (Eusebius' *Church History* being a very common book in the Byzantine period). On the other hand, the support for the reading '*three* virtues' is strong enough to make it probable.[78] The mention of a Περὶ εὐσεβείας in the other mss. should be explained as a deduction on the basis of the transmitted text, rather than a fossilized reference to a lost part of the treatise. The explanation for this is not, I believe, difficult to give. The words at §51, τὴν δ' εὐσεβείας συγγενεστάτην καὶ ἀδελφὴν καὶ δίδυμον ὄντος ἑξῆς ἐπισκεπτέον φιλανθρωπίαν, can easily be read as referring to a treatment of piety that has just been given. It is important to note that the ms. G actually goes looking for the section on piety and adds the title Περὶ εὐσέβειας at §34, preceding the account of the seductive Midianite attack on the Israelites.[79] This is not completely foolish, because the theme of piety is specifically mentioned at §42 and 45. The role of εὐσέβεια is in fact prominent in the entire treatise such as we have it. At *Spec.* 4.135, when introducing the theme of the ἀρεταί which still remain to be discussed as an appendix to his exposition of the Law, Philo refers to piety as the 'queen of the virtues,' and adds that he has already discussed her, as well as two other virtues φρόνησις and σωφροσύνη.[80] At §175, the beginning of *De paenitentia*, εὐσέβεια is again mentioned (together with δικαιοσύνη) as the virtue that enables the repentant to join the Mosaic commonwealth, while the section end with the synonymous term θεοσέβεια. In the examples of true εὐγένεια piety returns on three occasions (§201, 218, 221). Piety, it would seem, is presented by Philo as a kind of super-virtue which stands above the other virtues and is presupposed by them, i.e., if you have δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, φιλανθρωπία, μετάνοια, εὐγένεια of the kind enjoined by Moses, you will also possess true εὐσέβεια towards God. Schürer is therefore correct, in my view, in concluding that the inclusion of a Περὶ εὐσεβείας was most likely caused by a false inference from Philo's formulation at §51.[81] And this means that there is much to be said for the title printed by Mangey in his edition: Περὶ τριῶν ἀρετῶν ἤτοι περὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φιλανθρωπίας καὶ μετανοίας.[82]

(b) If we accept the view that the title referred to three virtues, there is an obvious problem in the case of Περὶ εὐγένειας, since the possibility remains that this section was not part of the original treatise. Here the evidence of Clement surely has great weight indeed. It is safe to deduce from Clement's adaptations

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[77] The reading at Codex Vaticanus 1553 fol. 73r is difficult, but appears to be περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν rather than περὶ γ' ἀρετῶν; cf. Wendland, 'Philo und Clemens' 436.

[78] Note that Philo appears to have written another work Περὶ ἀρετῶν, i.e. the larger work to which *Flacc.* and *Legat.* belong (cf. Morris, 'Jewish Philosopher' 3.863), so there would need to be a way of distinguishing the two works. We note too that *Contempl.* is in some mss. called the fourth book of Περὶ ἀρετῶν *vel sim.*

[79] See app. crit. at C-W 5.275.11; noted by Colson *Philo* 8.xiv.

[80] εὐσέβεια is also called ἡγεμονίς at *Decal.* 119, and together with φιλανθρωπία at *Virt.* 95.

[81] Schürer, *Geschichte* 3.671 n. 101; cf. Colson, *Philo* 8.xiv.

[82] Mangey, *Philonis* 2.376 (as noted above at n. 11 he does not include Περὶ εὐγένειας in the treatise); cf. Colson *Philo* 8.440, whose criticism of Cohn is quite justified.

that all four sections occurred in sequence in his copy of the treatise, since he makes use of them all in exactly the order given in Cohn's treatise. He had no section Περὶ εὐσεβείας in his copy, but it did include the section Περὶ εὐγένειας. Colson, who finds this last section an unworthy conclusion to the whole work, attempts to circumvent Clement's evidence by suggesting that it was already misplaced in his copy.[83] Such suspicion seems to me unwarranted when it concerns evidence so close to the time of the original autograph. The final section can, in my view, adequately explained as a somewhat polemical development *in contrariam partem* of the final idea of Περὶ μετανοίας, which is based on the biblical text Deut. 26:17-18 cited in §184. If the penitent makes the choice offered in this text, he becomes a true θεραπευτής τε καὶ ἱκέτης and as such is of equal worth to an entire people, i.e., of Israel who made the same choice under Moses (cf. also Deut. 30:19-20). *But*[84] those who do belong to the race of Israel by birth, and rely on that rather than on piety and virtue are making a great mistake, for true εὐγένεια is reserved for the wise man and not those who can boast distinguished ancestors...[85]

(c) How, finally, should we regard the fragments derived from the lost Περὶ εὐσεβείας? Schürer argued that these tell us nothing about the position of the work, in *Virt.* or elsewhere.[86] Philo may have written a work on piety which has nothing to do with our treatise at all. But since then some fresh evidence has come in. Schürer knew only of the three fragments published by Harris.[87] A fourth fragment has come to light. It was first published by Lewy, but in the two mss. of the *Sacra Parallela* where he found it no reference was given to the Philonic work from which it was drawn.[88] More recently Royse has shown that the same fragment is found in the ms. Thessaloniciensis Βλάτεων Monasterii 9,[89] where it is said to come ἐκ τοῦ περὶ εὐσεβείας κεφαλαίου (the same reference given for Harris' third fragment; for the other two the reference is ἐκ τοῦ περὶ εὐσεβείας[90]). Earlier, however, Früchtel had discovered that by an amazing coincidence one of the papyrus scraps of POxy XI 1356 fr. 10[r] contained exactly the same text as the first half of Lewy's fragment.[91] From this Royse concluded that the Philonic codex found at Oxyrhynchus probably contained the text of the

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83 Colson, *Philo* xvii-xviii.

84 For the text of the opening words of the section in §206 I prefer to read τοῖς δὲ ὑμνοῖσι with the majority of mss, rather than διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὑμνοῖσι (F, preferred by Cohn) or καὶ τοῖς ὑμνοῖσι (S).

85 In most of *De nobilitate* Philo speaks in rather generalized tones, but that he concretely has Jewish persons in mind is shown by §206, 226.

86 Schürer, *Geschichte* 3.672 n. 101.

87 J. Rendel Harris, *Fragments of Philo Judaeus* (Cambridge: University Press, 1886) 10-11. Of these the first is already found in a slightly different version in Mangey, *Philonis* 2.667, while the third was first published by Pitra in 1884.

88 H. Lewy, 'Neue Philontexte in der Überarbeitung des Ambrosius. Mit einem Anhang: neu gefundene griechische Philonfragmente,' *Sitzber. preuss. Akad. d. Wiss. phil.-hist. Kl.* 1932 IV (Berlin 1932) 82-83, frag. no. 27.

89 J. R. Royse, 'The Oxyrhynchus Papyrus of Philo,' *Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists* 17 (1980) 162. The fifth fragment which he postulates on account of the *similarity* between P.Oxy. fr. 10r and Harris' third fragment is altogether speculative.

90 If I read his cryptic description on p.10 correctly.

91 L. Früchtel, 'Zum Oxyrhynchus-Papyrus des Philon,' *Philologische Wochenschrift* 58 (1938) 1437-39.

lost Περὶ εὐσεβείας, and that its length was about 14 pages, which, as he rightly remarks, compares well with two of the parts of *Virt.*[92]

These discoveries, though of great intrinsic interest, are not sufficient to make us revise our views on the contents of *Virt.* The extracts from *Virt.* in the *Sacra Parallela* are labelled ἐκ τοῦ περὶ (τῶν) ἀρετῶν, and do not refer to specific parts of the work.[93] Naturally one is curious to know what the term κεφάλαιον means in the two titles mentioned above. The natural explanation is 'chapter,' i.e., part of a larger work. But I have found no parallels in the Philonic fragments found in the *Sacra Parallela* for this designation.[94] Some further interesting evidence is found in a *Catena* on the Pentateuch, where a Philonic extract is entitled Φίλωνος Ἑβραίου ἐν τῷ περὶ εὐσεβείας λόγῳ, but it emerges that the text is from *Spec.* 2.120-124![95] It would appear that these Byzantine attributions are often rather doubtful, and that it is risky to deduce too much from them.[96] I am in agreement with Schürer, therefore, that we should not allow the fragments of Περὶ εὐσεβείας to influence our views on the contents of *Virt.* such as we know them from the direct and indirect tradition.

*7. Some concluding remarks*

Philonists may consider themselves fortunate. It is very unlikely, *pace* Alexander,[97] that the project of new critical edition of Philo's works will be undertaken again in the foreseeable future. The task would be vast, as can be gauged from our example of the single treatise *De virtutibus.* Such a project would have to be carried out by a classicist, but few are trained to do this work nowadays, and it would not be placed high on the list of scholarly priorities. It is indeed fortunate, therefore, that in Cohn's edition of our treatise we possess a solid foundation for further research. Especially his diligence in recording the manuscript variants is most valuable. If new discoveries are made, they will have to be superimposed on his labours. As we have seen, it is possible to call into question many of his editorial decisions. But at least the materials for making such evaluations are readily available. Also in the case of the English translation of Colson, now fifty years old, fortune has favoured the Philonist.[98] Colson devoted half a lifetime to an intimate study of Philo's Greek style, and his rendering points the way to a sound understanding of a text that is by no means always straightforward. Apart from its other merits it can serve as a valuable check on the earlier philological work carried out by Cohn and other scholars.

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92 Royse 'Oxyrhynchus Papyrus' 163.

93 App. test. at C-W 5.268-269, 300. The fragment at C-W 5.321 entitled τοῦ Φίλωνος περὶ μετανοίας has a different background, coming from a ms. that contains *excerpts* from Philo.

94 Only a fragment in Paris. Coislinianus 276 (= G-G 50).220$^{r}$ with the title Φίλωνος ἐκ τοῦ περὶ κοσμοποιΐα ς· γ' κεφαλαίου (actually = *QG* 2.54, cited by F. Petit, *Quaestiones in Genesim et Exodum: fragmenta graeca,* Les Œuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie 33 (Paris: Éditions du CERF, 1978) 110).

95 Catena Barbarini IV 56 (= G-G 183); see app. test. C-W *ad loc.*

96 There are numerous misattributions in the *Sacra Parallela* and *Catenae,* as a cursory inspection of the app. test. in C-W and the attributions in Harris and Petit will confirm.

97 Cf. the remark cited above at n. 44.

98 This applies to the translation work done by Colson himself. In early volumes he shared the task with G. H. Whitaker, who was considerably less competent. The translation of *Opif.*, for example, contains many serious mistakes.

Nevertheless my hope is that the small piece of research carried out in this article will shake Philonists out of any kind of complacency they may possess. This was the point of the analogy with computer programming with which the article commenced. It is important to bear in mind that both the text and the translations we use are scholarly products built upon an elaborate sub-structure of codicological research and textual criticism. Cohn and Colson can be regarded as sound structures upon which one can build further. But for serious research on Philo's writings the foundations upon which they are built should not remain wholly unexamined. This is not just a matter of a philological purism which attempts to come as close as possible to Philo's original words. The texts that have come down to us are historical products. As we have seen in this article, the survival and transmission of Philo's writings throughout a period of nearly two millennia—from their reception by the early Christians to their treatment at the hands of generations of modern scholars—contains many aspects that should be of intrinsic interest to every student of Philo's writings.

# *Metanoia* in the Writings of Philo Judaeus

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The purpose of this study is to examine the use of μετάνοια and cognate terms in the writings of Philo Judaeus of Alexandria. Philo uses these terms more often than almost any other non-Christian writer in antiquity.[1] In his writings, the terms are closely associated with the conversion of Gentiles to Judaism. They denote a radical turning from sin (particularly idolatry), and a turning to God accompanied by beginning a life of virtue. However, Philo also uses the terms to describe the response of anyone who turns to God from a life of ignorance, incontinence, injustice, or immorality. This concept of "repentance" is found in many passages, but it is dealt with most thoroughly in the tractate "On Repentance" in Philo's work *On the Virtues* 175-186. After discussing some introductory matters, this study will focus on Philo's use of μετάνοια and cognate terms in that tractate.[2]

In Classical and Hellenistic Greek, the terms μετανοέω and μετάνοια express various changes in the mind, the will, or the emotions. They are sometimes used of purely intellectual activity, but more often denote the dissatisfaction, pain, grief, or shame associated with a change of one's mind. The verb, although at times meaning only "perceive afterwards, change one's mind," can also mean "change one's feelings, regret." In the Classical period these terms are rare. In Hellenistic Greek, they are more common and often denote a "penitent alteration of judgment" due to a correction of mistaken views, though without particularly ethical or religious connotations.[3]

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[1] In his extant writings, Philo uses μετάνοια and cognate terms 62 times. The only non-Christian writers in antiquity to use the terms more often are Josephus (77 times) and Plutarch (74 times). Other authors who use the terms frequently are Diodorus Siculus (29 times) and Appian (25 times). This data is from the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* compiled at the University of California at Irvine, and available from the Packard Humanities Institute, Los Altos, CA.

[2] The Greek text and English translation of Philo's writings used in this study are from *Philo*, ed. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker, The Loeb Classical Library, 10 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929-1962).

[3] Henry Liddell and Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, rev. and aug. Henry Jones and Roderick McKenzie, 9th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), 1115; Johannes Behm and Ernst Würthwein, "μετάνοια," *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 10 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964-1976), 4:979-984.

The idea of repentance in the Old Testament is important for the use of μετάνοια and cognate terms in the writings of Philo.[4] In the Hebrew Bible the common term for repentance is שוב. This word has as its basic meaning "turn back" or "return," and usually denotes a physical action of turning. However, it is also used in for moral, spiritual, or religious turning, and is used by the prophets to describe turning from evil and turning to God.[5]

However, in the Septuagint, the root שוב is usually translated by the στρέφω, "turn," ἀποστρέφω, "turn away from," and ἐπιστρέφω, "turn around."[6] Although μετανοέω occurs over twenty times in the Septuagint, it almost always translates the root נחם, "be sorry, regret something, suffer grief, be moved to pity."[7] It often denotes an action of God rather than human beings.[8] When used of God, μετανοέω refers to a change of mind with a corresponding change in behavior. On other occasions, the μετανοέω is used of human beings; yet only in Sir 48:15 does the verb represent שוב.[9] The noun μετάνοια is used of human beings, but never to translate שוב.[10] Only in the Wisdom of Sirach, the Wisdom of Solomon, and the Prayer of Manasseh, do μετανοέω and μετάνοια denote religious change: "Enoch pleased the Lord and was taken up, as an example of repentance to all generations" (Sir 44:16); "Despite all this the people did not repent, nor did they forsake their sins" (Sir 48:15); "But judging them little by little you gave them an opportunity to repent" (Wis 12:10); "You have filled your children with good hope, because you give repentance from sins" (Wis 12:19); "O Lord, according to your great goodness you have promised repentance and forgiveness to those who have sinned against you, and in the multitude of your mercies you have appointed repentance for sinners that they may be saved" (Prayer of Manasseh 7); "For you, O Lord, are the God of those who repent" (Prayer of Manasseh 13).

By the time of Philo, the Jewish idea of repentance שוב was expressed by the Greek terms μετανοέω and μετάνοια. The New Testament uses μετανοέω in reference to Jonah 3:5-10, which has שוב in the Hebrew and ἐπιστρέφω in the Septuagint (Matt 12:41; Luke 11:42). And generally, the New Testament uses μετανοέω and μετάνοια for religious conversion.[11] In the Greek version of

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[4] The editions of the OT used for this study are the Hebrew-Aramaic text of E. Elliger and W. Rudolph, *Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelstiftung, 1977), and the Greek text of Alfred Rahlfs, *Septuaginta* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1935).

[5] F. Brown, S. R. Driver, and C. A. Briggs, *Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1907; reprint ed. 1981), 623-624 (hereafter cited as BDB, *Lexicon*). See Jer 3:7, 12, 14, 22; 4:1; 5:3; 15:7; 18:8; Ezek 3:19; 13:22; 18:30; Hos 3:15; 5:4; 6:1; 7:10; 11:5; Amos 4:6, 8, 9, 10, 11.

[6] Information on Greek Versions of the OT is from Edwin Hatch and Henry Redpath, *Concordance to the Septuagint and Other Greek Versions of the Old Testament*, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1897; reprint ed., Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983).

[7] BDB, *Lexicon*, 636-637.

[8] 1 Kgds (1 Sam) 15:29; Am 7:3, 6; Joel 2:13, 14; Jon 3:9, 10; 4:2; Zech 8:14; Jer 4:28; 18:8, 10.

[9] Prov 20:25; 24:24, 47; Wis 5:3; Sir 17:24; 48:15; Isa 46:8; Jer 8:6; 38 (31):19; Prayer of Manasseh 7, 13.

[10] Prov 14:15; Wis 11:23; 12:10, 19; Sir 44:16; Prayer of Manasseh 7, 8, 13.

[11] W. Bauer, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, trans. W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich, 2nd ed., rev. and aug. F. W. Gingrich and F. W. Danker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 512; J. Behm and E. Würthwein, "μετάνοια," *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed. G. Kittel and G.

Symmachus, μετανοέω and μετάνοια are used to translate שוב.[12] And as in later books of the Apocrypha, in the Pseudepigrapha μετανοέω and μετάνοια are used for repentance.[13] Especially in the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, the terms denote penitence for sin to appease God.[14] Here they often denote change in moral and ethical behavior:

> Righteousness expels hatred; humility kills envy. For the person who is just and humble is ashamed to commit an injustice, not because someone else will pass judgment on him but out of his own heart, because the Lord considers his inner deliberations. He will not denounce a fellow man, since fear of the Most High overcomes hatred. Being concerned not to arouse the Lord's anger, he is completely unwilling to wrong anyone, even in his thoughts. I understood this at the last, after I had repented concerning Joseph, for according to God's truth, repentance destroys disobedience, puts darkness to flight, illumines the vision, furnishes knowledge for the soul, and guides the deliberative powers to salvation. What it has not learned from human agency, it understands through repentance.[15]

In addition to the usage of specific Greek terms, repentance as religious conversion was prominent in developing Judaism. For example, members of the Qumran community called themselves "the converts of Israel," and considered true conversion essential (1QS 5:1-8; 10:20; 1QH 2:9; CD 4:2; 19:16). Likewise, for the Rabbis, repentance involving reformation of life was the ultimate act of piety and more important than sacrifice or good works.[16]

The significance of this Jewish background is that, in general, Greek authors did not speak favorably of repentance.[17] A few texts use μετανοέω and μετάνοια in a positive sense with religious, moral, or ethical connotations. In the *Tabula* of Cebes, μετάνοια is the way a person is cleansed, saved, and made happy in life.[18] In the *Poimandres* tractate of the *Corpus Hermeticum*, people are told: "Repent, you who have journeyed with error and kept company with ignorance. Rid yourselves of the light which is darkness. Abandon corruption, partake of immortality."[19] But basically, Philo stands alone as an author of Greek philosophy endorsing μετάνοια as a virtue for his readers.

According to Harry Wolfson and Ronald Williamson, Philo's view of repentance as a virtue is a logical consequence of his belief in the freedom of the

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Friedrich, trans. G. W. Bromiley, 10 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964-1976), 4:979-984.

12 Job 36:10; Isa 30:15; 31:6; 55:7; Jer 18:8; Ezek 33:12.

13 *Jub* 1.23; 23.26-28; *Pss of Sol* 18.4-5; *Life of Adam* 4.6; *Sib Or* 1.128; 4.168.

14 *T.Reu* 1.9; *T.Sim* 2.13; *T.Jud* 15.4; *T.Zeb* 9.7; *T.Ash* 1.6; *T.Jos* 6.6.

15 *T.Gad* 5.3-8. Translation by H. C. Kee, in *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, ed. J. H. Charlesworth, 2 vols. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983-1985), 1:815. See also *T.Gad* 6.3, 6; 7.5.

16 C. G. Montefiore, "Rabbinic Conceptions of Repentance," *Jewish Quarterly Review* 16 (1904): 209-257.

17 Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* IX.4.1166b.24-25; Stobaeus, *Eclogae* II.111.18.20-26; Epictetus, *Enchiridion* 34; Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 8.10.

18 Cebes *Tabula* 11.1-2. J. T. Fitzgerald and L. M. White, eds. *The Tabula of Cebes*, Texts and Translations, 24 (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983), 78-81.

19 *Corpus Hermeticum* 1.28. A. D. Nock and A.-J. Festugière, eds., *Corpus Hermeticum*, 4 vols. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1946-1954).

will, the ability of human beings to choose good or evil.[20] However, as David Winston has shown, for Philo, "the ethical theory of Philo is firmly rooted in his overpowering conception of God as the supremely transcendent Reality whose pervasive immanence controls and directs every aspect of cosmic activity."[21] And so, as with every other virtue, repentance is viewed by Philo as a free action of human beings which is accomplished only as they are activated and empowered to act by God. *On the Cherubim* 2 says that God gives the ability to repent to a person who is not yet firmly in the grip of wickedness. *On Abraham* 17 praises Enoch as an example of repentance (see: Sir 44:16), but states that such change is brought about only by God. And according *Allegorical Interpretation* 3.213, although many desire to repent, they are unable to do so because God does not permit it (see: Wis 12:10, 19). For Philo, the divine origin of repentance is so important, in *Questions and Answers on Genesis* 1.82 he describes it as a pre-existent idea in the mind of God (also a rabbinic teaching; see: *b. Pesahim* 54a; *b. Nedarim* 39b; *Midrash Tehillim* 3 on Ps 93:2). Yet, although repentance existed before creation in the mind of God, according to Philo it did not exist in the created world until Enoch was the first human being who actually repented.

For Philo, repentance involves a shame, self-reproach, and confession of sin, both inwardly in the sight God and outwardly in the sight of human beings.[22] But it must be much more than just the feeling of regret or remorse that accompanies an awareness of one's sins. It is a radical and complete change of life. It is a transformation of the entire person including actions that make up for past wrongs.[23]

This concept of repentance is found throughout the writings of Philo, but it is dealt with most thoroughly in the tractate "On Repentance" (Περὶ Μετανοίας) in his work *On the Virtues* 175-186. There are questions regarding the audience for whom this text was intended, and whether "On Repentance" was originally a component of the actual work entitled *On the Virtues*.

In this text, Philo commends repentance in a manner that will make it most acceptable to an educated Hellenistic audience, whether it be made up of Gentiles, Proselytes, or Jews. Repentance is described as the proper response of Gentiles who turn from polytheism in order to serve the one true and living God. Yet, repentance is also portrayed as the response of anyone who has lived a life of ignorance, incontinence, injustice, or immorality. This could just as easily apply to apostate Jews as to Gentiles. Yet there are several statements where Philo appears to be urging those who are ethnic Jews to accept Gentiles who become Proselytes to the Jewish religion. For example, in section 179 he says of those who repent: "They have shown the godliness of heart which above all leads up to friendship and affinity, and we must rejoice with them, as if though blind at the first they had recovered their sight and had come from the deepest darkness to behold the most radiant light." It may be that "On Repentance" was

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[20] Harry Wolfson, *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, rev. ed., 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 2:256; Ronald Williamson, *Jews in the Hellenistic World: Philo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 252.

[21] David Winston, "Philo's Ethical Theory," in *Hellenistisches Judentum in römischen Zeit: Philon und Josephus*, ed. Wolfgang Haase, Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, II.21.1 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972- ), 372.

[22] *On Rewards and Punishments* 163.

[23] Émile Bréhier, *Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie*, 3rd ed. (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1950), 304-305.

written for a Jewish audience tending to depart from Judaism, or for a Gentile audience interested in becoming Proselytes. But it seems more likely that it is addressed to a mixed audience of Proselytes and ethnic Jews, encouraging Proselytes to recognize the importance of their own conversion, and urging ethnic Jews to fully accept Proselytes who have turned to God in repentance and who are more godly than ethnic Jews who have abandoned the Law.[24]

There are definite reasons to question whether "On Repentance" was originally a component of *On the Virtues*. First, the complete title attributed to the entire work is: *ON THE THREE VIRTUES: ON VIRTUES WHICH TOGETHER WITH OTHERS WERE DESCRIBED BY MOSES, OR ON COURAGE AND PIETY AND HUMANITY AND REPENTANCE* (ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΤΡΙΩΝ ΑΡΕΤΩΝ ΑΣ ΣΥΝ ΑΛΛΑΙΣ ΑΝΕΓΡΑΨΕ ΜΩΥΣΗΣ ΗΤΟΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΑΝΔΡΕΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΥΣΕΒΕΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΙΛΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΤΑΝΟΙΑΣ). Since this title mentions three virtues (Περὶ τῶν τριῶν ἀρετῶν), and then lists four (Περὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ εὐσεβείας καὶ φιλανθρωπίας καὶ μετανοίας); and since the four virtues that are listed do not correspond to the extant divisions of the work (Περὶ ἀνδρείας, 1-50; Περὶ φιλανθρωπίας, 51-174; Περὶ μετανοίας, 175-186; Περὶ εὐγενείας, 187-227); it seems likely the text has undergone corruption in the transmission process. In addition, it seems unusual that Philo would include repentance (μετάνοια) in a list of virtues, since it is never consider a virtue (ἀρετή) by other Greek authors. Therefore, it is suggested that "On Repentance" belongs somewhere else in the writings of Philo; or that it (perhaps along with "On Nobleness of Birth") is merely an elaboration of "On Humanity"; or that originally it was a short, independent treatise not to be connected with what preceded it.[25]

However, the original text of the tractate's title is far from certain and there is no indication where "On Repentance" should be located if not here, where it is found in the entire textual tradition. Similarly, just because the topic of repentance is not included in lists of cardinal virtues by other Greek authors, that does not prove that Philo could not have included it here.

The first author to provide a list of virtues was Plato.[26] He insisted that corresponding to the the three-fold nature of the soul (rational, λογιστικόν; emotional or spirited, θυμοειδές; volitional or appetitive, ἐπιθυμητικόν) there are three primary virtues: wisdom, σοφία; courage, ἀνδρεία; temperance, σωφροσύνη; and that there is also a fourth virtue securing the harmony of the first three: justice (δικαιοσύνη).[27] For the authors within the Platonist and Middle-Platonist tradition, these four virtues constituted almost a canonical list. However, for the Stoics, the virtues were not restricted to these four, but could include other positive moral qualities.[28] It is not likely that Philo was attempting to reproduce a traditional list of Greek virtues, either Platonist or Stoic. Instead, by employing a list of virtues in a manner similar to that of other Hellenistic philosophers, Philo endorses some positive moral qualities that are characteristic of those who follow

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24 Ibid., 307.

25 Jenny Morris, "The Jewish Philosopher Philo," in *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ*, ed. Emil Schürer, rev. Geza Vermes, Fergus Millar, Matthew Black, Martin Goodman, and Pamela Vermes, 3 vols. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1973-1987), 3:851-853.

26 A. C. Pearson, "Ethics and Morality (Greek)," in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. James Hastings, 12 vols. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908-1912), 5:491-492.

27 Plato, *Republic* 4.433.

28 Epictetus, *Meditations* 2.16.45; 3.2.3; 3.22.13.

the Jewish Law. The intent of this technique was probably to enhance adherence to the Law among an educated Hellenistic audience, and perhaps to respond to certain philosophers who denigrated such prized Jewish practices as repentance.

What then of the possibility that "On Repentance" should not be considered an original part of *On the Virtues*? In spite of the difficulties, there is no compelling reason for rejecting it as an original component of this work. At the very least it should be considered a closely connected appendix, perhaps along with "On Nobleness of Birth."

Turning to the content of "On Repentance," it is at once clear that Philo considers this a moral quality of great value. To those who repent are seen as conquerers of sin, for according to Philo, in the Law of Moses those who repent are promised rewards and blessings "in honor of their victory" (*On the Virtues* 175). In the writings of Philo, repentance is essential for spiritual victory. Such victory over sin is often described in terms of cleansing and pardon. One who repents is resolved "not only to commit no further sin, but also to wash away the past"; while one who lacks this resolve must keep far away since "he cannot be purified" (*On the Unchangeableness of God* 8). When by "repentance" the soul has "washed away its defilements, and made use of the lustrations and purifications of wisdom, it can not be but clean and fair" (*On the Change of Names* 124). When a person realizes his error and confesses his wrongs to God in repentance, "he is cleansed" (*On Dreams* 1.91). As an example of repentance, Enoch was so changed he could not be found, "because his life was blotted out as if it had never been" (*On Abraham* 17).

Philo presents some illustrations of repentance, indicating that it is desirable for human beings, even if it is second to absolute perfection and sinlessness. For example, although a healthy body free from disease is best, recovery from disease is the next best thing. And although a safe journey by ship is best, deliverance from a dangerous voyage is to be desired. And though perfect remembrance of the past without any forgetfulness is best, to remember something after it has been forgotten is good. In the same way, repentance comes second only sinlessness, which "belongs to God alone, or possibly to a divine man" (*On the Virtues* 176-177). And the acceptance of repentance shows that a person is "a man of wisdom who has not been utterly ignorant of what is for his own good" (*On the Virtues* 177).

Sections 178 and 179 of the tractate contain clear language that Philo is concerned with Proselytes who have converted from pagan polytheism to the Jewish religion. By their repentance, Proselytes have turned to Moses for him to "initiate them into his mysteries" and have left behind "the mythical fables impressed on their yet tender souls from their earliest years." And in turning to God, they have come to that which is "the best of all" after previously neglecting him and honoring "those who were no gods." But according to Philo, all those who turn to the one true God must be accepted as "our dearest friends and closest kinsmen" for they have come "from the deepest darkness to behold the most radiant light." Such is the importance of repentance.

Sections 180 through 182 emphasize that those who repent display a complete change of life characterized by all of the other virtues of godliness. True repentance involves "passing from ignorance to knowledge..., from senselessness to good sense, from incontinence to continence, from injustice to justice, from timidity to boldness." And where by repentance a person turns to honor the one true God, "the whole company of the other virtues must follow in its train as surely as in the sunshine the shadow follows the body." And so, as a result of

repentance, Proselytes become "temperate, continent, modest, gentle, kind, human, serious, just, high-minded, truth-lovers, superior to the desire for money and pleasure..." and they abandon the destructive and deadly lifestyle of those who reject the Law.

Philo goes on to emphasize that repentance leads to "a better and changed condition" (*On the Virtues* 183). For Philo, it brings a person into a condition of spiritual health. Repentance as a means of healing spiritual disease is common in the writings of Philo. "If a wise man sins, he repents, as if to recover from illness" (*Alleg. Interp.* 2.60). Repentance is given by God for the healing and correcting of those who stumble (*Alleg. Interp.* 3.106). Those who repent recognize they have been ill with foolishness, senselessness, and unrighteousness (*Alleg. Interp.* 3.211). One who lies against the truth and claims to repent while still doing wrong is insane: "it is as if a sick man were to pretend to be healthy: he will only get worse by refusing the means to health" (*On Flight and Finding* 160). Repentance is second to perfection, just as a change from sickness to health is second to a body free from disease (*On Abraham* 26). But repentance has "saved a person from fatal disaster, eliminated a deadly disease, and brought him to complete health"; for the one who repents is "saved" from "sickness of soul" (*Special Laws* 1.236-253).

In sections 184 through 186, Philo stresses that when one's thoughts and intentions and actions are in harmony, that person will be "well-pleasing to God, thus becoming at once God-loving and God-beloved." In such a state, that person is not only prized by God, but protected by God; for, as a wise man, he is as valuable as the whole nation. And as such, "the wise man can hold his own, protected by the impregnable wall of godliness" (*On the Virtues* 186). Repentance is the path of wisdom, righteousness, obedience, and virtue. For Philo, those who repent recognize the senselessness and unrighteousness of their past lives (*Alleg. Interp.* 3.211), and seek repentance as the way of true righteousness, rationality and virtue (*On Flight and Finding* 157-159).

Philo commends repentance as a part of the Jewish religion which he believes is rational and virtuous. He probably was attempting to enhance adherence to the Law among an educated Hellenistic audience, and perhaps to respond to certain philosophers who denigrated such Jewish practices as repentance. He was also encouraging Proselytes to recognize the importance of their own conversion, and urging ethnic Jews to fully accept Proselytes who have turned to God and who were more godly than ethnic Jews who had abandoned the Law.

# Intertextuality and the Genre of the Apocalypse

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### I. Intertextuality as a Critical Method

Intertextuality plays a central role in both the production and reception of texts, so that critics can focus on either the author who constructed the text or the reader who reconstructs the text, or both. Intertextuality is a way of reading a text which sees it as a network of references to other texts, a phenomenon which may be approached at the levels of the word, the phrase and the sentence, but which becomes particularly evident in terms of larger textual units within a composition which has parallels or analogues in the constituent literary units of other texts. In the initial sequential reading of a text, connections with other textual units known to the reader are forged, which may upon the completion of the reading task lead the reader to an association with analogous self-contained literary texts, i.e., to a conception of the genre to which a given text belongs.

From the standpoint of intertextuality, a particular text only exists as part of a larger literary tradition, or "canon" (culture itself can be considered an intertext). A given text is part of a web of relationships with earlier texts which must be known in order to fully understand the focal text, at least from the perspective of the author who constructed it and the readers who reconstructed it. Texts are necessarily written and read in light of the familiarity which both authors and readers have of earlier texts. The writers of texts use a variety of strategies as they write in the light of a circle of texts which they consider significant. Intertextuality is not as concerned with identifying the sources of a document as it is with understanding the impact and function of both earlier and contemporary texts in a given text. In fact, texts take on distinctive features when they intentionally deviate from their precursors, and this may suggest the particular function of a textual unit.

Normally intertextuality centers on the modern reader (i.e., the literary critic as reader), and the intertext out of which the text is read and understood is the one known to that reader. An intertextual reading is not usually limited to the intertext of the author or to that of the original readers. In this paper, however, I will focus on the intertextual reconstruction of the Apocalypse of John by the original circle of readers. While the intertext of the modern critical reader is (at least theoretically) completely accessible to that reader, any attempt to reconstruct the intertext of the original readers can only be partially and imperfectly realized. While no two early Christian readers would have understood the

Apocalypse in precisely the same way (since their knowledge of precursor texts would necessarily have been different), it is also likely that particular congregations of readers would have a relatively homologous understanding of the Apocalypse because of their shared knowledge of antecedent texts. The modern critic, on the other hand, can never become fully aware of the range of ancient responses to the Apocalypse for the simple reason that many (perhaps even most) of the precursor texts which the ancient reader would have assumed have been lost and are consequently unknown to us. Though some might regard our focus on the reader of the late first and early second century AD as inappropriate, in my view it is a completely legitimate enterprise which does not, however, invalidate other approaches to the response of readers to this particular text. Indeed, there can be no privileged approach to the reading and understanding of written texts. In the present context it is not possible to provide a detailed analysis of all of the intertexts which might have shaped the responses of an ancient reader to the Apocalypse of John. In what follows, however, I will provide a sequential survey of the various textual units which comprise the Apocalypse, and make suggestions regarding the particular precursor texts which might very well have guided readers during the late first and early second centuries AD.

## II. Aspects of the Literary Character of the Apocalypse

### *A. The Participant Transmitter*

The textual history of most early Jewish and early Christian apocalypses suggests that the popular conception of the task of the ancient "copyist" as a faithful transcriber and transmitter of a stable sacred text is largely an imaginary construction. For many early Jewish and early Christian scribes, the task of recopying a text provided the opportunity (perhaps even the obligation) to rewrite that text. In many instances it is even likely that the primary motivation for recopying a text was based on the desire to *rewrite* that text, since scribes often appear to have had agendas of their own. In such instances the reader's response was transmuted (or transmogrified) into the literal recreation of the text, suggesting that the modern distinction between author and reader may not apply in a straightforward way to certain types of ancient compositions including apocalypses. Unlike many other early Christian apocalypses, all the manuscripts of the Apocalypse of John appear to derive from one exemplar. The eventual canonical status of the Apocalypse may be the major reason why earlier versions have not survived. Source criticism (see below) can provide a way of reconstructing how the author and his predecessors responded to the texts and partial-texts which he (and they) revised.

### *B. Source Critical Issues*

During the last centuries, many source critical theories of the the origin of the Apocalypse have been generated by scholars struck by the many aporias, doublets, pleonastic phrases, glosses and grammatical peculiarities which permeate the text. While a wholistic literary approach to the Apocalypse may choose to bracket out these problematic features (or even attempt to explain such textual phenomena in a way that makes an appeal to the hypothetical sources and redactional techniques of the author unnecessary), sooner or later these features of the Apocalypse must be dealt with. The Apocalypse is far from a finished, unified

composition, and it is my view that only a careful source critical analysis can explain the many peculiarities of the text.

Tempting though it might be, this is obviously not the forum for articulating such a proposal.

*C. Appropriate Types of Intertexts*

The following three types of intertexts certainly do not exhaust the intertexts within which the Apocalypse of John could be read, but they are among the more significant.

1. *Old Testament Allusions.* From the perspective of the ancient reader, the Apocalypse signaled its relationship to various precursor texts in a variety of ways. One way was certainly the allusions to the OT which permeate the composition. The most recent edition of the Nestle-Aland Greek text uses its margins to suggest that there are 734 quotations or allusions to the OT in the Apocalypse. While I think that this is an excessive number (i.e., the primary intertext of the Apocalypse for modern scholars is the OT), I am not prepared to offer a rebuttal.

Another, more complex way in which the OT functions as the intertext of the Apocalypse is in the replication of structures found in various OT compositions.

2. *The Anaphoric Definite Article.* One very particular way in which the author reflects an intertext within which he wrote is reflected in his use of the anaphoric definite article. Part of the style of apocalyptic literature is the use of already familiar persons and things drawn from stock apocalyptic imagery which are introduced the first time with with article.[1] Each of the following seventeen nouns occurs with the definite article upon its first occurrence, apparently because the author assumes that the readers are already familiar with the reality which the substantive represents: (1) *οἱ ἑπτὰ ἄγγελοι οἳ ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ ἑστήκασιν* "the seven angels who stand before God" (8:2, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13; 9:1, 13, 14). (2) *οἱ τέσσαρες ἄγγελοι οἳ δεδεμένοι ἐπὶ τῷ ποταμῷ τῷ μεγάλῳ Εὐφράτῃ*, "the four angels who are bound at the great river Euphrates" (9:14). (3) *ὁ ἀετός*, "the eagle" (12:14). (4) *αἱ ἑπτὰ βρονταί*, "the seven thunders" (10:3). (5) *ἡ γυνή*, "the wife [of the Lamb]" (19:7; 21:9). (6) *ἡ εἰρήνη τῆς γῆς*, "the peace of the earth" (6:4). (7) *τὸ θηρίον*, "the Animal" (11:7). (8) *ἡ ἶρις*, "the rainbow" (10:1). (9) *ἡ κιβωτὸς τῆς διαθήκης*, "the ark of the covenant" (11:19). (10) *οἱ δύο μάρτυρές μου*, "my two witnesses" (11:3). (11) *ἡ πλατεῖα τῆς πόλεως τῆς μεγάλης*, "the street of the great city" (11:8). (12) *τὰ ἑπτὰ πνεύματα* "the seven spirits" (1:4; 3:1; 4:5; 5:6). (13) *ὁ πόλεμος*, "the war" (16:14). (14) *ἡ πορνή*, "the whore" (17:1, 15, 16; 19:2). (15) *τὸ τέκνον*, "the child" (12:4). (16) *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ*, "the son of God" (2:18). (17) *τὸ φρέαρ τῆς ἀβύσσου*, "the shaft of the abyss" (9:1).

3. *Constituent Literary Forms.* A third type of intertext consists of the constituent literary units within a composition which the reader has encountered in other texts. This analysis focuses on the sequential identification of what initially appear to be coherent units of text containing codes which trigger in the reader a particular set of intertextual associations. When a different set of associations are triggered, it is apparent that a new unit of text with a different set of codes is before the reader. Discrete units of text are usually introduced with recognizable formulas which prepare the reader to look for new associations. The

[1] Josef Schmid, *Studien zur Geschichte des griechischen Apokalypse-Textes* (Munchen: Karl Zink Verlag, 1955), II, 194f.; G. Mussies, *The Morphology of Koine Greek as Used in the Apocalypse of St. John: A Study in Bilingualism* (NovTSup 27; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), 187f.

intertext within which each unit of text is read suggests both similarities and differences to the reader. However, while these units might initially appear to be relatively independent, the process of reading and association quickly makes connections between contiguous textual units (by virtue of their sequential proximity, the repetition of formulaic phrases encountered earlier, and by virtue of verbal and thematic associations which the reader discovers during process of reading and rereading, or hearing and rehearing). It is precisely the retrospective association of what initially appeared to be discrete textual units which brings readers to associate this text, more or less in its entirety, with other discrete texts in their experience. Further, it is important to consider a dimension of reading often neglected, i.e., interactive reading or reading aloud as a social experience in which the verbal and behavioral responses of the audience constitute signals productive of a more homogeneous experience than one might otherwise expect in readers who belong to a social network, but who read the text in isolation from others.[2]

### III. Intertextual Analysis of the Apocalypse

In this section of the paper it is my intention to discuss eighteen major textual units within Rev 1-18 for the purpose of suggesting the various associations which the original circle of readers might have had with each discrete literary form.[3] This level of generic intertext is particularly important for analyzing a composition such as the Apocalypse of John precisely because of the conventional, episodic, highly stylized and formulaic character of Jewish and Christian apocalypses generally.

1. Rev 1:1-3. Ancient expectations regarding the function of the opening sentence of Rev are revealed in Epiphanius *Pan.* 1.1.1:[4]

> The authors of old used to give hints of the subject they were to treat in the prefaces or remarks which they composed as a sort of title. Hence we too shall use this style in writing our preface for you, beloved brothers, and we shall briefly summarize the essential matter of [our work composed?] against the sects.

This suggests the obvious, namely, that Rev 1:1-3 functions as a title, and conforms to the ancient tendency to describe the essential contents of a literary work. In content, however, this text clearly suggests that the composition it introduces is a particular type of literary text, namely one which mediates divine revelation. Revelatory literature is a broad category of texts clearly identifiable by both form and content.[5] Similar titles or introductory sentences occur in both prophetic and apocalyptic works (Jer 1:1-2; Ezek 1:1-3; Amos 1:1; *1 Enoch* 1:1;

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[2] Cf. Linda Dégh and Andrew Vázsony, "Legend and Belief," *Folklore Genres*, ed. Dan Ben-Amos (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1976), pp. 100-103 in which the interaction of those who narrate legends and their audience is considered an essential feature of the legend genre.

[3] The seven proclamations of Rev 2-3 are considered subunits within a single major unit of text. This analysis has been limited to Rev 1-18 primarily because of the limitations of space.

[4] Philip R. Amidon (trans. and ed.), *The Panarion of St. Epiphanius, Bishop of Salamis: Selected Passages* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 5.

[5] David E. Aune, *The New Testament in Its Literary Environment* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1987), 231-38.

93:1-3; *3 Apoc. Bar. praef.* 1-2). When the author claims that the revelation of Jesus Christ was made known to him by an *angel*, that would have suggested immediately the stock apocalyptic figure of the *angelus interpres*, though no such figure actually appears until 17:1-18 and 21:9-22:11 (the conclusion of this section is difficult to specify). The content of the revelation, "what must soon take place" (v. 1), underlines the imminence of the revealed events, and the fact that "the time is near" (v. 3) indicates that eschatological events are in view. Describing his composition as "prophetic words" (cf. 22:7, 10, 18, where the parallel phrase "prophetic book" occurs), the author was undoubtedly encouraging the reader to associate this work with earlier prophetic books in the Israelite and early Jewish tradition. The concluding emphasis on obeying the message of the book (v. 3) emphasizes the paraenetic function of the work which is certainly more characteristic of prophecy than of apocalyptic. Since the present version of the Apocalypse is characterized as "prophetic words" or "prophetic oracles" which must be obeyed (1:3), and yet which were revealed by an *angelus interpres* (1:1), the original readers would readily have associated the title as a combination of prophetic and apocalyptic features.

2. Rev 1:4-5a is an epistolary prescript which is abruptly introduced, since such prescripts *never* follow titles. The fact that this one does would very probably have triggered *literary* associations, i. e., this particular letter is meant to be "published" in the sense of copied many times for distribution and circulation. Since this composition contains an epistolary prescript near the beginning, the ancient reader would have expected an epistolary closing formula at the end and would not have been disappointed (22: 21). While it is certain that these epistolary formulas reflect a distinctive early Christian adaptation of liturgical formulas, it is not clear that this adaptation was (as many maintain) a Pauline innovation. Regardless of their origin, these epistolary formulas would connect the Apocalypse with the role and function of other early Christian letters, particularly the Pauline letters. In the salutation in v. 4, the author does not simply identify the source of grace and peace as God, but rather as "the one who is and who was and who is coming," a formula which modifies the widespread "Dreizeitenformel" used of God in the Hellenistic world by changing the timeless "who will be" to the eschatological "who is coming," i.e., "who will come." The jarring solecism ἀπὸ ὁ ὤν, "from the one who is," provides a foretaste of coming grammatical incongruities. Despite the fact that the Apocalypse is framed with epistolary conventions, the entire text does not appear to have been affected by epistolary features.[6]

[EXCURSUS: Ugo Vanni connects the units of text in Rev 1:4-8 in a very different way. He has suggested that Rev 1:4-8 reflects a "liturgical dialogue," and that a recognition of this fact solves the problem of the apparent lack of unity in this section.[7] He points to several features which

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6 Contrary to the view of Martin Karrer, *Die Johannesoffenbarung als Brief* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986).

7 Vanni, U. "Un esempio di dialogo liturgico in Ap 1:4-8." *Bib* 57 (1976) 453-467; idem, *L'Apocalisse: Ermeneutica, exegesi, teologia* (Bologna: Edizione Dihoniana, 1988), 101-113. The schema which Vanni finds is the following ("Dialogo Liturgico," 460f.; *L'Apocalisse*, 107f.):

Lector (ὁ ἀναγινώσκων):
4b Grace to you and peace
from him who is and who was and who is to come,

suggest the presence of such a dialogue: (1) Rev 1:3 has revealed the existence of a reader or lector and a group of listeners, the assembly. (2) The two amens (vv. 6, 7) lend a liturgical flavor to the passage. (3) An abrupt change of person occurs in the passage between 1:4-5a (χάρις ὑμῖν, "grace to you," a second-person plural pronoun), and 1:5b-6 (τῷ ἀγαπῶντι ἡμᾶς καὶ λύσαντι ἡμᾶς . . . καὶ ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς, "to the one who loved *us*, and washed *us* . . . and made *us*, three first-person plural pronouns). Attractive though this proposal is, it is highly speculative since there are no analogous liturgical dialogues in existence in early Christianity which might prove the actual existence of such a liturgical genre.]

3. Rev 1:5b-6 is a doxology which is liturgically sonorous yet appropriate following an epistolary prescript since Gal 1:1-5 exhibits a close parallel. Doxologies are frequently used to conclude early Jewish and early Christian religious compositions (3 Macc 7:23; 4 Macc 18:24; Tob 14:15; 1 Clem 64:2; 2 Clem 20:5) or to conclude a constituent unit of text, particularly in letters (Rom 11:36; 1 Tim 1:17; 1 Pet 4:11; 1 Clem 20:12; 32:4; 38:4). The inclusion of this doxology would probably have increased the liturgical expectations of the reader, a fact which gives some weight to Vanni's suggestions.

4. Rev 1:7-8 contains what appear to be two prophetic oracles (the first ends with a climactic ναί, ἀμήν). The first (v. 7) is a third-person prediction of the coming of Jesus Christ using the words of Dan 7:13 and Zech 12:10b. The second (v. 8) is a brief first-person speech of the Lord God in which he uses the "I am" formula to claim that he is the Alpha and the Omega, and to reiterate the revised "Dreizeitenformel" (v. 4), perhaps to authenticate the ultimate source of the revelation which John is transmitting. Both of these oracles reinforce the propriety of the phrase "words of prophecy" which the author used to characterize his work, though the first appears to be predominantly apocalyptic (focusing as it does on the parousia), while the second has predominantly prophetic associations (i.e., in divine self-predications in Isaiah).

5. Rev 1:9-20 is a relatively short ego-narrative of a vision of the exalted Christ in which John receives a command to write what he sees in a book and send it to the seven Christian congregations. This narrative style is maintained

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and from the seven spirits who are before his throne,
5 and from Jesus Christ the faithful witness,
the firstborn from the dead, and the ruler of kings on earth.

Assembly (οἱ ἀκούοντες):
To him who loves us
and has freed us by his blood
6 and made us a kingdom, priests to his God and Father,
to him be glory and dominion for ever and ever. Amen.

Lector:
7 Behold, he is coming with the clouds
and every eye will see him,
every one who pierced him;
and all tribes of the earth will wail on account of him.

Assembly:
Even so. Amen.

Lector:
8 I am the Alpha and the Omega
—says the Lord God—
who is and who was and who is to come,
the Almighty.

throughout the rest of the work, and is generally characteristic of apocalyptic or prophetic vision or dream reports, an important factor contributing to their authenticity. Yet it has often been noted that while Jewish and Christian apocalypses are pseudonymous, the Apocalypse of John is apparently not. While there is no reason to suspect that John was aware of the pseudonymous character of all earlier apocalypses, he would have been cognizant of the fact that among the putative authors of apocalypses, none wrote later than Ezra. John's self-consciously autobiographical style, therefore, may be linked to prophetic books. The command to "write what you see" is given twice (and expressed in two different ways: v. 11: ὃ βλέπεις γράψον; v. 19: γράψον οὖν ἃ εἶδες), and then reiterated through the repetition of the aorist imperative γράψον in the introduction to each of the seven proclamations. Similar commands to write also occur in 14:13; 19:9 and 21:5. Two major aspects of this epiphany may well have impressed the readers: (1) it identifies the exalted Jesus with the Ancient of Days through allusions to Dan 7:9-14 and 10:5-9,[8] and (2) it provides divine legitimation for the composition of the Apocalypse through the reiterated command to write down the visions which John is about to see. Commands issued by God or angels to write down a revelatory message occasionally occur in the OT and early Jewish texts (Isa 30:8; Exod 34:27-28; Deut 31:19, 21; *Jub.* 1:5-7; cf. Tob 12:20; 4 Ezra 14), though they are much more frequent in Greco-Roman texts (Plato *Phaedo* 4.60e-61b; Callimachus *Aetia* 1.1.21-22; Propertius 3.3; Cicero *Academica priora* 2.16.51; Pausanias 1.21.2; Pliny *Ep.* 3.5.4; Aelius Aristides *Or.* 48.2; Dio Cassius 73.23.2). The author's autobiographical style (1:9) is characteristic of prophetic self-consciousness, while the command to write is a more general phenomenon characteristic of ancient revelatory literature. Rev 1:9-20 is not an inaugural call (comparable to the call narratives in Isa 6, Jer 1 or Ezek 1-3), for John is not called to a new vocation but rather commissioned for a particular task.

6. Rev 2:1-3:22. By the time the reader has finished the vision of commission narrated in 1:9-20, there is no reason to expect that the exalted Christ will dictate seven individual messages to each of the seven congregations. This section consists of seven units of text, often incorrectly styled "letters" which share an extraordinarily large number of stereotypical formulas. This literary device has no parallels in other apocalypses, and must therefore be regarded as one of the author's more innovative moves. In all probability, early Christian readers would have associated these seven closely related textual units with royal or imperial decrees which were preserved on stone in important urban centers throughout the Roman province of Asia, and which the author has freely adapted for use in the present context.[9] Since each of the seven "proclamations" (a more appropriate designation than "letters") is dictated by the exalted Jesus, who knows the intimate details of each of the seven Christian communities, these texts clearly fit the general rubric of revelatory literature, though there are no close parallels in other Jewish or Christian apocalypses. Since the language used by the exalted

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[8] This identification of the human figure with the Ancient of Days in Dan 7:13 was already assumed in Mss. 88 and 687, the only two extant LXX manuscripts of Daniel. Cf. the reading of Dan 7:13 in Ms. 967 (A. Giessen, *Der Septuaginta-Text des Buches Daniel*, 108): ηρχετο ως υιος ανθρωπου και ως παλαιος ημερω(ν) παρην και οι παρεστηκοτες προσηγαγον αυτω ("he came like a son of man and like the Ancient of Days was present, and those who were near approached him").

[9] David E. Aune, "The Form and Function of the Proclamations to the Seven Churches (Revelation 2-3)," *NTS* 36 (1990) 182-204.

Jesus in these proclamations is in a subtly higher register than that of the rest of the Apocalypse, Jesus is presented as more eloquent than the author.[10] The reading and rereading of the entire text suggests that using the form of royal or imperial proclamations is in fact part of the author's strategy of contrasting God and Christ with the Roman emperor, who is but a diabolical imitation of the former. Further, these proclamation are permeated with paraenesis (2:4-6, 14-16, 20-22; 3:1-4, 15-19) and in that respect they have a strikingly prophetic character, for paraenesis is almost entirely lacking in apocalypses.[11]

7. Rev 4:1-6:17 (and 8:1) constitutes an extended throne vision narrative which begins with the heavenly ascent "in spirit" of the author, followed by a vision of the throne of God and the liturgy of angelic beings in the heavenly court. It is introduced somewhat abruptly, though the abruptness is mitigated by the continuity in trumpet-like voices (1:10; 4:1). Though the reader has been given no hint that such a visionary ascent is in the works, such ascents, coupled with visions of the heavenly throne room, are stock features of many apocalypses. According to a cosmology widespread in the Hellenistic world, the earth was the lowest part of the cosmos surrounded by seven planetary spheres; in the early Jewish version of this cosmology, God's throne was located in the seventh heaven. Surprisingly, this cosmology is absent from John's conception, which is apparently that of the older cosmology of a three-tiered universe consisting of heaven above, earth beneath, and the underworld below the earth (Rev 5:3, 13). They function in one of at least six different ways, i.e., (1) as *enthronement* scenes (Dan 7:13-14; 4 Ezra 2:42-48; Ezekiel the Tragedian *Exgaoge* 68-82; Odes of Sol. 36; cf. Rev 3:21, (2) as *judgment* scenes (Dan 7:9-12; *1 Enoch* 25:3; 45:3; 47:3-4; 62:1-6; Apoc. Moses 22:1-29:6; Matt 19:28-30 [and par. Luke 22:28-30]; 25:31-46; Rev 20:4-6; 20:11-15), (3) as *commission* scenes (1 Kgs 22:19-22; Job 1:6-12; 2:1-6; Isa 6:1-13; Ezek 1:4-3:11; 1 Enoch 14:8-16:4; Asc. Isa. 10:1-16; cf. Rev 3:21), (4) as *eschatological heavenly festal gathering* scenes (Rev 7:9-12; Heb 12:22-24; Ode of Sol 36), (5) as *the goal of Merkavah mysticism* (*3 Enoch* 1:6-12; 7.1; cf. Sepher ha-Razim 7 [ed. M. Morgan, 81-86]), and (6) as a *literary device* used for commenting on earthly events in the narrative, much like the chorus in Greek tragedy (2 Kgs 22:19-20; Job 1:6-12; 2:1-6; Rev 4:1-6:17; 11:15-18; 14:1-5; 19:1-8).

Since throne visions typically functioned in one of the six ways mentioned above, the readers might well wonder about the purpose of this particular throne vision. Rev 4:1-6:17 is a textual unit which presents the readers with three distinct subunits. (1) In 4:1-11 the author relates his vision of God enthroned and the angelic liturgy in the heavenly court room. One group of heavenly beings, the

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[10] The adversative particle ἀλλά occurs frequently in Hellenistic Greek literature, but just thirteen times in Rev, of which eight of those instances occur in Rev 2-3 (2:4, 6, 9 [2x], 14, 20; 3:4, 9). The common connective particle δέ also occurs three times Rev 2-3 (2:5, 16, 24), and just four times in the rest of Rev. These two stylistic features suggest that the author is providing the words of the exalted Christ with what he regarded as a dignified style; cf. J. A. L. Lee, "Some Features of the Speech of Jesus in Mark's Gospel," *NovT* 27 (1985) 1-26. Also relevant is the fact that while 73.8% of the 337 sentences in Rev begin with καί, Rev 2-3 contains 44 sentences, just nine of which begin with καί, i.e., 20.5%. Not a single sentence begins with καί in the Proclamation to the Ephesians, and the other occurrences of καί occur only at the beginning of each proclamation (2:8, 12, 18; 3:1, 7, 14), with the exception of the Proclamation to Thyatira, where καί is used at the beginning of three of the eight sentences in the Proclamation (2:21, 23, 26).

[11] For a qualification of this generalization, see J. C. H. Lebram, "The Piety of Jewish Apocalyptists," *Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World and the Near East*, ed. David Hellholm (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1983), 171-210.

twenty-four elders, is found only in the Apocalypse; the quest for their identity has been the cause for much fruitless speculation. The narrative pace is leisurely and serves to slow down and even delay the narrative. There is a degree of suspense in this narrative, for the function of the throne vision has not yet become clear. (2) In 5:1-14 a short drama is enacted in which the slain Lamb, first paradoxically identified as the lion of the tribe of Judah (v. 5), is found worthy to open the scroll. The figure of the Lamb is not found in any other Jewish or Christian apocalypse, and constitutes an innovation on the part of the author. The first of twenty-nine occurrences of *ἀρνίον* in 5:6 is anarthrous, suggesting that the author assumed that this figure was unfamiliar to the readers. In 5:6-14, the author gradually focuses on the Lamb, and carefully builds up the suspense to the point where the scroll actually begins to be unsealed. The reader remains in suspense, for the function of the throne scene has not yet become clear. (3) In 6:1-17, when the seals are opened, it becomes obvious that this throne vision constitutes an unusual form of judgment scene. The four horsemen bring waves of slaughter upon the people of the earth, though no basis for these punishments has yet been given (motivations for behavior are often missing from apocalypses; here the apocalyptic framework permits the reader assume that those who dwell on the earth are irredeemably wicked). Finally in vv. 9-11, an implied motive for the preceeding judgments appears to have been divine revenge for the slaughter of Christians. After the opening of the sixth seal (6:12-17), the reader is left hanging, since only *six* of the seven seals have been opened, while an entirely different scene begins in 7:1 (the readers' expectation that the seventh seal will be opened is of course eventually fulfilled in a rather strange, anticlimactic way in 8:1).

8. Rev 7:1-17 is introduced abruptly because the reader expects the opening of the seventh seal, which is postponed until 8:1. Rev 7:1-17 consists of two distinct, but related,[12] textual units, 7:1-8 and 7:9-17. The first unit, Rev 7:1-8, consists of three subunits of text. (1) The first is an *angelic epiphany* (a form which occurs three more times in Rev (8:2; 15:1; 20:1-3), and each time exhibits a similar structure: (a) Introductory phrase: *καὶ εἶδον*. (b) Object of vision: *ἄγγελον* or *ἀγγέλους*. (c) Brief description of the action of the angel(s). (d) Followed by an abrupt change of subject. The author presents these brief angelic epiphanies as an outside observer; the angel(s) he sees and whose action he describes neither interact with him nor he with them. This is a peculiar form with few if any parallels in Jewish or Christian apocalyptic literature, though they seem appropriate in the context of a vision report. (2) Rev 7:2-3 contains an *angelic speech* (this form occurs eight more times in Rev (10:1-7; 14:6-7; 14:8; 14:9-11; 14:14-16; 14:18-20; 18:1-3; 19:17-18), and again has few parallels in Jewish and Christian apocalyptic literature. The *angelic speech* in Rev exhibits the following structural features: (a) Introductory phrase: *καὶ εἶδον*. (b) Object of vision: *ἄλλον ἄγγελον*. (c) The angel moves (ascends, descends, flies, emerges) to the center of the action. (d) The angel "cries with a loud voice." (e) The angel utters a brief statement on divine authority which must be understood as divine commentary on events in the eschatological drama. (3) Finally, the roster of the 144,000 who are sealed is given in 7:4-8 (though the sealing scene itself is omitted between vv. 3 and 4), which somewhat surprisingly consists of a list of twelve Israelite tribes, from each of which 12,000 are selected for this magical ritual of divine protection. Whether the readers understand the 144,000 to be Christians of pagan and/or Jewish origin,

[12] A similar two-part structure occurs in 1 Enoch 39:6-40:10.

the list of tribes serve to underscore the continuity between Judaism and Christianity.

In Rev 7:9-17 we meet another throne vision, in this instance one which functions as an eschatological heavenly festal gathering scene (Rev 14:1-5; Heb 12:22-24;[13] 4 Ezra 2:42-45; 13:5-50; Odes of Sol. 36). This type of throne vision dramatizes the final gathering before the heavenly throne of God of all the righteous in the company of the angelic beings engaged in the celebration of the victory and majesty of God. The constituent motifs in Heb 12:22-24 indicate the typical elements found in this scene: (1) Mount Zion, the heavenly Jerusalem (the setting), (2) an innumerable angelic host in festal gathering, (3) the assembly of the first-born, (4) God the judge of all, (5) the assembly of righteous people, apparently distinct from "the assembly of first-born," (6) Jesus, and (7) the sprinkled blood (implying the figurative presence of the ark).

9. Rev 8:2-9:21 centers on a series of seven plagues which are inflicted on the earth and its inhabitants, unleashed by the blowing of seven trumpets. The strikingly anticlimactic opening of the seventh seal in 8:1 is followed by two short angelic epiphanies, the first consisting of the brief introduction of the seven trumpet angels (v. 2), and the second consisting of a brief scene involving an angel at the heavenly altar who casts fire down upon the earth (vv. 3-5). This serves to emphasize the point (like the throne vision in 4:1-6:17) that divine retribution originates in heaven, i.e., with God. As in the case of the seven seals, there is an interruption (10:1-11:14) before the blowing of the seventh trumpet (11:15-18). There is a widespread tendency, which is essentially correct, to understand the seven trumpet plagues (and the seven bowl plagues in 16:1-21), as an eschatological counterpart to the ten plagues inflicted by Moses upon the Egyptians. Though the particular schema found in Rev 8:2-9:21 (with 11:15-18) has no counterpart in other Jewish or Christian apocalypses (and so must be considered an innovation by the author), the constituent features are all thoroughly at home in Jewish apocalypticism. First, there is the tendency to conceive of the end of the world as a time when God will punish the unrighteous inhabitants of the world with plagues (ten are enumerated in *Apoc. Abr.* 30:3-8; T. Dan 5.8).[14] Second, there is (the admittedly rare) use of trumpet blasts as a structuring device for eschatological events (*Apoc. Zeph.* 9-12), though the trumpet did become a minor though staple feature of early Jewish and early Christian apocalyptic imagery (Isa 27:3; Zech 9:14; Matt 29:31; 1 Thess 4:16; 1 Cor 15:52; Did 16:6), often associated with eschatological judgment (Isa 58:1; Joel 2:2-3; Zeph 1:15-16; 4 Ezra 6:23; *Sib. Or.* 4.174f.; *Apoc. Mos.* 22:3; *Par. Jer.* 3:2; 4:1; *Apoc. Zeph.* 12:1; *Grk. Apoc. Ezra* 4:36). Third, there is the observable tendency to reduce the ten plagues of Exodus to seven (Ps 78:43-51; Ps 105:27-36; Amos 4:6-11; Artapanus [Eusebius *Praep. evang.* 9.27.1-37]; Wis 11:1-19:9; cf. *T. Benj.* 7:1-4; *m. Abot* 5.8). Nevertheless, though some of the trumpet plagues resemble some of the plagues of Exodus, the correlation is far from striking. This thoroughly apocalyptic section concludes on a prophetic note in 9:20-21, which seems to imply that the people punished could have repented, but chose not to do so.

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[13] In Heb 12:22-24 this type-scene is used metaphorically (cf. Heb 12:18: "you have not come to what may be touched"), a fact which suggests that it was widely familiar in early Jewish and early Christian circles.

[14] Though the Egyptian plagues were a recurring theme in early Jewish literature, they are rarely interpreted eschatologically.

10. Rev 10:1-11:2 is a unit of text consisting of three separate sections; the first two are linked only by virtue of the fact that a single angel and a voice from heaven figure prominently in both episodes. Since the author had already interrupted the opening of the seventh seal, it comes as no great surprise that he interrupts the blowing of the seventh trumpet with two major units of text, 10:1-11 and 11:1-14. It does come as a surprise, however, that in a passage which functions to delay the blowing of the seventh trumpet, the angelic revealer expressly swears that there will be no more delay (10:6). The first episode (10:1-7) looks like a cross between an *angelic epiphany* and an *angelic speech* (see above under Rev 7:1-8), though with one major difference: in both episodes John interacts with the heavenly voice, and in the second episode he interacts with the angelic revealer as well. The peculiarity of the content of this episode[15] suggests that it was composed entirely by the author for its present context and that he followed no obvious exemplars. At the end of the first episode the readers would very likely anticipate the blowing of the seventh trumpet, particularly since "there will be no more delay" (10:6b). The second episode (10:8-11) appears to have been consciously modeled after that part of the prophetic call of Ezekiel found in Ezek 2:8-3:3, and would be naturally understood as a prophetic commission by those familiar with that text. The fact that it functions as a prophetic commission is made clear in 10:11: "you must again prophecy about many peoples and nations and tongues and kings." This section therefore contributes to the perception of the author as a prophet in the tradition of the OT prophets.[16] The third episode occurs in 11:1-2 (though it is difficult to decide whether v. 2 or v. 3 concludes the section).[17] Rev 11:1-2 should be construed as a continuation of 10:8-11 (no typical Johannine formulas suggest a new unit of text), for John is given a measuring rod and told what to measure and what not to measure; this is the language of commission, and is therefore appropriately placed after 10:8-11.

11. The abrupt appearance of Rev 11:3-13 is mitigated by the fact that in vv. 1b-3, the brief speech of God or Christ slides from one subject to another, from a command to measure the temple to a prediction that the two witnesses will prophecy for 1,260 days (from a source-critical perspective this is an obvious seam). The reader expects the delayed blowing of the seventh trumpet to occur momentarily, but this event is delayed. Rev 11:3-13 exhibits a literary character quite different from anything which the reader has yet confronted in the Apocalypse. It is not presented as a vision (the author's characteristic "I saw" is conspicuous by its absence), but rather as a prophetic narrative, which appears to begin as a commentary on Zech 4:1-14, though that passage soon disappears from view. The quasi-visionary form of 11:3-13 is suggested by the clusters of verb tenses. There are thirty-six verbs in Rev 11:3-13. The author begins with three future tenses in v. 3, then shifts largely to the present tense in vv. 4-6 (eight verbs). He shifts back to the future in v. 7 (three verbs), then back largely to the

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15 This section has all the features of an *angelic speech*, were it not for the fact that what the angel says is not recorded, and when John begins to write down the response of the seven thunders, he is explicitly commanded not to write down what they said.

16 The author's prophetic role is also emphasized in Rev 22:16; cf. David E. Aune, "The Prophetic Circle of John of Patmos and the Exegesis of Revelation 22:16," *JSNT* 37 (1989) 103-116.

17 The problem is that there is a brief speech, apparently by God or Christ (cf. "*my* two witnesses" in v. 3a) in vv. 1b-3. What the voice says in v. 3, however, has no logical connection with what was said in vv. 1b-2, but seems to belong to vv. 4-13. It may well be that the author has intentionally created this dovetail joint to link vv. 1-2 to vv. 4-13.

present in vv. 8-10 (five verbs). The future tense (usually characteristic of predictions in apocalyptic literature) appears just once in v. 10, then twelve aorists are used in vv. 11-13. This phenomenon of a shifting from one group of tenses to another is characteristic of Johannine vision reports,[18] and while it may provide criteria for source critical analysis, an intertextual approach to this peculiar style suggests that the original readers would probably understand 11:3-13 as at least the functional equivalent of a vision. It appears to be the first of several scenarios borrowed from Jewish apocalyptic folklore (similar material occurs in close proximity in Rev 12 and 13). While several parallel texts suggest that John's readers were familiar with the story of the martyrdom of the two witnesses (note the occurrence of the anaphoric article used with the first occurrence of the phrase "my two witnesses" in 11:3),[19] a particularly close parallel is found in a text preserved in Lactantius *Div. Inst.* 7.17. The parallels can be seen more clearly in a synoptic presentation in which the only change in order is the placement of Rev 11:6 before 11:5:[20]

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[18] G. Mussies, *The Morphology of Koine Greek as Used in the Apocalypse of John* (NovTSup 27; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), 330-36, 340.

[19] Two such texts are found in *Apoc. Elijah* 4:7-17 and 14:9-15:7. The *Apoc. Elijah* is probably late (AD 150 to 275), and 4:7-19 may be dependent, at least in part, on Rev 11:3-13. However, *Apoc. Elijah* 14:9-15:7 is a doublet featuring the woman Tabitha which appears to be independent of Rev 11:3-13 (P. Chester Beatty 2018; trans. Pietersma): "The young woman whose name is Tabitha will hear that the shameless one has made his appearance in the holy places. She will dress in her linen clothes and hurry to Judea and reprove him as far as Jerusalem, and say to him, 'O you shameless one, O you lawless one, O you enemy of all the saints!' Then the shameless one will become angry with the young woman. He will pursue her to the region of the setting of the sun. He will suck her blood in the evening and toss her onto the temple, and she will become salvation for the people. At dawn she will rise up alive and rebuke him saying, 'You shameless one, You have no power over my soul, nor over my body, because I live in the Lord always, and even my blood which you spilled on the temple became salvation for the people.'"

[20] Here is the entire passage in Lactantius *Did. Inst.* 7.17 (trans. M. F. McDonald, *Lactantius*, 517f.): "Now, when the end of these times is imminent, a great prophet [*magnus propheta*] will be sent from God to convert men to a recognition of God, and he will have the power of working miracles. Whenever men will not hear him, he will close heaven and will hold back the rains; he will change water into blood, and will torture them with thirst and hunger; and fire will proceed from his mouth and burn whoever will attempt to hurt him. By these prodigies and powers, he will convert many to the worship of God. When these works of his have been carried out, another king will rise from Syria, born of the evil spirit, the overthrower and destroyer of the human race, who will destroy the remains of that previous evil one together with itself. This one will fight against the prophet of God; he will conquer and kill him and suffer him to lie unburied. But after the third day, he will rise again and will be taken into heaven while all look on and marvel."

| *Rev 11:3-12* | *Lactantius 7.17.1-8* |
|---|---|
| v. 3 I will permit my two witnesses to prophecy | 1 Now, when the end of these times is imminent, a great prophet will be sent by God to convert men to a recognition of God, |
| | and he will have the power of working miracles. |
| v. 6a They have power to shut up heaven that rain might not fall during the period when they prophesy. | 2 Wherever men will not hear him, he will close heaven and will hold back the rains. |
| v. 6b They also have power over the waters, that is, to turn to blood. | he will change water into blood and will torture them with thirst and hunger. |
| v. 5 If anyone wants to harm them, fire proceeds from their mouths and utterly destroys their enemies. | 2 and fire will proceed from his mouth and burn whoever will attempt to hurt him. |
| v. 7 When they finish their witness, the Beast who ascends from the abyss will wage war on them that he might conquer them and kill them. | 3 This one will fight against the prophet of God; he will conquer and kill him |
| v. 9 but people would not permit their bodies to be buried | and suffer him to lie unburied. |
| v. 11 Now after three-and-a-half days a spirit of life from God entered into them so that they stood on their feet with the result that great fear fell on those who saw them. | But after the third day, he will rise again |
| v. 12 They heard a loud voice from heaven saying to them: 'Come up here.'" They ascended to heaven on a cloud while their enemies looked on. | and will be taken into heaven while all look on and marvel. |

There are several reasons for supposing that Lactantius is dependent here on the Oracles of Hystaspes[21] or some otherwise unknown Jewish source and *not* on Rev 11:3-13, based on a comparison of these two texts. (1) A single prophet is found in Lactantius, compared with two prophets in Rev. (2) The result of closing the heavens and turning the waters into blood in Lactantius is to torment people with hunger and thirst, while this effect is absent from Rev. (3) The narrative in Rev is consistently told with verbs in past tenses, while that in Lactantius is told using future tenses. (4) The text in Rev contains a number of explanatory glosses none of which appear in the account of Lactantius. (5) The narrative in Lactantius continues on to describe events similar to those in Rev 13:1-10 but lacks allusions to Rev 11:14-12:17. (6) Since Lactantius lived from ca. 250-325 it is not impossible

21 The view of David Flusser, "Hystaspes and John of Patmos," *Irano-Judaica: Studies Relating to Jewish Contacts with Persian Culture Throughout the Ages* (ed. S. Shaked; Jerusalem, 1982), 12-75.

that he may have been influenced by the text of Rev, yet he does not elsewhere reflect a very profound knowledge of that work.[22]

Assuming, then, that Rev 11:3-13 was a particular eschatological scenario with which the readers were familiar, what might they have made of it? First, the prophetic role of the two witnesses is clear, and that prophetic role appropriately follows the prophetic commissions in 10:8-11 and 11:1-2. Second, like other eschatological scenarios from Jewish apocalyptic folklore, the participants in the melodramatic conflict are not named, so that the readers can only speculate on their identity. Indeed, the author appears to encourage such speculation.

12. In Rev 11:15-18 the seventh trumpet is finally blown. Presumably, it was in order to avoid the problem of relating Rev 11:19-12:17 to 11:3-13 (i.e., the chronological order in the eschatological scheme is thereby obscured) that the author has inserted the blowing of the seventh trumpet with its consequences. However, rather than introduce an expected seventh set of plagues, it rather signals the introduction of a brief (and relatively awkward) throne vision which begins as something John *hears* in heaven (vv. 15b-16), but soon turns into a throne vision which John apparently *sees*, complete with a thanksgiving hymn sung by the twenty-four elders (the other denizens of the heavenly court are, for the nonce, absent).

13. In Rev 11:19-12:17 the author inserts another eschatological scenario which centers on the conflict between the Woman and the Dragon. Because this section is immediately preceded by the episode involving the blowing of the seventh trumpet (11:14-18), the reader is somewhat insulated from the problem of the relationship between the story of the two witnesses (11:3-13) and the story of the Woman and the Dragon (11:19-12:17), both with regard to chronology and characters. There is no continuity in *dramatis personae*, who are for the most part not named (challenging the ingenuity of the readers). In 12:7-9, however, the combatants are specifically named Michael and the Devil or Satan. In the rest of the story, the identities of the Messiah, i.e., Christ (v. 3) and faithful Christians (v. 17b) are obvious. The author has apparently sandwiched two stories together by placing the narrative of Satan's defeat and expulsion from heaven, complete with commentary by the heavenly "chorus" (vv. 7-12) into the frame of the narrative of the Woman and the Dragon (vv. 1-6, 13-17). Adela Yarbro Collins (and others before her) have demonstrated the pre-Christian existence of the component elements of these combats in Greco-Roman and Jewish folklore. Important as this recognition is for the source criticism of the Apocalypse, it is also important for reconstructing the intertext within which the Apocalypse was read. Variants of

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22 Outside of *Div. Inst.* 7.17, Lactantius appears to reflect an awareness of Rev when he speaks of the second resurrection after a thousand years (*Div. Inst.* 7.26.5-7; cf. Rev 20:11-13, though the term "second resurrection" does not occur in Rev). A comparison between Lactantius *Epitome* 66.9 (a later work in which the *Divine Institutes* are presented in abbreviated form) reflects an alteration of what he had originally written in *Div. Inst.* 7.17.7 apparently made in light of Rev 13:16. Lactantius was thoroughly familiar with classical sources, and also with the Sibylline Oracles and Hermetic writings (R. M. Ogilvie, *The Library of Lactantius* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978], 28-36), and even with early Christian extra-canonical literature (Ogilvie, 105-8), but less familiar with the Bible (Ogilvie, 96-110, where he concludes that the 73 Biblical quotations in *Div. Inst.* 4 are closely related to Cyprian's *Ad Quirinum*, though Lactantius cannot have drawn these quotations from the *Ad Quir.* in its present state). Outside of *Div. Inst.* 7 (with its 73 quotations of the Bible), the rest of *Div. Inst.* contains just 7 quotations (Ogilvie, 107f.), and the other works of Lactantius contain no Biblical quotations at all (with the exception of the later *Epitome*).

two stories familiar to the readers, the Leto-Apollo-Python myth and the proto-logical combat myth in which angels who remained faithful to God expelled rebel angels from heaven, have been linked in such a way as to demonstrate that pre-Christian myth contains basic truths about the Christian dispensation. Again, this complex scenario is not introduced or punctuated by the phrases typically used to introduce vision reports, such as "I saw," or "I saw, and behold" (the unusual introduction in v. 1, "A great sign appeared [ὤφθη] in heaven," is not simply a parallel expression, since in 15:1 the author begins a new segment with the phrase "And I saw another great and marvelous sign in heaven"). Further, the narrative style departs considerably from that of other vision reports in the Apocalypse. There are forty-five verbs in Rev 12, thirty-four are aorists (the basic narrative tense), two are perfects (N.B. the fusion of aorist and perfect indicatives in Hellenistic Greek), nine are presents; the future tense does not occur. Rev 12:1-17, therefore, would certainly not be understood as a vision report by the original readers.

14. Rev 13:1-18, in contrast to 11:3-13 and 11:19-12:17, is explicitly cast in the form of a vision report divided up into two major segments, one concerning the Beast from the Sea (vv. 1-10), and the other concerning the Beast from the Land (vv. 11-18). Since the Beast from the Sea has seven heads and ten horns (v. 1), the readers would immediately identify it with the great red Dragon of 12:3. But this first impression is not correct, since the Dragon is very quickly distinguished as both different from and superior to the Beast from the Sea (v. 2b). The seven heads and ten horns of the latter must rather be attributed to family resemblance. Despite the awkwardness of vv. 1-2 read as a continuation of 11:19-12:17, it is obvious that the original readers would have understood 13:1-18 precisely as a continuation of that story. Among the known protological and eschatological myths of Jewish apocalyptic there is no close parallel to Rev 13. The reader would probably be aware, however, that the author has selected some elements from the early Jewish Leviathan and Behemoth myths (1 Enoch 60:7-11, 24; 4 Ezra 6:49-52; 2 Apoc. Bar. 29:4; b. B. Bat. 74b-75a), and combined them with motifs from the eschatological antagonist myth. The eschatological Antagonist myth appears to have had two primary variants, one of which was based on the tradition of the godless tyrannical ruler (largely dependent on the depiction of Antiochus IV in Daniel), and the other of which was based on the figure of the false and seductive prophet. These traditions are presented separately in Rev 13:1-10 and 13:11-18 respectively, but blended (for example) in 2 Thess 2:3-12. In Christian apocalyptic, a presentation of the antics of the eschatological Antagonist was perhaps *de rigueur* (this figure is noteworthy by his absence in Rev 11:3-13, though he is present in parallel eschatological scenarios such as Lactantius *Div. Inst.* 7.17). The author's retention of *two* eschatological Antagonists very probably corresponds to his desire to encourage the reader to speculate about the particular identities of the *dramatis personae* in these traditional myths (this reaches a high point with the gematria puzzle in v. 18).

15. Rev 14:1-20. The composition and structure of Rev 14 is extraordinarily complex and consists of six self-contained units of text framed by one of the author's favorite introductory formulas which is frequently used to introduce a new subject in 14:1: "I saw and behold," and at the end by the phrase in 15:1: "Then I saw another sign" (referring back to 12:1, 3), which also indicates a new subject. There are six units of text in Rev 14: (1) 14:1-5, (2) 14:6-11; (3) 14:12, (4) 14:13, (5) 14:14-20, each of which presents a unique set of problems (14:12 and 14:13 will not be discussed here). Rev 14:1-5 provides an effective contrast to the

terrifying developments narrated in Rev 13. The reader would naturally link the 144,000 with the earlier mention of the same number of those sealed in Rev 7:4-8. The entire pericope is introduced with the formula "I saw, and behold" (v. 1), and is followed by three structural segments, (1) the earthly vision of the 144,000 in v. 1, (2) the audition of the New Song sung in heaven in vv. 2-3, which constitutes a brief throne vision, and (3) the interpretive explanation in vv. 4-5 which elaborates on the identity of the 144,000 using three οὗτοι clauses.

Rev 14:6-11 is a group of three angelic visions (vv. 6-7, 8, 9-11), all introduced with the phrase "then I saw" (v. 6), and concluded when the author inserts an explanatory statement in v. 12. Each of the angelic visions is introduced by the mention of a new angelic revealer, the second and third of which are specifically enumerated: "another angel" (v. 6), "another angel, a second one" (v. 8), and "another angel, a third one" (v. 9).

Rev 14:14-20 is introduced with one of the author's customary formulas for beginning a new subject, "I saw and behold" (v. 14), and concludes in v. 20, which is followed by an introductory phrase indicating the beginning of a major new section of the composition "I saw another sign" (15:1). Rev 14:14-20 consists of two units, the first in vv. 14-16, and the second in vv. 17-20, which are essentially doublets:

| | *Rev 14:14-17* | | *Rev 14:17-20* |
|---|---|---|---|
| v. 14 | figure with sickle seated on cloud | v. 17 | figure with sickle comes out of temple |
| v. 15a | another angel comes out of the temple | v. 18a | another angel comes out from the altar |
| v. 15b | calls with loud voice to first figure | v. 18b | calls with loud voice to first figure |
| v. 15c | "Put in your sickle" [πέμψον τὸ δρέπανόν σου] | v. 18c | "Put in your sickle" [πέμψον σου τὸ δρέπανον] |
| v. 15d | to harvest | v. 18d | to gather clusters |
| v. 15e | for harvest is ripe | v. 18e | for grapes are ripe |
| v. 16a | first figure used his sickle on the earth | v. 19a | first angel used his sickle on the earth |
| v. 16b | the earth was reaped gathered | v. 19b | vintage of earth |

The parallelism ceases with vv. 19c-20, where the imagery of the grape harvest is continued by mentioning the "great wine press of the wrath of God," into which the grapes are placed. The juxtaposition of the imagery of the grain harvest and the grape harvest as metaphors for divine judgment in vv. 14-20 is also found in Joel 3:13: "Put in the sickle, for the harvest is ripe. Go in, tread, for the wine press is full. The vats overflow, for their wickedness is great."[23]

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[23] Elsewhere the cutting of the grape clusters and/or the treading of the vintage is used alone as a metaphor for divine judgment (Isa 63:1-6; Jer 25:30-31), as is the metaphor of the grain harvest and/or the image of the threshing floor (Isa 17:4-5; Jer 51:33; Micah 4:13; Matt 3:12 [= Luke 3:17]; Matt 9:37-38 [= Luke 10:2; Gosp. Thom. 73]; Mark 4:29; cf. Gal 6:7-9).

16. Rev 15:1-16:21 is a unit of text in the form of a vision report which narrates the plagues unleashed by the seven bowl angels. It is important to observe that the first readers would hardly have anticipated another round of plagues, particularly after the result of the seventh trumpet (11:14-18), which signals heavenly rejoicing over the commencement of God's reign. This section begins with a title (15:1), and thereafter there are two subunits of text: (1) 15:2-8, a scene in the heavenly temple which narrates the commission of the seven bowl angels, and (2) 16:1-20, the plagues in the bowls are poured out upon the earth. These seven bowl plagues have rough parallels with the seven trumpet plagues, to the extent that the earliest readers would very probably have understood them together.

17. Rev 17:1-18 is a very distinctive textual unit in the Apocalypse. It is an angelic revelation consisting of a vision (17:1-6) paired with an interpretation by the angelic guide (17:7-18). Even though the role of the *angelus interpres* has been accentuated in the title in 1:1 (and reappears at the end in 22:8), only in Rev 17 does this stock figure of apocalyptic literature appear in his stereotypical role (N.B. that in 21:9-22:5, though John has an angelic guide, the guide offers no interpretation of what the author sees and hears). This particular vision report involves the transport of the visionary "in the spirit" to a remote location, a motif apparently based on the Elijah cycle which in turn influenced Ezekiel (cf. 1 Kgs 18:12; 2 Kgs 2:16; Ezek 3:14; 40:2; Rev 21:10; Hermas *Vis.* 1.1.3; 2.1.1). Another distinctive feature of this vision lies in the fact that it is a *tableau*, i.e., there is no movement in what John sees. It is very likely that the vision itself in vv. 3-6 is an *ekphrasis*, i.e., a description of a work of art. The work of art in question, probably a marble bas relief or series of bas reliefs, survives only on a series of bronze sestertii of Vespasian minted in AD 71.[24] The reverse depicts the goddess Roma in military dress seated on the Seven Hills of Rome, with a parazonium in her left hand and her right foot touches the anthropomorphic figure of the river god Tiber. The readers, familiar with this marble bas relief and its numismatic counterpart as instruments of imperial propaganda, would have shared this inside allegorical joke with the author. While *ekphraseis* in the restricted sense of "description [of a work of art]" are not typical of apocalypses, a description of a painting does occur in *Apoc. Abr.* 21:7-29:21, while Hermas *Vis.* 3 and *Sim.* 6 and 9 appear to reflect *ekphraseis* in dependence on the *Tabula* of Cebes. By the Second Sophistic (second cent. AD), there were two major ways in which *ekphraseis* were used in literature. One approach centers on the necessity of understanding and interpreting the work of art itself, while the other (with examples in Cebes and Lucian) stresses the hidden meanings conveyed by the work of art which can usually be made clear through allegorical interpretation.[25] While the allegorical meaning of some *ekphraseis* is obvious, in others the meaning must be carefully explained. In Lucian's *Hercules* and Cebes' *Tabula*, the narrator is puzzled over the meaning of the work of art, not unlike the surprise and wonder expressed by John in v. 6b over what he has just seen in vv. 1-6a. Though Rev 17 is probably the result of a complex redactional process, in its present form it a represents a particular type of apocalyptic vision report, while in content it uses a contempo-

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24 F. Castagnoli, "Note Numistiche," *Archeologia Classica* 5 (1953) 104-111; R. Beauvery, "L'Apocalypse au risque de la numismatique. Babylone, la grande Prostituée et le sixième roi Vespasien et la déese Rome," *RB* 90 (1983) 243-60.

25 Shadia Bartsch, *Decoding the Ancient Novel: The Reader and the Role of Description in Heliodorus and Achilles Tatius* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 22-31.

rary piece of propagandistic Roman art as an allegorical vehicle for a forceful condemnation of Rome; the conventionality of the vision report is combined with the unconventionality of the *ekphrasis* at its core.

18. In the poetic parallelism of Rev 18:1-24, the prose style in the Apocalypse reaches its highest and most lyrical level. The strophes are arranged to produce a particular effect on the readers. After announcing the fall of Babylon (vv. 1-3), events *preceding* that fall are narrated (vv. 4-7), after which events *subsequent* to the fall are described (vv. 8-21), first in future tenses in vv. 8-11 (seven future verbs), and then, following v. 18, exclusively in past tenses. Finally, the prophecy that Babylon will be destroyed is reiterated in v. 21. Three different types of poetic composition are connected in celebration of the fall of Babylon: (1) a ritual lament (vv. 1-3, 9-20; strikingly reminiscent of ritual laments over Tyre in Ezek 26:15-18 and 27:1-8, 26-36), interrupted by (2) a command to flee (vv. 4-8; cf. Jer 4:4-5; 6:1; 48:6-8; 50:8-10; 51:6-10; 51:45-48), and (3) a symbolic action and its interpretation (vv. 21-24; cf. prophetic symbolic actions in 1 Kgs 22:11; 2 Kgs 13:14-19; Isa 7:10-12). The literary forms in this chapter are strikingly dependent on the writing prophets of the OT (the pervasive influence of Jeremiah is particularly prominent) rather than on early Jewish apocalyptic traditions.

## IV. Conclusions

After this brief guided tour through the literary forms of the Apocalypse with suggestions regarding the intertextual associations which formed the context within which it might have been read and understood by the original readers, it is time to ask whether anything of significance has been learned, or whether you, dear reader, have not been led down the garden path (where angels fear to tread) by a *magister interpres.*

From the perspective of the original reader, it has become obvious that the sequence of literary forms in the Apocalypse conforms to no known ancient literary conventions.[26] Since the author rarely provides signals anticipating what he will do next, the readers either had no way to anticipate what would occur next or were in fact as surprised as we are by new turns in the narrative. Since the Apocalypse, whatever else it may be, is certainly an example of ancient revelatory literature, it is worth wondering whether the original readers would have thought that such abrupt literary moves were consonant with their understanding of the appropriate ways of narrating divine revelation.

Perhaps the most interesting result of our survey is the phenomenon that in the Apocalypse, literary forms which had come to be associated either with apocalyptic or prophetic literary traditions (but not general enough to be associated with both), have been synthesized through juxtaposition. It is critical at this juncture to define what I understand by "prophecy" and "apocalyptic." Perhaps the most significant way in which prophecy can be differentiated from apocalyptic is *sociologically.* In contrast to apocalypticism, prophecy does not rigidly distinguish between the righteous and the wicked, but rather assumes that the wicked may repent and change their ways, and that the righteous require admonition, censure and exhortation to encourage them to remain faithful or to repent and return to the fold. Apocalypticism, on the other hand

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[26] This statement must be qualified by the admission that the problem of the literary patterns evident in the sequence of constituent literary forms in apocalypses is a subject which has not been investigated.

(i.e., the religious ideology within the context of which apocalypses were written), is a perspective generally thought to have been espoused by an oppressed minority which clearly distinguished the righteous from the wicked and anticipated an eschatological denouement, in which they would be rewarded and the wicked punished.

By placing apocalyptic traditions within a prophetic framework (Rev 1-3 and 22:6-20), and by juxtaposing apocalyptic with prophetic elements throughout the entire composition, the author appears to have attempted to give a new lease on life to apocalyptic traditions which could not and did not long retain their vitality in early Christianity because of their indissoluble association with nationalistic myths connected with the royal ideology of ancient Israel. Apocalypses, the primary repository of apocalyptic traditions, were largely a scribal phenomenon perforce divorced from real settings because of their pseudepigraphical character. This suprahistorical perspective of apocalyptic literature generally appears to have been mitigated in the Apocalypse of John through the incorporation of prophetic concerns which have a historical orientation. The Apocalypse of John one of the only apocalypses for which the author, audience and setting is generally known because it is not concealed in the work itself, though that setting is not reflected in the hardcore, genre-bound apocalyptic sections of the work.

# Reading the Apocalypse as an Apocalypse

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One of the recurring debates surrounding interpretation of the Apocalypse of John concerns its generic classification. While the current general consensus is that it is primarily an apocalypse, some interpreters propose that it primarily belongs to some other genre. Even those who consider it an apocalypse recognize that its apocalyptic conventions have been combined with other generic features, but they disagree over the significance of these other elements. The decision one makes regarding the generic identity of the Apocalypse is crucial for its interpretation, for it provides the interpreter with a reading strategy that will guide her in discerning the meaning of various elements of the text.

The Apocalypse has proven notoriously difficult to classify in one pure genre. This difficulty results from its high degree of intertextuality, its multiple connections with other literary works. It is a hybrid genre that refuses to stay within any certain generic boundaries. Because it combines the conventions of other genres in a unique fashion, it offers readers the opportunity to select which ones they will foreground and follow as their dominant reading strategy. Since the work cannot be completely and permanently contained in any generic framework, other readers will select other generic conventions as dominant for them. To complicate matters even more, these genres are themselves the creation of interpreters, who use them for pragmatic and rhetorical purposes.

To support these statements, I will first offer a reader-oriented theory of genre, and then I will discuss the hybrid character of the Apocalypse. I will then show that those who interpret it as an apocalypse have selected certain features of the text that are similar to certain other texts in order to construct a genre that serves as a guide for interpretation. However, this is only one among many possible ways of reading the text. I do not offer one more solution to the question concerning the genre of the Apocalypse of John because I believe the text allows for more than one solution. Instead, I will adopt a metainterpretive perspective in order to discover what this debate tells us about the Apocalypse and its readers.

## A Reader-Oriented Theory of Genre

A genre is a group of literary works that have been connected by readers who have judged their similarities to be of greater number and significance than their differences. To specify the genre of a text is to clarify and delineate the text's

intertextual relations.[1] The interpreter compares the text with other texts, noting its similarities and differences, and then determines which of those other texts are most similar to it. Through this process of comparison and differentiation, interpreters separate and categorize literary works into groups, called genres, or kinds. By drawing boundaries around certain groups of works, interpreters partition, classify, and organize the vast field of textuality. However, some texts prove more resistant to constraint within a single genre than others. A reader-oriented theory of genre consists of the following six theses.

*1. Readers must classify a literary work in at least one genre.*

Every text belongs to at least one genre.[2] This is true for two reasons. First, writers cannot write without having some preexisting examples in mind. They begin writing on the basis of things already attempted. They conceive of their task in terms of writings they have read, which become for them models to be imitated, transformed, or opposed.[3] Second, genres have a hermeneutic function as well as a generative function. Not only are they necessary for writers to be able to write; they are also necessary for readers to be able to read. Readers cannot read and understand a work unless they are able to relate it to other works that they have read. They must be able to set the work in "some context of familiar types."[4] As Ralph Cohen notes, "if each piece of writing were different from all others there would be no basis for theorizing or even for communication."[5]

Actually, it is impossible for a piece of writing to be completely different from all others or to be completely unintelligible to the reader (provided it is written in a language in which the reader is competent). Readers have amazing powers of recuperation and naturalization that allow them to relate any work to other works so that it may take on meaning. According to Jonathan Culler, readers naturalize the texts they read by bringing the strange and deviant text "into relation with a type of discourse or model which is already, in some sense, natural and legible."[6] Readers naturalize texts by placing them in a literary *context*, which means "a weaving together." They trace the threads of textuality

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[1] For genre as an aspect of intertextuality, see Gérard Genette, *Palimpsestes: La littérature au second degré* (Paris: Seuil, 1982), 11; Fredric Jameson, "Magical Narratives: Romance as Genre," *New Literary History* 7 (1975): 155; Steven Mailloux, *Interpretive Conventions: The Reader in the Study of American Fiction* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 151-52; Laurent Jenny, "The Strategy of Form," trans. R. Carter, in *French Literary Theory Today: A Reader*, ed. Tzvetan Todorov (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 42-43.

[2] John Barton, *Reading the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Study* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984), 16; Ralph Cohen, "Do Postmodern Genres Exist?" *Genre* 20 (1987): 244; Alastair Fowler, *Kinds of Literature: An Introduction to the Theory of Genres and Modes* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 20; Hans Robert Jauss, "Theory of Genres and Medieval Literature," chap. in *Toward an Aesthetics of Reception*, trans. Timothy Bahti (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 79.

[3] Robert Scholes, *Structuralism in Literature: An Introduction* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 130; E. D. Hirsch, Jr., *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 104.

[4] Fowler, 36, 259.

[5] Cohen, 244. See also Adena Rosmarin, *The Power of Genre* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 45.

[6] Jonathan Culler, *Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), 137-38.

in the text back to other similar texts they have read.[7] When they notice that certain works seem to have close intertextual connections, they group them into a genre. Thus reading is by nature an intertextual, and therefore generic, activity; otherwise, readers could not make sense of texts. As Culler says: "A work can only be read in connection with or against other texts, which provide a grid through which it is read and structured by establishing expectations which enable one to pick out salient features and give them a structure."[8] Every text belongs to at least one genre so that writers can write and readers can read.

*2. A reader's identification of a work's genre will affect how she interprets the work.*

The intertextual connections readers perceive in a work and their subsequent classification of it in a genre affect immensely how the work is interpreted. The purpose of identifying a work's genre is to orient and guide the reader's encounter with the text since different types of texts require different types of interpretation.[9] Consequently, the question of a text's genre is the most important question an interpreter can ask, "since its answer implies the way it should be understood with respect to its shape and emphasis as well as the scope and direction of its meanings."[10] According to E. D. Hirsch, the interpreter's "preliminary generic conception of a text is constitutive of everything that he subsequently understands."[11]

Hirsch also notes that "an interpreter's notion of the type of meaning he confronts will powerfully influence his understanding of details."[12] The interpreter's understanding of a text's genre will affect the significance she attaches to specific elements of the text. Heather Dubrow illustrates this fact by presenting a hypothetical opening paragraph of a novel and then proceeding to show that the reader's understanding of the novel as a murder mystery would cause him to attach certain meanings to various details while another reader's view of it as a *Bildungsroman* would cause him to understand those details differently. The various elements take on different meanings according to the generic presuppositions of the reader.[13] Thomas L. Kent offers another example when he relates the true story of a letter to the editor of the Des Moines *Register* in which the writer complained about an editorial cartoon which he or she felt was typical of the paper's desire to cater to the wealthy and affluent. Kent shows that the writer, by viewing the cartoon as belonging to the genre of "household hints," interpreted it completely different from those who would classify it in the sub-

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7 The Latin word *texere* means "to weave," and *intertexere* means "to weave into," or "to intermix by weaving." Thus Roland Barthes can say that "the metaphor of the text is that of the *network*." A text is a web, fabric, or network. See Roland Barthes, "From Work to Text," chap. in *Image-Music-Text*, trans. Stephen Heath (Glasgow: Fontana, 1977), 161; Hans-George Ruprecht, "Intertextualité," in *L'Intertextualité: Intertexte, autotexte, intratexte*, vol. 2, *Texte*, ed. Brian T. Fitch and Andrew Oliver (Toronto: Trinity College, 1983), 13; E. R. Harty, "Text, Context, Intertext," *Journal of Literary Studies* 1 (1985): 1-6.

8 Culler, *Structuralist Poetics*, 139.

9 Tremper Longman III, "Form Criticism, Recent Developments in Genre Theory, and the Evangelical," *Westminster Theological Journal* 47 (1985): 51, 67; Culler, *Structuralist Poetics*, 136; Fowler, 37-38; Hirsch, 113.

10 Hirsch, 263.

11 Ibid., 74.

12 Ibid., 75.

13 Heather Dubrow, *Genre* (London: Methuen, 1982), 1-2.

genre "satiric cartoon."[14] A Biblical example of the interrelation of genre and interpretation is given by Tremper Longman III. He shows that Biblical scholars will translate *yhwh malak* in the psalms either as "Yahweh is becoming king" if they understand these psalms to be enthronement ceremonies or as "Yahweh reigns" if they do not.[15]

Different genres provide the reader with different expectations and therefore different interpretations. According to Terence Hawkes, our understanding of the genre of a work "'programmes' our reading of it, reduces its complexity, or rather gives it a knowable shape, enabling us literally to 'read' it, by giving it a context and a framework which allows order and complexity to appear."[16] So it appears that disagreements about the interpretation of a text are often disagreements about its genre. Kent forcefully argues this point:

> Through history, interpretations of a text change. One way to view these different readings is to see interpretations growing out of different generic perceptions of texts.... Literary texts are interpreted differently when their generic categories are perceived differently. For example, to read *Moby-Dick* as predominantly an allegorical romance means that the text will be interpreted differently than if it were read as a predominately realistic novel. This observation is another way of saying that when a text shifts generic categories or when it is perceived as changing categories—which amounts to the same thing—it also changes meaning.[17]

The reason interpreters expend so much time and energy trying to determine the generic identity of Revelation is that their decision will affect the way they interpret and understand the work. The genre provides an interpretive strategy, an encompassing framework in which to fit the smaller details of the text.

The connection between genre and interpretation must be qualified somewhat by noting that some aspects of a text are understandable to a reader apart from her understanding of its genre. As Marie-Laure Ryan points out, a reader may appreciate a sonnet even if one has never before encountered that form or is not aware of its conventions.[18] Some aspects of the meaning of a text are available even to a naive reader with little literary competence because the reader can always connect the text with something with which she is familiar. Also, the identification of a work's genre does not always determine or control the interpretation of *every* element. Often, the genre provides a general, overall orientation or viewpoint that sometimes affects interpretation of particular points and sometimes does not. The connection between genre and interpretation is a close one, but a certain amount of interpretation can take place without reference to the genre.

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14 Thomas L. Kent, "Interpretation and Genre Perception," *Semiotica* 56 (1985): 134-36; idem, *Interpretation and Genre: The Role of Generic Perception in the Study of Narrative Texts* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1986), 16-19.

15 Longman, 62-63.

16 Terence Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 103. See also Culler, *Structuralist Poetics*, 136-37.

17 Kent, *Interpretation and Genre*, 151. See also ibid., 22; Hirsch, 98, 222; Fowler, 38; Jonathan Culler, *The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 59.

18 Marie-Laure Ryan, "Toward a Competence Theory of Genre," *Poetics* 8 (1979): 329.

*3. A genre is a set of implicit or explicit literary conventions that writers follow as they write and readers follow as they read.*

Literary or generic conventions act as norms, rules, prescriptions, restrictions, or prohibitions that determine or condition how writers write a certain kind of work and how readers read it. Generic conventions can include numerous aspects of literary works, including form, content, function, modes of publication and delivery, interpretive strategies, etc.[19] They result from a shared understanding that has arisen among a community of readers either in explicit or implicit fashion. If they have not been codified and explicated, they remain unconscious and tacit, forming what Renato Poggioli refers to as the "unwritten poetics" of an age.[20] Kent refers to these two types of literary conventions as formulated and unformulated. Formulated literary conventions are the static, synchronic, formal elements of a text, whereas unformulated literary conventions are fluid, changeable, diachronic, and non-prescriptive.[21] Whether explicit or implicit, formulated or unformulated, the conventional nature of genres causes them to take on the character of institutions that "function as 'horizons of expectation' for readers, and as 'models of writing' for authors."[22]

When a person becomes aware of literary conventions by means of her education and experience, she possesses "literary competence," which may be defined as the ability to recognize genre.[23] Kent uses the concept of literary competence to place readers along a spectrum that stretches between the naive reader, "who has yet to internalize the generic conventions of a large number of genres," and the sophisticated reader, "who recognizes the conventions of a large number of genres." Most readers fall somewhere in between these two extremes.[24]

When writers write in a genre whose conventions have been codified and made explicit and they signal its use through paratextual indications such as titles, subtitles, or prefaces, or through less obvious means, then they appear to offer a contract to the reader. As Dubrow says: "[The author] in effect agrees that he will follow at least some of the patterns and conventions we associate with the genre or genres in which he is writing, and we in turn agree that we will pay close attention to certain aspects of his work while realizing that others, because of the nature of the genres, are likely to be far less important."[25] Paul Ricoeur also emphasizes the communicative and hermeneutical functions of genre: "The function of literary genres is to mediate between speaker and hearer by establishing a common *dynamics* capable of ruling both the production of discourse as a

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19 Jeremy Hawthorn, *Unlocking the Text: Fundamental Issues in Literary Theory* (London: Edward Arnold, 1987), 49.

20 Renato Poggioli, "Poetics and Metrics," in *Comparative Literature: Proceedings of the Second Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association*, vol. I, ed. Werner Friederich (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 194-95.

21 Kent, *Interpretation and Genre*, 36-40.

22 Tzvetan Todorov, "The Origin of Genres," trans. Richard M. Berrong, *New Literary History* 8 (1976): 163.

23 Culler, *Structuralist Poetics*, 113-30; Barton, 8-19; Ryan, 329-30; Kent, *Interpretation and Genre*, 38.

24 Kent, "Interpretation and Genre Perception," 134-38; idem, *Interpretation and Genre*, 19.

25 Dubrow, 31.

work of a certain kind and its interpretation according to the rules provided by the 'genre.'"[26]

Some have argued on this basis that the key to a correct interpretation is to discover the genre used by the author and to follow its conventions in reading.[27] However, the process of interpretation is not quite that simple. Authors often do not clearly specify the genre that they are using so that the generic identity of a work is a matter of interpretation and uncertainty. Even when authors do announce the genre of their work, readers will sometimes question for several reasons whether that particular generic reading is the only possible one or even the best possible one. One reason for this skepticism is that authors sometimes fail to fulfill their intentions. A second reason is that writers often do not follow the conventions of a single genre, a complication that allows readers to decide which conventions they view as most important or prevalent. Third, the reader can never be sure that the author will remain true to her stated intentions because some authors attempt to overturn, subvert, or frustrate the expectations raised by the generic conventions they have evoked.[28] Fourth, a reader may simply decide that she can produce a more powerful and interesting reading if she reads the work as a member of a genre other than the one specified by the writer. Fifth, since genres develop through time and since disagreements over the definition of a genre often exist, it is likely that an author and her reader will rarely share exactly the same view of a genre's conventions.[29] Of course, in the case of explicitly theorized genres, writers and readers stand a better chance of agreeing on the elements of a genre, but even in this case the reader must always be on the alert that the writer may be modifying the genre in some way.

When a text does not clearly signal its generic category, or if its generic conventions are part of the unwritten poetics of an era, then the reader is allowed even more room in which to construct some constraints or guidelines for interpretation. She does this by comparing the work with similar works in order to hypothesize the conventions the text is following. Readers can never read in a vacuum. They must naturalize the text before them by specifying its intertextual relations with other texts they have read. As they continue reading, they may continually modify their hypotheses, but, as Hirsch admits, "the interpreter can never be completely certain what that genre is and can never completely codify its proprieties in all their complexity."[30]

*4. Genres are creations of interpreters, critics, and readers who construct them to serve as guides for reading.*

By constructing a generic category, interpreters place boundaries around a group of works to set them off from others. By placing an individual work within one of those categories, they place boundaries around it in order to set it off from

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26 Paul Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation," trans. David Pellauer, *Philosophy Today* 17 (1973): 136. See also Longman, 53.

27 Hirsch, 68-126; Grant R. Osborne, "Genre Criticism—Sensus Literalis," *Trinity Journal*, n.s., 4, no. 2 (1983): 1-27; Gordon Fee, "The Genre of New Testament Literature and Biblical Hermeneutics," in *Interpreting the Word of God*, ed. Samuel J. Schultz and Morris A. Inch (Chicago: Moody Press, 1976), 105-27; Gordon Fee and Douglas Stuart, *How to Read the Bible for All Its Worth: A Guide to Understanding the Bible* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1982).

28 Dubrow, 37.

29 Ryan, 312.

30 Hirsch, 94.

some works and alongside others. This act of placing boundaries or frames around a text is an attempt to restrict the text, to set borders that limit its dissemination of meaning, so that one can interpret it. Genre plays a paradoxical role in setting these boundaries because, as Jacques Derrida remarks, the mark of belonging or inclusion which is the distinctive trait of a genre does not itself belong to any genre or class: "The re-mark of belonging does not belong." Genre labels are supplements to the text which place "within and without the work, along its boundary, an inclusion and exclusion with regard to genre in general, as to an identifiable class in general." He concludes from this that "every text participates in one or several genres, there is no genreless text; there is always a genre and genres, yet such participation never amounts to belonging." In his view, while genre groupings are necessary, no sooner are they posited than they are violated by texts.[31]

Derrida's discussion elsewhere of the role of the parergon in artistic works also relates to the status and role of genre.[32] The parergon, a term borrowed from Kant, is something which lies against, beside, and in addition to the work, such as clothes on a statue, columns on a building, or picture frames. It is neither simply outside nor simply inside the work; it stands out both from the work and from its milieu. It stands out against two grounds, but with respect to each of those two grounds, it merges into the other. From one perspective, a picture frame blends in with the picture, while from another perspective, it blends in with the wall, but it never really belongs to either one. Genre works in the same way: It serves to distinguish the individual work from other literature, but it does not belong to the work nor does the work completely belong to it. It resides in a liminal area between an individual text and the broader field of textuality, obtaining and maintaining its existence only by its difference from other things.

Genres are not metaphysical entities that live independently of texts or readers, so interpreters must be careful not to reify or hypostatize genres. Rather, genres are heuristic devices constructed by readers to help them explain and interpret texts.[33] Gustavo Pérez Firmat points out that a genre is itself a text compiled from other texts so that it is always less than and different from any of those particular texts. Genre is a "text of texts" that exists only in critical discourse.[34] Adena Rosmarin argues at length that "genre is the most powerful explanatory tool available to the literary critic."[35] She shows that by constructing genres critics are trying to read one thing as another, which is an "edifying mistake of classification" that allows criticism to begin. She demonstrates that all generic descriptions and definitions result from deductive reasoning, despite claims of inductiveness by those who construct them. The process of genre

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[31] Jacques Derrida, "The Law of Genre," 63-66; idem, "Living On: Border Lines," trans. James Hulbert, in Harold Bloom et al., *Deconstruction and Criticism* (New York: Continuum, 1979), 86.

[32] Jacques Derrida, "II. The Parergon," chap. in *The Truth in Painting*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 53-64. For a helpful discussion of this article, see Jonathan Culler, *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 193-200.

[33] John J. Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to the Jewish Matrix of Christianity* (New York: Crossroad, 1987), 6; idem, "Preface," *Semeia* 14 (1979): iv; Edgar V. McKnight, *Postmodern Use of the Bible: The Emergence of Reader-oriented Criticism* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1988), 243-44.

[34] Gustavo Pérez Firmat, "The Novel as Genres," *Genre* 12 (1979): 278.

[35] Rosmarin, 39.

definition proceeds from purpose to premise to particular texts rather than from the opposite direction.[36] Pérez Firmat also shows that descriptions of genre are circular and deductive in nature. One cannot argue empirically from works to theories because one must always rely on a prior principle of selection to isolate the texts that are compared.[37] Rosmarin concludes from these facts that genre critics should adopt an explicitly deductive approach that would be pragmatic and rhetorical in nature. In her view, genres are pragmatic rather than natural, defined rather than found, used rather than described.[38]

*5. Texts can be distinguished by the degree of difficulty interpreters experience in attempting to classify them in a single genre.*

Readers find that some works are easily classified in one genre. They appear to follow the conventions of a genre slavishly, while others violate the rules of every genre so that they are not easily classified. The former is typical of popular literature, such as detective fiction, which tends to be formulaic in its characterization and plot development. Kent labels these "automatized texts," because they are formulaic, predictable, high in redundancy, and low in information.[39] The term "easy reading" applies to these works because they do not offer any difficulty or challenge to the reader. On the other hand, serious literature, or what many critics would consider "good literature," violates the rules or, to use Kent's terminology, deforms conventions in some way.[40] Kent even goes so far as to identify literariness with hybridization or deformation of generic conventions:

> Certain formally organized sign systems appear strange; they seem to either incorporate or deform the conventions we commonly associate with other kinds of texts. These texts that break generic conventions—texts that we usually consider literary—appear to form new generic categories. They appear to be like no other text we have ever read before.[41]

Elsewhere he notes that "most highly regarded literary texts go beyond formulas by either deforming genres, like Hopkins deforms the sonnet, or combining genres, like Sterne succeeds in doing in *Tristram Shandy*."[42]

Tzvetan Todorov also argues that "the major work creates, in a sense, a new genre and at the same time transgresses the previously valid rules of the genre." Therefore, "one might say that every great book establishes the existence of two genres, the reality of two norms: that of the genre it transgresses, which dominated the preceding literature, and that of the genre it creates." He concludes that "as a rule, the literary masterpiece does not enter any genre save perhaps its own; but the masterpiece of popular literature is precisely the book which best fits its genre."[43] In this connection, Rosalie Colie has shown that "the greatness of

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36 Ibid., 22-25.

37 Pérez Firmat, "The Novel as Genres," 271, 274-77. He appeals to Karl Popper's argument in *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* that "all inductive reasoning presupposes an antecedent, non-inductive step" [276 n. 11].

38 Rosmarin, 23-50.

39 Kent, *Interpretation and Genre*, 48, 53, 57-58, 62, 65, 68, 70, 78, 81-101, 142-43, 146.

40 Ibid., 16, 40, 68-70, 78-79, 102-23.

41 Ibid., 16.

42 Ibid., 40.

43 Tzvetan Todorov, "The Typology of Detective Fiction," chap. in *The Poetics of Prose*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), 43. For similar views, see Maria Corti, *An Introduction to Literary Semiotics*, trans. Margherita Bogat and

such works as *Paradise Lost* and *King Lear* derives in large part from their being encyclopedic works of 'mixed genre' which incorporate and juxtapose virtually the entire range of generic conventions, displaying through these different 'fixes' on experience the full range of human possibilities."[44]

Other theorists maintain that *every* true work of art violates the rules in some way. Benedetto Croce provided the classic statement for this view when he asserted that each work of art is a genre unto itself because the artist must always do something different with his materials.[45] To a certain extent, Croce and his followers are right to say that "each and every work is an absolute, incomparable individuality" since every work will contain more than any generic description can comprehend.[46] As Adena Rosmarin says: "Genres can never be perfectly coincident with texts unless we posit as many genres as texts." Admittedly, the genres or "supertexts"[47] that readers construct will do violence in some way to the particularity, originality, and individuality of literary works. Nevertheless, readers must group and classify works in order to interpret them, which is always possible because, as we have seen, every writer must follow some conventions if her work is to be understandable at all. Even the Crocean view unconsciously recognizes this because, when its supporters speak of works of art transgressing norms, they admit that norms must always be present.[48]

Every text must follow conventions to some extent so that communication may take place. If texts were pure individual expressions without any connection to what might be expected, no one could read or understand them. As Eliseo Vivas says:

> No artist, however talented, can make objects each of which is in a class by itself. If he could, his work would be totally idiotic, utterly private, each job would be a monad without windows or preestablished harmony. His work would say nothing to anyone but himself, the maker—if it did that much.[49]

A text that shifted ceaselessly from one set of generic conventions to another so that the competent reader could not fix it as a specific kind would provide so much uncertainty and so little redundancy as to make it uninterpretable. It would impart no information to the competent reader. On the other hand, the

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Allen Mandelbaum (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 132; Dubrow, 32; Fowler, 23-24; Jauss, 89; Thomas L. Kent, "The Classification of Genres," *Genre* 16 (1983): 10-12; idem, *Interpretation and Genre*, 16, 20, 40, 58, 78, 103.

[44] Barbara K. Lewalski, foreword to *Resources of Kind: Genre-Theory in the Renaissance*, by Rosalie Colie, ed. Barbara K. Lewalski (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), viii.

[45] Croce also criticized genre criticism for diverting the reader from a proper intuitive response to the work of art to an improper logical response. For discussions of Croce's theory, see William K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Cleanth Brooks, *Romantic and Modern Criticism*, vol. 2, *Literary History: A Short History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Midway Reprints, 1983), 499-519; Dubrow, 83-84; Jauss, 77-79.

[46] Adrian Marino, "Toward a Definition of Literary Genres," in *Theories of Literary Genre*, ed. Joseph P. Strelka, Yearbook of Comparative Literature, no. 8 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), 51.

[47] The term is used in John G. Cawelti, "The Question of Popular Genres," *Journal of Popular Film and Television* 13 (1985): 55.

[48] Todorov, *The Fantastic*, 8; Kent, "Interpretation and Genre Perception," 134.

[49] Eliseo Vivas, "Literary Classes: Some Problems," *Genre* 1 (1968): 103.

completely formulaic text would not impart any information either since the competent reader "would know precisely the generic conventions that constitute the text and what the formulaic text intends to communicate." Most texts fall somewhere in between the two extremes.[50] While it may be true that many works of art do not fit completely into any one genre, one should not go so far as to posit that each of these works is a genre unto itself, without any connections to other works. Such a view overlooks the need for writers to follow prior models and the need for readers to relate works to each other.

*6. A hybrid text whose generic category is difficult to identify because of its high degree of intertextuality provides more room for the reader to participate in the production of its meaning; hence, a hybrid text is more susceptible to multiple interpretations than pure texts.*

Genres are artificial constructs of readers, interpreters, critics, and theorists that supplement, bind, and limit texts in order to aid in their interpretation. Some texts are easier to limit in this way while others are more difficult to classify in one category. The latter often are more highly intertextual than the former, and therefore they resist grouping on the basis of similarities more than texts whose intertextuality is not quite so extensive.[51] While some texts seem to be constructed in order to attempt to limit the options of classification for the interpreter, others have multiple and extensive intertextual relations so that the interpreter has more difficulty classifying them in one group. These highly intertextual texts are often called "mixed" or "hybrid" genres.

Kent explains that hybrid genres are created by deforming or incorporating conventions commonly associated with other kinds of texts. Texts do this through a process he calls "syntagmatic foregrounding," which is "the disappointment of a specific generic expectation that is created by the repetition of a narrative element in an unexpected context, or by the omission of an important narrative element from the text." The result of this combination of different generic categories in unexpected ways is that "uncertainty is manufactured about the hybrid genre's true generic category."[52] "Paradigmatic foregrounding" establishes generic expectations at the beginning of a text, and when these are satisfied, the text is automatized. Syntagmatic foregrounding deautomatizes a text by introducing "designed uncertainty," which overcomes the tendency towards "systemic closure" in the text. According to information theory, the higher the uncertainty, the greater the information content.[53] Consequently, the

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50 Kent, "Interpretation and Genre Perception," 138-39; idem, *Interpretation and Genre*, 20-21, 103.

51 Gustavo Pérez Firmat, in "Apuntes para un modelo de la intertextualidad en literatura," *Romanic Review* 69 (1978): 2, notes that "intertextuality is not an absolute value but a quantitative phenomenon. Not all texts show the same degree of intertextuality: in some, intertextuality constitutes the generating principle of the text (the work of Lautréamont); in others, it appears only in an accidental manner (the realistic novel)" [my translation]. This view contrasts with deconstructionist views of intertextuality, which see it as infinite and unlimited in every text. If one is thinking strictly in terms of intertextuality as literary relations between texts, then the amount of intertextuality in a work would depend on the extent of the writer's literary competence and her use of it in that work and on the extent of the reader's literary competence, which would enable the latter to recognize the degree of intertextuality.

52 Kent, *Interpretation and Genre*, 50.

53 Ibid., 50-51, 53, 56-57, 61-62, 65, 69, 104.

hybrid genre is open to multiple interpretations, as Kent says of his example *Moby-Dick*: "Because of its mixture of generic categories, *Moby-Dick* becomes a tapestry of possible interpretations."[54]

The hybrid genre provides so many possibilities to readers that they must choose one on which to focus their attention. Analogously, in the everyday world, we are continuously bombarded with more sensory stimuli than we can possibly be aware of at one time. Consequently, we choose to respond selectively to certain ones and ignore the others, an ability which is termed "selective attention." An example is the "cocktail party effect," which occurs when a person standing in a crowded room of talking people shifts attention from one conversation to the other, simultaneously blocking out the others which might interfere with her reception. The mechanism by which humans can do this has not been identified definitively, but one of the most popular theories is the "Broadbent filter theory." According to Donald Broadbent, the brain possesses only one information processing channel, and a limited one at that. Incoming sensory stimuli are stored in a short-term sensory register, and from this the filter selects the message to be received. The filter's selection of a message may be influenced by biases towards those stimuli that are novel, more intense, more probable, considered more valuable, or that best match the contextual information derived from recent inputs and memories.[55]

In the case of ambiguous cognitive illusions or the figure-ground phenomenon, more than one competing sensory stimuli is presented simultaneously to the observer. When she focuses on one, it becomes the figure, which appears to have a hard surface with a recognizable shape and definable boundaries. Simultaneously, she must divert her attention from the other stimuli, which become the ground, perceived as less surface-like and without definite boundaries. In these illusions, one notices the figure and ground alternating as perception shifts from one competing picture or object to the other. In this alternation of perception, the observer is entertaining alternative perceptual hypotheses concerning what the object is or where its parts lie in space. Common examples are the duck-rabbit, vase-faces, and the Necker cube.[56]

In a similar though not identical way, a hybrid genre containing a mixture of conventions offers multiple possibilities to readers, who must foreground one and background the others. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the reader to read a text as if it belonged simultaneously to more than one genre. This would allow no foundation on which to interpret the text consistently. Since human beings desire order, coherence, and consistency, in these cases they choose to reduce the complexity of the text by focusing their attention on one cluster of conventions—even if it is incomplete. They make one set of conventions dominant over the others; one becomes figure and the others become ground. In such cases, the reader chooses which conventions to follow and which ones to ignore. Other

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[54] Ibid., 25.

[55] Neville Moray, "Attention," in *The Oxford Companion to the Mind*, ed. Richard L. Gregory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 59-61; Donald H. McBurney and Virginia B. Collings, *Introduction to Sensation/Perception*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 251-54.

[56] Richard L. Gregory, "Illusions," in *The Oxford Companion to the Mind*, ed. Richard L. Gregory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 337-43; idem, "Perception as Hypotheses," in *OCM*, 608-610; idem, "Figure-Ground," in *OCM*, 263-64; Julian Hochberg, "Gestalt Theory," in *OCM*, 288-91. Illustrations of these illusions can be found in Gregory, "Illusions," 340.

readers of the same text may adopt a different perspective and foreground a different cluster, or the same reader may regard the same text differently upon a second or third reading. The different decisions result largely from the biases, predispositions, interests, or experiences of the reader at the time of reading. Hybrid texts may provide evidence of various kinds that would support each of these possibilities without fully committing themselves to any one of them.[57]

A text that is highly intertextual and intergeneric has as a result a high degree of polyvalence. Julia Kristeva notes this fact:

> If one grants that every signifying practice is a field of transpositions of various signifying systems (an inter-textuality), one then understands that its 'place' of enunciation and its denoted 'object' are never single, complete, and identical to themselves, but always plural, shattered, capable of being tabulated. In this way polysemy can also be seen as the result of a semiotic polyvalence—an adherence to different sign systems.[58]

Kent concludes also that "a hybrid genre is higher in uncertainty and information content than a pure genre," and "the greater the degree of foregrounding activity within a text, the higher is the uncertainty and the information content within that text."[59] He illustrates this point by showing that one work by Herman Melville, *Pierre*, is a formulaic example of tragedy, while another work, *Moby-Dick*, combines a number of generic elements. He shows that three different scholars all agree on the generic identification of the former and also on their low evaluation of it. However, they sharply disagree on the generic identification of the latter, viewing it as a tragedy, a phenomenological text, and a dialectical novel. The hybrid character of *Moby-Dick* produces two results: 1) Scholars offer different interpretations of the book based on their generic identifications; 2) They agree on the high degree of the book's aesthetic value.[60] Hybrid texts result in multiple interpretations, which readers generally find more pleasing than the formulaic text that is easier to interpret. Thus, a greater degree of intertextuality and intergenericity opens a text to multiple interpretations. Its meaning and relevance appear inexhaustible.

Roland Barthes' concept of "writerly" texts and Umberto Eco's similar concept of "open" works can be applied to hybrid genres. According to Barthes, the readerly text puts the reader in the position of a passive consumer; it does not allow for much creativity or participation on the part of the reader. The writerly text, on the other hand, allows the reader to participate in the text as producer of

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[57] David E. Aune, in "The Apocalypse of John and the Problem of Genre," *Semeia* 36 (1986): 67, suggests that "the conception of 'mixed genres' is theoretically infelicitous and should be used only as a court of last resort, for if the notion of *mixtum compositum* is too quickly applied to a problematic text, the possibility of achieving a generic understanding of the structure of the entire text is given up without a struggle." I would say instead that every text is a *mixtum compositum* to a greater or lesser extent, but in order to make sense of it, the reader has to place restrictions on it. This is done by focusing on one set of generic conventions, but in the case of highly intertextual works, this often involves a greater "struggle." Considering the numerous options that have been given for the generic identification of the Apocalypse of John, it does not seem hasty at all to suggest that it is a hybrid text.

[58] Julia Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, trans. Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 60.

[59] Kent, "Classification of Genres," 11-12.

[60] Kent, *Interpretation and Genre*, 140-44.

its meaning; the reader is allowed to enter the play of signifiers and write the text herself.[61] The reader can actively construct meaning from the various possibilities the text offers her. In Eco's view, closed works of art are composed with the intention to guide the addressee along a straight and narrow path towards a single, determinate meaning. The author presents the work as "a finished product with the intention that his particular composition should be appreciated and received in the same form as he devised it." Open works, however, are composed with an indeterminate structure that allows the performer or reader to complete it so that the performer is simultaneously the composer and the reader simultaneously the writer. Eco recognizes that even closed works will be susceptible to different interpretations because the reader's "comprehension of the original artifact is always modified by his particular and individual perspective." But he believes that we can still distinguish works on the basis of whether their composers try to ignore or repress this fact or whether they try to exploit the inevitable openness of works and turn it into "a positive aspect of [their] production, recasting the work so as to expose it to the maximum possible 'opening.'"[62]

The highly intertextual text that mixes generic conventions is a "writerly text" or an "open work." It allows the reader greater space in which to create her own meaning from the text. Robert T. Eberwein correctly concludes that "generically fragmented" works are writerly texts because they allow readers to provide the ordering principle themselves rather than as opposed to deriving it from the stabilizing conventions of the genre.[63] As Barthes says: "The more plural the text, the less it is written before I read it."[64] Since the role of producer is an inherently more interesting, though less secure, one for readers, this kind of text gives greater pleasure to the reader.[65] The Apocalypse of John is this kind of text. It is highly intertextual, it has mixed conventions of different kinds, and therefore it is open to multiple interpretations. In the following section, I will show that the Apocalypse is a mixed genre and that this allows readers freedom to construct its identity and, therefore, its meaning.

## The Apocalypse of John as a Hybrid Genre

Various generic identities for the Apocalypse of John have been offered through the centuries, but, as with the Gospels, it has proven difficult to provide a definitive answer to the question of its genre. The Apocalypse, like the Gospels, offers many generic possibilities to the reader without fully supporting any one of the categories. Like the Gospels, it mixes conventions from various genres so that the reader must decide which to foreground and which to background. This

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61 Roland Barthes, *S/Z*, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), 4-5.

62 Umberto Eco, "The Poetics of the Open Work," chap. in *The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), 49-50.

63 Robert T. Eberwein, "Genre and the Writerly Text," *Journal of Popular Film and Television* 13 (1985): 64.

64 Barthes, *S/Z*, 10.

65 This point is emphasized by Roland Barthes in *The Pleasure of the Text*, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975). Barthes distinguishes the text of pleasure (*plaisir*) and the text of bliss (*jouissance*). The former is linked to a comfortable practice of reading, while the latter discomforts and unsettles the reader (14). But the latter text is the one that leads to the greatest pleasure, which he describes in erotic terms.

kind of mongrel text with its "matrix of generic features"[66] is frustrating to the reader who looks for a simple, consistent interpretive strategy to make sense of the text, but it can also supply much pleasure since it allows the reader a greater role in the production of its meaning.

*Mixture of Generic Conventions in 1:1-20*

The intertextual and intergeneric character of Revelation can be illustrated by a close examination of the first chapter for clues to the generic conventions being followed. Often a writer will indicate his use of a genre at the beginning of his work by means of a title or sub-title, preface, foreword, or some other paratextual reference, a process Kent calls "paradigmatic foregrounding." If the genre is not specified in such paratextual ways, then the reader must begin reading with a hypothesis concerning the work's genre in mind. As she reads, she alters and adjusts her hypothesis as the evidence supporting it or contradicting it accumulates. The opening of John's book is so highly intertextual, i.e., its literary threads run in so many different directions, that the reader who tries to categorize the book in a single genre ends up frustrated. By 1:20, the reader must proceed on the hypothesis of some blend of conventions with one set viewed as primary, but different readers select different combinations and emphases.

The first three words hold out hope for a quick solution to the question of the Apocalypse's genre since it entitles the book *Apokalypsis Iēsou Christou*. This self-description tempts the reader to understand it as a genre-designation. G. B. Caird, for example, says that this phrase "not only describes its content, but classifies it as a recognized type of literature."[67] David Hellholm also argues that *apokalypsis* serves as a genre-designation because it refers to a written form and because of its emphatic position at the beginning of the title.[68] The difficulty with this assumption is that there is no record of *apokalypsis* being used as a generic title before this writing, as Morton Smith notes:

> Remarkable is the rarity of the words in works now commonly called "apocalypses." I do not know any such text prior to the New Testament Apocalypse which either describes itself or the proceedings in it as *apokalypseis [sic]* or even uses the verb *apokalyptō* for the whole of the revelation.[69]

Leon Morris draws the proper conclusion from these facts:

> We should make it clear that "apocalyptic" is our term. It is not one which the ancients used, at least in this way. It is not even certain that they regarded the books we speak of as apocalyptic as constituting a definite class. Doubtless they saw some similarities, but whether they were as impressed by them as are modern scholars, we do not know. If they were, they have not left it on record. There is quite a range of apocalyptic opinion, and the men who wrote this kind of literature seem to have come

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66 Eberwein, 65.

67 G. B. Caird, *A Commentary on the Revelation of St. John the Divine* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966; reprint, Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1987), 9.

68 David Hellholm, "The Visions He Saw or: To Encode the Future in Writing," in *Text and Logos: The Humanistic Interpretation of the New Testament*, ed. Theodore W. Jennings, Jr. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 112-114, 121-123.

> from all parties and from none. It may well not have occurred to the men of antiquity, accordingly, to group their writings together. They may have been more impressed by the differences than the resemblances. In antiquity then there is neither the name (i.e., as applied to a class of books; the term occurs but is used otherwise), nor the classification.[70]

It was later that *apokalypsis* became a genre-designation for a certain group of works among which interpreters saw significant similarities. At the earliest, the word was used in this way by the patristic writers of the second century.[71] Doubtless, it was used as a generic title because of the influence of the Apocalypse in the same way that the self-description of the Gospel of Mark, *Archē tou euangeliou Iēsou Christou,* later was adopted as a technical generic title for works similar to it. While the first word of the Apocalypse would not have referred to a genre in the minds of John or his readers, later readers used the word to refer to a group of works that shared significant similarities. Since the genre apocalypse is a later creation of interpreters, one should be careful to avoid the anachronism of supposing that John is using this term to classify his book as a recognizable type of literature or genre. It appears then that the first word of John's book does not provide a clear answer to the question of its genre. It may simply be a synonym for prophecy, or it may refer to some genre that may be distinguished from prophecy to some degree, a genre which the reader must construct by determining the quality and quantity of that difference. Whichever hypothesis the reader adopts, she must continue to look for evidence in the book to confirm or refute it.

As readers proceed, they notice that the revelation is mediated to John by an angel, which they will connect with other literature containing this element, such as Daniel, *1 Enoch,* and *Shepherd of Hermas.* They will then continue to examine the book to see how prominent is the role of the angel-interpreter. Also in verse 1, one finds that the message is transmitted to John by means of symbols, as the verb *esēmanen* implies. This leads the reader to relate the book to other symbolic works. In verse 2, the phrase "word of God" is used, which reminds readers of the way Old Testament prophets referred to their revelations. Verse 3 contains a beatitude, which was a linguistic form used by the prophets of Israel (Isa. 19:25; 30:18; 56:2; Jer. 17:7). This verse also indicates that the work was written as an oral performance, which suggests a liturgical character. In the midst of this beatitude, John refers to his work as "the words of the prophecy," which will cause the reader to search the book for similarities to other prophetic books. The phrase, "the time is near," indicates a view of eschatology that must be compared with other eschatological books to determine to which it is most similar.

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[69] Morton Smith, "On the History of *APOKALYPTO* and *APOKALYPSIS*," in *Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World and the Near East,* ed. David Hellholm (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1983), 14.

[70] Leon Morris, *Apocalyptic* (London: InterVarsity Press, 1973), 20-21. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza also notes the lack of evidence that *apokalypsis* was a technical term for revelatory literature and concludes that "it is doubtful that the author chose this title in order to qualify his prophecy as an apocalyptic document" [*The Book of Revelation: Justice and Judgment* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 150]. See also R. H. Charles, *The Revelation of St. John* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1920), 1:4; Robert H. Mounce, *The Book of Revelation* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1977), 63-64.

[71] Smith, 13, 18-19; Philipp Vielhauer, "Introduction: Apocalypses and Related Subjects," trans. David Hill, in *New Testament Apocrypha,* ed. Edgar Hennecke and Wilhelm Schneemelcher (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965), 2:582.

Up to this point, the book begins in a way similar to the beginnings of many Old Testament prophetic books, but beginning with verse 4, a new generic alternative is offered to the reader. Suddenly and unexpectedly, the book begins to follow the conventions of a letter as it was developed in the Hellenistic world and modified by Paul. It contains the typical references to the sender and recipients and also Paul's peculiar form of greeting, which includes the blessings of grace and peace. Verses 5 and 6 contain a doxology similar to the ones found in the epistolary prescripts of 2 Corinthians and Galatians. Verses 7 and 8, however, contain two prophetic utterances borrowed from the Old Testament and unrelated to the epistolary opening. As readers continue to examine the book for epistolary conventions, they will not find any more until the very end, but there they must decide exactly what verses are to be included in the epistolary postscript.[72]

Verses 1-8 are an example of syntagmatic foregrounding. The work begins by paradigmatically foregrounding conventions many readers will associate with Old Testament prophecy, but then suddenly other conventions enter the syntagmatic progression of the narrative, thereby temporarily frustrating the generic expectations that have been raised in the reader. Just as suddenly, these epistolary conventions disappear until the end of the book. This one example of syntagmatic foregrounding—and doubtless there are more in the Apocalypse—introduces into the narrative designed uncertainty, which deautomatizes it and allows the reader the option of choosing which conventions to continue to follow.[73]

For example, the whole work seems to be set in an epistolary frame so that the reader must decide what and how much to make of this fact. Since it functions as a frame and does not extend through the book, is the epistolary character more or less important for understanding the work? The interpreter must choose whether to foreground or background the epistolary elements. Can the book at this point be described as an epistolary prophecy, or a prophetic letter, or an apocalypse in the form of an apostolic letter, or some other permutation of these generic elements?[74]

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72 The most common suggestions are verse 21, verses 10-21, or verses 6-21.

73 Michael Anthony Harris, "The Literary Function of Hymns in the Apocalypse of John" (Ph.D. diss., The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1989), 252-58, illustrates how the alternation between apocalyptic and epistolary conventions in the first chapter makes the Revelation a "deformulated apocalypse." Although he states that "because of the nature of the narrative, it is a mistake to valorize one generic element over the other," a few sentences later he concludes that "the narrative should still be broadly regarded as apocalyptic, since the apocalyptic visions dominate the narrative" (253). He makes few references to the prophetic conventions followed in the first chapter. Like many interpreters, he neglects to see how extensive is the Apocalypse's intertextuality and that the distinction between prophetic and apocalyptic conventions is ultimately the decision of the interpreter.

74 For example, Adela Yarbro Collins, in "The Early Christian Apocalypses," *Semeia* 14 (1979): 70-71, minimizes the epistolary conventions, as does David E. Aune, *The New Testament in its Literary Environment* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1987), 240-41; Frederick David Mazzaferri, *The Genre of the Book of Revelation from a Source-critical Perspective* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989), 231-33; and W. S. Vorster, "'Genre' and the Revelation of John: A Study in Text, Context, and Intertext," *Neotestamentica* 22 (1988): 114-15. On the other hand, others emphasize its epistolary character: Schüssler Fiorenza, *Book of Revelation*, 169; J. Ramsey Michaels, "Jewish and Christian Apocalyptic Letters: 1 Peter, Revelation, and 2 Baruch 78-87," in *Society of Biblical Literature 1987 Seminar Papers*, ed. Kent Harold Richards (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987), 268-75; Jürgen Roloff, *Die*

Verse 9 begins to describe a vision experienced by the author. This vision calls to mind certain prophetic call narratives, such as Isaiah 6, Jeremiah 1, and Ezekiel 1-3. In verse 10, the reader is told that the vision occurred when he was "in the Spirit." Here the reader must decide whether the phrase refers to the gift of prophecy or a trance-like state experienced by apocalyptic visionaries. Verse 11 contains the command to write to the seven churches, again emphasizing the character of the book as a circular letter. Some readers also connect this feature with other books that can be distinguished from prophetic books by their self-conscious written form as opposed to the oral character of prophecy. The description of the Son of Man in verses 12-20 contains numerous images adopted from the Old Testament, although some of them can also be found in other Jewish writings. Verse 19 contains a phrase that appears to have been a common formula of that era for describing prophecy.[75]

Readers also note another detail in the first chapter that may provide a key to the genre. Eleven times the word "seven" appears, and it continues to play a key role throughout the book. Four sections of the book are clearly divided into seven parts, which tempts some readers to divide the rest of the book according to this pattern. Some readers connect this sevenfold pattern with the theater at Ephesus, which is the only one in the ancient world that has seven *thurōmata*, or openings for scenery.[76] This connection suggests that the work was constructed as a drama in seven acts, perhaps with the Ephesus stage in mind since its audience would have been familiar with it. However, those who argue for the dramatic character of the book usually combine it with some other generic aspect, such as liturgy or prophecy.[77] This illustrates the difficulty of viewing this work as belonging to just one genre.

By the end of the first chapter, no single, clear generic identity has been offered to the reader. In chapters 2 and 3, another unusual element occurs: Seven letters to different churches are included. But these letters are not like the ones Paul wrote. Instead, they seem to be more like prophetic proclamations.[78] It seems rather unusual for either prophecy or apocalypse to incorporate seven letters into their structure, which again provides a difficulty for any generic identification.

As one continues through the book, other elements must be considered in any generic hypothesis. For example, the numerous hymns and the fact that the book apparently was to be read in a worship setting leads some to view the dominant genre as liturgy.[79] Others foreground the mythological elements of the book and

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*Offenbarung des Johannes* (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1984), 15-16; and M. Eugene Boring, *Revelation* (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1989), 5-8.

[75] W. C. van Unnik, "A Formula Describing Prophecy," *New Testament Studies* 9 (1962-63): 86-94.

[76] James L. Blevins, "The Genre of Revelation," *Review and Expositor* 77 (1980): 393-408.

[77] John Wick Bowman, "The Revelation to John: Its Dramatic Structure and Message," *Interpretation* 9 (1955): 436-53.

[78] Klaus Berger, "Apostelbrief und apostolische Rede/Zum Formular frühchristlicher Briefe," *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 65 (1974): 190-231.

[79] M. H. Shepard, *The Paschal Liturgy and the Apocalypse* (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960); Otto A. Piper, "The Apocalypse of John and the Liturgy of the Ancient Church," *Church History* (1951): 10-22; Edouard Cothenet, "Earthly and Heavenly Liturgy according to the Book of Revelation," in *Roles in the Liturgical Assembly*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell (New York: Pueblo Publishing Co., 1981), 115-35; David L. Barr, "The Apocalypse of John as Oral Enactment," *Interpretation* 40 (1986): 243-56.

refer to it as myth.[80] Other readers deemphasize these elements as merely constituent parts of a more inclusive genre. By the end of the book, because of the great amount of syntagmatic foregrounding the reader is able to link it up with many different kinds of works. Thus, the Apocalypse is a deformed text or a hybrid genre, which allows the reader to choose which conventions she will foreground, which she will background, and which she will ignore altogether.[81]

*Foregrounding the Conventions of Apocalypse in the Apocalypse*

Perhaps the most popular generic category in which the Apocalypse is placed at the present time is that of apocalypse. Yet, as we saw earlier, apocalypse is a genre that did not exist at the time John wrote since its conventions had not yet been explicated. Apocalypse is an example of a genre whose conventions remained unformulated and implicit for many years—in this case centuries—until a critic formulated them. Some genre theorists, such as Jauss and Pérez Firmat, suggest that ancient genres should be constructed on the basis of "poetological documents." In this process, "one would piece together the scattered critical observations of the day in order to recover the conception of the genre that oriented the composition and reception of such works." In fact, Pérez Firmat argues that genres do not exist until they are constructed in critical discourse.[82] But this process only works in the case of writings that follow formulated conventions. Some works are later recognized by readers as bearing significant similarities to certain other works so that they can be grouped into a genre. But at the time they were written, either they were considered members of a genre whose conventions were more conscious and well-known or we have no way of knowing which set of conventions the writer and his readers thought the work was following.[83] Apocalypse is an example of a genre that is an *a posteriori* construction, created by later interpreters who have come to recognize that certain works shared enough similarities to each other and differences from other works to justify categorizing them in their own genre. The genre apocalypse did not exist until it had been constructed and defined in critical discourse.

In the case of apocalypse, although readers began to recognize these works as a separate genre as early as the second century, the first critic to attempt to specify its conventions was Friedrich Lücke, who published a study of apocalyptic literature in 1832. The attempt to specify the conventions of apocalypse continues until this day. All of these attempts result from the fact that later readers have recognized that a certain group of works, including at the very least Daniel, *1 Enoch*, 4 Ezra, *2 Baruch*, and the Apocalypse of John, shared similarities that distinguished them from other genres, including prophecy, the one nearest to them. Critics have recognized that the writers of these works were unconsciously following tacit conventions that formed an unwritten poetics, and they have attempted to specify and codify those conventions, thereby drawing

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[80] John G. Gager, *Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early Christianity* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975), 49-57.

[81] For a discussion of some of these various options and their shortcomings along with an attempt to identify the "complex literary type" of the Revelation by doing justice to the various generic connections of the book, see Schüssler Fiorenza, *Book of Revelation*, 165-70.

[82] Gustavo Pérez Firmat, "Genre as Text," *Comparative Literature Studies* 17 (1980): 16-25; idem, "The Novel as Genres," 284-91.

[83] Longman, 58-59.

boundaries around a certain group of works in order to set it off from other groups. However, they disagree on the nature and placement of the boundaries.

This procedure of marking boundaries is difficult to perform with a highly intertextual phenomenon like apocalypse, especially in early Christianity where apocalypse and prophecy were so tightly interwoven.[84] However, if it helps interpreters to provide interesting and compelling readings of these works, the procedure is justified. Apocalypse is not a metaphysical entity or essence that scholars are trying to discover; it is a construct created by interpreters to help them interpret.[85] Critics have disagreed over what conventions to include in the definition of apocalypse, but the ultimate goal of their attempts is the same pragmatic one of helping readers interpret and understand these works.

The writers themselves, however, did not realize they were writing apocalypses. Apparently, many, if not all, of them thought they were writing prophecies.[86] Certainly, John's most conscious self-concept of his work is that of prophecy, since he labels it as such six times (1:3; 19:10; 22:7, 10, 18, 19). Since John juxtaposes the description of his book as "the words of the prophecy" (1:3) with the description of it as *apokalypsis* (1:1), it may be reasonable to conclude that the latter term "is a synonym for *propheteia* for John," especially since the noun and verb forms are used elsewhere for Christian prophecy, as in *Hermas*, Galatians 1:12, and 1 Corinthians 14.[87] As Adela Yarbro Collins notes, "the author does not seem to have distinguished between an apocalyptic and a prophetic book."[88] When one compares the term with its use in the Pauline and deutero-Pauline traditions, one can see that for John and his readers it most likely denoted "a visionary, ecstatic experience similar to prophecy."[89]

Those who read the Apocalypse as an apocalypse have selected certain characteristics of the book that it shares with certain other books in order to read it *as if* it were one of those books. They have grouped those works together on the basis of certain similarities and given them the name "apocalypse" because the Apocalypse of John is often used as the starting-point for comparison.[90] The metaphorical nature of reading the Apocalypse as an apocalypse is revealed by the word "as." Those who have described or defined the genre apocalypse have not identified some essence hiding within these texts, waiting to be discovered. Instead, such readers have made intertextual connections between certain works that allow them to read the works in similar ways. In the case of the Apocalypse,

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84 Schüssler Fiorenza, *Book of Revelation*, 168-69. This is a recurrent theme in her work.

85 Collins, *Apocalyptic Imagination*, 6.

86 Schüssler Fiorenza cites *4 Esdras* 12:42; 14:22, 26, in this connection (*Book of Revelation*, 140, 153 n. 21).

87 M. Eugene Boring, "The Apocalypse as Christian Prophecy: A Discussion of the Issues Raised by the Book of Revelation for the Study of Early Christian Prophecy," in *Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers 1974*, ed. G. W. MacRae (Missoula, Mont.: Society of Biblical Literature, 1974), 47; Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, *Invitation to the Book of Revelation* (Garden City: Image Books, 1981), 32; Mazzaferri, 276.

88 Adela Yarbro Collins, *The Apocalypse* (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979), 5.

89 Schüssler Fiorenza, *Book of Revelation*, 150-51.

90 P. D. Hanson, "Apocalypse, Genre," in *Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible: Supplementary Volume*, ed. Keith Crim (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1976), 27. Leonard L. Thompson advises the same approach when he says that "a work may be called an apocalypse if it resembles the Revelation of John" [*The Book of Revelation: Apocalypse and Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 18]. He refers to the Apocalypse of John as "the source for delineating apocalyptic literature" (213).

such a reading requires foregrounding and emphasizing certain aspects at the expense of others, which are deemphasized. In fact, it has proven very difficult to compare the Apocalypse exactly with the other so-called apocalypses because in the eyes of many it either leaves out or adds certain crucial elements so that it cannot be classified as a pure apocalypse.

When the identification of the Apocalypse as an apocalypse is challenged, interpreters who support that identification must respond either by defining the genre so that it does not include those missing elements or by explaining their absence in such a way that the book can still be considered primarily an apocalypse. An example of the latter strategy occurs when it is noted that the Apocalypse is not pseudonymous, which for some is a crucial element of apocalypse. Adela Yarbro Collins responds to this challenge by noting that pseudonymity was a characteristic of many other kinds of works, thereby minimizing its importance for apocalypse.[91] Others have responded to this by noting that the same might also be said for most, if not all, of the other elements of apocalypse.[92] Similarly, John J. Collins explains that the lack of pseudonymity, *ex eventu* prophecy, and esotericism in the Apocalypse is due to the reemergence of prophecy in early Christianity and the resultant "heightened eschatological fervor," which rendered these elements superfluous.[93] Others have responded to him by asking whether the creative impact of prophecy on John's use of the apocalyptic genre has skewed the features of the latter to the point that his work can no longer be considered a pure apocalypse.[94] The same strategy is also used when it is pointed out that the Apocalypse has additional characteristics not normally found in apocalypses. For example, most interpeters note that the Apocalypse is the only apocalypse that is set in an epistolary framework. Because some would question on that basis whether the Apocalypse is a true apocalypse, others must minimize the importance of the epistolary elements.[95]

A second strategy used to defend one's generic identification is to define the genre so that elements missing from the Apocalypse are not included in the definition. For example, those who deny that the Apocalypse is primarily an apocalypse point out that it lacks certain apocalyptic features, pseudonymity being the most frequently mentioned. Interpreters who support its identification as apocalypse respond by excluding those missing features such as pseudonymity from their definition of apocalypse. This strategy was employed most visibly by the Apocalypse Group of the SBL Genres Project, whose results were published in *Semeia* 14. In spite of the fact that all fifteen of the Jewish apocalypses and nineteen out of twenty-four of the early Christian apocalypses[96] included in the investigation are pseudonymous, the group excluded pseudonymity from their definition.

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91 Yarbro Collins, "Early Christian Apocalypses," 71.

92 Mazzaferri, 226-27.

93 Collins, "Pseudonymity," 329-43.

94 Schüssler Fiorenza, "Phenomenon," 310; Vielhauer, 623; Mazzaferri, 227-28.

95 See note 74. Mazzaferri also minimizes the importance of the epistolary elements as incidental due to John's circumstances of banishment, but he does so in order to maintain his identification of the Apocalypse as classical prophecy (231-33).

96 Schüssler Fiorenza believes that only six of the works surveyed in Yarbro Collins' article on early Christian apocalypses are in fact both Christian and early ["The Phenomenon of Early Christian Apocalyptic: Some Reflections on Method," in *Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World and the Near East*, ed. David Hellholm (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1983), 299].

This exclusion was made possible by their methodology, which involved circular reasoning, a typical feature of genre definitions.[97] John J. Collins' description of their procedure reveals the circularity of the approach:

> The strategy employed in this volume has been to begin by examining all the writings which are either called apocalypses or are referred to as apocalyptic by modern authors, and any other writings which appear to be similar to these. By listing the prominent recurring features in these works it is possible to assess the extent of the similarity between them and decide which writings can meaningfully be classified in the same genre. The material surveyed has been limited to "late Antiquity" (approximately 250 BCE to 250 CE, although some earlier material has been studied for background and some material of uncertain date may be later) and to the area of the eastern Mediterranean.[98]

The circularity involved in this project can be exposed in the question that vexes all genre theorists, How can one define apocalypse before one knows on which works to base the definition, yet how can one know on which works to base the definition before one has defined apocalypse?[99] The whole project hinged on their prior selection of works to examine. The Apocalypse Group decided from the outset what works were apocalypses so that the results were predetermined. Because of their synchronic perspective that grouped together works from a wide span of time, they could not allow for the possibility that some of these works might have departed from the unwritten poetics of apocalypse by excluding or transforming some of the conventions. Consequently, by casting their net so widely, they may have forced a number of works into a category in which they do not fit completely. Moreover, it is possible that their definition has left out features that should be included. These points are not intended as criticisms of their project, for it is quite helpful that they have specified the signified or referent of the signifier "apocalypse," thus providing a starting-point for others who wish to use the word in similar or different ways. I am simply illustrating in this way that the definition of apocalypse and the decision whether to include the Apocalypse in that category are ultimately determined by readers and not by the texts themselves.

The approach of the Apocalypse Group is helpful for looking at the group of literary works as a whole, but when one examines an individual book, one must consider its placement in the diachronic development of the generic conventions in order to determine its degree of adherence to or departure from them. Because of their uncritical acceptance of scholarly consensus, the Apocalypse Group included the Apocalypse in their list of books to be compared. Since they decided from the outset that the Apocalypse was an apocalypse, and since it lacks pseudonymity and historical reviews, these features were left out of the final definition. This approach begs the question of the Apocalypse's generic identity by deciding *a priori* that it is an apocalypse. Those who accept the majority view often fail to recognize that their inclusion of the Apocalypse in the genre apoca-

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[97] See Dubrow, 46; Claudio Guillén, *Literature as System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 129; Paul Hernadi, *Beyond Genre: New Directions in Literary Classification* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 2-6; Pérez Firmat, "The Novel as Genres," 271-77.

[98] John J. Collins, "Preface," 4-5.

[99] Hernadi, 2.

lypse depends on how one defines apocalypse. Since the genre is not an essence to be discovered but a text assembled by critics from other texts, interpreters are going to define it in different ways in order to serve their own rhetorical and pragmatic purposes.

When one considers the Apocalypse's diachronic relations to the conventions of apocalypse, one cannot ignore that all of the works considered apocalypses that were written prior to the Apocalypse were pseudonymous. If John were indeed writing an apocalypse, he did not write it based on the common-core definition of the Apocalypse Group, but rather on the basis of the Jewish apocalypses with which he was familiar—and all of them were pseudonymous. While from the later perspective of the Apocalypse Group John wrote an apocalypse, from his own standpoint in the first century, he was writing something different from what we now understand to be an apocalypse. He was departing significantly from the tacit conventions that had been followed in those visionary works up to his day. And not only did he transform the genre by avoiding pseudonymity and historical reviews, he also set his work in an epistolary framework, which was most unusual. When one compares these features with those of similar works which preceded the Apocalypse, one must conclude that the latter is not a pure member of the genre apocalypse as John and his readers would have recognized it, if indeed they would have even recognized such a discrete genre.[100]

The attempt by many to categorize the Apocalypse as an apocalypse reveals two aspects of the role of the reader. First, the reader constructs and defines the genre by deciding which conventions will be considered essential. Second, the reader foregrounds the aspects of the Apocalypse that conform to those conventions. If that categorization is challenged, some ingenuity and effort is required to make it more secure. However, one must wonder how many other generic connections of the book have been overlooked in order to make it fit this one. On what basis does one determine which conventions provide the primary identity for the book? In fact, there seems to be no objective basis for doing so. The decision resides more in the reader and her purposes than in the text.

*The Role of Genre in Interpretation of the Apocalypse*

The interpreter's understanding of the genre in which she categorizes the Apocalypse will affect how she interprets it and what significance she attaches to its various details. Commentators often point out that a proper understanding of this work's genre is essential for its interpretation. As Robert Mounce states: "It is difficult to say what anything means until one has decided in a sense what everything means." He admonishes that "an informed sensitivity to the thought forms and vocabulary of apocalyptic is the *sine qua non* of satisfactory exegesis."[101] Commentators agree that one's assumption of a book's genre will affect how one interprets it. However, one's prior understanding of the nature of the assumed genre also affects how one interprets the book. Various readers may

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100 Harris, 258, n. 55, also recognizes that the lack of pseudonymity and the addition of epistolary conventions deformulates apocalyptic conventions, yet he continues to refer to the Apocalypse as an apocalypse.

101 Mounce, *Book of Revelation*, 12. Additional admonitions to correct generic identification can be found in G. R. Beasley-Murray, *The Book of Revelation* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1974), 16-19; Yarbro Collins, *The Apocalypse*, x-xiv; Schüssler Fiorenza, *Invitation to the Book of Revelation*, 16-22; and James M. Efird, *Revelation for Today: An Apocalyptic Approach* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989), 12.

consider the Apocalypse to be an apocalypse, but if they have different views of the conventions that constitute apocalypse, they will interpret apocalypses in different ways. For example, if an interpreter assumes the Apocalypse is an apocalypse and that apocalypse is literature of the oppressed that combines revelation with the promise of restoration and reversal,[102] then he will highlight those aspects of the book. If one assumes it is an apocalypse but that apocalypse is a revelation of heavenly mysteries,[103] then the mystical and revelatory aspects will carry greater significance than the eschatological. If one thinks that apocalypse is a flight from history into a cosmic vision of divine deliverance due to a pessimistic view of reality,[104] then elements supporting this view will become more significant than those that relate the cosmic vision to everyday reality. If one views apocalyptic symbols as "steno-symbols" or simple allegorical codes for historical persons and events contemporary with the writer,[105] then he will interpret the symbols of the Apocalypse to refer to particular persons and events in John's day. Interpreters who understand apocalyptic to be a reflection of the hope for transcendence of death on the part of oppressed people will focus on the visions of the afterlife in the book and will interpret the rest of the book as reflecting those concerns.[106] Those who adopt a sociology-of-knowledge approach to apocalyptic and see it as offering an alternative symbolic universe to readers will perhaps downplay the historical, "real-world" connections of the book and highlight its construction of a story in which suffering of the righteous makes sense.[107] These examples suggest that one's view of the pragmatic aspects of a genre, i.e., its function, purpose, or referentiality, especially determines how one interprets it.

Of course, the book will take on a completely different character for the reader who assumes it is a prophecy or a drama or a liturgy, depending on the reader's understanding of those genres. It appears that the various methods or schools of interpretation of the Apocalypse most likely resulted from disagreements over its genre and the significance or referent of each of the proposed genres.[108] Other elements that affect interpretation factor into the process of reading, but the identification of the genre determines to a large extent the interpreter's general orientation.

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[102] E. P. Sanders, "The Genre of Palestinian Jewish Apocalypses," in *Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World and the Near East*, ed. David Hellholm (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1983), 447-59.

[103] Christopher Rowland, *The Open Heaven: A Study of Apocalyptic in Judaism and Early Christianity* (New York: Crossroad, 1982).

[104] Paul D. Hanson, *The Dawn of Apocalyptic: The Historical and Sociological Roots of Jewish Apocalyptic Eschatology*, rev. ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979).

[105] Norman Perrin, *Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom: Symbol and Metaphor in New Testament Interpretation* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 30-32, 44-45, 59-60, 76-78.

[106] John J. Collins, "The Symbolism of Transcendence in Jewish Apocalyptic," *Biblical Research* 19 (1974): 5-22.

[107] David L. Barr, "The Apocalypse as a Symbolic Transformation of the World: A Literary Analysis," *Interpretation* 38 (1984): 39-50; Paul D. Hanson, "Apocalypticism," in *Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, Supplementary Volume*, ed. Keith Crim (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1976), 31.

[108] For analyses of these approaches, see R. H. Charles, "History of the Interpretation of the Apocalypse," chap. in *Studies in the Apocalypse*, 2nd ed (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1915); John M. Court, *Myth and History in the Book of Revelation* (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1979), 1-19; Mounce, 39-45; Schüssler Fiorenza, *Book of Revelation*, 35-45.

*Common Patterns in Hypotheses of the Apocalypse's Genre*

A survey of the various hypotheses of the Apocalypse's genre reveals two patterns. First, rarely does anyone argue that the book can be categorized as belonging to just one genre. Usually, one generic aspect will be considered the form into which some other generic content has been poured. Schüssler Fiorenza views it as Christian prophetic-apocalyptic in the form of a circular, authoritative apostolic letter, but she views prophecy as the primary aspect.[109] Willem Vorster describes it in one place as a first-person narrative in the form of a circular letter containing apocalyptic eschatology[110] and elsewhere as a narrative of fantasy.[111] According to John Wick Bowman, it consists of prophetic content constructed as a drama in seven acts with the form of a letter superimposed on it.[112] James L. Blevins describes it as a syncretistic combination of a prophetic message and the form of Greek tragic drama.[113] David E. Aune says that it is an extended vision report, or apocalypse, framed by an epistolary prescript and postscript and introduced by a title.[114] Beasley-Murray views it as a unique combination of epistle, apocalypse, and prophecy.[115] David Hill regards it as prophetic in intention and character but concedes that it employs much of the traditional apparatus of apocalyptic while lacking many of apocalyptic's characteristic features.[116] The options go on and on, but all seem to recognize that this book has mixed generic conventions so that it cannot be categorized in one pure genre. In fact, the adjective that is used frequently to refer to the form of the book is "unique."[117] Even those few who attempt valiantly but unsuccessfully to categorize the book in one genre often recognize the many other generic features contained in it and must concede that its inclusion of these various elements in one book makes it unique. For example, Aune describes the Apocalypse as an apocalypse but nevertheless emphasizes that no other apocalypse is framed by epistolary conventions.[118]

The second pattern is that no matter what genre is considered the primary one for this book, someone can always point out ways in which the book does not quite fit into that genre. If one says it is an apocalypse, others will point out that it lacks pseudonymity, *ex eventu* prophecies, esotericism, heavenly journeys, an angel-interpreter to a great extent, pessimism concerning the present age, determinism, and lists of revealed things.[119] If one says it is a drama, someone

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109 Schüssler Fiorenza, *Book of Revelation*, 133-156; idem, *The Apocalypse* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1976), 14-26.

110 Willem Vorster, "1 Enoch and the Jewish Literary Setting of the New Testament: A Study in Text Types," *Neotestamentica* 17 (1983): 11-12.

111 Vorster, "'Genre' and the Revelation of John," 111-20.

112 Bowman, 436-53.

113 Blevins, 393.

114 Aune, *New Testament in its Literary Environment*, 240.

115 Beasley-Murray, 12-29.

116 David Hill, *New Testament Prophecy* (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1979), 75.

117 Beasley-Murray, 12; Aune, *New Testament*, 240; Hill, 75.

118 Aune, *New Testament*, 240. Examples of those who attempt to minimize other missing generic elements in order to classify the Revelation in one genre include John J. Collins, "Pseudonymity, Historical Reviews and the Genre of the Revelation of John," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 39 (1977): 329-43; Yarbro Collins, "Early Christian Apocalypses"; and Mazzaferri.

119 Schüssler Fiorenza, *Book of Revelation*, 168-69; Bruce W. Jones, "More about the Apocalypse as Apocalyptic," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 87 (1968): 325-27; George Eldon

else will point out that it does not contain the dialogue one normally finds in drama nor do the hymns really function as choruses.[120] These disagreements originate in two different aspects of reading. First, the disagreements result from different views of what characteristics constitute the genre that is being considered. For example, whether or not one believes pseudonymity to be an essential part of apocalypse determines whether one views the Apocalypse as an apocalypse. Disagreements over the Apocalypse's generic identity may have its origin in a prior disagreement about the genre with which it is compared. Second, the disagreement may result from the way the interpreter reads the evidence in the Apocalypse. Some of the features of a genre may be open to subjective interpretations. For example, if one believes that pessimism about current history is a fundamental feature of apocalypse, then one must examine the book for evidence either supporting or refuting this aspect, but since this involves interpretation of the book, readers may, and do, come to different conclusions. Another example is that most definitions of apocalypse view the angel-interpreter as a crucial element. In the Apocalypse, however, the angel-interpreter appears infrequently (1:1; 17:1-18; 18:1-3, 21-24; 19:9; 21:9-14; 22:6ff.), and when he does appear, he rarely gives an interpretation. In addition, it is not always clear whether the same angel or different ones are speaking to John. Often, the revelation is given directly by a voice from heaven or by Christ himself rather than through the angel.[121] Obviously, this evidence will be read in different ways by different readers. Some will conclude that the angel-interpreter plays a large enough role to consider this an apocalypse while others will argue that the angel's lack of importance in the narrative calls into question the apocalyptic identification.

Disagreements over the Apocalypse's generic identity result from the process of comparing a particular text to its generic paradigm. In the case of the Apocalypse, some of the genres with which it is compared, such as apocalypse and prophecy, were not clearly defined and recognized in antiquity. In this case, the interpreter's identification of the Apocalypse is dependent on her prior reconstruction of the ancient genre. In the case of other genres that were relatively fixed and conscious, such as drama, the Apocalypse just does not seem to fit comfortably into any of them. It seems that no matter what genre or blend of genres one chooses for its identity, the Apocalypse will always be more and less than that identity. There will always be some surplus not accounted for by the generic choice, and the text will refuse to fit completely and neatly into any generic identification. This text constantly overruns any boundaries placed around it. It refuses to stay in bounds.

## Summary

The fact that readers have proffered so many different generic identities of the Apocalypse reveals certain aspects of the text and its readers. With respect to the text, the Apocalypse is a highly intertextual work, a mixed genre. It offers multiple possibilities to the reader without fully supporting any one option. It gives the reader the opportunity to focus on one or a combination of several alterna-

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Ladd, "The Revelation and Jewish Apocalyptic," *Evangelical Quarterly* 29 (1957): 94-100; Vielhauer, 623; Hill, 71-76; Mazzaferri, 223-51; Mounce, 23-24.

[120] Schüssler Fiorenza, *Book of Revelation*, 167; Vorster, "'Genre' and the Book of Revelation," 116.

[121] Vielhauer, 623; Mazzaferri, 228, 276-78, 293-94.

tives, but whatever boundaries the reader places around it cannot bind the text. It will not stay in bounds. It is constantly breaking out of its frame. Consequently, it can be described as a writerly text or an open work that allows the reader to participate in producing its meaning. Because of its intertextuality, it is also polyvalent, allowing readers to produce multiple interpretations. Thus, this book is both a bane and blessing to interpreters. It provides simultaneous frustration and pleasure to the reader.

With respect to its readers, they cannot read this work without a hypothesis concerning its genre. Readers create genres in a deductive fashion in order to aid interpretation. Their presuppositions concerning a genre's conventions will determine what meanings they find in the text belonging to that genre and how they react to what they find. Readers cannot read a text from multiple perspectives simultaneously, so in the case of works of a high degree of intertextuality they will focus on one alternative or try to create some blend of two or three. But these attempts never really describe the "nature" or "essence" of the text since the text will always be more and less than these attempts can account for.

There is no one correct solution to the question of the Apocalypse's genre. Readers can never get behind the veil of the text and pluck out an indisputable, irrefutable generic essence that will be convincing to all readers. The text will not let them do this, and readers would not stand for it anyway. Readers can never reach the end of the road in interpreting this book. They will continue plumbing its depths for years to come, offering new possibilities, answers, and solutions never before offered. The search for its generic identity and its meaning will continue endlessly. That is one reason why reading this book provides the reader with so much pleasure.

# Christ as a Pharmakos in Pauline Soteriology

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> Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law having become a curse in our place—for it is written, "Cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree." (Gal. 3:13)

This paper will explore a new approach for interpreting the concept of atonement found in Gal. 3:13. If one thing emerges from this text more clearly than any other, it is that, in the eyes of Paul, atonement was effected by Christ becoming accursed. Since Paul's letters are theologically, rather than biographically, motivated *vis à vis* Jesus, we are justified in concluding that this text does not simply embellish a historical reminiscence of Jesus' death passed on by the early Church. Rather, Paul is making a *theological* statement which must be interpreted.

What sort of soteriology can be behind Paul's image of Christ the curse? Unless we are to empty Gal. 3:13 of all content it must be frankly admitted that this image of the accursed savior cannot be confused with any concept which does not include this idea as a central feature. This idea will provide this inquiry with an important principle of discernment and selection—a cornerstone criterion for exploring the background ideas of this text.

The atoning significance of Christ's death has traditionally been interpreted in reference to Levitical sacrifice, the *Ebed Yahweh* (cf. Is. 53:4-5, 11-12), the righteous martyr (e.g., 4 Macc. 6:28-29; 17:21-22) and the *Akedah*. I my opinion, the theology of Levitical sacrifice cannot explain Paul's theology of the atonement, much less account the concept of Christ becoming accursed.[1] Moreover, Paul displays no interest in the soteriology of the *Ebed Yahweh*: in all of his letters, there is not a single quotation or clear allusion to any verse of the fourth Servant Song concerning atonement.[2] All this aside, I know of no text in the Jewish tradition which contains the teaching that a righteous man can vicariously atone for the sin of others by becoming accursed.

Yet, it cannot be supposed that Paul's accursed Christ is a creation *ex nihilo*. Paul could not have created such unanticipated configurations of thought with-

[1] Bradley McLean, "The Absence of an Atoning Sacrifice in Paul's Soteriology," forthcoming in *NTS*; for an explanation of the meaning of the Levitical sin offering see: Bradley McLean, "The Interpretation of the Levitical Sin Offering and the Scapegoat," forthcoming in *Studies in Religion*.

[2] Paul quotes Is. 52:15 (=Rom. 15:21) and Is. 53:1 (=Rom. 10:16) in order to convince the Romans of the value of his planned mission to Spain.

out the aid of cognate conceptions provided by the surrounding cultures and religions.[3] I suggest that a new starting point is required for the exegesis of Gal. 3:13 and other texts, based on the Greco-Roman *pharmakos* rituals as defined below. The common features of these rituals include the selection of a substitutionary human victim, the transfer of a curse to the victim, and finally, his expulsion or execution. In my reading, only one scholar, Joseph Lightfoot, has compared the theology of Gal. 3:13 to pharmakos rituals.[4]

There is no reason to exclude *a priori* the influence of pharmakos rituals on Paul. The emergence of Christianity in the first century required the assimilation of new and diverse ideas into existing ones. The language, cosmology and anthropology of the Paul are in many ways a common possession of the ancient Near Eastern religious consciousness, despite the fact that these borrowed concepts frequently fulfilled new functions within the context of Paul's theology. Nor should it be assumed that Paul restricted himself to Jewish typology when discussing the significance of Christ's death. Paul could scarcely have expected his gospel to take root in the Greco-Roman world unless he incorporated ideas which were familiar to the Gentile Christians in the churches of Asia, Macedonia and Achaia. Therefore, it stands to reason that Paul's soteriology cannot be properly understood unless a scholar is also a citizen of this broader religious culture.

In the following pages I shall discuss five soteriological features of Gal. 3:10-14 which, taken together, embody its operative soteriological paradigm. A brief exegesis of 2 Cor. 5:21 will demonstrate that this same combination of features occurs elsewhere in Paul's letters. Secondly, I will give an account of the various so-called 'pharmakos rituals,' their underlying concepts, probable purposes, and methods of execution. Having completed an examination of particular rituals, I will compare the pharmakos paradigm with the paradigm of Gal. 3:10-14. Finally, I will evaluate the evidence as to whether Paul would have had knowledge of pharmakos rituals.

*A) The Soteriological Paradigm in Gal. 3:10-14*

My exegesis will be amplified from the following five headings: 1) the necessity for the crucifixion; 2) the role of Christ; 3) the operation of atonement; 4) the resultant state of Christ; 5) the resultant state of Christians.

*1) The Necessity for the Crucifixion (Gal. 3:10)*

> For all who rely on works of the law are under a curse (ὑπὸ κατάραν); for it is written, "Cursed (ἐπικατάρτος) is everyone who does not fulfill all things written in the book of the law."

In the preceding verses Paul has asserted that those who have renounced all allegiances with the old creation are freed to be partakers in God's *blessing* (Gal. 3:7-9). In verse 10 he states the corollary of this proposition: those who have *retained* loyalties to the old creation by observing the law are "under a curse"

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[3] Heinz Guenther, "The World of Religion in the New Testament," in *New Testament and Hermeneutics. Commemorating the 80th Birthday of Prof. Dr. Jisaburo Matsuki,* (1986), 1-26, esp. 20.

[4] Joseph Lightfoot, *St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians,* (London: Macmillan, 1865/$^{3}$1905), 139.

(ὑπὸ κατάραν).[5] It is entirely logical that the corresponding fate to being blessed is bearing a curse since the act of cursing is the diametric opposite of blessing.[6] Paul does not envision any middle ground—one is either blessed or cursed.

Paul takes pains to support his argument by quoting Dt. 27:26. This citation is taken from the closing statement of the curses pronounced on Mount Ebal. In order to comprehend fully the implied import of Dt. 27:26 in Paul's argument, it is necessary to compare his citation of Dt. 27:26 with that of the LXX and the Masoretic text. The Masoretic text reads: "Cursed is anyone who does not fulfill the words of this law by observing them." The LXX has intensified the gravity and comprehensiveness of the statement with the addition of the words, πᾶς and πᾶσιν , stressing that "cursed (ἐπικατάρτος) is *everyone* who does not fulfill *all* the words of this law." The 'laws' to which the Masoretic text and LXX refer are narrowly defined and limited in number. Dt. 27:26 specifies "the sayings of *this* law," namely, the twelve curses previously cited in Dt. 27:15-26.

Paul modifies Dt. 27:26 such that it encompasses the entire Jewish law (πᾶσιν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ τοῦ νόμου). According to Paul's version of Dt. 27:26, the whole law must be observed *in toto* or else a curse is invoked. In this adapted form, Dt. 27:26 serves as a stern indictment of the Galatian compromisers and their gospel, for they do not keep the *whole* law (Gal. 6:13, cf. 5:3). Paul warns that the selective observance of the law, as taught by the Galatian compromisers, can have no future. The transgression of but a single ordinance results in a curse.[7]

The curse associated with transgression of the law should not be psychologized or spiritualized. In the ancient world to which Paul belonged, curses were perceived to be real. When Jesus cursed a fig tree, it "withered at once" (Mt. 21:19-20).[8] Curses were like toxic pollutions whose inherent potency was so great

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[5] The phrase ὑπὸ κατάραν is a *hapax legomenon* in the New Testament. It is clearly related to the expression "*under* the law" (ὑπὸ νόμον; Gal. 4:4, 5; 5:18; Rom. 6:14), since observing the law according to Paul implies bearing its curse. Cf. similar expressions such as "*under* guardians and trustees" and being "enslaved to the elemental powers of the world" (Gal. 4:2, 3; cf. 4:8, 9).

[6] The act of blessing is the perfect opposite of cursing. For this reason, the forms given to curses and blessing are frequently parallel (e.g., Dt. 11:29; Jer. 17:5-8). Six tribes stood on Mt. Ebal to curse those who disobeyed the law while at the same time the six remaining tribes stood on Mt. Gerazim to pronounce the corresponding blessing (Dt. 27:11-28:6). The close identity between cursing and blessing is evident in Jas. 3:9-10: "With the tongue we bless the Lord and Father, and with it we curse men...From the same mouth comes blessing and cursing."

[7] On the surface, Dt. 27:26 seems to contradict Paul's assertion that all who follow the law are under a curse. The positive inference of Dt. 27:16 is that as many as observe the law faithfully are *not* cursed. However, Paul's theology proceeds from solution to plight (E. P. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977], 474). Christ's provision of a new creation has invalidated the old creation including the law (B. R. Gaventa, "The Singularity of the Gospel: A Reading of Galatians," *SBL 1988 Seminar Papers*, (D. J. Lull, ed.; Atlanta: Georgia, 1988), 20, 23, 26). Therefore, loyalty to the law has the same consequence as loyalty to the old unredeemed order; it results in bearing a curse.

[8] The custom of cursing presumes a close association between a spoken wish and its fulfillment. Edward Westermarck explains: "The wish is looked upon in the light of energy which may be transferred—by material contact, or by the eye, or by means of speech—to the person concerned, and then becomes a fact. This process, however, is not taken quite as a matter of course; there is always some mystery about it" (*The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, [2 Vols; London: Macmillan, 1906-8], I, 563).

that they often accompanied the declaration of punishments (Gen. 3:14, 16; 4:11), the utterance of threats (Jer. 11:3; 17:5; Mal. 1:4) and the proclamation of laws (Dt. 11:26-28; 27:15ff) in order to provide the necessary deterrent. The pollution associated with curses was such that they were also used as potent weapons (e.g. Jgs. 9:57; Prov. 11:26; 30:10). Likewise, Paul's concept of being *"under* a curse" should be understood in such *physical* terms; he means to say that the transgressors truly incur a deadly polluting curse on their backs, and are in absolute subjection to its toxic effects.[9]

*2) Christ's Substitutionary Role (Gal. 3:13a)*

Nothing illustrates more strikingly the potential peril of this curse than Paul's boldly conceived account of Christ's act of discharging this curse in his own body. Christ's role in this process is succinctly defined by the prepositional phrase ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν. There are two meanings of ὑπέρ (+ genitive) which are easily confused; the *beneficiary use* has the English sense, 'for our benefit.' The *substitutionary use* means 'in place of us.' These two meanings are conceptually distinguishable, though they sometimes overlap in actual practice: there are circumstances when one acts for the benefit of another person by taking his place. The beneficiary use of ὑπέρ in the New Testament is by no means controversial. Contention has arisen, however, over the translation of ὑπέρ (+ gen.) in a substitutionary sense in Gal. 3:13.

There is widespread evidence in classical and hellenistic Greek literature for the substitutionary use of ὑπέρ, including the literal sense of a life being offering in substitute for another life.[10] Therefore, it is not surprising that Paul also employs ὑπέρ in a substitutionary sense. Paul speaks of "those who are being baptized *in the place of* the dead" (οἱ βαπτιζόμενοι ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν [1 Cor. 15:29]). In 2 Cor. 5:14, Paul declares: "For the love of Christ controls us, because we are convinced that one has died *in the place of* all people (ὑπὲρ πάντων); therefore all have died."[11]

Though the attack against the substitutionary usage of ὑπέρ in Gal. 3:13 was argued by nineteenth-century scholars, I have found only one twentieth-century

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[9] In the NT, ὑπό (+ acc.) frequently means under the power, rule, or command of someone or something (Walter Bauer, *A Greek Lexicon of the New Testament,* (Rev. & Augmented by Wm. R. Arndt, F. W. Gingrich and F. W. Danker; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958/21979), ὑπό, 843, sect. 2b).

[10] E.g. Is. 43:3-4; Jn. 11:50; 1 Clem. 5:1; Ep. Diog. 9:2, 5; Xen. *Anab.* VII, 4.9; Herodotus, *Hist.* VII, 114.2; Pl. *Rep.* 590a; also *Gorg.* 515c; Thuc. I, 141.15. Adolf Deissmann has observed the habitual use of ὑπέρ in a substitutionary sense in papyri and ostraca indicating that the scribe acts as the representative or agent of an illiterate person (*Light from the Ancient East,* [Rev. ed.; L. R. M. Strachan; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1927], 152, 166, 331, 335).

[11] A. T. Robertson remarks that in 2 Cor. 5:14, ὑπέρ should be understood in a substitutionary sense because Paul uses "therefore all have died" as the conclusion of εἷς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανεν (A. T. Robertson speaks of Christ taking us "out from under the curse" (*A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research* [Nashville: Broadman, 1934], 631). J.-F. Collage concludes, "Toutefois, l'antithèse 'un-tous' ne permet pas d'en préciser le sens autrement que dans l'optique de la substitution. Le ὑπὲρ se rapproche ainsi d'un ἀντί" (*Énigmes de la Deuxième Épître de Paul aux Corinthiens,* [Cambridge: CUP, 1972], 254). This evidence is strengthened further by the fact that Paul never uses ἀντί in a substitutionary sense. The interchangeability of ὑπέρand ἀντί is demonstrated by Irenaeus (*Haer.* V, 1.1). Elsewhere, Paul explains to Philemon: "I would have been glad to keep him [Onesimus] with me, in order that he might serve me *as your agent* (ὑπὲρ σοῦ) during my imprisonment for the gospel" (Phlm. 13).

scholar, *viz.* Ernest de Witt Burton (1921), who has adopted this position. In his argumentation, it is not so much the semantic features of ὑπέρ, as its theological character to which his attention is chiefly directed.[12] Indeed, there is now virtual scholarly unanimity on the substitutionary meaning of ὑπέρ in Gal. 3:13. The explanation given by A.T. Robertson is most instructive and worthy of being quoted *in extenso*:[13]

> There are a few other passages where ὑπὲρ has the resultant notion of *instead* and only violence to the context can get rid of it. One of these is Gal. 3:13. In verse 10, Paul has said that those under the law were under a curse (ὑπὸ κατάραν). In verse 13 he carries on the same image. Christ bought us "out from under" the curse (ἐκ τῆς κατάρας τοῦ νόμου) of the law by becoming a curse "over us" (γενόμενος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν κατάρα). In a word, we were *under* the curse; Christ took the curse on himself and thus *over* us (between the suspended curse and us) and thus rescued us *out from under* the curse. We went free while he was considered accursed (3:13).

Therefore, in Gal. 3:13 Christ's soteriological role is defined in terms of substitution; he physically stands in the place of the transgressors in order that he may bear their curse.

*3) The Operation of Atonement (Gal. 3:13b)*

In the citation of Dt. 27:26 in Gal. 3:10, the term ἐπικατάρατος ("cursed") was employed to describe those who transgress the law. In his citation of Dt. 21:23 (Gal. 3:13), Paul has substituted this same term (ἐπικατάρατος) in place of a synonym (κεκατηραμένος). By this minor alteration, Paul has created a literal parallel between the accursed condition of the transgressors (Gal. 3:10) and the accursed condition of Christ (Gal. 3:13).[14] This parallelism reinforces Paul's assertion that the two curses are in fact one.

Paul makes use of Dt. 21:23 in order to illustrate exactly how the curse borne by transgressors was transferred to Christ: it was the *manner* of Christ's death, that is, *hanging on a tree*, which involved him in the curse of transgressors.[15] The act of crucifying Christ simultaneously caused the curse to be transferred from humanity to Christ. As Hans Dieter Betz explains, Dt. 21:23 demonstrates that "a curse [on Christ] became effective through the act of hanging on the cross."[16]

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[12] Ernest de Witt Burton offers no arguments against a substitutionary interpretation. He only argues in favour of a beneficiary usage, meaning 'to accomplish something for someone,' by analogy with Gal. 1:4 (*A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians*, [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1921], 12, 172). Substitutionary meaning was denied by Johann von Flatt (1828), Leopold Rückert (1833), Johann von Hoffmann (1863), Franz Reithmayr (1865) and H. A. W. Meyer (1884). Twentieth century exponents of the *substitutionary* interpretation include: Pierre Bonnard, C. K. Barrett, Marie-Joseph Lagrange, Franz Mussner, Charles Coursar, Joseph Fitzmyer, Donald Guthrie, William Neil, H. Riesenfeld, and Joachim Jeremias; cf. Justin Martyr *Dial.* 95:2.

[13] A. T. Robertson, *Grammar*, 631; also: Maximilian Zerwick, *Biblical Greek*, (J. Smith; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1963), 30, sect. 91.

[14] Hans Vollmer, *Die alttestamentlichen Citate bei Paulus*, (Leipzig: Metzger & Wittig, 1869), 29; Marie-Joseph Lagrange, *St. Paul, Epître aux Galates*, (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1918/$^{2}$1925), 72; F. F. Bruce, *The Epistle of Paul to the Galatians*, (Exeter: Pater Noster Press, 1982), 165; Georg Bertram, κρεμάννυμι, *TDNT*, III, 917-19.

[15] Donald Guthrie, *Galatians*, (CBNS; London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1969), 103.

[16] Hans Dieter Betz, *Galatians*, (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 152. Similarly, F. F. Bruce remarks: "The curse which Christ 'became' was his people's curse,

*4) Resultant State of Christ*

The consequence of Christ's substitutionary crucifixion is set forth in Paul's startling statement, "Christ *became a curse* (γενόμενος κατάρα) in our place." This same expression (*viz.*, γίνομαι + κατάρα) occurs in the Protevangelium of James where Anna laments her barrenness in an impassioned prayer to God: "I have *become a curse* (κατάρα ἐγενήθην) in the eyes of the Israelites" (Pr. Jas. 3).

Any analysis of Paul's statement must begin with the recognition of the rhetorical device known as metonymy, i.e., the use of an abstract term for one which is more concrete.[17] Paul has employed metonymy in other contexts. For example, the abstract terms 'circumcision' (περιτομή) and 'uncircumcision' (ἀκροβυστία) are used to specify 'Jews' and 'Gentiles' (e.g., Gal. 2:7; 5:6; 6:15). Metonymy is also at work in 2 Cor. 5:21 where Christ is described as becoming *sin*, an abstract term.

Paul signals the reader that he is using metonymy in Gal. 3:13 by complementing the abstract term 'curse' (κατάρα) with the adjective 'cursed' (ἐπικατάρατος) and by omitting the article with κατάρα, indicating that a category of quality is intended. Therefore, the statement, "Christ became a curse" is an emphatic way of saying 'Christ became the object of a polluting curse.' In the words of Marie-Joseph Lagrange, Christ is "the one upon whom the curse is discharged."[18] Lightfoot's explanation is more detailed:

> The expression is to be explained ... by the religious conception which it involves. The victim is regarded as bearing the sins of those for whom atonement is made. The curse is transferred from them to it. It becomes in a certain sense the impersonation of the sin and of the curse.[19]

Paul's use of metonymy in Gal. 3:13 describes Christ's condition in the strongest possible terms. The discharge of the curse is absolute with the result that Christ physically embodies the curse, or as Marie-Joseph Lagrange concludes, "Christ became a curse personified."[20] By his subjection to this curse, Christ becomes an image of fallen humanity, a recreation of the first Adam.

A review of biblical texts will reveal that the polluted condition of being cursed necessitated banishment. After Adam and Eve were cursed they were driven out of the garden and armed cherubim were stationed at the entrance to prevent their return (Gen. 3:16-19, 23-24). After the cursing of Cain, God banished him as a fugitive: Cain laments, "behold you have driven me this day away from the ground; and from your face I shall be hidden; and I shall be a fugitive and a wanderer on the earth" (Gen. 4:14). Simeon and Levi are cursed

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as the death which he died was their death...Christ endured the curse on his people's behalf (by being 'hanged on a tree') in order to redeem them from the curse pronounced on those who failed to keep the law" (*Galatians*, 166, cf. 164).

17 M.-J. Lagrange, *Galates*, 71; F. Büchsel, *s.v.* κατάρα, *TDNT*, I, 449-51, esp. 450; John Bligh *Galatians in Greek*, (Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1966), 138; Rudolf Bultmann *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, (tr. R. A. Harrisville; Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House, 1976/1985), 165. H. A. W. Meyer, *Critical and Exegetical Commentary to the Epistle to the Galatians*, (CECNT 7; tr. Wm. D. Dickson; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1884), 153; Johann Bengel, *Gnomon of the New Testament*, (2 Vols; tr. Charlton T. Lewis; Philadelphia: Pekinpini & Higgins, 1860), II, 355.

18 M.-J. Lagrange, *Galates*, 72.

19 J. B. Lightfoot, *Galatians*, note on Gal. 3:13, p.139.

20 M.-J. Lagrange, *Galates*, 72. Paul's portrayal of Christ's debasement, defilement and humiliation is a theme found elsewhere in his letters (e.g. Phil. 2:5-8; 2 Cor. 8:9).

and then scattered in Israel (Gen. 49:7). According to Dt. 29:18 the Lord brought curses upon those who forsook the law and he "uprooted them from their land ... and cast them into another land" (Dt. 29:28). The prophet Jeremiah warns: "Cursed is the man who trusts in man ... whose heart turns away from the Lord ... He shall dwell in the parched places of the wilderness, in an uninhabited salt land" (Jer. 17:5-6). Similarly, when Christ was polluted by a curse, he became unfit for all social contact. His death is a kind of expulsion which eradicates the curse by eradicating the curse-bearer.

*5) Resultant State of Christians (Gal. 3:14)*

Gal. 3:14 summarizes the benefits of Christ's death which the Galatians will receive if they remain faithful to Paul 's gospel. This verse is structured around two parallel ἵνα clauses which together, specify that these benefits are contained within the purpose of the preceding verse, i.e., they are occasioned by the transfer of their curse to Christ. First, Christians will be partakers of Abraham's blessing (cf. Gal. 3:8-9); secondly, they will receive God's Spirit. The second ἵνα clause expresses coincidence of time with the first such that God is said to bestow his Spirit and his blessing in a single act.[21]

**The Soteriological Paradigm in 2 Cor. 5:21**

> God made him who knew no sin to be sin (ἁμαρτία) in our place, in order that we may become the righteousness of God (δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ).

The exegesis of this passage must begin by putting to rest the question of the meaning of the second occurrence of the term ἁμαρτία in this verse. Does it mean *sin*, or as some have suggested, *sin offering*? I know of only one recent New Testament scholar, F. F. Bruce, who has thought that ἁμαρτία in 2 Cor. 5:21 means 'sin-offering.' Bruce's translation is based on an analogy with Is. 53:6.[22] However, Oscar Cullmann has persuasively demonstrated that there is no clear reference to Is. 53:6 in 2 Cor. 5:21, thereby undercutting the foundation of Bruce's argument.[23] Philipp Bachmann has dealt with the issue of the meaning of ἁμαρτία in 2 Cor. 5:21 more exhaustively than any other scholar and has summarized the general scholarly consensus on this subject, namely, that ἁμαρτία in 2 Cor. 5:21 means *sin*, not *sin offering*.[24] 2 Cor. 5:21 can be analyzed according to same framework as that used for Gal. 3:13.

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[21] Charles Ellicott, *A Commentary, Critical and Grammatical on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, (Boston: Crosby, Nicholas, Lee & Co., 1860), 75.*

[22] *F. F. Bruce, 1 and 2 Corinthians*, (London: Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1971), 210; cf. some Old Testament scholars also hold this interpretation: Roland de Vaux, *Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions*, (J. McHugh, tr.; NY: McGraw-Hill, 1961), 420; Norman Snaith, "Sacrifices in the Old Testament," *VT* 7 (1957), 308-317, esp. 316. This interpretation was also adopted by Augustine (354-430 CE), Ambrosiaster (4th cent.), Pelagius (d. ca. 412), Oecumenius (6th cent.) and Erasmus (1469-1536 CE).

[23] Oscar Cullman, *Christology of the New Testament*, (tr. Shirley C. Guthrie & Charles A.M. Hall; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1957/1959), 76.

[24] Philipp Bachmann, *Der zweite Brief des Paulus an die Korinther*, (KNT 8; Th. Zahn ed.; Leipzig: Deichert, 1918/41922), 272-274.

*1) Necessity for the Crucifixion*

The Corinthians have lapsed from righteousness (2 Cor. 5:19). They are therefore in need of being 'reconciled' to God (2 Cor. 5:20).

*2) Christ's Substitutionary Role*

The evidence of Paul's use of ὑπέρ in a substitutionary sense need not be repeated here. In 2 Cor. 5:21, ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν is used in a substitutionary sense.[25] By standing in the place of humanity, Christ receives the burden of humanity's sin (ἁμαρτία). This purification restores humanity to its original condition, defined as "the righteousness of God." In the words of John McFadyen:

> Christ was completely identified with human sin; and with the same completeness as we are identified with divine righteousness ... in both cases there is an inner identification, as it were—of Him with sin, and of us with righteousness.[26]

*3) The Operation of Atonement*

In 2 Cor. 5:21 Paul clearly specifies that it was God who caused the sin to be transferred. There is the underlying assumption that Christians act unwisely if they rely on their own efforts to recover their sinless state: a substitutionary victim is necessary upon whom the polluting sin may be transferred. The main difference between 2 Cor. 5:21 and Gal. 3:13 is that the former specifies the divine agency of this transfer (God), whereas the latter specifies the earthly means (crucifixion).

*4) Resultant State of Christ*

As in Gal. 3:13, Paul employs the semantic devise known as metonymy, the substitution of the abstract term for one which is concrete.[27] When Paul says that God made Christ to be *sin*, he means that Christ assumed the burden of sin borne by transgressors. Hartwig Thyen describes Christ as being made over into "a carrier of sin."[28] In the words of J.-F. Collange, "Christ was made sin in the sense that he personified all the sins of man, he is the curse incarnate."[29]

Common sense suggests that sin can more easily be transferred to a sinless victim than to a victim which is already loaded with sin. Perhaps this is the logic at work in Paul's statement that Christ's original condition was that of *not knowing sin* (2 Cor. 5:21a; cf. Phil. 2:6).

*5) Resultant State of Christians*

In the preceding verses, Paul has made it clear how the long-expected salvation is partially realized as a present reality. He emphasizes that each Christian is "in Christ" (ἐν Χριστῷ) and therefore each a "new creation" (καινὴ κτίσις, 2 Cor. 5:17-18). This same theme is repeated in 2 Cor. 5:21, for Christians are said to

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[25] M. Zerwick, *Biblical Greek*, 30, sect. 91.

[26] John McFadyen, *The Epistles to the Corinthians*, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1911), 322.

[27] R. Bultmann, *Corinthians*, 165; Jean Héring, *La Seconde Épître de St. Paul aux Corinthiens*, (CNT 8; Neuchatel; Paris: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1958), 54.

[28] Hartwig Thyen, *Studien zur Sündenvergebung im Neuen Testament und seinen alttestamentlichen und jüdischen Voraussetzungen*, (FRLANT 96; Göttingen: V. & R., 1970), 188.

[29] J.-F. Collange, *Deuxième Epître*, 276.

have bestowed upon them a new nature, previously reserved for Christ, the "righteousness of God" (δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ).

*B) Greco-Roman Pharmakos Rituals*

Though the rituals described below share many common characteristics, the terminology is diverse.[30] As a convenient shorthand, I shall refer to them as *pharmakos rituals* because the term *pharmakos* (φαρμακός) occurs frequency in the sources and is commonly employed in the secondary literature.[31]

In order to understand pharmakos rituals it is necessary to comprehend something of the interior belief which inspired them. Pharmakos rituals reflect a shared belief in the reality of curses as deadly pollutions which involved the very real possibility of physical contagion and personal danger. Curses, as pollutions or impurities, could physically manifested themselves as plagues, droughts, famines or even as military defeat. These curses were the product of transgression against the gods. As Robert Parker explains, a curse was "a spontaneous and automatic product of transgression."[32] Diogenes Laertius illustrates this causal relationship between transgression, a curse and pestilence. According to Diogenes, a pestilence which had devastated Athens was in fact the manifestation of a 'curse' (ἄγος) resulting from a transgression committed by one named Cylon. He goes on to describe the remedy: "In consequence two young men, Cratinus and Ctesibus, were put to death and the city was delivered from the scourge."[33]

Mythic tales can be useful for explaining the framework of belief behind ritual practices. According to Jan Bremmer, "the myth clarified the meaning of the ritual."[34] The story of king Oedipus, whom many considered to be a mythic pharmakos, confirms the ideas in the above text of Diogenes.[35] On the occasion of

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[30] On the diversity of terminology see my article: "On the Revision of Scapegoat Terminology," *Numen 37/2 (1991), 168-173, esp. 170. In this article I suggest the use of the generic term 'scapeman.'*

[31] φάρμακος in Ionic. In other contexts this term can mean 'magic man' while the word, φάρμακον means 'healing,' 'medicine,' 'poison,' etc.—all with a magical connotation. Therefore, the term φαρμακός in the context of human purification rites seems to designate one who heals the people. In Aristophanes the term is also used as one of abuse and contempt (e.g. Ar. *Ran.* 734; *Eq.* 1405; *Frogs* 532). It is unclear whether Aristophanes himself employs 'pharmakos' as a term of abuse with this ritual meaning in mind. Jane Harrison, W. B. Stanford and Robert Neil think he is alluding to the ritual (Jane Ellen Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, (Cambridge: CUP, 21921), 97; W. B. Stanford, *Aristophanes: The Frogs*, [London: Macmillan, 1958], 135; Robert Neil, *The Knights of Aristophanes*, [Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966], 152, n. 1135; 183, n. 1404-1405), but Lewis Farnell disagrees (*The Cults of the Greek States*, [5 Vols; Oxford: Clarendon, 1896-1909], IV, 271).

[32] Robert Parker, *Miasmus: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), 191. In the words of Wm. Robertson Smith, curses were used "to stamp an offender with the guilt of impiety and bring him under the direct judgment of supernatural powers" (*Religion of the Semites*, [NY: Meridian Books, 1889], 163).

[33] R.D. Hicks, (tr.), *Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, (LCL; 2 Vols; London: Wm. Heinemann, 1959), I, 110.

[34] Jan Bremmer, "Scapegoat Rituals in Ancient Greece," *HSCP* 87 (1983), 299-320, esp. 318.

[35] Cf. Walter Burkert, *Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual*, (Sather Lectures 47; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 65; René Girard, *The Scapegoat*, (Y. Freccero, tr.; Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1982/1986), 84-91; Jean

a prolonged plague in Thebes, Oedipus consulted an oracle only to discover that the plague was caused by a curse resulting from transgression: one of the citizens of Thebes was responsible for the assassination of king Laïus. At the outset of his investigation, Oedipus prays that this curse may be transferred to the guilty party. Finally, when it comes to light that Oedipus himself had killed Laïus, he blinds himself and banishes himself from the city "bearing the curse" in order to save the city (Soph. *O.Rex.* 1290-93).

The testimonies of Diogenes Laertius and Oedipus Rex testify to the belief in curses which result from transgression, and the devastation which such pollutions can wreak upon society. Only when the threatening curse was removed could society's health and order be restored. For this, a substitute for the community was needed upon whom the curse may be transferred. Jane Harrison remarks, "the notion, so foreign to our scientific habit of thought, so familiar to the ancients, was that evil of all kinds was a physical infection that could be caught and transferred."[36] The pharmakos ritual embodies the belief that once sin had blighted a society, it would work itself out upon it unless a substitute be provided upon whom it may be discharged.

*1) The Athenian Pharmakos Ritual*

When Athens was ravaged by a plague, the citizens were accustomed to expel two pharmakoi (pl.). According to Helladios (3d century CE):

> It was the custom at Athens to lead in procession two pharmakoi with a view to purification (καθαρμός), one for the men, one for the women....This purification was of the nature of an apotropaic ceremony to avert diseases... When the Athenians suffered abnormally from a pestilential disease, the custom was observed of constantly purifying the city by pharmakoi.[37]

A scholiast on Aristophanes (*Eq.* 1136) testifies that certain people (called *demosioi*)[38] were kept for this ritual at public expense:

> The *demosioi* (δημοσίοι) are those who were called pharmakoi and these pharmakoi purified cities by their slaughter ... for the Athenians maintained certain very ignoble and useless persons, and on the occasion of any calamity befalling the city, I mean a pestilence or anything of that sort, they sacrificed these persons with a view to purification from pollution and they called them purifications (καθάρματα).[39]

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Vernant, *Tragedy and Myth in Ancient Greece, (Brighton:* Harvester Press, 1973), 114-131; J. E. Harrison, *Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, (Cambridge: CUP, 1921), xli, 25.

[36] J. E. Harrison, *Prolegommena*, 103, cf. 105.

[37] Helladios, as preserved in in Phot. *Bibl.* 534a (René Henry [tr.], *Photius: Bibliotheca*, [8 Vols; Paris: Société d'éditon, 1959-1977]).

[38] Here the scholiast is commenting on the lemma ὥσπερ δημοσίους in Aristophanes, *Eq.* 1135-1140. All scholia on Aristophanes are indebted to Didymus (80-10 BCE), who himself was dependent on earlier now lost scholia.

[39] Schol. on Ar. *Eq.* 1136: Lewis Farnell is probably correct in concluding that Aristophanes uses the term δημόσιοι to mean animal victims that were fattened at public expense rather than pharmakos victims (*Cults*, 271, n. *a*; following: August Mommsen, *Feste der Stadt Athen im Altertum, geordnet nach attischen Kalender*, [Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, $^{2}$1898], 475, n. 3). However, this does not take away from the fact that the scholiast

Lysias (399 BCE) declares that in the act of expelling the pharmakoi, the citizens were "cleansing the city" and "solemnly purifying it from pollution" (*c. Ankok.* 53).[40]

The Athenians were also accustomed to expel annually two pharmakoi during the month of Thargelion.[41] The festival of Thargelia, being held at this time (in the latter part of May or the beginning of June), was both an agricultural feast and an occasion for the national renewal of the people. As an agricultural festival, it was the occasion when the still ripening barley and other first fruits of harvest were offered to Apollo.

The significance of the expulsion of two pharmakoi on the 6th of Thargelion has been a matter of some debate. Are they expelled to assure a bountiful harvest or to effect national renewal? The 6th and 7th days of the month of Thargelion were perhaps the two most celebrated days in the Athenian calendar: Socrates and Alexander were born on the 6th, Apollo and Plato on the 7th. Moreover, the greatest victories of the Persian war were commemorated on the 6th of Thargelion (Artemisium, Plataea, Mycale), as well the death of Alexander. The fact that the pharmakos ritual overlapped with the celebrations of the 6th and 7th of Thargelion suggests that the ritual had more to do with national renewal than agricultural prosperity. Perhaps the Athenians reasoned that the annual cleansing of the people might prevent the accumulation of impurities which in sum, would become a polluting curse.

The sources are divided as to whether the pharmakoi were expelled (Helladios, Lysias) or slaughtered (scholiast Ar.) or both (Istros). The expulsion or destruction of the pharmakos was a vital step in assuring the permanency of the ritual. The fact that the witnesses contradict one another, as to whether the pharmakoi were banished or slain, is not unusual: the same disagreement among primary sources is present in most of the rituals to be considered. This suggests that the custom changed in different localities from time to time. This is not surprising since, ritually speaking, it is a matter of indifference: both extermination and expulsion accomplished the final goal of permanently excluding the individual from the society. As Jane Ellen Harrison observes, "the gist of the [pharmakos] ceremony is magical riddance; it is essential that the 'scapegoat,' whatever form he takes, should never return."[42]

It must be emphasized that the slaying of the pharmakos was not a sacrificial act. The pharmakos victim, being defiled by the imposition of society's pollution, was unfit for offering to the gods. In the words of Harrison:

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himself is supplying information about the pharmakos ritual which he has obtained from other sources.

[40] Lysia (399 BCE) alludes to the pharmakos ritual when he expresses the desire that his enemy, Andokides might share the same fate as a pharmakos. Andokides had been cursed by the high priests and expelled from the city. However, he later reentered the city and committed numerous sacrilegious acts in the temple precincts (*c. Andok.* 52). "You should, therefore, consider that today, in punishing Andokides and in ridding yourselves of him, you are cleansing the city, you are purifying it from pollution, you solemnly expel a pharmakos, you are getting rid of a criminal; for this man is all of them in one" (W. R. M. Lamb, [tr.], *Lysia*, [LCL; London: Heinemann, 1930], *c. Andok.* 53). Though perhaps not written by Lysias, it was at least written by a contemporary.

[41] Istros (fl. 230 BCE) in Harp. *s.v.* Φαρμακός (Wilhelm Dindorf, *Valerius Harpocration*, [2 Vols; Oxford: OUP, 1853], I, 298); Diogenes Laertius, II, 44.

[42] J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena* 104.

> The pharmakos is killed then, not because his death is a vicarious sacrifice, but because he is so infected and tabooed that his life is a practical impossibility. The uneducated, among whom his lot would necessarily be cast, regard him as an infected horror, an incarnate pollution.[43]

The fundamental difference between a sacrificial victim and a pharmakos is implicit in the difference between 'offering up' and 'forcing out.' This essential distinction is recognized by Jane Harrison: "the two ceremonies of sacrifice and riddance express widely different conditions and sentiments in the mind of the worshiper"[44] A sacrifice *is offered up* to the gods; it is an image of value and human goodness. In contrast, a pharmakos *is ejected out* because he is an image of no value, a pollution, a portrait of human evil.

*2) The Expulsion of a Pharmakos from the Cities of Ionia*

A ritual very similar to the Athenian pharmakos expulsion was performed in the Ionian colonies such as Ephesus and Colophon. Our earliest source of information is the poet Hipponax (fl. 550 BCE), a native of Ephesus who was later expelled to nearby Claxomenae. Only a few fragments of Hipponax have been preserved concerning this ritual, chiefly in *The Thousand Histories* (1150 CE), of Byzantine grammarian John Tzetzes.[45]

Hipponax states that the purpose of the ritual was "to purify the city" (πόλιν καθαίρειν, *Fr.* 5). This is confirmed by Tzetzes who specifies that the ritual was used to eradicate "misfortune," "famine" and "plague" (H. 726-29). Tzetzes calls the victim a "pharmakos": the role of the victim was "to be an expiation (καθαρμός) and pharmakos (φάρμακος) of the diseased city" (H. 730).

According to Hipponax, the pharmakos was given a meal (*Fr.* 7) and then flagellated (*Frs.* 4, 5, 8, 9; cf. Tzet. *H.* 733-34). This ceremonial whipping was a sort of medical treatment to render the victim suitable to bear the evil of the society. Jane Harrison concisely clarifies the idea behind whipping the pharmakos

> You beat a bush, a bird escapes; you beat a garment, the dust comes out; you beat a man, the evil, whatever it be, will surely emerge. We associate beating with moral stimulus, but the first notion is clearly expulsive.[46]

Speculation has arisen that this practice may be grounded in the belief that the pharmakos represented a god who was beaten in order to expel evil influences and improve his ability to care for his people. Wilhelm Mannhardt concluded that the victim was originally understood to be a harvest deity who must be whipped and finally killed or expelled in order to be reborn afresh.[47]

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43 J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena* 104.

44 J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena* 109.

45 There are seven fragments of Hipponax which are relevant to this study (*Frs.* 4 [=47], 5 [=48], 6 [=49], 7 [=50], 8 [=51], 9 [=52], 11). The fragments are numbered according to Theodor Bergk (*Poetae Lyrici Graeci*, [4th ed; Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1882]) while the numbering of A. D. Knox is supplied in brackets ([tr.], "Fragments of Hipponax," in *Herodes, Cercidas and the Greek Choliambic Poets*, [LCL; London: Wm. Heinemann, 1929], 15-65). The fragments are quoted in Tzetzes (Petrus A. M. Leone [ed.], *Tzetzae: Historiae*, [Naples: Libreria Scientifica Editrice, 1968], V, 738ff).

46 J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena*, 100, cf. 101.

47 Wilhelm Mannhardt, *Mythologische Forschungen*, Quellen und Forschungen zur Sprach- und Culturgeschichte der germanischen Volker 51 (Strassburg: Karl J. Trübner, 1884), 124-138. This interpretation is followed by J.E. Harrison, (*Prolegomena*, 101). For the bearing of the pharmakos ritual on the agricultural festival see: Martin Nilsson,

Pan, for example is beaten with leeks by worshipers when he did not produce sufficient game during a hunting party.[48] Similarly, Victor Gebhard thinks that the pharmakos was beaten with lucky plants in order to drive bad magic out and good magic in, making him a kind of temporary god.[49] However, Walter Burkert warns that "speculations about the Vegetarian Spirit have tended to obscure the simple and terrifying character of this drama."[50]

After the pharmakos was flagellated, he was then expelled while curses imprecated upon him (*Fr.* 11).[51]

*3) The Expulsion of a Poor Man from Marseilles*

The primary sources for this ritual are Petronius (d. 66 CE) and Lactantius (d. 325 CE). Petronius is quoted by the Roman grammarian Servius (fl. 350-400 CE) in his commentary on the lemma, "the sacred hunger for gold" in Virgil's *Aeneid*:

> "The sacred hunger for gold." "Sacred" means "accursed." This expression is derived from a Gallic custom. For whenever the inhabitants of Marseilles were burdened with a pestilence, one of the poor would offer himself to be kept at public expense and fed on food of special purity. After this period he would be decked with sacred herbs and clad in holy garments, and led about through the whole city *while people cursed him*, in order that the sufferings of the whole city might fall upon him, and so would be cast out.[52]

Here we find the conventional idea that a plague is the result of a curse, whose polluting character was perceived as being contagious; it could spread from person to person, leaving an epidemic in its wake.

This curse was transferred to the pharmakos such that the plague was perceived to be embodied in him. A. E. Crawley remarks that: "good and evil in all but the higher stages of thought are constantly 'embodied,' either by analogy,

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*Geschichte Feste von religiöser Bedeutung mit Ausschluss der attischen*, [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1906], 109-110), 113-115; Ludwig Deubner, *Attische Feste* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1932), 192-193.

[48] Dear Pan, if this my prayer may granted be
Then never shall the boys of Arcady
Flog thee on back and flank with leeks and sting
When scanty meat is left for offering;
If not, thy skin with nails be flayed and torn,
And amid nettles mayst thou couch till morn.
(Theocritus, *Idylls* 7.106-109)

[49] Victor Gebhard, *Die Pharmakoi in Ionien und die Sybakchoi in Athen* (Diss.; Amberg: H. Böes Söhne, 1926), 60. This same interpretation has been made of the pharmakos rituals at the Thargelia in Athens (e.g., L. Farnell, *Cults*, 281), Leukas (e.g., L. Farnell, *Cults*, 282), and in Rome (James Frazer, *Golden Bough: Pt. 6. The Scapegoat*, [London: Macmillan, 1890/$^{3}$1911-15], 229).

[50] Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion*, (J. Raffan, tr.; Cornwall: T. J. Press, 1985), 83.

[51] In his poem, Hipponax does not set out to describe the pharmakos ritual in particular, but to insult his enemy Boupalos and threaten him with the same fate as a pharmakos. In this context, the fragment calling for Boupalos to be cursed should likewise be taken as a reference to the pharmakos ritual.

[52] Petr. in Serv. on Virg. *Aen.* 3.57 (= Petr. *Frg.* 1) (Michael Heseltine [tr.], "Fragments," in *Petronius*, [LCL; London: Wm. Heinemann, 1961], 322-35).

personification, or the much more normal and prevalent mode of mere mental objectification."[53]

The curse was transferred to the victim by spoken word, i.e., by an imprecation. This custom is rooted in the ancient belief that there was a close association between a spoken wish and its fulfillment.

Oedipus is a good example of the power of a curse unleashed by the spoken word. He pronounced a curse against the as yet unknown killer of king Laïus. When Oedipus discovered that it was he who had committed the murder, he cried out: "God help me! I much fear that I have wrought a curse on mine own head, and knew it not."[54]

There are several conflicts between the testimony of Petronius and that of Lactantius. According to Petronius, the rite was observed when a plague ravaged the city; Lactantius states that it was an annual ritual.[55] It will be recalled that Athens observed the pharmakos ritual, sometimes in times of desperation, sometimes annually; this may also have been the case in Marseilles. Once again, the sources also disagree on whether the pharmakos was expelled (Petronius) or killed (Lactantius: stoned outside the walls).

*4) The Expulsion of a Slave from Abdera*

Abdera is a Greek city in Thrace near the mouth of the river Nestos, about fifty-two kilometers east of Philippi. In this city, a pharmakos ritual was performed with the expressed purpose of purifying the people of their *sins*.[56] According to the scholiast, it was the custom in Abdera that one of the freemen would be excommunicated for six days, and afterward stoned to death "in order that he alone might bear the sins of all the people."[57]

The same ritual is recorded in a fragment of the poet Callimachus (d. 240 BCE), an Alexandrian from the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus. In this fragment, a slave appears to be speaking: "There, Abdera, where now ... leads (me) a pharmakos." According to the diegesis on this fragment, the pharmakos was processed around the city streets "purifying in his own person the city" and then expelled.[58] This extended procession around the city had purificatory significance, as indicated by the expression, "to purify all around" (κύκλῳ περικαθαίρειν [1.34-36]; cf. 1 Cor. 4:13]).[59]

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53 A. E. Crawley, "Cursing and Blessing," *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, (Ed. James Hastings; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1920), IV, 367-374, esp. 368.

54 *O. Tyr. 744-55; cf. 235-45; 1380-84* (C. Jebb, *Sophocles, [Cambridge: CUP, 1883])*.

55 *Lactantius Placidi on "Lustralemne" in Statius Thebais, X, 793.*

56 This is attested in the *locus classicus* on Ovid. Schol. Ovid *Ibis* 467. Ovid's poem *Ibis* (ca. 11 CE) is a curse directed at an unnamed enemy of Ovid. In this poem, Ovid prays against his enemy "that he may be sacrificed at the holy altar as a victim to Phoebus...or that Abdera on certain solemn days might devote him to death (*aut te devoteat*), and that a shower of stones thicker than hail might fall upon him" (R. Ellis, *P. Ovid Ovidii Nasonis Ibis* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1881], 465-467).

57 Commmenting on the phrase, "Aut te devoteat" (*Ibis*, 467) the scholiast says: "Mos erat in Abdera civitate singulis annis excommunicari, ut sic omnium peccata solus haberet" (R. Ellis, "Scholia" in *Ovid*, 43-104).

58 Callimachus *Fr.* 90 (Rudolf Pfeiffer [ed.], *Callimachus*, [2 Vols; Oxford: Clarendon, 1949], I, 97; ET: Thomas Gelzer [notes] and Cedric Whitman [tr.], *Callimachus*, [LCL; Cambridge, Mass.; Wm. Heinemann, 1965], 70-71).

59 R. Pfeiffer, *Callimachus*, 1.97. The *Diegeseis* which have come to light are said by Thomas Gelzer to be "of inestimable value for the knowledge of the subjects

*5) The Expulsion of a Criminal from Leukas*

The town of Leukas is located on the Leucadian peninsula, off the north-west coast of the Peloponnese. The Leucadians sought to "avert evil" for the coming year during the annual festival of Apollo by hurling a criminal into the sea from a white bluff at the southern end of the island. Men, waiting in a flotilla of boats at the base of the bluff, would retrieve this ritual outcast and escort him away from the island. The earliest witness to this ritual is found in Strabo (64/3 BCE – 21 CE).[60]

In addition to Photius' lexical entry on this rite, he also reports how a young man was annually hurled into the sea with the prayer, "Become our *offscouring*!" (περίψημα: cf. 1 Cor. 4:13).[61]

*6) The Ritual Self-Offering of a Roman Soldier*

As in previously described examples, a social evil, in this instance, the imminent defeat of the Roman army, is interpreted as the manifestation of a curse. This curse was transferred to a substitutionary victim who was then dispatched to the enemy. The best attestations to this ritual are found in the writings of Livy (59 BCE – 17 CE). He explains that when the Roman army feared defeat in battle, the consul would choose a soldier for a victim in order to remove the curse:

> Marcus Livius commanded this man [Decius] to recite before him the words which he proposed to devote himself and the enemy's legions on behalf of the army of the Roman people, the Quirites ... and having added to the usual prayers that ... the wrath of the gods celestial and gods infernal should blight with a *curse* the standards, weapons and armor of the enemy, and that one and the same place should witness his own destruction and that of the Gauls and Samnites,—having uttered, I say, these *curses* upon himself and the enemy, he spurred his charger against the Gallic lines, where he saw that they were thickest, and hurling himself against the weapons of the enemy met his death. From that moment the battle seemed scarce to depend on human efforts.[62]

### *C) The Paradigm of the Pharmakos*

When normal functioning of a society was threatened by plague, drought, famine or military defeat, such threats were often interpreted as the manifestation of curses, a kind of pollution that resulted from transgression. Once in existence, a curse would work itself out on the society, unless a substitute victim was provided upon whom it may be discharged. A pharmakos was required to stand as a substitute for the community and bear its curse in its place. The pharmakos, bearing this infectious pollution must either be banished or killed. In either case, the final goal of permanently excluding the pharmakos from the society is accomplished.

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Callimachus treated in his poetry" (*Callimachus*, xiv). Three have survived, all deriving from a common source.

60 Strabo X, 2.9; see also: Phot., *s.v.* Λευκάτης Ampelius, 8.4.

61 Phot., *s.v.* περίψημα (S.A. Naber, *Photii Patriarchae Lexicon* [Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1864]). Though this account does not specify any location, it has been connected with the Leucadian observance by M. P. Nilsson (*Geschichte Feste* , 109-110).

62 Livy, X, 28.14-X, 29.1; cf. Livy, VIII, 9.9-10 (B. O. Foster [tr.], *Livy*, [LCL; 13 Vols; London: Wm. Heinemann, 1926]).

The correspondence between the pharmakos paradigm and Paul's soteriological paradigm (Gal. 3:10-14; 2 Cor. 5:21) is remarkable indeed. In both cases, a group is endangered by a curse which has resulted from transgression. In order to save the group, both Christ and the pharmakos serve as a substitutionary victims, upon whom this curse is discharged, thereby saving the community. Neither Christ or the pharmakos are *offered up* to propitiate God/gods as spotless sacrificial victims. On the contrary, they are *ejected* from society because they have become carriers of a lethal pollution. Conceptually, both represent personifications of human evil.

In the Old Testament, curses and expulsion go hand in hand. Christ's expulsion from human society is implied by his accursed state and illustrated by the manner of his execution since crucifixion was reserved for criminals who are socially marginal people. Moreover, the act of crucifixion assures the irrevocability of the transfer of the curse to Christ.

Christ's original sinless condition, prior to the transfer, is attested in 2 Cor. 5:21. This motif seems to find its corollary in act of flagellating the pharmakos which purified the pharmakos such that he was sinless.[63] It was important that both be ritually clean, otherwise their own personal impurity may impair the transfer of the pollution. The suggestion that the pharmakos was a temporary god who was thereby reborn (cf. nn. 48, 49) is too speculative in my opinion to be used as a parallel for Christ's divinity and resurrection.

It cannot be concluded that Paul has intentionally modeled his soteriology upon the pharmakos paradigm until other criteria are also satisfied. Correlations between religious ideas do not already prove dependencies. What appears to reflect genealogy may merely be analogy. Does the similarity between Paul's soteriology and the pharmakos paradigm merely reflect parallel phenomena or is Paul's soteriology somehow structured by the pharmakos ritual? This question cannot be answered without an adequate assessment of the geographical distribution and continuance of these rituals into the Roman period. Only after it has been demonstrated that the pharmakos rituals and Paul's soteriology coexisted in the same cultural area, simultaneously, is it legitimate to suppose that one is dependent upon the other.

*D) Geographical and Historical Distribution of Pharmakos Rituals*

I have demonstrated that pharmakos rituals were observed in Athens, Ephesus, Marseilles, Abdera, Leukas, and by Roman soldiers. Paul himself visited two of these cities, Athens and Ephesus. Moreover, Abdera is near Philippi, the city of Paul's favorite church, and Leukas is in the general region of Corinth. More important than all of this is the wide distribution of these rituals throughout the Greco-Roman world. The examples in this paper are given as representative examples of many other similar rituals.

On the subject of the common man's familiarity with these rituals, an examination of the sources will reveal that the textual witnesses to the pharmakos rituals are evenly spread over a period of more than eight hundred years, straddling, more or less evenly, the period of Paul's life.

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63 The victim was also flagellated in Rome (cf. Servius on Virgil, *Aen. 7.* 188; J. Frazer, *Golden Bough: Pt. 6. The Scapegoat*, 229-31) and in Chaeronea (Plut. *M.* 693-94).

| | |
|---|---|
| 550 BCE | Hipponax (Ephesus, Colophon) |
| 399 BCE | Lysias (Athens) |
| 240 BCE | Callimachus (Abdera) |
| 230 BCE | Istros (Athens) |
| 80-10 BCE | Scholiast on Aristophanes (Athens) |
| 64 BCE-21 CE | Strabo (Leukas) |
| 66 CE | Petronius (Marseilles) |
| 100-200 CE | Harpocration (Athens) |
| 200-250 CE | Diogenes Laertius (Athens) |
| 59 BCE – 17 CE | Livy (Roman army) |
| 200-300 CE | Helladios (Athens) |
| 325 CE | Lactantius (Marseilles) |
| 350-400 CE | Servius (Marseilles) |
| 375-400 CE | Hesychius (Athens) |

This would suggest that knowledge of pharmakos rituals continued through and beyond the first century CE. According to Lewis Farnell, even the *employment* of pharmakos rituals "may have survived in the Greek world sporadically, or as an expedient in great crises, far on into the Hellenistic period."[64]

A case in point is the expulsion of *Hunger* (*βούλιμος*) from Chaeronea, near Athens, in the first century CE.[65] Plutarch himself (fl. 50 CE) presided over the ceremony when he served as archon (*M.* 693-694). This ceremony was performed by the chief magistrate and by each house owner. A slave was selected from each household, as well as an additional slave to represent the whole town. Each of these slaves was ceremonially flagellated and driven out of doors to the words, "Out with *Hunger*, in with Wealth and Health!" (*M.* 693e-f). This ritual was performed in the expectation that the threat of Hunger would be averted for coming year.[66] In Chaeronea, the slave was probably permitted to return after the ritual, showing that the original savage ritual had been replaced by a kind of fictive simulation.

As example of the possible impact of pharmakos rituals on Judaism, consider the notable similarities that exist between the story of Jonah (Jon. 1:1-17) and the pharmakos paradigm. When a great storm threatens to break up the ship, the sailors realize that the threat was a physical manifestation of one man's transgression, i.e., a curse. In order to achieve safety, they conclude that this curse had to be transferred to a victim, and then expelled. When lots were cast, and Jonah was selected for the victim (Jon. 1:7). Jonah accepted the outcome, even requesting that he be thrown into the sea so that the others might be saved (Jon. 1:12). The sailors prayed that they may not be held responsible for Jonah's "innocent

64 L. Farnell, *Cults*, IV, 277; cf. J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena*, 96.

65 The term *βούλιμος* is difficult to translate, sometimes being rendered 'ox-hunger' or 'voracious appetite.' These translations do not fully capture the sense of this term in this ritual. Plutarch does not treat the condition of Bulimy merely as a physical state resulting from the deprivation of food, but rather as a disease which infects the undernourished (cf. *M.* 694c).

66 Though Plutarch calls this ritual a 'sacrifice' (*θυσία*), he reveals his discomforture with the term 'sacrifice' and his understanding that it is really a purification, when he describes the ritual as "a sacrifice with an admixture of purification" (*μεμμιγμένην τινὰ καθαμοῦ θυσία*). The use of the term 'sacrifice' is a concession to popular usage which called all religious ceremonies 'sacrifices.'

blood" (Jon. 1:14). When Jonah was flung into the sea, the curse left with him, for the sea immediately ceased to rage (Jon. 1:15).

It would appear that when the author of the tale of Jonah set out to narrate the calming of a raging sea, he drew upon ideas which were conceptually identical to the pharmakos rituals such that it could be argued, though not proved, that Jonah has been cast in the image of a pharmakos. If this is true, then it raises the possibility of similar applications elsewhere in Jewish-Christian literature (cf. Mk. 5:1-14).

In view of all of the above evidence, there can be little doubt of the knowledge, if not the practice, of pharmakos rituals in the Greco-Roman world throughout the first century CE and beyond. Though it is probable that many pharmakos rituals had fallen into disuse by the first century, it remains highly probable that fictive simulations (e.g., Chaeronea) arose in their place and that they also survived through folklore, popular curses and proverbial sayings. 1 Cor. 4:13 seems to be a case in point. In this verse, Paul's seems to apply the terminology of the pharmakos to himself.

> We have become like the περικάθαρμα of the world,
> the περίψημα of all things, to this very day.

The term περικάθαρμα is an intensive form of κάθαρμα which is the most common term, after φαρμακός, for naming the ritual victim.[67] According to Friedrich Hauck, περικάθαρμα has the same meaning as κάθαρμα: it refers to pharmakos rituals "which either regularly or in special emergencies are offered to make expiation for a community (people or city)."[68] Moreover, the verb περικαθαίρειν is used to describe the function of the pharmakos rituals in Abdera and Athens.[69] Bauer's lexicon prefers the translation of περικάρμα in 1 Cor. 4:13 as a reference to pharmakos rituals.[70]

The term περίψημα is also applied to pharmakos victims.[71] It can be used as a term of self-deprecation ('refuse/scum'). However, in his lengthy analysis of the meaning of this term in 1 Cor. 4:13, Gustav Stählin favors the ritual interpretation, *vis à vis* the pharmakos victim.[72] If one accepts the conclusion that Paul's

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67 κάθαρμα: Phot. *s.v.* φαρμακός, 640; schol. Ar. *Plut.* 454; schol. Ar. *Eq.* 1133; schol. Ar. *Ran.* 742; Suid. *s.v.* καθάρματα; Tzet. *H.* 726.

68 Friedrich Hauck, περικάθαρμα, in *TDNT*, III, 430-431.

69 Abdera: Callimachus, *Diegesis* on *Fr.* 90, (1.97, *l.* 36): περίεισι κύκλῳ περικαθαίρων; Athens: Hesech. *Lex.* 1514: φαρμακοί. καθαρτήριοι. περικαθαίροντες τὰς πόλεις (Maurice Schmidt [ed.], *Hesychii Alexandrini: Lexicon* [Ienae: Frederici Maukii, 1863]).

70 W. Bauer, *Lexicon*, *s.v.* περικάθαρμα, 647.

71 Phot., *s.v.* περίψημα: κατά(μα)γμα ἢ ὑπὸ τὰ ἴχνη ἀπολύτρωσις· καὶ οὕτως ἐπέλεγον τῷ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἐμβαλλομένωι τῇ θαλάσσηι νεανίαι ἐπὶ ἀπαλλαγῇ τῶν συνεχόντων κακῶν· περίψημα ἡμῶν γενοῦ, ἤτοι σωτηρία καὶ ἀπολύτρωσις· καὶ οὕτως ἐνέβαλλον τῇ θαλάσσῃ ὡσανεί τῷ Ποσειδῶνι θυσίαν ἀποτινύντες. The same lexical note is found in Suidas, *s.v.* περίψημα.

72 "That this is not just conventional self-abasement on a universal scale (πάντων περίψημα), but that the apostle has in view a picture of the contemptible περίψημα vicariously given up to death for all is supported by the following considerations: 1. the association with πάντων, for a feature of the practice denoted by περίψημα is that an individual or individuals must perish for a whole city or people; 2. the association with ἐγενήθημεν, for by choosing the same verb γίνεσθαι Paul formally adopts the expiatory suffrage spoken over the victim: περίψημα ἡμῶν γενοῦ [cf. Phot. above, n. 66], thus showing that the apostles see this fulfilled in themselves; ἐγενήθημεν περίψημα; 3. these

applies pharmakos terminology to himself in 1 Cor. 4:13, then it follows that he was likely familiar with both the meaning and practice of pharmakos rituals. This makes the hypothesis that he also portrayed Christ as a pharmakos all the more probable.

## Conclusion

My analysis of Gal. 3:13 and 2 Cor. 5:21 has endeavored to describe and identify those aspects which give these texts their peculiar weight. The soteriological features of these texts can be treated collectively as a kind of characteristic 'fingerprint' for their underlying soteriological paradigm. I have demonstrated that all five of these features are prominent in the family of pharmakos rituals.

I have also demonstrated that pharmakos rituals and lore were part of Greco-Roman culture. The fact that these rituals were widespread throughout the area of Paul's missionary activity strongly suggests that both Paul and the first Gentile Christians were familiar with these practices. If this is indeed true, then the correspondence between Paul's soteriology and the pharmakos paradigm suggests that Paul was guided by this ritual phenomenon in the composition of the Gal. 3:13 and 2 Cor. 5:21, not to mention 1 Cor. 4:13.

There are numerous reasons why the pharmakos paradigm would have had particular appeal to Paul. First, it presupposes an understanding of the eradication of curses and sin which was well-suited to Paul's own gospel. Gal. 3:13 and 2 Cor. 5:21 evince Paul's conviction that it was not enough that Christians be merely reckoned noetically as righteous: the origin and actuality of their sin and curse had also to be addressed. It was necessary that Christ become a substitutionary victim, a pharmakos, upon whom human sin and its curse may be discharged.

Secondly, Paul was motivated by the urgent need to make the significance of Christ's ignominious death intelligible to potential Gentile converts. This would have entailed drawing upon symbols and religious practices from Greco-Roman culture which would have been recognizable to the Gentile converts. Pharmakos rituals were ideally suited for such a purpose. They offered a hermeneutical starting point for the Crucifixion which was familiar to, and understood by, his Gentile audience.

Thirdly, Paul lived in a culture where the suffering and death of animals had no meaning. Even the slaughter of sacrificial animals was not considered to be part of the actual ritual, but merely a preparatory act that prepared the carcass for the ritual to follow. The fact of the animal's death had no meaning in and of itself. How then could Christ's suffering and death be meaningfully interpreted

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last words take up again, in an easy change of image, the opening words of the section (1 Cor. 4:9: *ὁ θεὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀποστόλους ἐσχάτους ἀπέδειξεν ὡς ἐπιθανατίους*) which turn our thoughts to condemned criminals, who are regarded as the very last of men, i.e., the dregs of human society, and whose human dignity is so completely lost that their execution is a public spectacle and entertainment; this image, after a realistic depiction of apostolic life (1 Cor. 4:10-12), obviously suggested to the apostle the associated image of the one who is publicly slain for all, or, if the word *περίψημα* was suggested by contempt of the world, he and his readers were led by the words *περικάθαρμα* and *περίψημα*, namely, that the reviled and despised are blessing and expiation. Paul is thus confessing that he is a man who throws away himself and his life and that he thus looks like a useless scapegoat and despised sin-offering, but in so doing he also confesses that he is the bearer of reconciliation for the world and of salvation for all men" (Gustav Stählin, *περίψημα*, *in TDNT*, VI, 84-93, esp. 89-91).

in the light of the suffering and death of animals. In contrast, the interpretation of Christ's suffering and death in the light of the pharmakos victim was able to offer Paul great potential: the pharmakos, like Christ, was a human being, and his suffering and death did have meaning for others. Hence, the portrayal of Christ as a pharmakos became an expressive image for Paul's deeper faith that Christ had acted decisively for all.

# The Unutterable Symbols of Ge-Themis Reconsidered

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A consideration of the question of the contents of ritual *cistae mysticae* several years ago focused on the nature of their "unutterable" contents and their association with the mother goddess.[1] Further study and a better understanding of Callimachus' evidence about the (presumably) Alexandrian processions in honor of the goddess suggests a possible new interpretation both of the significance of the symbols and the referentiality of the Callimachus Demeter hymn (h. 6). The ritual described by Callimachus in the Demeter hymn was placed by tradition at Alexandria and somehow involved the Eleusinian mysteries. Hopkinson argued that both assumptions were false.[2]

The festival in question was probably a harvest celebration in which maidens carried offerings to the goddess in baskets carried on their heads. Yet the fact that the baskets in the Callimachus hymn are filled with gold (presumably golden objects representing the unutterable symbols) led Hopkinson to conclude that the procession itself was literary, because golden objects are unknown in genuine ritual.

If the procession was simply part of a literary convention, why would Clement of Alexandria (*Protrep.* 2,22) have become so incensed as to rage against it? In addition the "symbola" are specific: ὀρίγανον (itself a problem), a lamp, a sword, and a κτεὶς γυναικεῖος, a euphemism for the female pudenda. Farnell argued that although the sword and lamp could well be the symbol of Themis as goddess of righteousness, only by assuming that Themis was something more and allied to a fertility goddess that we could explain the other symbols. Clement describes the contents of mystic chests used in other mystery rites. Among the selected items he lists cakes, salt balls, the serpent, as well as "the unutterable symbols of (Ge)-Themis." In what sense are these symbols "unutterable"? What was the association with (Ge)-Themis?

The Callimachean Hymn to Demeter (h. 6) represents a voice calling out instructions for ritual and prayer. A group of women are waiting for the return of the sacred basket to its starting point after a procession. The women invoke Demeter, hailing her as goddess of plenty. A set of instructions for the spectators is given in a triple anaphora with the middle line itself an anaphoric tricolon: no one must look from above into the basket which contains elements of the ritual. The picture is given of the sacred basket drawn on a cart by four white horses,

[1] Louis Roberts, "The Unutterable Symbols of (Γῆ)-θέμις," *Harvard Theological Review* 68 (1958), 73-82.

[2] N. Hopkinson, *Callimachus Hymn to Demeter* (Cambridge: University Press, 1984).

followed by women barefoot and bareheaded. Other women follow carrying baskets full of golden objects. Ritual instructions follow: the main body of initiates under sixty will proceed right to the goddess's temple; the uninitiated will follow only to the town-hall; pregnant women and the sick should accompany the procession as far as they are able.

The poem's structure is symmetrical: 23 lines of ritual, 92 of narrative, 23 of ritual. The narrative section is double the length of the ritual ekphrasis. The observers are thirsty; they have fasted throughout the day. When Hesperus appears, he is doubly welcome with the promise of food and rest. All this recalls the journeying of Demeter in search of her daughter, Persephone. The particular interest in the hymn, however, involves the baskets carried in the procession and their contents.

In order to make some sense of the argument that follows, it is important to recall the myth of Ouranos indulging his sexual appetite excessively, unable to see further than Gaia's pudenda. The basic question at the heart of the cosmogonic myths is that of the connections between generative order and disorder.

The order in this paper involves first an examination of the term *σύμβολον* by Clement; second, an overview of the nature of the *cistae* and their possible contents; third, some comment on textual problems involving the use of *ἄρρητος* and *ἀπόρρητος*; and finally, a consideration of possible new evidence.

## I. The Term *σύμβολον*

Words related to *σύμβολον* acquired a variety of meanings centering around a notion of matching entities or corresponding pieces. The word came to refer to such things as a sign or mark by means of which one person could give another to understand something; a token, which could prove identity; a contribution of money to a feast; a share of a reckoning; a commercial treaty guaranteeing security and protection. Gradually a meaning indicating abstract values developed. Plutarch emphasized an aspect of *σύμβολον* as secret code. In the early Christian centuries it became associated with a set of beliefs constituting the Creed, in the canon known as the Symbol of the Apostles.

The religious use of the term came to imply that symbols provide information about the object of belief or at least hold power to generate the acquisition of such knowledge. Paintings, for instance in Roman catacombs disply symbols of palms, ships, fish, shepherds, etc. These were not simply decorative or didactic but were meant to portray meanings that otherwise had to be concealed.[3]

Clement provided a theoretical account and practical examples of his use of the term. Clement remarks in *Strom.* 8,8—a work which years of study encourage me to accept as genuine, although tattered—:

> There are three points about sound: the terms and symbols (*σύμβολα*) of the concepts in accord with the guiding principle...; the concepts are likenesses and images of the external object...; and third, the underlying meanings from which the concepts are impressed in us.

Like many of his contemporaries who were under strong Stoic influence, Clement used *σύμβολον* primarily of *νοήματα* under the control of the guiding principle and derivatively of the object of reference. Consequently he believed a true symbol could provide information about the referent in question. We can

[3] Cf. Raymond Firth, *Symbols Public and Private* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1965) 62-65.

bolster this interpretation by noting that Origen specifically relates the terms (*Frag. in Ps.* 1,15,1) with which we shall be concerned.

Clement is careful in his use of technical terms and he uses σύμβολον in a particular way. An exceptional and illustrative use is found at *Strom.* 2, 19, where he speaks of the mouth, the heart, and hands and says these would be a symbol: the mouth, a symbol of logos; the heart, of desire; and the hands, of action. He claims this would be a proper use of the term, implying that he thought of some kind of direct relation between symbol and referent. He notes (*Strom.* 5,8) that symbols are most useful in hermeneutics. Apart from this discussion and a brief treatment of symbols in oriental and Greek authors at *Strom.* 5, 7-9, few other uses of the term are found.

In the section of the *Protrep.* with which we are concerned, several instances fall close together. The first is at 2,25, where we read τὰ σύμβολα τῆς μυήσεως. This use is equated with a formula. Normally Clement uses the term συνήθεια for such reference. At 2,18 Clement mentions τὰ ἀχρεῖα σύμβολα of the rites of Dionysos. He lists these symbols as knucklebone, the ball, the spinning top, apples, wheel, and fleece. Does he mean they are "useless" because they give no information about Dionysos? At least they are ἀχρεῖον εἰς κατάγνωσιν.

The next instance of σύμβολα occurs in the text of principal concern on "the unutterable symbols." Is this use of the term the same as in the two previous instances? The first caveat to observe is that the symbols are said to be "unspeakable," not "useless." The second, that both lamp and sword are included among the classification. Why should those two objects be called "unutterable"? We will look at this adjective shortly. Clement usually reserves ἄρρητος for what is "unutterable" in a derogatory sense and ἀπόρρητος for "secret" or "hidden." But if he simply meant "secret," he could have used the common set of adjectives he normally reserved for that purpose.

It is difficult to sort out these uses of σύμβολα without first connecting them to the objects and kinds of baskets in which the symbols were purportedly transported. (The Callimachos Demeter hymn mentions both the kalathos and the liknon.) The fact that we have different kinds of baskets may relate to the implication that the kinds of symbols are different. Clement may also be referring to different sets of mysteries. If this is the case, what might they be and what is the relation between Ge-Themis and Demeter?

The first class of symbols relates to the "mysteries of Deo." Clement says symbols associated with these mysteries are such as provoke laughter. He quotes as symbols of initiation, "I ate from the drum; I drank from the cymbal; I was a *kernos*-bearer; I stole into the bridal chamber." Then he asks rhetorically, ταῦτα οὐχ ὕβρις τὰ σύμβολα? Symbols and mysteries are here related, for Clement explains that their content was the aphrodisiac attack and rape by Zeus of his mother Demeter and her ensuing anger. Because there is no evidence for associating this episode with the rites of Attic Eleusis, it may well have been part of the rites of mysteries performed at Eleusis in Alexandria.[4] Hopkinson summarized evidence against the existence of such Demeter rites at Alexandria. The rites, however, were probably in honor of Rhea. Mylonas argued that Clement "is speaking of rites in which Rhea-Kyhbele was the honored Goddess to whom the title or epithet Brimo was given."[5]

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[4] Cf. Karl Kerenyi, *Eleusis* (New York: Panatheon, 1967) 118-19.

[5] George Mylonas, *Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries* (Princeton: Princeton, 1961) 291.

The second class of symbols relates to mysteries involving the story of Baubo, who, Clement reports,

> having received Demeter as a guest, offers her a draught of wine and meal. She declines to take it, unwilling to drink on account of her mourning. Baubo is offended, thinking that she has been slighted, and thereupon uncovers her genitals and exhibits them to the goddess. Demeter is pleased at the sight, and at last receives the draught, delighted with the spectacle.(*Protrep.* 2,17)

Mylonas wanted to dissociate this passage from the Eleusinian mysteries, but Kerenyi has observed that he neglected at least one group of texts which do connect the Baubo figure with Attic Eleusis. These texts, though inconclusive, are difficult to ignore.[6] More important is the fact that Clement intends to situate his account at Eleusis in Attica. Clement thinks the symbols connected with these mysteries are useless, because they give no information; his use of the term σύμβολα in connection with these two sets of mysteries accords with his theoretical account of the term.

The third class of symbols involves mysteries associated with Themis. Themis, Mnemosyne and Rhea represent specific aspects of Gaia. Each reflects a different aspect of Gaia. Themis shares many of her mother's functions and attributes, including her knowledge of the future. Delphi was hers after it was Gaia's and before it became Apollo's.[7] But Themis also came to share her mother's symbolization of fertility. Pausanius describes a sanctuary of Aphrodite and Themis at Corinth (2.27.5). Gaia's rituals, like other chthonic rituals and those of the mystery cults, suggest the possibility of a different kind of identification between the worshipper and the goddess than we find in the worship of her Olympian offspring. Gaia's devotees experienced ecstatic and orgiastic possession (as was the case in cults devoted to Rhea).[8] What might the symbols associated with this fertility rite have been? In order to answer this question, we have to go back to the baskets used in the mysteries of each of the three classes of symbols.

## II. Cistae mysticae

Clement refers to mystic chests in the plural and requests that the reader consider their contents. "For I must strip bare their Hiera and utter the unutterable (ἄρρητα)." Some of the items in the list of Hiera occur in connection with the second set of symbols and some clearly refer to the first set (e.g., ivy leaves and poppies). Regarding the baskets associated with the first set, we can agree with Farnell that in the rite the maidens who carried certain offerings dedicated to the goddess carried them on their heads in λίκνα. Such baskets usually contained fruits and flowers and baked goods. A similar basket was a *kana* (Hom. *Od.* 3.442)

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[6] In the *Plutos* (101) of Aristophanes a comic old woman boasts of having figured at the bridge in a cart. Kerenyi (*Eleusis*, 65) believes she was playing the role of Iambe or Baubo, who with her jokes and obscene gestures moved Demeter to laughter.

[7] This relationship was preserved at Olympia. "On what is called the Gaion is an altar of Gaia made of ashes. They say that formerly in this place was an oracle of Gaia; there they have built an altar they call the Mouth of Themis" (Pausanias 5.14.10).

[8] See Christine R. Downing, "The Mother Goddess Among the Greeks," in *The Goddess*, ed. Carl Olson, (New York: Crossroad, 1989) 51.

But Callimachos' text implies that it is the κάλαθος that contained objects that were not to be revealed. Thus at least two kinds of baskets were involved in this procession, small ones carried by maidens on their heads and a large one on a horse-drawn carriage. Now such small baskets were also in use at Attic Eleusis. They are found portrayed on Caryatids of Pentelic marble. Each of these baskets was cylindircal in form and was decorated with the emblems of the cult of Demeter: a head of wheat, the poppy, the lidded *kernos* (an earthenware vessel holding a number of small cups cemented together), flanked by small flower rosettes, and a molding which Mylonis believes was meant to represent the Bacchos. Such *cistae* would certainly hold the objects mentioned by Clement.

A Boeotian *skyphos* now in the collection at Tübingen contains a representation of Themis and Bendis. Both deities are named. Themis carries a torch similar to that connected with Demeter and she is holding a flat basket. The ornament on her head dress is similar to one often found on Demeter and Kore. It resembles poppies. What is significant is the fact that the basket Themis holds in her left hand is most likely a type of λίκνον. Corn would be placed in such baskets after threshing and would then be thrown against the wind to winnow the grain from the chaff. They are probably what Vergil refers to as "Mystica vannus Iacchi" (*Georg.* 1, 166). Servius in commenting on this says,

> alii 'mysticam' sic accipiunt, ut vannum vas vimineum latum dicant, in quod ipsam propter capacitatem congere rustici primitias frugum soleant, et Libero et Liberae sacrum facere.

Sometimes reference is made to only a single basket in connection with the mysteries, but Apuleius (*Metam.* 6,2) and Plutarch (*Phokion*, 28) indicate that there were at least several of them. More than one is mentioned on the inscription of Andania, where we read that the sacred virgins led the chariots on which were to be seen the *cistae* which contained the sacred Hiera. Thus it appears that both the number of small and large baskets was plural and that they were of at least three kinds. Each may have held a different set of symbols. In the procession which Clement envisions, three different sets of mysteries may have been represented. Some or all of the baskets may have contained objects which were not necessarily Hiera of mystery rites.

### III. Textual Questions

Before taking up the question of the "unutterableness" of the symbols, we need to address the problem in Clement's text about the name of the goddess. The manuscript reading[9] is καὶ προσέτι τῆς θέμιδος, and this is the reading accepted by Mondésert[10] and all earlier editions. Wilamowitz suggested the emendation accepted by Stählin of reading Γῆς for τῆς This is a probable emendation. Writing a tau for a gamma has a probability of .000347, which is significant.[11] There is also a precedent (*CIG* 3.350) on a theater seat: ἱερίας Γῆς Θέμιδος.

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[9] The principal manuscript is Parisinus Graecus 451. A description may be found in *GCS* 52(15).

[10] Claude Mondésert, *Clément d'Alexandrie, Le Protreptique* (Paris: Cerf, 1949).

[11] These probabilities are based on a study of manuscript errors in the textual tradition of Aeschylus which I conducted several years ago.

Although the emendation is possible, I do not accept it.[12] Clement does not hyphenate names of gods or goddesses.

Another emendation suggests reading Θεσμός for Θέμιδος; but this seems even more unacceptable. Difficulties with accepting the manuscript reading disappear if we accept a fertility role for Themis in Alexandrian religious traditions. This does not eliminate the possibility that Clement may have combined different rituals in his mind. Scholars now recognize that the ancient goddess Gaia remained important through Hellenistic times. Porphyry (*Abstin.* 2,23) says that Γῆ must be praised and loved as the common mother of all. Clement himself follows this convention, although in an ironic mode. For he speaks of Γῆ as the common mother of iron and bronze, the material of images of the gods (*Protrep.* 4,50; 5,56).

The second and more important group of textual problems involves the adjectives ἄρρητα and ἀπόρρητα. The former term is used by Clement to describe the mysteries of Rhea-Kybele and a festival, the Arretophoria (*Protrep.* 2,17). This is probably the force of the τὴν ἄρρητον mentioned among the mothers of Dionysos (Plutarch, *Caesar* 9) Callimachos (*Hecale* frag. 260,21) uses the term in the same sense. The names of Rhea and Demeter alternate in the myths. This tradition would certainly be something "unutterable" for Clement. The other symbols in the first two sets of mysteries might also qualify in Clement's thinking for this adjective. He seems to use it regularly in such contexts and in the sense of "unutterable" or "unspeakable."[13]

Clement uses ἀπόρρητα with the same consistency in the sense of "what is not to be revealed." Thus it would be a proper adjective for the Hiera of the mysteries. Origen in a couple of very revealing text ties together two aspects of the issue (*CC* 1, 25): ὅταν δὲ τὰ περὶ ὀνομάτων τις δύναται τὰ ἐν ἀπορρήτοις φιλοσοφεῖν πολλὰ ἄν εὕροι. . . and (*CC* 1,5): καὶ αἱ κίσται μυσταὶ δεῖ γὰρ . . . τὰ ἁγιαντῶν καὶ τὰ ἄρρητα . . . . The connection of ἄρρητα with the κίσται μυσταί provides further evidence of unmentionable symbol in the baskets involving the Hiera. Also it suggests the notion of "hidden" in connection with the adjective, because Origen most frequently connects the term with the Pauline sense of ἄρρητα ῥήματα.[14]

He combines both adjectives in (*Frag. in Ps.* 1,15): ὑπερβαινούσης τὰ σημαινόμενα ἀπορούσης λέξεως, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν λέξεων ἀπόρρητα καὶ ἄρρητα λαλούσης. . . . Further, Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom use the term specifically to refer to the pudenda.[15] If we accept the manuscript reading and take the adjective ἀπόρρητα with the symbols associated with Themis, we have more evidence for the survival of a fertility ritual. Clement implies that the symbols of the first two classes of mysteries are "unspeakable," but that they are not necessarily Hiera of the mysteries. Symbols associated with Themis, however, apparently did have in Clement's thought a mystery connotation and were related to the Hiera. Their association with orgiastic fertility rites would account for his strong attack. We should note that Clement was probably not familiar with the

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[12] See the argument in *HTR*, footnote no. 1.

[13] The names of both Demeter and Persephone are used for the mother of the child. Orphic Fragment 145 reads: "After becoming the mother of Zeus, she who had formerly been Rhea became Demeter." This tradition would be "unutterable" for Clement.

[14] For revealing passages see *Com. in Joh.* 1,6,5; 1,10,7; 1,13,5; 1,13,4; 1,13,48; *Exhort. ad mart.* 1.11,15; *De. orat.* 1,1,3; *Frag. in Jer.*, 1,1,58; *Philocal.*, 1,1,4; 1,1,16; 1,1,23.

[15] Dio Chrys. 23.409C; Plutarch, II. 284A; I 490 E.; 526B; II. 139E. See also *Anthologia Pal.* 5, 131.

actual rites. But evidence regarding the λίκνα would lead to the conclusion that the symbols in the baskets were not hidden.

## IV. Other Considerations

The public nature of the lamp and the sword does not need demonstration. Their obvious connection with Themis as goddess of righteousness has lasted throughout western culture. The public character of the more controversial symbols needs to be considered. We begin with a Phrygian grave relief[16] which pictures an inverted basket with contents spilling out onto a v-shaped ribbon from which stylized tendrils hang. Scattered about the relief are various symbols, some of which have an obvious phallus shape; and there is also a stylized alabastron. More importantly there is a representation of a κτεὶς γυναικεῖος with some stylization to suggest a comb. The objects which seem to be falling directly from the basket are round and may be fruits but may also stand for ὀρίγανον.

Fifth century potters represented Gaia presenting the child Erichtheus to Athena. One vase from the Berlin Staatliches Museum pictures Gaia wearing an ornament on her head dress exactly like the Tübingen representation mentioned above. Next we must return to Callimachus (Fr. 343,136, K1, 308 Schn): αὐδ' οἷσιν ἐπὶ κτένος ἔσκον ἐθείραις Pfeiffer believed that this fragment refers only to "hair" and not to the pudenda.[17] He rejected combining it with Fragment 543.[18] But if we remember the earlier *Hecale* verses which recall the cosmogonic rituals of Themis, there is good reason to take the meaning "pudenda." I suggest a refusal to do so simply reflects the Puritanism which caused other references as well as the whole Callimachus poem to disappear during the Christian period. Callimachus in Ep. 27 uses the verb θέρω in the sense of growing warm from erotic passion. Three other sources suggest reference to αἰδοῖον. In short, if Callimachus can describe the ritual objects, Clement does not seem to be uncovering anything which could not have been known from other sources.

If there is evidence for the public knowledge of these two symbols, and if we can assume a long association of the sword and lamp (symbolic of justice) with Themis, in what sense are these symbols ἀπόρρητα? Symbols for Clement are related to referents. The first two classes of symbols give little direct information about their referents and in addition are trivial in Clement's view of the world. The third class of symbols, however, does have a conventional and natural relation to Themis, who was often connected with both Gaia and Demeter. Apuleius (*Metam.* 6,2) mentions the secrets of the baskets which are to be kept quiet (per tacita secreta cistarum. . . et cetera quae silentio tegit Eleusinis Atticae sacrarium). This accords with what we have seen in Vergil. Combining these bits of evidence leads to a conclusion that Clement is operating within a convention in his use of symbols for fertility rites. The phrase ἀπόρρητα σύμβολα was a stock usage connected with the mysteries to refer to the female pudenda as representing the order of generation in connection with rites of Themis. The symbols were probably well known. The moralism of succeeding centuries would account for the paucity of remaining references.

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16 Calder, *Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiquae* (Manchester: University, 1963) 6,53,299.

17 Rudolf Pfeiffer, *Callimachos* (Cambridge: Oxford, 1949) 1.292.

18 Hollis adroitly skirts the issue: *Callimachus Hecale*, ed., A. S. Hollis (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 144.

Clement therefore does not unveil any new information. What he does provide is important evidence for the role of Themis in the early Christian era. He supports the theories of Farnell and Ehrenburg.[19] The religious expectation and needs of the time brought about combinations of rites and symbols from originally different mysteries and processions. Clement was unsympathetic about the "enthusiasm" of the devotee of Themis or Demeter. This provoked his strong reaction. These goddesses were given responsiblity for preserving order in both political and natural spheres. The conclusion of Callimachus' Demeter hymn is a prayer to the goddess for two gifts: justice and fertility. It is hard to believe that the hymn is purely literary. For the Orphic Hymn to Demeter (40.18-23) unites the functions of fertility and justice.

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[19] Farnell believed that Clement's list of "mystic symbols" supported his own theory of the goddess Gaia. He argued that although the sword and the lamp might well be the badge of Themis, "it is only by supposing that the Themis of these unknown mystries was something more concrete than this and was allied to an earth divinity of fertilizing functions that we could hope to explain the *origanon* and the *kteis gynaikeos*." Ehrenburg thought that unless Clement was confused about the mysteries, there is here evidence for a purely chthonic-agrarian meaning for Themis. Lewis Richard Farnell, *The Cultus of the Greek States* (Chicago: Aegean, 1971), 3,13, 14; Victor Ehernburg, *Die Rechtsidee im Frühen Griechentum* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1966) 33.

# In What Sense "Blasphemy"? Jesus before Caiaphas in Mark 14:61-64

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Jesus' response to the question of Caiaphas, in which he agrees that he is "the Christ the Son of the Blessed," whom Caiaphas and company "will see" as "Son of Man seated at the right hand of power and coming with the clouds of heaven" (Mark 14:61-62), provokes the cry of "blasphemy!" (Mark 14:64). Many scholars have wondered why, and for good reason. Claiming to be Israel's Messiah (whether *a* messiah or *the* Messiah) was not considered blasphemous.[1] Although disparaging them as imposters and opportunists, Josephus never accused any of the many would-be kings and insurrectionists of first-century Israel as blasphemers. Perhaps a more telling example comes from rabbinic tradition. Rabbi Aqiba's proclamation of Simon ben Kosiba as Messiah was met with skepticism, but not with cries of blasphemy (cf. *y. Taʿan.* 4:5; *b. Sanh.* 93b.) Even claiming to be *son of God* was not necessarily blasphemous, for there is biblical precedent for such an expression (Pss 2:7; 82:6; 2 Sam 7:14).[2] Admittedly, later rabbinic and targumic traditions tend to shy away from this title, possibly as a reaction to Christianity (see 2 Sam 7:14 and 1 Chr 17:13 in the Targum; and *Exod. Rab.* 29.5 [on 20:2], where God says, "I have no son"; cf. *y. Taʿan.* 2:1). But these traditions do not necessarily reflect first-century thinking.

Recently Joel Marcus has suggested that Jesus' claim of divine sonship "would have fallen on Jewish ears as a claim to commensurability with God."[3] Marcus could be correct, for the charge of blasphemy in John 10 was occasioned by claims of sonship and unity with God: "Do you say, 'You blaspheme,' because I said, 'I am the son of God'?" (John 10:36). Otto Betz has argued similarly: "Jesus

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[1] W. L. Lane (*The Gospel of Mark* [NIC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974] 536) argues that "anyone who [was in prison and deserted by his followers, but nevertheless still] proclaimed himself to be the Messiah could not fail to be a blasphemer who dared to make a mockery of the promises given by God to his people." This is no more than an assumption. There is no evidence that a claim to be Messiah, under any circumstances, was considered blasphemous (*pace* J. C. O'Neill, "The Silence of Jesus," *NTS* 15 [1969] 153-67).

[2] An Aramaic fragment found at Qumran (Cave 4) reads: "[He] shall be great upon the earth, [O King!] . . . he shall be called [son of] the [g]reat [God], and by his name shall he be named. He shall be hailed (as) the Son of God, and they shall call him Son of the Most High (J. A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX* [AB 28; Garden City: Doubleday, 1981] 347). To whom reference here is being made is not clear, but there is no hint that calling this person [Messiah?] "son of God" is inappropriate.

[3] Joel Marcus, "Mark 14:61: 'Are You the Messiah-Son-of-God?'" *NovT* 31 (1989) 125-41, quote from p. 141.

blasphemed God because, despite his powerlessness, he would be equal to him."[4] But the Johannine version may very well reflect late first-century Christian polemic with the synagogue. If it does, then it may have been the *post-Easter Christian understanding* of the messiaship and sonship of Jesus that provoked charges of blasphemy from Jewish circles. If this is the case, then one could argue that the charge of blasphemy in Mark likewise reflects later Jewish-Christian controversy and that therefore the cry of blasphemy attributed to Caiaphas is not authentic. This is in fact the conclusion reached by E. P. Sanders in a recent study, in which he repeats and refines points made in an earlier work.[5] If Caiaphas' cry of blasphemy is to be accepted as historical, then a better explanation of Jesus' assertion and the High Priest's reaction is needed.

The present study will approach this problem in four sections. The first section will examine the narrower issue that asks in what sense Jesus' response could have been construed as blasphemy. It will conclude that Jesus did not commit blasphemy in the strict sense defined by Mishnah and that efforts to show this have not been successful. The second section will propose a solution. The third section will examine the christology of Rabbi Aqiba, a christology that prompted a colleague to accuse the famous rabbi of profaning the Divine Presence, while the fourth and final section will compare the christologies of Jesus and Aqiba. This final part will also provide arguments in support of the essential historicity of Mark 14:61-64.

## Wherein Lies Jesus' Blasphemy?

If claiming to be Messiah, even "Messiah son of God," was not a blasphemy, then what was? There are two components to this problem. The first has to do with the biblical and early Jewish understanding of what constituted "blasphemy," particularly from a legal point of view (i.e., blasphemy as a crime that warranted a death sentence). The second has to do with what specific part of Jesus' assertion in Mark 14:62 would have been regarded as blasphemy.

### *Blasphemy in the Bible and Early Judaism*

The relevant materials are adequately surveyed in the studies by Sanders and H. W. Beyer.[6] It will only be necessary to summarize the data briefly. According to Exod 22:28 (Hebr. 22:27) Israelites were commanded not to curse [לֹא תְקַלֵּל] God. On one occasion this commandment was broken (Lev 24:10-16). The blasphemer "pronounced the Name and cursed [וַיְקַלֵּל]" and so was stoned. Although the LXX does not translate these passages using the word βλασφημεῖν,

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[4] O. Betz, "Probleme des Prozesses Jesu," *ANRW* 2.25.1 (1982) 565-647, quote from p. 636. Betz also argues that "such a false messianic claim, of course, also endangers the Temple and the Holy City."

[5] E. P. Sanders, *Jesus and Judaism* (London: SCM; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985) 309-18 (with notes on pp. 409-11); idem, *Jewish Law from Jesus to the Mishnah* (London: SCM; Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1990) 57-67 (with notes on pp. 338-39). In the latter study, Sanders (p. 61 and p. 338, n. 14) cites M. Hengel (*Studies in the Gospel of Mark* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985] 37-38) as supporting his view that the two passages in Mark (Mark 2:5-7; 14:61-64), in which Jesus is accused of blasphemy, represent "the work of the author" (i.e., the evangelist Mark). It is not clear, however, that this is actually Hengel's position. According to the context of his discussion (*Mark*, 37-38 and p. 142, n. 26), Mark has *selected and arranged* his material, not created it.

[6] H. W. Beyer, "Βλασφημέω, κ.τ.λ.," *TDNT* 1 (1964) 621-25; Sanders, *Jewish Law*, 57-60.

Josephus does: "Let him who blasphemed [βλασφημήσας God be stoned, then hung for a day, and buried dishonorably and in obscurity" (*Ant.* 4.8.6 §202). Elsewhere the Greek tradition does employ βλασφημεῖν (and cognates βλασφημία and βλάσφημος) in translating נָקַב (2 Kgs 19:6, 22; cf. Isa 37:6, 23; Ezek 20:27; Ps 44:16), נָאַץ/נְאָצָה (Isa 52:5 [cited in Rom 2:24]; Ezek 35:12; cf. 2 Sam 12:14; 2 Kgs 19:3; Isa 37:3; Ps 74:10, 18), יָכַח (2 Kgs 19:4), שָׁלָה (Dan [θ] 3:29 [96]), and the euphemism בֵּרַךְ (Isa 66:3; cf. 1 Kgs 21:10, 13; Job 1:5; 2:9). Βλασφημεῖν and cognates occur in those books of the Greek tradition where there either was no Hebrew original or the Hebrew original is no longer extant (Tob [א] 1:18; Wis 1:6; Sir 3:16; Bel [θ] 8 [9]; 2 Macc 8:4; 9:28; 10:4, 34, 35, 36; 12:14; 15:24).

Both Josephus and Philo were influenced by the language of the LXX. The former believed it wrong even to blaspheme pagan gods "out of respect for the very word 'God'" (*Against Apion* 2.32 §237; *Ant.* 4.8.10 §207; cf. Acts 19:37: "these are not men who blaspheme our goddess"). The same idea is found in the latter (*Moses* 2.26 §205; *Special Laws* 1.7 §53).[7] In essence blasphemy constituted words or actions contemning what was regarded as sacred, particularly God himself (cf. *Against Apion* 1.11 §59; 1.25 §223; 1.31 §279; 2.13 §143).

The same broad usage is found in the writings of the New Testament. Jesus is accused of blaspheming for pronouncing the forgiveness of a man's sins, presumably an encroachment of God's perogative (Mark 2:5-7//Matt 9:2-3//Luke 5:20-21), and later he himself warns of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit (Mark 3:28-30//Matt 12:31-32//Luke 12:10). In the dispute over purity, Jesus cites blasphemy as one of the many defilements that proceed from the human heart (Mark 7:21-22//Matt 15:18-19). One evangelist describes the mockery of Jesus as blasphemy (Luke 22:65). Stephen is accused of "speaking blasphemous words against Moses and God" (Acts 6:11) and "speaking words against this holy place [i.e., the Temple] and against the Law" (6:13). Evidently, part of this blasphemy had to do with "saying that Jesus the Nazarene will destroy this place" (6:14). After his defense, Stephen is stoned (Acts 7:58). Already mentioned is the threat of stoning Jesus for having claimed equality with God (John 10:31-36). Following Jewish precedent, Christians regarded speaking against Jesus and Christian teaching as blasphemy (Acts 13:45; 18:6; 26:11; 1 Tim 1:20; 6:1; Titus 2:5; James 2:7; Rev 2:9; 13:1, 5, 6; 16:9, 11, 21; 17:3).

Based on Lev 24:16, Philo believed that the death penalty is called for if one utters the name of God in an inappropriate context (*Moses* 2.37-38 §203-206). His interpretation is consistent with the view later expressed in the Mishnah. According to the Mishnah blasphemy is among the various offenses that warrant stoning (*m. Sanh.* 7:4). But what kind of blasphemy warrants a death sentence? "'The blasphemer [הַמְנַקֵּב]' is not culpable unless he pronounces the Name itself" (*m. Sanh.* 7:5; cf. 6:4: "Why is this person hanged? Because he cursed the Name"). This opinion is based on Lev 24:11 ("he pronounced the Name and he cursed"). To be convicted, however, there must be two witnesses (cf. 7:5), an opinion based on Deut 19:15 ("only on the evidence of two witnesses . . . shall a charge be sustained"). In other words, if a person clearly pronounced the Divine Name, and was overheard by two or more credible witnesses, then that person was liable to capital punishment. It is not clear if other forms of blasphemy warranted a death sentence.

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[7] This idea is based on the LXX's translation of אֱלֹהִים as θεοί in Exod 22:28[27].

*"Blasphemy" in Jesus' Answer*

When Jesus is asked, "Are you the Christ the son of the Blessed?," he answered, "I am, and you will see the son of man seated at the right hand of Power and coming with the clouds of heaven" (Mark 14:61b-62). We are told that Caiaphas responded demonstratively. Several features of his response seem to cohere with Mishnaic law: (1) the tearing of his robes (Mark 14:63a; cf. *m. Sanh.* 7:8, 10; for biblical precedent see 2 Kgs 18:37; 19:1); (2) the rhetorical question, "What further need do we have of witnesses?" (Mark 14:63b; cf. *m. Sanh.* 7:5); (3) the claim of blasphemy (Mark 14:64a; cf. *m. Sanh.* 7:5); and (4) the condemning of Jesus as deserving of death (Mark 14:64b; cf. *m. Sanh.* 6:4; 7:5). One might conclude that this exchange between Jesus and Caiaphas is a textbook example of the case outlined in the Mishnah. It is not, however, for one important element is apparently missing: the pronunciation of the Divine Name. It is not missing, of course, if one understands Jesus' first two words, "I am" (ἐγώ εἰμι), as a deliberate allusion to Yahweh ("He is"),[8] instead of simply an affirmation to the question posed (i.e., "Yes, I am [the son of the Blessed]").[9] But this interpretation is very doubtful; and Sanders rightly rejects it.[10] Nor is it missing if, as Robert Gundry has recently suggested, Jesus actually said "at the right hand of YHWH."[11]

If Jesus did not pronounce the Divine Name (much less curse it), then in what sense was he guilty of blasphemy? It is primarily this difficulty that leads some scholars to view this exchange as reflecting later Jewish-Christian controversy more than what took place between Caiaphas and Jesus.[12] Moreover, if he *was* guilty of blasphemy, at least in some sense, why was he sent to Pilate and why did Pilate crucify him as "King of the Jews," as the *titulus* on the cross indicates (cf. Mark 15:26//Matt 27:37//Luke 23:38//John 19:19-21)? Accordingly, Sanders suspects that blasphemy probably had nothing to do with Jesus' trial and execution.[13]

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8 Cf. Exod 3:14: "God said to Moses, 'I am [ἐγώ εἰμι] who I am.'"

9 E. Stauffer, *Jesus and His Story* (London: SCM; New York: Knopf, 1960) 102, 142-159; cited by Sanders, *Jewish Law*, 339, n. 19. It should be noted that some MSS. read συ εἶπας ὅτι ἐγώ εἰμι (Θ *fam*13 arm); cf. Matt 26:64. For a defense of the shorter reading see R. Kempthorne, "The Marcan Text of Jesus' Answer to the High Priest," *NovT* 19 (1977) 198-208.

10 Sanders, *Jewish Law*, 65. Betz ("Prozess Jesu," 634) also rejects this interpretation.

11 In a paper read at the 1990 SBL meeting in New Orleans R. H. Gundry ("Jesus' Blasphemy according to Mark 14:61b-64 and Mishnah Sanhedrin 7:5," p. 6) has suggested that Jesus did pronounce the Divine Name, but in the public report of what he had said, "Power" replaced the tetragrammaton, in keeping with mishnaic regulations. If Gundry is correct, then Caiaphas' cry of blasphemy makes perfect sense. But other problems remain.

12 E. Schweizer (*The Good News according to Mark* [Atlanta: John Knox, 1970] 331) has said: "Since only those cases were regarded as blasphemy where the most holy Name was uttered, the sentencing of Jesus to death for this statement can hardly be thought to be justified." The problem with this statement is that what constituted blasphemy in pre-70 Judea is not certain. To be sure, Caiaphas' judgment was not justified in terms of the later Mishnaic ruling, but it may have been in Jesus' time.

13 Sanders, *Jewish Law*, 67: "It is conceivable, but not probable, that Jesus replied . . . in such a way that he denigrated God by claiming a special relationship with him." Sanders thinks that it was Jesus' action in the temple, and what that action meant, that concerned Caiaphas. I am convinced that this is correct.

## Towards a Solution

Can the charge of blasphemy be credibly explained that makes sense in the context of the factors that led to Jesus' arrest, trial, and execution? Or, to put it another way, are there elements in Jesus' assertion which simultaneously would have been viewed as blasphemy theologically and treason politically? I think there are, and an analysis of Mark 14:62 should make them evident. The text, with bracketed Old Testament allusions, reads as follows (minus the opening affirmation):

ὄψεσθε τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου [cf. LXX Dan 7:13: ὁ υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου]
ἐκ δεξιῶν καθήμενον τῆς δυνάμεως [cf. LXX Ps 109:1: κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν μου; and possibly 109:2: ῥάβδον δυνάμεώς σου]
καὶ ἐρχόμενον μετὰ τῶν νεφελῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ [cf. Θ Dan 7:13: μετὰ τῶν νεφελῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ . . . ἐρχόμενος]

As I see it, there are two principal problems with this tradition: (1) the problematic and controversial self-designation "son of man"; and (2) the odd juxtaposition of being *seated*, which implies being stationary, and *coming*, which obviously implies movement. This awkwardness has led Donald Juel to conclude that "two separate scenes" have been combined.[14] Some also see (3) a problem with Mark's circumlocutions "Blessed," and "Power," suspecting that these are Marcan and possibly not genuine Jewish expressions. Before the question of blasphemy can be resolved, these three problems must be addressed.

*Son of Man*

Recently, convincing arguments have been put forward in support of the authenticity of the self-designation "Son of Man." Ben Witherington's competent survey concludes that the ideas underlying the *Similitudes of Enoch* (i.e., *1 Enoch* 37–71) did not derive from Christian ideas based on the gospels, as J. T. Milik had argued,[15] but from Jewish, Palestinian, non-Christian ideas likely in circulation during the time of Jesus.[16] This conclusion, which today enjoys widespread scholarly support, is important for research into the meaning of the synoptic Son of Man sayings, for in the *Similitudes* the Son of Man is depicted as a judge, as he is in the gospels, particularly as seen in Mark 14:62. Moreover, the expression seems to have a "semi-titular" function in the *Similitudes*, as it does in the gospels.[17]

The apocalyptic description of the Son of Man in *1 Enoch* 62 is particularly instructive. The "Lord of the Spirits" will sit "down on the throne of his glory" (v 2). With him will sit the "Son of Man," also on a "throne of glory" (v 5; cf. 69:27, 29). The "elect" will stand before him (v 8). Sinners, including kings, governors, and high officials, will be judged (vv 9-12). Indeed, these earthly lords will "fall down before him on their faces, worship and raise their hopes in that Son Man" (v 9). The righteous and the elect will never again see the face of sinners, but will abide in the presence of the Son of Man forever (vv 13-16). If such an exegesis as

[14] D. Juel, *Messiah and Temple: The Trial of Jesus in the Gospel of Mark* (SBLDS 31; Missoula: Scholars, 1977) 95.

[15] J. T. Milik, *The Books of Enoch* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976) 91-92.

[16] B. Witherington III, *The Christology of Jesus* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990) 235.

[17] Witherington, *Christology of Jesus*, 235. For a much more thorough examination of the Son of Man sayings in the gospels, see pp. 233-62.

this were commonly associated with Daniel 7, which speaks of the setting up of thrones (v 9), sitting in judgment (vv 10, 26), the subjugation of nations, kings, and kingdoms (vv 14, 17, 25, 27), and everlasting rule (vv 14, 18, 27), then a background that is more than adequate for the synoptic Son of Man sayings is at hand.

*Seated and Coming*

The alleged discrepancy between being "seated at the right hand" and yet "coming with the clouds of heaven" disappears when the following three points are taken into consideration: (1) the similarity of the respective contexts of Daniel 7 and Psalm 110, (2) the combination of the two passages in Jewish exegesis, and (3) a commonly overlooked aspect of the Danielic description of the Divine throne. Because these three points have not been adequately taken into consideration, Jesus' answer has not in my judgment been understood correctly.

First, the respective contexts of Daniel 7 and Psalm 110 are quite similar. Both speak of the subjugation of Israel's enemies, including kings (Dan 7:14, 26; Ps 110:1, 5, 6), both speak of rule over God's people (Dan 7:14 ; Ps 110:3), and both speak of judgment (Dan 7:10, 22, 26; Ps 110:6). The juxtaposition in Mark 14:62 of phrases from these passages may be evidence of a wider comparison of these two texts, such as what may in fact be the case with respect to the *Similitudes* (see below). The similar themes would certainly facilitate a wider comparison.

Second, Daniel 7 and Psalm 110 are combined in later Jewish exegesis: "And in one place in the Writings it is written, 'The Lord said to my lord, "Sit at my right hand" [Ps 110:1],' and it is also written: 'Behold, one came with the clouds of heaven, as a Son of Man' [Dan 7:13]" (*Midr. Ps.* 2.9 [on 2:7]).[18] There is no indication that this exegesis either reflects or seeks to contradict Christian exegesis. Although preserved in writings that clearly post-date the New Testament, this tradition likely represents an independent exegesis. The combination of Daniel 7 and Psalm 110 in the Jesus tradition, if not in the *Similitudes* themselves,[19] suggests that this exegesis, in one form or another, existed at least as early as the first few decades of the first century. The juxtaposition of these texts, therefore, does not constitute an argument against the authenticity of Mark 14:62.

Third, the juxtaposition of being seated and coming is not odd when one realizes that what is being spoken of is God's chariot throne. Jane Schaberg has argued that Mark 14:62 reflects merkabah tradition in which Jesus (or the early Church, as she thinks) sees himself as a "co-occupant of the divine throne."[20] She concludes that this explanation accounts for the anomaly of the Son of man sitting and yet coming with the clouds: He is sitting on the throne, which is itself part of God's chariot. This interpretation is supported by Dan 7:9: "thrones were placed and one that was ancient of days took his seat . . . his throne was fiery flames, its wheels were burning fire" (cf. Ezekiel 1, 10). The throne that was set up was none other than God's chariot throne, as is made clear by the reference to the burning wheels. This could be the idea in *1 Enoch* 51:3: "In those days the

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18 Translation based on W. G. Braude, *The Midrash on the Psalms* (2 vols.; Yale Judaica 13; London and New Haven: Yale University, 1959) 1.40-41.

19 As texts that speak of the Son of Man sitting with, or next to, God would seem to imply (cf. *1 Enoch* 45:3; 55:4; 62:5). See Witherington, *Christology of Jesus*, 260-61.

20 J. Schaberg, "Mark 14.62: Early Christian Merkabah Imagery?" in *Apocalyptic and the New Testament* (J. L. Martyn Festschrift; JSNTSup 24; ed. J. Marcus and M. L. Soards; Sheffield: JSOT, 1989) 69-94, quote from p. 85.

Elect One shall sit on my throne." That this is what Jesus may have had in mind is supported by Rev 3:21: "He who conquers, I will grant him to sit with me on my throne, as I myself conquered and *sat down with my Father on his throne*" (my emphasis). A similar idea is also found in Philo, who says that the Logos sits in God's chariot next to God himself (cf. *On Flight and Finding* 19 §101).

What we have here may not be an independent Christian apocalyptic tradition, but a tradition ultimately dependent upon what lies behind Mark 14:62. In other words, Jesus' words in Mark 14:62 were understood as implying that Jesus anticipated sharing God's chariot throne. Such a claim would surely have been scandalous, for the idea of a mortal sitting on God's throne was unthinkable. A later Jewish exegesis illustrates the unthinkableness of the concept: "'Solomon sat on the throne of the Lord' [1 Chr 29:23]. Is it possible that flesh and blood could sit on the throne of the Lord? Is it not written, 'His throne was fiery flames, and its wheels burning fire' [Dan 7:9]? What then do the words, 'Solomon sat on the throne of the Lord,' mean? They mean that like his Maker, Solomon was able to render judgments without witnesses and without warning" (*Midr. Ps.* 72.2 [on 72:1]).[21]

*Blessed and Power as References to God*

Some question the authenticity of Mark 14:61-62 because "Blessed" (εὐλογητός) and "Power" (δύναμις) were not common circumlocutions for the Divine Name. Years ago Gustaf Dalman suggested that הַמְבֹרָךְ in *m. Ber.* 7:3 (cf. *y. Ber.* 7:3; *b. Ber.* 50a; *1 Enoch* 77:1), which he translated "the Blessed One," is a Hebrew equivalent.[22] Juel disagrees regarding "Blessed" as a "pseudo-Jewish expression" that cannot be viewed as something that Caiaphas could have said.[23] He argues that the examples in *Berakot* probably should not be understood as substantive, but adjectival: "who is blessed." It is, of course, possible that this is exactly the way it should be understood in Mark 14:61: "the son of the One who is blessed" (cf. Rom 1:25; 9:5). In either case, I do not think that calling Mark's phrase a "pseudo-Jewish expression" is justified. Moreover, Marcus thinks it unwise, in light of the "fragmentary nature of our sources for first-century Judaism," to dismiss the authenticity of the expression.[24] Its rarity within the extant sources does suggest that it was not a common way of referring to God. Perhaps it was for this reason that the Matthean evangelist altered Mark's "son of the Blessed" to "son of God" (Matt 26:63).

The expression "Power" as a substitute for God is better attested, being found in a saying attributed to Rabbi Ishmael: "It was said by the mouth of the Power [הַגְּבוּרָה]" (*Sipre Num.* §112 [on 15:31]; cf. *b. Erub.* 54b; *b. Yebam.* 105b; *Tg.* Job 5:8; 14:18 [var.]; 18:4 [var.]). There are references to "the Power that is above" (*Sipre Deut.* §319 [on 32:18]) and "in the eyes of the Power" (*ʾAbot R. Nat.* [A] §37). Note also *1 Enoch* 62:7: "For the Son of Man was concealed from the beginning, and the Most High One preserved him in the presence of his power." It is also possible that the word "Power" was suggested by Ps 110(109):2 ("the Lord will send forth from Zion the rod of your power [עֻזּ/δύναμις]").

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21 Translation based on Braude, *Midrash on the Psalms*, 1.558.

22 G. Dalman, *The Words of Jesus* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1909) 200. See also Betz, "Prozess Jesu," 633.

23 Juel, *Messiah and Temple*, 77-79.

24 Marcus, "Mark 14:61," 127, n. 6.

*Summary*

Thus far I think that the following things can be said. *First*, it is not likely that Jesus was accused of blasphemy for affirming Caiaphas' question about his messianic identity, although there is a remote possibility that accepting the title "Messiah son of God" might have provoked such a response, especially if Jesus had actually pronounced the Divine Name. *Second*, the juxtaposition of sitting and coming proves to be meaningful and coherent. *Third*, it is in this odd juxtaposition that we probably have found our solution, for surely Jesus' claim to share God's throne and to come in judgment upon Caiaphas and the temple establishment would have prompted the High Priest to accuse Jesus of blasphemy, whether or not the Divine Name was pronounced. Such a claim would have qualified as blasphemy according to the usage of the word in the writings of Philo and Josephus. Jesus' claim would have been understood as denigrating God and as threatening the High Priest, Israel's ruler. This will be made clearer shortly. *Fourth*, Jesus' acceptance of the title "Messiah" would obviously have carried with it political, as well as religious implications. That alone would have warranted the handing over of Jesus to Pilate. But the claim to be seated on God's throne, coming in judgment, would have carried with it not only only political implications, but potentially blasphemous theological implications as well. If Jesus' dangerous political claims could be construed as blasphemy, it would have been much easier for Caiaphas, at a time when many Passover pilgrims were present in Jerusalem, to hand over to the Romans a popular Galilean teacher and healer.

Although many features of Jesus' ministry, teachings, and claims are unique, particularly by virtue of their combination within a single individual, his christology is not entirely without parallel. The next section will examine one such parallel.

## The Christology of Rabbi Aqiba—A Possible Parallel

Because of his interpretation of Daniel 7 and because of his endorsement of the messianic candidacy of Simon ben Kosiba (132-135 CE), the messianic ideas, or "christology," of Rabbi Aqiba (*c.* 50-135 CE) could have some important bearing on the question of the meaning and authenticity of Mark 14:61-64. But how useful are post-New Testament rabbinic traditions for research in the life of Jesus? Since the tendency in the rabbinic materials was either to suppress or ignore ideas, exegeses, and traditions that supported or complemented Christian doctrines, particularly those which contrasted sharply with Jewish beliefs (e.g., the messiahship and divinity of Jesus, the Trinity), the preservation of such materials (e.g., Aqiba's rather "high" christology) may indicate that such materials were early and widespread and therefore not easily dispensed with. This is similar to the gospel authenticity criterion of tradition contrary to editorial tendency and dissimilar to the theological interests of the community. The christology of Aqiba seems to meet these criteria. Although there are important parallels, nowhere in this rabbi's christology do I detect dependence upon or polemic against distinctive Christian ideas.

All that can be known of the christology of Rabbi Aqiba is limited to four principal traditions: (1) his exegesis of Daniel 7, (2) his opinion regarding the duration of the messianic reign, (3) his opinion concerning the regathering of the ten northern tribes, and (4) his recognition of Simon ben Kosiba as Israel's

Messiah. Although this tradition is meager, it is not without potentially great significance, if it is viewed within its historical and traditional contexts.

*Exegesis of Daniel 7*

> One passage says: "His throne was fiery flames" [Dan 7:9b]; and another passage says: "Till thrones were placed, and One that was ancient of days did sit" [Dan 7:9a]. "There is no contradiction: One [throne] for him, and one for [the son of] David." This is the view of Rabbi Aqiba. Said Rabbi Yose the Galilean to him: "Aqiba, how long will you treat the Divine Presence as profane! Rather, [it must mean] one for justice and one for grace." [Aqiba then agreed. But then] said Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah to him: "Aqiba, what do you have to do with Haggadah? Cease your talk, and turn to [halakah]! Rather, [it must mean] one for a throne and one for a stool; the throne to sit upon, the stool for a footstool, for it is said: 'The heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool' [Isa 66:1]" (*b. Hag.* 14a).[25]

A parallel tradition appears elsewhere:

> What is the explanation of "until thrones were placed" [Dan 7:9]? One [throne] was for [God] and one for [the son of] David. This is the view of Rabbi Aqiba. Said Rabbi Yose to him: "Aqiba, how long will you profane the divine presence! Rather, one [throne] for justice, and the other for mercy." Did [Aqiba] accept [this answer] from him or not? Come and hear, for it has been taught: "One is for justice and the other for charity." This is [now] Rabbi Aqiba's view. Said Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah to him: "Aqiba, what do you have to do with Haggadah? Confine yourself to [the study of] *Nega'im* and *Ohalot*" (*b. Sanh.* 38b).[26]

A third version appears in *Midrash Tanhuma* (*Qedoshim* §1):

> And it says: "I kept looking until thrones were set up" [Dan 7:9]. What does "thrones" mean? Why are there many thrones? But it is written: "I saw Yahweh sitting upon a throne [high and lifted up" (Isa 6:1); and it is written: "A king sits on a throne of judgment" (Prov 20:8).] What then does "thrones" mean? Rabbi Yose the Galilean and Rabbi Aqiba [discussed this question.] One said: '"Thrones'—this refers to the throne and to the throne's footstool." The other said: "These are the thrones that belong to the people of the world, which the Holy One, blessed be he, is about to overthrow . . . ."

Other explanations are mentioned, but the explicitly messianic interpretation credited to Aqiba in the Babylonian Talmud does not appear. An implicit messianic interpretation may be present in an interpretation credited to "our rabbis": "What does 'thrones' mean in the world to come? The Holy One, blessed be he, will sit and the angels will give thrones to the great ones of Israel, and they

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25 Translation is based on I. Abrahams, "Hagiga," in I. Epstein, ed., *The Babylonian Talmud* (18 vols.; London: Soncino, 1978) 5.83.

26 Translation is based on J. Shachter and H. Freedman, "Sanhedrin," in I. Epstein, ed., *Babylonian Talmud*, 12.245.

will sit . . . And whose are these thrones? [They belong to] the house of David and to the elders of Israel" (Ps 122:5 is then cited as a proof text).[27]

What is to be made of this "synoptic" tradition? Recognizing the many difficulties that attend analysis of rabbinica, I would like to make a few cautious suggestions about the contextualization and presentation of these Aqiba parallels. *First*, it should be noted that Aqiba's exegesis has been remembered and presented in a critical light. This is seen clearly in the two passages preserved in the Babylonian Talmud. In both instances Aqiba has been rebuked ("How long will you profane God?"). And in both instances Aqiba changes his mind, being chided for taking an interest in haggadic exegesis, instead of halakic exegesis, for which this rabbi was justly famous. In the third passage, Aqiba's earlier interpretation is not mentioned at all, unless it is part of what "our rabbis" said: "And whose are these thrones? [They belong to] the house of David and to the elders of Israel." The midrash goes on to suggest that this is the meaning of Dan 7:9 ("Thrones were set up and the Ancient of Days sat down"). God, along with the elders of Israel will sit in judgment upon the nations. There is, however, no explicit mention of Messiah.

*Second*, the context of the discussion in *b. Sanh.* 38b is particularly important. The preceding paragraphs address various heresies. The paragraph that immediately precedes the one in which Aqiba's exegesis appears discusses the *minim* who find in passages where God is spoken of in the plural evidence for the plurality of the Godhead (cited, among others, are Gen 1:26 and 11:27). Our paragraph, with its discussion of the significance of the plurality of the "thrones" in Dan 7:9, is part of this discussion. It is indeed significant that Aqiba's interpretation was placed in such a pejorative context. The implication is that Aqiba's suggestion that "David" (i.e., the Messiah) would take his seat next to God himself implied some sort of sharing of divine authority and status. Not only did Aqiba's contemporary, Yose the Galilean, object, but it is quite evident that the later editors of the Babylonian gemara saw this as dangerously similar to the various heresies (such as Christianity and Gnosticism) in which it was believed that there were two or more "Powers" in heaven.

*Third*, the denigration of Aqiba's exegesis and the rabbi's subsequent change of mind probably constitute a talmudic idealization. It is not likely that Aqiba expounded upon the meaning of the "thrones" of Dan 7:9, was challenged on the spot, and then readily abandoned his interpretation. I suspect that what we have here is a simplification, partly authentic and partly fiction. Aqiba probably did interpret Daniel the way the tradition remembers, and he may very well have eventually changed his mind, possibly after ben Kosiba's defeat. But it is possible that Aqiba's interpretation paralleled too closely Christian interpretation in which Jesus was conceptualized as the enthroned and deified Son of man. It could have been for this reason that the rabbinic tradition presents the tradition the way it does. Aqiba is promptly challenged and just as promptly drops his interpretation. The motivation probably had as much to do with preserving Aqiba's reputation, as it had to do with countering a heretical exegesis.

*Fourth*, did Aqiba's exegesis have antecedents? It evidently did, as is seen in *1 Enoch*, where at many points Daniel 7 is alluded to and interpreted: "pain shall seize [rulers] when they see that Son of Man sitting on the throne of his glory"

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[27] The translation is mine, based on the Hebrew text edited by S. Buber, *Midrash Tanhuma* (Rome: Wilna, 1913) 71-72. Part of the material in the square brackets is supplied by Buber himself; the rest I have added from other editions of Tanhuma.

(62:5; for more parallels see above). Daniel 7 does not explicitly state that the "Son of Man" of v 13 will sit on a throne. Verse 26 does say, however, that "the court will sit in judgment" (cf. v 10), but it is not clear if the Son of Man is part of this court. Aqiba understood the plural "thrones" of v 9 as implying that the Messiah would sit next to God. *1 Enoch*'s statement that the Son of Man will sit on a throne is probably the exegetical bridge between Daniel and Aqiba. This seems to be the idea in Matt 25:31: "When the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, then he will sit on his glorious throne" (cf. Mark 13:26).

*Duration of the Messianic Reign*

Opinions regarding the duration of the messianic reign varied greatly: "How long will the days of the Messiah last? Rabbi Aqiba said, 'Forty years—as long as the Israelites were in the wilderness.' . . . Rabbi Judah the Prince said, 'Four hundred years—as long as the Israelites were in Egypt. Rabbi Eliezer said, 'A thousand years'" (*Midrash Tanhuma, Ekeb* §7).[28] Rabbi Aqiba's expectation seems to be limited to one generation, or to the length of adult life expectancy (in contrast to Eliezer and Judah), such as would have been the case had Simon ben Kosiba succeeded.

Of related interest is tradition which reports that Aqiba believed that forty years after the destruction of the Temple, Messiah would appear (i.e., in 110 CE; cf. *Pesiq. R.* 1.7). He goes on to speculate about what will signal Messiah's approach: "How can one tell when the King Messiah is coming? Rabbi Aqiba [some mss. read Eliezer] said: 'Near the days of the Messiah ten territories will be swallowed up, ten territories will be overturned, ten territories will have their inhabitants put to death'" (*Pesiq. R.* 1.7).[29]

According to another tradition Aqiba is criticized, along with others, for having attempted to predict the coming of the Messiah: "It has been taught: Rabbi Nathan said, 'This verse pierces and descends to the very abyss: "For the vision is yet for an appointed time, but at the end it shall speak, and not lie: though he tarry, wait for him; because it will surely come, it will not tarry" [Hab 2:3].' Not as our Masters, who interpreted this verse, 'Until a time and times and the dividing of time' [Dan 7:25]; nor as Rabbi Simlai who expounded, 'You have fed them with the bread of tears, and given them tears to drink a third time' [Ps 80:6]; nor as Rabbi Aqiba who expounded, '"Yet once, it is a little while, and I will shake the heavens, and the earth" [Hag 2:6]: but the first dynasty [the Hasmonean] shall last seventy years, the second [the Herodian] fifty-two, and the reign of Bar Koziba two and a half years. What is meant by 'but at the end it shall speak [ויפח (from פּוּחַ)], and not lie'? Rabbi Samuel ben Nahmani said in the name of Rabbi Jonathan: 'Blasted be [ויפח (from יָפַח)] the bones of those who calculate the end. For they would say ["Messiah has come"], since the predetermined time has arrived, and yet he has not come'" (*b. Sanh.* 97b).[30] It is significant that the "Masters" appealed to Daniel 7 for determining Messiah's arrival. But Aqiba is said to have based his calculation on Hag 2:6.

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[28] Translation based on A. Cohen, *Everyman's Talmud* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1949) 356.

[29] Translation based on W. G. Braude, *Pesikta Rabbati* (2 vols.; Yale Judaica 18; New Haven and London: Yale University, 1968) 1.48.

[30] Translation based on Freedman, "Sanhedrin," 658-59.

*The Regathering of the Ten Northern Tribes of Israel*

In a discussion of what will happen in the messianic age, Rabbi Aqiba predicts the return of the ten northern tribes: "Even as the day is now overcast and now bright again, so shall their darkness be made bright" (*ʾAbot R. Nat.* [A] §36).[31] This hope is expressed in other rabbinic traditions (cf. *Tg.* Isa 53:8: "He [i.e., Messiah] will bring back our exiles"; *b. Qidd.* 70b; *Midr. Ps.* 122.4 [on 122:4]; *Amida* §10). However, according to the Mishna it was Rabbi Eliezer who believed that the ten tribes would return, with Aqiba holding the opposite view: "'The ten tribes shall not return again . . . as this day goes and returns not, so do they go and return not.' So Rabbi Aqiba" (*m. Sanh.* 10:3).[32] There is, of course, the distinct possibility that the opinions of Aqiba and Eliezer have been confused, for there is evidence that such confusion has happened elsewhere.

*Recognition of Simon ben Kosiba as Messiah*

The tradition of Aqiba's recognition of ben Kosiba[33] appears in the Palestinian Talmud and in the Midrash: "Rabbi Simeon ben Yohai said: 'Rabbi Aqiba my teacher used to explain the passage, "a star shall go forth from Jacob" [Num 24:17], in this way: "Koziba goes forth from Jacob."' Again Rabbi Aqiba, when he saw Bar Kosiba, said, 'This is the King Messiah.' Rabbi Yohanan ben Toreta said to him, 'Aqiba! Grass will grow on your cheeks before the Messiah will come!'" (*y. Taʿan.* 4:5; cf. *Lam. Rab.* 2:2 §4). Jacob Neusner understands this tradition as made up of two contradictory components: the first part denying the messiahship of Simon, with the second part identifying Simon as messiah. "What we have is simply two separate opinion's of Aqiba."[34] I disagree. Although it is possible that the first part betrays Aqiba's later disillusionment with Simon (in which case it should read: "A disappointment/lie [כּוֹזָבָא] shall come forth out of Jacob"), I think that it is more likely that this rabbinic tradition is a unified whole.[35] Aqiba understands Num 24:17 as foretelling the appearance of a man named Koziba, he meets Simon ben Kosiba and concludes that he has met the Messiah. Elsewhere in rabbinic writings Simon's name is understood as "disappointment" or "lie," but I do not think that this is the understanding in the Palestinian Talmud. The parallel, and later, passage in *Lam. Rab.* 2:2 §4 undoubtedly represents a reworking of the older tradition: "Rabbi Yohanan said: 'Rabbi used to interpret "There shall go forth a star" thus: "Read not 'star' [כּוֹכָב] but 'lie' [כּוֹזָב]."'" From here on the passage follows fairly closely what is found in *y. Taʿan.* 4:5.[36] As presented in the Midrash the tradition is clearly pejorative.

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[31] Translation based on J. Goldin, *The Fathers according to Rabbi Nathan* (Yale Judaica 10; New Haven and London: Yale University, 1955) 150.

[32] Translation based on H. Danby, *The Mishnah* (London: Oxford University, 1933) 398.

[33] The Rabbis spelled the name variously כּוֹזְבָה, כּוֹזְבָא, or כּוֹזִיבָא. Several of Simon's letters found at Nahal Hever read: "From Simon ben [*or* bar] Kosiba . . ." (משמעון בן [בר] כוסבה); cf. *EncJud* 4.237; Y. Yadin, *Bar-Kokhba* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971) 126-39. One letter is written in Greek, and spells the leader's name, Σιμων Χωσιβα, thus finally settling the question of which vowel (e or i) or consonant (z or s) was used (Yadin, *Bar-Kokhba*. 132).

[34] J. Neusner, *Messiah in Context* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984) 95.

[35] So R. A. Horsley and J. S. Hanson, *Bandits, Prophets, and Messiahs: Popular Movements at the Time of Jesus* (New York: Seabury, 1985) 128.

[36] Neusner, *Messiah in Context*, 94-95.

*Summary*

Rabbi Aqiba evidently held to a christology that entertained ideas of a mortal Messiah, such as someone like Simon ben Kosiba, who, enthroned next to God himself, would reign for forty years and would regather the lost tribes of Israel. It is, of course, possible that the forty year reign was thought to be earthly, while the enthronement was heavenly. In any case, it is significant that Aqiba understood such a potentially blasphemous interpretation of Daniel 7 to have been fulfilled in a mortal like Simon. Evidently Aqiba viewed the Messiah as mortal, so far as life on earth was concerned, for he expected him to reign but one generation. And yet Aqiba expected the Messiah to sit on a throne next to God himself. It is the combination of these ideas—Messiah will sit next to God/Simon ben Kosiba is Messiah—that is potentially so meaningful for our understanding of Jesus and Daniel 7.

Although Aqiba is supposedly rebuked for his earlier interpretation of Dan 7:9, other rabbis also applied parts of Daniel 7 (esp. vv 13-14) to the Messiah (see *b. Sanh.* 96b-97a, 98a; *Num. Rab.* 13.14 [on 7:13]; *Midr. Ps.* 21.5 [on 21:7]; 93.1 [on 93:1]) and to his "elect "(*Midrash Tanhuma, Qedoshim* §1). There is especially interest in the cloud imagery. In *b. Sanh.* 96b-97a Messiah is called "Bar Naphle," an expression behind which lies a pun referring to the "fallen" tent of David (from the Hebrew נָפַל–cf. Amos 9:11) and to the one who comes with the "clouds" (from the Greek νεφέλη–cf. LXX Dan 7:13).[37] Elsewhere are expressed alternative expectations, depending upon Israel's moral condition: "If they [the Israelites] are meritorious, [Messiah will come] on 'the clouds of heaven' [alluding to Dan 7:13]; if not, [Messiah will come] 'lowly and riding upon an ass' [alluding to Zech 9:9]" (*b. Sanh.* 98a). Finally, the cloud imagery appears in one of the targums in which Moses and David are compared: "Moses shall go forth from the wilderness and the King Messiah from Rome. The one shall lead the way on top of a cloud and the other shall lead the way on top of a cloud" (*Frag. Tg.* Exod 12:42).

## The Christologies of Jesus and Aqiba—A Comparison

Comparison of the respective christologies of Jesus and Aqiba is instructive, for they are mutually clarifying. I should also note that parallel Jewish exegesis will be drawn upon, although it is the basic outline of Aqiba's views that is in view. Reasoning principally from coherence, arguments for the authenticity of Mark 14:61-64 will now be offered.

### *Mark 14:61-64 and Related Authentic Tradition*

The strongest claim to the authenticity of Mark 14:61-64 is seen in its coherence with Jesus' promise to his disciples that they will someday sit with him on thrones in the Kingdom of God. This tradition is clearly based upon Daniel 7.[38] Jesus apparently understood himself in terms of Daniel's "Son of man," to whom the kingdom would be given (cf. Dan 7:14; *1 Enoch* 69:29; *Pss. Sol.* 17:44), and his disciples as the "saints" to whom judgment would some day be given (cf. Dan 7:22). This is likely what lies behind the tradition found in Mark and Q:

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[37] See Freedman, "Sanhedrin," 654, n. 2.

[38] Juel (*Messiah and Temple*, 158-59) regards Matt 19:28//Luke 22:28-30 and Mark 14:62 as "seemingly indisputable allusions" to Daniel 7.

From Mark:

> And [James and John] said to him, "Grant us to sit, one at your right hand and one at your left, in your glory." But Jesus said to them, "You do not know what you are asking . . . to sit at my right hand or at my left is not mine to grant, but it is for those for whom it has been prepared." (10:37-40)

From Q:[39]

> Truly, I say to you, in the new world, when the Son of man shall sit on his glorious throne, you who have followed me will also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel. (Matt 19:28)
>
> You are those who have continued with me in my trials; and I assign to you, as my Father assigned to me, a kingdom, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel. (Luke 22:28-30)

According to Rudolf Bultmann, "it is unquestionably the risen Lord who speaks [in Matt 19:28//Luke 22:28-30] . . . We are dealing with a formulation deriving from the early Church, for it was there that the Twelve were first held to be judges of Israel in the time of the end."[40] More recently F. W. Beare has opined that "it is not conceivable that Jesus could ever have spoken these words. They come from a Palestinian Christianity dominated by vivid apocalyptic expectations couched in traditional Jewish imagery . . . [It does] not come from earliest times. The kind of exaltation of the apostles, the notion of them as a collegiate body governing the church, belongs to the second generation (or later)."[41]

In recent years, however, scholars have come to regard this tradition as authentic. Sanders argues convincingly that it would have been highly unlikely for the early Church to have created a saying about the Twelve sitting on twelve thrones, when the early Church knew that one of the Twelve (Judas) had betrayed Jesus.[42] This is no doubt the reason why Luke omitted "twelve," and simply spoke of the disciples sitting on "thrones judging the twelve tribes."[43] Ben Meyer argues, moreover, that surely Jesus anticipated vindication for himself

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[39] Scholars are divided over the origin of this tradition. Some believe the Matthean and Lucan forms derive from Q or from different recensions of Q. Others believe that they derive from M and L. See J. S. Kloppenborg, *Q Parallels* (Sonoma: Polebridge, 1988) 202. Virtually all regard these as divergent forms of the same saying.

[40] R. Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968) 158-59. Elsewhere Bultmann says that this tradition "is related to the inner life of the early Church" (p. 163).

[41] F. W. Beare, *The Gospel according to Matthew* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981) 400. The form of the tradition as it appears in Rev 3:21 ("He who conquers, I will grant him to sit with me on my throne, as I myself conquered and sat down with my Father on his throne") is a later "universalizing of a saying which applied originally only to the Twelve"; cf. Bultmann, *Synoptic Tradition*, 159, n. 4. Relevant also is 1 Cor 6:2: "Do you not know that the saints will judge [κρινοῦσιν] the world?"

[42] Sanders, *Jesus and Judaism*, 98-99. Cf. I. H. Marshall, *Commentary on Luke* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978) 815.

[43] So J. A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke X-XXIV* (AB 28a; Garden City: Doubleday, 1985) 1419.

and for his disciples.[44] The saying as it is preserved in Matt 19:28//Luke 22:28-30 is an expression of such anticipation.[45]

The same arguments may be offered for the authenticity of Mark 10:37-40. Indeed, additional reasons support the authenticity of this passage. *First*, it paints a discreditable picture of the disciples James and John.[46] It is highly unlikely that the early Church would have invented such a tradition, though it might have been retained for edifying purposes. *Secondly*, the limitation placed on Jesus ("to sit at my right hand or at my left is not mine to grant") surely does not derive from the early Church, nor does it reflect the Jewish principle that the Master has the authority to assign seats on his right and left (cf. *b. Erub.* 54b).[47]

The authenticity of this tradition gains further support when its meaning is properly assessed. Daniel 7 is not the only Old Testament passage that lies behind these traditions of sitting on Jesus' right and left and judging the twelve tribes of Israel. It is likely that Ps 122:3-5 ("Jerusalem . . . to which the tribes go up . . . There thrones for judgment were set, the thrones of the house of David") has also contributed to this eschatological saying.[48] This is indeed likely, for both passages, Daniel 7 and Psalm 122, are cited side by side in a rabbinic exegesis that anticipates the day when God and Israel's elders will sit in judgment upon the peoples of the world (cf. *Midrash Tanhuma, Qedoshim* §1, cited above; cf. *Midr. Ps.* 122.6 [on 122:5]). By means of the exegetical principle of *gezera shawa*, the rabbis have linked the two texts by the words "thrones" and "judgment." Linkage was also facilitated because of Daniel 7's messianic overtones and because of Psalm 122's explicit reference to "the house of David." It is this combination and, to a large extent, this exegesis that lie behind Jesus' sayings.

Jesus saw himself as the Son of man who will sit on one of the "thrones" of Dan 7:9 (in agreement with Aqiba's [early] understanding of this verse) and, along with his disciples, who displace the "elders of Israel,"[49] will judge the tribes (as suggested by Ps 122:3-5). The meaning of "judging [κρίνοντες] the twelve tribes" should probably be understood in the Old Testament sense of "ruling" (see LXX Judg 3:10 where κρίνειν translates שָׁפַט), and very likely had no punitive connotation (as in later Christian and Jewish exegesis).[50] A close parallel

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44 B. F. Meyer, *The Aims of Jesus* (London: SCM, 1979) 209.

45 See also W. G. Kümmel, *Promise and Fulfillment* (SBT 23; London: SCM, 1957) 47.

46 V. Taylor, *The Gospel according to St. Mark* (London: Macmillan, 1952) 439; C. E. B. Cranfield, *The Gospel according to St. Mark* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1959) 336.

47 I suspect that these related traditions from Mark and Q were originally part of a unified saying, perhaps something like this: "The sons of Zebedee said to him, 'Grant us to sit, one at your right hand and one at your left, in your glory.' But Jesus said to them, 'You do not know what you are asking. To sit at my right hand or at my left is not mine to grant, but it is for those for whom it has been prepared. Truly I say to you, when I sit on my glorious throne, you who have followed [*or* continued with] me will also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.'"

48 Not many commentators have seen the allusions to Daniel 7 and Psalm 122; Fitzmyer (*Luke X-XXIV*, 1419) sees Ps 122:4-5 lying behind Luke 22:30; R. H. Gundry (*Matthew: A Commentary on His Literary and Theological Art* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982] 393) recognizes the parallels between Daniel 7 and Matt 19:28; Marshall (*Luke*, 818) rightly sees the presence of both Old Testament passages behind the saying.

49 D. Zeller, *Kommentar zur Logienquelle* (Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1986) 88.

50 Christians understood Matt 19:28 as predicting punitive judgment of Israel. After citing the verse, Origen says that "the just will judge the twelve tribes of Israel which have not believed" (*Com. Matt.* 15.24). Chrysostom asks: "What is the meaning of 'judging the twelve tribes of Israel'? It means 'condemning them'" (*Hom. Matt.* 64.2).

is found in the *Psalms of Solomon*: "[Messiah] will gather a holy people whom he will lead in righteousness; and he will judge [κρινεῖ] the tribes of the people" (17:26; cf. 17:29; Ps 2:10; 1 Macc 9:73). In effect, Jesus has promised his disciples a place in his government.

But part of this task will be the regathering of the twelve tribes in order to reconstitute and renew Israel, something that most of the other messianic claimants, especially ben Kosiba, hoped to accomplish.[51] It is very likely that this is what such sayings as those under consideration imply. This is in part why Richard Horsley, in keeping with the idea in the Book of Judges, translates Matt 19:28 as "sitting on twelve thrones *liberating* the twelve tribes of Israel" (my emphasis).[52] Not only does Jesus' promise cohere with the rabbinic expectation, at least as it has been expressed in *Midrash Tanhuma*, that the "great ones" of Israel will sit upon the various thrones that will be set up in Jerusalem, but it coheres with Aqiba's expectation that the ten lost tribes of the north will someday be regathered.

The implication of this interpretation is clear. If Jesus, drawing upon the imagery of Daniel 7 and Psalm 122, promised his disciples thrones, then the statement that is attributed to him in Mark 14:62, a statement that reflects the same understanding of Daniel 7, has a reasonable claim to authenticity. Moreover, making this statement to the High Priest is also contextually appropriate, for it implies that his rule will be displaced by Jesus' rule. Indeed, the sayings in Mark 10 and Matt 19:28/Luke 22:28-30 offer a critique of one aspect of the Jewish interpretation of Daniel 7 in suggesting that the "great ones" of Israel will be those who humble themselves. The thrones for judgment will not be given to Israel's current rulers (i.e., the High Priest, ruling priests, members of the Sanhedrin), i.e., those who exalt themselves (cf. *T. Moses* 7); the thrones will be given to Jesus' followers who have humbled themselves, as seen in their willingness to serve, rather than be served.[53]

*Mark 14:61-64 and the Historical, Political, and Social Context*

Secondary support for the authenticity of Mark 14:61-64 is found in the observation that Rabbi Aqiba interpreted Daniel 7 messianically (as did many Rabbis) and identified (as probably many other rabbis did) a human being,

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Perhaps in response to this kind of interpretation, the rabbis think that Ps 122:5 implies the judgment of "the nations of the world" (*Midr. Ps.* 122.6 [on 122:5]). In the targum, the idea of judgment drops out altogether: "For there thrones will be set in Jerusalem, thrones in the temple for the kings of the house of David."

[51] The precise cause of the Bar Kokhba revolt is not clear. According to Dio Cassius (*Roman History* 69.12.1-2) Hadrian provoked the war by erecting a temple dedicated to Zeus on the very spot where once the Jewish Temple stood. Chrysostom (*Oration against the Jews* 5.10) believed that the Jews attempted to rebuild their temple during the war. According to Historia Augusta (*Life of Hadrian* 14.2) the Emperor outlawed cicumcision (*mutilare genitalia*). Appian (*Syrian War* §50) speaks of oppressive measures and Jewish hatred of Hadrian (cf. *Gen. Rab.* 63.7 [on 25:23]). Most of these reasons suggest that Simon was probably motivated for religious reasons. The Bar Kokhba letters make it clear that he was religiously observant.

[52] R. A. Horsley, *Sociology and the Jesus Movement* (New York: Crossroad, 1989) 119.

[53] O. Betz (*Jesus und das Danielbuch, Band II: Die Menschensohnworte Jesu und die Zukunftserwartung des Paulus (Daniel 7, 13-14)* [ANTJ 6.2; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1985] 175-76) sees in this concept a deliberate reversal on the part of Jesus of Daniel's idea that the Son of Man will be served. Betz believes that Jesus thought that he must first serve and suffer before he could be exalted and served.

Simon ben Kosiba, as Israel's Messiah. Such an identification by a revered rabbi lends plausibility to Jesus' self-identification as the Messiah who would sit next to God. In other words, it is not necessary to suppose that such "high christology" must have arisen in the early Church, following the Easter proclamation. Lending further support to the tradition's authenticity is the fact that many persons aspired to messianic recognition in the generation before Jesus, and in the two or three generations that followed. Some of these persons aspired to be "king," others claimed to be prophets of renewal, probably in accordance with the prophet-like Moses theme.[54]

*Mark 14:61-64 and the Parable of Wicked Vineyard Tenants*

There is evidence elsewhere that Jesus viewed himself as God's Son. This is seen especially in the Parable of the Wicked Vineyard Tenants (Mark 12:1-12), a parable which increasingly scholars are coming to regard as authentic.[55] Against the older assertion that the parable was a creation of the early Church depicting what had happened to Jesus,[56] it has been pointed out that the parable warns of the coming judgment of the wicked tenants and says nothing of the son's vindication. Moreover, murdering the son and then casting him "outside" (v 8) of the vineyard (which, according to this view, is Jerusalem) does not parallel Jesus' experience. Jesus was first taken outside of Jerusalem and then was put to death.[57] Finally, K. R. Snodgrass has recently made a good case for the authenticity of the concluding citation of Ps 118:22-23.[58] He argues that the rejected stone of the Ps 118:22 (which in the targum reads: "the son which the builders rejected") makes up an essential part of the parable and must not be viewed as a later, secondary addition.

Assuming that this parable does indeed derive from Jesus, we learn several significant facts about Jesus' self-understanding: (1) Jesus viewed himself as God's "son,"[59] sent to the religious authorities, the caretakers of God's vineyard, Israel; (2) Jesus viewed the religious authorities as corrupt and under the threat of divine judgment (which is likely how the action in the Temple should be

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[54] For a discussion of these claimants see Horsley and Hanson, *Bandits*. G. Thiessen ("Die Tempelweissagung Jesu. Prophetie im Spannungsfeld von Stadt und Land," *TZ* 32 [1976] 144-58) suspects that Jesus' utterances against the Temple, which he thinks are likely authentic, may reflect widespread rural opposition to the Temple establishment.

[55] C. H. Dodd, *The Parables of Jesus* (2nd ed.; New York: Scribner's, 1961) 96-102; J. Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus* (3rd ed.; London: SCM, 1972) 70-77; Cranfield, *Mark*, 366-68; J. D. Crossan, "The Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen," *JBL* 90 (1971) 451-65; Fitzmyer, *Luke X-XXIV*, 1279-80. J. H. Charlesworth, *Jesus within Judaism* (New York: Doubleday, 1988) 139-53.

[56] In the past this parable was viewed as inauthentic because of its allegorizing features; cf. Bultmann, *Synoptic Tradition*, 177, 205; Kümmel, *Promise and Fulfillment*, 83. Schweizer (*Mark*, 239) thinks that the parable is a creation of the Greek-speaking church. Such a view overlooks the Semitic and Jewish exegetical features that run throughout the parable, including the citation of Ps 118:22-23.

[57] Charlesworth, *Jesus within Judaism*, 141.

[58] K. R. Snodgrass, *The Parable of the Wicked Tenants: An Inquiry into Parable Interpretation* (WUNT 27; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1983) 111.

[59] For surveys of references to "son of God" in early Judaism, see M. Hengel, *The Son of God* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976) and Charlesworth, *Jesus within Judaism*, 149-53. In view of the evidence, Charlesworth concludes that "it simply will no longer suffice to attribute all references to 'son' or 'Son of God' to the needs and proclamation of the early Church" (p. 152).

understood); and (3) assuming that the quotation of Ps 118:22-23 was an original and authentic part of this parable, Jesus understood himself, the "cornerstone,"[60] as the antithesis, indeed, the very replacement of the religious leaders, the "builders."[61] All of these elements cohere with the trial scene that Mark provides us.

*Miscellaneous Considerations*

There are other objections raised against the authenticity of Mark 14:61-64 which the above discussion has not taken into account. They may now be considered. *First*, Sanders thinks that the blasphemy charge may function as a sort of diversion, drawing the readers' attention away from the real charge brought against Jesus: his threat to destroy the temple. Sanders thinks that Mark attempted to tone down Jesus' harsh criticism and demonstration against the temple establishment. I find this line of interpretation problematic, for Mark's redactional thrust appears to run in precisely the opposite direction. The evangelist has *emphasized* the antagonism between Jesus and the temple establishment, not toned it down.[62] In view of this it is not at all apparent that the temple charge is a piece of embarrassing historical tradition that Mark felt compelled to revise and push aside in favor of the charge of blasphemy. In favor of the authenticity of Mark 14:62 is the fact that by 70 CE, about the time the Gospel of Mark was written, Jesus' prediction made to Caiaphas and company ("you will see the Son of Man . . .") could easily have been construed as having failed. Or, as Witherington puts it: "Mark 14:62 has good claims to authenticity, for the church would not make up what appeared to be an unfulfilled prophecy."[63]

*Second*, some redaction critics think that they find several tell-tale signs of the evangelist's editorial activity in Mark 14:61-64 and so conclude that the pericope is wholly or mostly inauthentic. In my judgment these redaction critical claims have overestimated the extent of the Marcan evangelist's creative activity. For example, John Donahue gets himself into trouble in trying to make his case that the Marcan trial scene is largely the creation of the evangelist.[64] His attempt to show that the intercalation of Peter outside by the fire and Jesus inside before the religious authorities runs shipwreck on the fact that the same "intercalation" occurs in John 18. Donahue is therefore forced to claim that John derived this intercalated presentation from Mark, something that is highly unlikely and

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60 There are messianic implications associated with the "corner stone"(ראש פנה): "Out of them shall come forth the corner stone [פנה], out of them the stake..." (Zech 10:4); but in the targum: "Out of him comes his king, out of him comes his Messiah . . ."; recall the exegesis of Deut 33:16 in *Sipre Deut.* §353 (on 33:16) above, where ראש was interpreted messianically.

61 The rabbis and religious leaders sometimes referred to themselves as the "builders" of Israel (*b. Shabb.* 114a; *b. Ber.* 64a; cf. 1 Cor 3:10). Qumran offers a few negative references, obviously meant to denigrate the establishment's self-description: "Such men are builders of a rickety wall" (CD 4:19, alluding to Ezek 13:10); ". . . those who build the wall and cover it with whitewash" (CD 8:12); "[God hates the] builders of the wall" (CD 8:18).

62 See C. A. Evans, "Jesus' Action in the Temple: Cleansing or Portent of Destruction?" *CBQ* 51 (1989) 237-70, esp. pp. 238-43.

63 Witherington, *Christology of Jesus*, 258.

64 J. Donahue, *Are You the Christ? The Trial Narrative in the Gospel of Mark* (SBLDS 10; Missoula: Scholars, 1973).

highly problematic.[65] It is much more likely that the trial material, though in some measure edited and arranged by the evangelist, is traditional.

*Third*, Norman Perrin's conclusion that Mark 14:62 is inauthentic, owing its origin to a Christian pesher on Dan 7:13 and Ps 110:1,[66] runs into serious trouble when it is observed that, possibly apart from Rev 3:21, there is little evidence in the New Testament that the early church understood Jesus' saying, much less created it. When Stephen is martyred he says: "Behold, I see the heavens opened and the son of man standing at the right hand of God" (Acts 7:56). The allusion to Mark 14:62, and its components from Daniel 7 and Psalm 110, is obvious. But Jesus is described as *standing*, not *sitting*. It may be that the Lucan evangelist, or in this case the tradition before him, did not fully understand the dominical saying. Elsewhere Luke seems to understand the tradition in terms of Jesus Messiah sitting on the throne of his father David (Luke 1:32; Acts 2:30). In Paul, Jesus sits not on God's throne, but on the βῆμα—the judgment seat (2 Cor 5:10; cf. Rom 14:10). The idea is somewhat parallel, for Jesus will judge, or evaluate, his people (cf. Matt 19:28; Luke 22:28-30). In Hebrews, Jesus, the High Priest, is "seated at the right hand of the throne of Majesty in heaven" (8:1; cf. 12:2). Jesus is not seated on the throne, nor do these texts have anything to do with judgment. Only in the Apocalypse does it appear that the idea has been preserved (Rev 3:21; cf. 22:1, 3). Moreover, Betz's argument that the nocturnal hearing before Caiaphas, as well as other aspects of Jesus' ministry and teaching, is clarified by Nathan's oracle (2 Samuel 7) should be taken seriously.[67] There is little evidence, apart perhaps from Heb 1:5 where 2 Sam 7:14 is quoted, that early Christians elaborated upon or even recognized the significance of this passage. That it nevertheless clarifies Jesus' ministry, especially the hearing before Caiaphas, the trial before Pilate, and the subsequent crucifixion, complete with the *titulus* that proclaims Jesus "King of the Jews," is support for the essential history of the Marcan trial narrative. In other words, it does not appear to be a Christian exegesis or apologetic of some sort, but a reasonably accurate, though not always understood, report of what happened.

*Concluding Remarks*

On historical and exegetical grounds it seems that Jesus was one among many who offered restoration and renewal to oppressed and beleaguered Israel of the early first century CE. His "christology," evidently similar to that of Rabbi Aqiba at several important points, was in direct conflict with the interests of the Jerusalem ruling establishment. The Marcan trial scene, obviously an edited, truncated, and incomplete version, is probably accurate in reporting that Jesus actually met Caiaphas and offended him (which coheres with the Temple action and the subsequent arrest, involving servants of the High Priest). The Marcan scene is probably also accurate in reporting that Jesus acknowledged his divine sonship and described that sonship in terms of Daniel 7 and 2 Samuel 7. In my

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65 See R. T. Fortna, "Jesus and Peter at the High Priest's House: A Test Case for the Question of the Relation between Mark's and John's Gospels," *NTS* 24 (1977-78) 371-83; C. A. Evans, "'Peter Warming Himself': The Problem of an Editorial 'Seam,'" *JBL* 101 (1982) 245-49.

66 N. Perrin, "Mark 14:62: The End Product of a Christian Pesher Tradition?" *NTS* 13 (1966) 150-55.

67 Betz, "Prozess Jesu," 625-28; cf. idem, "Die Frage nach dem messianischen Bewusstsein Jesu," *NovT* 6 (1963) 20-48, esp. 34-37; idem, *Was wissen wir von Jesus?* (Stuttgart and Berlin: Kreuz, 1965) 59-62.

judgment, scholars should no longer set this tradition aside as inauthentic. To do so is to exclude an important aspect of Jesus' self-understanding.

# The (A)Historicity of Jesus' Temple Demonstration: A Test Case in Methodology

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Last spring, the Jesus Seminar completed its six-year task of considering the historical value of the teachings of Jesus. Among the byproducts that have emerged from the Seminar's work are some significant methodological developments. In *The Gospel of Mark: Red Letter Edition* (Polebridge 1991), Robert Funk explains the Seminar's "Rules of Evidence." There are five rules relating to oral transmission, eleven to the nature of written gospels, four to attestation, four to narration, and seven general principles. Drawing on these and on a very wide consensus that predates the Jesus Seminar, Funk distills eight theses on the speech of Jesus. Funk's presentation is the most recent and most comprehensive digest of the methodological principles for evaluating the historicity of the sayings tradition.

While investigation of the sayings has sparked serious methodological reflection and generated a sophisticated battery of interlocking criteria, the methodology of the investigation of the deeds of Jesus is still relatively primitive. I know of no digest of principles even remotely comparable to the one Funk offers on the methodology of the sayings. This is somewhat surprising, since many who offer portraits of the historical Jesus make historical judgments on his deeds with little reticence.

The task of this paper is to come at the issue of method inductively, by analyzing the methods actually used by scholars who make historical judgments about the deeds of Jesus. Since no scholar in this survey explicitly describes his method, my task is to infer the methods in use from the ways in which the various arguments unfold. Along the way, I will 1) ask whether and how these methods coordinate, 2) press them for their adequacy (can they achieve the results claimed for them?), and 3) probe them for the limits within which they are useful (how much can they prove?).

My strategy is to focus on a specific test case: scholarly judgments on the historicity of Jesus' temple demonstration (hereafter abbreviated "TD") in Mark 11:15-17 par. This case is useful for two reasons. 1) It is not a miracle and so discussion of it need not be burdened by worries about its possibility. 2) It is a unique event, not an instance of, say, a healing. We are not dealing with a scene composed to exemplify some characteristic activity of Jesus. We won't end up asserting something like "we are confident that Jesus did exorcisms, but we don't know whether any given pericope corresponds to a specific event."

Among the writers who have expressed opinions on the historicity of the TD, there is a nearly unanimous consensus that Mark 11:15-17 preserves a kernel of historical remembrance: that Jesus did something to disrupt the merchants in the temple area. Unfortunately, this consensus stands with a near absence of argument or evidence. Almost without exception, scholars express their confidence that the event happened, but offer little or no explanation for the basis of their confidence. Discussion of method is very rare and, when it occurs, usually brief.

First, I will examine E. P. Sanders' position on the TD and consider in some detail one of his methodological theses. Then I will take up the positions of David Catchpole, A. E. Harvey, Ben Witherington, and Burton Mack. Finally, I will gather up the methodological judgments made along the way and attempt a synthesis, by proposing a working method for assessing the deeds of Jesus, discussing its promises and pitfalls.

## Sanders

We begin with one of the most significant studies of the historical Jesus of the 1980s, E. P. Sanders' *Jesus and Judaism* (Fortress 1985). This book is especially important to our topic in that the TD is the foundation on which Sanders builds his reconstruction.

In his Introduction, Sanders lays out his understanding of what a good hypothesis about the historical Jesus has to explain. His second requirement for a good hypothesis, which undergirds his position on the TD, is that it explain the "connection between what Jesus did and said and the reason for his execution" (22). Sanders considers two locations in which scholars often find this connection: either in Jesus' claims about himself, or in his attitude toward the Law. Sanders rejects both options (55-57), and so considers a tempting alternative: that "there was no link between Jesus' teaching in Galilee and the cause of his death in Jerusalem" (57). Yet for Sanders this raises "even graver objections," the worst being that "it presupposes that Jesus' activity in the temple has no intrinsic connection with his teaching" (57). This statement contains a crucial transition in Sanders' argument, for in it he glides from "the cause of his death in Jerusalem" to "Jesus' activity in the temple." Sanders gives no justification for this substitution. By the end of his Introduction, Sanders is certain that: 1) Jesus actually performed the TD, and 2) it was the cause of his death.[1] Sanders argues at length for (2), but he nowhere argues for (1).[2]

It is important that we take note of this omission, for the first sentence in Chapter One looks back to the Introduction: "Having named Jesus' activity in the temple as the surest starting point for our investigation . . ." (61). This implies (at least to me) that the Introduction had demonstrated the historicity of the TD. In fact, it sent me back to reread, thinking I had missed it. Yet no such demonstration is there. On the same page Sanders reiterates his certainty: "It is *overwhelmingly probable* that Jesus did something in the temple and said something about its destruction" (emphasis added). While this does not amount to an argument, it is

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[1] Sanders recognizes that the TD alone did not lead to Jesus' death, but he maintains that it was *the* decisive factor. It was "the crucial act which led to his execution, though there were contributing causes" (334). "The gun may have already been cocked, but it was the TD which pulled the trigger" (305).

[2] To emphasize the obvious: arguments for (2) are irrelevant until (1) is demonstrated.

helpful for understanding the source of Sanders' certainty. On page 11, Sanders lists eight "almost indisputable facts" about Jesus that can serve as a bedrock for historical reconstruction. Among these is that "Jesus engaged in a controversy about the temple."[3] By "temple controversy" Sanders means (at least) Jesus' spoken threats against the temple. Apparently, Sanders coordinates the prediction of the temple's destruction with the TD, and coordinates them so closely that evidence for the historicity of the former doubles as evidence for the historicity of the latter. Consider the reason given for his position. "The conflict over the temple seems deeply implanted in the tradition, and that there was such a conflict would seem to be indisputable" (61). Here, "did something in the temple and said something about its destruction" has been elided into "the conflict over the temple." As evidence that this conflict is "deeply implanted," Sanders points out that "an accusation that Jesus threatened the temple is reflected in three other passages: the crucifixion scene (Matt 27:39f//Mark 15:29f); Stephen's speech (Acts 6:13f); and, with post-Easter interpretation, in John 2:18-22" (61).

In response, four points need to be considered. 1) How deeply implanted is this tradition? The three passages represent at most two sources, for Luke had access to Mark in his composition of Acts, and perhaps only one source, depending on whether the Johannine tradition is independent. 2) "Deeply implanted in the tradition" is not equivalent to historical. It only means "early." 3) Even if the accusation that Jesus threatened the temple were historical, it would not prove that he really did, any more than the historicity of the rumor in Matt 28:11-15 proves that the disciples stole the body. 4) Even if Jesus had threatened the temple verbally, this by itself would not prove the historicity of the TD.

The citation of the three passages concludes Sanders' discussion of the historicity of the TD. He next takes up the issue of its meaning. (Although this is not strictly relevant to our topic, it is germane to follow Sanders' argument, for it illuminates further aspects of his method.) Sanders argues that the TD was originally neither a protest against trade in the temple (an interpretation based on Mark) nor a rejection of animal sacrifice (an interpretation reflecting Protestant bias against ritual). Sanders holds that Mark 11:17 is a Markan addition and so cannot be used to interpret the meaning of the TD for Jesus. He concludes that the deed is a symbolic act in the prophetic mode. The key gesture is the act of overturning tables,[4] which symbolizes the destruction of the temple. Sanders offers no argument for this, merely asserting that this meaning "appears to me to be quite an obvious one."[5]

Sanders determines the meaning of the TD in much the same way as he establishes its historicity: by implicitly linking it to the threats Jesus allegedly made against the temple. Sanders presents no direct argument about the meaning, no investigation into the symbolic resonance of tables or acts of overturning them. He concludes on different grounds that Jesus threatened the temple and

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3 "I have chosen to begin with the temple controversy, . . . which offers almost as good an entry for the study of Jesus' intention and his relationship to his contemporaries as would a truly eyewitness account of the trial" (11-12).

4 Sanders does not say why the driving out of merchants or animals is not essential to the meaning of the act.

5 "I must leave to others the assessment of 'overturning' as a self-evident symbol of destruction" (70). As he closes the chapter he reiterates that the overturning of tables "points *naturally* toward destruction" (90, emphasis added).

uses this to interpret the symbolic act reported in the TD.[6] But why overturning tables by itself portends destruction he does not say.

Sanders' position has already been cited as authoritative by at least one competent scholar. In treating the TD, Paula Fredriksen (*From Jesus to Christ*, Yale 1988) states, "Overturned tables symbolize not purification but destruction." No argument, no evidence, only a note that Sanders "carefully reviews the evidence and current academic discussion on this point" (112-113). Consider also a description of Fredriksen's book from Reginald Fuller's review: "Following E. P. Sanders, our author reconstructs the historical Jesus primarily on the basis on the *incontroverted 'facts'* (his baptism, *the cleansing of the temple*, and his death by crucifixion) . . ." (*JAAR* [1990] 496, emphasis added). Are these indications of an emerging consensus on Sanders' position? How many consenses in our field get started in just this way? We should be ashamed.

Before continuing our consideration of Sanders, a brief detour can sketch the contours of the history of scholarship on the historicity of the TD. While the following is a rather random survey (confined to works I could find in one trip to one library), I believe it gives an accurate (if impressionistic) sampling of how untroubled scholars are on this issue.

C. Roth (1960), N. Q. Hamilton (1967), S. G. F. Brandon (1967), and Martin Hengel (1971) assert or assume the historicity of the TD, but do not argue for it. Victor Eppstein (1964), although his article shows how little sense the story makes, and despite its title, does not argue the historicity question. Ben Meyer (1979) states that the "historicity of . . . the cleansing of the temple is solidly probable," without presenting evidence for his view. Marcus Borg (1984), while he discusses at length the meaning of the deed, restricts his argument for its historicity to observing that "John independently attests this incident." Richard Horsley (1987) also argues over the meaning of the TD, but assumes its historicity. Fredriksen (1988) also assumes its historicity and, as we have seen, follows Sanders' interpretation of its meaning. Craig Evans (1989) vigorously contests Sanders' interpretation but never questions his assumptions about its historicity. Most recently, David Tiede (1990), in a volume in a series aiming to mediate responsible historical Jesus research to a general audience, gives no hint that there is any question about the historicity of the TD.[7]

## The Satisfaction of Connections

Fundamental to Sanders' treatment of the TD is his search for the connection between Jesus' activity and his death. Sanders admits that the existence of such a

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[6] "Jesus probably did not *do* one thing in the temple and say another about it during the same brief period without there being some interconnection" (302). Sanders claims that he "argued extensively in chapter 4" that Jesus' threats against the temple are connected to the TD, but I am unable to locate his arguments on this point.

[7] Roth, "The Cleansing of the Temple and Zechariah XIV 21," *NT* 4 (1960) 174-181; Hamilton, "Temple Cleansing and Temple Bank," *JBL* 83 (1964) 365-372; Brandon, *Jesus and the Zealots* (Manchester University 1967); Hengel, *Was Jesus a Revolutionist?* (Fortress 1971) 17; Eppstein, "The Historicity of the Gospel Account of the Cleansing of the Temple," *ZNW* 55 (1964) 42-58; Meyer, *The Aims of Jesus* (SCM 1979) 170; Borg, *Conflict, Holiness, and Politics in the Teachings of Jesus* (Mellen 1984) 172; Horsley, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence* (Harper and Row 1987) 297-300; Fredriksen, *From Jesus to Christ*, 112; Evans, "Jesus' Action in the Temple: Cleansing or Portent of Destruction?" *CBQ* 51 (1989) 237-270; Tiede, *Jesus and the Future* (Cambridge University 1990) 54-55.

connection is not absolutely clear a priori. Jesus' death could have been the result of bad luck and misunderstanding. This is "possible, but again it seems preferable to posit a connection between what he did and said and the reason for his execution" (22, emphasis added). So while it is possible to account for the death of Jesus without connecting it to his words and deeds, "it is not satisfying historically." But "far more important than a priori suppositions" is that "the evidence shows that there was a causal connection"(22).

Sanders makes important methodological claims here which deserve scrutiny. The first has to do with the "satisfaction" produced by establishing connections. We need to ask why this is and what weight it ought to have. Sanders' second assertion is that the evidence points to the connection he proposes. We need to ask what kind of evidence can establish such a connection and how and to what extent it can do so.

It is undeniable that hypotheses with connections are more satisfying than those without them. Why? Because they offer a higher degree of intelligibility. They show regularities underlying seemingly disparate events. A scientific example can illustrate. The heliocentric model of our planetary system is more satisfying than the geocentric model. While both account for the data, the Copernican-Kepler model possesses simple and elegant connections lacking in the Ptolemaic model. What looks contingent under Ptolemy's proliferation of epicycles looks causally connected under Kepler's laws of planetary motion. The heliocentric model is more satisfying because simplicity is more pleasing than messiness, and causes more pleasing than contingencies.

But history is not astronomy. We believe that physical events do not just happen. We further believe that they are governed by a few simple laws. But can the same beliefs guide our attempt to explain human history? Humans can and do act unpredictably. Human events are always contingent and frequently messy. Attempts to explain historical events in terms of one or few "causes" are almost always less adequate than explanations that take into account multiple influences interacting in contingent ways.

So we need to ask Sanders: if we don't assume that there was a connection, then why should a hypothesis that finds a connection be considered superior to a hypothesis that does not? Only if we presuppose that such a connection existed is a hypothesis that discovers it superior to one that does not. Such a presupposition runs the obvious risk of begging the question. The need to avoid this pitfall calls for a different criterion for ranking hypotheses: *a superior hypothesis explains the data with fewer presuppositions that beg relevant questions.* In our case this would be a hypothesis that explains the teaching and death of Jesus without assuming they are coherently connected.

How can we discover whether the connection existed? Connections are not facts. They exist, not as observable events, but as the motivations of human participants. Our access to reliable information about participants' motives is extremely limited. Even first-person reports about motives can seldom be taken at face value. The connection that Sanders seeks is precisely that set of perceptions and motivations that existed in the minds of those responsible for Jesus' death. What little information we have on this is exceptionally problematic.

So we need to worry when Sanders tells us that the evidence indicates that there was a connection. One thing that needs clarification is the concept of "evidence." Evidence is interpreted data. Our only data are the words in our texts. Data must be interpreted to produce evidence. Evidence is gathered in order to argue for or against a hypothesis. In this case, one posits the existence of

the connection, interprets the data to produce evidence, then uses the evidence to test the hypothesis. It is too simplistic to claim that evidence "shows" a connection because evidence for a connection can be found only by presupposing the connection in the first place. Evidence can support a hypothesis, it can even build a compelling case for one, but we will only find the evidence for a connection if we go looking for it. So the question arises, why look for it? The hunger for explanations that "satisfy" is, I believe, the fundamental motivation.

There is another side to the question. Why *not* look for a connection? If there was a connection and we don't look for it, is this any less arbitrary or wrong-headed than looking for one if it does not exist? Since we cannot know beforehand whether there was a connection, why is it methodologically more rigorous to proceed without the supposition of its existence than with it?

A fair question, to which I offer an answer. Sanders' "connection hypothesis" implies that the death of Jesus was his enemies' solution to the threat he posed (304). It presupposes that they understood the gravity of this threat, that they targeted him specifically, and then managed to have him executed. By contrast, a "connectionless hypothesis" entails that we do not know why Jesus was killed, but that we do not need a Big Reason to explain it.

Nothing in the connection hypothesis is implausible in itself. However, we should be cautious because its outline matches the plot of Mark's gospel. There is no evidence that the basic picure of Jesus' being killed by those who knew what he stood for, and because of what he stood for, existed before Mark sketched it. Hence, to accept the connection hypothesis is to accept the essential historicity of the plot of Mark.

The connection hypothesis assumes that Jesus' death requires an explanation based on well-formulated intentions of Jesus, his Jewish opponents, and the Roman authorities. The connectionless hypothesis questions the need for a Big Reason in accounting for his death. The first assumes that the Romans crucified only those who "needed crucifying," after an investigation to establish the individual's "guilt." The second assumes that at least some people got crucified haphazardly. Since crucifixion was part of Rome's attempt to terrorize an unruly subject people, a cluster of probabilities supports the second assumption. Some victims of the cross could have been crucified out of mistaken identity. Some could have been unlucky bystanders rounded up in a group of troublemakers. Some could have been random victims crucified in reprisal for some anti-Roman violence. Some could have been been maliciously denounced by informants working out personal grudges. Some perceived leaders or instigators could have been punished for the disturbances of "followers." Since ancient bureaucracies were as efficient as modern ones, some hapless few could have been crucified without anybody really knowing why. If contemporary police states have any parallel to the Roman administration of Palestine, the Romans may well have crucified first and asked questions later.

To imagine the events leading up to Jesus' death as ones of high drama (with Judas' betrayal, priestly conspiracies, a midnight arrest, interrogation by chief priests, and negotiations between chief priests and Pilate) is to accept Mark's portrait of Jesus as someone so important as to disrupt the schedules of the Jerusalem power structure. But apart from the perspective of the gospels, why should we think that Jesus was considered any more important than two others reportedly crucified on that particular day? Why might not Jesus have been merely one of a dozen or so crucified that week, or one of many hundred that year? Do we know to what extent the Jewish power structure and the Roman

administration discussed arrangements to crucify people? Is it implausible that senior Roman officers may have had authority to crucify at their own discretion anybody involved in public disorder? Several scenarios are perfectly plausible in which someone speaking in public could be arrested if, for example, the audience made hostile gestures at soldiers. Such cases may never even have come to the attention of Pilate. Finally, if Jesus died at Passover, the situation would have been all the more tense. With crowds of Jews coming to the city to commemorate their liberation from foreign domination, the Roman security forces would have been on heightened alert and probably very jumpy.

I am not here arguing that these scenarios represent the actual facts. My claim is simply that if they are at all plausible, then we need not assume that there was a Big Reason for Jesus' death.

Sanders acknowledges the possibility of proceeding without a Big Reason, "but again it seems preferable to posit a connection" (22). My hunch is that Sanders preference is, at its roots, a preference for events' having happened in the connected and coherent way he describes. When people act deliberately, on the basis of good information, and see their plans to completion; when both sides know what is at stake and understand the motivations of the opponent; when decisions are rational, and no unforeseen contingencies intrude; especially when people contend over sincerely held beliefs—all of this seems implicit in Sanders requirements for a good hypothesis, and all of it makes for history that is fully intelligible, and hence more satisfying than events that result from bad luck, misunderstanding, irrationality, bureaucratic oversight, faulty equipment, and unintended consequences. The yearning for intelligibility is all the more natural when the historical event in question is the death of Jesus, theologically the most important event in human history. Our task as historians is precisely to come up with the whys. When the best we can say is that we don't know, we admit our failure to complete our task. To claim that, for all we know, Jesus' death happened more or less by accident, is extremely frustrating, hence most unsatisfying: unsatisfying intellectually and unappealing theologically.

Over-interpeting the data, making it support conclusions it cannot truly bear, is frequently the root mistake of discredited theories.[8] On the other hand, minimalist conclusions are usually frustrating and sometimes even professionally embarrassing. Yet since over-interpretation is such a strong and perennial temptation, it may be wise to limit our assumptions as best we know, so that if we are to err, we will err on the side of caution. I propose that in so doing we honor the ragged and incomplete state of our evidence.

### Catchpole

David Catchpole's interest in the TD[9] is not focused on the question of its historicity, but rather on the act's original meaning, which he believes has been reinterpreted by Mark 11:17. Catchpole argues that the event in vv 15-16 was

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[8] A classic example is Conzelmann's *Theology of St. Luke*. This satisfying synthesis, which influenced a generation of scholars, now appears to be built on an over-interpretation of Luke 16:16. Paul Minear's quotable barb is apt: "Rarely has a scholar placed so much weight on so dubious an interpretation of so difficult a logion." "Luke's Use of the Birth Stories," in *Studies in Luke-Acts*, ed. L. Keck and J. Martyn (Fortress 1966) 122.

[9] "The 'Triumphal Entry,'" in *Jesus and the Politics of His Day*, ed. E. Bammel and C. F. D. Moule (Cambridge University 1984) 319-334.

intended by Jesus as a temporary fulfillment of Zech 14:21 ("There shall no longer be a trader in the house of the Lord on that day").

Catchpole's conclusions are less important for us than his method. His conclusion is unpersuasive, for it cannot be established that Jesus had a specific prophecy in mind as the interpretive backdrop to one of his deeds, if that prophecy is never quoted or alluded to in the tradition. At best, Catchpole's position is a possible interpretation, an undemonstrable suggestion. However, some aspects of his method deserve our attention.

Catchpole brings up the issue of multiple attestation, but judges it unimportant. He can find evidence both for and against Johannine dependence on Mark. "However, the choice between these two options is not critical since it is unlikely that the ultimate meaning of the traditions is affected" (331). This clearly indicates that, for Catchpole, the historicity of the scene is not really in question, only its meaning.

Taking up Mark 11:15-19, he identifies v 19 as transitional and v 18 as redactional (since it matches Mark 1:22 and 3:6). He puts the problem of v 17 like this: v 17 is original to the story only if "the activity which Jesus interrupts so dramatically has changed an *oikos proseuchēs* into a *spēlaion lēstōn*" (331). He registers three objections to the "cleansing" interpretation. 1) The event must have been limited in scale. Since Jesus was not arrested on the spot or even immediately afterwards, and since the disciples were not arrested at all, it must have been "trivial in size" and a solo performance by Jesus. 2) Taking Mark 11:15-19 with 11:1-10, Catchpole identifies the sequence as an example of a "more or less fixed pattern of triumphal entry" (319). This pattern, found in a dozen stories in the Maccabean literature and Josephus, concludes with the hero's activity in the temple, "either positive (e.g., offering of sacrifice), or negative (e.g., expulsion of objectionable persons and the cleansing away of uncleanness)" (321). Hence, Mark's rendering of the TD as a cleansing is due to his conforming the story to this pattern. 3) Mark 11:17 is a secondary addition. The temple trade neither prevented the temple from being a house of prayer nor made it into a den of robbers (in either Jeremiah's or Josephus' sense of *lēstēs*). Hence, "v 17 reflects a later anti-temple tendency in primitive Christianity" (334), while the tradition behind vv 15-16 is at least pre-Markan. Unfortunately, Catchpole gives no argument for the latter assertion.

For these reasons, Catchpole maintains that a cleansing cannot be what Jesus intended. Once v 17 is excised from the scene, another prophecy suggests itself: Zech 14:21.[10] In the light of this prophecy, the TD is "an anticipatory sign carried out in prophetic fashion" (334). Understood this way, the event is appropriate to the mission of the historical Jesus, whom Catchpole characterizes as an eschatological prophet.

Catchpole apparently believes that this suffices to prove the historicity of the TD, for "in the Temple incident Jesus is seen as what he was before Easter" (334).

How does Catchpole hit on Zech 14:21 as the correct prophecy for interpreting the event? For that matter, why does Catchpole think that its interpretation needs to come by way of a specific verse from the prophets? Though Catchpole does not tell us, it is not hard to figure out. He must have decided beforehand that Jesus was an eschatological prophet and that the TD is historical. Only with these two beliefs already in place would one hunt for an eschatological prophecy.

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[10] Catchpole is indebted here to Roth, "The Cleansing of the Temple," and E. Trocmé, "L'expulsion des marchands du temple," *NTS* 15 (1968) 18.

So Catchpole has not really argued for the historicity of the TD. Rather, he has shown that the TD can be interpreted so as to fit the career of an eschatological prophet. Although Catchpole and Sanders arrive at slightly different conclusions, they arrive at them in much the same way: by assuming the TD's historicity, arguing that Mark's interpretation makes little sense for the situation of Jesus, and proposing a meaning more apt to Jesus' eschatological mission.

Despite the weakness of Catchpole's conclusion, all three of his objections to the cleansing interpretation are relevant to our methodological concerns. 1) His objection that the event Mark narrates is implausible is frequently noted and I will discuss it below. 2) By identifying a familiar literary scheme (the celebratory entry story) behind Mark 11:1-10, 15-19, Catchpole can explain Mark's interpretation as one element in the scheme. A different conclusion one could draw from the same form-critical argument is that Mark invented the whole TD to fill out the features of this scheme.[11] To express this as a principle: if a scene can be identified as an integral part of a coherent literary pattern after which a sequence of scenes in the gospels is modeled, this counts against the scene's historicity. 3) The cleansing interpretation of 11:17 does not fit the action in v 15, for nothing depicted there is an abuse or a profanation. This tension between deed and interpretation is a prima facie indication that the scene originally had a different meaning than the one foisted on it by the gospel.

## Harvey

A. E. Harvey (*Jesus and the Constraints of History*, Westminster 1982) also treats the Entry to Jerusalem and the TD together. While they "both have a strong claim to historical reliability" (120), Harvey allows that the claim for the Entry "requires a few words of justification." Apparently, he does not believe that the historicity of the TD requires demonstration, which may be why he offers none. His argument is presented here only for the purposes of considering his curious method.

Harvey argues that for Jesus to enter Jerusalem riding an animal, rather than on foot, would be "extremely ostentatious" and a "gratuitous act of provocation to religious sensibilities" (121). His stunning conclusion is that such a scene could not be the product of Christian imagination. "For such a unprecedented act, we are surely justified in invoking the principle that 'odd is true.'" Therefore, "it would be unreasonable to call it into question" (121).

It is hard to know what to make of this. One wonders if Harvey would so easily apply this principle to certain events in the Book of Ezekiel, or the Book of Mormon. Yet Harvey does not apply this principle to the TD. He argues that the scene, as narrated in the gospels, is "improbable": the temple area is too big to be seriously attacked, the merchants would have called the police, the pilgrims would not have welcomed it, the Romans would have intervened, and its violence seems "out of character" for Jesus. In this case, however, the odd is not true. Something happened, but on a smaller scale than the gospels report. In fact, it was so small that it need not have attracted the attention of the police or affected "Jesus' reputation as one who stood fundamentally for persuasion rather

[11] While Catchpole argues that the scene of the Entry (Mark 11:1-10) is fictive, he correctly notes that this does not entail that the TD is also unhistorical. "Arrival in Jerusalem (stated or presupposed) as a prelude to action in the Temple could easily have been expanded christologically to form a fitting introduction" (330).

than force" (131). Here Harvey makes the common move of reasoning that since the scene described by Mark is implausible, we should reconstruct a plausible event underneath it. As in Catchpole's case, what controls the reconstruction is not a literary analysis that isolates earlier and later layers, but simply the desire to remove its implausible aspects.

Let us set these two ways of reconstructing a core scene in stark contrast. The first is to look for redactional seams, strained syntax, signs of authorial intrusion, resignification, the presence of topical themes or narrative devices known to be used by the author, and other evidence that the story may not always have existed in its present form. This evidence can lead to identification of elements which are secondary to the story. When these are excised, the core scene can then be evaluated as a candidate for historicity. Only at this stage would the plausibility issue be raised, for the core scene still might not narrate a plausible event. This possibility protects the "objectivity" of this procedure ("objective" in the sense that it may defeat the bias of its user).

The second way is to identify implausible elements in the story, remove them, and thus arrive at a plausible version. This approach clearly assumes that a plausible version once existed. Hence considering the historicity of a scene reconstructed in this fashion has already begged the question. The first way proceeds without this asumption, but rather looks for the traces of the scene's tradition history.

Even after considering his hypothetical version of the scene, Harvey maintains that "it is difficult to think how it could have entered the gospel tradition had not something of the kind occurred" (129). Why this is, he does not say. Perhaps all he means is that it is difficult for *him* to think of alternative explanations. What is valuable here is that he takes for granted the bedrock principle of research into the historicity of the gospels: the judgment that a scene represents a historical event is essentially a negative one. That is, we may judge an event to be historical only if there is no other reasonable way to account for its presence in the gospel. This principle produces minimalist results, almost certainly ruling out some historical scenes because they match the creative proclivities and religious interests of early Christian tradition. But such is the burden of proof which must be shouldered if we are to move beyond wishful thinking and arrive at anything approaching "assured" conclusions.

### Witherington

Ben Witherington (*The Christology of Jesus*, Fortress 1990) argues for the historicity of the TD, offering six considerations which "seem decisive" on the issue (109-110). 1) The scene is unlikely to be a Christian invention because it presents an image of their movement that is against their interests. Before 70, the church was involved in the temple and after 70, it tried to portray itself as no threat to the Empire. (The Romans frowned on violations of temples.) 2) The outer court of the temple was so large that it is possible that Jesus would not have created a major disturbance. It might have been a minor disruption, easily "handled by a few temple police." 3) "Even Bultmann allows that a historical background to this story may be postulated." 4) The objection that Jesus would not have been allowed to disrupt the entire court of the Gentiles is without merit because the action was a prophetic sign, not an effective cleansing, and so was quite limited in scope. 5) The scene is multiply attested, John's version being

independent of Markan tradition. 6) If Jesus was angry at the trade in the temple, his action would be "comprehensible as a response to a recent abuse."

After listing these considerations, Witherington believes historicity has been established. "If we grant that an action in the temple is both possible and plausible, the question then becomes which form of text, the Markan or Johannine, is more likely to preserve the original historical substance of the event" (110). This is a revealing remark. It shows that Witherington believes that the possibility and the plausibility of the scene suffices to prove its historicity, for the only remaining question is which text better reflects the facts. I would think that if we grant the scene's possibility and plausibility, the question then becomes whether the evidence for historicity is able to bear the burden of proof.

Let us take up Witherington's points. 1) He claims that the scene cuts against the interests of the early church. This is a relevant point, a version of the much maligned but useful test of dissimilarity. But is Witherington right? I think not, for his reasoning involves a fallacy: that what is true of a part is true of the whole. The fallacy is built into Witherington's vocabulary: any statement about "the church" is likely to be overgeneralized. If we grant that some early Christians were involved in the temple (and this would have to be demonstrated), it does not follow that all Christians were (e.g, those represented by Stephen's speech in Acts 6). The same goes for the cultivation of a non-threatening stance toward the Empire. Besides, neither objection obtains if the TD is a Markan fiction. The first would be irrelevant after the temple's destruction, and while the second plays a role in Luke and Paul, it is not a demonstrable factor in Mark.

2) Arguing for the possibility of this event is curious. Arguments for possibility are typically aimed at straw men. Those who question the possibility of this event are confusing possibility for plausibility.[12] The event is surely possible, but this says nothing for its historicity.

3) Citing authorities (even the mighty Bultmann) without assessing their arguments is not useful.

4) The event narrated in the scene can be construed in such a way that it becomes plausible. This is true and relevant. The plausiblity of a scene can be one piece of a cumulative argument for historicity. (It should be noted that Witherington's construal of the event entails a judgment that Mark 11:16 is fictive.)

5) Arguments for multiple attestation are relevant and important. If the scene is multiply attested, then (by definition) it is not a Markan composition. Pre-Markan, however, is not equivalent to historical.

6) That the event is coherent with the historical circumstances of Jesus' time is relevant. While it does not advance the case for historicity, it does keep it from being ruled out on the grounds that it reflects circumstances which pertained only after Jesus' death.

Witherington has not made a good case for the historicity of the TD. His argument that the scene is unlikely to be a Christian invention is crippled by a

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[12] The issue is relevant in regards to miracles. Since judgments about their possibility are cosmological and not historical, they force biblical scholars to moonlight as philosophers of science, with predictably messy results (though we seem as untroubled by it as do philosphers and theologians who cite biblical texts uncritically). We have much to learn from the philosophy of science and the philosophy of religion on the cosmological and theological issues entailed in judgments about the possibility of miracles. One problem, which cannot be cavalierly dismissed, is that the cosmological assumptions routinely made in our guild are beholden in part to an obsolete 19th century world view.

logical fallacy. Neither his argument for its possibility nor his argument from authority proves anything. His argument for plausibility could be sound if there were good reason for excising v 16.[13] Even so, the event's plausibility only makes the scene a candidate for historicity. The argument from multiple attestation is a potentially powerful one. If multiple attestation can be established, it would rule out the scene being a Markan fiction. It would not, however, demonstrate its historicity. Finally, his argument that the event fits its own era (i.e., that it is historically plausible) functions like the other argument for plausibility.

At most, Witherington establishes that the story can be rewritten so that it narrates a plausible event, that it may be pre-Markan, and that it is historically plausible. Though his argument is not decisive, it should be taken seriously because its method uses four valid criteria: dissimilarity, multiple attestation, event plausibility, and historical plausibility.[14] Despite the weakness of his evidence, the fact that he uses these criteria makes his argument methodologically superior to any surveyed so far.

### Mack

Burton Mack's treatment of the TD (in *A Myth of Innocence*, Fortress 1988) is noteworthy in two respects: 1) he deals with the scene in its actual narrative context, and 2) he concludes that it is unhistorical. Mack attempts something no one else has: to account for the scene in terms of the narrative designs of Mark.[15]

Mack divides the scene into four units: 1) the act of driving out; 2) the teaching from Isaiah and Jeremiah; 3) the response of Jesus' enemies; 4) the reaction of the crowd.

Unit 4 registers the amazement of the crowd at an act of casting out characterized as teaching (*didache*). This is Markan construction, for it duplicates the response to Jesus' first "teaching" in the synagogue at Capernaum (1:27). It belongs to one of Mark's designs, the messianic scenario of the crowd.[16] Unit 3 is a decisive element in the narrative design of the leaders' plot against Jesus, which began at 3:6. Unit 1 works for Mark as a symbolic casting out of evil ("filthy lucre") and a taking charge of the temple. Jesus, acting as the divinely commissioned representative of the kindgom of God, is also thereby taking charge of the religious heritage of Israel (295). The act itself positions Jesus on the right side of a hot political issue (temple revenue), while the prophetic pronouncement shows Jesus acting out of righteous indignation.

Mack's method is to analyze how the scene matches Mark's interests. In this one scene, Mark portrays Jesus laying claim to the heritage of Israel, the crowds being amazed by his authoritative teaching, and the leaders setting in motion the plot which leads to his death. The most important element is the last one. Mack argues that Mark's passion narrative is basically patterned after the stock story of

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13 See the discussion below.

14 These two types of plausibility are defined and discussed below.

15 Mack does not take into account the Johannine version of the scene because he does not consider it an independent source. See 225, n. 12.

16 Mack identifies four distinct narrative designs in Mark, each one associated with one of the Markan characterizations of Jesus: son of God, Christ, Son of Man, and prophet. See 289.

the persecuted Righteous One.[17] The TD is an essential episode in Mark's rendition of the story of the persecuted Righteous One, for it functions as the provocation which sets the persecution plot in motion (271).

The sequencing of the TD is also a result of Markan plotting. Its placement as the first act of Jesus in Jerusalem follows the same pattern as his entrance into Galilee in chapter 1. There Jesus entered a synagogue, cast out an unclean spirit, an event interpreted as a teaching. This was followed by a "period of instruction consisting mostly of controversy stories. Just as the set of controversy stories in Mark 2:1-3:6 plays upon and develops the theme of authority announced in the synagogue act, so does the second set of instructions in the temple (Mark 11:27-44)" (274). Within this second period of instruction, Mack notes two reversals: 1) the death plot at the end of the first (3:6) is matched by the prediction of the temple's destruction; 2) the kingdom announced by Jesus in the first is now specified as coming apocalyptically. On the basis of these thematic interrelationships and the dynamics of the plot of the gospel, Mack identifies a narrative cluster (including the entry, the teaching in the temple, the conspiracy, and the plans for the betrayal) that depends on the TD for its significance (274). After explaining how these all hold together, Mack goes on to show that the TD "triggers other events that serve to conjoin unresolved narrative themes that have been developing throughout the gospel" (274), namely, the plot of the leaders, the following along of the disciples, and the crowd's view of Jesus. The TD "is pivotal to the integration of all three narrative themes: the crowds, the leaders, and the disciples" (275).

Mack's conclusion speaks for itself. "The temple act cannot be historical. If one deletes from the story those themes essential to the Markan plots, there is nothing left over for historical reminiscence. The anti-temple theme is clearly Markan and the reasons for it can be explained. The lack of any evidence for an anti-temple attitude in the Jesus and Christ traditions prior to Mark fits with the incredible lack of incidence in the story itself. Nothing happens. Even the chief priests overhear his 'instruction' and do nothing. The conclusion must be that the temple act is a Markan fabrication" (292).

This paragraph contains three methodological implications germane to our discussion. 1) If a scene is composed entirely of themes and narrative designs essential to the gospel's plot, the deed in that scene should be considered unhistorical.

2) Mack judges the anti-temple theme to be a Markan creation for two reasons: a) it can be accounted for in terms of Mark's interests, and b) there is no evidence for its existence prior to Mark.[18] The methodological principle here is that if a deed of Jesus embodies a theme that is the creation of the evangelist, it should be considered unhistorical.

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[17] Mack here draws on the work of Detlev Dormeyer (*Die Passion Jesu als Verhaltensmodell*, Aschendorff 1974) and George Nicklesburg ("The Genre and Function of the Markan Passion Narrative," *HTR* 73 (1980) 153-184). See Mack, 270.

[18] The second reason is stronger than the first. If (b) were not true, the truth of (a) would only show that the evangelist was able to shape traditional material to his own use, an ability we assume for evangelists in any case. If (b) were true and (a) were not, it would be a sign of our imperfect understanding of the gospel or the paucity of our evidence. Only if the theme in question was *against* the interests of the evangelist would the truth of (b) not be decisive. Finally, if (a) and (b) are both true, as Mack argues, the fictive nature of the theme is all the more likely.

3) Along with Sanders, Catchpole, Harvey, and Witherington, Mack judges the scene to be implausible. He takes it to be an indication of the fictive nature of the scene, whereas to the others it means that an historical event has been exaggerated. Mack's treatment is superior to theirs in that he can explain why the implausiblity is there: Mark has sacrificed plausiblity for the sake of more clearly developing his narrative designs.[19] Sanders and company shrink the scope of the event to explain why Jesus was not arrested, but none of them explains why Mark has inflated the event to implausible dimensions. A theory which explains the present state of the text is superior to one which does not.

The standard solution is problematic on two additional counts. 1) If one shrinks the event to a plausible size, it gets proportionately more difficult to understand how it aroused the lethal enmity of the Jewish authorities. The event had to be so small as to pass virtually unnoticed by the authorities, yet so serious that they decide to crucify him for it.[20]

2) Sanders, et al., maintain that Jesus did not intend actually to shut down the temple trade (despite Mark 11:16), but only to enact a prophetic symbol. As Sanders describes it, the only thing Jesus did was overturn a table or two, which would have taken a few seconds. But does this not defeat the very purpose of prophecy? Were not the symbolic acts of prophets meant to be a form of public teaching, object lessons explained by the prophets themselves on the spot? (Mark certainly thinks so, for he tells us that Jesus immediately "taught them.") In some cases, the outlandish behavior of the prophets seems specifically designed to attract public attention. If prophets strove for maximal publicity, a symbolic act on the scale envisioned by Sanders and company has to be judged a most inept one. On the scale reported by Mark, on the other hand, it has the public dimension of the outrageous acts of the classical prophets, with chief priests, scribes, and the crowd looking and listening, the latter in amazement.

## A Proposal of Method

*Burden of Proof*

The reason we have historical Jesus research is that we believe that some of the material in the gospels is historical and some is not. Those who believe that the gospels are entirely historical feel no need to search for the historical Jesus, and those who believe them entirely fictional don't bother. It is because we believe the gospels to be part history and part fiction that we have the problem of the historical Jesus.

It may seem boringly obvious to put the issue like this, but it can help us solve the vital preliminary problem of the burden of proof. Those who believe the gospels to be fundamentally historical maintain that events in the gospels should be regarded as historical unless proven otherwise. Conversely, those who regard the gospels as essentially fictive maintain that events in the gospels should be taken as unhistorical unless proven otherwise. While neither of these positions need be irrational or arbitrary, they are both crippled by a logical fallacy. The concept of a burden of proof exists to guide our research. Yet the only reasonable way to lay the burden on one side or the other is to know

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[19] Mark uses it to set the death plot in motion, but because Mark also needs to let Jesus do some more teaching, he does not have him arrested on the spot.

[20] Craig Evans has also noticed this paradox. "Jesus' Action in the Temple," 239, n. 6.

beforehand the major portion of the results of that research. This would beg the question.

A burden of proof is necessary not only to control for subjective bias and to make scholarly consensus intelligible, but also to prevent questions being decided on insufficient evidence. The only way to construe the burden of proof without deciding the majority of the questions beforehand is to formulate it neutrally: *the burden of proof falls on the one who makes a claim*. To be accepted as either historical or unhistorical, an event in the gospels must be demonstrated as such. If follows that prior to the demonstration of its historicity, no event can legitimately be used in reconstructions of the historical Jesus.

The key term here is "demonstration." This is a rigorous sounding term in a field inevitably fraught with subjective judgments, and so I need to define it. *A position can be held to be demonstrated when the methodologically sound reasons for accepting it significantly outweigh the methodologically sound reasons for not accepting it*. This entails a gray area where the reasons for a position somewhat outweigh the reasons against it, in which case the position is held to be "likely" or "probable," but not demonstrated. Of course, an adverb like "significantly" leaves considerable range for subjective judgments. Lament it we may, but that's the way it is in the humanities. Ideally, scholarly consensus based on shared methods corrects for the gross excesses of individual bias and misjudgment.

A demonstration of historicity or ahistoricity does not mean that we know that an event did or did not happen. Such conclusions are virtually impossible without credible eyewitness testimony. Our findings are not statements about the event themselves but about our ability to account for their presence in our texts. *A finding of historicity means that we have no other reasonable way to account for the presence of a story in our texts*. The finding of historicity is essentially a default position, that is, one taken after eliminating all other reasonable alternatives. Thus we can hold an event to be historical only if the only reasonable way we can account for the story that reports it is that the event actually happened. On the other hand, a finding of ahistoricity means that we have a reasonable way to account for its story other than that it actually happened.

Defining the claims in this way means that stories carry what amounts to a presumption of ahistoricity; for an initial way to account for any story is to claim that the author of the gospel made it up. By itself, this claim is not persuasive, but it is an account and it is not obviously unreasonable. It is untenable if the story is attested in an independent source. But what if it is not attested outside the sole independent source in which we find it? Is the absence of this evidence sufficient by itself to demonstrate ahistoricity? I believe not, because this does not fulfill the burden of proof. However, unless there are good arguments for historicity, the lack of multiple attestation prevents us from considering it historical.

*Multiple Attestation*

Multiple attestation (understood as multiple *independent* attestation) is a strong criterion because it demonstrates that a scene did not originate with the texts in which it occurs. This criterion has been immensely useful in the study of Jesus' sayings, but will be much less so in the study of his deeds. What makes it so important in the analysis of the sayings is the nearly unanimous consensus that Q and Thomas represent early sources independent of Mark. Q and Thomas, however, are all but useless for the study of the deeds tradition, since they lack narratives. Our grasp of the history of the deeds tradition is far less refined than for the sayings tradition. The conventional wisdom about the independence of

John has held sway more by repeated assertion than by demonstration. While no compelling argument for the *literary* dependence of John on the synoptics has been made, it can no longer be safely assumed that the Johannine tradition developed in complete isolation from the tradition emanating from Mark.

The only pre- or non-Markan narrative sources whose existence commands any confidence are a pre-Markan miracle catena, the Johannine Signs Gospel, and the so-called "Cross Gospel." All three offer meager resources for historical Jesus research. Like Q, all three are hypothetical "texts." Unlike Q, they are all reconstructed from a single source. While the text of the Signs Gospel can be recovered with a degree of confidence (thanks to Robert Fortna), this is by no means the case for the pre-Markan catena, and the jury is still out on Crossan's theory of the Cross Gospel. If the textual uncertainties were not enough, the historical value of all three sources is highly dubious. The first two are made up of miracle stories (with all the epistemological impedimenta they bring to the historian's task) featuring mythical and biblical themes. If Crossan is right, the Cross Gospel is constructed out of biblical prophecy. In short, the criterion of multiple attestation, though promising theoretically, may prove to be nearly useless in practice, given our current grasp of the history of the deeds tradition.

*Dissimilarity*

If a given scene is not attested in an independent source, two questions are in order. 1) Is the scene essential to the narrative designs of the gospel? 2) Does it employ christological themes distinctive to the gospel? These questions test whether the scene can be accounted for in terms of the literary or christological agendas of the specific gospel in which it occurs. If it can be accounted for in one or both of these ways, this is good reason to attribute the scene to the creativity of the evangelist.

If the results of this effort are either negative or inconclusive, the next step is to seek indications that the scene pre-existed the gospel. Does it fit uneasily into its literary context or into the narrative designs of the gospel? That is, are there aporias or redactional seams in the scene? In addition, does the Jesus portrayed in this scene or implied by this deed grate against the christological tendencies of the gospel? (This is the dissimilarity test as it specifically applies to the deeds tradition.) A positive finding on either count constitutes evidence that the scene was not invented by the evangelist.

However, demonstrating that a scene pre-existed a gospel does not clinch an argument for its historicity. Some of us seem to assume that pre-Markan equals historical. But pre-Markan only means pre-70, which could well be a long way from the historical Jesus. In order to push the deed to the time of Jesus, one needs to show not only that its implicit christology is dissimilar to Mark's, but also that it is dissimilar to the christological tendencies of any Christian ideology within Mark's tradition. Since we have little hard evidence on the limits of the Christian currents available to Mark, we need to consider virtually all pre-Markan christologies. Thus the burden of proof on this point is formidable.

*Plausibility*

Judgments about plausibility are unavoidably subjective: what is implausible to some will not bother others. Nor does implausibility mean that an event did not occur. All of us have witnessed, perhaps even participated in, implausible events. (Anyone who follows Kentucky politics quickly grows accustomed to the implausible.) So we need to be very generous in our judgments about plausibil-

ity. Still, a scene depicting an event that severely strains our collective credulity is unlikely to be accepted as historical. There is a second type of implausibility which is far more decisive and much easier to detect: anachronism. If a scene reflects historical circumstances from a time after Jesus' death, it is implausible. (For the sake of definition, let us call the first type of plausibility "event plausibility" and the second type "historical plausibility.")

If we judge a scene implausible, our next step is to investigate whether the implausible features are secondary to the scene. If the offending features are subtracted, does a coherent scene remain? (This is a common move in dealing with Jesus' sayings—reconstructing a core saying by removing the redactional features.) If so, is there any reason to believe that the story ever existed without these features? A positive answer requires textual evidence (e.g., the implausible aspects contain stylistic traits, vocabulary, or themes characteristic of the evangelist). To argue that certain features are secondary simply because they are implausible is to beg the question of the existence of a plausible version of the scene. This is the flaw in Sanders' and Witherington's method. They both excise Mark 11:16 (and Sanders seems also to excise v 15a) and so reconstruct scenarios that are both plausible and coherent. But neither of them offers any grounds for regarding the implausible features as secondary. If we don't decide beforehand that there must be a historical core to the scene, we need some textual justification to seek a hypothetical plausible version of it.

If the implausible features can be thus isolated, one task remains: to explain why the original story acquired them. Sanders makes a move in this direction but only gets halfway. He believes that the reinterpretation of the TD as a cleansing was motivated by Christian "embarrassment."[21] While Sanders explains why the original meaning was covered over, his argument is weakened by his failure to explain either why Mark reinterprets it as cleansing or why the implausible v 16 was added. Conversely, it is a strength of Mack's position that he explains why Mark tells the story in just the way he does. It is not enough simply to reconstruct an original version of the story. One must also account for the present state of the text.

*Coherence*

In research on the sayings, the historicity of a given item is often argued on grounds of its coherence with other authentic sayings. Sanders makes a somewhat similar argument concerning the TD. He begins by asserting that it is "almost indisputable" that "Jesus engaged in a controversy about the temple" (11). Sanders then uses a coherence argument (with generous assistance from his "connection theory") to support the interpretation of the TD as a symbol of the temple's destruction. Though Sanders does not make the argument directly, it seems to go like this: since Jesus prophesied the destruction of the temple, it is likely that his action in the temple was a symbol of its destruction. Those who don't assume the historicity of the TD might argue in a similar manner: if Jesus prophesied the end of the temple, it is likely that he enacted a prophetic symbol with the same meaning. The argument from coherence is often used in just this way, and two problems come with it, one procedural and the other methodological.

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[21] Sanders, 75. Evans (238-240) has seriously undermined Sanders' position on this point.

The procedural problem is that a fallacy can unwittingly occur: if saying A is coherent with saying B, one might use the historicity of A to argue for the historicity of B, and later use B to argue for the historicity of A. While such arguments are not made knowingly, they can occur when different people study the same sayings at different times. In the Jesus Seminar, in situations when saying X was voted historical because of its coherence with saying Y which was previously voted historical, one occasionally suspected that one of the arguments for the historicity of Y was its coherence with X. I do not know for a fact that this ever happened, but given the varying number of participants, the length of time of the project, and the sheer size of the data base, I would not be surprised if a sleuth turned up a few such cases among the papers of Seminar.

This procedural problem can be prevented simply by scrupulous attention to detail. The other problem is more serious. It is that the coherence of two items can often be explained in terms of the creativity of the tradition. If Jesus prophesied the end of the temple, and if Mark had sayings to that effect in his tradition, it is equally likely theoretically that Mark composed the story of the TD, or that it is historical. Either explanation could account for the story's coherence with the saying. On what basis can we prefer one explanation over the other?

To use coherence as an argument for historicity, one needs to show either that: 1) the occurrence of the deed in question is presupposed by an authentic saying, or 2) the meaning of the deed for Jesus is the same as the meaning of an authentic saying. An example of the first is that the authenticity of Q 11:20 entails that Jesus performed exorcisms. (Of course, the argument for the historicity of Q 11:20 could not have been based on the assumption that Jesus was an exorcist.) The second is complicated by the possibility that the meaning a given deed would have had for Jesus may not be the meaning it has in the gospel. This possibility rules out determining the "Jesus meaning" of a deed by means of its coherence with an authentic saying, for this would beg the very question of its coherence. Only if the meaning of an authentic saying and the alleged deed are established *independently* can the coherence between them serve as an argument for the historicity of the deed.

So the question is whether the meaning of a deed in the gospel is a reinterpretation of an earlier report. We can approach this question in the same way we do for a saying: by looking for signs of tension between the interpretation of the saying taken by itself and the interpretation produced by its context in the gospel. As with the plausibility issue, if one does distinguish an earlier meaning from the one in the gospel, one also needs to explain how, why, and when the resignification occurred.

# The Institutional Setting of the Late Formation of the Pentateuch in the Work of John Van Seters

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The focus of this article is John Van Seters' solution to the problem of social setting in the late formation of the Pentateuch. The problem of social setting will be broken down into the following three questions: (1) What is the institutional setting that is giving rise to the late formation of the Pentateuch? (2) How does this institutional setting provide insight for evaluating late literary developments in the Pentateuch? (3) What is the relationship between this institutional setting and earlier stages (oral or literary) of the tradition? Answers to these three questions will require a review of Van Seters' research program over the past two decades.

Van Seters, himself, has provided the structure for such a review, when he argued in *Abraham in History and Tradition*[1] that Noth's *History of Pentateuchal Traditions*[2] was not a successful project because it failed to identify four aspects that are essential to an interpretation of the Pentateuch: (1) its form and structure, (2) its process of growth, (3) its function, and (4) the identity of the bearers of tradition.[3] These four categories will provide the structure for summarizing Van Seters' interpretation of the Pentateuch. It will become apparent in the following review that Van Seters' quest to answer these questions has pushed his research into two related, but distinct phases. The first, represented by *Abraham in History and Tradition*, concerns the form and the process of growth of the Pentateuch. Although questions concerning the function of the literature and the identity of the bearers of the tradition are touched upon, they are not fully answered. The second phase, represented by *In Search of History*,[4] focuses more on the function of the Pentateuch and somewhat on the identity (or institutional setting) of the authors. As such *In Search of History* presupposes the results of *Abraham in History and Tradition*, while seeking to advance this work by adding a comparative component of historiography to the previous literary analysis of the late formation of the Abrahamic tradition.

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1 *Abraham in History and Tradition* , New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975.

2 *A History of Pentateuchal Traditions*, translated by B. W. Anderson, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1972.

3 *Abraham*, 148.

4 *In Search of History. Historiography in the Ancient World and the Origins of Biblical History*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983.

## I

Van Seters' central aim in *Abraham in History and Tradition* is to evaluate the tradition-historical development of the Abrahamic cycle of literature. In view of this more internal focus on the tradition, comparative study of literature (which becomes central in his later work) plays little or no role here. In its place Van Seters presents a literary analysis aimed at critically evaluating two current (and mutually dependent) hypotheses concerning Abrahamic tradition: the oral character of the tradition and its antiquity.[5] This two-part critical review of past scholarship provides the springboard for Van Seters to propose a new methodology for interpreting the composition of the Abrahamic tradition.[6] Our review of his methodological proposal will separate into three parts: first, oral tradition and the problem of the form and development in the Abrahamic tradition; second, the antiquity of the tradition; and, third, the social and institutional setting of the Pentateuch implicit in the methodological proposal of Van Seters.

First, oral tradition and the problem of the form and development of the Abrahamic tradition. The problem of literary methodology is posed in Part 2 of the book (chapters 6-15), yet our review must begin at this point since it is the principal issue of the study. Van Seters' central methodological argument of the book is that: "Literary sources should be separated, first of all, on the basis of literary criteria."[7] This axiom provides the starting point for a critical evaluation of the prominent role of oral tradition in form criticism, tradition history, and source criticism. Three of Gunkel's form-critical conclusions are challenged: (1) that genres can be classified on the basis of changing thought processes which are assumed to accompany the evolution from oral to written types (i.e., myth, *Sage*, legend, historia), (2) that etiology is central to the *Sage* form, and (3) that *Sagen* are necessarily ancient and oral.[8] Two arguments are raised against Alt's tradition-historical reconstruction of the Abrahamic tradition: (1) that he is dependent on the form-critical conclusions of Gunkel, and more importantly (2) that there is a lack of any literary analysis as a control on his work.[9] Finally, three aspects of source criticism are also rejected: (1) that similarity in literary sources be accounted for on the basis of a hypothetical "common oral tradition" or a reconstructed *Grundlage*,[10] (2) that the sources are constructed independently from each other, and (3) that the late formation of written tradition (and the linking of the different sources) is a negative process in which redactors are judged either to have misinterpreted earlier tradition and/or to have created the literary difficulties in the present structure of the text in their attempt to harmo-

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5 *Abraham*, chap. 6.

6 *Abraham*, chap. 7.

7 *Abraham*, 128.

8 *Abraham*, 131-138, 158-164.

9 *Abraham*, 139-148.

10 Van Seters (*Abraham*, 157) writes that the notion of a "common tradition" is "most insidious, in that it immediately stops all serious comparison between sources. Yet unless one can say something about this common tradition, its form and content, and the way in which the two versions depart from it one has said nothing at all."

nize distinct sources. Such a view, according to Van Seters is nothing more than a "*deus ex machina* to solve literary difficulties."[11]

Van Seters proposes a new method for interpreting the Abrahamic literature, which virtually eliminates oral tradition as a meaningful hypothesis for interpreting Pentateuchal literature, and he replaces it with a hermeneutic based on author's intent. Van Seters does not deny that there may be indications of oral folklore in the Abrahamic tradition,[12] but he argues that such indications do not provide the basis for reconstructing a detailed history of tradition, because authors of the written traditions (1) had access to large amounts of folklore, which (2) they used with great freedom in creating their compositions. Thus in the end the reader only has the literature provided by the author as a guide for constructing tradition history.[13]

Van Seters' axiom that tradition history should be determined on the basis of literary criteria provides the framework for a larger hermeneutical theory for interpreting the Pentateuch that can be summarized in the following six points: (1) The central literary characteristic of the Pentateuch is the freedom of composition exercised by its authors both in their reinterpretation of older material and in their use of this material within a literary composition.[14] (2) The freedom of composition of the authors closes off the pre-history of the text as a meaningful stage of interpretation—not because the reader isn't able to detect indications of oral folklore, but because the reader is no longer able to link these oral motifs to any concrete social institution, since these institutional settings have been effectively obscured by the authors.[15] (3) Interpretation of the Pentateuch, therefore, must be aimed at uncovering the author's intent as it is demonstrated in the form and structure of the literature.[16] Uncovering the intention of pentateuchal authors can be aided by broadening the scope of study to include prophetic literary traditions outside of the Pentateuch.[17] (4) The central role of authors, who freely adapt past tradition, favors a redaction-critical model for tradition history, since, for Van Seters, the growth of the Pentateuch is the result of self-conscious reinterpretations and transformations of older material in order to create a new

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11 For general discussion of these conclusions see *Abraham*, 125-131. Several quotations from *Abraham* add detail to the conclusions listed above. Van Seters writes: "It should be obvious that the nature of oral tradition ought not to be explained on the basis of what is necessary for a hypothesis of literary criticism but on an objective description of the phenomenon in its own right" (p. 134). In contrast to a common oral tradition, Van Seters proposes that we view the construction of the Pentateuch as a deliberate literary composition by "authors" as is the case with other literary histories. In fact he concludes that "unless other very strong reasons are suggested for doing otherwise I can see no alternative but to trace the tradition-history of the Pentateuch on the basis of redaction criticism" (p. 144).

12 See the discussion of Olrik's laws in *Abraham*, 158-160.

13 Van Seters (*Abraham*, 237) writes, "The only story that we have is the written one. Whatever 'sources' were used, such as popular folklore motifs, etiological models, or the like, there is every indication that the writer exercised considerable freedom in the use of them so that the present account is in every meaningful sense his own. Without further specific and concrete evidence there is no way of moving behind this level on the tradition to any other 'historical' or sociological reality."

14 *Abraham*, 220.

15 *Abraham*, 237.

16 *Abraham*, 143, 144, 161, 164.

17 *Abraham*, 2. "Confessional Reformulation in the Exilic Period," *VT* 22 (1972) 448-459.

story.[18] (5) Furthermore, the self-conscious character of authors allows for one general distinction in genre based on intent: Although myth, legend, and historical narrative are not functionally distinct, they differ in their degree of remoteness from the author. The more remote the subject matter, the more serious the author's intention. Thus myth and legend are more "serious" genres than historical narrative.[19] Finally, (6) the function or intention of authors in creating stories is for the purpose of "community-making."[20]

Second, the antiquity of the Abrahamic tradition. The problem of historicity is posed in Part I of the book (chapters 1-5) as a contrast between Albright and Wellhausen, between 2nd millennium and 1st millennium BCE as the setting of the tradition, between historically reliable tradition and literary invention.[21] Van Seters favors the latter pole of the contrasts and seeks to show how the character of the literature does not reflect the historical milieu of the 2nd millenium. He does this by evaluating past arguments concerning semi-nomadism, geographical and tribal configurations in the literature (i.e., Amorites, Ur, Haran, Hapiru, Arameans, etc.), personal names, and social customs.[22] His criticism throughout this section is that prior assumptions concerning the nature of the tradition (its antiquity), which were supported by a hypothesis of oral tradition have overly determined the focus of the historical comparisons (2nd millennium).[23] Van Seters' response is that neither the historical comparisons nor the assumptions concerning oral tradition can stand up to close literary inspection.

Van Seters presents his own solution to the question of the age of the initial literary formation of the Abrahamic tradition through an interpretation of Genesis 15 (chap. 12). This chapter, therefore, addresses most clearly his emerging interpretation of the social and institutional setting of the late formation of the Pentateuch. Van Seters argues that the date of the composition is the exile and that this writer is the Yahwist. Examples of an exilic date for the literature include reference to Ur of the Chaldeans (v. 2), the late development of Abraham in prophetic tradition (compare the sparse use in Jeremiah and Ezekiel with 2 Isaiah), the expansion of the exodus election tradition to the patriarchs, the unconditional nature of the promise of land, and the influence that this interpretation of promise had on blessing.[24]

Third, the social and institutional setting of the Pentateuch implicit in the methodological proposal of Van Seters. Even though the primary focus in *Abraham in History and Tradition* is on literary methodology, the groundwork for several important conclusions concerning social and institutional setting is set forth in this work. The most important implication is that when Van Seters departs from Gunkel, Alt, von Rad, *et al.*, and rejects oral tradition as a working hypothesis for literary analysis, he also rejects the central place of the cult in their work as a viable *Sitz-im-Leben* to account for the late formation of the Pentateuch. In its place he suggests a creative writer, whose aim is community formation. Van Seters addresses this significant shift concerning institutional setting in a footnote when he writes: "I use the term "environment" for a writer rather than

18 *Abraham*, 144.
19 *Abraham*, 159.
20 *Abraham*, 159.
21 *Abraham*, 7-12.
22 *Abraham*, chaps. 2-4.
23 *Abraham*, 10-11.
24 *Abraham*, 249-278.

*Sitz-im-Leben*, which has a narrower sociological perspective and does not allow sufficiently for the secondary appropriation of a form or genre in a purely literary work."[25]

The shift away from a cultic setting by Van Seters as the setting for the literature provides the basis for several additional conclusions concerning the environment and intention of the Yahwist. First, indications of the Yahwist's intention arise from an examination of the overall structure of the tradition and motifs within it. The structure of the entire tradition (particularly how it is kept separate from the period of settlement as a time of promise) and the priority given to interrelating different groups suggests that "[the Abrahamic tradition] functioned as a way of rationalizing and legitimating various territorial claims and relationships with neighboring groups of people and other political and social phenomena of later historical periods."[26] Second, this rationalizing tendency is also evident, according to Van Seters, by the way in which a number of cultic motifs are used outside of a cultic context (e. g., the affirming of righteousness on a person in Genesis 15, the bestowing of blessing in the future in Genesis 15, and the demythologizing of Zion to Palestine in Genesis 22).[27] Van Seters accounts for this rationalizing tendency by noting that "cultic activity was at a minimum [during the exilic period] and it was, at any rate, entirely secondary to one completely overriding concern, namely, whether or not a particular Jew living in the exile really believed there was a future for Israel any longer."[28] The combination of the structure and the rationalizing tendency in the use of cultic motifs provides the basis for Van Seters to conclude that "the whole orientation [of the Yahwist] is similar to that of Deutero-Isaiah, and it was at this time that the Abrahamic tradition was taken up and given its present basic shape as the fundamental unifying identity for the people of "Israel," on the threshold of the restoration."[29] The Yahwist intended to achieve this aim by presenting historiographic support that his tradition was "true and reliable and must be taken seriously."[30]

## II

The research program behind *In Search of History* represents Van Seters' attempt to provide a more detailed description of the function of history writing in Israel, by using the comparative study of primarily Greek (but also the full range of ancient Near Eastern) history writing as a control for evaluating prose narrative in the Hebrew Bible. The methodological argument of the book is two-sided: one, to show how past studies of Israelite historiography have lacked clear definition; and, two, to demonstrate that a study of history writing in ancient Israel must be primarily literary in its focus and comparative in its method. Our review will follow these two points and conclude by summarizing how the comparative study advances arguments concerning the social and institutional setting of history writing in ancient Israel.

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25 *Abraham*, 252 n. 10.

26 *Abraham*, 28-29.

27 *Abraham*, 238, 257, 258, 265, 272,

28 *Abraham*, 269.

29 *Abraham*, 278.

30 *Abraham*, 220.

First, the problem with past studies of Israelite historiography. The overriding problem of past research in Israelite historiography, according to Van Seters, is the ambiguity in defining the object of study. The result of this lack of clarity has been that historiography has frequently shifted between three different conceptions: (1) the history of a genre and the evolution of literary forms, (2) the quest for origins and the development of history writing, (3) and the idea of history as a particular form of consciousness or human reflection.[31] This ambiguity has reinforced several evolutionary presuppositions concerning ancient Israel, which have been used to support arguments for the early development of history writing in Israel during the monarchy period. One assumption is rooted in the work of Gunkel and Gressmann and carried through von Rad and Noth, namely, that history writing is a development from early etiological *Sagen*. This assumption was already the central point of criticism for Van Seters in *Abraham in History and Tradition* and the arguments are reviewed and expanded once again in *In Search of History*.[32] A second assumption is the evolutionary model of Albright that Israelite history writing is a development from an older epic form that was faithfully transmitted orally in the setting of the cult. Van Seters concludes from a comparison with Greek epic and later Greek history writing that such a theory does not stand up to a literary analysis of the Pentateuch.[33] A third presupposition is that history writing arose early in Israelite society because of their theological orientation, which included a unique belief in the sovereignty of God.[34] Van Seters notes approvingly how this assumption has been challenged by Albrektson[35] in his comparison of the Hebrew Bible with the role of the gods in ancient Near Eastern texts.[36] In fact, Van Seters takes Albrektson's work a step further by arguing that there is no eschatology in even the most developed Israelite historiography, which he considers to be the exilic Yahwist.[37]

Second, Van Seters' approach to the study of history writing. Van Seters wishes to bring clarity to the discussion of history writing by focusing exclusively on the question of genre by which he means to exclude all discussion concerning theology or the history of ideas.[38] He takes as his starting point Huizenga's definition that: "History is the intellectual form in which a civilization renders account to itself of its past."[39] He narrows this definition down even further by underscoring the literary character of history writing, and the important role of the self-conscious, intellectual intention by an author who is working in a larger nationalistic context. Any text, therefore, that was not specifically intended for the purpose of "rendering an account of the past" for nationalistic purposes is outside the definition even though such texts may have acquired a

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31 *In Search of History*, 209-220.

32 *In Search of History*, 220-224 *et passim*.

33 *In Search of History*, 18-31, 224-227.

34 *In Search of History*, 237-248.

35 B. Albrektson, *History and the Gods: An Essay on the Idea of Historical Events as Divine Manifestations in the Ancient Near East and in Israel* (Lund: Gleerup, 1967).

36 *In Search of History*, 57-59, 240.

37 *In Search of History*, 241.

38 *In Search of History*, 59. See also reference to the work of J. J. M. Roberts, "Myth versus History: Relaying the Comparative Foundations," *CBQ* 38 (1976) 1-13.

39 *In Search of History*, 1. See J. Huizinga, "A Definition of the Concept of History," *Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer* (ed. R. Klibansky and H. J. Paton; New York, 1963) 9.

historiographic function in the way that they were later used.[40] The difference, then, between all potentially historiographic texts and history writing rests on the intention of the author, which can only be discerned when the entire work is interpreted as a whole (in contrast to interpretations which focus on smaller sections of larger historical works). Van Seters writes, "One must pay close attention to the matter of the genre and function of historical texts, for it is in the transformation of such limited forms of historiography into a particular form of literature that the origin of history is to be found."[41]

Literary comparison is the tool by which Van Seters discerns the transformation of historiographic texts into the more specific genre of history writing. Although his aim is to sketch the earliest genres (e.g., genealogy and chronology) and the literary techniques that may have given rise to history writing in the ancient Near East, in Greece and in ancient Israel, his most forceful arguments focus on the close literary parallels between Hebrew Bible and Herodotus in three areas: genre, unifying structure of the whole work, and use of sources. The present review will focus on these three points. First, genre. The central question for Van Seters concerning genre is the relationship of epic and history writing. Van Seters underscores the contrast between the *Tendenz* of epic to idealize a heroic age in the deep past and the more critical approach of prose writers like Herodotus, who tended to focus on recent past tradition, and who organized this tradition by making use of genealogies and chronologies.[42] Second, the unifying structure. The central question under structure is whether the whole of Herodotus' history is more than the sum of its parts. Van Seters concludes that it is because of the way in which common themes are woven into the work (e.g., posterity, deeds, customs, features of nature, causes of Persian war, notions about world order, etc.) and by the way in which literary devices are employed (e.g., parataxis, chronology, analogy, narrative patterns, use of speeches as commentary, etc.).[43] Third, the use of sources. The central question does not change when the focus shifts from unifying structure to the use of sources. Once again the argument is presented that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts because of the great freedom of Herodotus in creating his work.[44] Van Seters concludes from his study of genre, structure and sources in Herodotus that Greek history writing cannot be studied by focusing on the sources employed by the author, nor by looking for points of disunity in the work. Rather, interpretation must remain focused on the whole document in order to uncover the intention of the author.[45]

Herodotus provides background for analyzing, first, the yahwistic history (part of chapter 2), and, more importantly, the deuteronomistic history (chapters 7-11). Van Seters concludes that the deuteronomistic history parallels Herodotus in genre (e.g., it makes use of chronology, royal inscriptions, etc., and avoids a heroic age in favor of a more critical reflection on recent history), in structure and literary technique (e.g., parataxis, the use of speeches for commentary, analogies, periodization of history, themes associated with principle characters, etc.), and in

40 *In Search of History*, 2-3.

41 *In Search of History*, 6.

42 *In Search of History*, 18-31.

43 *In Search of History*, 31-40.

44 *In Search of History*, 40-51.

45 *In Search of History*, 52 *et passim*.

its use of sources (e.g., free use of folk traditions in service to the larger work).[46] The only problem for the deuteronomistic historian, according to Van Seters, is that his anonymity has tended to fracture the analysis of the larger work into a study of its different parts (e.g., court history *et al.*), which has turned attention away from the overall intention of the author in creating the work as a whole.[47]

Third, the social and institutional setting of the deuteronomistic history. It has become evident at this point that the central focus of Van Seters in *In Search of History* is literary just as it was in *Abraham in History and Tradition*.[48] The comparative focus, however, does allow Van Seters to advance several arguments about the social and institutional setting of history writing in ancient Israel. The first and central argument of Van Seters concerns the dating of history writing in Israel. The absence of history writing in the ancient Near East prior to the deuteronomistic history and the similarities between this work and Greek history writing argue for a late date for the rise of this genre in Israel to parallel the same development in Greece.[49]

The historical milieu of Greece which gave rise to the genre of history writing provides a point of comparison for sketching both the social forces and the institutions that may also have given rise to history writing in Israel. Van Seters notes from his study of Greek culture (1) that history writing is a distinctly literary activity carried on in scribal traditions;[50] (2) that Herodotus (and to a lesser degree his precursors) evince a critical spirit that culminated in the Ionic enlightenment, which was characterized by a rationalistic perspective which sought to free itself from the religious world view of epic in describing causes for events within well defined historical periods;[51] (3) that two intentions are evident in history writing: a forensic intent (to evaluate the moral character of a people) and a quest for identity;[52] and (4) that many Greek historians are travelers who live in foreign lands and write history to address the causes of defeat of their own nation.[53]

Van Seters does not wish to compare the deuteronomistic historian with Herodotus, but he does wish to place the deuteronomistic history in the larger context of the Hellenistic precursors to Herodotus.[54] Van Seters argues that the deuteronomistic history is the earliest history in ancient Israel, and for that matter, in western civilization.[55] Furthermore, he writes that "[t]he discovery of history writing is the discovery of the most comprehensive and authoritative genre of tradition."[56] What makes the genre so authoritative is that it is able to

46 *In Search of History*, chaps. 8-10. See the summary on pp. 354-359.

47 *In Search of History*, 359.

48 Van Seters (*In Search of History*, 18) writes concerning his comparative study: "Here the comparative data will not be anthropological or sociological materials, helpful as these may be for form critical analysis, but literary ones, using a body of literature closely related in time and space to that of the Hebrews but largely ignored."

49 *In Search of History*, 51-54 *et passim*.

50 *In Search of History*, 4, 23.

51 *In Search of History*, 23-25.

52 *In Search of History*, 1-2.

53 *In Search of History*, 213.

54 *In Search of History*, chap. 11. See also "Tradition and History: History as National Tradition," *Histoire et conscience historique* (Les civilisations du Proche-Orient Ancien vol. 5; Lueven: Éditions Peeters, 1986) 63-74.

55 *In Search of History*, 362.

56 *In Search of History*, 360.

use the past in a variety of ways in order to exercise authority over institutions, customs, rights, behaviors, the temple, priesthood, the dynasty and even territorial claims.[57] Van Seters writes, "The genius of the Dtr history is that it attempted such a wide-ranging integration of forms in order to set forth within one work the whole foundation of Israelite society."[58] Once canonized, the deuteronomistic history prompted supplementation backwards by the Yahwist historian, an institutional and cultic revision by P, and a revisionist history by the Chronicler.[59]

## III

This brief overview of Van Seters' work provides background for addressing the central questions of this study: (1) the institutional setting of the late formation of the Pentateuch, (2) how this institutional setting provides insight for evaluating late literary developments in the Pentateuch, and (3) the relationship between this institutional setting and earlier stages of the tradition. What becomes clear at this juncture is that questions concerning institutional setting are still emerging in the research program of Van Seters, because his primary interest has been literary in focus (the internal nature of the Abrahamic tradition and comparative historiography as a literary genre) in order to argue in more general terms for a late date to the formation of the Pentateuch. We can, however, glean Van Seters' response to the questions of institutional setting by summarizing his work in three stages.

First, *Abraham in History and Tradition*. Here the question concerning institutional setting as a positive category for interpreting the late formation of the Pentateuch is inappropriate, because it is really the breakdown of institutions (both cultic and political) in the exilic period that is providing the social setting, according to Van Seters, for the production of the literature. We might even venture that the breakdown of established institutions is, in fact, the central sociological clue for understanding how the Abrahamic literature was formed and what its relationship is to prior tradition. We could summarize Van Seters argument at this point as follows: With the lose of traditional institutions, writers (especially the Yahwist) were able to exercise freedom in their use of past tradition for the purpose of constructing a new community identity that was intented to account for vast social change while also being aimed at a future restoration. By "freedom of use" Van Seters means selection, organization, as well as a more rationalistic *Tendenz* in how past material was interpreted. The result of this is that the institutional settings of older traditions are not carried over into the new literary creation of the Yahwist.

Second, *In Search of History*. Even though this study remains primarily literary in its focus, the introduction of comparison invites at least some conclusions concerning the institutional setting of history writing in Greece that carry over into ancient Israel. The conclusion which provides the most insight into Van Seters' emerging view of the institutional setting of the late formation of the Pentateuch is that history writing is the product of an intellectual élite group and that it is transmitted in scribal traditions. Furthermore, Van Seters broadens the social function of history writing (from *Abraham in History and Tradition*) when he

57 *In Search of History*, 356-357.

58 *In Search of History*, 357.

59 *In Search of History*, 361-362.

writes that it is the "most comprehensive and authoritative genre of tradition," by which he means that the genre of history writing is intended to exercise authority over both the social (e.g., institutions, dynasty, customs, rights, behavior, etc.) and the religious dimensions of the nation (e.g., temple, priesthood, religious law, etc.). The attributing of such a broad function to history writing goes beyond the conclusions in *Abraham in History and Tradition*, and it raises new questions, on the one hand, concerning the aims and social function of an intellectual élite group which may be producing the Pentateuch, and, on the other hand, the relationship of history writing to older tradition—especially with regard to past religious tradition.

Third, continuing research. The aim of this article has been to describe the research program of Van Seters from the point of view of the social and institutional setting in the late formation of the Pentateuch. This summary of Van Seters' work underscores how his research program over the past two decades has been remarkably focused and how it is not yet complete. If we use the four categories listed at the outset of this study (which Van Seters used to evaluate Noth's work), as the framework for a concluding summary, it becomes clear that the central focus of Van Seters' work up to this point has been on the literary questions of the (1) form and structure of the Pentateuch and (2) its process of growth. We have also seen that he has addressed (3) the function of history writing in some detail and touched upon (4) the identity of the bearers of tradition. It is the final point that requires further research, especially in light of the broad function of history writing that was outlined by Van Seters in *In Search of History*.[60]

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60 Van Seters, himself, is aware of this conclusion, since, in more recent studies he has continued to address issues of social and institutional setting of the Pentateuch in an attempt to provide more detail on the relationship of history writing and its social implications in ancient Israel. The most noteworthy of these studies is "Tradition and History: History as National Tradition," where Van Seters presents four sociological principles that are essential for evaluating the rise of history writing: (1) the formation of tradition is the activity of an intellectual élite, (2) the historian is an intellectual and as such he is the creator and maintainer of historical tradition, (3) the traditions created by historiography are national traditions, and (4) national histories undergo criticism and revision. At the close of this article Van Seters speculates that perhaps national histories were "published" through public reading.

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# Some Observations on "The Institutional Setting" by T. Dozeman

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Two comments follow: the first is a point of clarification about the role of oral tradition in my work, and the second concerns literary method and tradition history of the Pentateuch.

First, oral tradition. In 20 years the questions and issues have changed drastically. When I criticized putting so much reliance upon oral tradition in *Abraham in History and Tradition*, I adopted a minimalist position by using Olrik's Laws more cautiously than had been done before. This has now been understood at times to mean that I put too much trust in them. I can easily give them up. But that does not mean that there is no oral tradition behind either J or DtrH. The fact is that Greek historians, such as Herodotus and Hellenicus, made use of both written and oral sources. The antiquarian historians used myth, legend and other forms of folklore and we must expect to find these in the Pentateuch whatever criteria we use.

Second, literary method. What needs to be more strongly stressed in my work is the **supplemental** approach to the literary development of the tradition. This is an alternative to the notion of independent sources and redactors. It is the major point of departure from the documentary hypothesis. The supplementary approach also provides a framework for addressing the problem of the relationship of sources to each other. Since J is later than DtrH, the Pentateuch (Gen-Num) is a secondary development to the national history (DtrH). It solves the dispute between Noth's Tetrateuch and von Rad's Hexateuch. P is also a supplement to J + DtrH. The implications of this literary approach for the social/institutional setting is that J's "occupation" as historian is not fundamentally different from that of Dtr. While Noth wanted to deal with their *Sitz-im-Leben* in an entirely different way, I see them as essentially the same. I believe they belong to that scribal group know as the "wise."

# Jesus and the Domination System

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At the beginning of every course I teach on Jesus, I ask the participants to write a one paragraph description of him. Then I ask them to go back through the paragraph and note everything that is also true of them, or represents something to which they aspire. Students are astonished at the degree to which their picture of Jesus is a projected image of themselves and what they would like to be. Jesus is, to that degree, their own idealized self-image.

This, in miniature, is what Albert Schweitzer exposed on a grand scale in his *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*.[1] Schweitzer demonstrated that the "lives" of Jesus produced by nineteenth-century scholars were selective portraits reflecting the piety and prejudices of extremely learned writers. Schweitzer himself proceeded to depict a Jesus ostensibly rendered immune from modernization by being enveloped in a web of apocalypticism so foreign to current sensibilities as to appear beyond the reproach of projection. Then he renounced prestigious positions as a theologian, organist and musicologist to become a medical missionary in Africa. He had not made Jesus over into his own image, after all; he had made himself over into his image of Jesus.

What Schweitzer did was instructive. He did not despair of historical reconstruction. He simply sought to insure that the reconstruction was not simply pure projection, but that something authentic in the gospels emerged with sufficient power to remake life. If it could not remake Europe's life, it would remake his own.

Projection has been much misunderstood as a falsification of objective reality by the superimposition of subjective values and images on the data. It is that, but it is something more: a means of self- and other-discovery. What my students discovered is not just that they make Jesus over into their own images of who they are and wish to be, but that Jesus offers them a mirror for discovering their own essential selfhood. What they project onto Jesus is what they *need* in themselves; their projection arises out of a longing to become more, a longing *that has itself been awakened by the figure of Jesus in the gospels*. I always do the exercise along with the class, and every time, my picture of Jesus is different, reflecting the growing edge of my desire to transcend what I am, to become what I can be. But my Jesus-picture is itself subject to check; it must be coherent with the biblical data.

Jesus, of course, remains more and other than we can integrate into our immediate picture; sensing this, we continually seek for a broader canvas, truer

[1] First German edition, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, 1906. First English edition published by A. & C. Black, Ltd., 1910.

pigments, excluded options, new information. But even those expanded, more mature pictures of Jesus will contain a large measure of projection. This is not a violation of the text. In a certain sense, that is why the text exists at all: not to provide historical information, but to foster our transformation.

Because we recognize that our own depictions of Jesus may be narrow, nonsensical, unjust, naive or overly conventional, we read depictions by others. They too project onto Jesus their own selfhood and struggles, but in so doing they may highlight an aspect of his life—and therefore of our own human possibilities —that we have overlooked, neglected, repressed, or avoided. The task of scholarship is thus not to uncover an "objective" picture of Jesus, since that cannot be done, but to continually enlarge our admittedly subjective pictures to include more of life and more of the data.

Biblical scholars have been exceedingly slow to grasp the implications of the Heisenberg principle: that the observer is always a part of the field being observed, and disturbs that field by the very act of observation. In hermeneutical terms, this means that there can be no question of an objective view of Jesus "as he really was." "Objective view" is itself an oxymoron; every view is subjective, from a particular angle of vision. But we can make a virtue of our limitations, because our very subjectivity may in fact enable us to see things in the text that others have overlooked. Black, liberationist, and feminist interpretations of Scripture are a case in point.

This "quest" is faced with two major limitations, however: the paucity of the biblical data, and the poverty of our selves. Scholars seek to rectify the limitation on our data by turning over every leaf in search of new information about the ancient world. Newly discovered texts, new ways of reading texts, new disciplines applied to the texts, all provide invaluable aid in understanding Jesus' world and his own relation to it. Such research participates in a perpetual feedback process in which our interpretation of solitary sayings and deeds of Jesus continually modifies the overall gestalt, while the gestalt in turn exercises a powerful influence in the way we read the solitary pieces. The overall picture is far more stable, however, than the pieces. It performs the homeostatic function of providing coherence and consistency to the whole. It makes the pieces intelligible.

But no matter how vast our knowledge of Jesus' period, unless we are also doing something about the poverty of our selves, we will be unable to proceed closer to the mystery, but will simply continue to circle its perimeter, accumulating ever more information without ourselves being changed by the encounter.

No scholar can construct a picture of Jesus beyond the level of spiritual awareness that she or he has attained. No reconstruction outstrips its reconstructor. We cannot explain truths we have not yet understood. We cannot present insights that we have not yet perceived. Our picture of Jesus reflects, not only Jesus, but the person portraying Jesus, and if we are spiritual infants or adolescents, there are whole realms of human reality that will simply escape us. (Though the encounter with Jesus in the text may itself be transformative, as it was for Schweitzer.)

Not only will the undeveloped self fail to perceive truths that it has not yet tasted, but different people at different levels of development will understand the *same* saying or deed in different or even opposite ways. A person still mired in a legalistic religious framework might regard the statement about the human being ("son of man") as lord of the sabbath (Mark 2:28 par.) to mean that Jesus, as Son of Man (taken as a christological title equivalent to Son of God and Christ),

has exclusive authority over the law. A person rebelling against such a framework and undergoing doubt about the whole religious enterprise might decide that the point is moot since Jesus probably never spoke this saying. A person on a spiritual quest might understand the statement as indicating that *any* person who is in touch with the inner divine reality has the authority to discriminate between which laws should be obeyed and which should not; and this would be true whether Jesus said it or not. And a truly mature person might interpret the text in ways that most of us cannot presently comprehend. We may even have read commentaries that adequately explained what Jesus meant, and were simply unable to understand them at our present stage of development.

We cannot escape this limitation, because historical reconstruction proceeds by analogy from our own experience.[2] Therefore, the closer our spirituality to the upper reaches of maturity, the more truly analogous our experience is likely to be to that of Jesus (assuming that Jesus was spiritually mature).

Occasionally, however, a really powerful new angle of vision or perspective comes along from *outside* Jesus studies that provides a new way of looking at the data and radically modifies the way we understand both the solitary pieces of tradition and the picture of Jesus as a whole. Apocalypticism has already been mentioned in reference to Schweitzer. So also Bultmann's existentialist interpretation of the gospel, or the liberationist Jesus of some third world theologians, or the feminist critique of the Bible, or the recasting of Jesus in the image of a wisdom teacher, have all provided new perspectives for looking at the data. At the same time, however, they also provide new ways of looking at ourselves and our world.

Or a new *method* or *approach* may surface new insights about the culture or customs of the period which enable us to see the social setting in fresh and more intelligible ways. One could instance the work of Douglas Oakman on first century Palestinian economics, or Bruce Malina on Mediterranean social customs.[3]

These new perspectives and approaches have played a critical role in enabling helpful new readings of the text. They interpose between the text and our projections on the text a new filter that allows us to see what we have been blind to before, no matter how earnestly we had desired to let the text transform us. They do not free us from projecting, but they may open up domains of understanding previously closed to us. And they also make available new materials on which to project, and thus (if we identify and work with what the projection teaches us about ourselves) further our human growth.

These new readings can actually change the way we assess the historical probability of the pieces of the tradition even as they modify or revolutionize our picture of Jesus as a whole. I want to offer one such new perspective, one that draws most heavily on liberationist and feminist hermeneutics, both to test its general plausibility and to reflect on how such perspectival images may change our evaluation of what is authentic Jesus tradition. I am interested in the way new perspectives create new plausibilities, and thus profoundly modify what we regard as historically probable. I am exploring a hunch that what we regard as

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[2] Troeltsch; see Van A. Harvey, *The Historian and the Believer* (New York: Macmillan, 1966) 3-37.

[3] Douglas E. Oakman, *Jesus and the Economic Questions of His Day* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986); Bruce Malina, *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1981).

historical is far more a function of our overall perspectives and plausibility structures than a consequence of rigorous historical methodology, and that this may not only be inevitable but proper. If this hunch proves correct, then it becomes necessary to ask whether historiography is not perhaps less in the service of fact than of myth. Perhaps the idea of history *is* our myth. Perhaps our scholarship is far from being an objective, scientific endeavor, and is much more a kind of apologetic for whatever perspectival image of Jesus and view of the world (religion) we happen to hold.

What follows is one such picture, as seen through the lens of a critique of domination.

*Jesus Against Domination*

The world into which Jesus was born was a world of domination. The rich dominated the poor; men, women; Romans, their subjects. Power was patriarchal, hierarchical, autocratic, and androcratic, and was exerted through conquest, deception, competition, and force. Violence and war were regarded as inevitable and redemptive. Ethnic barriers separated Jew from Gentile. Status distinctions were jealously preserved; a man's place at a banquet was a delicate matter of relative ranking. The more powerful surrounded themselves with clients; patrons exercised control through honor and shaming, gifts and obligations. Slavery was ubiquitous. Women's reproductive capacities and sexual expression were subject to male control, and their freedom in relationships and movement were sharply circumscribed. Divine beings were scarcely distinguishable from human tyrants, demanding propitiation by means of bloody sacrifices. A coterie of priests held a monopoly on temple wealth and power. Nature itself existed to be exploited by a single one of its species.

I will call this set of arrangements the Domination System. It did not always exist, but arose in large part with the rise of the great empires after 3000 BCE.[4] This was the context in which Jesus preached, and his message was a context-

[4] See Elise Boulding, *The Underside of History: A View of Women Through Time* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976); Sue Mansfield, *The Gestalts of War* (New York: Dial Press, 1982) 1-19; Richard E. Leakey and Roger Lewin, *People of the Lake* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1978) 270-75; James Mellaart, *The Neolithic of the Near East* (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1975); Morton Fried, Marvin Harris, and Robert Murphy, eds., *War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression* (Garden City, NY: The Natural History Press, 1967); Morton Fried, *The Evolution of Human Society* (New York: Random House, 1967); Ronald Cohen and Elman R. Service, eds., *The Origins of the State: The Anthropology of Political Evolution* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1978); C. R. Hallpike, *The Principles of Social Evolution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Henri J. M. Claessen and Peter Skalnik, eds., *The Early State* (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1978); Jacquetta Hawkes and Sir Leonard Woolley, *History of Mankind*, Vol. 1, *Prehistory and the Beginnings of Civilization* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); Stuart Struever and Felicia Antonelli Holton, *Koster: Americans in Search of Their Prehistoric Past* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1979); Riane Eisler, *The Chalice and the Blade* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987); Elinor W. Gadon, *Once and Future Goddess* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989); Marija Gimbutas, *The Goddesses and Gods of Old Europe, 7000-3500* BC (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982); Gerda Lerner, *The Creation of Patriarchy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); and Andrew Bard Schmookler, *The Parable of the Tribes: The Problem of Power in Social Evolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). All of these authors are agreed that prior to 3000 BCE there was relatively little warfare, and that at least some societies were markedly egalitarian. The Domination System was not the creation of the early state, however; it was already evident in bands of nomadic herdsmen as much as a millennium earlier.

specific remedy for the ills of that system. His proclamation was not a timeless truth applicable to all conceivable worlds. It was a specific response to a specific set of injustices whose common characteristic was the desire by some to dominate others.

Jesus and his followers not only repudiated the androcratic values of power and wealth, but the institutions and systems that provided them authorization and support: marriage and the family, the law, the sacrificial system, the temple, kosher food regulations, the distinction between clean and unclean, patriarchy, the role-expectations of women and children, the caste/class system, the use of violence, racial/ethnic divisions, insider/outsider distinctions—indeed, every conceivable prop of domination, division, and autarchy.

In the material that follows, I have not attempted to maintain a careful distinction between statements and deeds that are authentic to Jesus and those ascribed to him by the church, so long as they both reject the system of domination and reflect the values of God's domination-free order.

At points I differentiate Jesus' views from those of the church, especially when the latter failed to maintain his egalitarian spirit. It may even be the case that Jesus himself was not entirely free of androcratic attitudes; the Syrophoenician woman seems to have exposed in him a certain prejudice against Gentiles (whom he calls "dogs"—or "puppies," if you prefer); but she sets him straight by clever repartee and an indomitable spirit (Mark 7:24-30; Matt 15:21-28).

Using Jesus' critique of the Domination System as a selective grid enables us to recover emphases lost as the gospel was domesticated to androcratic attitudes in the early church. Although occasionally Jesus' teachings were further radicalized (as in Stephen's speech in Acts 7 or the extension of the mission to include Gentiles), the more pronounced tendency of the tradition was to accommodate the gospel in significant ways to structures of domination (for example, the pastoral epistles). This critique of domination does not replace the historical criteria worked out with such care by New Testament scholars;[5] it simply represents a new perspective, to be supplemented (as I have done in this chapter) by historical criteria as needed.

I am *not* attempting to present a definitive picture of the historical Jesus. I am focusing instead on an originating impulse that issued from him and was continued by his disciples. If some of the texts I cite are not adequately expressive of Jesus' spirit, at least most of them are. The words and deeds of Jesus are like holograms, that marvelous laser photography in which the entire photographic image is preserved in any fragment of the negative. Just so, the dramatically new reality proclaimed by Jesus is reproduced in even a single act or saying. Despite the complexity of the tradition, his spirit shines through.

We begin with Jesus' rejection of domination.

*Domination*

> Mimetic rivalry arose among them [the disciples] as to which of them was to be regarded as the greatest. Jesus said to them, "The kings of the nations lord it over their subjects, and those in authority over them are called benefactors [!]. But not so with you; rather let the oldest among you become as the youngest, and the leader as one who serves. For which is

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[5] See Robert W. Funk, "Rules of Evidence," in *The Gospel of Mark: Red Letter Edition*, ed. Funk with Mahlon H. Smith (Sonoma, CA: Polebridge Press, 1991), 29-52.

> the more important, one who sits at table, or one who serves? Is it not the one who sits at table? But I am among you as one who serves." (Luke 22:24-27, author's translation)

Jesus does not condemn ambition or aspiration; he merely changes the values to which they are attached: "Whoever wants to be first must be last of all and servant of all."[6] He does not reject power, but only its use to dominate others. He does not reject greatness, but finds it in identification and solidarity with the needy at the bottom of society (Matt 5:3-12//Luke 6:20-23). He does not renounce heroism, but expresses it by repudiating the powers of death and confronting the entrenched might of the authorities unarmed.

His rejection of domination hierarchies could scarcely be more complete than when he taught, astonishingly, "Happy are those servants whom the master finds awake when he comes. Truly I tell you: he will hitch up his robe, seat them [lit., "have them recline," as at a formal banquet or feast!] at table, and come and wait on them" (Luke 12:37).

In his beatitudes, his healings, his table fellowship with outcasts and sinners, Jesus declares God's special concern for the oppressed. When you give a banquet, Jesus suggests to the wealthy with a straight face, do not invite your friends, because they will just reciprocate, but invite instead the poor, the maimed, the lame, and the blind.[7] If another invites you to a feast, do not sit down in a place of honor, but in the last place (Luke 14:7-11). Do not be like the religious leaders, who make their prayer shawls ornate and their robes fashionable, and covet salutations in the market place and the best seats in the synagogues, and places of honor at feasts, and make long, pretentious prayers.[8] These are the words and deeds, not of a minor reformer, but of an egalitarian prophet who repudiates the very premises on which domination is based: the right of some to lord it over others by means of power, wealth, shaming, or titles.

Jesus himself seems to have rejected the titles people tried to pin on him—including "Christ/Messiah." Historically, most scholars agree, Jesus did not claim for himself the status of God, Son of God, or Messiah; these were ascribed to him after the resurrection by his followers, who reinterpreted them in the light of the cross. Jesus refused the roles of Mosaic prophet, priestly messiah, and Davidic ruler,[9] and was not interested in being made king (John 6:15). "If you are the son of God," the Devil insinuates, behave like a messiah: be like the great heroes of Israel. Jesus refuses (Matt 4:1-11//Luke 4:1-13).

Nor are church leaders to take titles: "But you are not to be called rabbi, for you have one teacher, and you are all students. And call no one your father [i.e., "papa" or Pope] on earth, for you have one Father—the one in heaven. Nor are you to be called instructors, for you have one instructor" (Matt 23:8-10). His

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[6] Mark 9:35 par.; 10:43-44 par.; Luke 14:11//Matt 23:12; Luke 18:14; Matt 18:4. It is important to note that Jesus addresses his words to *men*, not women. They are an attack on androcracy, not an attempt to reinforce the servility of women.

[7] Luke 14:12-14; 14:15-24//Matt 22:1-10.

[8] Matt 23:5-7; Mark 12:38-40//Luke 20:46; 18:9-14.

[9] Matt 4:1-11//Luke 4:1-13; Mark 12:35-37 par.; Luke 12:13-14; Matt 11:2-6//Luke 7:18-23; Mark 8:27-33 par.; Mark 15:2-5 par.; Matt 26:63//Luke 22:70; Luke 22:67-69. Mark 14:61-62 cannot have been the reading that Matthew and Luke found in their copies of Mark; how else can we explain their both independently changing Mark's full confession, "I am [the Christ]" to the ambiguous "Your have said so," especially since they both believed he *was* the Christ? Some manuscripts of Mark 14:62 read "You have said so"; they probably represent the earlier reading.

followers are to maintain domination-free relationships in a discipleship of equals that even included women.[10] The hierarchical master/slave, teacher/student relationship is not to persist in the church. "I do not call you servants any longer, because the servant does not know what the master is doing; but I have called you friends" (John 15:15).[11]

Jesus' actions embody his words. According to the Fourth Gospel, Jesus washes the disciples' feet, a task considered so menial that a master could not order a Jewish slave to perform it (John 13:1-20).[12] He also prearranges for the Last Supper by having his disciples meet a man carrying a water pitcher, a task strictly confined to women (Mark 14:13; Luke 22:10; Matthew apparently finds this intolerable and omits it).

Consistent with all that he has said and done, Jesus enters Jerusalem farcically, on a donkey. The church later read portentous meaning into this act on the strength of Zechariah 9:9 (Matt 21:5; John 12:15). But Mark and Luke make no reference to Zechariah, and may reflect something closer to Jesus' intent: lampooning the Davidic kingship by paradoxical reversal.[13] The human being who has no place to lay his head (Luke 9:57-58//Matt 8:19-20) is the same "king" who owns nothing and must borrow—not even a horse—an ass!

The church later developed this reversal of values in the magnificent infancy narratives, where, according to the account in Luke 2, the child of the Creator of the universe must be born in a stable because no one would make room for his family in the inn; where shepherds, regarded by the righteous as constitutionally dishonest, unclean, and no better than Gentile slaves, and who were thus banned from being witnesses,[14] are the sole witnesses of Jesus' birth. Thus the witnesses of Jesus' nativity (shepherds) and of his resurrection (women) were both disallowed by Jesus' culture. The same theme is present in Matthew's account of the homage of the Wise Men (2:1-12); in the Magnificat (Luke 1:46-55); in the claim in Matthew 28:18 that "all authority in heaven and on earth has been given" to this lowly and crucified artisan; and in Paul's rhapsody over the self-abnegation of the Christ in becoming a slave (Phil 2:5-11).

We must reckon with the possibility that at least one impulse in the development of Christology was the attempt to insert Jesus back into the world of androcracy by attaching to him honorific titles refulgent with power—the whole operation concealed behind a veil of obsequious devotion (itself a telltale sign of androcratic values).

*Equality*

The gospel of Jesus is founded on economic equality, because economic inequities are the basis of domination. Ranking, domination hierarchies, classism and the caste system are all built on accumulated power provided by excess wealth. Those in power see to it, by taxation, expropriation, indebtedness and

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[10] Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her* (New York: Crossroad, 1984) 107, 121, 143.

[11] Here as elsewhere in this essay I cite sayings attributed to Jesus by the Fourth Evangelist that may not be historical, but which authentically reflect Jesus' critique of domination.

[12] *Mek. Ex.* 21:2 (Lauterbach, vol. 3, p. 5).

[13] Mark 11:1-10; Luke 19:28-38. It is conceivable that Zech 9:9 is already farcical, and that Jesus took his inspiration from it.

[14] *T. B. Sanh.* 25b; *M. B. Qam.* 10:9; *T. B. B. Qam.* 94b Bar.; J. Jeremias, *Jerusalem in the Time of Jesus* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969) 304-11.

monopolistic control of prices, that the poor are never able to rise above their station. This brute economic control is given mythological and ideological sanction to guarantee that those who have most to lose from obedience to the ruling class become its staunchest supporters.

Breaking with androcracy means ending the economic domination of the many by the few. Since the powerful are not likely to abdicate their wealth, the poor must find ways of transcending the Domination Epoch while still in it.

John the Baptist set the tone for everything that was to follow: "Whoever has two coats must share with anyone who has none; and whoever has food must do likewise" (Luke 3:11).[15] Jesus, for his part, pours scorn on those who are clothed in soft raiment and dwell in king's houses (Matt 11:8//Luke 7:25). He challenges those who make loans, not only to require no interest, but no repayment.[16] To those who wish to follow him, he counsels selling everything, and warns the rich that they have no access whatever to the new society coming.[17] Those who hoard luxuries and neglect the poor at their doors are presented with the prospect of their own death and divine judgment (Luke 12:13-21; 16:19-31). To the religionist's dream of being able to be "spiritual" and still amass wealth within the current unjust system, Jesus pronounces an unconditional No: "You cannot serve God and wealth" (Matt 6:24//Luke 16:13).

The earth, he insists, is so constituted that it will provide all our needs *if*, and only if, we share equitably: "Strive first for the kingdom of God and God's righteousness, and all these things [necessities of life] will be given to you as well" (Matt 6:33//Luke 12:31). His followers were to begin living now "as if" the new order had already come. Jesus and his disciples subsisted from a common purse (Luke 8:1-3; John 12:6; 13:29). He sent his disciples out preaching the new order without food or money or extra clothes, relying on God's providence through others (Mark 6:7-11 par.; 10:29-30 par.). They "had all things in common, and they sold their possessions and goods and distributed them to all, as any had need" (Acts 2:44-45; 4:32-5:11).[18] They were not to give special status to the rich among them.[19] Those who exploit the poor are condemned (James 5:1-6).

It is rather the poor whom God elects and blesses, the meek and brokenhearted and despised who will inherit God's coming reign on earth. It is the merciful not the mighty, the peacemakers not the warriors, the persecuted not the aristocrats, who will enter into the joy of God (Matt 5:3-12//Luke 6:20-26).

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15 For an argument favoring the historicity of this passage, which Bultmann ascribed to the hellenistic church, see Joseph Ernst, *Johannes der Täufer* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989) 93-98.

16 Luke 6:34. Gos. Thom. 95 represents a more original form than Matt 5:42 or Luke 6:30 (R. McL. Wilson, *Studies in the Gospel of Thomas* [London: Mowbray, 1960] 128).

17 Luke 12:33-34//Matt 6:19-21; Luke 14:33; Mark 10:17-31 par.; Matt 13:44-46.

18 Doubts about the historicity of the passages about the sharing of possessions in Acts began simultaneously with the rise of nineteenth century socialism. In 1853, the French Academy actually sponsored a competition for the best essay proving that the early church did *not* practice communism. Brian J. Capper has provided a persuasive case for the historicity of early Christian sharing in his forthcoming study, "Community of Goods in the Earliest Jerusalem Church," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, forthcoming; and *All Things in Common* (WUNT; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, forthcoming); "The Interpretation of Acts 5.4," *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 19 (1983) 117-31; and "'In der Hand des Ananias...' Erwägungen zu 1 QS VI, 20 und der urchristlichen Gütergemeinschaft," *Revue de Qumran* 46 (1986) 223-36.

19 1 Cor 11:20-22; James 1:9-11; 2:1-7.

In parable after parable, Jesus speaks of the "reigning of God,"[20] using images drawn, not from king's courts and palaces, but from farming and women's work. In Jesus' parables, the coming reign of God is not described as coming from on high down to earth; it rises quietly and imperceptibly out of the land. It is established, not by armies and military might, but by an ineluctable process of growth from below, among the common people. Its colors are not gold and scarlet and purple, but earth-tones: brown, yellow and green. Its symbolism is not masculine (kings, swords, chargers, shields, spears) but feminine (water, soil, dough, women, a home).[21]

While others look heavenward for divine intervention, Jesus reports that God's domination-free order has already commenced, in the very midst of them (Luke 17:20-21). While others ask when the promised king would come, Jesus heals the sick and casts out demons ("But if it is by the finger of God that I cast out the demons, then the kingdom of God has come to you"—Luke 11:20//Matt 12:28). While others long for Israel to become like a mighty cedar of Lebanon, dominating the Gentile nations round about (Ezek 17:22-24), Jesus sardonically compares the reigning of God to a tiny mustard seed that grows rank and wild in hedgerow and garden, "and becomes the greatest of all—shrubs"![22] He is, in sum, not looking for a kingdom for himself or anyone else where power can be wielded in order to *force* people to be good. He is inaugurating God's domination-free order.

*The Family*

The family is the most basic instrument of nurture, social control, enculturation, and training in society. Obedience to parents was mandated by Moses in the Ten Commandments. Yet Jesus proclaims, "Whoever comes to me and does not hate father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters, yes, and even life itself, cannot be my disciple" (Luke 14:26; see Matt 10:37). "Do you think that I have come to bring peace to the earth? No, I tell you, but rather division! From now on five in one household will be divided, three against two and two against three; they will be divided: father against son and son against father, mother against daughter and daughter against mother, mother-in-law against her daughter-in-law and daughter-in-law against mother-in-law" (Luke 12:51-53//Matt 10:34-36).

When his own mother and brothers, thinking him mad, come to take him home, Jesus refuses to go out to them, repudiating the blood-tie between them: "'Who are my mother and my brothers?' And looking at those who sat about him, he said, 'Here are my mother and my brothers! Whoever does the will of God is my brother and sister and mother'" (Mark 3:21, 31-35 par.). In violation of a religious duty known to every culture, Jesus tells a man to leave his dying father's side, ignore the filial obligation to see to his burial, and to follow him peremptorily (Luke 9:59-60//Matt 8:21-22).

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[20] "Kingdom" has never been an accurate translation of *malkuth*, which denotes God's activity of exercising sovereignty rather than a territorial expanse. The verbal noun "reigning" is thus more precise than "reign," but awkward. I use "God's domination-free order" as a paraphrase for "kingdom of God."

[21] Mark 4:1-9 par.; 26-29; 30-32 par. = Gos. Thom. 20; Matt 13:24-30 = Gos. Thom. 57; 13:33//Luke 13:20-21 = Gos. Thom. 96; 13:44-46 = Gos. Thom. 76, 109; Luke 15:8-10; Matt 18:23-35; 20:1-16; 21:28-32; 25:1-13; 14-30//Luke 11:12-27; Matt 31-46.

[22] Mark 4:30-32 par. = Gos. Thom. 20.

The patriarchal family is the citadel of hierarchical male dominance, the inculcator of gender roles, the inhibitor of change. "It is exactly in the family that women's oppression and men's power is enacted most plainly and personally."[23] The larger structures of patriarchal dominance grow out of the cell of the patriarchal family, notes Gerda Lerner. The archaic state is merely the patriarchal family blown large. "Fathers, empowered to treat the virginity of their daughters as a family property asset, represent an authority as absolute as that of the king. Children reared and socialized within such authority will grow into the kinds of citizens needed in an absolutist kingship."[24]

The first person to attempt to squelch any act of courage, defiance, or revolt is usually a family member. (Is it not the case that the overwhelming preponderance of time and attention in psychotherapy is devoted to undoing damage done within families?)

So deeply is the family enmeshed in the values of the Domination System that people's own flesh and blood may even betray them rather than see society's values jeopardized: "Brother will betray brother to death, and a father his child, and children will rise against parents and have them put to death" (Mark 13:12 par.)—a trauma the church was in fact undergoing at the time the evangelists wrote.

Jesus may well have been of Davidic descent (Matt 1:1-17; Luke 3:23-38), but if so, he never appeals to it. In Mark 2:23-28 par., where one would have expected him to argue along blood-lines from the authority of David to that of the Son of David, he shifts abruptly to the son of man; and in Mark 12:35-37 he explicitly rejects the concept of the Son of David as messiah. He renounces the family as constituted by patrilineal blood-lines, and offers an alternative: a new family, made up of those whose delusions have been shattered, who are linked, not by that tightest of all bonds, the blood-tie, but by the doing of God's will (Mark 3:31-35 par.).[25]

In the new family of Jesus men can only be brothers, not patriarchs: "call no man your father on earth, for you have one Father—the one in heaven" (Matt 23:9).[26] Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza remarks,

> The saying of Jesus uses the "father" name of God not as a legitimation for existing patriarchal power structures in society or church but as a critical subversion of all structures of domination. The "father" God of Jesus makes possible the "sisterhood of men" (in the phrase of Mary Daly) by denying any father, and all patriarchy, its right to existence. Neither the "brothers" nor the "sisters" in the Christian community can claim the "authority of the father" because that would involve claiming authority and power reserved to God alone.[27]

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23 Thelma Jean Goodrich, "Women, Power, and Family Therapy: What's Wrong With This Picture," in *Women and Power: Perspectives for Family Therapy*, ed. by Goodrich (New York: Norton, 1991), forthcoming.

24 Gerda Lerner, *The Creation of Patriarchy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) 140, 209.

25 Ken Taylor, "Church/Family," D.Min. thesis, Hartford Seminary, 1978, 121, 145.

26 L. William Countryman, *Dirt, Greed, and Sex* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988) 171.

27 Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her*, 151.

Paul's surprisingly anti-family attitude in 1 Cor 7 becomes more intelligible in the light of Jesus' teaching. Paul is not simply anticipating an immediate end to history; he is trying to disentangle believers from the most profoundly soul-shaping institution in human society. Some women may have found welcome relief in being freed from having to marry, bear an unlimited number of children, and live a life restricted to the household.[28] Paul may have been closer to the mind of Jesus here than he has been given credit for.

*The Law*

The family, even more than the synagogue, was where Jewish boys were taught the Law. Scholars have gone to heroic lengths to scotch the crass Christian caricature of the Law as outmoded, cruel, and callous to human needs. Yet for some reason most members of the early church soon abandoned observance of the Law, and barely held on to the Old Testament by means of fantastic allegorizing, arbitrary picking and choosing, and regarding it as prophetic of the coming of Christ. How did a Jewish sect so quickly jettison the Law, unless Jesus had already sown the seeds of that rejection?[29]

Repeatedly, the gospels report, Jesus healed on the sabbath.[30] Violation of the sabbath was punishable by death (Exod 31:15). But there was much discussion among the rabbis as to what constituted such a violation. It is highly unlikely that the death penalty for sabbath violation was ever imposed in first century Palestine. The religious authorities were probably simply fighting a rear-guard action to slow the erosion of sabbath observance in Galilee.

Why then did Jesus apparently go out of his way to flaunt current standards, already weakened by the indifference of the *am haaretz*, the common peasants? Clearly there is more here than simply his insistence that acts of compassion and healing are appropriate on the sabbath (e.g., Mark 3:1-6 par.; Luke 13:10-17). For he also defends his disciples' quite unambiguous infraction of the law against harvesting on the sabbath (Mark 2:23-28 par.). They simply failed to plan ahead—or else, in following Jesus, they had no place to prepare the sabbath meal beforehand. On that occasion he articulates a principle: "The sabbath was made for humanity, not humanity for the sabbath; so the human being ('son of man') is sovereign even over the sabbath" (Mark 2:27-28, author's tr.).

As long as "son of man" here is taken as a christological title, the passage appears to elevate Jesus over the Law. Taken simply as a Hebrew idiom meaning "person," "son of man" here may mean just what it says: the human being, who

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28 See Antoinette Clark Wire, *The Corinthian Women Prophets* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990).

29 Rejection of the Jewish law by Gentile Christians is not surprising. But how do we account for the Jewish Christian source preserved in the Pseudo-Clementine literature (the "Preaching of Peter"), which rejected sacrifice and alleged that the Old Testament had been interpolated by "false pericopes" inspired by Satan? See Jean Danielou, *The Theology of Jewish Christianity* (Chicago: Regnery, 1964).

30 Mark 1:21-28 par.; 3:1-6; 6:1-6//Matt 13:54-58; Luke 13:10-17; 14:1-6; John 5:1-18; 7:21-24; 9:1-41. In the gospels, the afflicted always take the initiative for healing—except on the sabbath, whose end they patiently await before asking for help (Mark 1:32-34). It is always Jesus who takes the initiative to heal on the sabbath (Marcus Borg, *Conflict, Holiness and Politics in the Teachings of Jesus* [New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1984] 148). It is significant that violation of the sabbath is not mentioned outside the gospels. Apparently the early church did not make of it the issue Jesus did, and it would have been a non-issue for Gentiles.

recognizes his or her creation in the divine image, is judge of what constitutes "keeping the sabbath holy."

On the fringe of Christian tradition there are sayings indicating that the church was concerned to preserve the meaning and intent of the sabbath, even as it moved to substitute it with the day of Jesus' resurrection (Sunday). Gos. Thom. 27b states, "If you do not keep the sabbath as sabbath, you will not see the Father." And, more interesting yet, Codex Bezae reads, at Luke 6:4, "On the same day, seeing some one working on the sabbath, he said to him, 'Man [= son of man], if indeed you know what you are doing, you are blessed; but if you do not know, you are cursed and a transgressor of the law." Paul, only twenty or so years after Jesus' death, had already formulated the most brilliant dialectical argument about the law ever penned (Romans), and the Fourth Evangelist was to substitute the love command for the whole of Torah.

What had Jesus set loose? Apparently he regarded the Law as a hindrance to the immediate perception of the will of God by the attentive individual.[31] Such sovereign freedom strikes terror in the hearts of the authorities, both religious and secular, both Jewish and Christian. Jesus and his followers checked the wild chaos this freedom would lead to by a tight community that exercised joint discernment about people's perceptions of the divine will. We see the difficulty of maintaining decency and order in Paul's struggles with the fractious Corinthians. Later on, Montanism and Gnosticism would spawn so many Godlings that the church overreacted with a tyrannous hierarchy: its own Scripture, canon law, and orthodoxy as rigidly and violently defended as anything Judaism had ever known under Moses or Ezra or the Maccabees.

In a little-known statement of Luke 12:57, Jesus asks, "Why do you not judge for yourselves what is right?" Such a challenge requires a maturity in human beings not easily achieved. As Abba, God does not want slavish obedience, but a mutual relationship of love. The Domination System cannot use people who think for themselves. Such people threaten its capacity to exact unthinking compliance from those whom it exploits. The Law, a great step for humanity, nevertheless enshrined regulations that diminished women, dehumanized Gentiles, advocated in the name of Yahweh unmitigated violence and even genocidal destruction, interfered with compassion,[32] mandated the sacrifice of countless animals, institutionalized patriarchy, and, perhaps the heart of the matter, settled in advance what constitutes the will of God so that individuals and communities were exempt from seeking to discern it in each situation.

As Paul saw so clearly, law has been co-opted by sin and androcracy (Rom 7:7-13) and has become captive to violence for its enforcement. Law is sucked into the vortex of the contest for power; thus it becomes an instrument of violence and a generator of violence, limiting significantly its utility as a means of reducing or eliminating violence.[33] Nevertheless, it is "holy and just and good" (Rom 7:12), because it is able to contain, control or mitigate some forms of violence, and it expresses fundamental values necessary for the survival of human communities.

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31 Matt 7:13-14//Luke 13:23-24; Matt 7:21-23//Luke 6:46; Luke 13:26-27; Mark 3:35; Mark 14:35-36 par.; Matt 21:28-32; 25:14-30//Luke 19:12-27; John 7:16-17.

32 The priest in the Parable of the Compassionate Samaritan would have been in violation of the law if the wounded man had died in his care—Lev 21:1-3.

33 Edwin A. Hallsten, "The Community That Kills—Paul and Prohibition," Colloquium on Religion and Violence, New Orleans, November 16, 1990, 33-34.

For many in the early church, the Law had apparently ceased to be a blessing and functioned rather to separate them from a vital relationship with the living God. Clearly, most Jews (and even some Jewish Christians—Acts 21:20; Gal 2:4, 13; 6:12-13) did not share this sense; the followers of Jesus were distinctly unsuccessful in proselytizing Jews.

It is not just a characteristic of Judaism as such, but of all religions, to degenerate periodically into legalism. And when spiritual degeneracy is coupled with an institution of great economic and political power like the Jerusalem temple or the Vatican or any other concentration of sacred power, it is utterly predictable that the religious authorities will react decisively and, if necessary, at times murderously, to maintain their wealth and power. This is a statement about the nature of power, not about any particular religious tradition. It is as true of Christian or Muslim institutions as it is of Jewish.

It is not just the leaders of Judaism, but religious leaders generally, who become preoccupied with ritual minutiae while neglecting the weightier matters of the law: justice, mercy, and love (Luke 11:42//Matt 23:23); or who burden people with regulations that they do nothing to lighten (Luke 11:46//Matt 23:4); or who take away the key of knowledge, neither entering themselves nor allowing others to enter (Luke 11:52//Matt 23:13). It is well-known that the office of the chief priest was sold by the Romans to the highest bidder, who was thus required to hail from a wealthy priestly family; and that rural priests were impoverished by the inequities created by the greed of the priestly aristocracy. Religious leaders in every age have far too often blocked access to God rather than enabling it.

It is damningly true that Christians, already in the New Testament, called down everlasting guilt on Jews for their part in the execution of Jesus,[34] and that Roman culpability was downplayed, even in Scripture.[35] But truth is not served by denying the obvious: that Jewish religion in first century Palestine was corrupt at the top, often legalistic in its observance, and narrow-minded in its relations with the rest of the world. Jesus attacked it, in the tradition of the prophets, and called it to a fresh relationship with the God of his fathers and mothers that he called Abba. *He was not attacking Judaism as such, but the entire system of domination that had subverted even the Law to its own purposes.*

*The Purity System*

That Jesus abandoned kosher food regulations is doubtful, since otherwise the vision that Peter received canceling them would have been superfluous (Acts 10:1—11:18; 15:7-11). But the issue is moot, since Jesus violated the *principle* behind such regulations by eating with the unclean.[36] He did not require his disciples to wash their hands before eating (Mark 7:1-23//Matt 15:1-20), and he articulated a principle that, in a single sentence, wiped out the basis for the entire system of purification and defilement: "There is nothing outside a person that by going in can defile, but the things that come out are what defile" (Mark 7:15//Matt 15:11).

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34 Luke 11:50-51//Matt 23:35-36; Matt 27:25; Mark 12:1-12 par.; Luke 19:12-14, 27.

35 Mark 15:2-5 par.; Luke 23:6-16; Matt 27:19, 24-25; Luke 23:47.

36 Tax collectors and sinners: Mark 2:13-17 par.; Matt 11:19//Luke 7:34; Luke 19:1-10. On the theme of purity, see the bench mark work of Marcus Borg, *Conflict, Holiness and Politics in the Teachings of Jesus.*

Why did the Jesus movement break with the purity system? Surely not because they found it inconvenient, or an infringement on their freedom to act. Rather, because rules of ritual purity are what keep the various people and parts of society in their "proper" place. Without purity regulations, there would be a crisis of distinctions in which everyone, and everything, was the same: women equal to men, outsiders equal to insiders, the sacred no different than the profane. There would be no holy place or holy priests or holy people. Gentile would be no different than Jew. "Clean" people would sit at table with "unclean"; no one would be better in God's sight. Socially imposed shame about the body keeps people submissive to societal authority by weakening in them the immediacy of their own organic sense of what is right. Without such shame, what becomes of societal authority?

Domination depends on ranking. Without such distinctions, how can one know whom to dominate?

*Sacrifice*

Not only the law and the purity system, but even the temple and the sacrificial system themselves came under the uncompromising scalpel of this surgeon. Space does not permit discussion of Jesus' critique of the temple. Suffice it to say that whatever he may have intended by his action in the temple, the church gradually discerned that his life and teaching had undermined the entire theology of holiness on which the temple cult was based. Jesus' death exposed and annulled the whole system of sacrificial victimage, and thus terminated temple slaughter—in short, sacred violence.

*Nonviolence*

Jesus repudiates violence. When his disciples request permission to call down fire from heaven on inhospitable Samaritans, Jesus rebukes them (Luke 9:51-56). A fairly widespread addition to the text, which correctly elaborates Jesus' attitude, reads, "You do not know of what Spirit you are. For the Human Being did not come to destroy the lives of people but to save them."[37] He warns against using androcratic means to fight androcratic Powers (Luke 13:1-3). When a disciple cuts off the ear of the high priest's slave in an attempt to save Jesus from arrest, Jesus is portrayed as commanding, "No more of this!" (Luke 22:51)—an injunction the church took literally for the next three centuries. Matthew has Jesus say, "Put your sword back into its place; for all who take the sword will perish by the sword" (Matt 26:52)—a sentiment shared even by that most violent of New Testament books, the Revelation to John (13:10).[38] 2 Cor 10:4 summarizes the apparently universal view in the early community: "The weapons we use in our fight are not the Domination System's [*kosmos*] weapons but God's powerful weapons which we use to destroy strongholds." When reviled, Jesus' followers are to bless; when cursed, they are to pray for those who abuse them. They are to conform their lives to the life of Abba by loving even their enemies, just as God does, doing good to those that hate them.[39]

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[37] This reading appears in a number of late texts, but is lacking in all the major early witnesses except D. But it faithfully reflects Jesus' spirit.

[38] Luke 21:20-24 reflects the church's decision to flee Jerusalem to Pella rather than fight in the war against Rome.

[39] Matt 5:43-48//Luke 6:27-28, 32-36; see also Rom 12:14-21.

Far from counsels of perfection or incitements to cowardice, this anti-androcratic orientation is premised on a power seldom recognized by oppressor and oppressed alike. Its heart is the "unnatural" (that is, non-androcratic) refusal to mirror evil, refusing to let one's responses be determined by what one deplores. Turning the cheek, giving up one's undergarment, carrying a soldier's pack the second mile (Matt 5:39-41//Luke 6:23) do not at all mean acquiescing passively to evil, but are a studied and deliberate way of seizing the initiative and overthrowing evil by the force of its own momentum.[40]

The Eucharist celebrates Jesus' nonviolent breaking of the spiral of violence by absorbing its momentum with his own body. Jesus' way means living a life of forgiveness and doing acts of reconciliation, and working with anger and its projection out on others so as to maintain healthy communal relationships.[41] Perhaps the most fundamental statement of nonviolence of all is the Golden Rule: "Do to others as you would have them do to you" (Matt 7:12//Luke 6:31).

Whatever else his attitude toward the messianic role, Jesus clearly rejected military redress of Jewish grievances. He refused to lead troops in a messianic war, or defend his own cause by violent means. He endured the cross rather than prove false to his own nonviolent way.

What Jesus distilled from the long experience of his people in violent and nonviolent resistance was a way of opposing evil without becoming evil in the process. He advocated means consistent with the desired end: a society of justice, peace, and equality free of authoritarianism, oppression and ranking. His method and his goal were domination-free. Here at last is a full-blown alternative to the politics of "redemptive" violence.

*Women and Children*

Until the rise of feminist exegesis, Jesus' treatment of women had been considered something of an anomaly. Only a few scholars sensed how unique it was.[42] Through the lens of feminist hermeneutics, however, Jesus' attitude was nothing less than revolutionary. In every single encounter with women in the four gospels, Jesus violates the mores of his time. If we disencumber him from images of godhead and perfection, his behavior toward women, while not fully "modern" or feminist or all it might have been, was nevertheless astonishing, and, with the partial exceptions of Socrates and Pythagoras, was without parallel in "civilized" societies since the rise of androcracy three to four thousand years before his birth.

Respectable Jewish women were not to speak to men in public; Jesus freely conversed with women.[43] A woman was to touch no man but her spouse; Jesus

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[40] Matt 5:38-42//Luke 6:29-30; see also Rom 12:14-21; 1 Thes 5:15; 1 Peter 3:9; and my article, "Neither Passivity Nor Violence: Jesus' Third Way (Matt 5:38-42 par.)," forthcoming in *Forum*.

[41] Matt 5:21-24; 7:1-5//Luke 6:37-38, 41-42; Luke 10:29-37; Matt 6:12//Luke 11:4; Mark 11:25//Matt 6:14-15; Mark 2:1-12 par.; 3:28//Matt 12:31; Matt 12:32//Luke 12:10; Matt 18:21-22//Luke 17:3-4; Matt 18:23-35; Luke 7:36-50; Luke 23:34; see also Acts 7:60; Eph 4:26-27, 32; Col 3:13; Heb 12:14-15; James 1:19-20.

[42] Principally J. Jeremias, *Jerusalem in the Time of Jesus* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1969) 359-76.

[43] John 4:4-42; Mark 5:33-34//Luke 8:47-48; Mark 7:24-30//Matt 15:21-28.

was touched by, and touched, women.[44] When a prostitute[45] burst into an all-male banquet, knelt at Jesus' outstretched feet and began to kiss them, washing them with tears of remorse and relief, wiping them with her hair and anointing them with oil, Jesus, despite the stern censure of the other males, accepts her gift and its meaning, and takes her side, even though she has technically rendered him unclean and has scandalized the guests. Whether or not the concluding lines are original to the story, she was clearly behaving like one who knew her sins had been forgiven, whose faith had saved her. If Jesus did indeed say, "Your sins are forgiven," it was blasphemy, punishable by stoning (Luke 7:36-50).

Jesus calls a woman bent with a spinal disease for eighteen years out into the middle of the synagogue, lays his hands on her, and heals her from her "spirit of weakness." In the ensuing controversy (he had healed her on a sabbath), Jesus refers to her as a "daughter of Abraham," an expression I have been unable to find in all of ancient Jewish literature. Women were saved through their men; to call her a "daughter of Abraham" was to make her a full-fledged member of the covenant and of equal standing before God with men (Luke 13:10-17). To heal her on a sabbath was to liberate the sabbath to be a jubilee of release and restoration. To touch her was to revoke the holiness code with its male scruples about menstrual uncleanness and sexual advances. To speak to her in public was to jettison male restraints on women's freedoms, born of sexual possessiveness and the caricature of women as seducers. To place her in the midst of them was to challenge the male monopoly on the means of grace and access to God. To assert that her illness was not divine punishment for sin, but satanic oppression, was to declare war on the entire Domination System, whose driving spirit is Satan.

This tiny drama thus assumes cosmic proportions. In freeing this woman from Satan's power, Jesus simultaneously releases her from the encompassing network of patriarchy, male religious elitism, and the taboos fashioned to disadvantage some in order to preserve the advantage of others. The Domination System is precarious. To succeed in shattering its hold at any single point threatens its stability all along the line.

In one of the most beautiful stories in Scripture, though its textual lineage is uncertain, Jesus saves the life of an adulteress. Though her accusers caught her in the act, they did not arrest the man, as the law requires (Deut 22:22). Intending to entrap Jesus, they ask if she should be stoned, as the law stipulates. Perhaps to divert their attention from her bared breasts (adulteresses were thus shamed, *M. Sotah* 1.5), Jesus writes on the ground, then invites whoever is without sin to cast the first stone. Writing again in the dirt so that her accusers can melt away with-

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[44] Mark 5:24b-34 par.; Luke 13:10-17; Mark 1:29-31//Matt 8:14-15; Mark 5:21-24a, 35-43 par.; Luke 7:36-50; John 20:17 reading "cling." Note 1 Cor 7:1—Paul echoes his own training when he advises, "It is well for a man not to touch a woman."

[45] Was she a prostitute? Her hair was loosed in public, before men, something no respectable woman would do (*M. Sotah* 3:8; loose hair in public could be grounds for divorce, *T. B. Ket.* 72a); she was "a woman in the city, who was a sinner," a phrase reminiscent of our "woman of the streets"; the Pharisee assumes that Jesus should be able, from outer signs, to tell "who and what kind of woman this is"; what she does is highly sensual and perhaps even sexual; she possesses an alabaster flask of ointment (myrrh) which in John 12:5 is valued at a year's wage—perhaps it was a gift from a client, or was used in her trade (Prov 7:17). The case is circumstantial, but does point toward prostitution. The contrast between the "respectable" men and the outcast woman requires that she be socially despised, since Jesus reverses the cultural values and identifies with her against the representatives of a patriarchal system that absolutely requires prostitutes and yet refuses to acknowledge their humanity.

out drawing attention to themselves, he then asks her: "Woman, where are they? Has no one condemned you?" She says, "No one, sir." "Neither do I condemn you; go your way, and from now on do not sin again" (John 7:53-8:11).

The Domination System treats adultery as the ultimate sexual sin, because it is the most egregious violation of male property rights over the woman. Feminism, by contrast, treats rape as the most venal sexual sin, because it is a ritualization of male violence against women and the male prerogative to "have" any woman regardless of her own choice in the matter.[46]

When a woman who has had a hemorrhage for twelve years touches him in a crowd, rendering unclean, not only Jesus, but everyone else she touched while elbowing her way through the crowd to reach him, he includes her in the new family he is forming, calling her "Daughter," and asserting that her faith, not his power, has healed her (Mark 5:24b-34 par.). The contagion of holiness overcomes the contagion of uncleanness. And that new family, he makes clear elsewhere, includes not only men but women: "Whoever does the will of God is my brother and *sister* and *mother*" (Mark 3:35 par.—note that there are no fathers in this new family).

Even children have a share in this new family, and exemplify the way to enter it (Mark 10:13-16 par.; 9:36-37 par.). This constituted a radically new view of children, says Jeremias, in a world where children, like women, were counted as having little value. Jesus not only declares children closer to God than adults (Matt 18:10), but insists that it is only possible for a man [sic] to enter God's realm if he becomes a child again.[47]

There are passages in the New Testament that are an acute embarrassment and source of outrage for their attitudes toward women; none of them is based on the teaching of Jesus.[48] Martha complains to Jesus that Mary refuses to help serve the dinner, but has instead seated herself at Jesus' feet—the prerogative of a *male disciple* of a teacher. However much we might wish that Jesus had gotten up and helped to serve the meal and to clean up afterwards—a role to which he seems not to have been averse (Luke 12:37)—the fact remains that Jesus and Mary were transgressing on a deep-seated prohibition from which even Martha could not free herself.[49]

Keep women in their place! "Blessed is the womb that bore you,", cried a woman in the crowd, "and the breasts that nursed you!" Why not give his mother credit, the only way the culture allowed it? Jesus refuses: "Blessed rather are those who hear the word of God and obey it" (Luke 11:27-28). This woman persists in believing that her value, like his mother Mary's, lies in bearing a male child and living out through him her ambitions. But Jesus retorts: You do not have to be "saved" any longer through bearing sons. You yourself, a woman, can hear the word of God and keep it. Indeed, if androcracy is ever to be overturned, women will have to stop consenting to its expectations. (By the second century,

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46 See Countryman, *Dirt Greed and Sex*, 248-50.

47 Joachim Jeremias, *New Testament Theology* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971) 227-28. See also John 3:1-12. "It is remarkable enough that Jesus draws attention at all to children, for they were considered nonentities. It is quite shocking that he would advance them as models for his social program" (Ched Myers, *Binding the Strong Man* [Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988] 261).

48 1 Cor 14:33b-36; 11:2-16; Eph 5:22-33; 1 Tim 2:8-15; 5:3-16; Titus 2:3-5; 1 Peter 3:1-7; Rev 14:4.

49 Luke 10:38-42. Mark 3:34-35 also implies that women disciples were seated on the floor along with males, listening to Jesus' teaching.

women are again ordered to be silent in worship and are to be saved through childbearing—1 Tim 2:11-15).

Jesus institutionalizes the new domination-free order. His loose band of followers is scandalously mixed, including prostitutes like the one who washed his feet with her tears (what else could she do, if she had lost her livelihood, but join his band?), women freed from demons like Mary Magdalene, and aristocratic women like Joanna, wife of Herod's chamberlain, "and many other women, who provided for them out of their means" (Luke 8:1-3). When the rich young man asked to follow him, Jesus told him to sell all, give it to the poor—*not* to Jesus' group of followers—and follow him, *destitute* (Mark 10:17-22 par.). The women, however, he puts in the role of patrons and benefactors. The first shall be last, and the last first, as a necessary compensatory rectification on the path to full partnership in God.

Jesus also attempts to change a major structural cause of prostitution: the ease with which a man could divorce a woman. The severity of his pronouncement—he allows *no* cause for divorce, not even adultery[50]—is intended to stop the wholesale dumping of ex-wives onto the streets. At the same time he completely redefines adultery. A Jewish male could not commit adultery against his own wife, but only against the sexual property of other men. But Jesus regards even "lust" as adultery (Matt 5:27-28), meaning by lust not sexual excitement, as we use the word today, but *envy of another man's sexual property*. He radicalizes the meaning of adultery, not to shower guilt on people, as the church has used this saying, but to counter the self-righteousness of men who are technically free of adultery under the law but continue to treat women as sexual objects. "Adultery has not, then, ceased to be a sin; but Jesus has made the social sanctions against it unenforceable, once again drastically undermining the social institution of the family."[51]

There may be sex-role stereotyping in Mark 1:29-31 par., where Jesus heals Peter's mother-in-law's fever, almost, it appears, so she can get up and cook supper! But Ivan Illich cautions that sex-role stereotyping is a category that is only fully appropriate after the onset of the industrial revolution, and that traditional societies display gender specialization that may or may not be humanly restrictive.[52] Less ambiguously, Jesus features women in his parables as exemplary of the nature of the coming age.[53] In that age to come, women will no longer be the property of men, but equals (Mark 12:18-27 par.).

The passion narrative shows the men weak, vacillating, denying, betraying, hiding. It is a woman who anoints him beforehand for burial, a kindness that he requests be remembered of her wherever the gospel is preached (Mark 14:3-9//Matt 26:6-13). It is women who view his death,[54] women who visit the tomb and find it empty,[55] and to women that Jesus first appears.[56]

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50 Mark 10:1-12//Matt 19:1-12. Matthew softens the command by allowing adultery as due cause for divorce. But that only brings Jesus' position back to Shammai's view. See also Matt 5:31-32; Luke 16:18.

51 Countryman, *Dirt, Greed, and Sex*, 187.

52 Ivan Illich, *Gender* (New York: Pantheon, 1982).

53 Luke 15:8-9; 18:1-8; Matt 13:33//Luke 13:20-21//Gos. Thom. 96.

54 Mark 15:40 par.; John 19:25 agrees, but the followers of the "beloved disciple" cannot resist intruding him into the narrative as well.

55 Mark 16:1-8 par.; John 20:1, 11-18.

56 John 20:1, 11-18; Matt 28:9-10; Mark 16:9-11.

I have documented elsewhere the struggle in the early church over who were the valid witnesses to the resurrection, and hence the authentic leaders of the church.[57] Women in that world had no veracity as witnesses. How odd of God, then, to choose women as witnesses of the resurrection! Paul, in his list of witnesses, mentions not a single woman, and gives the impression that the risen Jesus appeared first to Peter (1 Cor 15:3-8), whereas three of the gospels (counting Mark's longer ending), and many of the non-canonical gospels as well, concur that the first witnesses of the resurrected Jesus were Mary Magdalene and the other women with her.[58]

Women received the Holy Spirit at the founding event of the church (Acts 1:14; 2:1) and were co-equal with men in receiving prophetic gifts.[59] They headed house churches,[60] opened new fields for evangelism (Phil 4:2-3), and were Paul's co-workers.[61] They were persecuted and jailed just like the men,[62] were named apostles,[63] disciples,[64] deacons,[65] led churches (Philem 1-2), and even, in one case, had authority over Paul himself (Rom 16:1-2—"for she [Phoebe] has been a ruler over many, indeed over me").[66]

The tide, however, quickly turned. The vast majority of churches soon came under male hierarchies, and women had been reduced to the roles of deaconesses and enrolled widows. Women who exercised authority were marginalized, accused of heresy, or silenced.

Paul, often criticized for his attitudes toward women, is not responsible for silencing women in the churches (1 Cor 14:33b-36). This passage interrupts the flow of Paul's discussion of spiritual gifts, which resumes after the interpolation. It has no relation to the context, and is utterly contradictory to 1 Cor 11:5, which asserts that women *do* prophesy in church. Whatever his defects, it is Paul who articulates the Christian charter of freedom in Gal 3:28—"there is ... no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus." It is Paul who calls for reciprocal rights in marriage, an attitude far in advance of his time (1 Cor 7:3-5).

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57 Walter Wink, "'And the Lord Appeared First to Mary': Sexual Politics in the Resurrection Witness," *Social Themes of the Christian Year*, ed. Dieter T. Hessel (Philadelphia: Geneva Press, 1983) 177-82.

58 John 20:2 ("we") implies that other women were originally with Mary Magdalene. In the *Gospel of Peter 12:50*, Mary Magdalene is called a disciple. The *Sophia Jesu Christi* speaks of seven women who followed Jesus as disciples. *Pistis Sophia* 96 states that Mary Magdalene "will surpass all my disciples and all men who shall receive mysteries of the Ineffable," and she will sit at Christ's right hand. In *Gospel of Thomas* 61, Salome calls herself Christ' disciple.

59 Acts 2:17-21 = Joel 2:28-32; 1 Cor 11:5; 12:4-11, 28-31.

60 Acts 12:12; 16:14-15, 40; Rom 16:1-2, 3, 5; 1 Cor 16:19; Col 4:15.

61 Rom 16:3, 6, 12; Acts 18:1-3, 18-19, 24-26; 1 Cor 16:19; 2 Tim 4:19-21.

62 Acts 8:3; 9:1-2; 22:4-5; Rom 16:7.

63 Rom 16:7 refers to "Junia," clearly a feminine proper name. The translators, unable or unwilling to believe that there were women apostles, simply assumed it had to be a man. Hence the RSV: "Greet Andronicus and Junias my kins*men* and my fellow prisoners; they are *men* of note among the apostles" (corrected in the NRSV).

64 Acts 9:36-42.

65 Luke 8:3; Mark 15:40-41// Matt 27:55-56; Rom 16:1-2; 1 Tim 3:8-13.

66 Leonard Swidler's translation, *Biblical Affirmations of Woman* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1979) 310-11. The RSV translates; "for she has been a *helper* of many and of myself as well." Liddell-Scott list under *prostatēs*: "one who stands before; leader, chief, administrator; president, presiding officer; guardian, champion, patron." Helper? The NRSV uses "benefactor"—not much better.

But old habits die hard; in 1 Cor. 11:2-3 Paul defends hierarchical patriarchy, and 1 Cor 11:4-16 shows Paul fumbling to find reasons for a custom (head-covering) which he should have rather abandoned, as he himself seems to sense (1 Cor 11:11-12).

Paul did not write Eph 5:21-33, 1 Tim 2:8-15; 5:3-16; or Titus 2:3-5, though they are ascribed to him. But someone in the early church did. With 1 Peter 3:1-7 and Rev 14:4, these and other passages document the church's inability to sustain Jesus' radically domination-free perspective. Over time, men gained a monopoly on leadership in the church, and androcracy demonstrated once more its resourcefulness under attack.

The church's apostasy from the rights of women in the new order must not blind us to the significance of what Jesus accomplished. Humanity has scarcely begun to take the measure of his message. Biblical feminism not only is an authentic extension of Jesus' concerns, it has made it possible for us to understand certain aspects of his message for the first time. Now it becomes clear that Jesus treated women as he did, not because he was "gallant" or "nice," but because the restoration of women to their full humanity in partnership with men is integral to the coming of God's equalitarian order.

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Looking back over Jesus' proclamation of God's domination-free order, what emerges with bracing clarity is the *comprehensive* nature of his vision. He was not intent on putting a new patch on an old garment, or new wine in old skins (Mark 2:21-22 par.). He was not a reformer, bringing alternative, better readings of the Law. Nor was he a revolutionary, attempting to replace one androcratic power with another (Mark 12:13-17 par.). He went beyond revolution. His assault was against the basic presuppositions and structures of androcracy itself. Violent revolution fails because it is not revolutionary enough. It changes the rulers but not the rules, the ends but not the means. Most of the old androcratic values and delusional assumptions remain intact. The world, and even the church, had no categories for such fundamental change. It is no wonder that the radicality of Jesus was soon dampered by the church.

*Conclusion*

With his death, Jesus quickly entered his own myth. He became larger than life. Worship of Jesus as God soon eclipsed the arduous task of continuing his work and living his way. The egalitarian shards of light he let loose upon the earth were systematically tracked down and quenched—or bottled—or enshrined, by the guardians of androcracy. The church itself has been a locus of the struggle between these two forces ever since, while the world at large has done all in its power to snuff out his influence.

Due to space considerations I have omitted discussion of other themes revelatory of Jesus' vision: new values, new assumptions, new strategies for social and personal transformation. Enough has been said, however, to test our initial question about the impact of new perspectives on our evaluation of the historicity of certain texts.

Take, for example, the statement ascribed to Jesus in Matt 23:9—"And call no one your father on earth, for you have one Father—the one in heaven." Most scholars have regarded this saying as part of a collection created by the Matthean community and ascribed to Jesus. But this judgment assumes that Matthew's

church was extending Jesus' critique of patriarchy, whereas it seems to have been moving with all deliberate speed to *reconstitute* patriarchy. The rejection of patriarchy in this saying is so radical that it must be regarded as an authentic expression of the originative impulse released by Jesus, *whether it is historical or not.*

In making that assertion, I am placing truth above historicity. I am, in fact, challenging the strange assumption on which the entire historiographical enterprise has been based: that truth is facticity, that something has to have happened to be true. Truth is not facticity; truth is an accurate description of reality. Fiction, fantasy, fairy tales, and myths are just as capable of revealing truth as a photograph or a tape recording. I am quite prepared to accept anything that accurately depicts Jesus' originative impulse, whatever its source, and to reject anything inconsistent with it, even if Jesus himself said or did it. (His reaction to the Syrophoenician woman, for example, appears to have been irritable and perhaps even racist.)

Or take the example of Jesus washing the disciples' feet in John 13:1-20. This is so unprecedented, and so embarrassing to androcratic sentiments, that one wonders how it could have been invented; whereas its omission by the other evangelists would be understandable. Matthew provides an example of just such embarrassment when he omits the story of the man with the water pitcher (Mark 14:13; Luke 22:10). But there is no *historical* basis on which a conclusion as to the footwashing's historicity can be reached.[67] The question is rather, is this story a faithful rendering of Jesus' anti-androcratic impulse? I believe it is, as is the story of the woman taken in adultery (John 8:2-11). We could have included the story of the Samaritan woman in John 4 as well, though most scholars have regarded all these narratives as non-historical, and therefore "untrue."

What emerges from the perspectival picture that I have presented is that the issue of historicity, while occasionally crucial, is far less significant than consistency with the originative impulse of Jesus, whether articulated by him or by his followers later. Working from the vantage-point provided by a critique of domination, the criteria of historicity were employed when needed to isolate what appears to be sayings authentic to Jesus. But it is not possible to begin from a neutral, "pictureless" standpoint and build a database from the bottom. Every analysis is value-laden, for, as I said at the outset, we cannot help projecting onto the texts our own unconscious needs and desires for transformation or confirmation, to say nothing of our socio-political location and biases. Every description of Jesus is a form of advocacy, whether positive or negative.[68] All lives of Jesus are a kind of apologetics. Thus liberals will tend to construct a liberal Jesus, conservatives a conservative Jesus, pietists a pietistic Jesus, radicals a radical Jesus, and

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[67] There were circles in the early church that maintained the radicality evident in the footwashing narrative. We learn from "The Passion of Andrew" 25, for example, of an aristocrat, Stratocles, who as a result of Andrew's preaching, carries his own oil flask to the gymnasium and does his own chores in public—buying his own vegetables, bread, and other necessities and carrying them on foot through the center of the city, "making himself look simply repulsive to everyone," though he has many slaves and "is of noble stock, the most honored man of Achaea" (Dennis Ronald McDonald, *The Acts of Andrew and The Acts of Andrew and Matthias in the City of the Cannibals* [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990] 357).

[68] Examples of the latter would be John Allegro, *The Sacred Mushroom and the Cross* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1970) and Morton Smith, *The Secret Gospel* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), both of which were counter-evangels that attempted to debunk the Christian view of Jesus on behalf of highly personal interests that neither author was honest enough to articulate.

atheists an unattractive Jesus. Scholars who believe Jesus was like a cynic philosopher will tend to reject as non-historical any data that suggests otherwise (apocalyptic elements, for example). Liberationists and feminists will tend to heighten elements that support their picture and reject what contradicts it. The criteria of historicity will be enlisted to dispose of data problematic for our pictures. This is routine in all research that is paradigm-driven, as T. S. Kuhn pointed out.[69] It is perfectly normal to try to fit the data into one's paradigm and only to abandon the paradigm in the face of significant and intractable anomalies. If we wish to transcend our starting point, therefore, we will have to listen very carefully to arguments from other perspectives.

But our pictures of Jesus are not always repetitions of a prevailing paradigm. They may also be a raid on the inarticulate, an attempt to rise to the measure of Jesus, to grasp something of his ability to transcend the conditioning of the Domination System. It is this combination of apologetics and authenticity that attracts—or repels—us.

This is not a brief, then, for abandoning the historical quest for Jesus. It is merely an appeal for a far more modest estimation of the power, objectivity, and disinterestedness of historical criticism. All methods operate in the service of interests.[70] Unless one's perspective and one's sense of Jesus' originating impulse are clearly articulated, they will simply be smuggled in sub rosa, without acknowledgment. If they are clearly articulated, then one can be held accountable by other scholars for the consistency between the perspective, picture, and the biblical data. Ignored or suppressed data, special pleading, and biased argumentation can be identified. The presence of a perspective does not spell the end of objectivity; once one abandons the chimera of disinterestedness, objectivity is free to become what it should have been all along: just another name for simple honesty and the willingness, like Schweitzer, to be changed by what we discover.

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69 *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

70 See my *The Bible in Human Transformation* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973).

# The Humor of the Absurd in the Parables of Jesus

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Although many interpreters have noted somewhat incidental humorous statements of Jesus and it has thus been acknowledged that Jesus deliberately made use of humor, there seems to be little recognition of systematic or programmatic use of humor by Jesus as a rhetorical device. The most extensive treatment of this aspect of Jesus' teaching remains that by Elton Trueblood, *The Humor of Christ*.[1] It appears that Trueblood's purpose is simply to demonstrate that Jesus did use humor and he did so intentionally. This recognition aids in understanding some otherwise difficult passages (e.g., the encounter with the Syrophoenecian woman), according to Trueblood. The function of Jesus' humor, in Trueblood's view, "is to clarify and increase understanding rather than to hurt."[2] This coincides with the generally understood purpose of all the parables. Hence, where humor occurs in the parables we must assume its presence was intentional and that it somehow was intended to aid the understanding of the hearer. The question, then, is how does humor function in the parables as an aid to understanding?

One other treatment of Jesus' humor is that by A. T. Cadoux. In an appendix to his *The Parables of Jesus, Their Art and Use* Cadoux argues for Jesus' intentional use of the absurd in five specific cases.[3] As Cadoux states his point, "Absurdity of figure is the natural expression for that which strikes the speaker as being in itself absurd."[4] This converges with the view, developed below, which sees Jesus' use of the absurd paradoxically expressing the congruity of aspects of the Kingdom of God with the natural world, including human existence.

It is my contention that Jesus used humor, used it programmatically, and had a definite rhetorical purpose for its use. I will attempt to demonstrate, on the basis of selected parables, that Jesus' use of humor, specifically the humor of the absurd, was designed to drive home his point in the most forceful way possible and that in the absurdity of the imagined situation, i.e., the parable, the point of the parable becomes lucid. It is my further contention that the point of those parables wherein the absurd is used is that there is at least resonance if not correspondence, albeit paradoxical, between the natural order of things (that which is described in the parable) and the Kingdom of God.

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1 Elton Trueblood, *The Humor of Christ*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).

2 *Humor*, 51.

3 A. T. Cadoux, *The Parables of Jesus Their Art and Use* (New York: MacMillan and Co., 1931), 243-253.

4 *Parables*, 244.

I will also attempt to demonstrate that the social context of Jesus' parables often provides clues to the otherwise unnoticed absurdity of the described commonplace which is the parable. The paradoxical description of the commonplace was intended to force the hearer to compare his understanding of world with the content of the parable and thus come to a decision with regard to the parable world.

In the purview of those parables where absurdities appear three theses emerge which will be tested in the interpretation of the parables. Thesis I: The absurdity is intrinsic to the image described and independent of the context of the parable. This would indicate that the absurdity was original to the parable and not subject to or the result of redactional reworking. Thesis II: The function of the humor in the parables was to challenge/shatter the hearer's understanding of world. This approaches Dan Via's understanding of a language event as injecting a new possibility into the situation of the hearers.[5] Thesis III: There is congruity between the natural world and Kingdom. The world as perceived by Jesus was characterized by wholeness. As perceived by his hearers it was characterized by division. The parables in general[6] and specifically those marked by absurd images depicted common-places as analogies to Kingdom, but in such a way as to portray Kingdom and world as whole. The following is a selection of those parables where the absurd is most obvious.

***The Lamp** (Mk 4:21; Mt 5:15 //Lk 11:33)*

The parable of the lamp provides the first case for consideration. This metaphor presents both support for the theses and problems. First, the problems. The saying is found in two strata of the tradition, Mark (4:21 with a variant version in the Lucan // 8:16) and Q (Mt. 5:15 // Lk. 11:33), as well as in the Gospel of Thomas 33b. The context varies in each case which indicates a floating saying. This raises the difficulty, as Jeremias notes, that we do not know what meaning Jesus gave to the saying.[7] Jeremias suggests the saying "would be most intelligible if uttered by Jesus in reference to his mission."[8] The Marcan context—the purpose of Jesus' use of parables and the interpretation of the parable of the sower (soils)—suggests that the metaphor is a parable of the parables. In that case the point would be that it is just as absurd to think that Jesus would tell parables in order to hide meaning as it is to think that one would light a lamp in order to snuff it out. If we posit any of the suggested subjects—the mission of Jesus, his teaching in general, or parables specifically—the comparison could be represented in the following way: Lamp (A) is to light (B) as mission/teaching/parable (A') is to Kingdom (B'). The noteworthy point is that regardless of the point of comparison the absurdity of the image of someone lighting a lamp in

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5 Dan O. Via, Jr., *The Parables*, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), 52ff.

6 Bernard Brandon Scott, *Jesus Symbol Maker for the Kingdom* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), passim.

7 Joachim Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963), 120.

8 Ibid., 121. Eduard Schweizer, *The Good News According to Mark*, trans. Donald Madvig (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1970), 99, concurs in this judgment while the teaching of Jesus is the point for F. C. Grant, *The Interpreter's Bible*, vol. 7, hereafter IB, (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1951), 701, and S.M. Gilmour, (IB, vol. 8, 151). C. H. Dodd, *The Parables of the Kingdom* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1961), 106f., notes, "Matthew alone gives an explicit application of the parable, but implies the artificial nature of the application.

order to snuff it out is clear. Thus, whether the point is the mission of Jesus or his teaching (including his use of parables), it is just as ludicrous to think that either begins in order to be stopped or silenced as it to imagine someone lighting a lamp in order to snuff it out.

Another problem this parable presents is the original form. Bultmann suggests the interrogative form of Mark is original.[9] Schweizer points to Matthew's version (5:15) as the older form.[10] No one suggests Luke's version as the original since it shows evidence of modifications for a Greco-Roman house structure. But as was the case with the original context, so it is with the original form. Regardless of whether the form was indicative or interrogative the absurdity of the imagined action described in the parable is clear. This suggests that picturing an absurd situation was not only deliberate but also gave the image a force which a declarative statement would lack.

***The Birds and the Lilies*** *(Mt 6:26, 28b-29 // Lk 12:24, 27)*

The setting of these sayings, although coming from Q, evidences alterations and additions by the evangelists as well as having different contexts in the two gospels.[11] However, as was the case with the parable of the lamp, so it is with the sayings about the birds and lilies: the humor of the absurd is intrinsic to the image described and independent of specific context. The general context in both gospels concerns anxiety over the necessities of life and thus the sayings are apropos. In these general contexts the image of birds sowing and reaping and wild lilies toiling and spinning is ludicrous, not because they exert no effort but because they only exert effort natural to their species.[12] The proverbial character of these sayings, as well as that of the lamp, point to an understanding of existence characteristic of the Jewish wisdom literature.[13] The significant difference between Jesus' use of these proverbial statements and the use of such in Jewish wisdom lies in the fact that in wisdom literature the experiences in one's surroundings provide the basis for coming to an understanding of life. Jesus' humorous formulation of the statements casts light, not on an understanding of life in the world, but rather on Kingdom. The analogical representation of the sayings would be: birds/lilies (A) are to necessities of life (B) as humans (A') are to Kingdom (B'). If Jewish wisdom, and specifically proverbial statements are compacted interpretations of life from a secular standpoint,[14] then

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[9] Rudolf Bultmann, *History of the Synoptic Tradition*, hereinafter HST, trans. John Marsh (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 79. In agreement is Samuel T. Lachs, *A Rabbinic Commentary on the New Testament* (New Jersey: KTAV Pub. House, 1987), 83.

[10] Schweizer, *The Good News According to Mark*, 100.

[11] Bultmann, HST, 81, 88. Eduard Schweizer, *The Good News According to Matthew*, trans. David E. Green (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975), 70, 161, 165.

[12] Jeremias, *Parables*, 214f., supports this understanding by his translation of *merimnan* in its second meaning "to put forth effort" and the fact that both images describe effort. See also A. H. McNeile, *The Gospel According to Matthew* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1915), 87.

[13] Gilmour, ibid., 227, views the sayings as at least comparable to such sayings as are found in Proverbs, Ecclesiasticus, Pirke Aboth, etc. Against this Bultmann considers the sayings "as an expression of a particular piety, rather than as secular wisdom," HST, 104. The Mishnah has a parallel saying: "Have you ever seen a wild animal or a bird practicing a trade? Yet they have their sustenance without care" (Kiddushin 4:14, cited by S. E. Johnson, IB, vol. 7, 321).

[14] This understanding is general enough to need little documentation but see, for example, Gerhard Von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972), 3-5. 15.

the use of birds/lilies as a comparison to God's care for humans discloses a congruity of Kingdom with the natural world. And it does so in such a way as to shatter the perhaps not atypical understanding that Kingdom can be attained through the exertion of effort. C.H. Dodd notes this congruity as a general point when he states, "There is a reason for this realism of the parables of Jesus. It arises from a conviction that there is no mere analogy, but an inward affinity, between the natural order and the spiritual order...."[15]

*The Beam in the Eye (Mt 7:3-4 //Lk 6:41-42)*

The context of this saying, found in Q, shows clear evidences of expansions, insertions, and rearrangement, particularly, though not exclusively, in the Lucan version.[16] In spite of this the saying itself shows remarkable verbal agreement between Matthew and Luke. That the original context had to do with judging others seems reasonable since both versions contain the application of the parable. However, as with the parable of the lamp, so here the absurdity and, therefore, the humor is found in the image described of someone trying to see a speck in the eye of another while having a beam in his own eye. In any case this saying, along with those of the camel through the needle's eye and straining out the gnat (see below), falls into the category of extreme hyperbole. And, as T. W. Manson states, "One utter absurdity is exposed by another."[17] The effectiveness of the absurdity of Jesus' formulation of the saying can be seen most clearly in contrast with the formulation by Rabbi Tarphon at the end of the first century CE. "If one says, 'Take the mote from thine eye,' he answers, 'Take the beam from thine own eye.'"[18] Tarphon's use is on the level of name-calling while the question of Jesus calls up an image in the mind of the hearer which is so ludicrous as to startle by its impossibility.

*Stones for Bread (Mt 7:9-10 //Lk 11:11-12)*

From Q comes the saying on a son asking for bread. The context in the Sermon on the Mount is God's answering prayer. The Lucan parallel is in a larger setting on prayer in which Luke includes the model prayer. The Lucan version omits the bread-stone saying and rather includes a request for an egg and receiving a scorpion. Schweizer states that the substitution of a scorpion and an egg destroys the original image, found in Matthew, and hence argues for Matthew's version as original.[19] As in the case of the parables discussed above, so here we see that the absurdity is intrinsic to the image described and independent of the context.

In this parable a human relationship is used as the analogy and the argument is from minor to major, "if you ... how much more God?" The question, "Would you give a stone for bread or a serpent for fish?" demands the answer, "Of course not."[20] In the context of Jesus' hearers the parable would force a reevaluation of

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15 C.H. Dodd, *Parables*, 20. Bernard Brandon Scott makes the same point (*Jesus*, passim), although I arrived at this conclusion independently of either Dodd or Scott. See also Cadoux, *Parables*, 57.

16 See, for example, Jeremias, *Parables*, 167; Bultmann, HST, 86f.; and Schweizer, *The Good News According to Matthew*, 167f.

17 T. W. Manson, *The Sayings of Jesus*, (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1964), 58.

18 Cited by T. W. Manson, ibid., among others.

19 Schweizer, *The Good News According to Matthew*, 173.

20 T. W. Manson, *Sayings*, 81f.

their understanding of world, both Greco-Roman and Jewish. Deities in the Greco-Roman religions were considered indifferent to human concerns, and in Judaism God's transcendent holiness meant for many that God responded only to those who were righteous. The possibility expressed in the parable that God is like a kind father, only more so, would shatter the hearers' view of world. This relates to Thesis III: There is congruity between the natural world, in this case the world of human relationships, and Kingdom world. The hearer must decide whether to remain in the world as it is perceived or move into the world disclosed in the parable.

***Grapes From Thorns*** *(Mt 7:16b //Lk 6:44b)*

The saying about gathering grapes from thorns or figs from thistles is found in Q material located in the Sermon on the Mount and Sermon on the Plain. Matthew evidences independent arranging of the material.[21] For example, vss. 17-19 contrast good and bad fruit coming from the tree, while v. 16 refers to fruit coming from a different type of plant than the fruit. Luke also contrasts good tree/bad fruit, bad tree/good fruit in vs. 43 but provides a transition to the parable in vs. 44a. If Jeremias is correct that the parable was originally addressed to the Pharisees, based on Mt. 12:33-35 (see n. 21), then neither Matthew nor Luke places the saying in its original context. Since the absurd image of one getting fruit from something other than its natural plant/tree marks the parable, Thesis I is again demonstrated. The humor of the absurd is intrinsic to the parable and independent of its context.

The contexts of the saying in both Matthew and Luke point to the basis for judging people. Schematic representation of the parable would be: action (A) is to character (B) as fruit (A') is to plant/tree (B'). However, the indicative formulation of the saying, as in Luke's version, sounds like the statement of a general truth, while the interrogative form in Matthew calls for the hearer to come to a decision in relation to the image and thus, in relation to the basis of judging character. The new basis, action/fruit, would be a reversal of the perceived world where certain actions would be presumed on the basis of status/position. In the context of Matthew's Sermon on the Mount the status of prophet does not assure rightness of actions. Rather, the reverse is true. Actions determine rightness of character. If the Pharisees were the original objects of the parable, as Jeremias suggests, the point remains that their status/position does not assure their rightness. Instead, evidence of their character is their actions.

Luke places the parable in a section of his Sermon on the Plain in which judging others is renounced. In his context the parable makes the point that judging is unnecessary since people will be known by their fruits/actions. Even though the force of the image is weakened in Luke's indicative formulation of the parable, its effectiveness does not dissolve completely. In Luke's context the hearer's perceived world would include the assumption of judging others on the basis of status/position. The parable challenges that perception of world and requires the hearer to choose between that perception of world and the perception disclosed in Jesus' parable. Thus, even though each evangelist has given the parable a different setting, in both cases Thesis II is confirmed. The parable serves to shatter the perception of world by placing over against it Jesus' understanding of Kingdom.

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[21] Ibid.; Jeremias, *Parables*, 167; Johnson, IB, vol. 7, 332.

By a somewhat different formulation of the schema of the parable, Thesis III is demonstrated. As it is with grapes and figs so it is with actions. Grapes and figs are produced by their natural plant/tree, and actions are produced from character natural to the actions. Therefore, there is congruity between the natural world and Kingdom. Wholeness marks both rather than division.

*The Unfruitful Fig Tree (Lk 13:6-9)*

Unlike the preceeding parables which fall into the category of what Scott calls one-liners,[22] the parable of the unfruitful fig tree is a narrative parable. Also unlike the one-liners, where the absurdity was self-contained and apparent apart from either the gospel context or cultural context, the absurdity of the image of this parable is apparent only if its cultural context is known.

The parable is found in Luke's special material in the setting of his travel narrative. That this setting is suspect is suggested by the fact that vss. 1-5, two parallel sayings countering the "dogma that particular sinfulness leads to particular disaster," serve to interpret the parable beforehand, a Lucan characteristic.[23] That the parable itself comes from early tradition is argued by both Jeremias and Schweizer.[24] This confirms Thesis I: The absurdity is intrinsic to the parable and independent of its Gospel context.

As noted above the absurdity is dependent upon the cultural context. Jeremias describes the typical practice and I quote him at some length.

> In Palestine vineyards and vegetable gardens are generally planted with fruit-trees. The first three years of a fig-tree's growth were allowed to elapse before its fruit became clean (Lev. 19:23), hence six years had already passed since it was planted. It is thus hopelessly barren. A fig-tree absorbs a specially large amount of nourishment and hence deprives the surrounding vines of their needed sustenance. . . . Manuring a vineyard is not mentioned in any passage of the Old Testament; moreover, as a matter of duty, the undemanding fig-tree does not need such care.[25]

This description was confirmed to me by Kenneth Bailey. Whereas Jeremias fails to see the humor in the situation, even though he is aware of the cultural setting, Bailey proposed that the idea of piling manure around a live tree which had born no fruit for six years would strike Jesus' hearers as utterly ludicrous.[26] To interpret this parable properly calls for conjecture as to its original setting and point of reference. Since that is impossible to recover we must be content with the present setting. The need for repentance, stated in vss. 1-5, is clear. In this light the scheme of the parable seems to be: As it is futile to manure a barren fig-tree and allow more time for it to bare fruit, so it is futile to extend the time for warned sinners who do not repent. The open end of the parable—we are not told what the owner's decision was—leaves the conclusion to the narrative up to the

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22 Scott, *Jesus, Symbol Maker*, passim.

23 Schweizer, *The Good News According to Luke*, 219. See also Bultmann, HST, 23, 61.

24 Jeremias, *Parables*, 182f.; Schweizer, ibid., 220.

25 Ibid., 170.

26 Personal conversation, February, 1989. Bailey, son of missionary parents, has spent most of his life in Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel, much of it in remote villages of Egypt and Lebanon where the culture has changed little since the time of Jesus. He has repeated many of the parables of Jesus to residents of these villages in order to discover the cultural nuances.

hearer. For Jesus' hearers there would be no doubt about the outcome—the tree comes down.

The interpretation of the parable in the setting provided by vss. 1-5 is that all are sinners in need of repentance, none moreso than others. Such an understanding would be unheard of in Jesus' time. Sin was punishable even to the third and fourth generation. This was the typical explanation of Judaism for suffering and disaster. It also served to justify those not suffering such disasters, and thus rendered repentance unnecessary. In this connection the parable of the barren fig-tree may be schematized as: Figs (A) are to tree (B) as repentance (A') is to the coming of Jesus/Kingdom (B'). The absurd image of the uncharacteristic care (digging and manuring) and the extension of time dramatizes the point that nothing alters the need for repentance. This confirms Thesis II: The absurd image of the parable shatters the accepted understanding of world. As noted above, the open end of the parable leaves to the hearer the decision with regard to the need for repentance. The invitation to repentance is implicit in the presence of Jesus and his call (12:35-53; 12:54-59).

***The Great Supper*** *(Mt 22:1-10 //Lk 14:15-24)*

The differences between the two versions of this story suggest independent sources rather than modified versions of a common source (Q).[27] The secondary nature of Matthew's version appears particularly in vss. 6-8 which tend toward allegory (e.g., v. 6, 7).[28] More to the point for the present study is the fact that in Matthew's version no specific reasons for refusal are stated and it is in the specific reasons, stated in the Lucan version, that the absurdity occurs. Hence, the Matthean version will not be discussed.

Although Luke's version shows evidence of redactional modification in v. 23 and 24, perhaps reflecting the Gentile mission,[29] the narrative form may be closer to the original. The setting (conversation at table) is supplied by Luke[30] and differs from Matthew's setting. Hence, the confirmation of Thesis I: The absurdity is intrinsic to the parable and independent of the Gospel context.

In any case the cultural context of Jesus' ministry provides the basis for the absurd images found in the parable, specifically in the three excuses given for refusing the invitation. Jeremias describes some of that cultural context in some detail. The buying of a field by one invited guest and five yoke of oxen by another suggest large landowners. The use of the aorist with reference to the married man indicates a recent transaction. Jeremias sees the absurdity in the seemingly unified declining of the invitation and the deliberate invitation of beggars and the homeless.[31] However, the more striking absurdity lies specifically in the three excuses.[32] In the first case, the purchase of a field sight unseen would strike Jesus' hearers as absolutely ludicrous. Rather, the purchaser would have observed the field through at least one growing season to see its fertility. Thus, there would be no urgent need to see the field immediately after purchase. The point is the same in the second case. The notion of purchasing five yoke of

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27 Dodd, *Parables*, 91; Jeremias, *Parables*, 63.

28 Jeremias, ibid., 176; Bultmann, HST, 175; T. W. Manson, *Sayings*, 129.

29 Bultmann, ibid., among others.

30 Schweizer, *The Good News According to Luke*, 233.

31 Jeremias, ibid., 178.

32 Cf. Scott, *Jesus*, 36, who sees the excuses as unimportant because they stand as examples. They may be examples, but it is in that fact that the force of the insult occurs.

oxen without knowing how the pairs work together, (e.g., whether one tires sooner than the other, whether one moves faster than the other), knowledge gained through careful observation, would be absurd. In the case of the recently married man the implication would be that he was unwilling to leave the marriage bed long enough to attend the banquet. And since such banquets typically started in late afternoon this excuse would also be considered absurd. The point in all three cases is that the excuses are so absurd as to represent a deliberate insult to the host.[33] This view is strengthened by the fact that an earlier invitation had apparently been accepted.[34] To think that three such urgent situations would have arisen between the initial invitation and the notice to those invited that the banquet was ready would be patently absurd to Jesus' hearers. If Scott is correct that these excuses are examples of the excuses given, then the point is that the host was insulted equally by all the excuses. The image of people of such high social standing acting in concert in such an unacceptable manner while paradoxically those never expecting to be invited actually fill the banquet hall would challenge the hearers' perception of world. Thesis II is thus confirmed: The function of humor was to challenge/shatter the hearer's understanding of world.

Diagrammatically the parable reads: Jesus (A) is to Kingdom (B) as invitation (A') is to banquet (B'). In Luke's setting, i.e., the statement by one at table ("Blessed is he who shall eat bread in the kingdom of God!"), the paradoxical point of the parable is, in Manson's words: "If you had the opportunity for which you profess to crave, you would unhesitatingly reject it."[35] Those who expect to be invited to the banquet but refuse the invitation with the most transparent excuses are thereby excluded, while those who never expected an invitation are invited and accept. This analogy between the social world of Jesus and Kingdom, paradoxical though it is, confirms Thesis III: There is congruity between the natural world and Kingdom. This is not world as the hearers would perceive it but as Jesus perceived it.

***Faith as a Mustard Seed*** *(Mt 17:20 // Lk 17:6; cf. Mk 11:23, Mt 21:21)*

The saying about faith which moves a mountain/sycamine tree presents particular problems. Foremost is the question of the original form of the saying. It is found in four places in the Synoptics and no two forms are the same. The versions likely based on the Q form read:

| *Mt 17:20* | *Lk 17:6* |
|---|---|
| if you have faith as a grain of mustard seed, you will say to this mountain, 'Move from here to there,' and it will move; | If you had faith as a grain of mustard seed, you could say to this sycamine tree, 'Be rooted up, and be planted in the sea,' and it would obey you. |

The remaining versions show the closest verbal agreement.

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33 Bailey, ibid.

34 T. W. Manson, ibid.

35 Ibid.

| *Mt 21:21* | *Mk 11:23* |
| --- | --- |
| Truly, I say to you, if you have faith and never doubt, you will not only do what has been done to the fig tree, but even if you say to this mountain, 'Be taken up and cast into the sea,' it will be done. | Truly, I say to you, whoever says to this mountain, "Be taken up and cast into the sea,' and does not doubt in his heart but believes that what he says will come to pass, it will be done for him. |

Missing from this version is the reference to the mustard seed in comparison to faith. Both contain the phrase "cast into the sea." The earlier forms (Mt 17:20 and Lk 17:6) differ from each other and from the latter forms markedly. The majority opinion views Mt 17:20 as the original form, although the evidence is not overpowering.[36] Noteworthy here is the fact that regardless of the original form the idea of uprooting/moving either tree or mountain to the sea is absurd. The absurdity would be heightened if the tree were planted in the sea. In summary, all forms of the saying contain an absurd image which, regardless of the original form, is retained even where the form is modified.

Another problem, as with the earlier parables, concerns the original context. The four forms of the saying are found in three different contexts. With regard to the forms found in the context of the cursing of the fig tree (Mt 21:21; Mk 11:23), the saying misses the point of that narrative and this, therefore, suggests that this context is not original.[37] Luke's version is connected with Jesus' words on forgiveness found in the travel narrative. Even if Matthew's version in 17:6 and the context are original the existence of the saying in other contexts demonstrates that the absurdity of the image is intrinsic to the saying and independent of the context. Thus, Thesis I is confirmed.

The comparison of faith to the mustard seed in Mt 17:20 and Lk 17:6 uses a common Jewish expression for a minute quantity to state the understanding that faith is not a matter of quantity. Even the smallest faith can accomplish the seemingly impossible, the absurdly impossible. The various images used in the different versions of the saying (mountain moved/cast into the sea; tree uprooted and planted in the sea) produce the same effect in contrast to faith as a mustard seed. In the hearers' world great faith is necessary to accomplish great things. The parable challenges that perception of world by the contrast of the mustard seed. In this way Thesis II is confirmed: The function of humor was to challenge/shatter the hearer's understanding of world.

The image of moving a mountain, or uprooting a tree and planting it in the sea, strikes one at first sight as demonstrating an incongruity between the spiritual realm and the natural. These actions are not only humanly impossible but also ludicrous to imagine. This would seem to negate Thesis III. On the other hand, the image says in a striking way that if one opens oneself to the spiritual realm, i.e., if Kingdom impinges on the human realm, then those things which

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36 Schweizer, *The Good News According to Mark*, 235; Bultmann, HST, 75; S. E. Johnson, IB, vol. 7, 464. Schweizer contends the form of the saying found in Lk 17:6 is a result of confusing the cursing of the fig tree with the saying about the mountain in the process of oral transmission. Against this view Manson, *Sayings*, 140, argues that Mt 17:20 and Lk 17:6 are two independent sayings on the power of faith with Mk 11:23 a mixture of the two in the process of transmission. He believes Luke's version (from Q) is original.

37 Schweizer, ibid., 235, suggests the saying was associated with the cursing of the fig tree prior to Mark.

are otherwise impossible in the natural world become possible. Paradoxically there is congruity between the natural world and Kingdom.

*A Camel Through a Needle's Eye (Mt 19:24 // Mk 10:25 //Lk 18:25)*

Perhaps one of the better known of Jesus' hyperbolical statements, this saying comes from the triple tradition. In all three gospels the larger setting (Mk 10:17-31 //s) is a call to discipleship by Jesus. A comparison of the three accounts makes obvious the redactional modifications of the pericope. Within Mark's version, largely followed by Matthew and Luke, vss. 17-22 and 28-30, 31 were originally separate units which were combined with vss. 23-27 on the basis of the saying on the hazards of wealth. Verse 23a connects 17-22 with 23b which was probably followed by vs. 25. Verse 26 best follows vs. 24 and the question in vs. 26 would logically be answered, "Those who are not rich." Verse 27, an authentic saying was then added to answer the question. Thus, vss. 23b, 25, and 27 are authentic sayings of Jesus worked into the narrative either by Mark or earlier.[38] The obvious absurdity occurs in vs. 25 in the image of a camel passing through the eye of a needle.[39] The fact that the absurdity occurs apart from its original context confirms Thesis I: The humor is intrinsic to the saying and independent of the context.

The utter impossibility of a camel passing through the eye of a needle, as a comparison with the rich entering the Kingdom, would shatter the commonplace understanding that wealth is a blessing from God. World, from the hearers' perspective, would be turned upside down with Jesus' reversal of the ordinary expectation. Kingdom as Jesus' perceives it stands in opposition to world as his hearers perceive it. This establishes Thesis II: The function of humor was to challenge/shatter the hearer's understanding of world. In the synoptic context—Jesus' call to discipleship—the comparison states that the very thing which is considered evidence of God's blessing actually stands in the way of encountering God.

Jesus' use of two familiar objects as the elements in the parable is certainly typical. In this case the camel was the largest animal known in Palestine, while the needle's eye was the smallest of openings. With this parable, as with others, Jesus uses the hyperbole of absolute extremes to make his point. One for whom wealth is the highest value can no more receive Kingdom as the highest value than a camel can go through the eye of a needle. One who receives Kingdom as the highest value experiences a complete reversal of the normally expected, i.e., even the naturally impossible becomes possible. Again, paradoxically there is congruity between the natural world and Kingdom (Thesis III). The natural world and Kingdom are whole.

*Straining Out a Gnat (Mt 23:24)*

The last of the parables utilizing the humor of the absurd is the saying, "You blind guides, straining out a gnat and swallowing a camel!" The saying is found only in Matthew. It occurs in the context of conflict-sayings with the scribes and

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38 Bultmann, HST, 22; Schweizer, ibid., 209f. Against this see C. S. Mann, *Mark*, The Anchor Bible vol. 27 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1986), 398.

39 Scott, *Jesus*, argues that the hyperbole is in the comparison of the image with the rich rather than in the image itself. It seems to be in both the comparison and the image. See Jeremias, *Parables*, 195; J. D. M. Derrett, "A Camel Through The Eye of a Needle," NTS, 32 (1986) 465, and others, reading *kamilos* (cable) instead of *kamēlos* (camel) is rejected.

Pharisees found in Mt 23: 1-36. The majority of the material is from Q, as a comparison with Luke shows, with some parallels in Mark. Whether the Matthean context is original or not is difficult to determine. The saying clearly fits with the series of "Woes" which comprise the section. That Matthew could have compiled the material is certainly possible. Bultmann considers the saying itself among the oldest material, without saying it is original.[40] In any case the ludicrous image of someone straining out a gnat but swallowing a camel does not depend on the specific context. Hence, as Thesis I states: The humor is intrinsic to the saying and independent of the context.

The practice the parable refers to is based on Lev. 11:41 which forbids eating "anything that swarms." Both gnat and camel were unclean animals and, thus, to be avoided. Wine was strained carefully to filter out any possible insects. With biting sarcasm the saying "pillories the elaborate precautions taken in minor matters and carelessness about big things."[41] In the world as perceived by Jesus' hearers the Pharisaic observance of the prohibitions regarding defilement in general and food laws specifically would assure their righteous standing before God. The contrast contained in the image of avoiding the tiny while polluted by the huge challenges that perception of world (Thesis II) by pointing out in an emphatic way the inconsistency in their behavior.

Once again the hyperbole of absolute extremes from the world of nature expresses the point of the parable. As it is with straining out a gnat to avoid defilement while swallowing a camel with disregard to defilement, so it is with acting with meticulous care for details of little significance, while ignoring things of ultimate importance. Glaring inconsistency has no more place in Kingdom world than in the natural world for there is congruity between the two worlds. There is wholeness rather than division (Thesis III).

This discussion of the parables which contain obviously absurd images, which display a humorous situation, makes no claim to be exhaustive. Other sayings could be cited which evidence the same or similar characteristics. It is sufficient to demonstrate, with perhaps varying force, that Jesus not only depicted obviously absurd images in his parables, but that he did so deliberately as a way of forcing the hearers to a decision in response to the parable. The humor of the absurd was, therefore, a conscious choice by Jesus, i.e., a deliberate rhetorical device in his chest of tools. That one would read the parables of Jesus with no sensitivity for the humor in them not only deprives the reader of an awareness of the lighter side of Jesus, but also deprives one of a significant insight into the message of Jesus conveyed through these parables.

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40 Bultmann, ibid., 147.

41 Manson, *Sayings*, 236.

# Philo's Practical Application of Δικαιοσύνη

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## I. Introduction

> Human moral reflection, it is often pointed out, tends generally to follow one of two procedures: It either begins by defining the end of action and seeks to relate specific conduct to the ultimate end, or it begins with the effort to state the primary laws or requirements that must be obeyed.[1]

It seems appropriate to approach the topic of Philo's ethics with a quotation from a standard introduction to ethics, and to reflect that just as he does in so many areas of thought, Philo manages to defy generalizations. Instead of choosing between alternatives, he superimposes one upon the other. From the Greek aspect of his thought he posits justice (*τὸ δίκαιον*; *ἡ δικαιοσύνη* as the overarching ethical principle: "*τὸ δίκαιον* in the soul is perfect and the true end of our life's actions" (*Congr.*90), but as a Jew he insists on the inviolability of the specific Biblical laws. The melding of the two is expressed in his words from *Somn.*2.224: "justice (*τὸ δίκαιον* and God's covenant are identical."[2]

Philo uses *δικαιοσύνη* primarily in the Greek sense of *ἀρετή*, as an impersonal ideal that is realized when certain conditions are met. Less frequently does he use it in the meaning channelled to him through the LXX, viz., as a concept of relationship. Rather, along with its cognates *δίκαιος*, *δίκη*, and *δικαιόω* it usually carries for Philo the sense of correct ordering, *iustitia distributiva*.[3] Although he

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[1] Waldo Beach and H. Richard Niebuhr, eds., *Christian Ethics: Sources of the Living Tradition* (New York: Ronald Press, 1955), p.16.

[2] For the covenant as overarching principle of Biblical theology see Richard M. Gula, *What Are They Saying about Moral Norms?* (New York: Paulist, 1982), pp.29-30. Consider also Wayne Meeks' statement: " . . . in Jewish moral discourse Israel is the dominating context for evaluating behavior as the polis is for Aristotle. 'Israel,' however, does not mean the same concrete social entity for the member of the Qumran community as it does for Philo of Alexandria." ("Understanding Early Christian Ethics" *JBL* 105.1 [March, 1986]:8). I see the context of Philo's ethics to be a conflation of Gula's and Meeks' terms, i.e. Israel as the covenant people.

[3] Martin Fiedler makes this observation in "Δικαιοσύνη in der diaspora-jüdischen und intertestamentarischen Literatur," *JSJ* 1 (1970):120-143. David Winston traces the antecedents in Greek thought, as well as the linking of *δικαιοσύνη* to natural law, in "Philo's Ethical Theory," *ANRW* 2.21.1 (1984), esp. 381-383. For the distinction between the Greek and LXX concept see H. Balz and G. Schneider, eds., *Exegetical Dictionary of the*

does not self-consciously present a definition, the matter is succinctly put in *Leg.*1.72: "it is justice (δίκαιον) for the better to rule always and everywhere, and for the worse to be ruled." This principle can be seen to apply in a variety of contexts in Philo's discussion of what ought to be.

An ethical system that corresponds to such a principle must depend on a view of existence that is essentially hierarchical. And here surely Philo found a happy coincidence. For on this point his Greek and Hebrew thought patterns overlapped: each viewed existence as a hierarchy. True, the world-views are hardly the same. But each consists of a graded series, and we can see that it would not be unthinkable to interlock the two and come up with a pattern that bore one's own stamp but had lost nothing from its sources. That, I believe, is what Philo did. The result is that it is easy to detect in Philo both a Biblical worldview and one that is remarkably similar to that of Plotinus.[4]

The hierarchical pattern of existence as it developed in the Greek tradition has come to be known as the Great Chain of Being, and was popularized in Arthur Lovejoy's 1936 book of the same name.[5] Lovejoy claimed that the theory of the Great Chain developed from a combination of Plato's concept of plenitude culminating in the Good, with Aristotle's *scala natura*. With variations, he said, the Great Chain persisted for centuries as one of those "implicit or incompletely explicit *assumptions*, or more or less *unconscious mental habits*, operating in the thought of an individual or generation."[6] Philo and Plotinus were two of the early proponents of the Great Chain. It was alive and well in the time of Milton to such a recognizable extent that the definition by C. S. Lewis in *A Preface to Paradise Lost* applies equally well to Philo:

> Everything except God has some natural superior, everything except unformed matter has some natural inferior. The goodness, happiness, and dignity of every being consists in obeying its natural superior and ruling its natural inferiors.[7]

If δικαιοσύνη entails the rule of the superior and the submission of the inferior, as it is stated in *Leg.*1.72, then to understand its working in Philo's thought we need to discern the rankings on his scale. It is a particular concern of mine that we be sensitive to gradations within humanity itself, as that may help us understand some of Philo's ethical pronouncements.[8]

Lovejoy had noted the central position of "man" in the scale. It was qualitatively different from the species below it, because it marked the onset of reason.

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*New Testament* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990) vol.1, s.v. "δικαιοσύνη." See also Edwin Hatch, *Essays in Biblical Greek* (Oxford: Clarendon), pp. 49 to 50.

4 In Dorothy Sly, *Philo's Perception of Women* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), p.105, n.32, I point out with reference to the text of the *Enneads* that Plotinus has a Great Chain similar to Philo's, but none of his gender distinctions.

5 Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

6 P.7. Emphasis his.

7 C. S. Lewis, *A Preface to Paradise Lost* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970—first published 1942), p. 75.

8 Winston (cited n.3) emphasizes the common bond of reason linking all humans. He sees this as leading Philo to disparage slavery. Starting from an acute awareness of one distinction Philo makes, viz., that between men and women, I shall be more aware of the instances where he does imply gradations within humanity. I develop these ideas in *Philo's Perception of Women* (cited above, n.4).

> Somewhere in that scale there *must* exist a creature in which the merely animal series terminates and the 'intellectual' series has its dim and rudimentary beginning; and man [*sic*] is that creature (p.198, emphasis his).

This view is consistent with Philo's. Reason is the faculty which links the human being to higher forms. With reference to creation "in the image of God," Philo speaks in *Her.*231 of "the mind (*νοῦν*) in each of us, which in the true and full sense is the 'man' (*ἄνθρωπος*)," at the same time calling it "an expression at third hand from the Maker," which is separated from God only by Reason itself. But Philo also differentiates among humans on the basis of their possession and exercise of reason. As I shall argue in a moment, women, homosexuals and slaves either do not possess, or do not use, reason. They are not truly *ἄνθρωποι*. Therefore, if we were to visualize Philo's scale of being we would see the division line not between animal and human life, but, within the human grouping, between reasoning and non-reasoning humans, viz., those who are truly *ἄνθρωποι* and those who are not. Justice within the human sphere, then, would entail the submission of those below the line to those above it.

Are we justified in claiming that Philo does not consider women, homosexuals and slaves as *ἄνθρωποι*? Let us study them in order, beginning with women. Consider the following quotation from *Spec.*1.200-201:

> The male is more complete, more dominant than the female, closer akin to causal activity, for the female is incomplete and in subjection and belongs to the category of the passive rather than the active. So too with the two ingredients which constitute our life-principle, the rational and the irrational; the rational which belongs to the mind and reason is of the masculine gender, the irrational, the province of sense, is of the feminine (See also *Leg.*2.97).

Although he never states explicitly that women are non-persons, his emphasis on reason as the mark of *ἄνθρωπος*, and on women's deficiency in that regard, certainly implies as much. Woman is equated with sense perception, and is *ἄλογος* (*Leg.*3.50); she is unable "to reflect greatly" (*QG* 1.46). Even the exceptional women named in *Prob.*114-117 are "endowed by nature with little sense" (*φύσει ὀλιγόφρονα*). When he cites Julia Augusta as one who "excelled all her sex" in that her reasoning had been rendered masculine (*ἀρρενωθεῖσα*), he adds that "the judgments of women as a rule are weaker and do not apprehend any mental conception apart from what their senses perceive" (*Legat.*319). And Eve succumbs to the snake's seduction because she is "prompted by a mind devoid of steadfastness and firm foundation" (*Opif.*156).

Homosexuals, or effeminate men, approximate women in that they allow their passions to overrule whatever reason they may possess. Philo's use of a number of derogatory terms virtually equates them with women. They are sick with the disease of femaleness (*Spec.*1.325, *Prob.*121-124), or are androgynous (*Spec.* 3.38), or changed into the form of a woman (*Spec.*2.50). In *Spec.*3.39 the pederast acts as a tutor of unmanliness (*ἀνανδρίας*), rendering female (*ἐκθηλύνων*) the bloom of his partner's prime.

And what of slaves? Philo's judgment of the "slavish" person does not always correspond with social reality, yet he does acknowledge the existence of such a type.[9] For example, in *Spec.*3.101 he excoriates "the basest of the women and

[9] In *Ios.*69 and 106 the reader is told that in spite of appearances Joseph is not a slave but free and high-born. In *Spec.*4.14-18 Philo deplores the selling of noble and freeborn

slave population." The slave, like the woman and the homosexual, is the one in whom passion rules. "Those in whom anger or desire or any other passion, or again any insidious vice holds sway, are entirely enslaved (πάντως εἰσὶ δοῦλοι) while all whose life is regulated by law are free. And right reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος) is an infallible law . . ." (*Prob.*45,46). From the Bible, he takes Esau as the slavish type who should rightly serve his brother Jacob (*Prob.*57). The ironic tale of Diogenes, recounted in *Prob.*121-124, presents the effeminate slave purchaser as the true slave, and Diogenes, who is about to be bought, as the real man (ἀνήρ).[10]

Such gradation from reasoning man to lesser human types fit naturally into the Greek pattern of thinking Philo had absorbed.[11] Nor would it have grated against his Biblical understanding of the world. The hierarchical system presupposed in the Bible is less complex than the Greek, but equally pervasive. Basically it has three elements: God, humanity, nature.[12] Within humanity certain functional rankings are recognized, though whether these extend to the metaphysical level is an open question.[13] In either case, it is enough to note that Biblical Law does rest on hierarchy, even though perhaps not spelled out in such detail as in the Greek tradition. In a volume celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Lovejoy's book, several writers argue for the pervasiveness of the theory of the Great Chain. One of them states:

> Had Lovejoy attended to Jacob's Ladder, he could have found easily a hundred examples, in contrast to the half dozen he uses of the Golden Chain. Perhaps he did not care to complicate the derivation of a Neo-Platonic scheme by admitting an Hebraic source . . . .[14]

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men into slavery, not because slavery is wrong, but because it is wrong *for these people* to be slaves. In *Cong.*175-6 he appears to condone slavery as the best state for one who lacks self-control.

[10] When he speaks of the "real man," Philo alternates between ἀνήρ and ἄνθρωπος. There seems to be no significant difference. Each is the person whose female traits are well under control. In *Philo's Perception*, chapter 4, I demonstrate that for Philo ἀνήρ and ἄνθρωπος both generally designate the male adult.

[11] Consider statements about women in Hesiod, *Works and Days* and *Theogony*, Semonides, Phocylides, Xenophon, *Oeconomicus*, Plato, *Laws* 781a-c, Aristotle, *Generation of Animals* 738b, *Politics* 1260a. An interesting refinement of the "Greek" view of women is given by Page DuBois (*Sowing the Body: Psychoanalysis and Ancient Representations of Women* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1988]). The Pre-Socratics saw woman as completely "other": Hesiod speaks of her creation as a disaster for ἀνήρ and ἄνθρωπος. Plato and Aristotle accepted her as ἄνθρωπος, but in a defective sense: if man is "A," then woman is "A minus 1."

[12] See J. J. Finkelstein, *The Ox That Gored*. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 71, Pt.2 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society):7.

[13] In "Studying Biblical Law as a Humanities," *Semeia* 45 (1989):38, Dale Patrick claims that "with the partial and ambiguous exception of slavery" Biblical law does not recognize hierarchy within humanity. Writing in the same volume ("Law and Philosophy: the Case of Sex in the Bible," pp.89-102), Tikva Frymer-Kensky implies that because there is "no coherent biblical treatment of sexuality" and there is "no vocabulary in the Bible in which to discuss such matters" one would have difficulty is determining whether, with regard to men and women, there is a hierarchical difference.

[14] Paul Kuntz, "A Formal Preface and an Informal Conclusion to *The Great Chain of Being*: the Necessity and Universality of Hierarchical Thought," in Marion Leathers Kuntz and Paul Grimley Kuntz, eds., *Jacob's Ladder and the Great Chain of Being* rev. ed., American University Studies Series V Philosophy vol.14. (New York: Peter Land, 1987), n.9, pp.12-13. For discussion of the Great Chain in early Christianity, and its roots, see Robert M. Grant's article, "Chains of Being in Early Christianity," pp.279-289, *Myths and*

## II. Δικαιοσύνη

In my opening paragraphs I remarked on the observation that Philo usually uses δικαιοσύνη in the Greek sense, i.e. as an umbrella principle valid for all aspects of existence. There are a few exceptions to be dispensed with. In *Legatio ad Gaium* he uses δικαία to denote rights or demands the Jews can claim under Roman law (180, 363). But usually he does not employ such words by themselves for earthly laws of particular states. On the few occasions where he does he restricts the meaning with modifiers: adding πολιτικὸν to δίκαιον (*Legat.*371), or speaking of rules in specific law-codes as things held to be δίκαια (*Opif.*1) and ordinances which custom and opinion approve (*Ebr.*64). These restrictions serve to emphasize the limited nature of such systems as compared with the universal and eternal Mosaic law. Having noted these exceptions, one can still declare that it is characteristic of Philo to use δικαιοσύνη for the abstract principle which finds concrete expression in the Pentateuch: "Δικαιοσύνη and every virtue are commanded by the law of our ancestors" (*Spec.*2.13); "the wise legislator has omitted nothing which can give possession δικαιοσύνης whole and complete" (*Spec.*4.143). In fact Philo speaks of law and justice as a pair, an hendiadys as it were: "He guides all things in what direction he pleases as law and right demand (*Opif.*46; see also *Agr.*51, *Sobr.* 6, *Congr.*170).

J. J. Finkelstein, in observing that the Bible presumes a hierarchy consisting of God, man and nature, added that this hierarchy is essentially man-centered, with both God and nature placed in positions relative to him. Since God is conveniently out of this world, man is regent here.[15] In similar fashion, Philo sees the operation of justice from man's point of view. The following two quotations cover the basic relationships that result from this outlook: man-to-God, man-to-man, and man-to-nature.

> Some . . . turning their backs upon all other concerns devoted their personal life wholly to the service of God. Others conceiving the idea that there is no good outside doing justice to man have no heart for anything but companionship with men . . . . Both come but halfway in virtue; they only have it whole who win honour in both departments (*Decal.*108-110).

> Indeed so great a love for justice does the law instil into those who live under its constitution that it does not even permit the fertile soil of a hostile city to be outraged by devastation or by cutting down trees to destroy the fruits (*Spec.*4.226; see also 217).

We may note further that in the first of the two passages just quoted being virtuous appears to be synonymous with doing justice. A closer look at Philo's virtue lists confirms that δικαιοσύνη is the overarching virtue, sometimes seeming to represent them all.[16]

His basic list of virtues is the traditional one: prudence, courage, temperance and justice, in that order (e.g. *QG* 1.12, *Opif.*73, *Ebr.*23).[17] Frequently he varies the

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*Symbols: Studies in Honor of Mircea Eliade*, ed. Joseph Kitagawa and Charles H. Long (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

15 The Ox that Gored, p.7.

16 So Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics V.i.15, where he quotes Theognis: "ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴ 'νί."

17 See Fiedler, p.124, for a more detailed account.

list, but still usually retains justice.[18] The lists may range in length from two items (*Decal*.164, *Virt*.175, *Legat*.312, *Leg*.3.150) to over thirty (*Sacr*.27). On occasions where δικαιοσύνη is paired with only one other, the second element varies from wisdom (*QE* 2.4), to temperance (*Legat*.312), to prudence (*Leg*.3.50), to truth (*QG* 4.194) and to καλοκἀγαθία (*Congr*.31, *Abr*.56). Frequently piety and/or holiness (ὁσιότης/εὐσέβεια) fill out the list (*Mos*.2.216) or replace some of the other basic three, but again justice remains (See *Somn*.2.296, *Cher*.96). In these cases ὁσιότης or εὐσέβεια take over the man-to-God relationship and δικαιοσύνη is limited to man-to-man or man-to-nature relationships. Indeed Philo frequently covers the full range of meaning by pairing δικαιοσύνη with εὐσέβεια or ὁσιότης: *Spec*.1.304, *Prob*.83, *QE* 1.12; see also *Prob*.79, *Her*.172, *Spec*.4.134, *Prov*.2.24, *Hypoth*.6.8, *Legat*.213, *Abr*.208, *Spec*.2.63. Such usage would have been familiar from Plato's thought expressed in *Euthyphro* 12e:

> I think, Socrates, that the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice.[19]

Just as εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης double for the man-to-God side of δικαιοσύνη, so does φιλανθρωπία serve the same function with regard to the man-to-man side. It is sometimes paired synonymously with δικαιοσύνη (e.g. *Decal*.164 and *Mut*.20). As well as serving as an umbrella term covering both piety and humanity, δικαιοσύνη, then, serves also, in a more restricted sense, as a alternative for the latter:

> The nature which is pious (εὐσεβῆ) is also kindly (φιλάνθρωπον), and the same person will exhibit both qualities, holiness (ὁσιότης) to God and justice (δικαιοσύνη) to men (*Abr*.208).
>
> But among the vast number of particular truths and principles there [in the Jewish schools] studied, there stand out practically high above the others two main heads: one of duty to God as shewn by piety and holiness (δι' εὐσεβείας καὶ ὁσιότητος), one of duty to men as shewn by humanity and justice (διὰ φιλανθρωπίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης) . . . (*Spec*.2.63; see also *Spec*.1.304, *Prob*.83).

A variation occurs in *Leg*.3.9-10, however. Here Philo differentiates between justice and piety not by their objects, i.e. man or God, but rather by degree. The object in each case is God, but piety is the purer virtue, justice standing somewhere between it and impiety: "A pious man is not found with the same ease as an impious one. We have to be content with the just man."

Creating one more subdivision, Philo can associate φιλανθρωπία with gentleness and consideration. In *De Virtutibus* Philo uses the latter terms to replace φιλανθρωπία when he is speaking of human relationships to lower forms of life:

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[18] *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, E.T. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), s.v. "δίκη."

[19] *The Trial and Death of Socrates*, trans. G. M. A.Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1975). Fiedler notes that the juxtaposition of δικαιοσύνη and εὐσέβεια occurs in Isocrates and other Greek authors. Op. cit. p.120. Δικαιοσύνη, the preferred reading in Matt 6:1, appears to cover both care of humans and reverence to God in this same fashion, for it introduces sections on almsgiving (vv 2-4) and prayer (vv 5-6).

as a pair in 81 (animals and cultivated trees) and 125 (animals), and consideration alone in 140 (animals) and 148 (vegetation).[20]

Finally, let us consider the terms mercy (τὸ ἔλεον) and pity (τὸ οἶκτον) and their cognates. These are, at times, encompassed by the term δικαιοσύνη (e.g., *Spec.*2.113,115), and express its particularly humane aspect.[21] They belong to the character of God: " . . . he takes pity and compassion (ἔλεον καὶ οἶκτον) on those most helplessly in need . . . " (*Spec.*1.308). In particular they describe His attitude to the people of Israel, exemplified in his delivering them from Egypt (*Mos.*1.86). Philo makes this clear in *Spec.*4.180:

> Nevertheless as Moses tells us the orphan-like desolate state of his people is always an object of pity and compassion to the Ruler of the Universe whose portion it is, because it has been set apart out of the whole human race as a kind of first fruits to the Maker and Father.

He urges his fellow Jews to pray that God should continue his "saving mercy" (σωτήριον ἔλεον) to them "to the end" (*Somn.*2.149). Further, they should exercise this quality in their own lives, for example showing mercy to suppliants (*Mos.*1.25). We see then that the canopy of δικαιοσύνη can be extended to cover even those God-like characteristics, mercy/pity and compassion. Yet we cannot state this categorically, for Philo makes it clear that in some instances they conflict with true δικαιοσύνη. Let us consider the passage at *Spec.*4.76-7. Philo has just finished extolling the beauty of compassion, but now he changes tone:

> It is only on the judgement seat that we are forbidden to show them compassion. Compassion is for misfortunes, and he who acts wickedly of his own free will is not unfortunate but unjust. Let punishment be meted to the unjust as surely as honours to the just. And therefore let no cowering, cringing rogue of a poor man evade his punishment by exciting pity for his penniless condition. His actions do not deserve compassion, far from it, but anger.

How can we account for this change? The answer seems clear. The person for whom pity is not a constituent part of δικαιοσύνη is the one who willfully breaks the law. I take this to mean the one who deliberately acts against the best interest of Israel as God's covenant people. For that person justice does not include mercy. This judgement is upheld by the wording Philo uses in his description of Phineas' heroism in *Mos.*1.303. Perceiving some of his fellow Israelites flagrantly breaking the covenant, Phineas spurred on the rest to take up the sword against their kindred. Philo reports that they did so, showing neither pity nor mercy: "To none of their convicted blood-relations did they shew pity, or mercifully condone their crimes."

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[20] Aristotle equates τὸ ἐπιεικὲς with δικαιοσύνη (Nicomachean Ethics 5.10.2,8) but uses τὸ ἐπιεικὲς in the sense of making exceptions to a law for the sake of fairness.

[21] Wolfson thought that the emphasis on this humane aspect of δικαιοσύνη reflected Philo's Jewish strain of thought: "In the Septuagint the Greek word for justice (*dikaiosynē*) translates the Hebrew word *ṣedeḳah* (Gen. 18:19), and at the same time *ṣedeḳah* is also translated by the Greek term for 'mercy' or 'alms' (*eleēmosynē*)." *Philo* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1947) vol.2, p.220. The same point is made by Edwin Hatch: "[In the Septuagint] the meanings of the two words *dikaiosynē* and *eleēmosynē* had interpenetrated each other." (*Essays*, p.50).

### III. Δικαιοσύνη and Women

Up to this point I have been presenting δικαιοσύνη from the point of view of the true ἄνθρωπος, i.e. the reasoning human being. Indeed reason is intrinsically linked to δικαιοσύνη. At times it is presented as a prerequisite. In *De congressu eruditionis gratia* Philo states that exercising the reason through the encyclia is propaedeutic to virtue and ultimate wisdom (9-12). Little children must be nourished on the reason of school-learning before they become real men (ἀνδράσιν ὡς ἀληθῶς) and can receive the virtues as nurture (18; see also *Agr.*18). Later in the same treatise he declares that the possession of reason allows a man to make a choice between virtue and vice (82,84). But in other places the dependency of virtue on reason seems to give way to a symbiotic relationship between the two: reason also needs the virtues. They safeguard the understanding (*Ebr.*23). "The body perishes if the soul quit it, and the soul if reason quit it, and reason if it be deprived of virtue" (*Det.*141).[22]

Since there is an interdependency of reason and virtue in his thought, it is legitimate to ask then whether Philo posits the exercise of δικαιοσύνη for unreasoning human beings such as women. The obvious answer is no, at least not in the full sense that he does for men. The aspect of δικαιοσύνη appropriate for women is to submit to their superiors: "Wives must be in servitude to their husbands, a servitude not imposed by violent ill-treatment but promoting obedience in all things"(*Hypoth.*7.3); "by observing the conditions prevailing in your own individual household, the element that is master in it, and that which is in subjection . . . you will gain forthwith a sure knowledge of God and His works" (*Migr.*185). The error in Eden was that Eve assumed the ruling role rather than one of submission (*Opif.*165). Bluntly put, "he [Moses?] wishes that man should take care of woman as of a very necessary part of him; but woman, in return, should serve him as a whole" (*QG* 1.27); "woman, taking the rank of servant, is shown to be obedient to his life" (*QG* 1.29).

Indeed Philo appears not to consider any of the traditional virtues as being applicable to women. With regard to both girls and women, he is prone to speak only of what is "fitting": education "as befits maidens" (*Spec.*2.125), secluded life, to which they "are suited" (*Spec.*3.169), "fitting" adornments (*Virt.* 21), and so on. His only virtue lists intended for women enumerate the following: "decency and modesty and temperance and the other virtues" (*Spec.*3.51; see the same three in *Somn.*1.124 and cf. *Fug.*154).[23] These are not virtues in the sense of qualities developed along with the reason, but they are the natural endowment of a decent person. Even when they are attributed to a man, they are not the virtues of the mature, but the instinct of a youth. They are said to belong to the youthful Joseph "by nature" (*Jos.*40); confronted by Potiphar's wife, Joseph has the common sense to flee from her advances. Philo praises him for this, but only in the context of his being weaker than the manly Phineas, who can stand up and fight seductive women (*Leg.*3.242).

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[22] Schooling in the ancient world presupposed parallel development in reason and virtue (H. I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* [London: Sheed and Ward, 1956], p.169.

[23] The list of virtues belonging to the woman Virtue in *Sacr.*27, contains terms similar to these as well as the traditional men's virtues. But this whole passage is allegorical; Pleasure and Virtue are not actual women distinct from men. Therefore I do not consider this list to contain only female qualities.

One might raise the fact that there is an overlap between men's and women's virtues in σωφροσύνη. The meaning changes, however, with the context. Arndt and Gingrich list the separate meanings of "decency" and "chastity" for σωφροσύνη when it depicts a feminine virtue. Linked traditionally in Greek thought with αἰδώς (as above), σωφροσύνη in a subordinate person has to do with recognizing one's place on the human scale.[24] That has already been determined by the man-centered hierarchy. After considering all three terms as applied to women—decency/chastity, modesty and temperance—it appears that the only real virtue for woman is to know her place relative to man, and that is a place of subordination.

Now we have set the stage for an understanding of Philo's practical application of δικαιοσύνη to women. First, we should note that women are the recipients of justice, rather than their practisers. Accepting that limitation, we turn then to the question of how δικαιοσύνη is rendered to them.

For those who accept the subordinate role, it is applied gently. Here we include the captive woman; she is subordinate both by gender and by situation. In his section on φιλανθρωπία Philo applauds the law for its treatment of her: the regulations are "charitable and very merciful," and Moses "shows pity for the captive" (*Virt.*109-114). Philo's tenderness towards the disadvantaged woman in this instance is matched by his implied mercy towards the barren wife, shown in *Spec.*3.35:

> Those who marry maidens in ignorance at the time of their capacity or incapacity for successful motherhood, and later refuse to dismiss them, when prolonged childlessness shews them to be barren, deserve our pardon. Familiarity, that most constraining influence, is too strong for them, and they are unable to rid themselves of the charm of old affection imprinted on their souls by long companionship.

In the same category we might also place his generous comments about the nobility of the foreign wives Tamar, Bilhah and Zilpah (*Virt.*220-225), in spite of the Biblical prohibition of intermarriage in Deut 7:3-6. These remarks are all the more surprising when we recall Philo's scathing condemnation of the foreign women Phineas encountered. But the former women's acceptance of the Israelite lifestyle is implied in Philo's statement that they were converts (220).[25] Foreign women who convert are not a threat to the hierarchy. As in the case of the barren wife, mercy here can soften strict adherence to the law.

And how is δικαιοσύνη applied to women within the community? Philo uses the term ἀστή (lady) for the proper woman of his own social rank. She is appropriately modest, restricts herself to the private sphere, and in general acts "like a free-born lady worthy of the name" (*Spec.*3 171). He has no occasion to discuss the application of δικαιοσύνη. He does, however, speak approvingly of the Biblical command for mercy to the widow, with the implication that this would

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[24] Aristotle, in Nicomachean Ethics 9.9.3, states that αἰδώς is appropriate only for young men, i.e. for those in whom the virtues have not yet developed.

[25] Alan Mendelson (*Philo's Jewish Identity* [Atlanta: Scholars, 1988], 74) suggests that "Philo's laxness on the subject [of intermarriage with foreigners] may be a sign that such unions were not unknown and that the better part of wisdom was to hope for the conversion of the non-Jewish partner." Athalya Brenner (*The Israelite Woman* [Sheffield: JSOT, 1985], p.119) says that "when a foreign woman chooses to adopt Israelite (Judahite) society and religion, and her behaviour indicates that she is seriously committed to her new community, then her acceptance is guaranteed."

be the deserving widow. And speaking of his own society, he takes pride in the fact that orphan virgins receive an education "as befits maidens" and have marriages to suitable husbands arranged under the supervision of the chief magistrate (*Spec.*2.125).

It is on the woman who rejects subordination by asserting herself in any way that the full unmitigated power of δικαιοσύνη must fall. In the Biblical story of Phineas, the Midianite women upset the order of nature by aggressively pursuing the Israelite men. With regard to them, Philo engages in some name-calling, labelling the woman who would do such a thing πόρνη and ἑταῖρα (*Mos.*1.302). In that situation, all the culprits are despatched without mercy or pity (*Mos.*1.302-3). This includes the Israelite apostates and the Midianite women who attracted them.

Women who produce love charms for a living are lumped together with other undesirables, as τὰ φαυλότατα (the basest), deserving immediate punishment under the law against sorcerers or poisoners (*Spec.*3.100-3). People who join mystery cults, "robbers and pirates and associations of abominable and licentious women," are to be banished from the state as enemies of τὸ καλὸν and ἡ ἀλήθεια (*Spec.*1.323). Philo is free with sexual slurs; in fact it appears that a woman who is neither virgin, wife or ἀστή falls into his category of "harlot." The harshest punishment, death itself, is decreed for such a person. "With us a courtesan is not even permitted to live, and death is the penalty appointed for women who ply this trade" (*Jos.*43). This prescription has no Scriptural warrant. We should note also the type of death he calls for: "A pest, a scourge, a plague-spot to the public, let her be stoned to death . . ." (*Spec.*3.51). Elsewhere, Philo distinguishes death by stoning from ordinary death (*Hypoth.*7.2). It is for the most impious crimes. J. J. Finkelstein sees the following significance in death by stoning:

> The common denominator of all the offences entailing the punishment of death by stoning is that they are thought to strike at the moral and religious fibers which the community as a whole sees as defining its essence and integrity. Such crimes, in other words, amount to insurrections against the cosmic order itself.[26]

Why would Philo see the harlot as such a threat? At first sight, Philo seems to follow no pattern in his attitude towards women. We have seen that it ranges from expressions of tender concern to cries for instant death of the most horrific kind. But I believe that he is remarkably consistent. The context of his ethical concern is Israel. Under the covenant, Israel operates in a hierarchical frame. That hierarchy calls for the subordination of women to men. Women who cooperate in the system, or at least give no overt opposition, get patronizing care; that is, they are to be treated with δικαιοσύνη in its broadest range of meanings, compassing philanthropy, mercy and compassion. But women who are immodest or assertive are seen to threaten the greater good. For them punitive δικαιοσύνη is to be applied without mercy. "Harlot" is a loose term Philo uses to cover any woman who threatens his vision of cosmic order.

When I was preparing this paper I asked myself occasionally what it really matters that I am presenting Philo's ethics about women to a predominantly male readership. Then I was encouraged by reading Samuel Sandmel's essay, "The Confrontation of Greek and Jewish Ethics."[27] Sandmel concludes, open-

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26 Finkelstein, *The Ox That Gored*, pp.27-28.

27 *Two Living Traditions* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1972) 279-290.

endedly, that although ancient documents cannot give programmatic advice for behaviour today, they are surely of more than antiquarian interest. And I agree. That is why I strongly object to dismissing Philo's offensive (from the feminist standpoint) remarks about women as mere evidence of personal "misogynism." The same applies to Paul, Augustine or Aquinas. These great minds of the past are not simply fine men who turn into cranks when it comes to understanding women. They are true to a thought pattern that produced marvellous results in many repects, but dreadful ramifications regarding human equality. For myself it is a sign of hope that the system of thinking which rationalized the denigration of women is gradually being recognized for what it is and is being largely superseded.[28] The Great Chain has been virtually dismantled, and so also should be those "survivals" of language, thought and behaviour which continue to shackle women.

[28] Lovejoy believed that the demise of the Great Chain came with the rise of Romanticism, a movement which valued the particular for what it is in itself. He believed that this distinguished the nineteenth and twentieth centuries from those which came before them (*Great Chain*, 294). A more pessimistic view is expressed by Page Dubois (*Sowing the Body*). Dubois argues that the Freudian view of the female as a male bereft of a penis, that is, an incomplete human, draws directly on the hierarchical view of the Great Chain, which sees emanating from God "a series of beings arranged on a ladder of diminishing value and quality, from god to philosopher to master to husband to wife to slave to animal down through the oysters" (16). So long as Freudian thought flourishes, the Great Chain remains with us.

# Philo and the "Higher" Law

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## I. The Problem

The problem of the written law in Philo is the problem of written law in Greek thought. At least from the time of the Sophists, the problem is one of arbitrariness. How do we know which law is good? Is the written law not simply an expression of a given society and so, finally, culturally relative? Most major Greek thinkers wrestled with the problem of how to root justice and law in reality, or some transcendent order, and so escape the arbitrary nature of law. By so doing, however, they laid a foundation upon which the written law was truly secondary. The written law was generally considered good, but the "higher" laws, the law of nature, the unwritten law, and the living law, were the true representations of justice.

This paper looks at Philo's attempt to deal with Greek forms of higher law, and his attempt to deal with the relation of the written law to these forms of higher law. Some have suggested that in his attempt to relate the higher law to the written law, Philo, like the Greeks, pulled the foundations out from under the law of Moses.[1]

## II. The Law of Nature

Nature is the creation of God in Philo's thought.[2] It operates according to certain laws and ordinances, both physical and ethical, which God gave as unalterable (*Op.* 61). In *De Iosepho*, Philo states that the world is the *megalopolis*, or

[1] There is a long history of this interpretation in modern Philonic scholarship: Charles Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 49; E. R. Goodenough, *By Light, Light: The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935), 73-96, esp. 87f; Sidney Sowers, *The Hermeneutics of Philo and Hebrews* (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1965), 44-48, esp. 48; Samuel Sandmel, *Philo's Place in Judaism* (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1971), 109; Andre Myre, "La Loi de la Nature et la loi mosaique selon Philon d'Alexandrie" in *Science et Esprit* 28/2 (1976), 176f; H. Kleinknecht and W. Gutbrod, "Nomos" in *TDNT*, 1052-1054.

[2] A number of commentators over the years have argued that *physis* and God are synonymous in Philo; this is not so. See Hans Leisegang, "Physis" in *Pauly-Wissowa Real Encyclopädie* 20.1, 1160-1161. He is most emphatic: Physis = God; E.R. Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, 31-54; James Drummond, *Philo Judaeus or the Jewish-Alexandrian Philosophy* (Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1969; repr. of London, 1888 ed.), 62,167; Gerhard Delling, "Wunder-Allegorie-Mythus bei Philon von Alexandrie" in *Studien zum Neuen Testament und zum hellenistischen Judentum* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970), 72-129.

great city, which has a single "polity" or rule, the *logos* of nature (*Jos.* 29). This *logos*, or *orthos logos*, is the law of nature.

The laws which constitute the law of nature were determined from the beginning (*ex archês*), when the world itself was created (*QG* 4.42). The only true law is that which is revealed by the *orthos logos* and is an invention of nature not man (*QG* 4.90; *Ebr.* 142; *Sobr.* 33).[3]

The constitution (*politeian*) of this world is the right reason of nature (*ho tês physeôs orthos logos*) (*Ebr.* 80). Philo can also claim that virtue is a law for each person (*LA* 3.245), because elsewhere he reveals that virtue is the law of nature (*Post.* 185). There is a deathless law engraved in the nature of the universe (*Ebr.* 141; *Spec.* 2.13). Nature was the law (*thesmos*) which Abraham followed; any person who properly uses the reason with which they were endowed knows the laws and statutes of nature (*Decal.* 132).[4]

Philo, too, is more willing to spell out what exactly the law of nature contains than most other ancient writers. The problem of the law of nature was, and is, always the same: what is its content? Philo makes a number of attempts at defining it. Laws of nature guide the ordering of the planets, of numbers, and of music (*Op.* 13,54,70). A herd needs a governor according to the law of nature (*Agr.* 31). The law of nature prohibits sleeping with a menstruating woman (*Spec.* 3.32). Passions between the sexes are recognized by the law of nature (*Conf.* 59). Philo gives many more examples and, if his examples seem unconvincing, they nonetheless demonstrate the extent to which in his view the law of nature influences every aspect of life.[5]

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[3] Andre Myre, "La loi dans l'ordre moral selon Philon d'Alexandrie" in *Science et Esprit* 24 (1972), 95.

[4] This brings us to the question of the relationship between *nomoi* and *thesmoi*. There is an acknowledged difference, though it is not clear how the terms differ. There has been no study which compares the use of the two terms or the possible differences between the two terms in Philo's usage. Again, Philo is something of gold mine when compared to other ancient sources and this vein of thought has not been exploited. According to Colson, *Philo* Vol.9 in the *LCL*, 509 *thesmos* "is more divine" than *nomos* and "has a wider scope and is like a general principle." I am not certain that the distinction always holds, however, and at time the terms are interchangeable.

[5] Goodenough, *By Light*, 52-57 has argued that there are two "laws of nature" in Philo's thought. Goodenough distinguishes between the "Law of God, or the Law of Nature" and the "natural law of matter" in the work of Philo (54). Philo maintains two laws of nature, according to Goodenough, to escape the attribution of the creation of evil to God (53-54). When Philo turns to the problem of evil, there is "mention of a law of material nature which seems at enmity with God's law" (54). Philo's discussion of the problem of theodicy may indeed function as a problematic in his thought, but it does not appear that Philo has created a second form of "natural law of matter." It seems from Philo's account of creation that God is responsible for the creation of matter and the laws which govern it. If Philo has difficulty explaining the role of irrational tendencies, or evil in this creation, he is not alone, either in the ancient or in the modern world. In his "Appendix: Law in the Subjective Realm," Goodenough argues more convincingly that the "law of the nature of the whole" and "the law of the nature of the part" are sometimes in conflict (394). What a body desires, therefore, is sometimes in conflict with what reason demands. This, it seems to me, carries us back to the problem of theodicy. The reasonable person knows, for instance, that sex is for procreation; the person who slavishly follows sexual desires without checking them with the reason inherent in him is a slave to irrational desires and, so, to sin. The person who follows irrational desires is not following another law of nature, but a perversion of nature. The Stoics faced the same problem, in a different way. Because of their monistic view of the world and especially of man's soul—it was considered only reasonable—how could they explain the existence

Nothing is free from the constraints and guidance of nature. Nature guides the ethical and physical world (probably Philo would not even make this distinction: where there is life, there is law). The *orthos logos* guides human beings no less than the planets and the moon.

In these few passages Philo has given to us more explicit statements regarding the law of nature than any other ancient author, in Greek, before him. This ought to explain Helmut Koester's great hope for Philo's role as the originator of the concept of the law of nature.[6]

There is a more mundane explanation though. The links with the Stoic view of natural law are abundant.[7] This is the profoundly meaningful and ethical nature of the Stoics, which guides mankind with its reason, which unites humanity in one common family, and whose laws cross the borders of any given land.[8] It is clear that Philo has adopted this Stoic view, perhaps from a Middle Platonist thinker.[9] But Philo has not simply adopted this view of law haphazardly, he has

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of "irrational" desires or "wrong judgements"? These they had to explain, however, with a different view of the soul than Philo and without the presence of a transcendent God. See Martha Nussbaum, "The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions" in *Apeiron* 20/2 (1987), 129-177; Michael Frede, "The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul" in *The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics* (eds. Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 93-110; Brad Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 127-181.

[6] Helmut Koester, "*Nomos Physeôs*: The Concept of Natural Law in Greek Thought" in *Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of E.R. Goodenough* (Leiden: Brill, 1968), 521-541. Koester believes that the law of nature is attributable to Philo.

[7] The list of authors who support a Stoic origin is too long to itemize, but most recently, and very persuasively, Gisela Striker, "Origins of the Concept of Natural Law" and Brad Inwood, "Commentary on Striker" in *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*. Vol.II. (Boston: University Press of America, 1987); Paul Vander Waerdt, *The Stoic Theory of Natural Law* (Diss., Princeton 1989); Gérard Verbeke, "Aux Origines de la Notion de 'loi naturelle'" in *La Filosofia della natura nel medievo. Atti del 3 Congresso internazionale di filosofia medioevale*. Posso della Mendola (Trento), 31 agosto—5 settembre 1964 (Milano, 1966), 164-173.

[8] As numerous scholars of Stoicism have pointed out, the "universality" of the law of nature was only a theoretical reality, at least for the early Stoics. Vander Waerdt, *The Stoic Theory*, 34 says

> only the wise man (whose knowledge of nature provides him with certain knowledge of good and evil) will be infallibly able to choose the right course of action; hence it would be misguided to grant such rules {*kathekonta*} the status of (natural) laws. The Stoic wise man has complete authority to violate the duties or laws when appropriate, and his conduct alone provides an infallible standard of action in accordance with nature.

Cf. Gerard Watson, "The Natural Law and Stoicism" in *Problems in Stoicism* (London: The Athlone Press, 1971); G.B. Kerferd, "What Does the Wise Man Know?" in *The Stoics* (ed. J.M. Rist; Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 125-135.

[9] See Richard Horsley, "Law of Nature in Philo and Cicero" in *Harvard Theological Review* 71 (1978), 35-59 for the view that Philo adopted this view of the law of nature from the Middle Platonists. He suggests that it may be Antiochus of Ascalon. John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London: Duckworth, 1977), 80-81 concurs that the law of nature discussion in Cicero, *De leg.* 1 is probably from Antiochus. Vander Waerdt, *The Stoic Theory*, 245-263 is certain that the discussion of natural law in Cicero in specific formulations and alterations is the work of Antiochus. It is very probable, as Horsley attempts to prove, that Philo and Cicero have a common source for their view of the law of nature. I am less willing to assign a name to the source. It seems to me it could have a number of sources: Posidonius, Panaetius, or Antiochus. Vander Waerdt too admits that

made it his own. The law of nature forms an integral part of his system. Philo employs a view of the law of nature because Philo believes in a law of nature.

God is Philo's addition to the law of nature.[10] The idea of God, transcending and guiding his creation, is central to Philo's thought on the law of nature. Philo finds that the Stoic ideas properly explain God's work in nature, without contradicting Jewish creation accounts, and he believes that the Jewish idea of the transcendent God supplies missing information for the Stoic view of nature.

He also preserves something else: accounts of people who have fulfilled the law of nature.[11] This is interesting not only because these accounts are lacking in Stoic sources, but because of how Philo describes these wise men.[12] He differs not in his description of the reason which guides the wise man: like the Stoic sage, Philo's wise men perceive the law of nature through their unique gifts. But in his description of these wise men, he links them, and the law of nature, to other Greek forms of higher law. In so doing, Philo adds something new to Greek thought on law.

### III. Unwritten Law

A second form of higher law in Greek thought is the unwritten law.[13] This is a vague and fluid concept, given less to a single definition than even the law of nature.

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"all we can say is that Antiochus' reinterpretation of the theory of natural law was prepared, perhaps in crucial respects, by certain developments in Stoic ethics already taking place under the influence of Panaetius and Posidonius" (234). Vander Waerdt is also right to stress that Cicero is not simply acting as a scribe: "there is no reason to assume that Cicero is simply copying out of one of his {Antiochus'} books" (236-237). Whomever the source, both Cicero and Philo reflect the common view of the law of nature. Cf. John Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (Hypomnemata 56; Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1978) and H. Tarrant, *Scepticism or Platonism? The Philosophy of the Fourth Academy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) for the history of Antiochus and the philosophical thought of the period; the difficulty in reconstructing the philosophy of this period with certainty is notorious.

10 Cf. Richard Horsley, "Law of Nature in Philo and Cicero," 35-59. Horsley argues that Cicero employs the same idea of a transcendent God, but on this point I am not convinced.

11 Cf. W. Richardson, "The Philonic Patriarchs as *Nomos Empsychos*" in *Studia Patristica: Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* Vol.1 (eds. K. Aland and F.L. Cross; Berlin: Akademie, 1957), 515-525.

12 Emile Brehier, *Les Ideés philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1950), 25-26 claims that Cicero (*De Rep.* 2.4) preserves an account of a Roman hero (Romulus) who did the law before it was written. Cicero's passage is not at all clear however: that Romulus followed a law, natural or written, is not obvious. The inability of the Stoics to locate a Sage caused great mirth to their opponents and it was a problem which they could not avoid. Cicero indicates both that there were none (*De Off.* 3.16; *De Rep.* 3.7) and that there were a handful (*De Nat. Deor.* 1.23); Sextus Empiricus (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, 2.38-42; *Against the Logicians*, 1.432; *Against the Physicists*, 1.133; *Against the Ethicists*, 1.181) takes great delight in poking fun at the Stoics on this score; Horace, *Epist.* I.1,106-108 mocks the ideal of the sage: the Sage is "second only to Zeus: rich, free, honoured, beautiful, king of kings, especially while he is healthy and not troubled by a cold." See also Alexander, *De Fato*, 199.14-22 (*SVF* 3.658); Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, 2.4,40. Cf. Kerferd, "What Does the Wise Man Know?", 127.

13 As to whether Philo speaks of the Jewish "oral law" in these passages, the position of Heinimann and Sandmel is most convincing. I. Heinimann, "Die Lehre vom ungeschriebenen Gesetz" in *HUCA* 1928, 149-171; and "Hellenistica" in *Monatsschrift für*

There are two dominant concepts of unwritten law: it can refer to the uncodified customs of a people;[14] or a law, or laws, which are considered universal, but uncodified.[15] The category of universal unwritten law is our major concern. Philo's uniqueness in this respect has not yet been fully noted and stressed.

The patriarchs followed the law of nature (*Quod.* 62; *Abr.* 5-6,276; *Mos.*2.13). They followed this law without need of instruction: they relied upon reason. Following Aristotle and the Stoics, Philo claims that there is no reason to give laws to the perfect man (*LA* 2.94).[16] They are laws themselves. Philo, however, gives them a title: those who have followed the law of nature are *agraphous nomous* (*Abr.* 5-6, 276; cf. *Decal.* 1).[17] They follow the law of nature, but more than that, they become unwritten laws.

Philo gives to us the second meaning of unwritten law, as eternal law, in *De Abrahamo* too, with a major change. He says that there are those who led to hopefulness by unwritten law, a law which is given by nature, not by written law (*Abr.* 16). Philo makes clear the obvious implications from other passages: the unwritten law is not only the physical representative of the law of nature, but it

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*Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums* 74 (1929), 441; Samuel Sandmel, "Philo's Place in Judaism. I" in *HUCA* 25 (1954), 226. (See Wolfson, *Philo* Vol.1, 188-194 for the position that Philo here refers to the Jewish oral law. More recently Naomi G. Cohen, "The Jewish Dimension of Philo's Judaism—An Elucidation of *de Spec. Leg.* IV 132-150 in *JJS* (1987), 165-186 takes up Wolfson's position. She points out that "unwritten law" in this passage cannot be "natural law," but seems not to be aware of the Greek discussions regarding "unwritten law" as custom.) Philo speaks here of unwritten laws in a general sense, not specifically of Jewish oral law. Certainly Philo knows of Jewish customs (cf. Heinimann, "Die Lehre," 159), and he may even have had it in mind at times (see *Legat.* 115); but Sandmel ("Philo's Place," 226) is right to point out that in *Spec.* 4.149 Philo speaks specifically of *ethê*. Is this strong enough to stand for halachot? It seems not. When Philo is clearly referring to the customs of the Jews, he speaks of the *agraphoi ethoi* (*Legat.* 115; *Hypoth.* 7.6). This is a phrase used by Philo perhaps with the specific intent of referring to Jewish customs. But I am still not convinced that Philo is referring to Palestinian custom and not Jewish customs in general. See also E. Mary Smallwood, *Philonis Alexandrini: Legatio ad Gaium* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), 208-209.

14 E.g. Plato, *Laws*, 793a-d; Demosthenes, *Against Aristocrates*, 70; Thucydides, 2.37,2; Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1374a,18; Dio Chrysostom, *Orat.*, 76.1.

15 E.g. Sophocles, *Antigone*, 450f; Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 4.4,19f; Demosthenes, *On the Crown*, 274-275; Thucydides, 5.105,1-2; Archytas, *Stob.* 4.1,132; Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1368b,1-7; *Rhetoric ad Alexandrum*, 1421b,35f. On the question of "unwritten law" in general see Victor Ehrenberg, *Sophocles and Pericles* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954); Rudolf Hirzel, *Agraphos Nomos* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1900); W.K.C. Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy.* Vol.III (Cambridge: The University Press, 1962-1981); Douglas Maurice MacDowell, *Andocides* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 125-126; E.M. Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric* (London, 1867), 242-243.

16 cf. Dio Chrysostom, 76.4.

17 The phrase in *Abr.* 276 is actually *thesmos agraphos*. *Thesmos agraphos*, which can only be translated as "unwritten law," deserves a word as well. Victor Ehrenberg, *Sophocles and Pericles*, 169 has said that one never sees this phrase because of the divine connotations of *thesmos*, yet here it is. Philo uses *thesmos* often, and often to refer to divine laws, or laws from God (e.g. *Quod* 3; *Quis* 168; *Congr.* 120). Horsley, "The Law of Nature," claims that the use of *thesmos* at this historical juncture was influenced by its usage in the work of Plato. Was this phrase borrowed from the Middle Platonists? Or is this Philo's independent usage? Either way this is the only appearance of this phrase known to me. It is hard to imagine that it can mean anything more than *agraphos nomos*. The same is true of *thesmos physeôs* (e.g. *Legat.* 68; *Jos.* 30; *Spec.* 1.202; 2.233). It must mean simply the *nomos physeôs*. While Philo seems on occasion to observe distinctions between *thesmos* and *nomos*, in terms of the higher law the distinctions must have been broken down.

is the law of nature itself. The explicit connection between the law of nature and the unwritten law is not made in any other Greek source. Though a number of classical scholars since Hirzel have considered the terms synonymous, no ancient Greek author before Philo does.

Philo has given two twists to the concept of the unwritten law. People who follow the law of nature are unwritten laws and the unwritten law is actually the law of nature by another name. Unwritten law, a concept which usually denotes one or two eternal laws in Greek discussions, becomes a concrete ideal, whose content is determined by the law of nature. Two discrete concepts have subtly become one.

## IV. Nomos Empsychos: The Living Law

A third category of higher law, which could also undermine the ascendant character of the law of Moses, or material law in general, is the concept of the *nomos empsychos*.[18] This Hellenistic Pythagorean ideal contrasts the king as the living law, the unique imitator and friend of God, with the written law. For his subjects, the king replaces the law and becomes the law himself. Philo is, again, both a source and an originator.[19]

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[18] The fragments are found in Stobaeus and are attributed to students of Pythagoras. The attributions are not considered genuine. The texts are as follows: Ecphantus: *Stob.* 4.7.22,64; Diotogenes: *Stob.* 4.7.61,62; Sthenidas: *Stob.* 4.7.63; Archytas: *Stob.* 4.1.135-138. The problem of dating these texts is a difficult one. Some scholars, Louis Delatte (*Les Traités de la Royauté d'Ecphante, Diotogène et Sthénidas.* Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège 97, 1942) and Walter Burkert ("Zur geistesgeschichtlichen Einordnung einiger Pseudopythagorica" in *Fondation Hardt: Pour L'Etude de L'Antiquité Classique Entretiens: Tome XVIII Pseudepigrapha I.* Geneve: Fondation Hardt 1972), date the texts to the 2nd or 3rd century CE. For a number of reasons, following E.R. Goodenough ("The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship" in *Yale Classical Studies* 1 (1928), 55-128), Holger Thesleff (*An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period.* Åbo: Åbo Akademie, 1961; "On the Problem of the Doric Pseudo-Pythagorica: An Alternative Theory of Date and Purpose" *Fondation Hardt: Pour L'Etude de L'Antiquité Classique Entretiens: Tome XVIII Pseudipigrapha I.* Geneve: Fondation Hardt 1972; *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period.* Acta Academiae Aboensis. Ser.A: Humaniora, v.30, no.1; Åbo: Åbo Akademie, 1965), Francis Dvornik (*Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy: Origins and Background.* Vol.I. Washinton, D.C., 1966), and Glenn Chesnut ("The Ruler and the Logos in NeoPythagorean, Middle Platonic, and Late Stoic Political Philosophy" in *ANRW* II.16.2., 1310-1332), I do not think this is the case. This is not, however, the place to argue the point.

Armand Delatte (*Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne.* Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège, 1922) thought the work of Archytas was genuine. I am not certain that anyone else holds this position, but there is a noted difference in the treatment of Archytas and that of Ecphantus, Sthenidas, and Diotogenes. L. Delatte does not, for instance, deal with Archytas in his book; he considers him earlier. Thesleff also considers Archytas' work earlier than that of the other three. So, too, does Burkert, who believes that the Pythagorean writings of the Hellenistic period in general may be based upon genuine writings of Archytas.

The ideal is located in a number of other sources, such as the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (1420a, 21-25), Cicero (*De leg.*3.2-3; *De rep.*1.52; *De off.* 2.41-42), Musonius Rufus (Stob., *Flor.*, 46, 67), and Plutarch (*Ad Ineruditiem Principem* 780b). All of these texts maintain the basic distinction of the *nomos empsychos* ideal: the law is either written or it is the king, the living law.

[19] Archytas (*Stob.* 4.1.132) makes at least one connection which Philo may have drawn upon. He speaks of the unwritten law influencing the law on earth, which may either be

*Nomos empsychos* appears in *De Abrahamo* 5. This passage makes clear the close relationship between all forms of higher law in Philo's work. The patriarchs have already been described as unwritten laws and men who live according to nature, when Philo describes them as *empsychoi kai logikoi nomoi* (*Abr.* 5). By living in conformity with nature, that is, by following the law of nature, one becomes a *nomos empsychos*.[20] The terms of higher law have become in the hands of Philo almost interchangeable.

There is another result. Whereas Philo gave the unwritten law more form by connecting it to the law of nature, by connecting the living law ideal to the law of nature, Philo drains the kingship concept of most of its power. The king, who was once the unique creation of God, becomes in Philo's work, the one who does the law of nature.

Only in the case of Moses does the concept of the living law have all of the implications it has in the Hellenistic fragments (*Mos.* 1.162; 2.4). The living law ideal describes a king, a special being existing between man and God, who alone was created in the true image of God: only Moses has this rare status. Only Moses is described according to the full details of the *nomos empsychos* ideal (*Mos.* 1.148-162). The "kingly" and unique aspects of the ideal are not, therefore, lost on Philo, but he maintains two strata of *nomoi empsychoi*.[21]

Philo maintains a distinction between the living law as the sage who fulfils the law of nature, much like the Stoic maxim "every good man is a king," and Moses as the living law, the true king, the friend of God.[22] This distinction speaks not only of Philo's high regard for Moses, but, more importantly for our purposes, Philo's complete knowledge of his subject matter and his awareness of

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the written law or the king. In this case, though, the unwritten law and the living law are not the same concept.

20 This connection could have been influenced by the Stoic conception that "every good man is a king" (cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.125) which was then adapted to the Pythagorean model of kingship. Whether this connection was first made by Philo will be discussed later in the paper.

21 Goodenough, *The Politics of Philo Judaeus: Practice and Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), 90-100; Brehier, *Les Idees*, 18-19; Wayne Meeks, *The Prophet-King* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967), 109-111. Long before he became a lawgiver, he was a *nomos empsychos kai logikos* (Mos. 1.162). He was a king because of his goodness (*eunoia*) (148); he hated evil (*misoponêria*) (149) and his goal was to benefit his subjects (151). He enjoyed, too, a close relationship with God. The kingly office was an office which God bestowed upon him (148). It was bestowed because of his justness (*dikaiosynai*) (154). He was a partner (*koinon*) of God (154). The elements obeyed him because he was a friend of God (156). His closeness to God made him a model for other men (158), for the worse imitate (*mimeisthai*) the better (159). His subjects also are said to emulate (*zêlôtai*) him (160). All of these terms, and ideas, are found in the Hellenistic Pythagorean fragments.

22 On another occasion Philo calls Moses *theos* (*Sacr.* 9). This is probably inspired by the designation in the Hebrew Bible. Meeks, *The Prophet-King*, 104-105 claims that in this passage Moses appears to share consubstantiality with God. Goodenough, *Politics*, 99-100 rightly insists that Moses is not the supreme being and likens Philo's view to that of Ecphantus. I would liken it to Diotogenes' (*Stob.* 4.7,61—265,10-12) and Aristotle's (*Pol.* 1264a) view that the king is a "god among men." (On Aristotle's view of kingship in general see Paul Vander Waerdt, "Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle's Best Regime" in *Phronesis* 30/3 (1985), 249-273.) Meeks does later say that Moses' "godhood" appears to be only figurative (105). Cf. *Mos.* 2.288-292; *Virt.* 73-75; *Det.* 161-162. Cf. also Alan Mendelson, *Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria* (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1982), 54.

how he is using and changing the concepts of higher law, in this case the *nomos empsychos*.

The important additions that Philo has made to the *nomos empsychos* ideal, apart from casting the "living laws" all in the past,[23] are the connection to the unwritten law and the law of nature, completing his unity of all forms of higher law, the claim that every sage is a *nomos empsychos*, and his silence on the major component of the living law ideal: the conflict between the written law and the living law. This silence will be addressed in the section dealing with the law of Moses.

## V. The Law of Moses

How do these higher forms of law relate to the law of Moses? Greek discussions of all these terms implied an inferiority of the written law. Does Philo imply such?

The Mosaic law, as E. R. Goodenough,[24] Andre Myre,[25] and others have pointed out,[26] seems to exist below the law of nature in Philo's hierarchy of law. The law of nature exists in the realm of the Logos, and is, in some ways, the Logos.[27] This gives it an ontological status higher than the law of Moses, for the law of Moses, a written law and a law which exists in corruptible nature, is a copy, albeit a true one, of the law of nature.[28] The one is created, the other pre-existent (*QE* 2.19—the higher law is a prize). What this actually means for Philo in practical terms has never truly been determined. What is the place of the Mosaic law? Is it, as Goodenough has argued, among others, a law which is finally to be transcended? A law which is ultimately superfluous? A law which Goodenough has said in some cases may be called "bad"?

Two things should be clear: the law of Moses is the only law that the vast majority of people would ever need; and it is the best written law by far. Philo did not foresee a great number of people who could fulfil the law of nature (in this he is at one with his Greek sources); and he could not imagine a better written law.

In Philo's scheme of law, following the law of Moses means something unique and special. While Cicero complained that the Roman civil law was only a shadowy copy of the law of nature (*De off.* 3.69), Philo claimed something else: the Jews had an actual copy of the law of nature. Philo, in fact, if not responding to Cicero himself, is, I believe, responding to the general view of the law of nature when he claims that the Jews have a true copy of the law of nature.

Goodenough and Sowers believe that Philo is implicitly acknowledging the secondary status of the Mosaic law when he says it is a copy, but when we

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[23] Philo does not seem to be writing for present-day kings. His desire, of course, would be that all kings follow the example of Moses, but unlike the Hellenistic Pythagorean texts, which seem to address actual kings with temporal kingdoms (cf. Holger Thesleff, "On the Problem of the Doric Pseudo-Pythagorica," 85), Philo's intentions are ethical and didactic.

[24] Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, 73-96.

[25] Andre Myre, "Le Loi de la Nature," 176f.

[26] Herman Kleinknecht and W. Gutbrod,"*Nomos*" in *TDNT*, 1052-1054; Charles Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, 49.

[27] Myre, "La loi dans l'ordre cosmique et politique selon Philon d'Alexandrie" in *Science et Esprit* 24 (1972), 222-224.

[28] Myre, "La loi de la nature," 168.

compare Philo's claims that the laws of Moses are *eikonôn* (*Abr.* 3) of the law of nature, that Moses' laws are *mimêmata* of the law of nature (*Mos.* 2.11), or stamped with the seals of nature (*Mos.* 2.13,48) to Cicero's claims that the civil law is a shadow (*umbra*) and appearance (*imaginibus*) of a complete (*solidam*) and distinct (*expressam*) *effigiem* (*De off.* 3.69), something else seems to be going on. Philo seems to be arguing against the Graeco-Roman view that there is no true representation here on earth of the law of nature.[29]

Philo was given leeway which the Stoics, for instance, did not possess. He was able to argue that the world was in harmony with the law of nature, and the law in harmony with the world. So far, so Stoic. Philo could add, however, because of the role of a transcendent God in the giving of the written law, something the Stoics could not, namely, that the law of Moses, a particular written law, is in full agreement with the law of nature.[30] As a result the living law did not replace the written law, it was in agreement with it. The unwritten law did not contain unknown laws dependent on the whims of gods, but the manifestation of reason.

Philo could not admit that the Mosaic law was only a shadowy sketch of true law. God gave the law to Moses; God also created the world and with it the law of nature. The law of Moses, divinely given, could in no way contradict the law of nature, divinely implanted in the world at creation.[31] Philo is thus able to claim more than any Greek or Roman author could or would.[32]

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29 Valentin Nikiprowetzky, *Le Commentaire de l'ecriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977), 122f.

30 Myre, "Les caracteristiques de la loi mosaique selon Philon d'Alexandrie" in *Science et Esprit* 25 (1973), 67 points to the tension of this claim when he says, "la caracterè historique de la révélation s'oppose à sa préexistence." The tension between the historical promulgation of the Mosaic law and the etrnal character of the law of nature is, indeed, Philo's greatest problem with the relationship between the forms of law, even if we accept, as I will argue shortly, that the differences between the two laws rest not with the laws so much as with the people who follow them. Cf. Federico Pastor, "Libertad helénica y libertad paulina" in *Miscelanea Comillas* 37 (1979), 232.

31 Bernhard Lohse, *Askese und Mönchtum in der Antike und in der alten Kirche* (München: Oldenbourg, 1969), 110.

32 We must reckon, however, with a new claim made by Paul Vander Waerdt. In *The Stoic Theory*, 245-263 Vander Waerdt argues that Antiochus of Ascalon modified the Stoic theory of natural law so as to enjoin *kathêkonta*, not the *katorthômata* of the sage. Vander Waerdt seems to believe that Antiochus even supplied a code (253). I do not think there is evidence for this claim. There is some evidence that Cicero attempted to relate the Stoic theory of natural law to the civil law (*De Off.* 3.69; *De Leg.* 1.42,44), but Cicero found the civil law sadly lacking. He continued to maintain that the reason of the wise man was the law of nature (*De Leg.* 2.11). Marcia L. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages* Vol.1 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), 96-101 argues that, in fact, Cicero considers the law of Rome to be the law of nature in *De Leg.* 2.26. If this is so, it is true only for some specific instances. He would not, and does not, claim Roman law, in its entirety, the law of nature.

She is correct, however, in saying that Cicero begins the transformation of the law of nature as a cosmic law to that of a higher law used to legitimize the civil or written law of a given community (96). Vander Waerdt, *The Stoic Theory*, 245-263 has attributed this move to Antiochus, especially as it relates to the *kathêkonta*. It may be, however, that it was indeed Cicero who was concerned with the relationship between the law of nature and the civil law. Antiochus was interested in finding a guide for all humans through the *kathêkonta*, but Cicero, the lawyer, would have had abundant reason to wonder how the law of nature was to be related to the civil law and a system of law.

How the law of Moses and higher law are related, however, still remains unclear; Philo is never explicit. Andre Myre affirms that the law of nature is primary and that of Moses secondary, but admits that the discussion is nuanced and does not lend itself to generalizations.[33] What is the place of the law of Moses?

## VI. Philo's Contribution: The Unity of Law

To begin to suggest an answer, we need to ask why Philo presents three discrete forms of higher law as one. In no other ancient source do all three forms of higher law appear, and in no ancient source are any two forms of higher law as tightly connected as all three forms are in Philo's work. A second question is closely related, whether Philo created this unity of law or borrowed it, was it used for the express intent of protecting the Mosaic law from superfluity? Every Greek notion of law which could potentially render the Mosaic law, or any form of written law, superfluous is not rejected and ignored but accepted and altered.

### *A. The Unity of Law*

Is it possible that the connections among the law of nature, the Hellenistic Pythagorean living law, and the unwritten law took place elsewhere? The ideas of the living law and the law of nature, particularly, make sense together. Without much alteration, the living law ideal could breathe real life into the Stoic maxim that the wise man, the best man, was king. The living law ideal would provide an apologia for why, and how, this was so; the Stoics provide the claim that the king need not be, after all, a king.[34] This could have influenced Philo. None of the Patriarchs, after all, was a true king. This new understanding of the living law ideal would serve Philo's purposes perfectly. This connection could have been made by the Middle Platonists, especially after the entrance of Eudorus on the scene.[35] That the connection between the living law concept and

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[33] Andre Myre, "Le Loi de Nature," 176,180-181.

[34] Nevertheless, it bears mentioning that no such combination is seen in Plutarch, a Middle Platonist whose work includes a short treatise based upon the *nomos empsychos* ideal (*Ad ineruditiem principem*). It is true, though, that the phrase Plutarch uses, *logos empsychos*, could have been influenced by Stoic thought. The same phrase appears in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (1420a, 21-25) to describe the king. In Clement of Alexandria's long passage in which he describes Jesus as the *nomos empsychos*, *Strom.* 2.4, 35-40 (18,3-19,4), he mixes Stoic language of the Sage in equal proportion to that of the Hellenistic Pythagorean language of the king. Finally, Philo describes the Patriarchs as *empsychoi kai logikoi nomoi* (*Abr.* 5). His use of *logikoi* may also indicate Stoic influence. It bears saying, however, that the concept of the *logos*, though closely related to Stoic thought, is by no means a product of or the property of Stoic thought; it is a common Greek philosophical term.

[35] Eudorus, according to John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, was the philosopher who added Pythagoreanism to the Middle Platonic mix. Cf. also John Dillon, "'Orthodoxy' and 'Eclecticism': Middle Platonists and Neo-Pythagoreans" in *The Question of "Eclecticism": Studies in Later Greek Philosophy* (eds. John M. Dillon and A.A. Long; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 103-125; and Tarrant, *Scepticism or Platonism*, 47. On the question of Philo's relation to Middle Platonism, and the need for caution in assessing Philo's role, see David T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986), 485-510; and "Redrawing the Map of Middle Platonism: Some comments on the Philonic evidence" in *Hellenica et Judaica: Hommage à Valentin Nikiprowetzky* (eds. A. Caquot, M. Hadas-Lebel, J. Riaud; Leuven-Paris: Editions Peeters, 1986), 85-104.

the law of nature took place elsewhere remains a supposition only however, for Philo alone makes the explicit connection and there is no reason to doubt that he is responsible for the connection.

Unwritten law is a more difficult category to consider. Unwritten law as eternal law, after Aristotle, is not found in many Hellenistic discussions, and never in Stoic discussions, of law. The new discussions of the law of nature seemed to relegate this concept to the sidelines. Philo brings it back into play.

The claim that the one who follows the law of nature is an unwritten law is found only in Philo; the claim is an odd one and does not readily suggest itself. Nothing in the law of nature discussions suggests that someone who does the law of nature is an unwritten law. The explanation for the connection seems to require the need to account for all forms of higher law.

The impetus to take account of the unwritten law, instead of ignoring it, as most do in the Hellenistic period, must depend upon the need to leave no loose ends, no opportunity for someone to ignore their written law in the service of a higher law. It is probably Philo who first connected the unwritten law to the law of nature, and probably Philo who claimed the one who does the law of nature is, in fact, an unwritten law.

His purpose in this unity of law would seem to be to claim the Patriarchs as the true wise men, in every possible form, while at the same time eliminating claims that there are higher forms of law which are not intimately connected to the written, Mosaic, law.

*B. The Law of Nature and the Law of Moses*

The tight connection between the law of nature, and by extension the other forms of higher law, and the law of Moses must be Philo's legacy too, though it could have come from another Jewish thinker.[36] Graeco-Roman discussions obviously would not have made the specific connection between the law of nature and the law of Moses, but it is difficult to imagine a Greek thinker making the connection between the law of nature and any form of written law. Which law would they have chosen? Which law did the Greeks agree was the best: that of Athens or Sparta? Which law could claim to be from the hand of God? Cicero, whose natural law thought may have the same source as Philo, calls Rome's law, which he considered the best possible written law, a "shadow and appearance" of a "distinct copy." This is evocative language, especially contrasted with Philo's claim that the law of Moses is the "true copy," but it probably has a mundane source: the common view of the law of nature. And why would this not be the common view? Was this not the point of the law of nature? That there was an eternal law which transcended the sometimes arbitrary, sometimes bad law of

[36] On the general connections between the law of Moses and nature, virtue, and wisdom see 4 Maccabees 1:8-9,15-18,28-30,34-35; 2:6,23; 3:17-18; 5:17-26; 6;31-35; 7:7-9; 13:1-6,16-18; 16:1-3; 18:1-3 and Wisdom of Solomon. On the purpose of the defense of the law of Moses in 4 Maccabees see Stephen Westerholm, "Law and the Rule of Reason: The Argument of 4 Maccabees," presented at Torah/Nomos Seminar *Canadian Society of Biblical Studies Annual Meetings* May 1987. He claims that the author was concerned with protecting the law of Moses by claiming in it the true embodiment of reason. In general, then, Philo did have predecessors.

In no other extant Jewish text, however, do we find such philosophically knowledgable and mature (not to mention extensive) arguments regarding Graeco-Roman law as in Philo; I believe that in most particulars he is responsible for his synthesis. He was not, of course, the first to attempt to protect the law of Moses by linking it to Graeco-Roman thought, but I believe his thought is in large measure original.

the cities? This was the very point upon which the origin and the development of the law of nature rested.[37]

Only a Jew, one is tempted to say only Philo, could have tied their written law so tightly to the law of nature. Only the Jews could have wanted to.[38] If the law of nature was the salvation of the meaning of law for the Gentile, could it not easily become the undoing of the law of Moses? Would there not be, after all, a law which transcends the law of Moses? The divine character of the law of Moses, the importance of the law for the life of the community, could not allow the law of Moses to be simply another law.[39]

*C. Conclusions*

Why create this unity of law? Answers have already been suggested. First, Philo was convinced that truth could be found in Greek philosophy, in this case Greek legal theory, when filtered through his Jewish perspective. He was convinced, that is, not only of the truth and reality of the law of nature, but of its connections to other, discrete forms of higher law. He was also convinced of God's provident creation, God's action in creation, and God's giving of the Mosaic law. There were many possibilities for contradiction in Philo's melding together of Greek and Jewish law, there was only one possibility for success: there could only be one true law, to which the law of nature, the unwritten law, the living law, and the Mosaic law belonged.

There may be a second, more practical reason: the good of the community. Philo believed in the truth of the law of nature, but he probably realized, at the same time, the danger it could present to his community. Perhaps he even faced the danger from proponents of these higher laws. The law of nature, in the hands of Apostates or extreme Allegorists, could be used to undercut the written law: why should we follow the national law of the Jews, if we follow the universal law? Paradoxically, then, the connection between the higher forms of law and the law of Moses, in the hands of Philo, far from undermining the law of Moses, saved the law of Moses from loss of status or non-observance. Philo implicitly rejected the possibility that the law of Moses may be transcended for higher forms of law. While he distinguished between the "inner" and the "outer" law, a "higher" and "lower" way to do the law, the law of Moses remained untouched. The reality must be faced: the law of nature, except for its quality of preexistence, is contained in full in the law of Moses in Philo's work. The person with true understanding is able to see the law of nature in the law of Moses. The Greek sage in the work of Philo would act much like a Hebrew patriarch.[40]

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[37] A. Reinhartz, "The Meaning of *nomos* in Philo's *Exposition of the Law*" in *SR* 15/3 (1986), 344 says, "from the tenor of his arguments, it would seem that no such claims were being made for other specific law codes. For example, Philo does not find it necessary to argue that other law codes do not embody the law." In some way he does, but the point holds: no one else could have conceived the need to argue that their written law was the law of nature.

[38] Cf. Helmut Koester, "*Nomos Physeôs*," 533.

[39] Alan Mendelson, *Philo's Jewish Identity* (BJS 161; Atlanta, GA.: Scholars Press, 1988), 24.

[40] Philo preserves a passage in which, it would appear, he claims to know of Gentiles, Greeks and Barbarians, who follow the law of nature (*Spec.* 2.42-48). In a discussion of Jewish feasts, Philo includes under its rubric the feast of "every day" (*hêmera pasa*). This feast appears to be based on the "continual" offerings discussed in Numbers 28,29. Philo takes these verses to mean that for the few wise people every day is a feast (cf. *Sacr.* 111). Some of the special few who follow this "Jewish" feast are Greeks and Barbarians (*Spec.*

What then of the superiority of the higher law in Philo's work? The Greeks and Romans do not offer us a valid comparison. They sought a superior law. The superiority of the law of nature in Philo, against Goodenough *et al*, is only relative: it goes to the heart of how people do and understand the law, not the law itself (*Abr.* 16,275-276; *Quod.* 62; *Contemp.* 2; *QG* 1.8, 2.62, 3.10, 4.30,47). The law of Moses ought not be transcended or abandoned, it ought to be understood. The law of Moses is a guide for the weak and the ordinary, the majority of people, but it is not a weak and ordinary law. Philo attacks literalists, not for literally following the law, but for not understanding the law they follow.[41] The superiority of the law of nature tells us more about the state of those who fulfil it than about the relative merits or demerits of the Mosaic law in relation to it.[42]

Kleinknecht and Gutbrod have argued that Philo's attachment to the law of Moses was a contradiction because he would not give up the centrality of the law, even though it had nothing to do with his "sources of his religiosity."[43] Goodenough claims that finally the law of Moses is to be abandoned.[44] However close Philo comes to such conclusions by toying with Greek discussions of higher law, he never accepts them.

In the final analysis, Philo's unity of higher law seems to be not only a way to express God's creation of law and unity of purpose, but an attempt to protect the law of Moses from Hellenistic assaults, by Jews or Gentiles.[45] He saw his chance to keep the Mosaic law strong by tying it to all forms of higher law so tightly that they became in practice, and almost in theory, one.[46] In attempting to protect the Mosaic law from superfluity, a real possibility, he produced a vision of law unique in the ancient world.

If Philo did see the Mosaic law as inferior, and that is clearly not the proper word, or not related to his chief source of religiosity, it is only in the sense that the law of Moses pointed beyond itself to the true nature of law and, therefore, his chief source of religiosity, namely, God. But as God was the author of all true law for Philo, we must be careful even in claiming that Philo believed the Mosaic law ought to be transcended. What, indeed, could that mean? To transcend is to rise above, and in rising above the Mosaic law, Philo did not intend it to be superfluous, he intended the law to be truly understood. That did not mean leaving the law of Moses behind, it meant grasping it for what it truly was.

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2.44-45). The virtuous Gentile is said to follow a Jewish festival, but whether by chance or foresight the festival they follow contains no particular Jewish practices. Would Philo claim that the Gentile who follows the law of nature also follows the law of Moses? When the Mosaic law records that every day is a festival it is, after all, accomodating "itself to the blameless life of righteous men who follow nature and her ordinances" (*Spec.* 2.42).

41 Montgomery J. Shroyer, "Alexandrian Jewish Literalists" in *JBL* 55 (1936), 263-265; Mendelson, *Philo's Jewish Identity*, 4-5.

42 Robert Barraclough, "Philo's Politics. Roman Rule and Hellenistic Judaism" in *ANRW* II 21.1., 509.

43 H. Kleinknecht and W. Gutbrod,"*Nomos*" in *TDNT*, 1054.

44 Goodenough, *By Light*, 54-71, 73-96.

45 Shroyer, "Literalists," 281.

46 Myre, "La loi de la nature," 167. Myre says they are not identified, probably because the law of Moses is historically promulgated (Myre, "Les caracteristiques," 67) and so not pre-existent. This tension, I believe, cannot be resolved.

In taking over Greek views of law, Philo particularized a universal view of law, the law of nature, and universalized a particular law, the law of Moses.[47] Philo was intent on convincing the Hellenistic world that the law of nature had been uncovered, that the true law could be followed.[48] He extends Judaism to the world in Greek dress. Far from a subverter of the faith, he is, indeed, a protector.

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47 Helmut Koester, "*Nomos Physeôs*," 534.

48 Wolfson, *Philo* Vol.2, 374-378 makes an important observation. Plato and Aristotle despaired of an ideal state because they had no ideal law; Philo had that law.

# Philo's Concept of Generic Virtue

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> A genus is that which is predicated in the category of essence of several things which differ in kind [i.e. in species]. (Aristotle, *Topics* 102 a 31) [1]

## Introduction

As Philo integrates Greek philosophical thought with Jewish Scriptural tradition he relies on technical terminology, e.g. γένος (genus), εἶδος (species), and ἰδέα (form), in his ethical theory to describe various aspects of virtue. In addition to his extensive use of allegory, his terminology poses a special challenge to the interpreter. What does Philo mean by generic virtue?[2]

## Genus and Species

Philo's use of the categories of genus and species in his philosophical interpretation of the Jewish Pentateuch presents interesting consequences for the subject of virtue. In *Mut.* 77 ff. he explains why the name of Abraham's wife was changed from Sarai to Sarah. (See the list of categorized terms in figure 1.)

> Her name Sarai (Σάρα) is changed to Sarah (Σάρρα) by the addition of one letter, rho. These are the names; now for the facts indicated by them: Sarai means "my sovereignty," Sarah "sovereign." The former is a symbol of specific virtue, the latter of generic, and in the same measure as the genus

[1] Porphyry, in his 3rd century AD *Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, reproduces Aristotle's definition of genus and expands Aristotle's illustration (animal = genus, man or ox = species) into the famous Tree of Porphyry going from the genus (substance) through the various classes or species (body, animate body, animal, rational animal, and man), to the particular (Socrates, Plato, etc.). Porphyry's commentary and his Tree are evidence in themselves that the theory of genus and species retained continued influence in the Hellenistic and Roman world, and would have been at least generally familiar to anyone who was interested in philosophy even if his knowledge were derived from handbooks.

[2] I owe my interest in this subject to the stimulating insights of Paul Plass and to an unpublished article by him, both of which have contributed greatly to the development of this study.

is greater than the species is the second name greater than the former. The species is small and perishable, the genus is large and imperishable.[3]

**FIGURE 1**
**Sarai Becomes Sarah**

| *Sarah* (Σάρρα) | *Sarai* (Σάρα) |
|---|---|
| sovereign (absolute) | my sovereignty (personal) |
| generic virtue | specific virtue |
| greater | lesser |
| large | small |
| imperishable | perishable |

His point in this portion of the treatise is to show how each name-change indicates a betterment of the soul (βελτίωσις ψυχῆς [¶65]). Philo compares this change to the reminting of a coin into a better form (¶ 123). So, when he states that the name of Sarai (specific virtue) was changed to Sarah (generic virtue) he means also that the genus is better, the species worse. In addition, he refers (¶ 78) to the species as the lesser (τὸ ἔλαττον) and as something small and perishable (βραχὺ καὶ φθαρτόν), but to the genus as something great and imperishable (πολὺ τε αὖ καὶ ἄφθαρτον). Philo's distinction here between the imperishable and the perishable is significant; the former is associated with the genus, the latter with the species.[4]

These vague and extremely general qualities spring into clearer focus when Philo explains (¶ 79) that prudence in its generic form (γενικὴ φρόνησις), is not prudence of an individual (τοῦ δεῖνος: "of such a one," or "of so-and-so"), but is the thing (prudence) itself (αὐτὸ τοῦτο). Therefore, specific prudence associated with an individual is like the skill or craft of an individual. It perishes just as an individual's skill perishes at his death. On the other hand, prudence (or the skill) itself, apart from the individual associated with it, never perishes. Solomon's wisdom perishes with Solomon, but Wisdom itself never dies.

### Genus, Species and Particular

In the context of the previous passage Philo has emphasized a simple contrast between the absolute (the thing itself) and the dependent or personal (i.e., associ-

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[3] "καὶ γὰρ αὕτη μετονομάζεται εἰς Σάρραν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς στοιχείου πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ῥῶ. τὰ μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ τυγχάνοντα μηνυτέον· ἑρμηνεύεται Σάρα μὲν ἀρχή μου, Σάρρα δὲ ἄρχουσα. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρότερον εἰδικῆς σύμβολον ἀρετῆς ἐστι, τὸ δ' ὕστερον γενικῆς. ὅσῳ δὲ γένος εἶδους διαφέρει κατὰ τὸ ἔλαττον, τοσούτῳ τὸ δεύτερον ὄνομα τοῦ προτέρου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶδος καὶ βραχὺ καὶ φθαρτόν, τὸ δὲ γένος πολύ τε αὖ καὶ ἄφθαρτον." (*Mut.* 77-78). The text and translations of Philo are, with occasional modifications, from the Loeb Classical Library, trans. Francis H. Colson and George H. Whitaker (New York 1929-62).

[4] Philo's perishable species in this passage is peculiar in light of the classificatory examples given by Aristotle and Porphyry; both of the latter equate the lowest classificatory level with empirical (i.e., perishable) *particulars* in contrast to the higher levels which are *not particular* (i.e. neither empirical nor perishable). In other words, a species (i.e., not on the lowest level as is a particular) is not normally considered perishable; yet here it is.

ated with an individual), between the generic and specific, better and worse, large and small, imperishable and perishable. This relatively simple, two-part framework for the theory of genus and species acquires a more intricate, three-part form elsewhere. In *Mut.* 148, for example, Philo says:

> "I will bless her [Sarah]," He [God] continues, "and she shall be for nations." He shows hereby that not only is generic virtue divided into its proximate species and things under the species, as into nations, but also that actions and ideas have nations in a sense, just as living creatures have, . . . .[5]

One point he intends to clarify in this passage is that generic virtue is divided into lower subdivisions: into the most proximate species (τὰ προσεχέστατα) on the next lower level, and into the things under the species (τὰ ὑπὸ τοῖς εἴδεσιν) on a level lower than that. Philo makes it clear that three-part hierarchy, i.e. genus, species, and things subordinate (instances or individuals), rather than simple contrast sets the pattern for this use of the theory. The preposition ὑπό denotes lower position on the scale and the adjective προσεχέστατα denotes relative proximity of position. Although he leaves the content of the lower two levels undefined, he clearly emphasizes the principle of division into subordinate parts in order to bring about hierarchy. (See figure 2, in which the underlying distinction of the imperishable, i.e. left side, and the perishable, i.e. right side, is maintained from the previous discussion of Sarah in *Mut.* 77-78.)

**FIGURE 2**
**"Sarah Shall Be For Nations"**

| *Imperishable* | *Perishable* |
|---|---|
| Sarah (i.e. ἡ γενικὴ ἀρετή) | (Sarai) (i.e. ἡ εἰδικὴ ἀρετή) |
| ἔθνη (i.e. τὰ προσεχέστατα εἴδη) | |
| τὰ ὑπὸ τοῖς εἴδεσιν | |

5 "'Εὐλογήσω' δέ φησιν 'αὐτήν, καὶ ἔσται εἰς ἔθνη,' δηλῶν ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἡ γενικὴ ἀρετὴ ὡς ἂν εἰς ἔθνη τὰ προσεχέστατα εἴδη τέμνεται καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῖς εἴδεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι συμβέβηκεν ὡς ζώων οὕτω καὶ πραγμάτων εἶναι τρόπον τινὰ ἔθνη, . . . ." (*Mut.* 148). This application of the genus-species distinction to virtue, in which the higher, more generic level is less in number and greater in generality compared to the lower level, strikes a contrast with John Dillon's treatment of grades of virtue where each grade appears to retain the same number of virtues. See his "Plotinus, Philo and Origen on the Grades of Virtue," in Horst-Dieter Blume and Friedhelm Mann (edd.), *Platonismus und Christentum: Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie,* Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum Ergänzungsband 10 (1983) 92-105.

Previously (*Mut.* 77 ff.) Philo has identified Sarai as specific (perishable) virtue in contrast to Sarah who is generic (imperishable) virtue; now he adds more details. Sarah, as a larger genus, can be divided into smaller subdivisions: τὰ προσεχέστατα εἴδη.[6] According to traditional classificatory principles these are considered *imperishable* species because they are not subject to change as are empirical particulars.[7] In this case they are also associated with Sarah who represents what is imperishable. As imperishables they fit appropriately on the left side of the figure. But we have seen above (fig. 1 and n. 4) that Philo contrasts Sarah with Sarai who represents specific virtue in its perishable aspect (i.e. perishing when the particular with which it is inseparably associated perishes). Similarly, in this passage (*Mut.* 148) one expects that the lowest level (τὰ ὑπὸ τοῖς εἴδεσιν) associated with Sarah refers to what is imperishable; but because it is on the lowest level (that of particulars) one expects it to refer to particulars that are perishable.[8]

The principle of division into ranks or orders appears in Philo's analogy of the proximate species with ἔθνη (nations). One can easily conceive of all mankind being divided into nations, each nation being divided into clans, and each clan being divided into subordinate groups.[9] But the second point he intends to clarify in this passage is that this division into subordinate classes (i.e. ἔθνη) also applies to πράγματα (i.e. human affairs in general), which are ordered by rank or station into classes (ἔθνη) in the same way that the members of Plato's republic are divided into different hierarchical social orders (ἔθνη).[10]

Philo applies the principle just established by his first point (i.e. threefold division into subordinate classes) to his following second point (i.e. applying classificatory hierarchy to πράγματα) by extending its use beyond the animal kingdom (ζῷα) to human affairs. Just as the animal kingdom has classes, the world of human affairs has classes. He divides them into those affairs conducted with and without virtue: good farming, good chariot racing, good navigation, good civic life, legal justice, and peace; in contrast to war, lawlessness, misgovernment, confusion, naval disaster, and revolution (*Mut.* 149-150). Those with virtue are better than those without.[11] His point is that just as the animal kingdom has a comprehensive classificatory structure, the world of human affairs has a systematic hierarchical structure over which virtue presides.[12]

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6 See *Her.* 133-40 for the importance of this principle of division in Creation.

7 See n. 4 on this point.

8 The question of how one can admit imperishable particulars is difficult. Needless to say, Philo does not provide an entirely satisfactory answer. The plural number of τὰ ὑπὸ τοῖς εἴδεσιν might indicate plural empirical particulars except that the εἴδη on the next higher level is also plural in number but is considered imperishable in the traditional system. Therefore, number alone is not a reliable indicator concerning perishability in this case.

9 Cf. the Greek system of φυλαί, φρατρίαι, and γένη.

10 See Plato's *Republic* 430 b; and George H. Liddell, Robert Scott, Henry S. Jones, and Roderick McKenzie, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed. (Oxford 1940) under ἔθνη. See also Philo, *Post.* 91 where he uses ἔθνη as a synonym for species (εἴδη).

11 Note that virtue here includes both moral and non-moral excellence.

12 Cf. Philo's use of συστήματα in *Mut.* 150, and Aristotle's in his *Historia Animalia* and *De Generatione Animalium.*

### Garden of Eden

In *L. A.* i. 59 and 56 Philo maintains this genus-species-individual structure in his discussion of the trees in the Garden of Eden:

> Now the tree of life is virtue in the most generic sense, which some call goodness, from which the particular virtues arise (¶ 59). These [trees of virtue] are the particular virtues and the activities corresponding to them; namely, moral accomplishments and common duties mentioned by the philosophers (¶ 56).[13]

These two passages reveal three categories: virtue in the most comprehensive sense (ἡ γενικωτάτη ἀρετὴ), the particular virtues (αἱ κατὰ μέρος ἀρεταί), and the activities corresponding to these particular virtues (αἱ κατ' αὐτὰς ἐνέργειαι). Figure 3 illustrates the rank and interrelation of each.

**FIGURE 3**
**Trees in the Garden of Eden**




The tree of life is in the middle (ἐν μέσῳ in *L. A.* i. 56, 60) because of its central, essential importance for all the other trees (τὴν συνεκτικωτάτην χώραν ἔχον, ¶ 59). Like a king attended on either side by guards (¶ 59) virtue, in the most generic form, surrounds itself with particular virtues, each of which has corresponding activities associated with it (αἱ κατ' αὐτάς ἐνεργείαι, ¶ 56).[14] Every virtuous act, therefore, whether in the nature of a moral accomplishment (κατόρθωμα) or moral duty (καθῆκον) finds its place under a corresponding particular virtue, subsisting under virtue itself, which, in its most generic form, is the ontological source and essential principle common to every level at which virtue is considered. The lines in figure 3 connecting each tree to the center indicate this

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[13] "τὸ δὲ ξύλον τῆς ζωῆς ἐστιν ἡ γενικωτάτη ἀρετή, ἥν τινες ἀγαθότητα καλοῦσιν, ἀφ' ἧς αἱ κατὰ μέρος ἀρεταὶ συνίστανται" (*L. A.* i. 59). "ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα αἵ τε κατὰ μέρος ἀρεταὶ καὶ αἱ κατ' αὐτὰς ἐνέργειαι, καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα, καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσι καθήκοντα·" (*L. A.* i. 56). I have translated the first conjunction in "καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα, καί . . ." as the explanatory copulative "namely" to bring out the most probable sense of the passage.

[14] Normally one would assume that these deeds are perishable particulars (i.e. that the garden represents in expanding order the descending levels of genus, species and instance, even though Philo makes no distinction between imperishable and perishable in this passage, and even though he speaks of activities in a general sense apart from specifics about performance or agent.

relation of each level to generic virtue. The concentric circles distinguish among different aspects of virtue: the most generic in the center, the least generic on the outside.

In this interrelation and distinction by degree, the same hierarchical, systematic structure appears as previously with the ἔθνη of the πράγματα in *Mut.* 148; but in this case Philo explains relative position as central and peripheral rather than higher and lower. Here distance from the center is the key. Nevertheless, the hierarchical nature of Philo's framework appears unmistakably from the comparison to a king and his guards. Just as a king holds the supreme position in a state, the tree of life holds the supreme position in the realm of virtue because it represents virtue in the most generic sense (ἡ γενικωτάτη ἀρετή). This superlative requires the distinction between things more generic and things less generic with at least three levels.

This hierarchy, with its distinction by degree, results in an inverse reciprocity between proximate orders: what is most generic (i.e. at the top) is least specific, and what is least generic (i.e. at the bottom) is most specific; and what is in the middle is less generic than that above and more generic than that below. This means that between virtue in the most generic form and virtue in the least generic form there exists a class (or more than one class) that is specific with respect to the genus above, but generic with respect to the species below. Porphyry defines this reciprocity by saying:

> Between the highest genus and the lowest species there are classes which are genera and species [pl.] at the same time, since they are comprehended in relation to the highest genus and to the lowest species.[15]

It is this sense of something being more generic or less generic that allows Philo to speak of the tree of life in the middle of the Garden as the "most generic" virtue.

In *L. A.* i. 63-64 Philo continues his Garden of Eden allegory but focuses on the rivers in the garden rather than the trees.

> The largest river, of which the four are branches, is generic virtue, which we have named "goodness." The four branches are the [cardinal] virtues of the same number. Generic virtue takes its origin from Eden, the wisdom of God, . . . but the four specific [virtues take their origin] from the generic [virtue], which waters, after the manner of a river, the moral accomplishments for each [of the four virtues] with a great flood of noble deeds.[16]

Attention in this passage switches from the tree of life (virtue in the most generic form) to Eden's largest river (generic virtue). The trees of particular virtue are replaced by the four rivers in the garden that branch off from the largest river. The trees of activities, however, which correspond to the particular virtues, remain trees which the four rivers of particular virtues water. Because both

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15 "μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ γενικώτατου καὶ τοῦ εἰδικωτάτου ἄλλα, ἃ καὶ γένη καὶ εἴδη ἐστὶ τὰ αὐτά, πρὸς ἄλλο μέντοι καὶ ἄλλο λαμβανόμενα." (Porphyry 2 a 10-12).

16 "ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγιστος ποταμός, οὗ αἱ τέτταρες ἀπόρροιαι γεγόνασιν, ἡ γενικὴ ἐστιν ἀρετή, ἣν ἀγαθότητα ὠνομάσαμεν, αἱ δὲ τέτταρες ἀπόρροιαι αἱ ἰσάριθμοι ἀρεταί. λαμβάνει μὲν οὖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ γενικὴ ἀρετὴ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐδέμ, τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ σοφίας, . . . αἱ δὲ ἐν εἴδει τέτταρες ἀπὸ τῆς γενικῆς, ἥτις ποταμοῦ δίκην ἄρδει τὰ κατορθώματα ἑκάσταις πολλῷ ῥεύματι καλῶν πράξεων." (*L. A.* i. 63 and 64). See n. 14 above, which also applies to the καλαὶ πράξεις.

allegories have a common setting in the garden of Eden figure 4 includes the elements of both.[17]

FIGURE 4
Eden's Trees and Rivers




The three categories illustrated by the passage are obvious: generic virtue (ἡ γενικὴ ἀρετή), the particular virtues (αἱ κατὰ μέρος ἀρεταί), and the moral accomplishments (κατορθώματα) watered by the four rivers. Philo explains the reciprocity in the hierarchy of these various levels by using the word ἀρχή.

According to Porphyry the term ἀρχή can be understood as equivalent to genus: a source or origin.[18] As a result, when Philo (*L. A.* i. 64) says, "Generic virtue takes its origins (τὰς ἀρχάς) from Eden . . . but the four specific [virtues take their origins] from the generic [virtue]," he means that the genus (or origin) of generic virtue is Eden and that the genus of the particular virtues is generic virtue. In other words, the higher level is the genus of the lower level and the lower, the species of the higher. When applied to more than two levels this is equivalent to saying that the middle level, although a species with respect to the higher level, is a genus with respect to the lower level.[19] (See figure 5.)

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[17] This pre-flood pattern of the garden of Eden is more similar to the Egyptian delta pattern than to the mountainous post-diluvian river pattern of Mesopotamia and the Caucasus.

[18] "In another sense genus (γένος) means the source (ἀρχή) of each man's birth. . . ." (Porphyry 1 a 22-23).

[19] See Porphyry 2 a 6-42 for this principle. Note also the following equivalent terms for the levels of any classificatory hierarchy: for the highest level, genus or "proper class"; for levels between the highest and lowest, genus, species, or "class"; for the lowest level, individual, particular, instance, or "member."

**FIGURE 5**
**Reciprocal Hierarchy of Eden's Trees and Rivers**

Eden (genus of lower level)
Generic Virtue (species of higher level; genus of lower level)
Particular Virtues (*idem*)
Moral Accomplishments (species of higher level)
Noble Deeds (particulars)

In addition to the three basic categories of virtue (genus, species, and particular), Philo has added another level to the top and bottom; he adds Eden to the top as the ἀρχή (i.e. genus) of generic virtue, and noble deeds (καλαί πράξεις) to the bottom as the concrete acts which constitute moral accomplishments (κατορθώματα).[20] When he identifies Eden as the Wisdom of God, and equates it with the Logos of God (*L. A.* i. 65) he adds yet another level to the top. His explanation there that generic virtue is made according to the Logos (κατὰ τὸν λόγον) paraphrases his earlier statement that Eden is the ἀρχή (i.e. genus) of generic virtue. This demonstrates Philo's use of the principle that each categorical level is a genus to the level below it and a species to the level above it.

**Systematization of Old Testament Law**

In Spec. iv. 132-34 Philo shows the result of applying the theory of genus and species to Old Testament law.

> For if it is necessary to show that things delivered as oracles by the divine voice are the chief categories of laws and that all the particular laws which Moses interpreted are subordinate forms, then there was a need for ingenuity in order to avoid confusing an accurate apprehension. Being furnished with this, I assigned and made to branch off from every legislation related things for each of the categories. . . . It is necessary not to be ignorant that just as there are for each of the ten [oracles] individually certain kindred things which have no commonality with another category, so there happen to be some things common to them all which fit not one or two, but [all] ten oracles. These are the common utility virtues.[21]

Because this passage concludes Philo's extensive treatment of the law, commandment by commandment in *Decal.* and *Spec.*, and contains principles he has applied throughout, it merits rather close scrutiny.

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20 That Philo relies on a distinction between κατορθώματα and καλαί πράξεις is evident from his allegory in which the latter is treated as more specific than the former, though there is usually little distinction. Cf. Harry A. Wolfson, *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam,* 2 vols. (Cambridge Mass. 1947) 2:205-7.

21 "εἰ γάρ δεῖ τὰ μὲν φωνῇ θείᾳ χρησμῳδηθέντα κεφάλαια γένη νόμων ἀποδεῖξαι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ μέρος πάντας οὓς διηρμήνευσε Μωυσῆς ὑποστέλλοντα εἴδη, πρὸς τὸ ἀσύγχυτον τῆς ἀκριβοῦς καταλήψεως φιλοτεχνίας ἐδέησεν, ᾗ χρησάμενος ἑκάστῳ τῶν γενῶν ἐξ ἁπάσης τῆς νομοθεσίας τὰ οἰκεῖα προσένειμα καὶ προσέφυσα. . . . οὐ δεῖ δ' ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι ὥσπερ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ τῶν δέκα συγγενῆ τινα τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἐστίν, ἃ πρὸς ἕτερον γένος οὐδεμίαν ἔχει κοινωνίαν, οὕτως ἔνια κοινὰ πάντων συμβέβηκεν, οὐχ ἑνὶ ἢ δυσίν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τοῖς ‹δὲ› δέκα λογίοις ἐφαρμόττοντα. ταῦτα δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κοινωφελεῖς ἀρεταί·" (*Spec.* iv. 132-134).

First of all, he distinguishes between the chief categories (κεφάλαια γένη) of the laws and all the particular (κατὰ μέρος) laws which he identifies as subordinate forms (ὑποστέλλοντα εἴδη) or "species" of them. Philo has maintained this distinction from the beginning of his treatment by contrasting the chief points (κεφάλαια) of the laws with the specific (ἐν μέρει) laws they summarize (*Decal.* 19, 154).[22] The Greek title to *Decal.* itself clearly posits this distinction by stating that it is a study "Concerning the Ten Commandments (Λόγοι) Which Are the Chief Points (Κεφάλαια) of the Laws." The title to *Spec.*, on the other hand, encompasses the other half of this distinction: "Concerning the Specific ('Εν Μέρει) Ordinances." So, even in the broad outline of these two treatises he applies the theory of genus and species by distinguishing between the Ten Commandments as chief categories (γένη) and the numerous specific (κατὰ μέρος) ordinances as particular laws ordered under the Ten.

Philo maintains this distinction in order to accomplish his overall task of systematizing Old Testament law and defining the sense in which it represents abstract, absolute, imperishable reality as that was understood in ancient philosophy. When he says that he assigned (προσένειμα) and made to branch off (προσέφυσα) from every legislation related things for each of the categories, he is using language of large-scale classification and attempting to do for the Torah what Aristotle did for the animal kingdom.

Philo also specifies the principles involved. Each chief point has certain kindred things (συγγενῆ τινα) which have nothing in common with another category. But the chief points themselves all have something in common with each other: they are common utility virtues (κοινωφελεῖς ἀρεταί).[23] The general pattern of figure 6 is similar to that of figure 4 and shows kindred things grouped together as well as the lines of relation from one level to the next.

FIGURE 6
**Systematization of Old Testament Law**




22 Naomi Cohen, "The Jewish Dimension of Philo's Judaism: An Elucidation of *De Spec. Leg.* iv. 132-150," *The Journal of Jewish Studies* 38 (1987) 170, n. 15, cites references for Rabbinic division of labors forbidden on the Sabbath in thirty-nine heads and their *toledoth* (generations), and of the 613 precepts under the heading of the Ten Commandments. Richard Hecht, "Preliminary Issues in the Analysis of Philo's *De Specialibus Legibus*," *Studia Philonica* 5 (1978) 6, cites the Rabbinic explanation that the Ten Commandments are composed of 613 letters.

23 The prefix κοινο- itself is parallel in thought to γένος; i.e,. it suggests a comprehensive and unified view. Cf. also the συνεκτικωτάτη χώρα in *L. A.* i. 59.

Each of the Ten Commandments has ordinances which are assigned to it and branch off from it, which are of the same class and therefore akin to each other but not akin to ordinances of a different class.

Three points are especially significant about this framework. First of all, Philo states the principle of exclusion between members of different classes; i.e. all members of one class are akin to each other but have no direct relation to members of different classes on the same level. Secondly, he subjoins all the Commandments under a synthesis of Greek and Jewish moral standards by his identification of the common utility virtues as prudence and justice (two of the four classical cardinal virtues), reverence to God (a virtue of supreme importance to the Jews), and the other chorus of virtues which he leaves unnamed. This shows Philo's intermediary position between the Greek and Jewish traditions. Thirdly, the plurality of the common utility virtues implies an even higher classificatory level of virtue itself representing the commonality of the virtues grouped below it, and even higher levels above that (e.g. Logos and God) which are evident from *L. A.* i. 63-65.

In addition, Philo includes yet another distinction for the Ten Commandments. In *Decal.* 50 and *Her.* 168-73 he divides the Ten Commandments into two sets of five: the first is superior to the second (*Decal.* 50-51) and deals with duties toward God; the second deals with duties toward men (*Her.* 168).

Combining these various levels relating to Old Testament law with previous classificatory levels, the extended hierarchical structure of figure 7 becomes apparent.[24]

**FIGURE 7**
**Extended Hierarchy for Old Testament Law**

God
Logos
Generic Virtue
Common Utility Virtues
Duties to God and Men
Ten Commandments
Specific Ordinances

[24] In this list common utility virtues are the counterpart to the cardinal virtues; duties to God and men, and the Ten Commandments are the counterpart to moral accomplishments; and the specific ordinances are the counterpart to noble deeds. I have listed "Duties to God and Men" higher than the Ten Commandments because "Duties to God" is a category consisting of the first five commandments, and "Duties to Men" of the latter five; i.e. the two higher categories include five lower items each. See Cohen (n. 22 above) 171, n. 16 for a similar interpretation. However, it would be equally valid to treat The Ten Commandments as one set which has two subsets (i.e. Duties to God, and Duties to Men), each with five items in the set. Acknowledging the close association of these two categories, Philo (*Virt.* 51) calls love for God (εὐσέβεια) and love for man (φιλανθρωπία) sisters and twins (ἀδελφαὶ καὶ δίδυμοι). I owe this latter insight to David Winston, "Philo's Ethical Theory," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, II Principat 21.1 (1984) 394-95.

### Platonic Forms and the Genus-Species Theory

In *L. A.* i. 22 Philo's use of Platonic Forms is immediately evident. (Bracketed numbers refer to items in figure 8.)

> And he [Moses] compares the original [1a] of the mind [2a] and the original [1b] of sense-perception [2b] to two fields; for the mind [2a] bears the fruit of things [4a] that come from thinking; sense-perception [2b], things [4b] that come from perceiving. What he means is something of this sort. As before the particular and individual mind [2a] there subsists a certain original [1a] as an archetype and pattern of it, and again before the particular sense-perception [2b], a certain original [1b] of sense-perception, having a correspondence to a seal stamping forms; just so, before the individual objects of intellectual perception [4a] came into being, there was the generic "intellectually-perceptible" itself [3a], by participation in which the other things [4a] have been named; and before the individual objects of sense-perception [4b] came into existence, there was the "sensibly-perceptible" itself [3b], by sharing in whose being the other objects of sense [4b] have come about.[25]

**FIGURE 8**
**Intelligibles and Sensibles**

| *Imperishable* | *Perishable* |
|---|---|
| Archetypes | Copies |
| 1. a. Νοῦς, b. Αἴσθησις (ἰδέα) | 2. a. νοῦς, b. αἴσθησις (ἐπὶ μέρους, κατὰ μέρος) |
| 3. a. Νοητόν, b. Αἰσθητόν (γενικόν) | 4. a. νοητά, b. αἰσθητά (ἐπὶ μέρους, κατὰ μέρος) |

The significance of this passage for the theory of genus and species is that in noting the similarity between the preexisting Platonic Form of Intellect (Νοῦς [1a], i.e. ἰδέα τοῦ ἀτόμου νοῦ [2a]) and the preexisting Platonic Form, Intelligible

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[25] "ἀγροῖς δὲ ἀπεικάζει δυσὶ τήν τε ἰδέαν [1a] τοῦ νοῦ [2a] καὶ τὴν ἰδέαν [1b] τῆς αἰσθήσεως [2b]· φέρει γὰρ ὁ μὲν νοῦς [2a] καρπὸν τὰ [4a] ἐν τῷ νοεῖν, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις [2b] τὰ [4b] ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. ὃ δὲ λέγει, τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ ἀτόμου νοῦ [2a] προϋπάρχει τις ἰδέα [1a], ὡς ἂν ἀρχέτυπος καὶ παράδειγμα τούτου, καὶ πάλιν τῆς κατὰ μέρος αἰσθήσεως [2b] ‹ἰδέα [1b] τις αἰσθήσεως›, σφραγῖδος λόγον ἔχουσα εἴδη τυπούσης, οὕτως πρὶν μὲν γενέσθαι τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους νοητά [4a], ἦν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο γενικὸν νοητόν [3a], οὗ κατὰ μετοχὴν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα [4a] ὠνόμασται, πρὶν δὲ γενέσθαι τὰ κατὰ μέρος αἰσθητά [4b], ἦν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο γενικὸν αἰσθητόν [3b], οὗ κατὰ μετουσίαν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ [4b] γέγονε." (*L. A.* i. 22). Notice here that ἰδέα is a Platonic Form; εἴδη are particular copies of the archetypal Form.

Although Philo acknowledges a relation between νοῦς and νοητά, αἴσθησις and αἰσθητά, he does not mean that the latter in each case is the proper subset of the former. The particular νοῦς (2a) is a member of the set designated by the universal Νοῦς (1a). Particular νοητά (4a) are members of the set designated by the universal Νοητόν (3a).

As the thinking part of mortal human nature, the νοῦς (2a) is understandably considered perishable; yet, as the equivalent of ψυχή it can also be considered immortal and imperishable.

(Νοητόν [3a]), Philo equates Form with genus. The Form and the genus are linked by Philo's juxtaposition, "just as a certain Form . . . preexists, . . . in the same way, . . . there was the generic . . . ."; both are categorized as archetypes and patterns. The result is that Philo equates Platonic Forms with things generic because both are archetypes.[26]

The Form Νοῦς (1a) (Mind) and the Form Αἴσθησις (1b) (Sensation) both preexist particular νοῦς (2a) and particular αἴσθησις (2b) as archetypes, paradigms, and ἰδέαι, just as the generic Intelligible (Νοητόν) (3a) and the generic Sensible (Αἰσθητόν) (3b) preexist particular νοητά (4a) and particular αἰσθητά (4b). For both intellect and sensation, the Forms or generic archetypes (1 and 3 on the left side) preexist, while the particular, specific copies (2 and 4 on the right side) are the products of their generic counterparts.

Νοῦς and Αἴσθησις (1) are the intelligible principles that lie above our particular minds and powers to perceive (2), while Νοητόν and Αἰσθητόν (3) are the intelligible principles that lie above our particular thoughts and perceptions (4). The distinction between 1 and 3 is not fully clear, though the noun forms Philo uses suggest that 1 is subjective, 3 objective, a distinction of basic importance later in Neoplatonism. This is Philo's intriguing fusion of the theory of genus and species with the theory of Platonic Forms.[27]

## Double Creation

In *L. A.* ii. 12 and 13 Philo applies the theory of genus and species to the creation of man.

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[26] *Contra* Richard Baer, *Philo's Use of the Categories Male and Female,* Arbeiten zur Literatur und Geschichte des hellenistischen Judentums (Leiden 1970) 33, who says, ". . . we have been able to find no instance in Philo where γενός is unambiguously equivalent to ἰδέα in the technical Platonic sense, . . . ." Previously, referring to *Mut.* 148, Samuel Sandmel posited the identification of the two based on an argument by nature ("it is natural that . . .") in "Philo's Place in Judaism: A Study of Conceptions of Abraham in Jewish Literature," *Hebrew Union College Annual* 26 (1955) 290, n. 317.

[27] Philo's emphasis on intelligibles in the passage above is a familiar Platonic theme; but in addition to normal intelligible Forms he also speaks of an intelligible Form of perception; i.e. a category of intelligible, archetypal Perception (Αἴσθησις). On this peculiarity see Baer (n. 26 above) 22, n. 3. Another significant point about the above passage (especially *L. A.* i. 21, 23, and 24) is that the Form Νοῦς (1a), i.e. ἰδέα ἀτόμου νοῦ (2a), is the source of particular νοῦς (2a), as well as the source of the Form Νοητόν (3a); i.e. γενικὸν νοητόν. That Νοῦς (1a) is the source of another Form (3a) is evident from Philo's identification of the Νοῦς (1a) with a hexaemeric field (i.e. part of the six-day, first, creation) which produces hexaemeric grass (i.e. the Form Νοητόν [3a]). This same Νοῦς (1a) (hexaemeric field) also produces the particular νοῦς (2a); i.e. earthly field which is part of the second creation of Genesis 2:4 ff. according to Philo. In other words, the Form Νοῦς (1a) (hexaemeric field) produces the particular νοῦς (2a) (earthly field) as an archetype produces a copy; but the Form Νοῦς (1a) (hexaemeric field) also produces the Form Νοητόν (3a) (hexaemeric grass). (See n. 28 below for more details about the chronology of creation.)

In reference to fig. 2 above, the lowest level of Sarah's virtue, i.e. τὰ ὑπὸ τοῖς εἴδεσιν, is in this way appropriate both to imperishable virtue (as the *principle* of perceived sensible reality), and to the same sensible reality played out in Sarai's perishable virtues. In biblical terms, the former is the divine plan for history, the latter historical events; in Greek terms, the former is imperishable intelligible reality, the latter perishable sensible events.

> . . . on the former occasion, when engaged in the Work of the six days, He wrought the genera or kinds and the originals of the passions, whereas now He is fashioning the species as well. This is why he says, "He fashioned moreover." That what were created in the first instance were genera, is evident from the words employed, "Let the earth bring forth the living soul," not according to species but "according to kind [i.e. genus]." And we find Him in every instance working in this way. Before the species He completes the genera. He does so in the case of man. Having first fashioned man as a genus, in which the prophet says that there is the male and female genus, He afterwards makes Adam the finished form or species.[28]

In this passage Philo uses key terms as synonyms for archetype or copy as illustrated in figure 9. On the left are the imperishable archetypes, on the right, perishable copies.[29]

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[28] "πρότερον μὲν ἐν τῇ ἑξαημέρῳ τὰ γένη τῶν παθῶν καὶ τὰς ἰδέας εἰργάζετο, νυνὶ δὲ τὰ εἴδη προσπλάττει· διό φησιν 'ἔπλασεν ἔτι.' ὅτι δὲ τὰ πάλαι κατασκευασθέντα γένη ἦν, φανερὸν ἐξ ὧν φησιν 'ἐξαγαγέτω ἡ γῆ ψυχὴν ζῶσαν' οὐ κατ' εἶδος, ἀλλὰ 'κατὰ γένος.' καὶ τοιοῦτος ἐν ἅπασιν εὑρίσκεται· πρὸ γὰρ τῶν εἰδῶν ἀποτελεῖ τὰ γένη, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· προτυπώσας γὰρ τὸν γενικὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ γένος φησὶν εἶναι, ὕστερον τὸ εἶδος ἀπεργάζεται τὸν 'Αδάμ." (*L. A.* ii. 12-13). David Winston, in his *Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria* (Cincinnati 1985) 24, states the apparent inconsistency of Philo's creation account: God made the intelligible model first (i.e. incorporeal form), then the visible world; but the creation of the incorporeal form of man (Gen. 1:27) takes place on the sixth day rather than the first. Wolfson, in his "Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretations of Platonic Ideas," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 22 (1961) 6, gives the usual interpretation: "When God by His own good will decided to create this world of ours, He first, out of the ideas which had been in His thoughts from eternity, constructed an 'intelligible world,' and this intelligible world he placed in the Logos, which had likewise existed previously from eternity in His thought. Then in the likeness of this intelligible world of ideas, He created this 'visible world' of ours." See Baer (n. 26 above) 26 on this view.

According to the most recent detailed study on the subject by David T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the "Timaeus" of Plato*, Philosophia Antiqua 44 (Leiden 1986) 553, there can be only one satisfactory "chronology" of the Mosaic cosmogony in Philo: a) the heaven and the earth are materially created by the sixth day; b) in the hexaemeron the generic or incorporeal forms of man, animals, and plants are created; c) on the seventh day Adam and Eve are created and the entire sensible cosmos is brought to completion.

[29] In this figure I do not posit any hierarchical relation between terms above or below each other, only the relation of archetype and copy between terms left and right. I have listed Philo's terms on the appropriate sides to show that, in *L. A.* ii. 12-13, the term εἶδος (species) indicates the perishable copy of the archetype (γένος or ἰδέα). Concerning the heavenly and earthly man, Baer, (n. 26 above) 21-22, 28-34, notes that the usual interpretation (that the man of Gen. 1:27 is the ideal man in a Platonic sense, and the man of Gen. 2:7 is his earthly counterpart) is inconsistent with Philo's interpretation elsewhere. In fact Baer (22) denies that Philo includes in his writings "the idea of man" at all. Rather, he speaks of the component parts of man, i.e. the idea of the rational or irrational soul which also includes the body (p. 22, n. 3, but see also p. 26, n. 1). He maintains that Philo generally uses Gen. 1:27 to establish the likeness of empirical man's rational soul to the Logos and God rather than to posit an ideal man. The generic heavenly man (ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα θεοῦ) is the rational soul of man (p. 32), and the generic earthly man (πλασθεὶς ἄνθρωπος of *Op.* 134) is the man "fashioned" by God, on a level above the first empirical male (αἰσθητὸς καὶ ἐπὶ μέρος ἄνθρωπος of *Op.* 135). Man is a composite of a heavenly and earthly part. First God formed the genus of each part, which afterward all together formed the first empirical man. Neither the heavenly nor the earthly man actu-

**FIGURE 9**
**"First the Genus, Then the Species": Key Terms**

| *Imperishable* | *Perishable* |
|---|---|
| Archetype | Copy |
| τὰ γένη | τὰ εἴδη |
| αἱ ἰδέαι | τὰ εἴδη |
| ὁ γενικὸς ἄνθρωπος (in which is the γένος male and female) | τὸ εἶδος (Adam) |

First the genera (i.e. archetypes or Forms), then the species (i.e. copies). This is Philo's explanation for what appears to be a second creation account in Genesis 2. Elsewhere he refers to the results of a double creation: a heavenly man and an earthly man (*L. A.* i. 31 ff.; ii. 4), an intelligible world and a visible world (*Op.* 16).[30] In the broader context of the passage (*L. A.* ii. 11 f.) he applies the genus-species distinction in the same way as above to the animal kingdom by stating that the four-footed creatures, the reptiles, and the wild beasts formed during the six days of creation are the genera (i.e. imperishable archetypes) while the creatures formed later, in Genesis 2, are the species (i.e. perishable copies).[31] By the same token, then, the genera Νοητόν and Αἰσθητόν (3a and b in fig. 8) are imperishable counterparts to perishable νοητά and αἰσθητά (4a and b).

Philo does not indicate in each case to which classificatory level he refers, except that the archetype, ὁ γενικὸς ἄνθρωπος, does not refer to the lowest level (because it includes even lower distinctions of male and female), but that τὸ εἶδος – Ἀδάμ does; he is the first human male: a perishable particular. Hebrew etymology, however, allows for possible ambiguity for the classificatory level of "Adam" because in Hebrew the noun can indicate man in the general sense,

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ally exists; they are only the generic component parts of the first empirical man (p. 28). He does not see Gen. 2:4-7 as recording a new creation but rather a summary recapitulation of what has already been described in Gen. 1:1-2:3 (p. 29). Thus, Gen 2:4-5 refers to the creation of the incorporeal ideas, Gen. 2:6 to the creation of the visible genera (but does not include man), and Gen. 2:7 to the creation of man.

The most recent detailed study on the subject by Runia (n. 28 above) 336-38 follows Baer. Note, however, Birger A. Pearson's ("Philo and Gnosticism," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, II Principat vol. 21.1, 1984) 325-26 acknowledgment that at some times (*Op.* 134 f., 76) Philo treats the man of Gen. 1:27 as the ideal type of the man in Gen. 2:7, but at other times (*Op.* 69ff., 73) not. Cornelia J. de Vogel, "Platonism and Christianity: A Mere Antagonism or a Profound Common Ground?," *Vigilae Christianae* 39 (1985) 16, interprets Philo's Platonism to include an ideal and eternal man-himself created in an heavenly order as a pattern for the earthly man who is a composite of body and soul. See also the comprehensive study of Thomas H. Tobin, *The Creation of Man: Philo and the History of Interpretation*, Catholic Biblical Quarterly. Monograph Series 14 (Washinton 1983).

30 Concerning Philo's account of the creation of the genera first, then the species, Baer (n.26 above) 26-28, maintains that in *Op.* 36-128 Philo refers to the creation of the generic, sense-perceptible world and that the genera created first are *mortal* genera of the visible creation (days two through six) which are generic in relation to the subsequent creation of species and are not to be equated with the intelligible ideas of the first day of creation.

31 Species (εἴδη) in this context refers to the perishable things of the second creation which are copies of the imperishable things of the the first creation.

including both male and female, or the personal name of the first human male. In the former case τὸ εἶδος – Ἀδάμ would refer to the class of perishable humankind (male and female); i.e. a Form immanent in individual human males and females which perishes when every particular human male and female perishes. This class would be on the same classificatory level as the ὁ γενικὸς ἄνθρωπος. In the later case τὸ εἶδος – Ἀδάμ would refer to the first perishable human male and would be on the lowest level (even lower than ὁ γενικὸς ἄνθρωπος).

The explanation for why the male and female genus or species is included in the class of generic man is given in *Op.* 76. The primary species (pl.) (τὰ προσεχέστατα τῶν εἰδῶν) are inherent (ἐνυπάρχειν) in the genus to begin with. Thus, God made generic man as male and female already before the individual species of male and female appeared. This principle explains *L. A.* i. 63 and 64 in which generic virtue (the largest river in the garden of Eden) receives its origins (αἱ ἀρχαί, i.e. the four cardinal virtues) from Eden (the Wisdom of God), and the specific four river branches (the four cardinal virtues) receive their origins from the largest river (generic virtue). In other words, the origins pass from the Wisdom of God, to generic virtue, and finally to specific virtue. The particulars are seminally present in the genus.

### Impersonal (Absolute) vs. Personal (Perishable)

In *Cher.* 5 and 7 Philo emphasizes a key aspect in the theory of genus and species. (See figure 10.)[32]

> Sarah was still Sarai, the type of personal sovereignty (her name means "my sovereignty"); she had not yet undergone the change to generic virtue; for all that is generic must be imperishable. She still had her place with the particular and specific virtues. She was still prudence, as shown in the "I," and similarly temperance, courage, justice, all perishable, because the sphere in which they move is the perishable "I" (¶ 5). Sarai again quits personal sovereignty to become Sarah, whose name is "sovereign," and this means that instead of being specific and perishable virtue she has become generic and imperishable (¶ 7).[33]

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[32] In this figure I posit a hierarchical relation between items higher and lower. Generic virtue on the left (1) is the genus for the four virtues below it (3), both of which are designated as imperishable. On the right, personal virtue in a general sense (2) (e.g. someone's virtue in general) is the genus for the four specific personal virtues below it (4) (e.g. someone's prudence, etc.), both levels of which are designated as perishable because they perish with the individual possessing them. (This is an example of immanent Forms in which the higher Forms of a lower classificatory level "perish" (i.e. cease to be instantiated) when the items of the lower level perish).

[33] "... Σάρα δὲ σύμβολον ἀρχῆς ἐμῆς—καλεῖται γὰρ ἀρχή μου—γενικὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔφθη μεταβαλοῦσα ἀρετὴ γενέσθαι—γένος γὰρ πᾶν ἄφθαρτον—, ταῖς δὲ ἐν μέρει καὶ κατ' εἶδος ἐξητάζετο, ἡ δὲ αὐτὴ φρόνησίς τ' ἦν ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, φθαρταὶ δὲ αὗται, ὅτι καὶ τὸ δεξάμενον αὐτὰς χωρίον ἐγὼ φθαρτός, ..." (¶ 5). "... Σάρα δὲ ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς μου γένηται Σάρρα, ἧς ἐστιν ἡ κλῆσις ἄρχουσα, ὅπερ ἦν ἴσον τῷ ἀντὶ εἰδικῆς καὶ φθαρτῆς ἀρετῆς γενικὴν καὶ ἄφθαρτον γενέσθαι, ..." (¶ 7). (*Cher.* 5 and 7). Notice that in this passage Philo does not actually specify a third (lowest) level for either imperishable Sarah (left side) or for perishable Sarai (right side) (though Sarai's perishable nature includes particular empir-

**FIGURE 10**
**Sari Becomes Sarah**

| *Imperishable* | *Perishable* |
|---|---|
| Sarah: | Sarai: |
| 1. "sovereign" (absolute) (i.e. generic virtue) | 2. "my sovereignty" (personal) (i.e. *personal* virtue in a general sense) |
| 3. (absolute virtues) (i.e. absolute prudence, temperance, courage, justice) | 4. particular and specific (*personal*) virtues (i.e. *personal* prudence, temperance, courage, justice) |

Before Sarai became Sarah, she was a symbol of personal sovereignty (2) and of the particular and specific (ἐν μέρει καὶ κατ' εἶδος) personal virtues (4) which are perishable because they are associated with perishable people. But after her name became Sarah she was "sovereign" (1) (absolute in contrast to personal; i.e. not "my sovereignty,") and by analogy also a symbol of the absolute virtues (3). For example, one can speak of an individual's personal virtues (i.e. prudence, temperance, courage, and justice "in me," [4]) which are perishable because they perish when that individual perishes.[34] One can also speak of an individual's virtue in general (2) without naming any specific virtue. Similarly one can speak of a particular absolute virtue (e.g. absolute prudence, [3]) which is imperishable and absolute in so far as it is not possessed by any perishable individual. But one can also speak of absolute virtue in a general sense (1). The key distinction here is between the perishable personal qualities (the right side, 2 and 4) and the imperishable absolute qualities (the left side, 1 and 3). Philo calls the imperishable (left) side "generic"; the perishable (right) side "specific."[35]

### Two Senses of Genus and Species

This double distinction between imperishable ("generic") genus and species, and perishable ("specific") genus and species is maintained in another key

ical acts, the lowest level in Aristotle's scheme), in contrast to *Mut.* 148 where he does specify a third level; i.e. τὰ ὑπὸ τοῖς εἴδεσιν (see fig. 2).

[34] Personal virtue in a general sense (2) and personal particular virtue (4) perish in the same way that Solomon's virtue in general and Solomon's wisdom in particular perished with Solomon.

[35] Dillon correctly sees, in his *Grades of Virtue* (n. 5 above) 102, that there are Forms of the four cardinal virtues which are logically subordinate to the Form of generic virtue, but he unhappily associates the former with the four rivers of Eden, calling them Forms of the cardinal virtues rather than recognizing them as allegorical symbols of the specific cardinal virtues. His deductions can be drawn correctly from the allegory of Sarah and Sarai as symbols of imperishable and perishable virtue as illustrated in fig. 10. His explanation (p. 97) of four higher kathartic virtues in Plotinus which are paradigmatic for four lower civic virtues reflects Philo's distinction between imperishable and perishable virtues.

passage illustrating Sarah's change of name: *Mut.* 79 and 80. (Bracketed numbers below refer to items in figure 11.)

> Wisdom [2] in the good man is a sovereignty vested in himself alone, and its possessor will not err if he says, "The wisdom in me is my sovereignty." But in the wisdom which is its archetype, the generic wisdom [1], we cease to have the sovereignty of the particular individual, but the sovereignty its very self. And therefore that specific wisdom [2] will perish with its possessor, while the other [1] which like a seal gave it its shape, being free from all mortal elements, will continue for ever imperishable.[36]

**FIGURE 11**
**Generic vs. Specific Prudence**

| *Imperishable* | *Perishable* |
|---|---|
| 1. γενική φρόνησις | 2. φρόνησις "in me" |

Philo contrasts prudence "in me," i.e. personal, perishable prudence (2), with generic prudence, i.e. absolute, imperishable prudence (1). Both are specific in one sense, because both are prudence in contrast to virtue in general; and yet φρόνησις "in me" (2) is called "specific" (ἐν εἴδει) in a second sense because it is perishable. Conversely, γενική φρόνησις (1) is called "generic" because it is imperishable (even though it is a particular virtue rather than virtue in general).[37] Here again (as in *Cher.* 5 and 7 above) the imperishable (left) side is called "generic," the perishable (right) side, "specific," even though both items are a particular virtue (prudence) and, as species, fit logically on the *same vertical* level of the genus-species-individual hierarchy.[38]

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36 "ἡ μὲν ‹γὰρ› ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ φρόνησις (2) αὐτοῦ μόνου ἐστὶν ἀρχή, καὶ οὐκ ἄν ἁμάρτοι ὁ ἔχων, εἰ λέγοι· ἀρχή μού ἐστιν ἡ ἐν ἐμοὶ φρόνησις· ἡ δὲ ταύτην τυπώσασα, ἡ γενικὴ φρόνησις (1), οὐκέτι τοῦ δεῖνός ἐστιν ἀρχη, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀρχή. τοιγαροῦν ἐκείνη (2) μὲν ἡ ἐν εἴδει τῷ ἔχοντι συμφθαρήσεται, ἡ δὲ σφραγῖδος τρόπον αὐτὴν (1) τυπώσασα παντὸς ἀπηλλαγμένη θνητοῦ διατελέσει πρὸς αἰῶνα ἄφθαρτος." (*Mut.* 79-80).

37 The two senses in which Philo uses the terms generic and specific are: (1) to denote the distinction between something more or less general in the genus-species-individual hierarchy (the vertical dimension), and (2) to denote the distinction between something imperishable or perishable (a horizontal dimension).

38 Within his interpretation of the four rivers of Eden Philo makes a similar distinction between two kinds of prudence (*L. A.* i. 63, 77-78). Gen. 2:12 says that the river Pheison (prudence) encircles all the land of Evilat, where the gold is good. Out of his sense of obligation to explain the distinction between good gold and bad gold, Philo says that good gold is universal (καθόλου) prudence (1 in figure 11 above) and bad gold is particular (ἐπὶ μέρους) prudence (2 in figure 11 above), by which he means that prudence associated with an individual (φρόνησις ἐν μοὶ) is not good because it perishes when the individual perishes, but that prudence in general is good because it is imperishable. This is precisely the same distinction we have noticed in *Mut.* 77 ff. where Sarah represents imperishable prudence itself and Sarai represents perishable prudence associated with an individual.

**Philo's Amalgam of Platonic and Aristotelian Systems**

This identification of "generic" with imperishable and "specific" with perishable is significant in light of Philo's previous identification of the genus with Platonic Forms. Figure 12 illustrates the various aspects of his fusion of Platonic Forms with the theory of genus, species, and particular.[39]

**FIGURE 12**
**Philo's Fusion of Platonic Forms with the Theory of Genus, Species, and Particular**

| *Imperishable* | *Perishable* |
|---|---|
| I. (Platonic Forms) | II. (Aristotelian universals) |
| a. Genus | a. genus |
| b. Species | b. species |
| c. Particular | c. particular |

As used by Philo, Platonic Forms (I. a, b, and c) are imperishable abstract entities in contrast to perishable particulars (II. c.). They are the cause of, ontologically prior to, and independent of their perishable exemplifications (i.e. they have a horizontal relation from the imperishable realm to the perishable), and they have hierarchical structure (i.e., a vertical relation of genus, species, and particular).[40]

One of the differences between Plato and Philo is that the latter includes imperishable particulars (I. c) while the former does not. Philo takes them for granted in his treatment of the double creation as one of image and reflection, a blueprint and resulting edifice, which correspond in details with each other.[41] Philo's type-antitype imagery depends on the class of imperishable particulars because a particular (perishable) copy requires a particular (imperishable) archetype in order to end up particular; otherwise, if the archetype were general, the copy would be general.

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[39] Although Plato does not incorporate imperishable particulars (I. c) in his theory of Forms, Philo does. The left side of figure 12 is titled "Platonic Forms" to show Philo's dependence on Platonism and to contrast it with the Aristotelian framework on the right, not to indicate that imperishable particulars are Plato's.

[40] Cf. Plato's placement of the Form of the Good at the top of his hierarchy in his *Republic* (e.g. 6. 509).

[41] Although Philo does not posit a strict one-to-one correspondence with each perishable particular having its own imperishable particular archetype (i.e. a complete doubling of our world), as Thomas Billings seems to suggest in his *The Platonism of Philo Judaeus* (Chicago 1919) 76, he does seem to take for granted a single imperishable particular archetype for multiple perishable particular copies on the same classificatory level (i.e. he provides for detailed originals on which the multiple copies of this world are based).

Another difference between Plato and Philo is that for Plato a Form is roughly comparable to the abstract universal of its particular; for Philo this is not necessarily the case. For Plato the imperishable Form is one classificatory level higher than the perishable particular; for Philo it can be on the same level. Thus, for Philo, each perishable item on side II normally has its corresponding imperishable Form *on the same level* on side I. This principle is the result of Philo's dependence on the type-antitype imagery which requires that reproduced details be based on archetypal details.[42] Philo shows his reliance on the relation between imperishable and perishable items on the same classificatory level by speaking of the intelligible world and the visible world (*Op.* 16), the heavenly man and the earthly man (*L. A.* i. 31 ff., ii. 4), the four-footed animals, creeping things, and wild beasts of the first creation, and those of the second creation. In *Op.* 24 f. he speaks of the first creation as a mental architectural blueprint including imperishable details (i.e. particulars) to which the perishable details correspond.[43]

For Plato the imperishable universal (I. b) is the ontological cause for the perishable particular (II. c): a diagonal relation from the higher classificatory level on the left side to a lower classificatory level on the right. For Philo the ontological relation is a horizontal one from the imperishable particular (I. c) on the left side, to the perishable particular (II. c) on the right.

In addition, a significant difference exists between Platonic Forms (I. a, and b) and Aristotelian universals (II. a and b) when the latter are considered immanent Forms. Strictly speaking, the term "immanent Form" denotes an abstract universal (either Platonic or Aristotelian) in the state of participation with, exemplification in, or instantiation in, perishable instances. Even though Plato speaks of Forms as immanent in particulars, his Forms are the only true realities; they do not perish even if every particular were to perish. But for Aristotle, because particulars in a sense are the only true realities, his universals depend on particulars for their existence. If all the particulars cease to exist, so do his immanent Forms.[44]

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[42] Cf. Philo's references (*L. A.* iii. 102, *Cong.* 8) to Ex. 25:40 where the earthly tabernacle (i.e. a detailed perishable particular) is a copy of the heavenly pattern (i.e. a detailed *imperishable* particular). The heavenly blueprint has all the particular details which the Israelites are to reproduce in the earthly tabernacle. Other Old Testament examples which come to mind and which may have influenced Philo are the accounts of creation and of the animals in Noah's ark; each illustrates a related use of "archetypal" (though perishable) particulars: Adam and Eve are the detailed "archetypes" (e.g. Adam for males; Eve for females) from which subsequent individuals are reproduced; as are each of the animals in Noah's ark for the post-diluvian world. For examples of imperishable particulars apart from the type-antitype imagery, angels come to mind (as well as human souls).

[43] Winston explains how God operates as an architect in his "Philo's Theory of Eternal Creation: *De Prov.* 1, 6-9," *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research* 47 (1980) 599: "Insofar as God is always thinking the intelligible 'Forms,' he is eternally creating the Intelligible World or Logos, and thereby also indirectly causing its shadow reflection, the sensible world, which he is constantly making to conform as closely as possible to its intellectual counterpart." This function is similar to that of Plato's Demiurge (*Tim.* 39e) who accomplishes his work by carefully shaping it with regard to the nature of the model.

[44] This cessation of Aristotelian universals is slightly different from that mentioned in Plato's *Phaedo* 102-5. Plato's point is that opposites (of Forms or instances) fly away, retire, or perish at the approach of the other (whether of Form or instance). More precisely, at the approach of an opposite, imperishable Forms *retreat* and perishable

The question of whether imperishable Forms transcend their perishable counterparts (e.g. as an archetype or pattern existing outside of the copy) or are immanent in them (e.g. as a presence in which they participate) is as unsettled in Philo as it is in Plato. Both retain both aspects. For Philo, as for Plato, perishable instances imitate or are patterned by Forms as copies by archetypes, but in different ways: for Plato from a higher to lower level, for Philo on the same level from left to right. For both Philo and Plato, the Forms participate in (i.e. μετέχειν, μεταλαμβάνειν), or have παρουσία, or κοινωνία in or with the perishable instances.

In Philo's passages considered above we find that he retains Platonic Forms as useful imperishable entities, and that he retains the genus-species-instance hierarchy as a useful classificatory structure; but he seems unconcerned about the precise relation between their various parts: e.g. the ontological dependence of Aristotelian universals (II. a and b) on perishable instances (II. c). Secondly, his use of technical terms related to these issues is at times so imprecise and careless that he nearly destroys their usefulness (e.g. speaking of imperishable prudence as generic, even though it can only be a species in a three-part genus-species-instance hierarchy).

This fusion of Platonic Forms with the theory of classificatory hierarchy has considerable significance for the terms genus and species because both now have two implications: firstly, that "generic" and "specific" distinguish between imperishable and perishable (i.e. the horizontal distinction between left and right sides respectively); secondly, that generic and specific distinguish between universal and particular (i.e. the vertical distinction between levels higher and lower respectively).

In light of this, something that is generic to a superlative degree (see *L. A.* i. 59 γενικωτάτη) is generic in both senses of the word: it is both imperishable and an abstract universal. Figure 13 applies this framework to virtue.

**FIGURE 13**
**Composite Classificatory Framework for Imperishable and Perishable Virtue**

| *Imperishable* | *Perishable* |
|---|---|
| I. (absolute) | II. (personal) |
| a. Virtue | a. virtue |
| b. A Specific Virtue | b. a specific virtue |
| c. A Particular Example Of A Specific Virtue | c. particular example of a specific virtue |

instances *perish*. E.g. when cold (or snow) is applied to heat (or fire), heat retires because it is an imperishable Form, but fire perishes because it is a perishable instance.

### Application of Classificatory Framework to Previous Passages

With this framework it is possible to clarify some of the imprecision in Philo's terminology. In *Cher.* 5 and 7, Sarai is "sovereignty of me," a symbol for personal virtue (II. a of fig.13), which is perishable (φθαρτή) and is called "specific" virtue (εἰδικὴ ἀρετή) even though it is at the top of a genus-species-instance hierarchy (see n. 37 for this second sense of species). Sarai (personal virtue) is also identified with all four particular personal virtues (II. b) because all four are seminally present as classificatory members in the classificatory genus above them. At the change of her name, Sarai changes from personal virtue (II. a) to "generic" (i.e. imperishable) Virtue (γενικὴ ἀρετή) (I. a). When considered in her particular aspects she has changed from the four particular perishable virtues (II. b) to the four particular imperishable Virtues (I. b).

In *L. A.* ii. 13, God's first creation of genera (γένη) and originals (ἰδέαι) includes all that is imperishable (I. a, b, and c in figure 14.)

**FIGURE 14**
**Composite Classificatory Framework**

| *Imperishable* | *Perishable* |
|---|---|
| I. | II. |
| a. Genus | a. genus |
| b. Species | b. species |
| c. Particular | c. particular |

His second creation was of "species" (εἴδη) which include everything perishable (II. a, b, and c). His γενικὸς ἄνθρωπος is imperishable Humankind (I. b) which encompasses the sub-categories Male and Female, which themselves fit above the level of imperishable Particular (I. c). Although Adam (the first earthly male) is a classificatory particular (II. c) of perishable man (II. b), he is "species" (τὸ εἶδος) in this passage because he is a perishable counterpart (i.e. copy) of an imperishable archetype. It is easy for Philo to leave out the distinction between the imperishable generic Man (I. b), i.e. Humankind as an imperishable genus, and the imperishable Particular Man (I. c), i.e. the imperishable particular archetype (I. c) of which the perishable Adam (II. c) is a copy, because in Hebrew, Adam is both Man in the generic sense (including both male and female genus) (I. b or II. b), and the personal name of the first human male (II. c).[45]

In *L. A.* i. 22 ff., νοῦς and αἴσθησις are both called "species" (εἴδη, i.e. "shapes" made by the seal), because they are perishable copies of the imperishable archetypes, not because they are species of a higher classificatory genus.

### Additional Aspects of Philo's Amalgam

In *Mut.* 122 Philo emphasizes the imperishable-perishable distinction in a different way:

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[45] This point, however, does not hinge on Philo's knowledge of Hebrew.

> For states are better than the individuals who embody them. . . .[46]

A state (ἕξις) in this context means a certain permanent condition. Individual (ποιός) means a man of certain specific qualities or a certain specific man. This latter term is the antonym of ἄποιος: a man of no specific quality, or a man in general. By contrasting music and the musician, medicine and the physician, craft and the craftsman, Philo distinguishes the permanent imperishable condition from the temporal perishable person with whom that condition is associated. In the context of this passage he contrasts the everlasting (ἀίδιον), active (ἐνεργοῦν), and perfect (τέλειον) condition with the mortal (θνητόν), acted on (πάσχον), and imperfect (ἀτελές) individual. By exalting ἕξις as an imperishable, wholly actualized cause better than the mortal, imperfect thing acted on, Philo adds an evaluation of relative worth to the genus-species hierarchy: the more generic something is, the better it is; the less generic, the worse it is. The general designation "goodness" for virtue in its most generic sense (e.g. in *L. A.* i. 59; 65) shows this principle clearly.

In *Det.* 77 Philo stresses how important an accurate knowledge of the theory of genus and species is.

> Therefore, those uninitiated in learning, who do not know the difference between wholes and parts or between genera and species, nor know that among them are equivocal names given to things different in nature and definition, altogether confound and confuse everything.[47]

The difference between wholes (ὅλοι) and parts (μέρη) and between genera (γένη) and species (εἴδη) can be understood as one-dimensional (i.e. vertical); it distinguishes between the whole genus and the particular species. But the difference between things with the same name (ὁμώνυμοι) and a different essence clearly connotes a second dimension (i.e. horizontal). For example, Prudence and prudence have the same name, but the second dimension of the genus-species theory accounts for the distinction between imperishable absolute Prudence and perishable personal prudence (see fig. 11).

Philo's interpretation of Cain's murder of Abel (*Det.* all, but especially ¶ 78) raises this principle of ὁμώνυμοι. Although Cain (Self Love) killed his brother in order to destroy Abel (Love For God), he accomplished only the murder of one specific individual, not the annihilation of the imperishable genus with the same name. He killed Abel (his brother) but could not destroy Abel (Love of God).

In this passage (¶ 78) Philo explains in greater detail the principle behind ὁμώνυμοι by listing two groups of generally synonymous terms: ἀρχέτυπον, γένος, and ἰδέα characterize the Abel that Cain could not kill; εἶδος, μέρος, and ἀπεικονισθεὶς τύπος characterize the Abel whom Cain killed (one specific perishable individual). The primary distinction between these lists of synonyms is that of imperishability and perishability. In using these general synonyms Philo is not worried about precise nomenclature within each of the general categories (e.g. γένος, ἰδέα, ἐννόημα in ¶ 78 and 76). He is content to leave that matter to the expertise of the ζητητικοί. But he considers an accurate distinction between the imperishable and the perishable group to be crucial.

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46 "ἕξεις γὰρ τῶν κατ' αὐτὰς ποιῶν ἀμείνους, . . ." (*Mut.* 122).

47 "οὐκ εἰδότες οὖν οἱ παιδείας ἀμύητοι διαφορὰς οὔθ' ὅλων πρὸς μέρη οὔτε γενῶν πρὸς εἴδη οὔτε τὰς ἐν τούτοις ὁμωνυμίας πάντα διὰ πάντων συγχέουσι καὶ φύρουσι." (*Det.* 77).

## Terminology

In *Som.* i. 45 Philo deals with another aspect of the imperishable, perishable distinction.

> For Laban, knowing neither pattern, nor genus, nor Form, nor concept, nor absolutely anything else of the things received by the intelligence alone, but depending on manifest things which come into the eyes and ears and kindred senses, was worthy of Haran as his country. . . . [48]

Philo explains that Laban's residence in Haran signifies that a man with no knowledge of intelligible things must exist on the level of sensation. Of the four terms listed as things grasped only by the intelligence, we have seen the last three: genus (γένος), Form (ἰδέα), and concept (ἐννόημα) grouped together before under the general category of imperishable things (see discussion on *Det.* 75-77). But in that context, pattern (εἶδος), was contrasted with γένος instead of equated with it as here.

Εἶδος, in Platonism, is often a synonym of ἰδέα. Both are derived from εἴδω (a non-extant form replaced by ὁράω); both denote a shape or form, which in a basic sense can be seen. But just as its meaning can shift from seeing with one's eyes to seeing with one's mind (as noted from the perfect tense, οἶδα, which means "I have mentally seen in the past—therefore I know in the present"), εἶδος and ἰδέα can shift in meaning from a shape or form perceived by sight to a shape or form perceived by the mind. Therefore, in the context of Platonic philosophy both εἶδος and ἰδέα usually mean an intellectually perceived shape or Form (e.g. imperishable prudence) which functions as a general intellectual pattern for specific empirical manifestations of that pattern (e.g. a particular perishable example of prudence). However, εἶδος, in some contexts (as with the first perishable male, Adam) denotes a particular shape or form perceivable with the eyes.

Just as εἶδος can denote shape or form in a broad general sense or in a narrow specific sense depending on the context, so γένος can denote class or kind either in a broad sense or narrow sense depending on the context. In the context of Platonic-Aristotelian logic, γένος is the class of which εἶδος is a subdivision. But in other contexts γένος can denote a subdivision of a yet broader class (e.g. φρατρία, and ἔθνος). By equating εἶδος with γένος in this passage, Philo is linking the sense of εἶδος (i.e. Form) in the context of Platonic philosophy and that of γένος (genus) in the context of Aristotelian logic so that they both denote the more general, less concrete category (i.e. intelligibles) as distinct from the less abstract, more concrete category (i.e. sensibles). The last term, ἐννόημα, because of its etymological relation to νοῦς, emphasizes the contrast between the category of things that are manifest (ἐμφανῆ) to the senses and those that are not. We see from this passage that Philo does not always use his terminology consistently; nevertheless, he does incorporate general Platonic distinctions in his application of the theory of genus and species.

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[48] "Λάβαν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ εἶδος, οὐ γένος, οὐκ ἰδέαν, οὐκ ἐννόημα, οὐκ ἄλλο τῶν νοήσει μόνῃ καταλαμβανομένων οὐδὲν ἁπλῶς εἰδώς, ἠρτημένος δὲ τῶν ἐμφανῶν, ἅπερ εἰς ὄψεις καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ τὰς συγγενεῖς δυνάμεις ἔρχεται, πατρίδος ἠξίωται Χαρράν, . . ." (*Som.* i. 45).

## Manna

In *L. A.* ii. 86 Philo explains that God satisfies the thirst of the soul by the water of his wisdom (the highest and first of his powers); he satisfies the hunger of the soul with manna, the most generic thing of all.

> The thirst of passions takes hold until God sends the stream of [i.e. from] his own sharp wisdom and waters the redirected soul with unchanging health. For the sharp rock is the wisdom of God which he marked off as the highest and first of his powers, from which [rock] he waters God-loving souls. Those watered also eat their fill of the most generic manna, (for manna is called "What [is it]?", which is the genus of everything). God is the most generic, and the Logos of God is second, and the other things subsist only by the Logos.[49]

In this passage Philo offers a succinct definition of "genus" and "generic" which springs delightfully from his allegorical perspective: the most generic of all things is manna. In the Exodus 16:15 (LXX) account the Israelites saw the small delicate flakes of bread covering the ground and said, "What is it?" (Τί ἐστιν τοῦτο; in Hebrew: *man hu*). Philo recognizes in this question the basis for identifying the essence of all things. The Socratic question "What is so-and-so?", which rejects all examples and accepts only the thing itself, is a search for its genus: the most common possible characteristic of that thing which defines its class. A definition of the genus is the answer to the most fundamental question "What is it?"[50]

## Summary

Philo relies on technical terminology, e.g. γένος (genus), εἶδος (species), and ἰδέα (form), in his ethical theory to describe various aspects of virtue. In doing so, he sometimes follows a pattern based on a simple contrast between generic and specific virtue, at other times one based on a tripartite framework which includes generic virtue, specific virtues, and particular concrete acts or instances of specific virtues. He uses two key allegorical examples: the rivers in the Garden of Eden, the largest of which he identifies with generic virtue, from which branch off the four specific virtues, which in turn water the individual acts of specific virtues; and the Ten Commandments which are the source for all the particular ordinances of the Old Testament but are also on the species level under the more generic "common utility" virtues.

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[49] "καὶ δίψα καταλαμβάνει ἡ τῶν παθῶν, μέχρις ἂν ὁ θεὸς τῆς ἀκροτόμου σοφίας ἑαυτοῦ τὸ νᾶμα ἐπιπέμψῃ καὶ ποτίσῃ τήν τραπεῖσαν ψυχὴν ἀμεταβλήτῳ ὑγείᾳ· ἡ γὰρ ἀκρότομος πέτρα ἡ σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστιν, ἣν ἄκραν καὶ πρωτίστην ἔτεμεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεων, ἐξ ἧς ποτίζει τὰς φιλοθέους ψυχάς· ποτισθεῖσαι δὲ καὶ τοῦ μάννα ἐμπίπλανται τοῦ γενικωτάτου—καλεῖται γὰρ τὸ μάννα 'τί,' ὅ πάντων ἐστὶ γένος—, τὸ δὲ γενικώτατόν ἐστιν ὁ θεός, καὶ δεύτερος ὁ θεοῦ λόγος, τὰ δ' ἄλλα λόγῳ μόνον ὑπάρχει, . . ." (*L. A.* ii. 86). See Peder Borgen, *Bread from Heaven: An Exegetical Study of the Concept of Manna in the Gospel of John and the Writings of Philo*, Supplements to Novum Testamentum 10 (Leiden 1965) for his treatment of manna as virtue or wisdom that is self-taught by nature which comes without toil or effort as the objects of God's grace (esp. 105-7, 119).

[50] Porphyry writes (1 b 26), "When, however, we are asked what man is, we answer, 'Animal.' Animal is the genus of man." See also Aristotle, *Topics* 128 a 20-29, who writes that the genus most appropriately indicates essence. See also his *Metaphysics* 1024 b 5-6.

Two key passages (on the double creation and Sarah's name change) demonstrate Philo's fusion of Platonic Forms with the genus-species hierarchy. In this amalgam Sarah is a symbol for imperishable virtue and Sarai for perishable virtue, whether in their generic, specific, or particular aspects. Philo's use of imperishable virtue (generic or specific) as an archetype of perishable virtue (generic or specific) in many respects equates the former with Platonic Forms and gives "generic" and "specific" two senses: (1) what is more or less general or abstract in the classificatory hierarchy of genus, species, and individual (the vertical dimension), and (2) what is imperishable or perishable (a horizontal dimension).

This duality lies behind Philo's use of homonymous terms (e.g. prudence as a reference to an imperishable or perishable reality), and ultimately behind his allegories as well; all of which allows Philo to speak of virtue (generic or specific) as imperishable (symbolized by Sarah), or as perishable (symbolized by Sarai). Imperishable generic virtue never perishes, but perishable generic virtue ceases when the individual with whom it is associated passes away.

# "Repentant Eve, Perfected Adam" Conversion in *The Acts of Andrew*

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> By conversion we mean the reorientation of the soul of an individual, [a] deliberate turning from indifference or from an earlier form of piety to another, a turning which implies a consciousness that a great change is involved, that the old was wrong and the new is right.[1]

## Introduction

Throughout the literary traditions of antiquity are found various portrayals and models of conversion. The ideas, symbols and rituals that constitute or describe the process of conversion are part of the diverse network of social, cultural and ideological structures of a community.[2] As A. D. Nock observed in his classic study, the widespread pattern of interaction and assimilation within different religious and philosophical settings (Jewish, Christian and Greco-Roman) reflects the spirit of rivalry among the assorted movements, and attests the basic impulses and needs that stirred individuals to distinctive forms of belief and moral standards. In this context the notion of conversion as willful decision for one to the exclusion of all others emerged as a prominent feature of ancient literature and propaganda.

Among Christian writings of the second and third centuries the apocryphal *Acts* provide the most elaborate and dramatic narrations of conversion to Christianity.[3] *The Acts of Andrew* (*AA*) is an especially promising document for

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[1] Nock, *Conversion. The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933) 7. Although Nock's assessment is true of certain ideas of conversion in antiquity, particularly among Jewish and Christian writers, other less exclusive understandings are present in the traditions; cf., Ramsay MacMullen, "Two Types of Conversion to Early Christianity," *VC* 37 (1983) 174-92; and idem, "Conversion: An Historian's View," *SecCent* 5.2 (1985/86) 67-81 (and responses).

[2] So Lewis R. Rambo, "Conversion," in Mircea Eliade, ed., *The Encyclopaedia of Religion* (16 vols.; New York: MacMillan, 1987) 4:73-79. For an analysis of the NT data, see Beverly Roberts Gaventa, *From Darkness to Light. Aspects of Conversion in the New Testament* (OBT 20; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986).

[3] See, e.g., *Acts of John* 30-37; 40-42 (*NTApoc* 2. 221-24, 236-37); *Acts of Peter* 12-13; 16; 23-27 (*NTApoc* 2. 294-96, 306-10); and *Acts of Thomas* 51-61 (*NTApoc* 2. 471-77). References

the study of 'images' of conversion in Christian communities, since the author(s) of the *Passion* (*PA*)[4] draws upon two popular traditions to depict the role of the apostle and the nature or result of personal transformation. In both episodes the dynamics of the conversion experience are sketched in the discourse and then 'actualized' by the characters in the story. Moreover, the dominant motifs and formative ideas of the scenes are taken from established *textual* material, an aspect of the literary production that points beyond the oral environment to a mode of imitation and (re)interpretation. The scenes are thus select paradigms for the narrative and the community and at the same time, one may surmise, afford a glimpse into the comprehensive literary design.

The present paper focuses on intertextual relationships within the conversion scenes of the *Passion of Andrew* and on the development of the traditions in the interest of the community's ascetic worldview and praxis. Though numerous parallels and related ideas are available for a detailed examination of source and tradition-history problems, my intention is to map the contours of the discourse/narration and to situate the traditions within the broader ideological schema. As the past decade of scholarship on the apocryphal Acts has engendered new perspectives and a renewed appreciation for the importance of this literature in early Christianity, so also a similar renascence may be envisioned for the *AA* with the recent publication of critical editions.[5] Future research will likely build upon the interdisciplinary approaches and insights of the last ten years.[6]

## I. Conversion Scenes in The *Passion of Andrew*

The *Passion of Andrew* portrays the conversions of Stratocles and Maximilla at two separate discourses of the apostle Andrew. As the story opens,[7] Stratocles, the brother of the proconsul Aegeates, arrives from Italy with an exemption from military service and a desire to pursue philosophy (1). A personal crisis is precipitated in his life by the sudden derangement and demon-possession of a favorite servant (*pais*), without whom Stratocles "cannot live" (2a). Maximilla assures Stratocles that Andrew can "dispel demons" and heal all types of diseases and disorders, and upon his arrival Andrew exhorts Maximilla (and the crowd), prays, and restores the boy to his former condition of lucidity and composure (2b-5). Maximilla returns to her bedroom with Andrew, Stratocles and the "brethren" to provide an opportunity for Andrew to address and convert Stratocles (6).

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are to Edgar Hennecke and Wilhelm Schneelmecher, eds., *New Testament Apocrypha* (2 vols; ET, R. McL. Wilson; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964).

[4] I.e., part III of *The Acts of Andrew*. All references and quotations are from Dennis R. MacDonald, *The Acts of Andrew and The Acts of Andrew and Matthias in the City of the Cannibals* (SBLTT 33, CApoc 1; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990).

[5] In addition to MacDonald, *Acts of Andrew*, see Jean-Marc Prieur, *Acta Andreae* (2 vols.; CChr Series Apocryphorum 5-6; Turnhout: Brepols, 1989). A survey of issues is given in Prieur, "Les Actes apocryphes de l'apótre Andre: Présentation des diverses traditions apocryphes et état de la question," ANRW 2.25.6 (1988) 4384-414.

[6] See the appraisal in Francois Bovon and Eric Junod, "Reading the Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles," *Semeia* 38 (1986) 161-71.

[7] In the epitome of Gregory of Tours (late sixth century) the story of the healing of Maximilla, wife of the proconsul Aegeates, is narrated, and details of the scene are presupposed in the *Passion* (cf. chap. 26).

(a) *The Conversion of Stratocles.* The initial discourse is set amidst the framework of the distress shown by Stratocles at the illness and cure of his servant. At the sight of the demented child, Stratocles becomes disturbed, and is "at a loss" (*diēporei*) as to the proper course of action. As he attends to the servant (Alcman), Andrew instructs Maximilla, "this is what is most distressing to those who are turning (*epistrephontas*) to a faith in God away from a great tempest and wandering: to see these ailments cured which many considered beyond help" (4c). The miraculous demonstration of power by Andrew produces in Stratocles a "total bewilderment" (*holōs diaporein*), and his "perplexity, hesitation and astonishment" (*aporia kai epoche kai thambōsis*) are the prelude to a favorable reception of the apostle's message. For Andrew, the task is to disclose the person at rest ("latent") in Stratocles:

> Bring to birth the child you are carrying and do not give yourself over to labor pains alone. I am no novice at midwifery or divination. I desire what you are birthing. I love what you are stifling. I will suckle what is within you. (7)

The transformation from the old norms of life to the "new self" (*kainos anthrōpos*) entails for Stratocles the repudiation of his former religion (*theosebeia*) and worship (*thrēskeia*) as well as the pursuit of philosophy. Andrew intuits the pangs of conscience within Stratocles, and leads him to acknowledge the "vacuous" and "worthless" nature of his prior conduct and aspirations. Amazed at the prophetic judgment of his new mentor, Stratocles pledges not to separate from Andrew until he recognizes himself (*gnōrizō emauton*) and learns to despise all of his past endeavors and opinions.

At this inchoate phase of spiritual rebirth, Stratocles comes to be the constant companion of Andrew, "sometimes examining, learning from, and interrupting him, and other times remaining silent and enjoying himself" (8b). The sage counsel of Andrew to "double the harvest" through the communal exchange of questions and answers is the catalyst for a more profound awareness of the inner reality. "It is not right for you," Andrew declares, "to conceal your labor pains even from your peers" (9). On the analogy of natural childbirth, where the child is delivered in the presence of the attendants who nurture the newborn to viability, the conversion of Stratocles is an event for the community, with Andrew as guide and skilled midwife:

> Likewise, Stratocles my child, we too must not be passive but bring your embryos into the open, so that they may be registered and be brought to the donative of saving words by many kindred, whose associate (*koinōnon*) I found you to be. (9)

(b) *The conversion of Maximilla.* A second portrait of conversion is recounted in Maximilla's resolve to maintain her chastity at the imprisonment and threatened execution of Andrew. The disclosure of the ruse against Aegeates—the use of a "surrogate" spouse—leads the proconsul to issue an ultimatum to Maximilla: to resume full marital relations or, by her refusal, to consign Andrew to death (36). In anguish, Maximilla visits Andrew in prison and is exhorted to remain chaste and valiant in the face of Aegeates' demands. For Andrew, the present scenario is a reenactment of the Paradise drama, with himself and Maximilla as the primal human beings:

> The most important thing I should say to you now comes to me: I rightly see in you Eve repenting and in me Adam converting. For what she suffered through ignorance, you—whose soul I seek—must now redress through conversion (*epistrephein*). (37)

The deficiency of Eve, i.e., sexual passion, is healed (*iasthai*) through the self-denial and discipline of Maximilla; in addition, the fatal flaw of Adam is perfected by Andrew in his flight for refuge in God. In summary, the archetypal transgressions are now remedied in their dual achievement:

> What Eve disobeyed, you obeyed; what Adam agreed to, I flee; the things that tripped them up, we have recognized. For it is ordained that each person correct his or her own fall. (37)

In a lavish tribute to Maximilla, Andrew broadens the scope of the Genesis tale and heralds a new and transposed solidarity within the cycle of redemption: "As Adam died in Eve ... so also I live in you" (39). The respective roles of teacher and disciple are for the moment reversed, as Andrew appeals to Maximilla, "Assist me in my becoming perfect" (*telios*) (40).

(c) *Summary*. These essential images of conversion are developed at length in the discourses and through allusions and overtones within the narrative. Moreover, there are related motifs that complement the model of Andrew as progenitor of the conversion experience. At the prospect of Andrew's death, Stratocles laments that he received "the seeds of the words of salvation" from one "sower," and that true cultivation of the harvest requires the compassion and expertise of the apostle (44). In a similar manner, Andrew's words and deeds comprise the only stable foundation for the community, and those who are obedient to his proclamation come to "observe, as in a mirror, the mysteries concerning their proper nature" (*tē idian physin*), that is, a genuine discernment of the inner self (47-48).

The rhetoric and hermeneutical framework of conversion in the *PA* are shaped by a dual strategy of polemic and paraenesis. In the case of Stratocles, the erstwhile philosopher, a complete disavowal of the past—religion, erudition, status and resources—stands at the heart of his present ordeal. A hint of the turmoil is apparent in the recurrent reports of his "groans" and "sighs," as he approaches Andrew as a dependent child (or better still, a neophyte; 12). On another level, the conversion results in the transvaluation of social roles and conventions for Stratocles, in that he acquires (in the narrative world) a rather whimsical, perhaps effeminate disposition, e.g., purchasing his own food in the marketplace (25). In contrast to his brother Aegeates, who is characterized as a boor, a glutton and a maniac (24; 35), Stratocles embodies the virtues of piety, humility and temperance (even with his assaults on Andrew's executioners!).

The "conversion" of Maximilla is also formulated with regard to pastoral and apologetic aims. Frequently she appears as an exemplary figure, a disciple of Andrew, a shrewd and capable woman, generous toward the servants in spite of their connivance. Aegeates praises Maximilla for her chastity and moral integrity in their marriage, and only reluctantly assents to harm her through Andrew. For all the admirable qualities in Maximilla, though, there remains within her a shade of ambivalence: like Stratocles, she harbors doubts and fears about the consequences of her decision. Yet after the admonition and summons to perseverance (37-41) Maximilla assumes her new *persona* through an unusual transformation into the ascetic ideal itself: "When she heard the words that

applied to her and in some way was changed by them, she became what the words themselves had signified" (46). The paraenetic value of the scene is manifest in her radical detachment from life and all sensual desires.

With this synopsis of the conversion scenes, attention is shifted to the intertextual dimensions of the discourse/narrations. Though each axis of intertextuality is relevant to an investigation of the document, I limit the discussion here to an analysis of the references, quotations and influences that derive from the literary productions utilized by the author(s).[8] It is clear that the traditions furnished the appropriate models and semantic potential for both a description and a narrative rendition of Christian conversion. The elements of these source-texts were not static, however; to the contrary, the *AA* displays the wide latitude for innovation among many Christian writers.

## II. The Traditions: Intertextuality and Development

(a) *Stratocles.* The maieutics conception of philosophy and education was a celebrated feature of the Socratic heritage.[9] The metaphor of Socrates as midwife is set forth in the *Theaetetus*, but earlier dialogues also probe the nature and theoretical foundations of knowledge and enquiry. In the *Meno*, Socrates' method warrants his reputation as a "perplexed man" who reduces others to perplexity (*autos te aporeis kai tous allous poieis aporein*).[10] Meno himself experiences this sensation of mental lethargy, and thus chides Socrates with a comparison to a stingray:

> Whenever anyone comes into contact with it, it numbs him; and that is the sort of thing you seem to be doing to me now. My mind and my lips are literally numb, and I have nothing to reply to you. (80b)

For his part, Socrates concedes the resemblance, with the proviso that he also is understood to share in the epistemological crisis. The duty of the philosopher is in the proper sense not to instruct, but rather to facilitate the "spontaneous recovery of knowledge" within the person, or, in other words, to make possible the "recollection" of true opinions resident in the soul (98e).

In the *Theaetetus*, the inner disquiet of contemplation is, Socrates avers, the mark of labor pains: "you are not barren but pregnant."[11] As the son of a midwife, Socrates also knows the routines and techniques of parturition, although his practice is set apart by fundamental differences:

> I attend men and not women ... I watch over the labor of their souls, not of their bodies. And the most important thing about my art is the ability to

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[8] For the designation 'axes' of intertextuality—"texts entering via authors (who are, first, readers) and texts entering via readers (co-producers)"—see Michael Worton and Judith Still, "Introduction," in Worton and Still, eds., *Intertextuality: Theories and Practices* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990) 1-2; also David R. Cartlidge, "Combien d'unités avez-vous de trois à quatre?: What Do We Mean by Intertextuality in Early Church Studies?" in SBLSP 29 (1990) 400-411.

[9] See I. M. Crombie, *Plato: The Midwife's Apprentice* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964) and M. F. Burnyeat, "Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 24 (1977) 7-16.

[10] Plato *Meno* 80a; the translation is derived from W. K. C. Guthrie (rpt; London: Metheun, 1967); the Greek text is the Loeb edition.

[11] Plato *Theaet* 148e; the translation is taken from M. J. Levett, revised by Myles Burnyeat (rpt; Indianapolis: Hackett, 1990); the Greek text is the Loeb edition.

> apply all possible tests to the offspring, to determine whether the young mind is being delivered of a phantom, that is, an error, or a fertile truth. (150c)

Once again Socrates admits his own dearth of wisdom, and retreats to the divine compulsion behind his trade: all who come to him discover within themselves the "multitude of beautiful things;" Socrates, with the aid of God, merely delivers their offspring (150d).

The agricultural theme is also employed in the *Theaetetus*, as Socrates seeks to demonstrate the unitary nature of midwifery (the obligation to make a suitable match and the responsibility to deliver progeny) on the analogy of the cultivation and harvest of grain products (149e). At the conclusion of the dialogue, the merit of the profession is once more affirmed, in that Socrates reiterates the sacred character of his vocation (210b-d).

In view of the repetition of these motifs and ideas in the *PA*, it is likely that the portrait of Stratocles' conversion was directly modelled on the introductory scene of the *Theaetetus*. A diagram of the most obvious parallels illustrates the patterns of relationship:

| *PASSION OF ANDREW* | *THEAETETUS* |
|---|---|
| (1) Stratocles: philospher (exemption from military) | Theaetetus: Soldier (former mathematician) |
| (2) Andrew: interrogator midwife | Socrates: interrogator midwife |
| (3) Stratocles: "gentle behavior" (1) social propriety | Theaetetus: "gentle temper" (144a-b) precocity and stability |

Other indications of intertextual bonds are the preliminary barriers that each authority figure confronts: Socrates, his reputation, and Andrew, mistaken identity (as a "shabby tramp"). The goal of Stratocles' conversion is to know himself, a phrase, of course, fashioned after the famous Delphic oracle.[12] At the early stage of the experience, Stratocles persists in a state of mental furor, and in his enthusiasm keeps Andrew from sleep. The Socratic understanding of the birth process provides a striking parallel to the narrative depiction:

> Those who associate with me are like women in child-birth. They suffer the pains of labour, and are filled day and night with distress; indeed they suffer far more than women. And this pain my art is able to bring on, and also to allay (151a).

It is perhaps important to note that the maieutics model is appropriated only for Stratocles, consistent with the statements of Socrates in the dialogue.

(b) *Maximilla*. The Eden narrative was a foundational tradition within Jewish and early Christian literature, and the ancient documents bear witness to the wealth of exegetical positions in the first century CE and beyond.[13] It is reasonable to assume that both the interpretation and the proper application of

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[12] Quoted in Plato, *Protagoras*, 343b.

[13] For discussion and bibliography, see, e.g., John R. Levison, *Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism. From Sirach to 2 Baruch.* (JSOTSup; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1988); Gregory A. Robbins, ed., *Genesis 1-3 in the History of Exegesis* (Lewiston: Mellen, 1988); and Elaine Pagels, *Adam, Eve and the Serpent* (New York: Random House, 1988).

the Genesis story were debated in Christian circles, although the domestication of the Pauline legacy in many respects served to redefine and regulate social norms within the churches.[14] While the 'orthodox' documents tended to preserve and consolidate the conservative patriarchal ideal (e.g., 1 Tim 2:11-15), other perspectives on the Fall tradition were available and ready for narrative development. The portrayal of community life in the apocryphal *Acts* includes elements of this alternative vision, as women forge an autonomous corporate identity as adherents of the apostles and as full participants in the administration of churches and in the missionary enterprise.[15] For the *PA*, the conversion of Maximilla represents the attainment of a new *kairos* of salvation history in the triumph of an egalitarian Christian communal order.

It is no surprise, then, that Maximilla and Andrew are favorably portrayed together in a typological relation to Eve and Adam (37). In tandem with the story of Stratocles, the narrative is advanced through the insinuations against Aegeates that presage a future crisis for Maximilla's devotion to chastity: the proconsul is characterized as a "savage lion" (13b), an "insolent and hostile snake" (*ophis*; 16), and later as "cursed" (*katēramenos*; 31). Aegeates attempts to persuade Maximilla through supplication (23) and intimidation (36), and on the latter occasion Maximilla is prompted to confer with the apostle. As in other apocryphal *Acts*, the decision to be confronted within the narrative world revolves around marriage and sexuality.[16] Maximilla as Eve is compelled to choose between her natural husband and her "inner husband" (16), between Aegeates as the primordial "serpent" ("son" of the serpent; 40) and Andrew as the new Adam. Likewise, the dilemma in regard to sexual relations is expressed in two alternatives, one fleshly, heinous, despicable and laden with pollution (*miasma*; 16; 21), the other spiritual, pure, holy and interior. Although the resolution is presupposed, the climax of the narrative occurs in the discourse of Andrew and the transformation of Maximilla into the "essence" of the apostle's mandate: "she became what the words themselves had signified," and with renewed conviction proceeds to "rebuff" Aegeates (46). In her repudiation of sexuality and righteous defiance Maximilla reverses the curse imposed by Eve and symbolizes with Andrew the mastery of human destiny required of the Christian community. Together Andrew and Maximilla are "transported" to an heightened spiritual stature, where they assist each other toward the life of perfection (41). The idea of a restoration of the pristine innocence and return to Paradise is preserved in other traditions,[17] but the discourse in the *PA* develops the theme in extraordinary depth and with peculiar nuances. The emphasis on the redemption of the debased mind (*nous*; 37) and the conquest of the transitory and illusory aspects of

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[14] MacDonald, *The Legend and the Apostle: The Battle for Paul in Story and Canon* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1983) 89.

[15] See Stevan L. Davies, *The Revolt of the Widows: The Social World of the Apocryphal Acts* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980) 50.

[16] See Virginia Burrus, *Chastity as Autonomy. Women in the Stories of Apocryphal Acts* (Studies in Women and Religion 23; Lewiston: Mellen, 1987) 81-119.

[17] See Elizabeth A. Clark, "Devil's Gateway and Bride of Christ: Women in the Early Christian World" in idem, *Ascetic Piety and Women's Faith* (Studies in Women and Religion 20; Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986) 43, 46; also Elaine Pagels, "'Freedom from Necessity': Philosophical and Psychological Dimensions of Christian Conversion," in Robbins, *Intrigue in the Garden* (=Pagels, *Adam, Eve and the Serpent*, chap. 4).

life (38, 40, 42) correspond to interests in Middle Platonism.[18] In addition, Maximilla is recast by the end of the speech into the pattern of a "male," as Andrew entreats her as a "man" (*anthrōpos*). A further idiosyncrasy is the repeated portrayal of Maximilla's bedroom (*koiton*) as the premier location of spiritual instruction and enlightenment (e.g., 6; 15b). In a prayer for Maximilla's welfare, Andrew appears as a father figure to consecrate a spiritual marriage:

> With respect to our enemy ... cause her [Maximilla] to sleep apart from her visible husband and wed her to her inner husband, whom you above all recognize, and for whose sake the entire mystery of your plan of salvation has been accomplished. (16)

Though the transgression of Eve is conceived of in sexual imagery, authentic Christian piety is also expressed through sexual metaphors. Maximilla announces in the presence of Aegeates:

> I am in love, and the object of my love is not of this world and therefore is imperceptible to you. Night and day it kindles and enflames me with love for it. You cannot see it for it is difficult to see, and you cannot separate me from it, for that is impossible. Let me have intercourse and take my rest with it alone. (23)

(c) *Summary.* The images of childbirth and paradise restored are elements in a literary plan that is dependent upon select Platonic dialogues and the Eden story. As MacDonald has suggested of miracle stories in the *AA*, it is apparent that the conversion scenes are also derived from "tale-types, motifs, and themes in other literature,"[19] in this instance, the *Theaetetus* and Genesis. Despite the high status of these source-texts, there are significant modifications and expansions of the material within the *PA*, related to various functions of the scenes.

### III. Conversions Scenes: Interpretation and Function

The complexity and creative achievement of the conversion scenes in the *PA* are evidence of the larger literary purposes of the apocryphal *Acts*. As Bovon and Junod have remarked, the common denominator among the documents is that the principal characters are all called to a "concrete change signifying their spiritual conversion."[20] The portrayals within the *PA* undoubtedly represent models in the movement toward self-definition and legitimacy, and thus have important functions in the narrative and in the setting of the community.

One purpose of the conversion scenes in the *PA* is governed by the catechetical practices of the community. Stratocles and Maximilla are model catechumens, each with a different impulse and primary objective in the experience. At Andrew's summons the two characters become 'disciple-companions,' and enter into a way of life that persists beyond the death of the teacher (cf. 64).[21] The focus

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[18] M. Hornschuh, "Acts of Andrew," Introduction, in *New Testament Apocrypha*, 393-94.

[19] "From Audita to Legenda: Oral and Written Miracle Stories," *Foundations & Facets Forum* 2,4 (1986) 20.

[20] "Reading the Apocryphal Acts," 164.

[21] The Greco-Roman rhetorical conventions of the teacher/disciple relation in Mark are analyzed in Vernon K. Robbins, *Jesus the Teacher. A Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation of Mark* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984.

of the narrations is properly the converts and conversion process, with the apostle as the agent of the divine power.[22]

A second function of the scenes is rooted in the polemic against alternative systems of philosophy. For the converting Stratocles, the past quest for truth is characterized as "hollow," "destitute," and "worthless" (7). This recognition is later dramatized in the response of the crowd to Andrew's crucifixion: "Bring the man down and we will all become philosophers" (59). Christian conversion is both shaped by and differentiated from the model of conversion to philosophy, in the same way that the language of the discourses stands in dialogue with and contradiction of prevalent ideas of Middle Platonism.

The conversion scenes have a third compensatory function in the narrative, through which the renunciation of sexuality and wealth become the formative marks of spirituality. Typical social roles and values are reversed or transcended, and new standards are established.[23] This aspect of the portrayal is not exclusively negative, but encompasses positive and innovative models of communal interaction.[24]

In summary, the conversion episodes in the *PA* are based on distinct motifs that are woven into the narrative fabric to portray a integrated vision of spiritual transformation and development. The patterns of intertextuality offer further evidence of the abundant literary and cultural interrelationships within early Christianity.

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[22] Eric Junod, "Les Vies de Philosophes et Les Actes Apocryphes Des Apôtres poursuivent-ils un Dessein Similaire?" *Les Actes Apocryphes des Apotres* (ed. François Bovon *et al.*; Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1981) 209-19.

[23] See Ross S. Kraemer, "The Conversion of Women to Ascetic Forms of Christianity," *Signs* 6.2 (1980) 298-307; also the essays in Clark, *Ascetic Piety*.

[24] Virginia Burrus, *Chastity as Autonomy: Women in the Stories of the Apocryphal Acts* (Lewiston: Mellen, 1987) 114-19.

# Text, Context, Conquest, Quest: The Bible and Social Struggle in Latin America

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### Preface

The topic chosen for this year's meeting of the SBL Group, "The Bible in Africa, Asia, and Latin America," is: "Contextualizing the Interpretation of the Biblical Conquest Traditions." An underlying assumption of the title seems to be that those presenting papers will select a text or set of texts a tradition from the Bible, and proceed by reading it in the light of the particular socio-economic/geo-political reality of their "third world/post-colonial" situation, thus "contextualizing" its "interpretation." I would be pleased to learn that this is not true. For I have been unable to address the "chosen" theme of our meeting in precisely this way by giving priority to a specific text. Instead, it is the Bible as such as a conquest tradition that has demanded my attention, and the contextualization of its interpretation as a blunt instrument of oppression.

### Introduction

The Bible in Latin America is itself a conquest tradition. Before we can speak about particular aspects of it like the land-takeover narratives in the Hexateuch or the ideology of election, we must contend with the Bible as a colonial assault weapon. Contextualizing its interpretation will mean in Latin America pointing the lethal force in another direction, making its mythopoetic discharge not an element of ethnocide but, from now on, a contribution to the construction of a social reality less permeated by systemic inequality, racial and sexist prejudice, and sheer sorrow. There is no innocence in such a project. It is a matter of picking up the pieces after centuries of homiletic and other discursive bombing on the basis of the Bible in the hope of forging a future.

The Bible came to Latin America as part of the ideological apparatus of the *conquistadores*. It belongs to men (literally) recently chosen by God (in their opinion) to drive the infidel Muslim invaders (as they saw them) out of Europe after occupying the Iberian peninsula for 800 years. They were now invaders of an unexpected "new" world, equally infidel (in their eyes) and needing (from their point of view) to be conquered= evangelized. The reading of texts about "a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, God's own people" (1 Peter 2:9) was frontloaded in favour of the right of these persons—the 16th century bearers

of the Biblical tradition in "America"—to become the new imposing "lords" (*señores*) of a continent (they thought) they had just discovered. A divergent reading of the same texts in our day simply registers the unwillingness of those previously dispossessed by such interpretations as reality and the Word of God to remain in this condition.

The debate, both then and now, is plainly about social power and cultural identity. Thus, interpretation of the Biblical conquest traditions in Latin America must begin with the tradition of conquest represented by the book itself. A social context of imperial oppression shapes the lens through which all texts are read, This includes not just how, but if and why they should be read at all.

Contextualization of interpretation in Latin America means not so much "applying" the Biblical text to contemporary reality, but rather, cheek to jowl with contemporary reality asking whether and/or where a given text fits in. How does it form part of the process of on-going and surrounding life? More important, once "inserted" into current affairs, what will it do? What forces of change does it support? Or does interpretation merely serve to maintain "business as usual"? The text does not have priority in this process. The context comes first. And before the context or behind it, as it were, in Latin America is the legacy of conquest with the corresponding quest of the conquered to have a say in their own destiny again.

*Understanding the Bible better is not the primary purpose of interpretation in Latin America, but enhancing life.* The Bible is a means toward this end, not somehow an end in itself (e.g., being read "for its own sake" or "because of what it is"). The basic issue in Latin America regarding the Biblical conquest traditions is how they can be used to confront and undo the continent's own historical experience of military and economic imposition. We are speaking about recovery from a cultural trauma still underway, and asking to what extent the language and literature of the Bible about divine dominion and elected rule may help to combat the imperial disease it otherwise so shamelessly has communicated in this place.

## Some Historical Observations

The *conquistadores* ware not avid Bible readers (if only because most of them could not read). Neither was the church whose truth they helped to carry to these shores especially devoted at the time to a searching scrutiny of Scripture. Scriptural inquiry was absorbed instead on the Iberian peninsula during the sixteenth and seventeenth century by the efforts of the Counter-Reformation, Spanish Christ-mysticism, and the Inquisition. The Catholic faith which sustained the occasionally uncertain spirits of "our men abroad" depended for its sense of conviction and orientation primarily on the deposit of revelation held by the papacy in Rome and its magisteruim, whose opinions were expressed most often in the form of law and other such legal pronouncements.

One of the first documents to be drawn up by Spanish jurists and theologians after the "discovery" of "America" is a writing called the "Requirement," formulated in Valladolid in 1513. When reading it, one is uncertain along with Fray Bartolomé de las Casas whether to laugh of to weep. "Even its author, the jurist Palacio Rubios, 'laughed often' when he was told of how it was applied in the

New World, though the learned doctor still believed that it satisfied the demands of Christian conscience when executed in the manner originally intended."[1]

Hardly a work of exegesis, it is interesting to observe the way in which the Bible figures in the rationale of the Requirement. The following excerpts correspond to the sequence of though in the document:

> On the part of the King, don Fernando, and of doña Juana, his daughter, Queen of Castille and Leon, subduers of the barbarous nations, we their servants notify and make known to you, as best we can, that the Lord our God, Living and Eternal, created the Heaven and the Earth, and one men and one woman, of whom you and I, and all the men of the world, were and are descendants, and all those who come after us.... Of all these nations God our Lord gave charge to one man, called St. Peter, that he should be Lord and Superior of all the men in the world, that all should obey him, and that he should be head of the whole human race, wherever men should live, and under whatever law, sect, or belief they should be; and he gave him the world for his kingdom and jurisdiction.... The men who lived in that time obeyed that St. Peter, and took him for Lord, King, and Superior of the universe; so also have they regarded the others who after him have been selected to the Pontificate, and so it has been continued even until now, and will continue until the end of the world. One of these Pontiffs ... made donation of these isles and Terra-firme to the aforesaid King and Queen and to their successors, our Lords, with all that there are in these territories, as is contained in certain writings which passed upon the subject as aforesaid, which you can see if you wish ... and some islands, and indeed almost all those to which this has been notified, have received and served their Highnesses, as lords and kings, in the way that subjects ought to do, with good will, without any resistance, immediately, without delay, when they were informed of the aforesaid facts. And also they received and obeyed the priests whom their Highnesses sent to preach to them and to teach them our Holy Faith; and all these, of their own free will, without any reward or condition, have become Christians, and are so, and their Highnesses have joyfully and benignantly received them, and also have commanded them to be treated as their subjects and vassals, and you too are held and obliged to do the same.... If you do so,... we in their name shall receive you in all love and charity, and shall leave you your wives, and your children, and your lands, free without servitude [and a series of other bald-faced lies]... But if you do not do this, and wickedly and intentionally delay to do so, I certify to you that, with the help of God, we shall forcibly enter into your country and shall make war against you in all ways and manners that we can, and shall subject you to the yoke and obedience of the Church and of their Highnesses; we shall take you and your wives and your children, and shall make slaves of them, and as such shall sell and dispose of them as their Highnesses may command; and we shall take away your goods, and shall do all the harm and damage that we can,... and we protest that the deaths and losses

[1] See Lewis Hanke, ed., *History of Latin American Civilization: Sources and Interpretation*. Vol. 1: *The Colonial Experience* (2nd ed.; Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973) 94.

which shall accrue from this are your fault, and not that of their Highnesses, or ours, nor of these cavaliers who come with us.[2]

We are not in the presence here of a "close reading" of the Bible. But neither is the understated interpretation naive or whimsical. It belongs to the imperial project of persons who saw themselves, before all else, as "subduers of the barbarous nations," whose right to rule in the "new" world was grounded first in a "totalizing" understanding of the opening chapters of the book of Genesis (filtered through the first part of the Nicene Creed), which served to explain how it was that all peoples, despite their previous ignorance of each other's existence, in fact shared a common point of origin— and therefore, it could be presumed, the same juridical code of reasoning.

The legal coherence of the otherwise divided "old" and "new" world derived from "the Lord our God, Living and Eternal, [who] created the Heaven and the Earth, and one man and one woman." This reduction of "the multitude" of "kingdoms and provinces" that had "sprung" up "in the five thousand years since the world was created" to a single set of ancestors made it possible for the author of the Requirement, without further ado, to jump directly from the book of Genesis to the gospel of Matthew and the "one man, called St. Peter," declared—on the basis of Matt 16:17-19 and the mediaeval exegetical tradition of papal supremacy—to be "Lord and Superior of all the men in the world, that all should obey him, and that he should be head of the whole human race." An "interim" ethic, tinged as the book of Revelation seals Christian Scripture with an apocalyptic imagination, the stated arrangement was supposed to have "continued even until now, and will continue until the end of the world."

In this diffuse and selective manner, the Bible was part and parcel of the Spanish conquest of "America" from the beginning. The hierarchical values of mediaeval European feudal society were also self-evidently by projected by the Requirement onto heretofore unknown lands and peoples. To what extent the document's concluding "just war" theory—its main objective—recalls Biblical traditions of "holy war" and promises of divine vengeance is unclear. The expectation stated in the Requirement of obedience to the governing authorities "with good will, without any resistance, immediately, without delay" is certainly reminiscent of Biblical passages like Rom 13:1-7 and Matt 5:38-42. One can only fearfully suspect how much of the sacred book's boisterous invective on other occasions stands behind the Requirement's threat of war "in all ways and manners that we can." Whence was gained the document's assurance to "subject you to the yoke and obedience of the Church and of their Highnesses," to "make slaves" of "you and your wives and your children" to "sell and dispose... as their Highnesses may command," doing "all the harm and damage that we can," though all "deaths and losses" would be "your fault"?

The physical diffusion of the Bible in Latin America belongs historically to the incursion of Protestantism into the region. "The Protestant pattern of growth was first a Bible, then a Protestant immigrant, then a church."[3] The coming of Protestantism to Latin America belongs, in turn, in the nineteenth century to the working out of "revolutions" of "independence" from Spanish colonialism on the continent. With the Protestants and their Bibles, both before and afterwards, arrived first British and then North American (USA) mercantile capitalism.

2 See Hanke, *History of Latin America Civilization*, 94-95.

3 See H. McKennie Goodpasture, ed., *Cross and Sword: An Eyewitness History of Christianity in Latin America* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1989) 183.

Protestant envoys to Latin America typically *sold* the blessed books they brought here. The grace of God to be proclaimed to benighted (largely Catholic) souls did not mean that the Word of God could therefore be given out gratis.

The international dis/order created by the "free-market" system continues to define the agonizing context of Biblical interpretation in Latin America. We might ask ourselves to what extent our own contemporary interest in the ongoing "contextualization" of Biblical interpretation in this part of the southern hemisphere does not belong, albeit in an inverted manner, to the seemingly insatiable desire of North Atlantic "western" nations to create ever greater "outlets" for their products. Those of us who make a living by "pushing" the Bible (one way or another) like multinational corporations would stand to "diversify" our "holdings" = readings through "globalization."

## A Chosen Race and the Divine Economy

The political economy linked to the Bible as a book makes its reading in Latin America inevitably either the "reproduction" of earlier modes of cultural conquest, or an attempt to turn what has been a tool of domination into an instrument of social change. Widespread speech in present-day Peru about the people of God (*el pueblo de Dios*) as contituting the (popular) church versus the institution of the (Catholic) church defining who form God's elect, along with liberation theology's well-known claim of God's "preferential option for the poor," belong to a rereading of the Bible as conquest literature. At stake is the question: who, in fact, are God's chosen people?

For those who read the Bible in Latin America with a concern for liberation, the elect would be all persons on this continent—and elsewhere—who still suffer the former fate of some escaped slaves form the east of Egypt, hoping like them to discover in the wake of Moses and his memory a similar *salida*—way out, exodus, freedom—from the grief of an advancing "civilized" state. (The Egyptian empire at the end of the second millennium BCE was an emblem of human "progress" and "development.") Those whom the Bible says God chose to free from a system of enslavement and exploitation are identified in Latin America, not on the basis—as a rule—of race, gender, ethnic heritage or religious creed but in terms of economic class, with the poor majority typically referred to simply as "the people" (*el pueblo*): the mass of the marginalized persons who cling, hungry, eager, and determined to the edge of existence in an urban explosion that, at least in Peru, is rapidly changing the socio-political landscape of this country.

Peru's capital city, Lima, on the west coast of South America in the midst of one of the world's driest deserts, has gone from a population of about 1,000,000 inhabitants 30 years ago (1961) to approximately 8,000,000 today (1991). The population has doubled in the last decade alone—that's 4,000,000 new bodies in 10 years at the same time that a civil war begun with "democratic" elections in 1980 has escalated and all financial reserves held by the government have essentially disappeared. Mainly peasants (*campesinos*) fleeing terror in the mountains and a tradition of complete neglect of their concerns by the centralized state in Lima, some analysts of the situation argue that the myriad "invaders," as they're called, are in effect immigrants within the boundaries of their "own" nation, pioneers or settlers moving down into largely unknown and historically hostile territory and now threatening to "take it over" in the eyes of the dominant upper classes traditionally ensconsed in wealthy neighborhoods like Miraflores and San Isidro.

It is not hard to imagine how any one of these modern "invaders," protagonists of a radical redrawing of the demographic and political map of Peru, might understand the Biblical narrative that depicts another set of displaced persons on the fringe of an ancient order (viz., *l'ancien régime*), descending from the hills of Moab, infiltrating Canaanite culture, and making it eventually their own. When Gustavo Gutierrez writes about *La irrupción de los pobres in la historia =The Power of the Poor in History*, the context of this work is a yellow sea of *chosas* of straw huts that "invaders" live in, crouching in the sandy hills surrounding Lima for the first five to ten, fifteen, twenty years of their struggle to remain where they are, "strangers in a strange land," slowly filling up every empty spot of unused ground they find, and spreading out each day in an uncontrollable dispersion of so-called *cholos de mierda*—a term not unlike what the Pharisees at a later date meant when they referred to the *'am ha'aretz*—on every streetcorner on the capital city. To say, in the language of another Biblical text, that "theirs is the kingdom of God" (Luke 6:20b) is to promote in Peru, among other things, the utterly mundane—but for many unwelcome, because threatening—possibility that such persons will also soon be recognized as "full citizens" of the land with all the corresponding rights and privileges.

The claim in Latin America of God's "preferential option for the poor" can be read as simply part of partisan politics in the name of the impoverished majority. The indicated perspective would represent a theological (ideological) framework for conducting "electoral" democracy "from below." National and local government is to be a function of the will and power of grassroots "base" communities. This is indeed what one branch of Latin American liberation theology is actively pursuing, and why it is being opposed.

Whether or not and/or how such a view can be "successfully" translated into concrete political power in Latin America remains to be seen. One reading of the "United Left's" large scale self-destruction in the recent national elections in Peru suggests that, in fact, every "parliamentary" or "representative" interpretation of the meaning of the poor as God's "chosen people" will be an inadequate response to what is wanted and expressed by such language when employed by marginalized persons themselves.

The act of election typically belongs in the Bible to the working out of some divine economy. In Latin America, the international economy currently at work on the destiny of the continent is not experienced by most as in any way divine. If those suffering its many ravages are nonetheless declared to be God's elect, it is because with them one hopes to achieve the establishment of a different system of production and exchange, one often labelled simply "life" in opposition to the premature death that otherwise constitutes the standard state of affairs.

## The Promised Land and Social Space

The Biblical traditions related to the exodus and freedom from oppression and slavery have been interpreted much more extensively in Latin America than those which deal with the conquest itself and the consolidation of military victory. The latter are the spoils of successful social struggle. The reason for their "neglect" by Latin American (liberation) theology is obvious. Most people in this part of the world still live in the shadow of "the flesh-pots of Egypt" with the hidden, but harsh chains of unemployment, underemployment, underpay, and unconcern. Why bother reading texts that have no obvious of immediate connection with daily reality and the efforts of the moment to perdure? Contextualizing

interpretation of the Bible means in part choosing what to interpret and what, if only for the time being in light of the interpreters' life-situation, to ignore.

The struggle for land has traditionally been one of the main sources of social conflict in Latin America. Except for his final chapter on the history of Peruvian literature, the longest of José Carlos Mariátegui's *Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana* concerns "the problem of the land."[4] For Mariátegui, this issue was equivalent to "the problem of the Indian" or *campesino* in Peru. Aside from the evident difficulties of such an expression, the question of land and people necessarily go together.

For the traditional communities of the Peruvian *sierra* whose physical and cultural life for millennia has been deeply identified with the soil and landscape of the Andean *cordillera*, acquisition of the ancestral lands usurped from them both during and after the conquest by a variety of pseudo-legal strategies such as the *encomienda, gamonalismo*, or state programmes of agrarian reform has always been—and continues to be—of paramount importance. To refer to this quest, however, as the search for a "promised" land would mask the fact that the land in question was already part of the patrimony of the subsequently dispossessed. The struggle for land by most native groups in Latin America is not a case of "finding" or "entering" or "having" soon a place to call their own, but the forced labour of recovering stolen goods and/or preventing further theft and destruction.

At the same time, the accelerated process of urbanization with its coterie of correlative problems evident throughout Latin America since World War II has produced a shift in many cases in the nature of these traditional aspirations. Immigrants from the "land" (*campo*) to the "city" are now demanding in different ways not so much the right to be left alone, but to exist within the official space of "their" nation. In Peru, after centuries of rural abandonment by the state and the systematic exclusion of most persons from participation in the country's government and wealth, a "brown" revolution is underway, filling up the streets and offices of metropolitan centres with claims to be attended and included in programmes of health, education, nutrition, and general well-being. The "promised land" becomes a "welfare" state: the construction of a social environment not inimical to the survival of and, indeed, dedicated to the thriving of those who constitute the country's *base*.

## Holy War

The theme of holy war—the third constitutive element of the Biblical conquest traditions—has, for a variety of reasons, not been discussed much by most Latin American exegetes, perhaps because the New Testament hardy encourages investigation along these lines. The question arises, however, to what extent in Latin America a violent solution is simply unavoidable, given so many people already "under the gun," faced daily with death-dealing economic "adjustments" dropped like "intelligent" missiles on a "passive" population in order to feed the foreign debt and the omnipresent "forces of order" sent to shoot up all who would disagree with the current strong man's view of "democracy." It is this situation that the Catholic bishops assembled in Medellin once referred to as a context of *violencia institucionalizada*.

[4] See José Carlos Mariátegui, *Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana*, chap. 3. The first edition was published in 1928.

In situations of prolonged and ever more skillful repression such as Peru, it would be the worst sort of romantic reading of the Bible to imagine that the contextualization of its conquest traditions could mean anything without addressing at some point the book's own heritage of justified killing and pillage in this place. Furthermore, it is imperative to appreciate the level of frustration an desperation which lead persons believing in the Biblically resonant promise of one day being a people "with a place to stand" not to take another generation of delay and, instead, begin to make it happen now. For New Testament exegetes accustomed to invoke a paradigm of eschatological urgency on the part of Jesus' first followers, this desire to be done—if not now, when?—with the lies and wickedness of an old oppressive age should come as no surprise.

In Peru, the Maoist insurgency movement calling itself *El Partido Comunista Peruano*, otherwise known as *El Sendero Luminoso de José Carlos Mariátegui* and referred to regularly in the foreign press simply as "the terrorist group, The Shining Path," has decided not to take it anymore. What distinguishes them from virtually every other act of rebellion on the part of the radical left in Peru in living memory is their fierce determination to act—characterized often, and not without some reason, as "fanaticism"—and a level of organization which not only has successfully resisted the military's increasingly bloody attempts over the last ten years to annihilate them, but also steadily proceeded with an explosive dismantling of the economic infrastructure of the nation (aided in this by recent government corruption). Members of *Sendero* are essentially conducting a "holy war" against the social order of present-day Peru, convinced that despite the fact that "some will have to fall," their vision of the future of Peru—the political orthodoxy (*pensamiento guía*) of Abimael Guzmán—is simply correct and therefore must prevail.

The strategies employed toward fulfillment of the "people's revolution" promised by *Sendero* have been denounced by critics of the movement as merely the marks of a "cult of violence." And no one can deny that the killings and other destruction authored by the *senderistas* are both extensive in number and frequently brutal. At the same time, however, they correspond to a plan of action recognized by most to entail a significant degree of discipline and forethought and are not merely random or wanton gestures of dismay. The question they consistently raise for many Peruvians, especially young people facing a completely uncertain future, is: what other alternative exists?

## Some Hermeneutical Reflections

In order to appreciate how the Bible both as part of a tradition of conquest and in terms of its own conquest traditions is (to be) contextualized in Latin America, I return to the question of the hermeneutical framework with which I began and the title of this paper: "Text, Context, Conquest, Quest: The Bible and Social Struggle in Latin America." It makes a great deal of different which way you read the initial set of terms, i.e., from left to right or right to left. Do we begin the act of interpretation with the text and after reading it carefully, move from there to a particular context, then the specific historical problem of conquest, and finally the quest for a solution to it? Or, as in Latin America, should our starting point be the quest itself: the daily effort to procure the basic necessities of life, the search for human dignity, freedom from the fear of violence and abuse, a longing for some sense of felicity and well-being, the lack of which is the abiding effect of a self-replicating tradition of conquest, creative of a social context of constant

struggle, in which immersed and immeshed we will find mixed-up one way or another the text of the Bible?

Impossible to extricate from a history of involvement in western imperialism throughout Latin America, the question asked by those who still read the Bible in this context is whether or not the discourse of the book can be redeployed. How might one begin to weave a new web of significations and connections that will make the text part of a different social project than the last one that it helped to articulate here? The distinction, in this regard, between text-context-conquest-quest and quest-conquest-context-text is key and not just a matter of two sides of the same coin.

The *conquistadores* participated in mediaeval traditions of the "quest" conducting the "conquest" of Latin America. They created thereby the "context" in which the Biblical "text" became part of the ideological apparatus of colonial rule. Although one might imagine "reversing" this process by rereading the same text in light of the current context, hoping thereby to help undo the legacy of conquest, in fact it is only the energy and force of an opposing quest by the conquered to re/create for themselves a social context that makes rereading the text both possible and worthwhile.

To state what is at stake here another way: Are we primarily people of the book, as Christians, Jews, and Muslims are sometimes referred to, or is the book of the people? The genitives in both cases would be subjective. Is it the Bible that matters most in its interpretation; or is it rather the book's interpreters, the people who find in it a resource and renewal for their quest and struggle against conquest, which is the critical question? In Latin America, especially in the face of a living tradition of conquest, it is the lives of the conquered that are the predominant concern of much Biblical interpretation. Contextualization means putting the language of election, the land, and the people—as well as that of holy war(?)—in a given text on behalf of the poor, the disenfranchised, and the socially marginalized.

# The Bible and Social Transformation in South Africa: a Work-in-progress Report on The Institute for the Study of the Bible

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## Introduction

The Bible is and has been one of the basic sources of African and black theology (Frostin 1988:17). However, in this time of crisis in South Africa there is, as *The Kairos Document* proclaims, a need to re-read the Bible. This cry of the poor and oppressed to return to the Bible to re-read the Bible arises out of their recognition of the Bible as both a problem and a solution, as both an oppressor and a liberator.

Takatso Mofokeng begins his essay on "Black Christians, the Bible and Liberation" with the following provocative paragraph.

> No statement in the history of political science as well as that of Christian missions expresses the dilemma that confronts black South Africans in their relationships with the Bible with greater precision and has whipped up more emotions than the following: 'When the white man came to our country he had the Bible and we had the land. The white man said to us 'let us pray'. After the prayer, the white man had the land and we had the bible'. With this statement which is known by young and old in South Africa, black people of South Africa point to three dialectically related realities. They show the central position which the Bible occupies in the ongoing process of colonization, national oppression and exploitation. They also confess the incomprehensible paradox of being colonized by a Christian people and yet being converted to their religion and accepting the Bible, their ideological instrument of colonization, oppression and exploitation. Thirdly, they express a historic commitment that is accepted solemnly by one generation and passed on to another—a commitment to terminate exploitation of humans by other humans (Mofokeng 1988:34).

These concerns are also found in the work of Itumeleng Mosala. Like Mofokeng, Mosala recognizes the that the Bible is both a liberator and an oppressor. Mosala grants that in the Bible there are "glimpses of liberation and of a determinate social movement galvanised by a powerful religious ideology in the biblical text." But he also insists that these liberating themes are framed by "oppressive structures" (Mosala 1989:40).

Mosala's essay on "The Use of the Bible in Black Theology" is particularly significant in that for the first time in the South African context of liberation there is a clearly articulated questioning of the status of the biblical *text* (Mosala 1986; Mosala 1989:chapter 1). Mosala's basic critique is directed at black theology's exegetical starting point which "expresses itself in the notion that the Bible is the revealed 'Word of God'" (Mosala 1986:177; Mosala 1989:15). He traces this view of the Bible as "an absolute, non-ideological 'Word of God'" back to the work of James Cone. He finds it even in the work of the "most theoretically astute of black theologians," Cornel West. More importantly, "South African black theologians are not free from enslavement to this neo-orthodox theological problematic that regards the notion of the 'Word of God' as a hermeneutical starting point" (Mosala 1986:179; Mosala 1989:17).

Mosala underlines the pervasiveness of this view of the biblical tradition by subjecting Sigqibo Dwane, Simon Gqubule, Khoza Mgojo, Manas Buthelezi, Desmond Tutu, and Allan Boesak to a similar critique. For example, Mosala argues that Boesak, like Cone and Cornel West, insists on there being a biblical truth according to which God sides with the oppressed in their struggle for liberation. Mosala is willing to admit that this is true as far as it goes. But

> as any hermeneutics deriving from the crucible of class struggle will attest, the biblical truth that God sides with the oppressed is only one of the biblical truths. The other truth is that the struggle between Yahweh and Baal is not simply an ideological warfare taking place in the minds and hearts of believers but a struggle between the God of Israelite landless peasants and subdued slaves and the God of Israelite royal, noble, landlord, and priestly classes. In other words, the Bible is rent apart by the antagonistic struggles of the warring classes of Israelite society in much the same way as our world is torn asunder by society's class, cultural, racial, and gender divisions (Mosala 1989:16; Mosala 1986:178).

Accordingly, black theology "needs a *new* exegetical starting point if it is to become a material force capable of gripping the black working class and peasant masses," and, as Mosala goes on to argue, "The social, cultural, political, and economic world of the black working class and peasantry constitutes the only valid hermeneutical starting point for a black theology of liberation" (Mosala 1989:21; Mosala 1986:181).

It should be made clear, however, that Mosala is here primarily discussing black theology's *starting point*. His contention, then, is that most of the Bible "offers no certain starting point for a theology of liberation within itself." For example, he argues that the book of Micah "is eloquent in its silence about the ideological struggle waged by the oppressed and exploited class of monarchic Israel." "In short, it is a ruling class document and represents the ideological and political interests of the ruling class." As such there "is simply too much de-ideologisation to be made before it can be hermeneutically straightforward in terms of the struggle for liberation" (Mosala 1986:196). The biblical text, therefore, cannot be the hermeneutical starting point of black theology. Rather, those committed to the struggles of the black oppressed and exploited people "cannot ignore the history, culture, and ideologies of the dominated black people as their primary hermeneutical starting point" (Mosala 1986:197).

However, this does not mean that Mosala totally rejects the biblical text. While the biblical text cannot be the primary starting point for black theology "there are enough contradictions within the book [of Micah] to enable eyes that

are hermeneutically trained in the struggle for liberation today to observe the kin struggles of the oppressed and exploited of the biblical communities in the very absences of those struggles in the text." The Bible is, therefore, "a product and a record of class struggles" (Mosala 1986:196). Mosala recognizes, in other words, that "black theologians are correct in detecting glimpses of liberation and of a determinate social movement galvanised by a powerful religious ideology in the biblical text." But, he continues, it "is not the existence of this which is in question. Rather, the problem being addressed here is one of developing an adequate hermeneutical framework which can rescue those liberative themes from the biblical text" (Mosala 1987:27-28).

As we have already seen, Mofokeng too argues that in the contemporary black South African context the Bible is both a problem and a solution. The "external" problem of the Bible is the oppressive and reactionary use of the Bible by white Christians. "When Black christians see all these conservative a[n]d reactionary efforts and hear the Bible being quoted in support of reactionary causes they realize that the Bible itself is indeed a serious problem to people who want to be free" (Mofokeng 1988:37).

Mofokeng outlines and critiques two main responses by black readers to locate and solve this problem. "The most commonly held approach has been to accuse oppressor-preachers of *misusing* the Bible for their oppressive purposes and objectives. This misuse is based, it is argued, on misinterpretation of biblical texts to support or promote oppressive intentions" (Mofokeng 1988:37). Also, in many cases "the problem of the Bible has been transferred to the area of ethics or the practical concretization of biblical teaching." Here "many downtrodden Christians have accused many preachers and racist whites of not practising what they preach" (Mofokeng 1988:38). It is clear, Mofokeng argues, that these responses are "based on the assumption that the Bible is essentially a book of liberation" (Mofokeng 1988:37). While Mofokeng concedes that these responses have a certain amount of truth to them, the crucial point he wants to make is that there are numerous "texts, stories and traditions in the Bible which lend themselves to only oppressive interpretations and oppressive uses because of their inherent oppressive nature." What is more, any attempt "to 'save' or 'co-opt' these oppressive texts for the oppressed only serve the interests of the oppressors" (Mofokeng 1988:38).

Young blacks in particular, Mofokeng states, "have categorically identified the Bible as an oppressive document by its very nature and to its very core" and suggest that the best option "is to disavow the Christian faith and consequently be rid of the obnoxious Bible." Indeed, some "have zealously campaigned for its expulsion from the oppressed Black community," but, he notes, with little success. The reason for this lack of success, Mofokeng argues, is

> largely due to the fact that no easily accessible ideological silo or storeroom is being offered to the social classes of our people that are desperately in need of liberation. African traditional religions are too far behind most blacks while Marxism, is to my mind, far ahead of many blacks, especially adult people. In the absence of a better storeroom of ideological and spiritual food, the Christian religion and the Bible will continue for an undeterminable period of time to be the haven of the Black masses par excellence.

Given this situation of very limited ideological options, Mofokeng continues, "Black theologians who are committed to the struggle for liberation and are

organically connected to the struggling Christian people, have chosen to honestly do their best to shape the Bible into a formidable weapon in the hands of the oppressed instead of leaving it to confuse, frustrate or even destroy our people" (Mofokeng 1988:40).

Mofokeng is not advocating a simple instrumentalist position here, however. He does recognize that

> when many Black Christians read their history of struggle carefully, they come upon many Black heroes and heroines who were inspired and sustained by some passages and stories of the Bible in their struggle, when they read and interpreted them in the light of their Black experience, history and culture. They could consequently resist dehumanization and the destruction of their faith in God the liberator. It is this noble Black Christian history that helps to bring out the other side of the Bible, namely, the nature of the Bible as a book of hope for the downtrodden (Mofokeng 1988:38).

More significantly, he continues, "A careful reading of the experiences and witness of the early church confirms the correctness of the experiences of our people concerning the usefulness of the Bible as a book with a message of survival, resistance and hope" (Mofokeng 1988:38).

So, Mofokeng argues, it is a "viable option" for black theologians "to insist on finding and controlling the tools of opening and interpreting the Bible as well as participating in the process of interpretation itself" (Mofokeng 1988:39).

It is with a clear recognition of the Bible as both a liberator and an oppressor that the Institute for the Study of the Bible (ISB) joins Mosala and Mofokeng in their search for tools and processes (an adequate hermeneutical framework) which will empower ordinary people to read the Bible in a liberative, creative, and transformative way.

## The Institute for the Study of the Bible

The Institute for the Study of the Bible (ISB) is a South African attempt to develop an interface between biblical studies and ordinary readers of the Bible, particularly the poor and oppressed. Given that the Bible has played and will continue to play a significant role in the life of Christians in South Africa *the primary aim of the ISB is to establish an interface between biblical studies and ordinary readers of the Bible in the church and community that will facilitate social transformation.* This interface has produced a number of related aims for the work of the ISB. These are to develop creative and contextual Bible study materials and processes; to set up a network of contextual Bible study groups throughout South Africa and Southern Africa; to train facilitators for contextual Bible study groups; to learn from and to reflect on the way in which the Bible is read by the poor and oppressed and through this to shape biblical and theological education and research; and to work for social transformation in South Africa.

The ISB is a project linked to the Department of Theological Studies at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, and to a number of community organizations throughout South Africa and Southern Africa. Although the ISB only began work as such in 1990, the need for something like the ISB has a longer history. The emergence of the ISB is rooted in two crucial assumptions. First, the readings of the Bible of the poor and oppressed in South Africa have a significant contribution to make to our understanding of the Bible and to what God is doing in

South Africa. Second, the readings of biblical scholars who are committed to the poor and oppressed have a significant contribution to make to our understanding of the Bible and to what God is doing in South Africa.

While it is the South African context which has been the primary factor in the shaping of the ISB, other contexts of liberation have also been a factor. Before saying any more about the ISB it may be useful to say something about at least one other context of struggle which has had an influence on the development of the ISB.

## The Shift in Latin American Liberation Theology

In South Africa, as in other contexts of liberation, a crucial question which has emerged concerns the relationship between intellectuals or academics and the poor and oppressed. One of the purposes of this paper is to explore this relationship, particularly in the context of Bible study. The question, then, is what is the relationship between the trained reader and the ordinary reader in a situation of liberation?

In the Latin American context Jan Luis Segundo has analyzed this question with remarkable clarity. In an important essay Segundo outlines the shift within Latin American theology between "two lines" of liberation theology, one essentially a middle class product and the other essentially the product of the "common people" (Segundo 1985). Segundo captures the complexities and the tensions of these two lines.

Segundo looks at the history, aims, methods, and results of at least two theologies of liberation coexisting now in Latin America. The first theology is characterized by

> the origin of a theology of conversion among middle class groups, the methodological trend to suspect that the customary way of understanding Christian faith was distorted at all levels of society by ideological bias that concealed and justified the status quo, and finally, the long-term aim of providing the pastoral activities of the Church with a new and de-ideologized theology capable of speaking about the common themes of Christian faith as they were at the beginning, i.e. a revelation of the humanizing and liberative will of God and of God's own being (Segundo 1985:22).

Segundo notes that in this first approach the social sciences are used in a way similar to the use theology made of philosophy in past centuries. However, while the social sciences "provide the theologian who wants to carry out a de-ideologizing task with valuable cognitive tools" they are "tools which ... are beyond the grasp of the majority of people" (Segundo 1985:28). In addition, the rise of popular or populist movements either outside or inside the church "had shown that common people had neither understood nor welcomed anything from the first theology of liberation, and had actually reacted against its criticism of the supposed oppressive elements of popular religion. They resisted the new pastoral trends trying to correct it" (Segundo 1985:23).

The second theology, then, comes from the common people who often did not understand or support the first. "It appeared then that if theologians were still to be the 'organic intellectuals' of the common people, that is to say useful as intellectuals charged with the understanding of popular faith, they were obliged to learn how oppressed people lived their faith" (Segundo 1985:23). So theologians wanting to be in religious matters the organic intellectuals of poor and unculti-

vated people "began then to understand their function as one of unifying and structuring people's understanding of their faith, as well as grounding and defending the practices coming from this faith" (Segundo 1985:24).

However, Segundo and other Latin American liberation theologians have reservations about this shift. They still refuse to give up the *critical* function of the first line which arises out of "a suspicion that theology, like other all-pervasive cultural features, can and perhaps should be considered an instrument of oppression and, hence, as a non-Christian theology" (Segundo 1985:24).[1] Segundo argues that Latin American reality points so obviously in that direction "that theologians belonging explicitly to the second line cannot but raise the same central question" (Segundo 1985:24). Segundo finds this tension in the work of Leonardo Boff. He argues that there is undoubtedly an involuntary contradiction in some of Boff's work "between the claim of having been evangelized by the poor and taught by them, and, on the other hand, the pretension of relocating in people's minds the true meaning of the cross and suffering" (Segundo 1985:24). In other words, how does one learn theology from the poor and oppressed and yet at the same time recognize that their theology has been predominantly shaped by the dominant theology of the oppressor?

This question has, of course, been raised by Mosala and Mofokeng in the discussion above. It has also been asked in other contexts. Much of the work of Paulo Freire in education, for example, takes place around this question (Freire 1985). There is much here of a theoretical nature that needs to be analyzed and researched, and we will return to some of these questions in the last section of the paper. Having heard the question of the relationship between the trained and the ordinary reader posed in the Latin American context we turn now to examine a Latin American response to this question as it has been worked out in the practice in the Bible movement in Brasil. Although there are significant differences between the Brasilian context and the South African context there are sufficient similarities to make this examination useful. In addition, the Bible movement in Brasil has had a direct influence on the development of the ISB through the ongoing process of South-South dialogue initiated by organisations like the Theological Exchange Programme (TEP), the Institute for Contextual Theology (ICT), the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), and the South African Council of Churches (SACC).

## The Bible movement in Brasil

What has been called "the Bible movement" in Brasil is an attempt at searching for answers to the challenges posed above. The Bible movement emerged with the poor and oppressed trying to read the Bible from a new perspective, a perspective which enabled the Bible to speak into their situation. Biblical scholars were drawn into this process and from the resulting interface the Centro de Estudos Bíblicos (CEBI) was formed.

The common factor that unites the work of CEBI is a Bible reading methodology. The reading methodology of CEBI involves three crucial commitments: first, a commitment to begin with reality as perceived by the organized base; second, a commitment to read the Bible in community; and third, a commitment to sociopolitical transformation through Bible reading. This reading methodology is referred to as the CEBI process of contextual Bible study.

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[1] In this respect Segundo shares the same concerns as Mosala.

The first of these commitments is critical. Fundamental to every level of CEBI is that the base "shows" reality. This is qualified, however, in that it is the organized or politicized base who present the picture of reality. This qualification is crucial because it indicates the concern for a critical consciousness among the poor and oppressed.

The second commitment highlights the importance of a communal reading of the Bible: "no-one can read the Bible alone, there must be a search for consensus in the group."[2] This commitment binds biblical scholars and ordinary readers together. While the base has in the past been suspicious of intellectuals this is not necessarily the case. Biblical scholars are continually being "called" by the people. This trust of intellectuals is reserved, however, only for those whom the people choose to speak with.

The biblical scholars who are part of the CEBI process are committed to doing biblical studies with and from the perspective of the poor and oppressed. So in CEBI there has always been a clear recognition by intellectuals of their role as servants. As all of the biblical scholars associated with CEBI are embedded in base communities there is continual awareness of the limited nature of their influence. Their contribution may be distinctive and different but it is not in any way better or more significant. While not all of the biblical scholars in CEBI are organic intellectuals, they all work closely with organic intellectuals. In fact, most of CEBI's work involves the ongoing training of what they call facilitators or animators. In all aspects of the CEBI process the concerns of such committed intellectuals and facilitators are shaped primarily by the needs of the base.

In the third commitment the emphasis is as much on "the Bible" as it is on "socio-political transformation." In other words, the Bible is not merely a strategic tool for liberation (at least not for the ordinary people and the vast majority of biblical scholars); the Bible is *the* source of "God's project," which is a project of liberation. Although there are a variety of modes of reading the Bible within CEBI, the predominant mode of reading is sociological. This emphasis arises out of the need for a critical consciousness among the poor and oppressed who are often trapped in a feudal and fatalistic culture of silence. The CEBI process of contextual Bible study works for a transfer of social analysis of the text to social analysis of the Brasilian context.

The CEBI Bible study process is transformative in two major respects. Bible study plays an important role in breaking the feudal and fatalistic religious culture of the poor and oppressed in Brasil. The CEBI process offers a new way of seeing reality from the perspective of God's project of liberation. Instead of being trapped in an unchangeable reality of oppression the Bible gives direction to and illuminates a dynamic reality of liberation. The poor and oppressed come to see themselves as active subjects and co-workers in God's project of liberation rather than as passive objects of fate.

The second major transformative role of contextual Bible study is that it gives the poor and oppressed analytical tools and so plays a role in developing a critical consciousness. This is particularly evident through the sociological mode of reading. This mode of reading offers *via its reconstructions* a grasp of historical and analytical concepts, tools, and skills. For example, through making available sociological and historical information people are given conceptual skills and frameworks which relate to time and space. Also, *via its method* this mode of

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[2] Much of the discussion of CEBI arises from a recent research trip to Brasil. Rowland and Corner 1990 also reflect on what can be learned from the Brasilian context.

reading offers social, economic, and political categories. For example, the most common sociological approach is the "Four Sides" approach of Gilberto Gorgulho. Here people are trained to pose four sets of questions to the text: economic, social, political, and ideological (including cultural). Reading the Bible from four sides creates categories of perception for text and life. As the people use this method of Bible reading there is some degree of transfer from text to Brasilian context. For example, a conflictual/class analysis of the biblical text leads to a conflictual/class analysis of Brasilian reality.

While CEBI's work has led to a liberative consciousness and praxis in many instances, this is not necessarily always the case. The developing of a transformative faith and a transformative critical consciousness in a society of socio-political and religious "silence" is no easy task. The task is no easier in South Africa (Cochrane and De Gruchy 1991).

## Contextual Bible Study in South Africa

These then are some of the factors which have shaped the ISB in South Africa. It is the South African context of struggle, however, which has been the major factor in the shaping of the ISB. Most of 1990 was spent consulting with activists in the church and community, with community organisations, with progressive agencies and groups within the church, and with other biblical and theological scholars committed to contextual Bible reading. The purpose of this extensive consultation was to delineate more carefully the work of the ISB and to network with similar initiatives.

The consultation process included the following: Institute for Contextual Theology (ICT); United Congregational Church of Southern Africa (UCCSA) Task Force; C.B. Powell Bible Centre (University of South Africa); Theological Education by Extension College; Khanya African Independent Churches Theological Training and Research Institute; Ubulungisa Project (Christian Citizenship Department of the Methodist Church); St John the Baptist Extension Seminary; Victims of Apartheid (VOA); South African Council of Churches (SACC); Church of the Province of Southern Africa Mission Department; Young Christian Workers (Soweto); Department of Religious Studies, University of Cape Town; Theological Exchange Programme (TEP); The Ecumenical Action Movement (TEAM); Lumko; Movement of Christian Workers (MCW); Churches Urban Planning Commission (CUPC); Broken Wall Community; University of the Western Cape (Seminary); Centre for Contextual Hermeneutics in Southern Africa; Ilimo Community Project (Amaoti); Order of Ethiopia in Kwanobuhle; Catholic Development Centre in Umtata; Albert Nolan; Itumeleng Mosala; John De Gruchy; Bernard Lategan; Frank Chikane; and others.

Through this ongoing consultation and collaboration the ISB has become involved in a number of projects. The core of ISB's work in 1990 has been a local ISB Bible study group in Pietermaritzburg. This group is non-racial and consists of trained and untrained readers of the Bible who are committed to the CEBI process outlined above. The purpose of this group is to do contextual Bible study together, to reflect on the contextual Bible study process, and to prepare material which might be of use to others.

The format of the Bible studies varies, but there is always interaction between the insights of biblical studies and the insights of ordinary people. There is usually some input by a biblical scholar who is committed to the poor and

oppressed and to contextual Bible study. This input is then discussed, probed, and supplemented from different perspectives.

The ideas and material emerging from this process are then taken and workshopped by a smaller group made up of participants from the larger Bible study group. The task of this smaller group is to produce contextual Bible study material and processes which reflect the interface between biblical studies and the ordinary reader. The materials and processes produced by this group are usually tried out in the larger group and then reworked.

Because the ISB is a part of a wider network of church and community groups involved in contextual Bible study there is an ongoing exchange of materials and processes. So the work of the ISB is rooted in and emerges from an ongoing process of group Bible study and reflection. The contextual Bible study process includes dialogue between trained and untrained readers of the Bible, but because this relationship is often an unequal one there is a deliberate attempt to allow the material and processes to be extensively shaped by ordinary readers as the process continues.

Other projects in which the ISB is involved are the following.

*Exodus project*

This project began in 1990 with a request by United Congregational Church of Southern Africa (UCCSA) for contextual Bible study material. Working closely with the Task Force of UCCSA in their plan to establish a network of base communities throughout Southern Africa, the ISB has produced a series of Bible Studies on Exodus 1-15. The ISB and the Institute for Contextual Theology (ICT) facilitated a workshop with UCCSA. The ISB is involved in the ongoing evaluation and training process with UCCSA.

*Ilimo Disciples Prayer project*

This project was initiated by the Ilimo squatter community in Amaoti (Natal). The Ilimo community project, a primary health care project, has produced a series of Bible studies and slides on "The Discipes Prayer in Amaoti." These studies reflect ordinary people's understanding of the Lord's Prayer in their community. The ISB has been asked to assist them in producing this as a booklet in English and Zulu. The ISB's involvement with the Ilimo project is ongoing in this and other areas (see below).

*Ilimo projects on the relationship between trained and ordinary readers*

The Ilimo community has asked the ISB to work with them in exploring the role of critical biblical scholarship in a community such as theirs where most of the people are illiterate or semi-literate. The nature of these projects is still to be decided in consultation with the community.

*Ad Hoc Committee for Southern Africa*

This project was the result of the ISB November Workshop in which participants elected an Ad Hoc Committee to co-ordinate the networking of contextual Bible study in Southern Africa. The ISB was asked to co-ordinate this work through the Ad Hoc Committee.

*Road to Damascus project*

This project arose from the need to develop Bible studies to go with the Road to Damscus Document. The Federal Theological Seminary in Pietermaritzburg, together with ICT, took up this task. The ISB was asked to facilitate the process at various points. The ISB has now been asked to prepare these Bible studies for publication.

*Christian Research, Education, and Information for Democracy (CREID) project*

This project involves the preparation of contextual Bible study material for a grassroots publication. The ISB has been asked to contribute Bible studies in various areas (e.g., education).

*ICT Magazine*

This is a new project which is being launched by ICT. ICT plans to produce a monthly magazine for ordinary readers consisting of a variety of articles, interviews, etc. The ISB has been asked to contribute a Bible study and background (including hisotrical, sociological, economic, ideological analysis) to the Bible for each edition. Currently the ISB is working on a series of Bible studies on Mark's gospel will be used for the this project.

*Theological Exchange Programme (TEP) Consultation*

This project is part of the ongoing work of TEP to develop contextual theological and biblical skills. TEP, in consultation with ICT, Lumko, ISB, and others is planning a CEBI-type workshop in Kimberley in September in which the development of a critical biblical perspective is the focus. The ISB has been asked to facilitate some of the sessions and to prepare a time chart on the biblical period.

*Ecumenical Documentation and Information Centre for Eastern and Southern Africa (EDICESA)/All African Conference of Churches (AACC) Project on Right Wing Christian Groups*

This project has been running for about three years already and is mainly focused on needs in Southern and Eastern Africa. The ISB has a representative on the steering committee. The task of the ISB is to provide contextual alternatives to counter the growing influence of conservative North American material and processes. The ISB has been asked to help plan a workshop on contextual Bible study in Namibia in October.

*Uitenhage/Kwanobuhle project on Women and the Bible*

A community project of the Order of Ethiopia in Kwanobuhle has asked the ISB to work with them in developing a series of Bible studies concerning the liberation of women.

*Anglican Church project*

This is an ongoing piece of research being conducted with the Anglican communities in Pietermaritzburg. The first stage of this research was completed by in 1989 (Draper and West 1989). The second stage of this project involves working in a more participatory manner with specific Anglican communities in order to discover whether and how critical input is useful to ordinary readers.

*The Bible in Africa workshop*

The ISB is planning to facilitate a workshop on contextual Bible study in Southern or Eastern Africa in 1992. The World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) will be involved in the planning.

*Sermon preparation group*

The ISB has been asked by local pastors to provide some training in the area of contextual sermon preparation.

*Bibliographical project*

Although this project is a project within the Department of Theological Studies, it has strong links with the ISB. The purpose of this project is to produce a Southern African contextual bibliography in the areas of theology and biblical studies.

In each of these projects, most of which have been intiated from the community, the ISB sets up structures through which it is accountable to the community. These are called Project Committees and consist of ISB and community representatives. One of the ongoing challenges to the ISB is the development of democratic structures and processes.

Many of these projects have raised a number of important issues for those working with the ISB. The overarching issue, as the discussions of Mofokeng, Mosala, and Segundo suggest, concerns the relationship between trained and ordinary readers of the Bible. The question of the relationship between biblical studies with its trained readers of the Bible and ordinary readers of the Bible lies at the heart of their discussions.

## The Interface between the Trained Reader and the Ordinary Reader

While all trained readers committed to a liberation paradigm want the Bible to be a weapon for liberation in South Africa, they differ on how this ought to happen. For this to happen, some argue, the Bible must be read critically, and so the ordinary reader must to some extent be dependent on the work of biblical scholarship. For this to happen, others argue, the Bible must be read from the perspective of the poor and oppressed, and so the trained reader must to some extent be dependent on the readings of ordinary readers. In other words, for the Bible to be a weapon of liberation in South Africa there needs to be an appropriate relationship between the trained reader and the ordinary reader. Some interpreters stress the role of the trained reader while others stress the role of the ordinary reader.

In order to analyze this difference in emphasis it will be useful to reconsider the dynamics and complexity of oppression and to reconsider the role of the organic intellectual. For Paulo Freire, among others,[3] "the logic of domination represents a combination of historical and contemporary ideological and material practices that are never completely successful, always embody contradictions, and are constantly being fought over within asymmetrical relations of power" (Giroux 1985:xii). In other words, we find in Freire's work a discourse that begins to bridge the relationship between agency and structure, "a discourse that

[3] See especially Welch 1990 and the work of Michel Foucault, particularly Foucault 1980.

situates human action in constraints forged in historical and contemporary practices, while also pointing to the spaces, contradictions, and forms of resistance that raise the possibility for social struggle" (Giroux 1985:xviii).

However, in Freire's analysis of domination the poor and oppressed are not only oppressed by external structures and forces, they also internalize and thus participate in their own oppression. So Freire recognizes that the oppressed people's accommodation to the logic of domination may mean that they actively resist emancipatory forms of knowledge (Giroux 1985:xix).

The message that emerges from this brief overview of Friere's analysis of domination is relatively clear. If we are to understand the meaning of liberation we must first understand the form that domination takes, the nature of its location, and the problems it poses for those who experience it as both a subjective and objective force (Giroux 1985:xx). Because there is no "average" ordinary reader, as the discussion in the previous chapter indicates, trained readers committed to working with the poor and oppressed will have differing emphases depending on their analysis of the nature of oppression within specfic contexts. For example, in Albert Nolan's work with fairly politicized and critically conscious workers he emphasizes the possibilities for self-emancipation, while in Mosala's work with members of a Zion Apostolic Church who have internalized their own oppression he emphasizes the need for critical intervention (West 1991:chapter 7).[4] Although analyses may differ, as in the case of Mosala and Nolan, the starting point remains constant. The social and historical particularities, the problems, sufferings, visions, and acts of resistance of the poor and oppressed constitute the starting point for the committed intellectual (Giroux 1985:xx-xxi).

Central to an adequate understanding of the relationship between the committed intellectual and the poor and oppressed is a redefinition of the very notion of the intellectual. Like the Italian social theorist Antonio Gramsci, Freire redefines the category of intellectual and argues that all men and women are intellectuals. "That is, regardless of one's social and economic function, all human beings perform as intellectuals by constantly interpreting and giving meanings to the world and by participating in a particular conception of the world" (Giroux 1985:xxiii). Moreover, and this is perhaps the crux of the relationship between the trained and the ordinary reader, "the oppressed need to develop their own organic and resistant intellectuals who can learn with such groups while simultaneously helping them to foster modes of self-education and struggle against various forms of oppression."

> In this case, intellectuals are organic in that they are *not* outsiders bringing theory to the masses. On the contrary, they are theorists fused organically with the culture and practical activities of the oppressed. Rather than casually dispense knowledge to the grateful masses, intellectuals fuse with the oppressed in order to make and remake the conditions necessary for a radical social project (Giroux 1985:xxiii).

Such a position highlights the political function of the trained reader. Such a position also emphasizes the pedagogical and democratic nature of the relation-

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[4] Mosala would argue, as we have indicated, that many black theologians have also to some extent internalized their own oppression in their use of the dominant hermeneutical epistemology for which truth is not historical, cultural, or economic (Mosala 1989:19).

ship between the trained and the ordinary reader (Giroux 1985:xxiii; Mosala 1986:181; Mosala 1989:21; Mofokeng 1988).

### Developing Accountability and a Critical Consciousness

In the work of the ISB in South Africa, as in the work of CEBI in Brasil, there is a clear recognition of the need for *democratic* processes. Central to the ISB, and CEBI, is the communal and corporate nature of contextual Bible study. However, because the partnership between biblical scholars and ordinary people is not an equal one, there are different aspects of democracy which have to be learned by the respective partners.

Crucial to the work of both the ISB and CEBI is the development of processes which facilitate the *accountability* of biblical studies and theological education to ordinary people, particularly the poor and oppressed. By making biblical studies accountable to ordinary people biblical scholars learn about democracy "from below." The view of democracy which most middle-class people have is considerably different from the understanding of democracy among the poor and oppressed. Accountability, therefore, requires at least two things from trained readers. First, it requires that trained readers abandon their tendency to want to be in control. Second, it requires that trained readers take seriously the deeply communal nature of contextual Bible study (Welch 1990:49-64). So, for example, trained readers should not impose their understandings of reality on the Bible study group, but should listen to and begin with ordinary people's view of reality "from below." So, too, biblical scholars have to learn to put their expertise in the hands of the poor and oppressed. And as Albert Nolan has argued, this is much more difficult to do than it might at first appear. "As academics, intellectuals, biblical scholars, we are more accustomed to making use of the insights of others than allowing ourselves to be made use of" (Nolan 1989:4). Accountability is a crucial aspect of democracy which biblical scholars and other intellectuals must learn in order to be of use to the community.

Also crucial to the work of the ISB and CEBI is the development of a critical consciousness among the poor and oppressed. The contextual Bible study process facilitates the learning and the transfer of *critical skills*. In South Africa, more so than in Brasil, many of the poor and oppressed are conscientized and some politicized. However, as Mosala argues and as recent events in South Africa suggest, there is still an urgent need for a critical consciousness among the poor and oppressed. Not only are there constant attempts by the state to co-opt the church, but there are also those within the church who continue to use the resources, symbols, and traditions of the church in a reactionary and conservative manner. Developing a critical consciousness, therefore, requires at least two things among ordinary readers. First, critical consciousness requires the development of analytical skills, skills which can be applied to the Bible as well as to society. Second, critical consciousness requires the development of constructive skills, skills which will enable ordinary people to participate in the construction of a transformed South Africa. So, for example, ordinary people need to develop a sense of confidence in their own ability to analyze both the biblical text and their context. So, too, ordinary people need to develop a sense of responsibility for their own present and future.

In facilitating the development of such critical skills biblical scholars committed to a liberation paradigm, biblical interpreters like Itumeleng Mosala (Mosala 1989), Norman Gottwald (Gottwald 1979), Carol Meyers (Meyers 1988), Cain

Hope Felder (Felder 1989), Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (Schüssler Fiorenza 1983), Phyllis Trible (Trible 1978; Trible 1984), J. Severino Croatto (Croatto 1987), and Sandra Schneiders (Schneiders 1989), all adopt and advocate *critical modes of reading* the Bible. Whether their focus is behind the text, on the text, or in front of the text, they are in agreement in their concern for a critical mode of reading the Bible (West 1991:chapter 6).

Critical modes of reading are important because these interpreters are concerned that readers recognize the ideological nature of the text (and society) and that readers develop the critical skills to analyze the text (and society) which will enable them to arrive at this recognition (West 1991:112). They must do so because the Bible and its interpretations have continually been used both to oppress ordinary people and to legitimate oppression of and among ordinary people (Mofokeng 1988).

Through the ISB we are also learning, however, that solidarity with and accountability to the poor and oppressed also requires that trained readers continue to appropriate the Bible inspite of their recognition of its conflicting ideological interests. They must do so because the Bible plays a significant role among the poor and oppressed (West 1991:chapters 4,7-8), and they must do so because of the need to stand in continuity with the 'dangerous memories' (Metz 1980) and the 'subjugated knowledges' (Welch 1990) within or behind the biblical text (Ruether 1983:18; West 1991:100). This last contribution is particularly important if liberative readings of the Bible are to take seriously their commitment to ordinary readers. So we would agree with Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza when she argues that a postbiblical feminist position is in danger of becoming ahistorical and apolitical because it 'too quickly concedes that women have no authentic history within biblical religion and too easily relinquishes women's feminist biblical heritage. Nor can such a stance do justice to the positive experiences of contemporary women within biblical religion.' Insofar as the Bible is still influential today and insofar as it forms a part of many women's personal, cultural, or religious Christian history, a cultural and social feminist transformation of society must take into account the biblical story and the historical impact of the biblical tradition. 'We will either transform it into a new liberating future or continue to be subject to its tyranny whether we recognize its power or not' (Schüssler Fiorenza 1983:xix).

### Modes of Reading and the Struggle

While many trained readers would agree with Schüssler Fiorenza, there would be less agreement on how this transformation is to be done. Is there one mode of reading, for example a sociological or literary mode of reading, which does this best? This is a complex question, but work in the ISB suggests that provided the mode of reading is a critical reading there is no one mode of reading which has a privileged relationship to the context of struggle. While there is certainly more to be analyzed here, and while there are a number questions still to clarify, different modes of reading, whether focusing behind the text (sociological readings), or on the text (literary readings), or in front of the text (metaphorical readings), can offer a coherent and theoretically well-grounded hermeneutics of liberation (West 1991:chapter 6). What is crucial is that each of these modes of reading is a *critical* reading in which each mode of reading offers, to use Mosala's term, a "structural" reading of the biblical text. Not only must the reading be critical but any appropriation of biblical elements must also be a

*critical appropriation*. While this is not always the case for all trained readers, it is true for Trible's literary reading, Croatto's metaphorical reading, and Mosala's, Gottwald's, and Schüssler Fiorenza's sociological readings (West 1991:chapter 6). For each of these interpreters the struggle within the biblical text can only be accessed and appropriated critically. For these trained readers the interpretive task involves the hermeneutics of both retrieval and suspicion, and often retrieval through suspicion (Tracy 1987:77,112).

Here, as in the other areas discussed above, we have much to learn. The contextual Bible study process provides a framework for learning in a participatory framework in each of these related areas.

## Some Needs in the Southern African Context

In this final section we briefly outline some the challenges and needs which face us in the South and Southern African context.

As much of the discussion so far suggests, there is an urgent need to train facilitators or organic intellectuals. The skills of facilitating or animating (as it is called in Brasil) are crucial to the contextual Bible study process. Fortunately there are a number of church and community related groups that are working in this area. The challenge we are facing here is that of networking and sharing resources.

There is also an enormous need for contextual Bible study material. This need is particularly acute in Southern and Eastern Africa where conservative North American material is virtually hegemonic. In South Africa itself there are some resources, but there is still the need for material which reflects a more critical perspective towards the Bible (avoiding a fundamentalism of the left).

Further research is obviously also necessary. For example, there is a need for more research in the area of the interface of the trained and the ordinary reader *within a participatory research paradigm* (see West 1991:chapter 7). Mosala (1989), Lategan and Rousseau (1988), Smit (1989), Draper and West (1989), and others have done some research in this area, but many questions still remain. The contextual Bible study process provides a context in which to continue exploring this interface.

There is also a need for more research in the area of how different modes of reading the Bible (sociological, literary, metaphorical, etc.) relate to contexts of struggle. In working with specific communities of the poor and oppressed we are beginning to see the usefulness of each mode for particular contexts. But perhaps the greatest challenge here is the way in which research is done. The need in our context is for participatory research in which the focus of the research emerges from the needs and experience of communities of the poor and oppressed; for research that rejects the possibility of doing value-neutral research in favour of dialectical notions of rationality and truth and therefore moves reflexively between theory and practice; for research that uses the interpretive categories of the participant practitioners as a basis for the discourse from within which the practitioners develop their own theorizing; for research that provides a means by which distorted self understandings of the participants may be overcome by analyzing the socio-economic forces that shape these understandings; for research that by linking theory to practice (action to reflection) reflexively offers transformative strategies which may overcome institutional and societal obstacles to democratic and free practices; and for research that is motivated by

an emancipatory concern where the process is just as important as the product (Luckett 1990).

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# Retrospect and Prospect in Luke-Acts Interpretation[1]

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One of the pressing problems in the theological[2] interpretation of Luke-Acts today is what may be called the Jewishness of Luke's work. There is today no serious question about the existence of this Jewishness, even if it was forgotten or overlooked for years.[3] At least on this point we have a consensus: Luke is interested in Jews and Jewish Christians. But the explanation of his Jewishness is marked by controversy, a matter that involves the composition of the Lucan community and the relationship between Jewish and Gentile Christianity. This is a particular problem in that for years scholars were nearly unanimous in viewing Luke-Acts as a Gentile Christian document, written by a Gentile Christian for Gentile Christians. We may discuss to what degree the theme of this Jewishness is important within Lucan exegesis. It is of course important for the immanent and inherent understanding of Luke's work, even more for the story of early Christianity, particularly after Paul. No significant discussion of the role and place of Jewish Christianity took place for some years. That may be taken to mean that we have reached a deadlock on the question, or that the question has been settled and that for once exegesis has reached a consensus.

The Jewishness of Luke-Acts is not a new problem. It was so already when the so-called Western Text appeared.[4] It was the case in the last century, among those great names asociated with F. C. Baur. It is still a problem for a generation of scholars who, with few exceptions, open their works on Luke by stating that the one sure thing about Luke is that he is a Gentile Christian writing for Gentile Christians.[5] Some twenty years ago I sought to reopen the discussion of Luke's

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[1] I have been asked by the steering committee to deal particularly with my own work and its impact on the American and European scene.

[2] I will not discuss methodological problems here.

[3] Cf. Robert Brawley, *Luke-Acts and the Jews. Conflict, Apology, and the Conciliation* (SBLMS 33; Atlanta, 1987), 3. (Hereafter, *Luke-Acts and the Jews.*)

[4] E. J. Epp, *The Theological Tendency of Codex Bezae Cantabrigiensis in Acts* (SBLMS 3; Cambridge, 1966).

[5] In the last ten years scholars have been more cautious. Typical is R. Pesch (1986 commentary, I, 27): "*Probably* a Gentile Christian, but as a God-fearer rooted in Hellenistic Jewish-Christian tradition" (italics mine); for the state of the question, see J. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke* (Anchor Bible 28; New York, 1981-) I, 41-47 (hereafter, *Luke*). There is a tendency in the last years of exegesis to stress that the Lucan community consisted mainly of God-fearers. But this group's relationship respectively to Christian Jews and Christian Gentiles remains an open question.

Jewishness in my book *Luke and the People of God*.[6] I had two intentions. The first was to show the place of Luke-Acts within Jewish traditions: Luke is not writing from a Gentile point of view. The second was to show that there was a Jewish Christianity even after 70 AD, not only in some small backwater but in the main stream.[7]

The books have made almost no impact whatever on the German-European scene,[8] at least until two years ago when M. Klinghardt's monograph, *Gesetz und Volk Gottes* appeared.[9] Dogmas in the history of exegesis are long-lived! It is to me a great mystery that I was asked to be the successor of E. Haenchen in writing the commentary on Acts for the Meyer Series.[10]

The situation in American exegesis has been quite different. There has been a new and very lively discussion and a stream of books and essays dealing especially with the Jewishness of Luke-Acts, Luke's milieu, his readers, and the law. On the one hand some contributions have advanced the discussion significantly along the lines I sketched. On the other, there has been valuable and thoroughgoing criticism profitable for Lucan studies.[11]

Certain catchwords may serve to identify the issues involved in discussions of the "Jewishness" of Luke-Acts:

1. Luke's *Christology* is marked by the fact that the Messiah of Luke-Acts is the most Jewish Messiah within the New Testament, not only in regard to language but also to content. This is the element of truth in Ph.

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6 *Luke and the People of God* (Minneapolis, 1972), including essays written from 1962 on.

7 The last point has been argued in a series of essays in my *The Unknown Paul* (Minneapolis, 1984).

8 It is perhaps no coincidence that of the reviews of my work, 90% have been in English and French, 10% in other languages, and none in German.

9 M. Klinghardt, *Gesetz und Volk Gottes* (WUNT 2, R. 21; Tübigen, 1989). Some of my views were discussed in G. Lohfink, *Die Sammlung Israels. Eine Untersuchung zur lukanischen Ekklesiologie* (StANT XXXIX; München, 1975); in the fine survey of scholarly works on Luke-Acts by F. Bovon, *Luc le théologien. Vingt-cing ans de recherches* (1978); R. Maddox, *The Purpose of Luke-Acts* (FRLANT 126; Göttingen, 1982)(hereafter, *Purpose*), who refers broadly to my views and in deprecatory fashion. The last edition of E. Haenchen's Commentary on Acts appeared in 1977 (KEK III, 7th ed; Göttingen, 1977; ET: Philadelphia, 1982). I corresponded with Haenchen on the subject and my criticism of his work, and he regretted that he was unable to take a stand on the questions in his last edition of the commentary. There has been some impact in other European countries, e.g., in England: S. Farris, *The Hymns of Luke's Infancy Narratives. Their Origin, Meaning, and Significance* (JSNT Sup. Ser. 9; Sheffield, 1985); E. Franklin, *Christ the Lord. A Study in the Purpose and Theology of Luke Acts* (Philadelphia, 1975 (hereafter, *Christ the Lord*). Finish exegetes have furthered the study of the law in Luke-Acts: K. Salo, *Luke's Treatment of the Law. A Redaction-Critical Investigation* (Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae. Dissertationes Humanarum Litterarum 57; Helsinki, 1991 (hereater, *Law*); K. Syreeni, "Matthew, Luke, and the Law. A Study in Hermeneutical Exegesis," *The Law in the Bible and in its Environment* (ed. T. Vejola; PFES 51; Helsinki, 1990), 126-155. On the question of Luke's use of the Scriptures, B. J. Koet, *Five Studies on Interpretation of Scripture in Luke-Acts* (Studiorum Novi testamenti Auxilia XIV; Leuven, 1989) (hereafter, *Scripture*).

10 E. Haenchen, *Die Apostlegeschichte*, KEK, 3, 10.Aufl., 7th ed. 1977; English ed., *The Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia, 1982) (hereafter, *Acts*).

11 I will deal with some of these contributions in the course of my essay.

Vielhauer's most quoted words about the christology of Luke being pre-Pauline.[12]

2. Luke's *ecclesiology* shows that the word for the church is not "church," but "people," λαός, which means Israel as distinguished from all other peoples and nations. And there is for Luke only one Israel, the people of God par excellence. Throughout Acts there are reported repeated mass conversions of Jews, some mass conversions of God-fearers, and none of Gentiles.

3. In regard to *soteriology*, we may note that all promises of salvation are given to Israel and those belonging to the people; the promises are never taken from the people.[13]

4. In the same context belongs the question of the *torah*, the law. Within the church the law has full validity for all Jewish Christians, and not only as regards ethics but above all in ritual and sacrificial matters. Even for non-Jews, that is for God-fearers, the Law of Moses is valid, as the apostolic decree proves. It is not that fulfilling the law gives remission of sins and salvation—which is not a Jewish concept either![14]—but that the people of God keep the law in order to remain the people of God.

5. *Jewish words, conceptions, and customs* appear from Luke 1 to Acts 28. That some of them are explained in the Gospel of Luke where there is no explanation at all in Mark is taken as proof that the Gospel is meant for Gentiles not familiar with Judaism.[15] But that is to overlook the fact that Luke explains only about 5%, leaving the rest unexplained. In Acts he presupposes more of them than in the Gospel. Where do we find any explanation?

6. The Acts of the Apostles, which could be called the Acts of *Paul* with prolegomena, presents us not with the apostle to the Gentiles but with the apostle to the Jews and to the world, which is to say to the diaspora. He is the Pharisee par excellence, not an ex-Pharisee but, so to speak, the eternal Pharisee. It is no wonder that Luke cannot find a place in his Gospel for the discussion of clean and unclean (Mk 7:1ff) and that he removes the

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12 "Zum 'Paulinismus' der Apostelgeschichte," *EvTheol* 10 (1950), 1-15; in English: "On the 'Paulinism' of Acts," *Studies in Luke-Acts*, ed. L. Keck and J. L. Martyn (Nashville, 1966), 35-50.

13 See my forthcoming essay, "Gottes Treue zum untreuen Volk" (hereafter, "Treue"), in the forthcoming Festschrift for G. Schneider. Most exegetes are incorrect in understanding Acts 28:16-31 as the definite farewell to Israel, to Judaism, and as a rejection of the people. There is, however, a division in Israel, *in casu* in Rome (28:24-25). The Jews who agreed with Paul and became believers are the true Israel, and this Israel is not rejected; the harsh words in 28:28 are applied to the unbelieving Jews, i.e., those unwilling to give Gentiles a share in salvation. It is not clear whether in 28:28ff. Luke sees the end of the mission to the Jews "from Jerusalem to Rome" (Acts 1:8). There is a growing tendency among exegetes to see 28:16-31 not as the rejection of Israel, but as a sign of "einem noch andauernden Prozess der Judenmission" (Klinghardt, *Gesetz und Volk Gottes*, 238); B. J. Koet, *Scripture*, 119-139; P. J. Müller, "Die jüdische Entscheidung gegen Jesus in der Apostlegeschichte," *Les Actes des Apôtres* (ed. J. Kremer; BETL XLVIII, 1979), 529ff; R. C. Tannehill, "Paul's Mission in Acts," *Luke-Acts and the Jewish People* (ed. J. Tyson; Minneapolis, 1988), 99ff.

14 Klinghardt, Gesetz und Volk Gottes, 101.

15 Thus again recently: J. Fitzmyer, *Luke*, I, 58.

scenes where Jesus polemicizes against the law in the Pharisaic context. And this is usually taken as a sign of his Gentile Christianity! In the lawsuit against Paul (Acts 22-28), the only topic under discussion is the question of law and resurrection, all from a Jewish point of view. It is all completely incomprehensible to the Romans, which they state explicitly. This is a strange apologetic!

7. *Language* is also significant. Luke is able to write Greek in decent style, but he seldom and only sporadically does. Most of his work he presents in what may be called Biblical Greek, clearly influenced by the Septuagint. The Septuagint is a Jewish book, written for Jews and not for Gentiles! And it is not only from a linguistic point of view that Luke is a biblicist. More than any other New Testament writer he has to prove whatever he says from the Scriptures, which to him have their proper place in the synagogue.[16]

All this calls for an explanation. There would be no problem at all if we conceived of Jewish Christianity as an important and multifarious part of the church throughout the first Christian century, at least equal to[17] Gentile Christianity and so to say in the mainstream of early Christianity even after 70 AD. The factors require an explanation, however, if we hold that Jewish Christianity was of no importance and dying, perhaps as early as the period after the apostolic council and without doubt after 70 AD.[18] The factors would have posed no problem if we conceived of Gentile Christianity as having absorbed older Jewish Christianity and made it a dominant part of its own theology. It is a sign of the situation that it is very difficult to give a precise definition of what the multifarious phenomenon "Jewish Christianity" actually is. It cannot of course be separated from the ethnological question, but there is more to it: Christianity cannot be separated from the religious, political, and cultural fate of Israel.

F. C. Baur, his colleagues and disciples, had an explanation. I would like to recall it, because it is far more convincing and reasonable than what has come after him.[19] The idea was that Acts represents a synthesis of Jewish Christianity and Gentile Christianity.[20] But then Jewish Christianity is something far more than a marginal note in the church. The decisive argument against Baur and his concept of Acts was that Jewish Christianity played no role after 70 A. D. Thus there could have been no synthesis.

But then there must be another explanation of the Jewishness of Acts. Here we turn above all to the German exegetes, with such names as Vielhauer,[21]

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16 J. Jervell, "Die Mitte der Schrift. Zum lukanischen Verständnis des Alten Testaments," *Die Mitte des Neuen Testaments* (Festschr. for E. Schweitzer; Göttingen, 1983), 79-96 (Hereafter, "Mitte der Schrift").

17 "Equal" does not refer to numbers but to theological importance and influence.

18 Cf. my *The Unknown Paul*, 26-51.

19 F. C. Baur, "Über den Ursprung des Episcopats in der christlichen Kirche," ZT 3 (1838), 142; idem, Kritische Untersuchungen über die kanonischen Evangelien (Tübingen, 1847), 394f, 428-34, 520-30.

20 It has often been said that the decisive factor in Baur's work was not historical evidence per se but the philosophy of Hegel. That is to underestimate Baur as a historian, but even if it is true, it can under no circumstances serve as an argument against Jewish Christianity having played an important role after 70 AD.

21 "Paulinismus."

Dibelius, Conzelmann, and Haenchen.[22] They have dominated exegesis in our field for the last 40 years, and when you look into the newer commentaries on Luke and Acts, you will still find their ideas about the Jewishness of Acts, even if the commentaries have other points of view on the greater parts of Luke's theology. The catchword here is "history." It is in this context of no consequence if we speak of Luke as the inventor of "Heilsgeschichte," or as a Hellenistic historiographer, or as a biblical writer (having taken his ideas about writing history from the Bible). In all these cases it is possible to subsume all the Jewishness into history: it belongs for Luke to the past, to the first Christian generations. Luke is thus understood to be writing the history of more than one epoch, namely that of Israel, the foregoing epoch of history. The time of Jesus is likewise to be considered as past. But even the apostolic era and the time of Paul belong to the past, and Luke's own time is that of the third Christian generation. He is not writing the history of his own time. He is living at a time when the mission to Israel is a matter of history; he belongs to a church different from the one visible in his reports of all the mass conversions, where the church is composed mostly of Jews. Labelling the Jewishness of Luke-Acts as "history" in this manner is very much in line with Overbeck, who saw the Judaism of Acts as part of the efforts of Gentile Christianity to elucidate its own past.[23]

When Acts is viewed in this way as a document telling of bygone times, there is a clear idea of the book's Jewishness. Let me put it in the words of the last great commentary on Luke, namely the one written by Fr. Bovon:[24] Luke testifies to a Hellenistic Christianity where is no strict adherence to the law. That the apostles and other witnesses nevertheless conform to Jewish practices can be attributed to Luke the historian who advocates the historic roots of the church; it is not a demand of Luke the theologian that Christians follow the same way of life.

We cannot pause to deal with the question if it is possible the separate Luke the historian from Luke the theologian.[25] And we will presently deal with the matter of Luke's understanding of the time of the apostles. Is that time not the ideal for the later church, so that history places obligations on the present? Is not

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[22] M. Dibelius, *Aufsätze zur Apostelgeschichte* (ed. H. Greeven; FRLANT 60; Göttingen, 1951; ET: *Studies in the Acts of the Apostles*); Conzelmann, *The Theology of St. Luke* (New York, 1982; orig. German ed 1953); idem, *Acts* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia, 1986; German ed 1972); E. Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia, 1982; first German ed, 1956).

[23] F. Overbeck, *Kurze Erklärung der Apostelgeschichte.* Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zum Neuen Testament von M. L. deWette I/4. (Leipzig, 4th ed 1870) (hereafter, *Apostelgeschichte*).

[24] Fr. Bovon, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas* (Lk 1:1-9:50) (EKK III/1; Zürich-Neukirchen, 1989), 25 (hereafter, *Lukas*).

[25] For many years, i.e. after 1950, the historian Luke has been almost completely absorbed by Luke the theologian. If he ever intended to write history, he did it poorly—though he is at the same time an original and capable theologian. More recently, i.e. after 1970, there has been a growing tendency to view Luke more and more as a historian—and a good one, as capable a historian as a theologian. Cf. the survey in H. Gasque, *A History of the Criticism of the Acts of the Apostles* (BGBE 17; Tübingen, 1975); I. H. Marshall, *Luke: Historian and Theologian* (Grand Rapids, 1970); E. Plümacher, *Lukas als hellenistischer Schriftsteller. Studien zur Apostelgeschichte* (SUNT 9; Göttingen, 1972). A new discussion will arise from the contribution of C.-J. Thornton, who sees in Paul's companion Luke, writing the history of Paul's travels, a Christian tragic historian (*Der Zeuge des Zeugen* [WUNT, 1991]; hereafter, *Zeuge*). My citations are from the proofs. The relationship between historian and theologian is still an open question, but Luke is at least a historian in the sense that he understands history theologically.

the law-observant Paul a norm for his successors? What then is to be left to the past and what is normative? But all the problematic texts disappear, so to say.

According to Luke, so the argument goes, the law—that is, the Mosaic Torah—was important to Jews in the first generation of the church.[26] Now it is a matter of history. It has no actual bearing upon the church. The apostolic decree, once part of ritual purity laws, has no longer any binding force on Luke's generation. The sermons of the apostles and Paul are not contemporary sermons—that is, in Luke's church. The synagogue once was the "church" for Christians, as we can see throughout Acts, but within the course of history synagogue and church were separated. That in Luke's account of Paul's trial the apostle deals with Jewish matters and not issues intelligible to the Romans—despite the fact that the apologetic is addressed to the Romans—is because Luke seeks to show that Christianity must have the same privileges as the Jewish religion had in the empire as "permitted religion" (*religio licita*).[27] The church, then, is the true successor of Israel. With regard to soteriology, it is true that all the promises were

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[26] Above all the question of the law in Luke-Acts—for years neglected by exegetes—has since 1972 been the subject of intense scholarly efforts: C. Blomberg, "The Law in Luke-Acts," JSNT 22 (1984), 53-80; F. G. Downing, "Law and Custom: Luke-Acts and late Hellenism," *Law and Religion. Essays on the Place of the Law in Israel and Early Christianity* (ed. B. Lindars; Cambridge, 1988), 148-58; P. F. Esler, *Community and Gospel in Luke-Acts. The Social and Political Motivation of Lukan Theology* (MSSNTS 57; Cambridge, 1987), 110-30 (hereafter, *Community*); M. Klinghardt, *Gesetz und Volk Gottes*, 1989; K. Salo, *Law*, 1991; M. A. Seifrid, "Jesus and the Law in Acts," JSNT 30 (1987), 39-57; W. Stegemann, *Zwischen Synagoge und Obrigkeit. Ein Beitrag zur Situation der lukanischen Christen* (Heidelberg, 1982), 146-183; K. Syreeni, *Matthew, Luke, and the Law*, 1990; M. Turner, "The Sabbath, Sunday, and the Law in Luke-Acts," *From Sabbath to Lord's Day. A Biblical, Historical and Theological Investigation* (ed. D. A. Carson; Grand Rapids, 1982); S. G. Wilson, *Luke and the Law* (MSSNTS 50; Cambridge, 1983).

[27] In favor of this theory: Jackson-Luke, *The Beginnings of Christianity* II, 177-87; F. F. Bruce, *Commentary on the Book of Acts* (NIGTC 5; Grand Rapids, 1976), 374; B. S. Easton, *Early Christianity* (1955; =*The Purpose of Acts* [London, 1936]), 41ff; E. Haenchen, Commentary, 536; A. Wickenhausen, *Die Apostelgeschichte* (RNT 5; Regensburg, 1961), 215; cf. also O. Bauernfeind, *Kommentar und Studien zur Apostelgeschichte* (ExpBC 9; Grand Rapids, 1982), 485f. We have no evidence whatever that such a category as *religio licita* ever existed; some scholars have tried to support the theory by investigating the legal language in the trial scenes: A. A. Trites, "The Importance of Legal Scenes and Language in the Book of Acts," NT 16 (1974), 278-284; cf. H. W. Tajra, *The Trial of St. Paul. A Juridical Analysis of the Second Half of the Acts of the Apostles* (WUNT 2 R 35; Tübingen, 1989), 56. An analysis of the *religio licita* theory in Esler, *Community*, 211ff: The Romans treated foreign relations on an ad hoc basis, but Judaism enjoyed a privileged position in the empire; cf. Tajra, *Trial*, 15-21. Apart from the argument regarding a *religio licita*, the notion that Luke offers a political apology for Christianity has been very influential. See the surveys in Esler, *Community*, 205-11; M. A. Powell, *What are they saying about Luke? (New Jersey, 1989)*, 82-85. There are various forms of the idea: Luke tries to persuade Roman outsiders that Christianity is politically harmless (Conzelmann, *Theology of Luke*, 144); Bovon, *Lukas*, 23: "Er möchte . . . die Angst der Römer vor der christlichen Mission beschwichtigen"; P. W. Walaskay, "'And so we came to Rome': The Political Perspective of St. Luke (MSSNTS 49; Cambridge, 1983), argues that Luke offers an *apologia pro imperio* to the church, cf. Maddox, *Purpose*, 91-99. Esler, *Community*, 210: the purpose is to demonstrate to Romans in Luke's community that faith in Jesus and allegiance to Rome were not mutually inconsistent."

Opposed to the idea of political apologetic: R. J. Cassidy, Jesus, Politics and Society. A Study of Luke's Gospel (New York, 1978); idem, Society and Politics in the Acts of the Apostles New York, 1987); A. Sloan, The Favorable Year of the Lord (Austin, 1977); A. Trocmé, Jesus and the Political Revolution (Scottsdale, 1973; French original in 1961).

meant for Israel, but as they refused salvation, the church turned to the Gentiles. The problem here is of course the notices of mass conversions, which speak against the idea that Israel en bloc turned down the gospel. The accounts must somehow be played down: they do not speak of conversions; besides being exaggerations, they demonstrate the power of the word of God. Luke's use of Semitisms and Septuagintisms is to show the former milieu and preaching of the church. It is then important that Luke, that is the author, is not himself directly a part of that history, that he himself has not taken part in what he reports. What then of the "We-passages"?[28] It is of course possible that he speaks there about himself as the author in order to show where he was present as an eyewitness.[29] Or it may be as most commentators explain: this is a stylistic remedy to provide a guarantee for the truth of what he is writing, in accordance with ancient historiographic convention.[30] Be that as it may. In any case the author maintains that he is narrating the history of his own time. Thus the church in Acts—at least in the last part of Acts—is his own church. The question arises: What about the Jewishness, what about the apostolic decree? The churches with their Jewish members? The Jewish practices? How is it that Luke is speaking about a Gentile Christian church when he tells us almost nothing about the conversion of Gentiles?[31]

When the question is then raised why Luke is so interested in history, nearly all commentaries answer that it has to do with continuity, not history per se. The church is the continuation of Israel, and the apostles are the continuation of Jesus and his history. Paul continues the work of the apostles. As far as I can see no one has felt obliged to define precisely the meaning of "continuity" within Luke's work.[32] If Luke criticizes the law and the temple, would it not be more to the point to speak about discontinuity—that is, between the church and Israel? And if the first Christians kept the law but later believers did not, is this continuity? Further, if continuity is the idea, it shows Luke to be a pragmatic historian,[33] in

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28 The Two latest studies are: J. Wehnert, *Die Wir-Passagen der Apostelgeschichte. Ein lukanisches Stilmittel aus jüdischer Tradition* (Göttinger Theologische Arbeiten 40; Göttingen, 1989); with a very different point of view, Thornton, *Zeuge*: Paul's companion Luke narrates about his travels with Paul.

29 J. Thornton, *Zeuge*, passim.

30 J. Thornton (*Zeuge*, 84-147) denies that such a convention existed. Ancient historians explicitly maintained their autopsy, not by using "we."

31 Cf. my essay, "The Church of Jews and God-fearers," *Luke-Acts and the Jewish People* (ed. J. Tyson; Minneapolis, 1988), 11-20 (hereafter, "Church of Jews"); see the remark of R. Brawley, *Luke-Acts and the Jews*, 71: "Luke exhibits less interest in the extension of the gospel beyond Israel than do most of his commentators."

32 It is mostly taken as a connection between epochs of history: Israel-Jesus-apostles-Paul-Luke. But what should be said about content in this connection or continuity? Is there any continuity between the church and the idolaters in the Israel of Israel (Acts 7)?

33 The primacy of the intellect in this type of historiography is not characteristic of Luke; the role of the emotions in understanding history, important to tragic historians, is more apt. See H. Strassburger, *Die Wesensgestimmung der Geschichte durch die Antike Geschichtsschreibung* (3rd ed, 1975), 78. On tragic and pragmatic historiography: B. Gentili and G. Cerri, *History and Biography in Ancient Thought (1988)*, 7-33. This aspect of historiography, namely "stirring the emotions by the vivid representation of scenes sensational in themselves," is a better parallel to Luke (F. W. Walbank, "History and Tragedy," *Historia* 9 [1960], 233). But Luke, of course, does not belong to a particular school.

the sense that he writes history to solve problems in his own church.[34] History then serves as a positive norm or as warning for him, suggesting that as a historian he is at the same time a theologian. Surely he is an historian. But he is no Herodotus, describing the cultural achievements of the past solely in order to prevent them from sinking into oblivion. He is more of a Thucydides, writing about his own time in order to understand better the apparently familiar phenomena. Or, his writing serves as anamnesis, recalling what has happened and what happens as binding on the life of his own church. Under no circumstances does he write history only to preserve records for posterity. If he considers the past as the ideal time—and surely he does, for example the time of the twelve apostles—then the past serves as a norm. He writes to proclaim and persuade. Not the history per se but the significance of history is essential.

The primary obstacle in coming to grips with Luke's theology, above all the Jewishness of his writing, is simply the deadlock we have reached when it comes to an understanding of the history of Primitive Christianity from the very beginning to the end of the first century. The historic-chronological line has been: in the first period, (Palestinian) Jewish Christianity; in the second, existing side by side Hellenistic Jewish Christianity, Gentile Christianity, and Paul; in the third—when Luke lived—Gentile Christianity. In the second period, after 48, Jewish Christianity was forced back and acted solely on the defensive, while in the third period, after 70 AD, Jewish Christianity mostly disappeared. Jewish Christians returned to the synagogue, became Gentile Christians, or settled as isolated Christian-Jewish sects. That is what most call "Jewish Christianity." The problem with this conception is that the construct, a heritage from the Tübingen school, is monocausal; there is one line of development. And if you look back into this scheme, it is simply impossible that a Jewish Christian could have written a work like Luke-Acts after AD 70 and for us to label it as Jewish Christian.[35] The situation is completely different, however, if we reckon with a more complex development, with more territorially defined layers. The situation is different if there is something called Jewish Christianity, and even varied, distinct groups of Jewish Christians, in the last decades of the first Christian century,[36] not as a marginal and an apocryphal phenomenon, so to speak, but rather as central and dominating. If that is the case, what do we make of the Jewishness of the Lucan writings? And further (here we are as always in exegesis arguing in a circle), what about the possibility of Luke's writing from a Jewish-Christian point of view? What about Luke as a connecting link between some Hellenistic-Jewish traditions and later Jewish Christianity, e.g., in the Pseudo-Clementines?[37]

Not only christology but even ecclesiology in Luke-Acts is clearly pre-Pauline. What kinds of people belong to the church? If we look at Luke's accounts of mass conversions, the picture is clear. Luke includes 14 accounts of mass conversions: 11 deal with the conversion of Jews, in Jerusalem and in the diaspora (2:41; 4:4; 5:14; 6:1, 7; 9:42; 12:24; 13:43; 14:1; 17:10ff; 21:20).[38] In some cases (7, to be precise), we find conversions of so-called God-fearers, people

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[34] On the question if Luke is writing to one or more communities, see Esler, *Community*, 25f.

[35] Note 1, 10.

[36] That Luke himself allows for different groups of Jewish Christians is clear from Acts 11, 15, 19, etc.

[37] On this above all Klinghardt, *Gesetz und Volk Gottes*.

[38] Note 4, 10.

related to Judaism via the synagogue (11:21,[39], 24; 13:43; 14:1; 17:4, 12; 18:8,[40], 10). There is not a single report of a mass conversion of Gentiles![41] We may of course label God-fearers "Gentiles," in so far as they were not circumcised. But for Jews, the God-fearer was not the same as the unclean Gentile, and that is the case for Luke as well. But where do we find "pure" Gentiles without any connection to the synagogue? Perhaps Sergius Paulus (13:7ff) is one, and the jailer in Philippi, and perhaps the few in Athens mentioned in 17:34. If Luke is writing to a Gentile Christian church with members of totally or predominantly Gentile background, how does it happen that the growth of the church in Acts portrays a church of Jews and God-fearers,[42] not only in Jerusalem, but also in the diaspora—and this as a result of the missionary work of Paul? And the author, according to himself, is a co-worker of Paul.[43] He claims to know him and to have seen for himself part of Paul's missionary work. What happened to all those Jewish and Gentile believers? If he wrote 25 years after the death of Paul, enough people from Paul's day were still alive and able to evaluate what Luke tells. It is simply inconceivable that all those Christian Jews had vanished. And all those Jews lived strictly in accordance with the Mosaic Law, as we can see from the second part of Acts—not simply from the way Paul lives, but from the attitude of Christian Jews to the law (21:20ff). At what time did they turn away from the law? Luke does not mention any such turn in his church.

If the Jews en bloc had rejected the gospel, we could speak of a rejected Israel. But that is impossible in view of the mass conversions.[44] And even if we were to speak of God's rejection of his old people, which is conceivable even with the conversion of some Jews,[45] this is nowhere stated expressis verbis, and there is not even the slightest hint of such an idea. Luke is not talking about the rejection of a people, but of a separation of unbelieving Jews *from* the people (Acts 3:25). The two resumés of the history of Israel in Acts 7 and 13:17-25 tell us another story, namely that in spite of all Israel has done in its opposition to God and his messengers, Israel remains the people of God to whom the promises still belong.[46] There is not a single word of criticism against the synagogue as a phenomenon, which is the house of the Scriptures for Luke.[47] When Paul is met

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[39] After Acts 10-11 with the description of Cornelius as the paradigm of the church's Gentiles, and an adherent of the law (esp. 10:22, 35), the "Hellenas" in 11:20 can only be God-fearers.

[40] Even here with have to do with God-fearers, since they are mentioned in the same breath with Krispus.

[41] Esler, *Community*, 220: Few of the members of Luke's community had been outright pagans prior to their conversion. The great majority of its Gentile membership had come from the God-fearers.

[42] Esler, *Community*, 31-45: Luke's community consists of a mixture of Jews and Gentiles with their distinctive stamp.

[43] Cf. Thornton, *Zeuge*, passim.

[44] I have been criticized for not taking into consideration Jewish opposition to the gospel by F. Bovon, *Lukas, 354-365; W. Eltester, "Israel im lukanischen Werk* und die Nazarethperikope," *Jesus in Nazareth* (ed. E. Grässer; Berlin, 1972), 122-25; E. Rochard, "The Divine Purpose: The Jews and the Gentile Mission," *SBL Seminary Papers, 1981*, 279. They have overlooked my identification of a pattern: reports of conversions alternate with accounts of rejection leading to persecution (*Luke and the People of God*, 47ff).

[45] This is the situation in Matthew's Gospel.

[46] Jervell, "Gottes Treue," *passim.*

[47] Jervell, "Die Mitte der Schrift."

by resistance in a synagogue—after the conversion of many Jews! (Acts 13:46 and 18:6)—he does not turn away from the synagogue as such and from the Jews.[48] He goes to the next synagogue (14:1; 16:13; 17:10, 17; 19:8), or even to Jews and God-fearers in the same town where he has left the synagogue (18:6ff). And since Israel is not being rejected despite judgment on some Jews, and there is but one Israel, what then about the identity of the church. Note also that the church is not called "church" by Luke;[49] he uses ἐκκλησία in a non-technical way has referring to a gathering of people, using it even of the popular assembly in the theater at Ephesus (20:17). The word for the church is "the people," which has only one meaning, namely Israel. The church *is* Israel, nothing less. Luke can even use the word αἵρησις, without any discrimination (Acts 24:5, 14; 28:22). There are several "parties" within Israel (Acts 5:17; 15:5; 28:6). The church is a party too, but with the claim of being more than a party, namely Israel. In the history of Israel there is only one unbroken line, running from Abraham to the church, consisting of Jews and God-fearers. When did the church cease to be Israel and the people of God? There is nothing like the idea of a "new Israel" or "new people" in Luke's work. How could a purely Gentile Christian church claim to be Israel of old? And if there is for Luke something called a Gentile Christian church, perhaps in opposition to a Jewish Christian community, how could such people feel that the history of Israel runs unbroken to themselves? Who are the predecessors to the Gentiles in the Aeropagos speech? The history of the church is the history of Israel, not of the nations, whose history Luke does not even mention.[50] God has not even been active in the history of the Gentile people, but "he allowed all the nations to follow their own ways" (Acts 14:16). There is no way from the Gentiles to the church that does not go through Abraham, the Jewish Abraham of Luke.[51] And Luke gives no explanation of Israel's story; he does not explain what the Scriptures and their interpretations are. The fathers, the parties within Judaism,

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48 13:46 and 18:6 have been cited as prooftexts for the notion that the Jews' rejection of the gospel caused the mission to Gentiles. But that fails to take into account: 1) that missionary efforts among Jews continue; 2) the reports of mass conversions; and 3) that the mission among non-Jews is a command in the Scriptures and part of the promises to Israel.

A valuable interpretation of the passage is offered by Esler, *Community*, 39ff: "going to the Gentiles" is the public establishment of table-fellowship between Jews and Gentiles. Esler correctly states that when Gentiles are admitted to the Christian community, this is "clearly not to the exclusion of Jews, but in addition to them" (*Community*, 39). Tannehill ("Rejection," 89) finds that in 13:46 the missionaries follow the instructions from Lk 9:5 and 10:11 "that apply when a **city** fails to receive the mission." But Lk 9:5 says nothing about a city, 10:11 says nothing about going to another city, and the Jew/Gentile problem is not dealt with. Tannehill further maintains that in 18:6ff there is a shift to a mission in the city at large, "where the population at large is predominantly Gentile." But nothing is said about a mission of this sort, only about continued work among Jews and God-fearers. On this correctly Esler, *Community*, 40f; Koet, *Scriptures*, 106-118.

49 There is one exception, namely in the citation of Ps 74:2 in Acts 20:28.

50 Jervell, "'Gottes Ratschluss': Zum Thema Gott und Geschichte in den Lukas-Schriften," *Gott und Geschichte* (Wis. Beiträge der Ernst-Moritz-Arndt Universität, Greifswald; Greifswald, 1988), 47-54; and "Treue," 2ff. We should under no circumstances maintain that Luke relates the Christ-event to "persons, times, institutions, and epochs of world-history" (Fitzmyer, *Luke*, I, 172). Luke is not interested in "world history," so he relates the Christ-event to the history of Israel, and further to persons and institutions of his own time.

51 N. A. Dahl, "The Story of Abraham in Luke-Acts," *Studies in Luke-Acts*, 139-158.

institutions, law and regulations and customs, circumcision—the whole tradition is simply taken for granted.[52] This Luke could do with Jews, and even with God-fearers. But what if his readers were "pure" Gentiles? I suppose that they could understand as much as the Romans do in the lawsuit against Paul, which is almost nothing, as Luke expressly states (Acts 25:26f).

In the discussion of Luke-Acts following among others my work, remarkably little attention has been paid to questions of christology,[53] even if many exegetes have found Luke's christology peculiar when intended for Gentile Christians. But this surprise has not led to great progress in the study of Luke's christology. We have focused for so many years on eschatology and ecclesiology that christology has been neglected. Let me recall Vielhauer's dictum: the christology of Luke-Acts is pre-Pauline. We have then a pre-Pauline christology in the post-Pauline era by a supposed post-Pauline Gentile Christian. In the area of christology, "post-Pauline" may signal a good many ideas, depending on what one finds in the church before Paul. I would identify the distinctive christology of Luke as what we might safely call Jewish-Christian, determined by the notion that Israel is the people of God. This christology cannot be labeled "historic" in the sense that it held up to Luke's readers and church the christology of their forefathers, the first generation in the church of Jerusalem, as though it had no bearing on the thinking and credo of Luke's church. This is something more that the concept of a christology of subordination, to which especially Conzelmann has pointed.[54]

There are three directions to explore:

1. Luke employs some seemingly very old christological titles, going back to the church in Jerusalem.

2. The messianic title is not simply taken as tradition, but is explained, reinterpreted and defined precisely from what can only be seen as Jewish-Christian way of thinking, sit venia verbo, a nationalistic christology.

3. In the area of christology, Luke is the only New Testament writer to portray Jesus as "the Son of the people," that is, of Israel.[55]

It is in addition important to observe what kind of christology Luke does not present.

1. The old archaic titles are: ὁ ὅσιος Acts 2:27 (in a scriptural reference), 13:35, 13:34 (used of David the law-observant, found only in Acts[56] ); ὁ δίκαιος, meaning the true agent of God to Israel Acts 3:14, 7:52, 22:14, likewise only in Acts;[57] παῖς Acts 3:13, 26; 4:25, 27, 30, Lk 1:54, describing Jesus as one of the men of God in the Scriptures, again employed only by Luke;[58] ὁ προφήτης (Acts 3:22, 7:37) puts Jesus in line with the prophets of the Scriptures, representing "the climax of God's continuing saving activity through them [the prophets]."[59] And above all,

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52 The one exception is Acts 23.

53 For surveys: Fitzmyer, *Luke*, I, 192-226; cf. J. Kingsbury, *Jesus Christ in Matthew, Mark, and Luke* (Philadelphia, 1981).

54 *Luke*, 149ff.

55 Jervell, "Der Sohn des Volkes," *Anfänge der Christologie* (Festschrift for F. Hahn; Göttingen, 1991), 246-254.

56 The term is used of God in Rev 16:4, 15:5.

57 Cf. Rev 16:5.

58 The term is a title not only for Jesus but for David and Israel (Lk 1:54).

59 Franklin, *Christ*, 67.

Jesus is the prophet like Moses (Acts 7:37f) who restores the original Mosaic Torah.[60]

2. Luke uses χριστός (again?) as a title[61] and not, as in accord with the christological development in early Christianity, as a name.[62] Luke uses this title not primarily to show the relation between God and Jesus, but attaches it to the story of Israel in terms of the scheme promise-fulfillment.[63] Jesus is the anointed of Israel. The title is for Luke not merely tradition; he uses it etymologically and gives a definition unintelligible to non-Jews (Lk 4:18; Acts 4:27, 10:38). The Messiah is thoroughly the Old Testament figure (Lk 2:36, 3:15, 24:24-46; Acts 2:31).[64] The notion of Jesus as the "Son of David" is used by Luke more than by any other New Testament writer. Two characteristics may be noted. First, the title is not merely tradition. Luke's language is different from the rest of the New Testament.[65] Second, as the Son of David, Jesus fulfills the promises to David about restoring David's kingdom for Israel (Lk 1:32f, 69; Acts 2:29-36; further Lk 2:4, 11, 14; 18:38f; 19:38; Acts 13:32, 34-37; 15:15-18). It is remarkable that Luke uses christological titles familiar to Jews but avoids what may be intelligible to non-Jews: the title υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ appears only once in Acts 9:20.[66] And when σωτήρ is mentioned, it refers to the savior of Israel and descendant of David (Lk 2:11 [1:47]; Acts 5:31, 13:23).[67] The background is obviously Old Testament.[68] And could anyone but a Jew understand Acts 3:19-21 and its Elijah tradition? For Luke there is no Messiah without the messianic people, i. e., Israel.

3. It is seldom noted that Luke even works with the christological notion of Jesus as the Son of the people, of Israel. There exists nothing like a title "Son of Israel," but the idea is present. The simple fact that Jesus was a Jew—a fact that no author in the New Testament denies or discusses—Luke elaborates in a most

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60 The context shows that it is impossible in Acts to separate Moses as the prophet from Moses as giver of the law: 7:37 prophet, 7:38 giver of the law.

61 Lk 2:11, 26; 3:15; 4:41; 9:20; 20:41; 22:67; 23:2, 35, 39; 24:26, 46; Acts 2:31, 36; 3:18, 20; 4:26; 5:42; 8:5; 9:22; 17:3; 18:5, 28; 26:23.

62 Thus even if Luke *can* use Christos as a sort of second name in Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, this is dependent upon his use of the term as a title. It shows that Luke knows what happened to the title.

63 On the status questionis regarding the purpose of Luke's use of the scriptures, particularly the question about promise-fulfillment and "proof from prophecy," see D. Bock, *Proclamation from Prophecy and Pattern. Lucan Old Testament Christology* (NStNT Sup 12; Sheffield, 1987). Bock modifies the "proof from prophecy" schema. See the recent contribution of B. J. Koet, *Scriptures* (1989), 157: " . . . Luke uses the Scriptures and their interpretation to show the continuity with the fulfillment of the (prophetic) message to Israel."

64 A glimpse at the manuscripts shows their dislike of Luke's usage of the title in accordance with Jewish tradition (*Beginnings* V, 357).

65 David is the father of Jesus (Lk 1:32) and the father of Israel, that is the church (Acts 4:25); David is παῖς, as Israel is παῖς (Lk 1:54); Israel is the House of David (Lk 1:67, 69; 2:4); David is identical with Israel (cf. Acts 7:46); Israel is the fallen tabernacle of David (Acts 15:16); David is the recipient of the promises of God (Acts 13:38).

66 It does appear, however, 5 times in Luke's Gospel.

67 G. Voss, *Die Christologie der lukanischen Schriften in Grundzügen* (StN 2; Paris, 1965), 45ff; usually this title is mentioned as useful for Hellenistic readers, but what about the Jewish content Luke provides?

68 On Luke's favorite title, "Lord": Fitzmyer, *Luke*, I, 202: "the transfer of that title to Jesus undoubtedly took place on Palestinian soil itself. . . probably formulated in Greek by the 'Hellenists' among the Jewish Christians of Palestine and in Aramaic and Hebrews by the 'Hebrews' among them."

independent way. It is important to him to show not that Jesus was a man, but that he was a Jewish man.[69] In Luke's Gospel, the emphasis is found in the material peculiar to Luke: Lk 2:21, the circumcision of Jesus; 2:22-24, the presentation in the temple; 2:41-52, Jesus as a boy in the temple; 3:21-22, his baptism together with the people. In Acts the emphasis is present in the two historical surveys,[70] 7 (esp. v. 37), and 13:17-25 (esp v. 23). Here Jesus falls into line with the history of the people. Added to this is the notion of Jesus as the Son of David (in a succession of many sons of David!), elaborated above all in the genealogy of Jesus (Lk 3:23-28)[71]

Absent from Luke's work is any form of metaphysical speculation in his christology. Jesus is not divine, not the creator or the tool in the creation, not preexistent, not the universal reconciler, not the imago dei, etc.

How can this kind of christology be suitable for non-Jewish readers of Luke's work? We can of course point to Luke's familiarity with the Old Testament known to him as a God-fearer. But what about his readers if they were Gentile Christians? No wonder that several exegetes have found his christology peculiar—with a view, that is, to his status as a Gentile with Gentile readers. Has Luke any interest in portraying an archaic christology without relevance for his church? We would have an indicator if we found his specific christology only in the first part of Acts, let us say before Paul's conversion, and after that a christology which we could label Hellenistic-Christian. Even that would have been strange. Could Luke's church differ in christology from the church in Jerusalem, whose christology came from the Scriptures? But there is no difference in the two main parts of Acts. I have not mentioned all of Luke's christological titles, esp. κύριος, the most frequent. But this title is obviously for Luke once again from the Scriptures and portrays Jesus as the promised Messiah, as the king of Israel. A glance in Luke's Gospel shows us that in the material common to Matthew and Mark there is more of what we might call Hellenistic christology that in Acts.

The most burning problem in Lucan theology is the question of the law, the torah, a question neglected for a long time. Luke was seen as a witness of the end of a process in early Christianity, namely the formation of the old catholic church, and consequently as a further development of Pauline ideas regarding the law. The law was to Luke an adiaphoron; as he was himself unprincipled on this matter,[72] there are obvious contrasts in his understanding. The issue was always dealt with by contrasting Luke with Paul with regard to soteriology, rooted in an individualistic-idealistic understanding of the Lutheran doctrine of justification. Luke represents a complementary doctrine of salvation (Acts 13:38, 15:10), and thus his idea is the insufficiency of the law for salvation. Above all, Luke as a representative of Gentile Christianity treats the law as a purely historical matter in so far as the law no longer represents an actual problem. Battles involving the law lie years back. The Gentiles are free from the law, and there are no Jewish-Christians left any longer in the church. Therefore it was of no great interest to deal with the law. And for years no exegete dealt with the problem.[73]

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69 Fitzmyer, *Luke*, I, 192: ". . . a Palestinian Jew."

70 Which shows that salvation is the continuing work of God throughout the history of Israel.

71 Jervell, "The Son of the People," 246f.

72 Overbeck, *Apostelgeschichte*, XXXI.

73 One exception is Vielhauer, "Paulinismus."

I tried to raise the question anew,[74] seeing that the very theme "law" bears upon several perspectives and above all upon the place of Luke-Acts in the history of early Christianity. Luke, who is supposedly not interested in the law, returns to it again and again. Why deal with the law from, or solely from, a soteriological point of view? Luke's consistent view is that the law consists of "living words,"[75] (Acts 7:38); not "one stroke of a letter in the law" will be dropped (Lk 16:17). Why view Luke in contrast to Paul or as an attempt to vulgarize Pauline theology? And what if Luke was not a representative of Gentile Christianity? What if the history of early Christianity was not a monolinear development leading into the fixed tradition of the old catholic church?

My main point is that Luke's obvious interest in the law—I think it no longer is possible to overlook that fact—has to do not primarily with soteriology, but is a determining fact in his ecclesiology. The torah is the distinguishing mark of Israel, and, since the church claims to be Israel, the church must keep the law: either the law in its totality (for the Jews in the church) or the law in the form meant for Gentiles (the apostolic decree). This has no direct bearing on soteriology, which for Luke has to do with the resurrection. That there is no salvation through fulfilling the law, even the Jews know! But the identification of Israel with the church is decisive for the legitimacy of the promises given to Israel, since these promises could not otherwise be valid for the church. Therefore there can be no criticism of the law in Acts. And we find no such criticism in the Gospel of Luke, either.[76] Luke's failure to include the scenes where Jesus polemicizes against the scribes and the Pharisees on matters of the law is usually taken as evidence that both Luke and his readers were Gentiles. But if we consider the law in Acts and Luke's veneration of it in his Gospel (Lk 1-2), coupled with Luke's mention of Jewish customs, the lack of polemic against the law is evidence of Luke's desire not to include any criticism of the law.

On this point there have been strong reactions from both sides of the Atlantic, reactions that have furthered our studies of Luke-Acts. I will discuss two very different views: those of S. G. Wilson and Matthias Klinghardt.[77]

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74 *Luke and the People of God* (1972) and *The Unknown Paul (1984).*

75 K. Salo, *Law*, 181: "An emphatically positive statement of the law."

76 That is true even for Acts 13:38f and 15:10, both of which I earlier found to represent a criticism of the law without, however, playing any role in Luke's overall conception. M. Klinghardt (*Gesetz und Volk Gottes*, 97-114) has elaborated this further; K. Salo (*Law*, 217f) suggests that ἐν νόμῳ Μωυσέως means "while being a Jew," so that Luke here is thinking of Judaism as a whole, which cannot provide justification.

77 S. G. Wilson, *Luke and the Law* (SNTS Monogr. Series 50, 1985; hereafter, *Law*); M. Klinghardt, *Gesetz und Volk Gottes*, WUNT 2.R, 32, 1988 (*Gesetz und Volk Gottes*). In addition to these should be mentioned: C. L. Blomberg, "The Law in Luke-Acts," JSNT 22 (1984), 53-80; Ph. Fr. Esler, *Community and Gospel in Luke-Acts: The social and political motivations of Lucan theology* (MSSNTS 57, 1987; hereafter, *Community*); K. Salo, *Luke's Treatment of the Law, A Redaction-Critical Investigation* (Helsinki, 1991; hereafter, *Law*); R. Maddox, "The Purpose of Luke-Acts" (FRALNT 126, 36-45; hereafter, "Purpose"); M. M. B. Turner, "The Sabbath, Sunday and the Law in Luke-Acts," (D. A. Carlson, ed., *From Sabbath to Lord's Day. A Biblical, Historical, and Theological Investigation* (1982), 100-157); W. Stegemann, *Zwischen Synagoge und Obrigkeit. Ein Beitrag zur historischen Situation der lukanischen Christen* (1982), 146-183.

According to Wilson, Luke as a Gentile Christian has no interest in the law; he is indifferent.[78] Therefore we have a clear ambiguity: on the one hand, he confirms the law or parts of it; on the other, parts of the law (and so the status of the law as a whole) are criticized and undermined, and are superseded by the teachings of Jesus. To Luke the law is the ethos (ἔθος) of a particular people (ἔθνος) within the framework of Hellenistic cultural pluralism. As such it is not binding on the Gentiles. And the readers of Luke's work are Gentiles, whereas Jews—above all those wanting commitment to the Law from Gentiles—are hardly present. The apostolic decree has nothing to do with the torah; it is not Mosaic, but apostolic. It has nothing to do with ritual purity, but shows fundamental ethical principles, "an established part of Gentile mores."[79]

Whereas Wilson does not reflect upon the situation of Luke's placement within the history of early Christianity, but takes the *communis opinio* for granted, Klinghardt redefines Luke's position in this context completely. The title of his book *Gesetz und Volk Gottes* (*The Law and the People of God* ) already shows that he is dealing with the law in Luke-Acts from and ecclesiological point of view. He carries my viewpoints further in an independent, creative, and stimulating way. To Luke the law is primarily the Pentateuch; only Luke among the Gospel writers sees the ritual prescriptions *expressis verbis* as commandments from the torah.[80] Among the commands the most important ones are those about ritual purity and the renuciation of property. Christian Jews live according to the law, keeping the sabbath and maintaining circumcision. By means of the law they define the boundaries of Israel in the endtime. Even Gentiles live according to the law, although under that part of the Pentateuch which deals with Gentiles, especially the commandments on purity.[81]

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78 Luke's lack of interest in the law: H. Conzelmann, *Luke* 145-149, 212f; R. Banks, *Jesus and the Law in the Synoptic Tradition* (MSSNTS 28, Cambridge 1975) 172, 246-248; C.L. Blomberg, *Midrash*, 70.

79 Wilson, *Law* 94.

80 Esler, *Community*, 128f: Luke's attitude to the Jewish law was "extremely conservative"; this attitude only makes sense if there were a significant number of Jews in his community; K. Salo, *Law*, 301f. finds it incorrect to talk about a conservative or radical attitude, as Luke's view is practical, not theological, concerned with uniting the Gentile and Jewish wings of the church (esp. evident in the circumcision of Timothy, Acts 16, and the Nazirite vow, Acts 21). Luke reveals a conservative practice. Is "practical" an alternative to "conservative" and "radical"? *idem* 302f: Luke's view of the law is "fairly consistent" and of present concern for Luke in his own time.

81 Acts 13:38f and 15:10f are not inconsistent with my views and Klinghardt's. These passages have again and again been interpreted from the viewpoint of Paul and his understanding of the law as critical of the law. They should have been treated within the Lucan context. I saw them as critical of the law, but as tradition and as part of a systematic concept (*The People of God*, 146; cf. K. Salo, *Law*, 243). Klinghardt goes a step further: 13:38 shows the possibility of conversion to the enthroned Messiah-King Jesus, which includes the forgiveness of sins, which was not possible *en nomo Mouseos*. There is no complementary justification here; *kai* is epexegetical and the *ton panton* not partitive genitive, but qualitative. Nothing is said about the function and capability of the torah; that the commandments and their fulfilling do not give salvation is known by the Jews, too. Salvation is is solely dependent upon God's mercy (*eleos*), his forgiving of sins. That salvation through obedience to the law is not a concept in contemporary Judaism: K. Salo, *Law*, 217; H. Räisänen, *Paul and the Law* (WUNT 29, 2 Aufl. 1987), 94-119. Acts 15:10f does not say that the law cannot be kept in principle. If that were so, why does Luke urge on the Jewish Christians the obligation to keep the law? 15:10 says that the law *de facto* has not been kept, which in turn presupposes that it is possible to fulfill it. This is, according to M. Klinghardt (*Gesetz und Volk Gottes*, 109-113), a confession of guilt

All the groups in the church—there are different Jewish groups[82]—have in the torah one common norm that guarantees the unity of the church. And the Jewish ideas on purity and holiness are combined and partly interpreted from the viewpoint of widespread Hellenistic ethics. Klinghardt has seen clearly the implications for the understanding of the history of the early church. Through Luke, Jewish Christianity is not marginal, but one of the main lines of the church in the first century. Representing some of the same ideas as an apologetic for Jewish purity regulations are 2 Peter, Jude, and the Apocalypse of John; the Pastoral Letters, among others, advocate the opposite view. Luke can be seen as an heir of Jewish-Hellenistic reforms in the 2nd century BC; the background is Pharasaic, with parallels in Qumran. The line continues to the Pseudo-Clementines.

It goes without saying that I agree with Klinghardt in his main points. Wilson's view, however, requires response. Is Luke a Gentile Christian writing for Gentile Christians with no interest in the Torah? If so, why does he demonstrate that he is conspicuously and positively preoccupied with the law, especially the ritual and ceremonial portions of it? Supposedly this is in a church in which there are almost no Jews left. Assuming that Luke wants to protect Paul from attacks from the Jews (so Wilson[83] ) only raises new questions: Where do the attacks come from, if there are almost no Jews left in the church and the church long ago separated from the synagogue? Where are the points of contact?[84] When Wilson says that Lk 16:18 "challenges Mosaic authority,"[85] is he not aware of the priestly commandments regarding purity,[86] *in casu* Lev 21:7-14, and that Lk 16:18 has a typically Pharasaic extension of priestly regulations to the laity?[87] But even apart from that, 16:18 emphasizes the continuing validity of the law, making it even more strict.[88] To Wilson, the apostolic decree has nothing to do with the law; it is not Mosaic but apostolic and was by Luke's time a part of

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from the Jews, because both Jews and Gentiles must convert in order to gain salvation; cf. K. Salo, *Law*, 241: "The precise meaning of the whole saying, when evaluated as part of Luke-Acts, remains cryptic...;" *idem* 243: it should not be taken as Luke's own view of the law; J. Nolland, "A Fresh Look at Acts 15:10," *NTS* 27 (1980), 105-115: "Acts 15:10 simply means that the law did not bring the experience of salvation to the Jews and has nothing to do with a mass of commandments which no man can fulfill." E. Haenchen, *Acts* 446.

82 See criticism of this point of Sanders, Tannehill, and Tyson among many in R. R. Brawley, *The Jews* 142f; cf. B.J. Koet, *Scripture* 151f.

83 *Law* 111.

84 Different is W. Stegemann, *Synagogue*, esp. 84ff: Jews and Christians had no direct contact, but discussions between them took place in pagan courts and fora.

85 *Law* 30; for Luke the radical statement on divorce, v.18, after the assertion of the permanence of the law, v.17, is meant as an intensification and not a denial of the torah. To demand stricter adherence to the law cannot mean to oppose the law; the Pharasaic system relies on stricter observance of regulations than would be necessary according to the law (cf. K. Salo, *Law* 148). A challenge to Mosaic authority can be found in the isolated word in v.18, that is, in the words of the historical Jesus, but not in the Lucan context.

86 K. Berger, *Die Gesetzesauslegung Jesu. Ihr historischer Hintergrund im Judentum und im Alten Testament.* Teil I: *Markus und Parallelen* (WMANT 40, Neukirchen 1972(, 561-567.

87 M. Klinghardt, *Gesetz und Volk Gottes*, 88-96; against Klinghardt, K. Salo, *Law* 148, note 104.

88 K. Salo, *Law* 135-150.

Christian mores, bound up with fundamental Hellenistic ethical principles.[89] Again, Klinghardt goes further.[90] Lev 17f does indeed form the background of the decrees, but this is not a sufficient explanation, for it overlooks the occurrence of the themes of Lev 17 in several places in the Old Testament. The combination of the four demands in the decree has to do with the formula of extermination: if one does not keep the regulations, then one is exterminated, cut off, from Israel. The decree (which is not without parallels in the stoic-enkratitic tradition) gives a common norm for Jews and Gentiles, grounding the unity of the church in the Jewish law. It goes without saying that the Gentiles kept more commandments than the four in the decree, but these four are especially important for identifying the church, in so far is it includes Gentiles, as Israel. The main point in the decree, in my view, is that keeping the law is a confession of the one and only God of Israel: God is one God (Dt 6:5). As the decree is part of the torah, the law remains valid for both the Jewish and the Gentile Christians.[91]

In Luke's Gospel there is no summary of the law, e.g., the commandment of love or a golden rule, in the form found in Mt 22:40 and Rom 13:16. This is why the various single commandments, especially the ritual and ceremonial ones, are essential to him. But all the various commandments are bound together in the confession of God as the one God of Israel.

But what about the sabbath and the conflicts surrounding it in the Gospel? Do they not show that the law here is so to say outdated and overbid?[92] I do not believe so. It is important to observe that christological argumentation is lacking in these passages.[93] Luke tries to show that the Christian way of practicing the sabbath is in accordance with Jewish rules. No works take place on the sabbath. Significant is the combination of mission and miraculous healing (Lk 10:9). The point is that Christian missionary preaching on the sabbath in synagogues is legitimate. Preaching cannot be separated from healing in Luke's conception.[94] The problem is the missionary efforts.

My thesis that Luke-Acts was written chiefly for Jewish-Christian readers—and, I would add, God-fearers, who are closer to Jews than to Gentiles[95]—is dependent upon the theological ideas in his work. I do not find convincing the often-advanced arguments for the opposite view, that Luke wrote for Gentile-Christian readers. That his two volumes were dedicated to Theophilus, someone with a Greek name, is no evidence. Even a Jew, not to mention a God-fearer, could bear such a name. Luke's desire to relate the promises of salvation given to Israel even to non-Jews reflects the situation in every synagogue, where the problem arose in connection with the Jewish mission. Finally, Luke's relating the Christ-event to a Greco-Roman literary device is something any Jew would have been capable of.

More serious are the arguments related to Luke's elimination of material from Mark and Q regarding Jewish ritual purity, and explanations and adjustments of Palestinian traditions to a Hellenistic situation (e.g., the substitution of Greek

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89 *Law* 101.

90 M. Klinghardt, *Gesetz und Volk Gottes*, 158-224.

91 E. Richard, "The Divine Purpose. The Jews and the Gentile Mission (Acts 15)," (SBL Seminar Papers, ed. Paul Achtemeier; Chico, 1980) p. 275.

92 Wilson, *Law*, 27-43.

93 In Lk 6:1-5, the point is the example of David.

94 See my "The Signs of an Apostle," *The Unknown Paul*, 86ff.

95 Cf. K. G. Kuhn, TDNT.

names for Hebrew and Aramaic). The arguments have become standard fixtures in most commentaries, but they have been renewed lately by Fitzmyer in the introduction to his commentary on Luke.[96]

When these supposed adjustments by Luke are examined, it becomes apparent first of all that they all occur in the Gospel and not in Acts. In Acts, Luke refers to Jewish terms, titles, customs, etc. without any kind of explanation. He mentions Jewish festivals, alms, gifts for Israel, times of prayer, a sabbath-journey, a levite, the sanhedrin, proselytes, God-fearers, purity and impurity, Nazirite vows. Acts 23:8 forms the only exception, where Luke provides background for the separation and struggle in the sanhedrin between Sadducees and Pharisees. If Luke occasionally avoids Semitisms from Mark in his Gospel, in Acts there are Semitisms, Aramaisms, Hebraisms, and above all septuagintisms[97] (and the Septuagint is a book for Jews).[98] Luke's adjustments to the Hellenistic situation in his Gospel are partly of a non-theological sort, explaining conditions in Palestine for people living in other parts of the world. He would have to explain some things even for Jews outside Palestine (e.g., 5:19 [Mk 2:49]; 6:15 [Mk 3:18]; 6:48f [Mt 7:24-27]; 10:25; 12:28). And if Luke seems uninterested in Jewish customs (cf. his removal of Mk 14:2 and 15:42), we should note that even Mt removes Mk 15:42. And how is it that in Acts Luke is highly interested in those customs about which he allegedly does not care in his Gospel? Luke sometimes omits Aramaic words (Mk 4:15, 5:41, 9:5, 14:36), but some of those omissions Mark feels obliged to explain (Mk 5:41 and 14:36); and a word omitted in one context is used several times in others (Mk 4:15: Σατανᾶς; but Lk 10:18, 11:18, 13:16, 22:3, 32). And he can use Aramaic words he has not found in Mark (Lk 16:13ff).

We would have expected that Luke would have avoided expressions and words unintelligible to Gentiles especially in his special material. But what then about Luke 1-2, with its host of Jewish words, expressions, allusions, customs, etc.? Luke explains only a small fraction of the words and expressions incomprehensible to non-Jews.

The most burning issue is Luke's elimination of material dealing with controversies between Jesus and the Jewish leaders in matters of law, where Jesus opposes Pharisaic interpretation (Mt 5:17-20, 21-48; 6:1-8:16-18; Mk 7:1-23). These things "are best explained by this Gentile Christian destination of his writings."[99] In my opinion this view is based more on the assumption that Luke's readers are Gentiles—so often repeated that no further proof seems necessary—than on sound methodological principles. It is of course impossible to prove anything beyond doubt in dealing with material Luke has deleted. But something can be

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[96] Fiztmyer, *Luke*, I, 158f.

[97] See the excellent survey in Fitzmyer, *Luke* I, 114-127.

[98] The use of the Septuagint in Luke-Acts is again and again taken as proof of Luke's Gentile audience. The language, however, is no proof. Hellenistic-Jewish literature is opaque to non-Jews. The Septuagint is completely unintelligible for those not familiar with its content and language. Thus even by using the Septuagint Luke leads his readers into the atmosphere of Judaism and the Old Testament; cf. W. K. L. Clarke in *Beginnings* II, 66-105; Esler, *Community*, 25, 45; F. L. Horton, "Reflections on the Semitism of Luke-Acts," *Perspectives on Luke-Acts* (ed. Ch. Talbert; Danville, 1978), 1-23; A. D. Nock, *Conversions: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford, 1933), 79; H. F. D. Sparks, "The Semitism of Luke's Gospel," JTS 44 (1943), 129-138.

[99] Fitzmyer, *Luke*, I, 58.

said. Luke introduces us to the law-observant Jewish Pharisee Paul. How can he picture Jesus as opposed to the Pharisees and their interpretation and to the law itself, when Luke expressly defends Jesus against accusations that he had altered the law (Acts 6:14)? In Acts the matter of purity plays a significant role (e.g., Acts 10-11, and 15; if purity is allegedly of no significance to Luke, that is not the case with the apostolic decree). And looking into the material in the Gospel which Luke does not eliminate, we can note that there is no opposition to what Luke understands as Pharisaic piety and interpretation. If this is so, then the one theory about Luke's elimination of the material in question is not as good as the other; the elimination is deliberately done in order to show the position of the torah in the church.[100] Otherwise Luke would have involved himself in contradictions.

In the lawsuit against Paul in Acts 22-28, Jewish themes again play an important role. Decisive are such topics as the law, the temple, the resurrection as the hope of Israel, and Paul's own Jewishness. Christianity is depicted as a form of Judaism. The speeches of Paul in this section are unquestionably of an apologetic nature; the question is, what kind of apologetic? The idea of *religio licita* offered one reasonable explanation: Luke tries to demonstrate that the church is a part of Judaism in order to benefit from Judaism's legal status. Even after the final rejection of the *religio licita* argument,[101] the idea of political apologetics seems reasonable and is advocated by most exegetes.[102] Luke, they argue, attempts to describe the Romans as positively as possible and as very tolerant of the church.[103] Decisive evidence against this point of view, however, is the way Luke in fact portrays the Romans. They frequently appear in an unflattering light: partial, acting for money and personal and political profit, soliciting bribes, acting contrary to Roman law, keeping Paul illegitimately in prison, and being thoroughly corrupt (Acts 24:22,26,27; 25:9-11).[104] Most importantly, Luke gives his opinion that Rome is a threat to the church by means of scriptural proof showing that Pilate was Jesus' murderer (Acts 4:25-28).[105] From a methodological point of view this passage sets the tone for Luke's understanding of Rome.[106]

Even if there existed nothing like *religio licita* in Roman law, Jews still had some privileges.[107] And the Romans had respect for ancestral tradition and

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100 S.G. Wilson, *Law* 53: The absence of Mk 7:1-23 in Luke is due to the fact that this was not a part of Luke's version of Mark, not that it was too radical for him; otherwise: Ph. Fr. Esler, *Community* 121ff; H. Hübner, *Das Gesetz in Synoptischen Tradition* (Witten 1973), 182-193; H. Schürmann, *Traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den synoptischen Evangelien* (Düsseldorf 1968), 280, 281, 287.

101 See above p.5, note 3.

102 For exegetes of another opinion, see above p. 5 note 3.

103 So even in the last study on this subject: H. W. Tajra, *Trial*, 1989.

104 Cf. J. Jervell, *Luke and the People of God* 156-158; Esler, *Community* 204.

105 Maintaining that 4:25-27 is dealing with traditional material is no solution. Why would Luke make use of such a tradition if he wanted to make a favorable impression on Roman authorities?

106 It is peculiar that some of the latest studies on the role of Romans in Luke do not mention 4:25-28; for example, H. W. Tajra, *The Trial of St. Paul*, and Ph. Fr. Esler, *Community*.

107 Ph. Fr. Esler, *Community* 211ff; H. W. Tajra, *Trial* 15-21: the privileges included assembly in synagogues, observance of the sabbath, sharing of common meals, circumcision of children, paying the Jerusalem temple tax, and adherence to the torah's dietary rule.

religion as politically stabilizing factors. What possible benefit under Roman law, then, could Luke hope to gain by depicting Christianity as a form of Judaism, if his community was composed of Gentiles, or even of Jewish Christians and Gentiles?[108] The Romans did not look to what the Jews believed, but to what they actually did.[109] If the community was composed solely of Gentiles, then posing as Jews or heirs of Israel was futile. And if some members of the community did not observe Jewish ritual laws, why should Luke seek Roman protection? Furthermore, the Roman attitude towards Jews at the time of Luke's writing was ambiguous. The Jews were perceived as troublemakers, and they had recently lost a war against Rome. If the Romans were suspicious of the Jews, what could Luke possibly achieve by showing the Jewishness of the church? There is no other explanation for the Jewishness of the apologetic speeches than that they are part of an intra-Jewish debate. Luke depicts Paul as a true Pharisee and Israelite and defends him against Jewish and Jewish-Christian accusations[110] in the setting of the lawsuit before Roman authorities.[111]

I have already said something about the prospects in Luke-Acts interpretation. But it is time to point to some desideria for exegesis on Luke-Acts. So far I have dealt with only one aspect of Luke-Acts interpretation: the question of Jewishness. Although not the only question, it is a crucial one. One cannot write a history of early Christianity without Luke-Acts, and our interpretation of Luke-Acts is decisive for the understanding of the roles of Gentile and Jewish Christianity in the first century AD. Our presuppositions about the history of early Christianity have always been decisive for our interpretations of Acts, providing the frame. Are the concepts we bring into the texts more basic than the immanent interpretation of the texts? I am looking forward to a monograph on the interplay between Lucan exegesis and the concept of the history of the primitive church.

I don't think that we can avoid reopening the whole question of the history of early Christianity and rewriting it—especially after the new and lively discussion on the American scene, particularly on the topics of the composition of Luke's community and on the law, and not the least after the challenge in M. Klinghardt's book on the law and the people of God. We will have to look to F. C. Baur once more, this time without a sidelong glance at his Hegelianism, but focussing upon the historical material he presented to us. The interrelations and controversies between Jewish and Gentile Christianity were there in the church, even after Paul. Is there a line from Luke to the Pseudo-Clementines?

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108 Ph. Fr. Esler asks this important question; *Community* 213.

109 Ibid.

110 The charges brought against Stephen in Acts 6:11-13f resemble those in 21:21; this parallelism shows, according to Klinghardt (*Gesetz und Volk Gottes* 281), that "hier die Grenze zwischen Juden und Judenchristen nicht so scharf gezogen werden kann"; cf. W. Stegemann, *Synagoge* 146f.

111 The arguments of P. Walasky, *And So We Came to Rome*, passim, and R. Maddox, *Purpose* 91-100, that Luke is creating an *apologia pro imperio* directed towards Christians, or that Luke is recommending the church to take the best possible view of Rome, fail to convince; the description of the Romans cannot serve as a recommendation. Ph. Fr. Esler, *Community* 217, maintains that Luke wanted to legitimate Christianity to Roman Christians, reassuring them of their loyalty to both church and empire. But this hardly explains the Jewishness of Acts 22-28.

There are a host of unsolved problems. We take it for granted that a Gentile after conversion continued as a Gentile, that is a Gentile Christian. Why? We have always had the notion that many Jews by converting became Gentiles, even trying to remove the signs of circumcision. What about the other way round? How many gentiles became Jewish Christians, particularly when it comes to theology? But even further than that. 1 Cor 7:17ff should have given us a warning. To Paul it is clear that some Gentiles converting to Christianity were circumcised. When did this cease? And this should be studied with an eye to the other possibility: conversions to Judaism from Gentiles becoming familiar with Judaism in the Christian church.

It is not possible to study Luke-Acts without focussing upon the Lucan picture of Paul. He is a key figure, not only in Acts, but in the history of early Christianity. What made the Lucan Paul possible? We have at least three different Pauls: The Paul of the Pauline letters, the Paul of Acts, and the Paul of the deuteropauline letters and the Pastorals. Not only by going into the second century and later do we see the ramified tradition on the apostle to the Gentiles. Is it possible to trace the various pictures back to the same source, namely Paul himself, even if we know only fragments of him, namely from his letters? It should be possible to make some progress in analyzing the relation between Paul's theology and thinking on the one hand, and his acts, practice and way of life on the other. In the tradition of Judaism behavior (according or not according to the law!) had theological significance. Halakah was normative, not haggadah. What made the Lucan Jewish and law-observant Paul necessary? It seems that this Paul is as necessary for the Lucan outline as the opposite is for the Pastorals. It would be promising to study the Lucan Paul as part of the history of the Pauline tradition.

What happened in the second and third generation of Jewish Christians? It looks to me as if we have completely overlooked that in the New Testament we are dealing not only with the first generations of Jewish Christians. Luke is obviously referring to both the first, second and third generation of Jewish Christians. And the Jewish Christians won by the church must among others have been second and third generation of those Christians. Did they merge with the Gentiles in the church? Or did they live like their fathers?

The decline of Jewish Christianity came in my opinion in the second century. From that time on Gentile Christianity is actually victorious, even if Jewish Christians existed for several hundreds of years afterward, at least into the fifth century AD. Why did the synagogue in the second century AD succeed in winning back Jewish Christians? That is perhaps what happened.

We even will have to reconsider the question of the God-fearers. Even today we have no monographs on the role of the God-fearers in Acts. I am dealing as well with the historical question about the God fearers[112] as Luke's idea about them. What was their actual status and positions within the synagogue community? What was their attitude towards other Gentiles, outside the synagogue? When they took part in synagogue activity, they obviously did not render Jews ritually unclean. Could they even partake in meals with Jews? What kind of traditions did they bring into the church? I am sure that they did not forget about their relations with the synagogue when they converted to the church. And if

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112 It is difficult for me to view the God-fearers as a Lucan invention, thus T. Kraabel, "The Dissapearance of the 'God-fearers,'" *Numen* 28 (1981), 113-126; cf. Jervell, "The Church of Jews," 138f, notes 3, 7, 8, and 15.

there were a considerable number of God-fearers in the Lucan church, we may be fairly sure that they transmitted Jewish-Christian traditions to the next generation.

The Haenchen-Conzelmann construals have disintegrated, or at least some major features, among North-American, English and other European scholars outside Germany. There is, however, even in German exegesis a breaking up of the old construals, in the understanding of Luke as historian and in his attitude to Scripture, Israel, and Jewish Christians. Is there any emerging consensus on Luke's project? There is none if we are talking about a theological consensus. And there is none in methodology, if we take into account the wide arsenal of methods and hermeneutical approaches. But there is some consensus about asking the same questions, seeing what problems are to be solved. I am thinking in particular of the problem of the placement of Luke in Jewish traditions in the Greco-Roman world. That is at the time the strength of the American exegesis. It will still take some years before we have solved this problem.

# Direct and Indirect Phraseology in the Gospel of Matthew

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Matthew's Gospel is being studied increasingly from perspectives derived from modern literary theory.[1] To date, the greatest amount of attention has been given to formalist approaches such as narrative criticism[2] and structuralism.[3] Formalism is text-centered in orientation. In other words, the primary concern of formalist criticism is to determine how various signals within the text guide the reader in deciding what the text means.[4] This orientation may be compared with other reader-centered approaches that emphasize the ways in which interpretation of a text may be shaped to fit the reader's own interests or circumstances.[5]

This paper is a study in one particular aspect of formalist literary theory (characterization) as applied to one particular literary work (the Gospel of Matthew). Specifically, this study concerns what is usually called the *discourse* component of characterization in Matthew's Gospel. Literary critics distinguish between the elements of *story* (what a narrative is about) and *discourse* (how the

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[1] An annotated list of 61 such studies can be found in *The Bible and Modern Literary Criticism: A Critical Assessment and Annotated Bibliography*, by Mark Allan Powell, with the assistance of Cecile G. Gray and Melissa C. Curtis (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991).

[2] See Mark Allan Powell, *What Is Narrative Criticism?* GBS (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990); Jack Dean Kingsbury, *Matthew As Story*, 2d ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988).

[3] See Daniel Patte, *Structural Exegesis for New Testament Critics*, GBS (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990); *The Gospel According to Matthew: A Structural Commentary on Matthew's Faith* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987).

[4] Introductions to formalist theory include J. Timothy Bagwell, *American Formalism and the Problem of Interpretation* (Houston: Rice University Press, 1986); Cleanth Brooks, "The Formalist Critics," *Kenyon Review* 13 (1951): 72-81; Edgar V. McKnight, *The Bible and the Reader: An Introduction to Literary Criticism* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985). For a critical perspective, see Frederic Jameson, *The Prison House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972); Lynn M. Poland, *Literary Criticism and Biblical Hermeneutics*, AARAS 48 (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1985).

[5] Text-centered and reader-centered approaches need not be in conflict. Only the most extreme reader-oriented critic would say the text offers no guidance for interpretation, and only the most extreme formalist would deny that individual readers make any contribution to the interpretation process. The distinction is primarily one of degree and focus.

story is told).[6] This study is concerned not so much with what the characters in Matthew's Gospel are like, but with *how* the reader comes to know that this is what they are like. What signals in the text guide the reader's interpretation of the characters?

This paper is limited in that it does not attempt to look at all of the characters in Matthew's narrative, but focuses only on the three major characters: Jesus, the disciples, and the religious leaders.[7] In addition, this paper examines only one aspect of characterization, that which is related to speech or phraseology. A more complete or detailed study would have to take other aspects into account as well.

## Characterization in Formalist Literary Theory

Narrative criticism emphasizes two components of characterization: "evaluative point of view" and "character traits."[8] Evaluative point of view refers to the norms, values, and general worldview that govern the way a character looks at things and renders judgments upon them.[9] Traits are persistent personal qualities that describe the character involved.[10] The process of characterization consists of an author (or implied author[11]) ascribing an evaluative point of view and a particular set of traits to the characters in a narrative.

In order for the narrative to work, what has been ascribed to the characters must be communicated to the reader. The Russian formalist Boris Uspensky has proposed a typology for analyzing the planes of expression on which such information is communicated between author and reader: (1) the ideological plane concerns values and beliefs; (2) the phraseological plane concerns speech, or thoughts if these are articulated as speech ("he said to himself..."); (3) the spatial and temporal planes concern actions; (4) the psychological plane concerns motives.[12] The evaluative point of view and the set of traits that an author ascribes to a character in his or her narrative are communicated to the reader by what is presented on any or all of these planes. In other words, judgments that readers make regarding characters in narrative literature are typically based on such factors as values, speech, actions, and motives.

Studies in the *discourse* of narrative literature are interested in which of these planes, if any, is dominant. It is one thing to recognize that Sherlock Holmes is "perceptive"; it is quite another thing to inquire as to *how* Sir Arthur Conan Doyle leads us to recognize this. Do we regard Holmes as perceptive primarily on the basis of what he says or on the basis of what he does? Do Holmes' motives

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6 See Seymour Chatman, *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978).

7 It has become customary to treat both "the disciples" and "the religious leaders" as single characters in Matthew's narrative. Although technically both are what literary critics call "character groups," they function in the story as single characters. See Kingsbury, *Matthew As Story*, 13, 18; Powell, *What Is Narrative Criticism?* 51, 58.

8 Powell, *What Is Narrative Criticism?* 53-55.

9 Boris Uspensky, *A Poetics of Composition: The Structure of the Artistic Text and Typology of a Compositional Form*, trans. by Valentina Zavarin and Susan Wittig (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), 8.

10 Chatman, *Story and Discourse*, 121.

11 On the concept of "implied author," see Wayne Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 66-77; Chatman, *Story and Discourse*, 147-51; Powell, *What Is Narrative Criticism?* 5-6.

12 Uspensky, *Poetics of Composition*, 8-100.

or values have any significance in this regard, or would we view him as perceptive even if they were quite different? Formalist literary studies have found that one or another of Uspensky's four planes is frequently more significant for characterization within a given narrative than the others.

Sometimes what is communicated on one plane may conflict with what is communicated on another plane. Speech may be inconsistent with actions, actions may be incompatible with motives, motives may contradict values, and so on. Uspensky refers to such discrepancies as instances of "nonconcurrence." When the reader encounters nonconcurrence, he or she must struggle to discern which of the planes presents the more accurate characterization. Typically, the reader will decide on the basis of various clues within the text that what is communicated on one or more of the planes is unreliable and must be discounted in light of what is communicated elsewhere. In Matthew's Gospel, the character of Herod as revealed on the psychological plane (he is frightened by news of Jesus' birth, 2:3) is nonconcurrent with his character as revealed on the phraseological plane (he wants to worship Jesus, 2:8). The tension thus created for the reader is partially resolved in verse 12 and in verse 13 when God and an angel issue warnings about Herod—warnings that would not be necessary if Herod truly wished only to worship Jesus. Herod's subsequent actions on the spatial-temporal plane (he tries to kill Jesus, 2:16) confirm the reader's suspicion that Herod's statement in 2:8 was a lie. Thus, Matthew overrides the unreliable information concerning Herod presented on the phraseological plane with more reliable information offered either on other planes (psychological, spatial-temporal) or through the phraseology of others (God, angels).

## Direct and Indirect Phraseology

Our immediate concern is with point of view on the phraseological plane. This study will investigate the extent to which the speech of various characters in Matthew's Gospel reveals those characters to the reader. At this point I must depart somewhat from Uspensky, whose categories for classifying phraseology are drawn from modern literature and are often inapplicable to the Gospels. Instead, I have found one basic distinction of my own to be significant, namely that between what I choose to call "direct phraseology" and "indirect phraseology."

Every evaluative speech act contains at least three elements: a *sender* who offers an evaluation of something; a *subject* that is evaluated; and a *recipient* who hears or receives this evaluation. In direct phraseology, the subject and the recipient are identical. For example, when John the Baptist addresses the Pharisees and Sadducees with the words, "You brood of vipers . . . " (3:7), he offers his evaluation of the Pharisees and Sadducees directly to the Pharisees and Sadducees themselves. In this instance, John the Baptist may be identified as sender, and the Pharisees and Sadducees may be identified as both subject and recipient.

Indirect phraseology assumes a distinction between subject and recipient. If, for example, John the Baptist were depicted as saying to the crowds, "The Pharisees and Sadducees are a brood of vipers," that would be an instance of indirect phraseology. John the Baptist would be identified as sender, the Pharisees and Sadducees as subject, and the crowds as recipient.

Two further points need to be made. First, although there may be some instances in which this distinction does not apply, most speech acts are at least

implicitly evaluative. When Jesus says to the crowds, "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand" (4:17), the implied evaluation of the crowds is that they are in need of repentance. When he says to his (future) disciples, "Follow me and I will make you fish for people" (4:19), his words carry an implicit evaluation regarding their acceptability to him and potential for ministry. Similarly, interrogative speech may qualify as direct phraseology if the speaker asks for the opinion of the party who is being addressed, or as indirect phraseology if the speaker asks for the opinion of someone else (cf. the indirect phraseology of Jesus in 6:13 with his direct phraseology in 6:15).

Second, the distinction between direct and indirect phraseology is not the same as the distinction that Uspensky and others make between direct and indirect discourse. The latter distinction identifies the manner in which the speech is reported. The following four examples should illustrate the possible ways in which these two distinctions can overlap:

1. John said, "You are a brood of vipers."
   (direct discourse/direct phraseology)
2. John said, "They are a brood of vipers."
   (direct discourse/indirect phraseology)
3. John told them that they were a brood of vipers.
   (indirect discourse/direct phraseology)
4. John told us that they were a brood of vipers.
   (indirect discourse/indirect phraseology)

With these theoretical and methodological points in mind, we may turn now to observations concerning what is communicated on the phraseological plane with regard to the characterization of the three major characters in Matthew's narrative.

## The Phraseology of Jesus

Literary-critical studies have described Jesus in Matthew's narrative as a "round character,"[13] that is, as a character who exhibits a great number and variety of traits.[14] Jesus is "obedient" toward God, "compassionate" toward the crowds, "confrontational" toward his enemies, "faithful" and "enabling" toward his disciples, and so on. Despite this variety of traits, however, Jesus is consistently portrayed in a positive light, as a character who always evinces an evaluative point of view aligned with that of God. God calls Jesus "Son" and is pleased with Jesus (3:17; 17:5).

Our present concern is with the role that the phraseology of Jesus plays in communicating this portrait to the reader. Although space does not permit us to consider every instance of Jesus' speech in the Gospel, my own analysis of that speech has allowed me to draw the following conclusions:

(1) The phraseology of Jesus is not the primary means by which Matthew communicates his characterization of Jesus to his readers. Jesus hardly speaks at

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[13] On "round" and "flat" characters, see E. M. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1927).

[14] See, e.g., Jack Dean Kingsbury, "The Figure of Jesus in Matthew's Story: A Literary-Critical Probe," *JSNT* 21 (1984): 3-36; *Matthew As Story*, 11-13.

all before the beginning of his ministry in 4:17;[15] instead, his characterization is established in the initial portion of the narrative through other means: comments by the narrator (1:1, 16-18), intercessions of angels (1:20-21; 2:13, 19-20), recollections of prophecy (1:22-23; 2:4-6, 15, 17, 23), reactions of other characters (1:24-25; 2:1-2, 3, 11, 16), and testimony from God (3:17). Thus, Matthew's reader comes to know that Jesus is born of a virgin (1:25); that he is the unique Son of God (3:17); that God is present with him (1:23); that he is to be worshiped (2:11); and that he will both save his people from sin (1:21) and execute judgment by baptizing people with the Holy Spirit and with fire (3:11-12). By establishing Jesus' characterization early in the narrative in ways that do not depend upon Jesus' own phraseology, Matthew avoids giving any impression of Jesus as one who testifies of himself. Rather, the basic and initial testimony to Jesus is that of the narrator, the prophets, the angels, and God. In this way, Matthew also indicates that the phraseology of Jesus alone may not be sufficient for a full apprehension of who Jesus is. Indeed, as the Gospel progresses, it becomes apparent that people who regard Jesus simply as "teacher" or as "prophet" have not fully grasped who he is.[16]

(2) The phraseology of Jesus serves to confirm, illustrate, and amplify the characterization of Jesus that is estabished through other means. Jesus' own phraseology testifies to the unique and intimate relationship that he has with God (11:25-27), as well as to his role as both savior from sin (9:3, 6, 13; 20:28; 26:28) and eschatological judge (5:20; 21:32, 43; 23:33-36; 24:30-31; 25:31-46; 24:64). Further examples of this confirming role for the phraseology of Jesus abound: Jesus' comment that he has compassion on the crowds (15:32) confirms a trait that has been twice ascribed to him by the narrator (9:36; 14:14); Jesus' claim to have authority (9:6; 28:18) confirms what the narrator says has caused others to be astonished by him (7:28-29; cf. 9:8). In this way, Matthew indicates that, even though Jesus is not primarily a character who testifies of himself, what he does have to say about himself is completely consistent with what is reported through reliable sources elsewhere.

(3) The phraseology of Jesus is absolutely reliable in what it communicates concerning the characterization of Jesus in Matthew's narrative. There is not a single instance of nonconcurrence between what is revealed through Jesus' speech and what is revealed through his actions, motives, or values. Congruence of the phraseological and spatial-temporal planes is especially pronounced, as examination of any of the themes highlighted above will indicate. Jesus not only says he has compassion (15:32), but also acts compassionately (15:35-38); he not only claims to have authority (9:6), but also acts authoritatively (9:5-8). In this way, Matthew presents Jesus as a character of integrity, who stands up to examination under his own principle that those who speak the truth are to be recognized "by their fruits" (7:16, 20; 12:33).[17] Unlike the scribes and the

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[15] See, only, 3:17; 4:4, 7, 10. Significantly, Jesus does not testify of himself in any of these instances, but simply quotes scripture and speaks of what is necessary to fulfill all righteousness.

[16] In Matthew, the terms "teacher" and "prophet" are never used for Jesus by persons with faith. On "teacher," see Günther Bornkamm, "End Expectation and Church in Matthew," in Günther Bornkamm, Gerhard Barth, and Heinz Joachim Held, *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963), 41-42. On "prophet," see Kingsbury, "Figure of Jesus," 14.

[17] Kingsbury describes Jesus as a "man of integrity" in *Matthew As Story*, 12.

Pharisees (23:2-3), Jesus not only preaches, but also practices what is pleasing to God.

(4) The distinction between direct and indirect phraseology proves to be irrelevant with regard to the characterization of Jesus. What Jesus says *to* other characters does not portray him in any different light than what he says *about* other characters. To illustrate, let us consider the evaluative phraseology of Jesus concerning the religious leaders in Matthew's narrative. What follows is a comprehensive summary of Jesus' *indirect* phraseology concerning the leaders:

A They will not enter the kingdom of heaven (5:20).

B They will persecute Jesus' followers (10:17).

C They will be condemned in the final judgment (15:13; cf. 13:24-30, 36-43).

D They are blind guides (15:14).

E People should beware of their teaching (16:6, 11-12).

F They will be responsible for Jesus' death (16:21; 20:18).

G Although they sit on Moses' seat, they do not practice what Moses intends (23:2-3).

H They make burdensome demands and show no concern for helping people (23:4).

I Their outward display of piety is hypocritical (23:5-7; cf. 6:5).

Every one of these statements may be compared with instances of Jesus' *direct* phraseology, with statements that Jesus makes directly to the religious leaders:

A′ The kingdom of God will be taken away from them (21:43; see also 23:13).

B′ They will persecute Jesus' followers (23:34).

C′ They will be condemned in the final judgment (12:41-42; 23:35).

D′ They are blind guides (23:16, 24; cf. 23:17, 19, 26).

E′ They turn their proselytes into children of hell (23:15).

F′ They will be responsible for Jesus' death (21:33-39, 45).

G′ Their practices nullify the true intent of Moses' teaching (15:3-9).

H′ They demand sacrifices from people without regard for showing mercy (12:7).

I′ Their outward appearance of righteousness is hypocritical (23:27-28).

Although the correspondences are not always exact, we may conclude that, in Matthew's Gospel, Jesus says nothing significant *about* the religious leaders that he does not also say *to* them. In this way, Matthew underscores his presentation of Jesus as a person of integrity. Not only are his words consistent with his deeds, motives, and actions, but what he says directly to characters is consistent with what he says indirectly about them.

### The Phraseology of Jesus' Disciples

Literary studies of Jesus' disciples in Matthew's Gospel have cast them as round characters who exhibit traits that are not only varied but actually in

conflict with each other.[18] They can, for instance, be described as "enlightened" in one scene (13:11, 16-17) and as "unperceptive" in another (16:5-12). They seem "loyal" and "sacrificial" when they leave all to follow Jesus (4:20, 22; 9:1; cf. 19:27), but "disloyal" and "self-concerned" when they desert him in the face of danger (26:56, 69-74). Their evaluative point of view is sometimes aligned with that of God (16:16-17) and at other times with that of Satan (16:22-23).

This complexity of characterization is evident in the disciples' phraseology. An analysis of this phraseology allows the following conclusions:

(1) The great majority of the phraseology attributed to the disciples in Matthew's narrative serves to expose their flaws. Their speech presents them as characters who lack faith (8:25; 14:30) and understanding (8:27; 16:7), who harbor false assumptions (18:21; 17:25; 19:25) and superstitious fears (14:26), who are slow to realize what God is able to accomplish (14:15-17; 15:33-34; 21:20), and who are reluctant to accept the costs of discipleship (8:21; 16:22; 26:70, 72, 74). The disciples sometimes appear to sympathize with Jesus' enemies (15:12) and to criticize his friends (26:8-9). Statements in which they offer evaluations of themselves are unrealistically positive (14:28; 19:27; 20:22; 26:33-35). Sometimes, the disciples' speech presents them in a more neutral light, as when they ask seemingly innocent questions (13:10, 36; 15:15; 17:10; 18:1; 24:3; 26:17), but, even then, Jesus' response may indicate that the question implies a lack of understanding (15:16) or improper attitude (18:2). Only occasionally does the phraseology of the disciples reveal them to be characters of faith and insight (14:33; 16:16).

(2) The characterization of the disciples presented through their own phraseology is consistent with that presented through Matthew's description of their actions. Although their actions may sometimes offer the reader a favorable picture of them as responsive (4:20, 22; 9:9) or obedient (21:7; 26:19) to Jesus, these actions also expose the kinds of flaws evident in their phraseology. To cite but a few examples: the failed exorcism in 17:14-17 reveals their lack of faith (17:19-20); the rebuke of people with children in 19:13 shows a failure to understand what Jesus said earlier in 18:5; and, the flight at Jesus' arrest (26:56) demonstrates their reluctance to accept the costs of discipleship. By establishing this consistency of characterization, Matthew indicates that, although the disciples may be flawed characters, the nature of their flaw does not involve a discrepancy between speech and actions. In this regard, they too are unlike the scribes and Pharisees (23:2-3).

(3) The distinction between direct phraseology and indirect phraseology seems to be irrelevant with regard to Matthew's characterization of Jesus' disciples. Statements offered directly to Jesus (e.g., 8:21, 25; 14:15-17, 30; 15:33-34; 16:22; 17:19; 18:21; 19:10, 25; 21:20) are no more or less likely to expose their flaws than statments made about Jesus to others (8:27; 14:26; 16:7; 17:25; 26:70, 72, 74). For example, in dealing with people who they don't think should see Jesus, they are just as likely to rebuke those people directly (19:13) as they are to ask Jesus to do so for them (15:23). Significantly, the same consistency holds with regard to their virtues. Matthew's Gospel contains only two instances in which the disciples' phraseology presents them as characters of faith and insight, and of these, one is an instance of direct phraseology (16:16) and the other is an instance of indirect phraseology (14:33). In this way, Matthew presents the disciples as characters who are at least sincere and genuine in what they say. They do not try

[18] See, e.g., Kingsbury, *Matthew As Story*, 13-17.

to cover up their faults or to put on false fronts. They may be flawed characters with little faith, but they are not hypocrites.

The one obvious exception to what has just been said is the character of Judas. The direct phraseology of Judas presents him as a character who feigns innocence and pretends to be friendly to Jesus (26:25, 49), while the indirect phraseology of Judas presents him as a character who knows full well that he is a traitor (26:14, 48; 27:4). The unreliable direct phraseology serves to highlight the duplicitous character of Judas' treachery.

(4) The characterization of the disciples presented through their own phraseology in Matthew's narrative needs to be supplemented by information that is communicated to the reader through another source, namely the phraseology of Jesus. What Jesus says to and about his disciples usually presents them in a much more positive light than does their own speech. Jesus refers to them as his family (12:49) and as part of the church that he will build (16:18-19; 18:15-18). He describes them as "guiltless" (12:7) and as privileged to know the secrets of the kingdom of heaven (13:11, 16-17). The blessings of the beatitudes (5:3-12) are apparently addressed to them (5:1-2). He promises them protection (10:30-31) and assures them of his continuing presence with them (18:20; 28:20). He says that in the future they will "fish for people" (4:19), minister in the face of rejection and persecution (10:5-23), make disciples of all nations (28:19), and judge the twelve tribes of Israel (19:28). In short, Matthew supplements the mostly negative portrait of the disciples offered through their own speech with a much more positive portrait offered through the speech of Jesus. By doing this, he indicates that the positive aspects of the disciples' characterization derive from Jesus and can only be realized through him. Jesus is the one who chooses the disciples (4:19, 21; 9:9) and Jesus is the one who can provide them with the authority (10:1; 28:18) and understanding (13;51; 16:12) they need. The reader ultimately views these disciples as characters with tremendous potential. The reader realizes, however, that this potential does not derive from any qualities the disciples possess in themselves, but from what Jesus sees in them and is able to impart to them.

### The Phraseology of the Religious Leaders

Literary studies of the religious leaders in Matthew's narrative have observed that they are flat characters who function as the antagonists of Jesus in the story.[19] Their root character trait is "evil," and other qualities such as "hypocrisy" and "blindness" may be subsumed under this basic characteristic. Their evaluative point of view is consistently opposed to that of God.

Once again, we are primarily interested in the extent to which the leader's own phraseology conveys this characterization to the reader. Our conclusions are as follows:

(1) The characterization of the religious leaders presented through their own phraseology offers two inconsistent portraits of them. Sometimes, their speech presents them as characters who regard Jesus as a blasphemer (9:3; 26:65), as an impostor (27:63), as one who wrongly eats with tax collectors and sinners (9:11), as a colleague of Beelzebul (9:34; 12:24), as one who deserves death (26:66), and

[19] See, e.g., Kingsbury, "The Developing Conflict Between Jesus and the Jewish Leaders in Matthew's Gospel: A Literary-Critical Study," *CBQ* 49 (1987): 57-73; *Matthew As Story*, 17-24.

as one whose inability to save himself proves that he is not the Son of God (27:42-43). At other times, however, their speech seems to present them as would-be disciples (8:19), as sincere questioners (12:10; 19:3; 22:16-17, 24-28, 36), or, at least, as polite skeptics (12:38; 21:21). The issue for the reader, then, is whether the religious leaders should be regarded as implacable opponents of Jesus who wish to bring about his demise or as possible converts who are not sure what to make of him.

(2) In every instance in which the leader's phraseology allows the more positive portrait, Matthew overrides this image by offering the reader compelling information through some other means. He does this in a variety of ways that utilize all four planes of expression:

(a) *ideological plane*—in 22:25, Matthew tells the reader that the Sadducees do not really believe in the resurrection, so that the reader will know their question in 22:24-28 is actually insincere.

(b) *phraseological plane*—in 12:39-42; 19:4; 21:16, 27; 22:18, 19, Matthew uses the always-reliable phraseology of Jesus to reveal opposition that is not apparent in the leaders' own words. Jesus responds to their seemingly innocuous speech with words of harsh condemnation, denouncing them for things their own speech did not reveal. Also, in 8:19, 12:38; 22:16, 24, 36, Matthew has the leaders address Jesus as "Teacher." Although this word does not express opposition in and of itself, it is never used in Matthew's Gospel as an address by persons of faith (cf. 19:16, 22; 26:18, 25, 49).

(c) *spatial-temporal plane*—in 12:14; 22:15, Matthew reports actions of the religious leaders that reveal a hostility not evident in their words. This correlates with Jesus' warning elsewhere to the effect that their deeds and words are inconsistent (23:2-3).

(d) *psychological plane*—in 12:10; 19:3; 21:15; 22:18, 35, Matthew reveals motives that present the religious leaders in a much more negative light than what is apparent from their speech alone. They ask Jesus innocent-sounding questions in order to accuse him, put him to the test, or entangle him in his talk.

Thus, the reader of Matthew's Gospel is led to realize that only the phraseological statements that present the more negative picture of the religious leaders are reliable. Statements that might present them in a neutral or positive light are nonconcurrent with more reliable information presented in other ways.

(3) The distinction between direct and indirect phraseology becomes quite significant in an examination of the religious leaders' speech. Almost without exception, the reliable statements that offer the reader a negative picture of the leaders are instances of indirect phraseology. The unreliable statements that offer the reader a more neutral or positive picture of the leaders are all instances of direct phraseology.

To illustrate this point, let us compare a list of statements that the religious leaders make *about* Jesus in Matthew's narrative with a list of statements that they make *to* Jesus.

The text of all of the indirect phraseological statements that the religious leaders make about Jesus is given below:[20]

A "This man is blaspheming" (9:3).

B "Why does your teacher eat with tax collectors and sinners?" (9:11).

C "By the ruler of demons, he casts out the demons" (9:34).

D "It is only by Beelzebul, the prince of demons, that this fellow casts out the demons" (12:24).

E "He has blasphemed! Why do we still need witnesses? You have heard his blasphemy. What is your verdict?" (26:65-66).

F "He deserves death" (26:66).

G "He saved others; he cannot save himself. He is the King of Israel; let him come down from the cross now, and we will believe in him. He trusts in God; let God deliver him now, if he wants to; for he said, 'I am God's Son'" (27:42-43).

H "Sir, we remember what that impostor said while he was still alive, 'After three days I will rise again.' Therefore command the tomb to be made secure until the third day; otherwise his disciples may go and steal him away, and tell the people, 'He has been raised from the dead,' and the last fraud will be worse than the first" (27:63-64).

In all of these statements, opposition to Jesus is clearly and consistently expressed. The indirect phraseology of the religious leaders presents them, without exception, as the implacable opponents of Jesus.

The text of all of the direct phraseological statements that the religious leaders make to Jesus is now given below:[21]

I "Teacher, I will follow you wherever you go" (8:19).

J "Is it lawful to cure on the sabbath?" (12:10).

K "Teacher, we wish to see a sign from you" (12:38).

L "Is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife for any cause?" (19:3).

M "Do you hear what these are saying?" (21:16).

N "By what authority are you doing these things, and who gave you this authority?" (21:23).

O "Teacher, we know that you are sincere and teach the way of God in accordance with truth, and show deference to no one; for you do not regard people with partiality. Tell us, then, what you think. Is it lawful to pay taxes to the emperor, or not?" (22:16-17).

P "Teacher, Moses said, 'If a man dies childless, his brother shall marry the widow and raise up children for his brother. Now there were seven brothers among us; the first died childless,

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[20] English text is from the New Revised Standard Version. I am not aware of any instances where variations of text or translation would affect the basic point that is here illustrated.

[21] The religious leaders also speak to Jesus in 12:2; 15:2; 21:27, 41; 22:42, but their speech does not offer an evaluation of Jesus in any of these instances.

leaving the widow to his brother. The second did the same, so also the third, down to the seventh. Last of all, the woman herself died. In the resurrection, then, whose wife of the seven will she be? For all of them had married her" (22:24-28).

Q "Teacher, which commandment in the law is the greatest?" (22:36).

R "Have you no answer? What is it that they testify against you?" (26:62).

S "I put you under oath before the living God, tell us if you are the Messiah, the Son of God" (26:63).

T "Prophesy to us, you Messiah! Who is it that struck you?" (26:68).

In Matthew's narrative, every one of these statments occurs in a context of opposition between the religious leaders and Jesus.[22] Divorced from their context, however, the statements do not all express this opposition. In most cases, the leaders' speech appears to be simply innocuous or even friendly to Jesus. Only in the last three instances, which occur in the climactic trial before the Council, is the hostility between the leaders and Jesus apparent in the leaders' own direct phraseology. Otherwise, these instances of direct phraseology are identical with the instances cited above in which Matthew must override an unreliable characterization with additional information.

Unlike the phraseology of Jesus and the disciples, then, the phraseology of the religious leaders is a reliable indicator of their point of view only when it is indirect. Their real opinion of Jesus is expressed only when they speak about him to other characters, not when they speak to him directly. This observation, furthermore, extends also to the religious leaders' phraseology concerning the disciples. They criticize Jesus to the disciples (9:11) and they criticize the disciples to Jesus (12:2; 15:2), but they are reluctant to criticize either face to face.

At times, Matthew actually portrays Jesus as responding directly to criticisms that the leaders have made indirectly (9:3-4; 12:2-8, 24-37). Even at the crucifixion, the leaders mock Jesus with indirect phraseology that contrasts with the more direct attacks of the passers-by (27:39-40). These rather unnatural extremes by which Matthew almost strains the logic of his narrative indicate how important it is for him to establish this contrast between the religious leaders' direct and indirect phraseology.

What effect does such a contrast have on the reader? Matthew uses this contrast to present the religious leaders as duplicitous.[23] The duplicity evident in

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[22] I assume that this opposition is obvious in every instance except perhaps 8:19. Kingsbury believes that opposition is evident even here. See Jack Dean Kingsbury, "On Following Jesus: The 'Eager' Scribe and the 'Reluctant' Disciple (Matt. 8:18-22)," *NTS* 34 (1988): 45-59.

[23] Patte is correct in his observation that the leaders' indirect negative comments constitute "the kind of judgment that is against God's will," but he misses the point in contrasting these with the judgments of Jesus which, because they are more direct, he regards as not "a judgment/condemnation but a call to repentance" (*Gospel According to Matthew*, 126, 129, 227 n. 1). Actually, Jesus does not offer the religious leaders any opportunity for repentance but judges and condemns them in the harshest of terms. But he does this with phraseology that is both direct and indirect. What is distinctive about the indirect phraseology of the leaders is not that it is more judgmental than that of

their phraseology is but one part of their overall characterization as hypocrites (15:7; 22:18; 23:13, 15, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29; cf. 6:1-6, 16-18; 23:1-7).[24] In 12:36, Jesus tells the religious leaders that, on the day of judgment, they will have to give account for every *careless* word they utter. Careless words, apparently, are virtually synonymous here with indirect phraseology. When the leaders are careful, they are able to "speak good" even though they are evil, but when their guard is down, their careless words reveal what is truly in their hearts (12:34). The duplicity that Matthew ascribes to the religious leaders, then, goes beyond a simple disparity between words and deeds (cf. 23:2-3) to extend also to a disparity between careful words (direct phraseology) and careless ones (indirect phraseology).

Jesus, whose point of view is always expressed consistently and reliably regardless of whether his phraseology is direct or indirect, seems to be particularly perturbed by this aspect of the religious leader's duplicity. "Either make the tree good and its fruit good," he says, "or make the tree bad, and its fruit bad" (12:33). In context, his assertion in 12:33 that "a tree is known by its fruits" refers not so much to deeds as to "careless words." The fruit by which religious leaders may be known is the quality of their unguarded speech, that is, the content of what they say when they are not making an effort to deceive or to impress. It is by such speech that religious leaders are justified or condemned (12:37).

Matthew could, of course, simply tell his readers outright that the religious leaders are duplicitous and often speak in ways that do not reveal their actual point of view. By taking the more subtle route and incorporating this aspect of their characterization into the discourse of his narrative, he scores an additional point. The reader is left to discover for him or her self that the guarded, direct phraseology of these characters is unreliable, while their careless, indirect statements are more revealing. Thus, by the very act of reading this narrative, Matthew's reader gains practice in the art of learning to recognize a tree by its fruits.

## General Conclusions

The phraseology of Jesus in Matthew's narrative provides the reader with reliable information for his characterization. This information serves primarily to confirm, illustrate, and amplify the characterization of Jesus presented through other sources, including the words of God, prophets, angels, other reliable characters, and the narrator. In this way, Matthew guides the reader to see that one might not be able to appreciate fully who Jesus is on the basis of Jesus' words alone, although those words are certainly consistent with what is revealed elsewhere. Jesus' phraseology also depicts him as a character of integrity, whose

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Jesus, but that it is inconsistent with their direct speech, and so highlights the duplicity of the latter.

[24] On Matthew's notion of hypocrisy, see Sjef Van Tilborg, *The Jewish Leaders in Matthew* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), 8-26. Cf. Dan O. Via, *Self-Deception and Wholeness in Paul and in Matthew* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 77-98. Via's conception of hypocrisy in Matthew as "self-deception" fails to account for the type of data presented in this study, where the leaders appear to deceive others intentionally. I believe that the leaders are self-deceived in Matthew, but Matthew's word for self-deception is not "hypocrisy" but "blindness." The irony is that the leaders, who as hypocrites intentionally deceive others, are also blind characters who have somehow deceived themselves. They have become, as it were, victims of their own hypocrisy.

words are consistent with his deeds, and who does not speak any differently about other characters than he does to them.

The phraseology of Jesus' disciples in Matthew's narrative provides the reader with reliable information for their characterization. Still, the mostly negative portrait conveyed by the disciples' own speech must be supplemented by the more positive information regarding the disciples found in the phraseology of Jesus. In this way, Matthew emphasizes that the disciples' best attributes derive from Jesus, that is, from what he sees in them and is able to impart to them. The disciples' phraseology also depicts them as characters of integrity, who do not present false fronts or attempt to hide their flaws. Their speech, even when it reveals their flaws, is at least genuine and sincere.

The phraseology of the religious leaders in Matthew's narrative provides the reader with reliable information for their characterization only when it is indirect. When the leaders use direct phraseology, their speech is usually not expressive of their actual point of view, which must be discerned through other means. In this way, Matthew highlights the duplicity of the religious leaders and guides the reader to recognize the deceptive way in which hypocrites may try to hide their real nature.

# "Named and Unnamed Disciples in Matthew: A Literary-Theological Study"

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Critical study of the disciples in Matthew's gospel is a comparatively recent phenomenon.[1] Since the completion of my initial study of the Matthean disciples nearly six years ago, a virtual landslide of materials has appeared. In this essay we will take stock of the scholarly work, evaluate the state of affairs, and provide an evaluation in the light of a particularly significant passage.

When evaluating modern critical study of the Matthean disciples, pride of place goes to the groundbreaking work of Günther Bornkamm, especially for the 1948 essay, "The Stilling of the Storm in Matthew."[2] The appearance of this essay is commonly said to mark the beginning of redaction-critical approaches to Matthean studies in general, and the Matthean disciples in particular. Bornkamm's students, G. Barth and H. Held, also carried out significant, exploratory, redaction-critical work on the disciples in Matthew.[3] Quickly following came the studies of W. Trilling, G. Strecker, and R. Hummel.[4] An influential work focusing exclusively on the disciples in Matthew's gospel was the redaction-critical work by U. Luz, "The Disciples in the Gospel according to Matthew,"

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[1] For a variety of reasons, but especially because of the note of incomprehension found there, the spotlight has focused upon the disciples in Mark's gospel for the last 25 years. For an overview, see C. Clifton Black, *The Disciples according to Mark: Markan Redaction in Current Debate*, JSNTSup 27 (Sheffield: JSOT, 1989) and Christopher D. Marshall, *Faith as a Theme in Mark's Narrative*, SNTSMS 64 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

[2] Günther Bornkamm, "Die Sturmstillung im Matthäusevangelium," *Wort und Dienst*, Jahrbuch der Theologischen Schule Bethel (1948), 49-54. The real impact of Bornkamm's work was not felt in the English-speaking world until 1963 when it was translated and published along with the redaction-critical works of his students in Günther Bornkamm, Gerhard Barth and Heinz Joachim Held, "The Stilling of the Storm in Matthew," *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew*, trans. Percy Scott (1960; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963), 52-57.

[3] Gerhard Barth, "Matthew's Understanding of the Law," in *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew*, 58-164; Heinz Joachim Held, "Matthew as Interpreter of the Miracle Stories," in *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew*, 165-299.

[4] Wolfgang Trilling, *Das Wahre Israel: Studien zur Theologie des Matthäus-Evangeliums* (3d. ed.; München: Kösel-Verlag, 1964); Georg Strecker, *Der Weg der Gerechtigkeit: Untersuchung zur Theologie des Matthäus* (1962; 3d. ed.; rpt. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1971); Reinhart Hummel, *Die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Kirche und Judentum im Matthäusevangelium* (Munich: Kaiser, 1963)

first published in German in 1971.[5] Several studies followed Luz's lead.[6] R. Gundry's climactic redaction-critical study of Matthew's gospel—*Matthew: A Commentary on His Literary and Theological Art*— paid special attention to the disciples.[7] The subtitle of Gundry's commentary indicated the direction in which Matthean studies would take. Redaction-critical analysis would give way to literary-critical analysis of Matthew. The transition from redaction-criticism to literary-criticism was made through composition-critical analysis of the disciples.[8]

A significant, new direction was charted through literary-critical, especially narrative, approaches to Matthew's gospel. J. Kingsbury provided early narrative-critical leadership with his work on Matthew's gospel in general[9] and his study of the Matthean disciples in particular.[10] R. Edwards provided a study of the Matthean disciples employing exclusively a literary-critical approach in "Uncertain Faith: Matthew's Portrait of the Disciples."[11] The decade of the 1980's saw an increasing stream of literary studies that, at least in part, considered the disciples in Matthew.[12]

A different direction taken in the study of the Matthean disciples was stimulated by sociological and anthropological approaches to the text. M. Hengel and G. Theissen provided early inspiration in Germany through a study of the

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[5] Ulrich Luz, "Die Jünger im Matthäusevangelium," *ZNW* 62 (1971) 141-171; trans. and repr. in *The Interpretation of Matthew*, ed. G. Stanton, IRT 3 (1971; London / Philadelphia: SPCK / Fortress, 1983), 98-128 (page numbers cited in this paper are from the German edition).

[6] E.g., Jean Zumstein, *La Condition du Croyant dans L'Evangile Selon Matthieu*, Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 16 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1977); Andrew H. Trotter, "Understanding and Stumbling: A Study of the Disciples' Understanding of Jesus and His Teaching in the Gospel of Matthew," (Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University, 1987).

[7] Robert H. Gundry, *Matthew: A Commentary on His Literary and Theological Art* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 5-10, and throughout the commentary.

[8] My own first work could be described as "composition criticism" in that, on the one hand, I tended to be more concerned with the gospel as a whole than with redactional changes, and on the other hand, with the content of theology rather than with "story." Cf. Michael J. Wilkins, *The Concept of Disciple in Matthew's Gospel: As Reflected in the Use of the Term Μαθητής*, NovTSup 59 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988). For a discussion of the differences in methodologies, see Stephen D. Moore, *Literary Criticism and the Gospels: The Theoretical Challenge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 4-7.

[9] E.g., Jack Dean Kingsbury, *Matthew: Structure, Christology, Kingdom* (1975; new ed.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989); *Matthew as Story* (2d ed.; rev. and enlarged; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988).

[10] E.g., Jack Dean Kingsbury, "The Figure of Peter in Matthew's Gospel as a Theological Problem." *JBL* 98 (1979) 67-83; "The Verb AKOLOUTHEIN (To Follow) as an Index of Matthew's View of His Community," *JBL* 97 (1978) 56-73; "The Developing Conflict between Jesus and the Jewish Leaders in Matthew's Gospel: A Literary-Critical Study," *CBQ* 49 (1987) 57-73; "On Following Jesus: The 'Eager' Scribe and the 'Reluctant' Disciple (Matthew 8:18-22)," *NTS* 34 (1988) 45-59.

[11] Richard A. Edwards, "Uncertain Faith: Matthew's Portrait of the Disciples," in *Discipleship in the New Testament*, ed. Fernando F. Segovia (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985).

[12] E.g., David R. Bauer, *The Structure of Matthew's Gospel: A Study in Literary Design*, Bible and Literature Series 15 (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1988); Dorothy Jean Weaver, *Matthew's Missionary Discourse*, JSNTSup 38 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990); David B. Howell, *Matthew's Inclusive Story: A Study in the Narrative Rhetoric of the First Gospel*, JSNTSup 42 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990).

Jesus movement.[13] The study of the first century social/cultural setting quickly became an international concern.[14] The social dynamic of Jesus and his disciples has stimulated several exploratory studies of the Jesus movement and the Matthean community, which necessarily involves addressing the Matthean disciples.[15]

## I. Features of the Matthean disciples

A major result of these recent studies is that something of a consensus has been reached concerning certain features of the Matthean disciples. These features gain clarity through an analysis of the disciples in Matthew in comparison to the disciples in the other gospel accounts, especially the other synoptics.[16]

*A. The small group of disciples around Jesus*

Matthew (and Mark) refers only to a small group of Jesus' disciples. This reference is different from Luke and John, who refer to a great crowd of Jesus' disciples (cf. Luke 6:17; 10:1; John 6:60, 66). Jesus can meet with the disciples "in a house" (cf. 9:10-19; 9:28; 13:36ff.) and they can all travel together in a single boat (cf. 8:23; 14:22). On several occasions Matthew focuses on a small group of disciples when in Luke and even in Mark there are indications of a larger group of

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13 Martin Hengel,*The Charismatic Leader and His Followers,* trans. James Greig (1968; New York: Crossroad, 1981); Gerd Theissen, *Sociology of Early Palestinian Christianity,* trans. John Bowden (1977; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978).

14 Cf. also John G. Gager, *Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early Christianity* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1975); Bruce J. Malina, *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1981) and *Christian Origins and Cultural Anthropology: Practical Models for Biblical Interpretation* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1986); Richard A. Horsley, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987) and *Sociology and the Jesus Movement* (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 95,137; Bengt Holmberg, *Sociology and the New Testament: An Appraisal* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990).

15 E.g., Amy-Jill Levine, *The Social and Ethnic Dimensions of Matthean Salvation History.* Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity 14 (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen, 1988); J. Andrew Overman, *Matthew's Gospel and Formative Judaism: The Social World of the Matthean Community* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 126-140; David E. Orton, *The Understanding Scribe: Matthew and the Apocalyptic Ideal,* JSNTSup 25 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1989).

16 Although I am philosophically in agreement with Graham Stanton, (*A Gospel for a New People: Studies in Matthew* [Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1991], chap. 1, 2), that "redaction-critical" work is essential as a background to literary and sociological analysis, the comparative approach employed here differs from typical (not necessarily Stanton's) redaction-critical analysis in at least four ways. First, it requires no particular form of source dependency with reference to the synoptic problem. Second, a comparative approach acknowledges as crucial to Matthew's portrait of the disciples features which are both held in common with the other gospels as well as features which differ. Third, typical redaction-critical approaches tend to focus on bits of evidence at the expense of the larger, narrative whole. Fourth, redaction-critical analysis tends to be driven by the principle of "transparency," which puts the historical-critical cart before the narrative horse. I adopted this comparative approach in my initial study of the Matthean disciples (*The Concept of Disciple in Matthew's Gospel,* 6-9, 129 n.17). Some would call this a composition-critical approach (e.g., Stephen S. Smalley, "Redaction Criticism," *New Testament Interpretation: Essays on Principles and Methods,* ed. I. Howard Marshall (Exeter, England / Grand Rapids: Paternoster / Eerdmans, 1977), 181; Moore, *Literary Criticism and the Gospels,* 4-7.

disciples. In Matthew's account of the Sermon on the Mount, the disciples come away from the crowds (5:1), whereas in Luke's account of the Sermon on the Plain we find "a great multitude of His disciples" (Luke 6:17). In Matthew's account of the entry to Jerusalem a "crowd" goes before Jesus (21:9), whereas Luke speaks of a "multitude of the disciples" (Luke 19:37). Matthew, who does not record the commissioning of the twelve, speaks of Jesus summoning the twelve disciples who were also called apostles (10:1), whereas in Mark and Luke's account of the commissioning these apostles were chosen from numerous other disciples (Mark 3:13-19 and Luke 6:13). Matthew tells of Jesus sending out only the twelve (10:5), but Luke speaks of Jesus sending out at another time the seventy (Luke 10:1). In his story, Matthew consistently has only a small group of disciples around Jesus.

*B. The "disciples," the "Twelve," and the "apostles"*

In keeping with this emphasis upon a small number of disciples, Matthew (and Mark[17]) tends to identify those individuals called "the disciples" with the titles "the Twelve" and "the apostles."[18] Although Mark refers to Jesus' disciples simply as "the Twelve" on at least eleven occasions, Matthew never uses this title by itself.[19] As an accepted identification in parallel passages, Matthew can use "the disciples" where Mark has "the Twelve" (13:10 cf. Mark 4:10; 18:1 cf. Mark 9:35), he can give a narrative reference "to His twelve disciples" (11:1), and he can occasionally complete the title "the Twelve" with "disciples" to form the longer title "the twelve disciples" (cf. 10:1; 20:17; 26:20). Only Matthew uses this longer title. R. Pesch states that the preference for the name "Matthew" (9:9; cf. 10:3) over "Levi" (Mark 2:14) is another indication that Matthew understands a strict equation of the disciples with the Twelve.[20]

In addition to this use of the title "the Twelve," Matthew and Mark use the title "apostles" only once, in each case referring to the Twelve being sent out on a mission in Palestine (10:2; Mark 6:30). Therefore, Matthew makes a very close identification of the term "disciple" with the title "the Twelve," which is immediately connected with the term "apostles."

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[17] Robert Meye contends, "Mark describes Jesus' ministry consistently with only the Twelve in view as the disciples of Jesus" (Robert P. Meye, *Jesus and the Twelve* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968], 210; see also 98-140, 228-230). The majority of modern scholarship accepts the thesis that at least from Mk 3:13 on Mark identified the terms "disciple" and "the Twelve" with one another. Cf., Rudolf Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition*, trans. John Marsh (ET; rev. ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 344-346; Vincent Taylor, *The Gospel According to St. Mark* (2nd ed.; rpt.; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981), 229-230; Leonhard Goppelt, *Theology of the New Testament*, trans. John E. Alsup, vol. I (Grand Rapids : Eerdmans, 1981), 210; C. S. Mann, *Mark*, AB 27 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1986), 246-251. That this is not a consensus is observed in Hengel, *The Charismatic Leader and His Followers*, 81-82 n. 163.

[18] Luz, "Die Jünger im Matthäusevangelium," 142-143. G. Strecker (*Der Weg der Gerechtigkeit* , 191-198) somewhat differently, sees Matthew making a conscious effort to make the identification complete.

[19] J. Keith Elliott, "*Mathētēs* with a Possessive in the New Testament," *ThZ* 35 (1979), 304. The Matthean lack of the bare title οἱ δώδεκα leads Elliott to conclude that the longer title οἱ δώδεκα μαθηταί is the correct textual reading at 20:17 and 26:20. Cf. Wilkins, *The Concept of Disciple in Matthew's Gospel*, 228, Appendix B, note 1, for a discussion of these texts.

[20] R. Pesch, "Levi-Mätthaus (Mc 2:14/Mt 9:9; 10:3). Ein Beitrag zur Lösung eines alten Problems," *ZNW* 59(1968), 40-56.

*C. Disciples, crowds, and religious leaders*

Three primary character groups—Jesus' disciples, the crowds and the Jewish leaders—provide a background for Matthew's story of Jesus. The disciples are those who have made a commitment to Jesus. The crowd is the basically neutral group that is the object of Jesus' saving ministry of preaching, teaching, and healing; but as a group the crowd does not exercise faith in him. The Jewish leaders are the antagonists, those responsible for Jesus' crucifixion.[21]

The disciples were Jesus' intimate companions during his earthly ministry (9:19; 14:22) and his fellow-workers in the ministry of caring for the crowds (9:36-37; 14:13ff.; 15:32ff.). Jesus held the disciples up to the crowds as an example of his true family, i.e., those who do the will of the Father (12:49-50). The "crowd" is a basically neutral, though curious, group who were not attached in a serious way to Jesus, and who were at various times either positively or negatively oriented toward him.[22] As Jesus preaches, teaches, and heals, the crowd follows him around (e.g., 4:25), but does not exhibit the twin prerequisites of discipleship: cost and commitment. The crowd follows Jesus only in a literal sense, never in the metaphysical sense of accompaniment as one's disciple.[23] The crowd follows him (4:25), appeals for healing (15:29-31), gives acclaim to him (7:28; 21:9,10); but at other times laughs at him (9:23-25), comes to arrest him (26:47), is influenced by the chief priests and elders to ask for Barabbas but to deliver over Jesus (27:20), and finally, as the "people," is responsible for the blood of Jesus (27:24). Therefore, the crowd is a neutral group, out of which come those who will become disciples of Jesus, or else those who will decide against him and ultimately be persuaded to join the religious leaders in opposing Jesus.[24]

*D. The disciples understand Jesus' teaching*

More than the other evangelists, Matthew emphasizes that the essence of true discipleship lies in individuals who understand and obey Jesus' teaching. On at least three occasions, Matthew says that the disciples "understand" Jesus' teaching (16:12; 17:13; 13:51), whereas in parallel passages Mark indicates that the disciples do not understand (Mark 6:52; 8:21; 9:10, 32). Matthew's purpose is different from that of Mark's. Mark emphasizes how difficult it was for even the disciples to comprehend the magnitude of Jesus' earthly ministry.[25] Matthew agrees, but he gives a further point: when Jesus teaches, disciples understand. Typically, Matthew shows how difficult it is to understand all that is transpiring in Jesus' earthly ministry, but after Jesus has finished teaching, the disciples finally understand.

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[21] Jack Dean Kingsbury, "The Developing Conflict between Jesus and the Jewish Leaders in Matthew's Gospel: A Literary-Critical Study," *CBQ* 49 (1987) 57-73.

[22] T. W. Manson, *The Teaching of Jesus* (2nd ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935), 19.

[23] Kingsbury, "The Verb AKOLOUTHEIN," 61; Albright and Mann, *Matthew*, LXXVII.

[24] Cf. W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Gospel According to Saint Matthew*, 3 vols, ICC (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1988), 1:419-420.

[25] Ernest Best, *Disciples and Discipleship: Studies in the Gospel According to Mark*. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1986; Camille Focant, "L'Incompréhension des Disciples dans le deuxième Evangile," *Revue Biblique* 82 (1985) 161-185; Theodore John Weeden, Sr., *Mark—Traditions in Conflict* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971); Werner Heinz Kelber, "Conclusion: From Passion Narrative to Gospel," *The Passion in Mark: Studies on Mark 14-16*, ed. W. H. Kelber (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976), 153-80.

The disciples and the crowds were at different points on the spiritual-understanding spectrum. On the occasion of the great discourse on the parables of the mystery of the kingdom, Jesus first directed parables to the crowd (13:1ff.). However, the parables revealed the hard-heartedness of the crowd: they cannot understand (13:10-17). As a result, Jesus leaves the crowd to go into the privacy of the house where the disciples become recipients of His teaching (13:10, 36). At the end of instruction to the disciples, they indicate that they now understand (13:51). True disciples will understand Jesus' teaching. Jesus said that knowing the will of God is found as one learns from him and his embodiment of the will of God (9:13; 11:29). The true disciple is the one who is obedient to the will of God (12:49-50), who learns from Jesus' parables (13:51; 24:32), and who is "discipled" by Jesus in the ways of the kingdom (13:52; 27:57).

The relationship between Jesus the teacher and his disciples has received increasing attention. While they should not be relegated to *extras*,[26] the disciples serve a primary purpose in Matthew's gospel of accentuating Jesus in his words and deeds. Matthew's arrangement of his story accentuates Jesus as the effective teacher of his disciples.[27] Each of the major discourses are directed primarily to the disciples (5:1; 10:1; 13:10, 36; 18:1; 23:1; 24:1-3), and teaching segments are often transformed into explicit discipleship-teaching pericopae by inclusion of the term disciple.[28] Matthew wants us to know that Jesus has come to teach the will of God, and the true disciple is the one who understands and obeys. This prepares the reader for the concluding commission (28:16-20).

*E. With Jesus or against him*

Therefore, the disciples are "with Jesus," the Jewish leaders are "against Jesus," and the crowds must make a decision to be either "with him or against him."[29] At first the crowds were amazed at Jesus' teaching (7:28-29) and miracles (9:8), and received Jesus' compassionate attention (9:35-38; 14:13-14), apparently siding with Jesus. But they increasingly demonstrate hardness of heart (cf. 13:2-3; 10-17; 34-36), until at the end the Jewish leaders persuade the crowds to ask for the death of Jesus (27:15-25). Only disciples are "with Jesus" as his followers after the resurrection.

*F. Simon Peter: First among equals*

The focus in Matthew is upon Jesus who calls, instructs, and sends disciples out to make more of what he has made them to be. But Matthew presents the disciples as a nameless, faceless, collective unity. Matthew often omits reference to named disciples (e.g., 20:20-28; 24:3; 26:37) or categories in the disciples (e.g., 24:1; 26:18,19), to present the disciples as a unified, nameless group. This Matthean tendency is in line with what Conzelmann states is the tradition's

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[26] As does Hans Conzelmann, *Jesus* (1959; E.T.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1973), 34.

[27] Cf. Trotter, "Understanding and Stumbling," 280-281; Hengel, *Charismatic Leader*, 79.

[28] 8:21,23; 9:27; 10:42; 12:49; 13:10; 15:23; 16:5 17:6; 17:10; 18:1; 19:10; 21:20; 24:3; 26:8,40,45.

[29] Cf. Mt 12:30; Mk 9:40; Lk 9:50—the saying in Matthew is the more restrictive. Matthew and Luke record the statement, "The one who is not with me, is against me, and the one who does not gather with me scatters" (Mt 12:30/ Lk 11:23). Mark and Luke have the reverse statement, "The one who is not against us, is for us" (cf. Mk 9:40; Lk 9:50), a saying not found in Matthew.

tendency to view the disciples as a collective unity.[30] Interestingly, Matthew stresses this even more than Mark. Paradoxically though, along with his stress on a nameless, faceless entity, Matthew brings Peter into more prominence, both positively (e.g., 16:15-19) and negatively (16:23—Matthew does not have "seeing disciples"). Matthew concentrates on the disciples as the group of Jesus' followers and Peter as a "typical" individual follower.[31] Against this backdrop of anonymity, Peter stands out starkly because he is the only named disciple who is emphasized. Peter functions in much the same way as do the group of disciples. In his strengths and in his weaknesses he can be an example to Matthew's readers; so, Matthew accentuates the truly human element in Peter. The readers would find much in common with Peter's typically human characteristics. He is much like any ordinary believer with his highs and lows, and, therefore, becomes an example from whom the reader can learn.

*G. Placement of the commission*

The so-called "great commission" (28:16-20) that concludes this gospel encapsulates Matthew's understanding of the purpose of Jesus' ministry. In addition, the placement of the commission at the conclusion of Matthew's gospel has long been recognized as an indication of Matthew's overall purpose for writing his gospel.[32] It is especially crucial for our understanding of the disciples' role in Matthew's gospel. Jesus directed his earthly ministry to teaching and training his disciples; now he sends the disciples out to make more of what he has made of them.

Implied in the command is both the call to and the process of becoming a disciple.[33] As one comes out from the nations to start life as a disciple, that one grows in discipleship through baptism and through obedience to Jesus' teaching. The participle, "baptizing," describes the activity by which the new disciple identifies with Jesus and the participle, "teaching," introduces the activities by which the new disciple grows in discipleship.[34] We should note that the process of growth does not include only instruction. Growth in discipleship is accomplished as the new disciple is obedient to what Jesus commanded. Obedience was the hallmark of Jesus' disciples (12:49-50).

## II. The circle of disciples

Our understanding of the Matthean disciples has been greatly enhanced by the abundance of recent studies. This brief glimpse at the portrait of the Matthean disciples reveals a growing consensus concerning their basic features. Matthew focuses on a small circle of disciples around Jesus, composed primarily of the Twelve, separated from the religious leaders and the crowds to be with

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30 Hans Conzelmann, *History of Primitive Christianity*, trans. John E. Steely (Nashville: Abingdon, 1973), 149.

31 Jack Dean Kingsbury, "The Figure of Peter in Matthew's Gospel as a Theological Problem," *JBL* 98 (1979), 78.

32 For recent discussion, see B. Rod Doyle, "Matthew's Intention as Discerned by His Structure," *Revue Biblique* 95 (1, 1988) 34-54; Bauer, *The Structure of Matthew's Gospel*.

33 Grant R. Osborne, *The Resurrection Narratives: A Redactional Study*, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984), 91; cf. Moisés Silva, "New Lexical Semitisms?," *ZNTW* 69 (1978), p. 256 n.9.

34 For recent discussion of the meaning of baptism as "adherence" see William B. Badke, "Was Jesus a Disciple of John?," *Evangelical Quarterly* 62 (3, 1990) 195-204.

Jesus. Jesus teaches these disciples and then he sends them out to make more disciples whom they will baptize and teach.

While these characteristics of the disciples are fairly well accepted by most scholars, a central issue surprisingly remains without consensus. Who is in the circle of disciples and how are they intended to function within Matthew's gospel? The answer to that question is significant, because it provides a major key to the interpretation of Matthew's gospel. From an historical-critical perspective, the constitution of the circle of disciples is an important consideration because those who make up the circle of disciples provide insight into the life and teaching of Jesus, early Christian tradition, and the composition of Matthew's community. From a literary-critical perspective the constitution of the circle of disciples is important because it provides insight into both the point of view of the implied author and the identification of the implied reader with characters in Matthew's story. Literary-critical approaches suggest that the implied reader is guided by the implied author to make an evaluative decision about the disciples in their role within the narrative world of the text, and so either to identify with them or not.[35]

Who, then, is in the circle of disciples in Matthew's gospel? An overview of both historical-critical and literary approaches to the Matthean disciples reveals diverse answers to that question. However, since several of these studies were published near the same time, they were not able to inform each other. This has created a wealth of data and insights, yet it has also produced narrowly focused, sometimes disparate, perspectives of the Matthean disciples. In addition, increasing specialization within these disciplines has tended to create a wedge that stifles interaction.[36]

Our purpose here is to lay out the various perspectives of the circle of disciples so that they can be analyzed in the light of one another. Historical-critical and literary-critical studies have developed somewhat independently of one another in the last two decades, yet several of the reconstructions of the circle of disciples are strikingly *similar between* disciplines, while strikingly *dissimilar within* disciplines. After we lay out the different answers to the question of the circle of the disciples, we will analyze those answers in the light of a crucial passage in the concluding section of the gospel, and provide some evaluation. Although we cannot here develop a methodology that incorporates both disciplines,[37] hopefully this will allow greater dialogue between disciplines and a

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[35] The metaphor of "windows and mirrors," which attempts to describe these approaches, was made popular among literary critics by Murray Krieger, *A Window to Criticism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 3-70. The metaphor has also become well-known among literary critics of biblical literature, especially through the influential work by Norman R. Petersen (*Literary Criticism for New Testament Critics*, GBS, ed. Dan O. Via, Jr. [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1978], 24-25).

[36] Petersen, *Literary Criticism*, 24-25. Matthean scholars still speak of the "potential" for these approaches to be used in a complementary methodology; e.g., Mark Allan Powell, *What Is Narrative Criticism?* GBS, ed. Dan O. Via, Jr. (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 10; Howell, *Matthew's Inclusive Story*, 259; Jack Dean Kingsbury, "Analysis of a Conversation," *The Social History of the Matthean Community: Cross-Disciplinary Approaches*, ed. David L. Balch (Minneapolis: Fortress, forthcoming).

[37] The difficulties of such a methodology are rooted especially in the problem of establishing criteria by which one moves from the text to the social situation of Matthew's gospel (cf. Kingsbury, "Analysis of a Conversation"). I have attempted a bi-focal methodology elsewhere: Michael J. Wilkins, "An Analysis of Discipleship Concepts in the Writings of Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch, in the light of Matthew's Gospel,"

broader perspective from which further study of the Matthean disciples can proceed.

*A. Historical-critical portraits of the Matthean disciples*

The Matthean disciples are said to provide a window into the world of Jesus, the early church, and/or Matthew's community. This conclusion is reached through redaction-critical analysis as well as sociological/anthropological analysis.

*1. Wandering charismatics and sympathizers*

Gerd Theissen is an example of a scholar who posits a two-level system within the Jesus movement of the first century. The first level is composed of those whom he calls "sympathizers." The sympathizers were settled, local communities that were sympathetic to Jesus' ministry, but who were not truly the embodiment of Christianity because they remained entangled in the affairs of daily life, including influences from Judaistic regulations of behavior, from internal structures of authority, and from procedures for accepting and rejecting members (i.e., baptism and discipline).[38] Among those sympathizers who welcomed Jesus were Mary and Martha (Luke 10:38ff.), Simon the leper (Mark 14:3ff.) and some women who gave Jesus material support (Luke 8:2f.).

The second level is composed of those whom he calls "wandering charismatics." The wandering charismatic heeded a call to follow Jesus, which included an ethical radicalism of giving up home, family, possessions and protection. These wanderers were not a marginal phenomenon in the Jesus movement. Rather, they were central to the synoptic presentation of the Jesus movement and formed the leading members of the early church.[39] Those included within this group Theissen calls apostles, prophets, and disciples.

> The two groups within the Jesus movement had a complementary relationship. The radical attitude of the wandering charismatics was possibly [sic.?] only on the basis of the material support offered to them by the local communities. To some degree the local communities relieved them of worries about their day-to-day existence. In turn, the local communities could allow themselves to compromise with the world around them because the wandering charismatics maintained such a clear distinction.[40]

Therefore, the first level group was less committed, and they felt free to remain in a condition of compromise with the world because they were not called to the higher level. The more committed wandering charismatics were the only ones called to such a commitment.[41]

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*Worship, Theology, and Ministry in the Early Church*, ed. M. J. Wilkins and T. Paige, JSNTSup (Sheffield: JSOT Press, forthcoming), and *Following the Master: A Biblical-Historical Theology of Disciples and Discipleship* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, forthcoming).

38 Theissen, *Sociology of Early Palestinian Christianity*, 18-21.

39 Theissen, *Sociology of Early Palestinian Christianity*, 8-16.

40 Theissen, *Sociology of Early Palestinian Christianity*, 22-23.

41 Cf. also Gerhard Lohfink, *Jesus and Community: The Social Dimension of Christian Faith* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 31-35, 39-44. Martin Hengel leans in this direction at times as well. He suggests that the "call" to discipleship in Jesus' earthly ministry was directed only to the disciples who followed him around, essentially the twelve (cf. Hengel, *The Charismatic Leader and His Followers*, 62-63). He does acknowledge that the gospel accounts include others who are called, but says that those passages are part of a

Theissen interprets the small group of disciples around Jesus to be an indication that Matthew teaches a two-level system of ethics within the Jesus movement, because only a few can be as committed as were the disciples. Theissen suggests that the incident of the rich young ruler indicates that only through the process of accomplishing a "better righteousness" can one become a disciple. He explains,

> In Matthew, the rich young ruler is first asked to observe all the commandments. Only after this is he summoned to become a disciple. His call is put in conditional, rather than apodeictic, terms: 'If you would be perfect, go, sell what you possess and give to the poor...' (Matt. 19.21). There are special rules for those who are perfect. The Didache puts it in a similar way: 'If you can bear the whole yoke of the Lord, you will be perfect, but if you cannot, do what you can' (Didache 6.2).[42]

Theissen suggests that traversing a graduated series of norms was necessary to pass from being a compromising local sympathizer to being a fully committed wandering charismatic (the "perfect one" implied in 19:21). Therefore, only a small group of radically committed individuals were able to become disciples.[43]

2. *Teaching ministers of the church*

Several authors postulate that the disciple is a believer who has been called out from other believers to enter into training for "ministry." Discipleship means to be with Jesus to learn from him how to serve the crowd. Focusing on the distinction between the crowds and the disciples in the gospel of Matthew, P. Minear maintains that because the crowds represent followers of Jesus, his disciples "form a much more limited and specialized group than is usually supposed. They are those chosen and trained as successors to Jesus in His role as exorcist, healer, prophet, and teacher."[44] He says elsewhere, "The author of this Gospel was a teacher who designed his work to be of maximum help to teachers in Christian congregations."[45]

This view of the disciples results from observing the close relationship of the twelve disciples with Jesus in his ministry to the crowds and the opposition to him from the religious leaders. Minear states, "We must remember that Matthew normally applied the term disciple to the twelve only, who were being trained for a special vocation, and not to all believers or followers... The twelve disciples correspond to the prophets, wise men, and scribes who were leaders in the

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later tradition (p. 63). He could avoid this difficulty by recognizing that there is a uniform distinction between the call to the twelve and the general call to discipleship. He himself seems to recognize this later (cf. pp. 82-83). For criticism of this position, see Richard A. Horsley, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence: Popular Jewish Resistance in Roman Palestine* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), 209ff.

42 Theissen, *Sociology of Early Palestinian Christianity*, 19.

43 This same position was held early this century by the influential Matthean scholar, Benjamin W. Bacon, *Studies in Matthew* (New York: Henry Holt, 1930), 87-89, 240.

44 Paul S. Minear, "The Disciples and the Crowds in the Gospel of Matthew," *Anglican Theological Review*, Supplemental Series, III (March, 1974) 31; cf. also Mark Sheridan, "Disciples and Discipleship in Matthew and Luke," *BibTheolBul* 3 (1973) 235-255; R. Thysman, *Communauté et directives éthiques: la catéchèse de Matthieu*, Recherches et Synthèses: Section d'exégèse, no. 1 (Gembloux: Duculot, 1974).

45 Paul S. Minear, *Matthew: The Teacher's Gospel* (New York: Pilgrim, 1982), 3-28.

churches of the second generation. The crowds of followers match the lay members of these churches."[46]

D. Orton similarly suggests that the disciples in Matthew's gospel correspond to the "prophets, wise men, and scribes" of 23:34. These are not three separate categories within the church, but rather express various facets or modes of the "prophetic" or "charismatic" role Jesus' disciples exercise in distinction from the scribes and Pharisees of Judaism.[47] Jesus' disciples fulfill the apocalyptic portrayal of the ideal scribe who is divinely inspired to understand the mysteries of God, to be invested with divine authority, and to interpret creatively Jesus' teaching.[48] Orton does not specify the distinction between Jesus' disciples and other groups, as does Minear, but the thrust of his argumentation implies that the disciples are those "ideal scribes" who are sent by Jesus to continue his role as Teacher and Maskil. J. Suggs similarly refers to the disciples as scribes who teach the Matthean community.[49]

These scholars suggest that the Matthean disciples are individuals who are separated from the rest of the community to carry out Jesus' role of ministering to the rest of the community, especially through some form of teaching.

3. *Ideal examples for the community*

An interesting reversal of this view of the disciples is offered by several authors. They suggest that the word disciple is the designation in Matthew's gospel for a Christian or true believer in the Matthean community.[50] Recently, A. Overman has taken the lead of some of these early redaction-critics and has noted the way in which the disciples understand Jesus' teaching. He suggests that the community as a whole, as represented by the disciples, are recipients of Jesus' teaching. The entire community is called to learn from Jesus and obey. The entire community is to be about the business of making disciples and teaching what Jesus commanded the disciples. Overman emphasizes,

> In his idealizing of the disciples and their emergence in the Gospel as followers of Jesus who truly learn, understand, and now *teach* others, Matthew provides a model for the life and behavior of the community member. While Jesus is the hero and agent of God in Matthew's story, it is really the life and ministry of the disciples, centering as it does on learning, understanding, and instruction, which constitutes the primary focus of the member's own ministry in the present. The community members are to identify and emulate the disciples of Jesus as they are portrayed in the Gospel.[51]

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[46] Minear, *Matthew: The Teacher's Gospel*, 11.

[47] David E. Orton, *The Understanding Scribe: Matthew and the Apocalyptic Ideal*, JSNTSup 25 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1989), 155.

[48] Orton, *The Understanding Scribe*, 162-163.

[49] M. Jack Suggs, *Wisdom, Christology, and Law in Matthew's Gospel* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 120-127.

[50] Variations on this theme are advocated by Luz, "Die Jünger im Matthäusevangelium," 159-165; Hubert Frankemölle, "Amtskritik im Matthäus-Evangelium?," *Bib* 54 (1973) 247-262 and *Jahwebund und Kirche Christi: Studien zur Form- und Traditionsgeschichte des Evangeliums nach Matthäus*, NT Abh 10 (Münster: Verlag Aschendorff, 1974), esp. 84-85, 150ff.; Davies and Allison, *Saint Matthew*, 1:425.

[51] Overman, *Matthew's Gospel and Formative Judaism*, 135-136. For a similar view, but without the emphasis upon teaching, see Horsley, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence*, 231-245.

Two emphases should be noted here. First, Overman stresses the egalitarian nature of the community. Teachers and students are both called disciples within the community. All members are equal as disciples within the community, because all are called to be learners, to understand fully the teachings of Jesus and to fulfill them. Second, Overman accentuates an "idealizing" touch that Matthew has included in his portrait of the disciples. By this he means that the disciples in Matthew have become ideal types; they are prototypes for the follower of Jesus.

> The disciples do not appear to struggle and at times fail in their attempt to follow Jesus, as the Markan disciples seem to do. The disciples in Matthew lack sharp contours, with little or no personal and biographical information provided about them. The disciples are models *(Vorbild)* for the members of the community.[52]

The emphasis upon "community" is especially important for Overman's social reconstruction of the disciples.

*B. Literary portraits of the Matthean disciples*

Literary portraits do not reveal the same diversity, primarily because most do not go beyond the text. As we noted above, historical-critical approaches to the Matthean disciples tend to be guided by the principle of transparency as a first-line approach to the text. Literary critics, as a rule, try to understand the disciples within the developing narrative before making judgments about how the disciples would have been understood in the implied author's and/or reader's community.

Several recent literary studies of Matthew's gospel advocate portraits of the disciples that are similar, yet different, from one another. These studies are similar in that they view the disciples as the character group with which the reader can most easily identify. They also tend to view the disciples as virtually co-extensive with the Twelve. The difference lies in the way in which they understand the role of the Twelve (exemplary or not) and the identity of the implied reader.

*1. Disciples as the model for teachers*

A. Lincoln suggests that, although the central character of Matthew's story is Jesus, a great impact may be felt from the narrative if one focuses upon the role of the disciples.[53] Through focusing on the disciples, attention can also be paid to the implied readers. The implied readers' situation is most similar to that of the disciples, not to that of Jesus, although they are expected to share the point of view of Jesus. Therefore, the readers identify more with the disciples as characters in the story, whose portrayal includes development and uncertainty, than

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52 Overman, *Matthew's Gospel and Formative Judaism*, 135. He acknowledges the influence of Frankemölle (*Jahwebund und Kirche Christi*, 256) in this direction, but several other early redaction-critics also tended toward "idealization;" e.g., Trilling, *Das Wahre Israel*, 50, 159, 213 and Zumstein, *La Condition du Croyant dans L'Evangile Selon Matthieu*, 81.

53 Andrew T. Lincoln, "Matthew—A Story for Teachers?," *The Bible in Three Dimensions: Essays in Celebration of Forty Years of Biblical Studies in the University of Sheffield*, edd. David J. A. Clines, Stephen E. Fowl, Stanley E. Porter, JSOT Sup 87 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990),105-6.

with Jesus, who is in many ways more static and fulfills his narrative role or task in a fairly straightforward and unambiguous fashion.[54]

Lincoln argues, specifically, that the story of the disciples with their developing understanding yet uncertain faith is a story of those who are being prepared to teach with authority among all nations. This perspective of the disciples is noted especially at two climactic points—the first at the close of the major period of public ministry in 16:13-20 and the second at the ending of the narrative as a whole in 28:16-20.[55] Matthew's gospel is of course a story about Jesus, but the best way to appreciate the impact of this particular story on the reader is to focus on the implied readers and their relationship to Jesus' disciples. Throughout the narrative, the implied author tells his story about Jesus in such a way as to prepare his implied readers to be missionary teachers among the nations, carrying on the task of Jesus the teacher. Lincoln states,

> In preparation for this task they have been thoroughly acquainted with Jesus' teaching, mission, and authoritative presence ... Matthew's gospel should be read as a story for would-be teachers. The implied author is in effect saying to the implied reader, 'So, you want to be a teacher? Let me tell you a story.'[56]

Therefore, Lincoln suggests that the reader is understood to be some form of "teacher."

2. *Jesus as the model for discipleship*

D. Howell takes a different tack toward the disciples. Howell agrees that within the narrative the disciples are a character group that is both positively and negatively oriented toward Jesus. However, he emphasizes that the implied reader is informed by other characters, minor and major, and is privy to information and teaching communicated to him/her by the implied author through the narrative, but not available to the disciples. This leads Howell to declare that

> the disciples as a character group in the plotted story of the Gospel must therefore not be seen as a cipher for the members of Matthew's church, for the Matthean implied reader is an entity distinct from the disciples. The disciples neither embody all the values and norms commended by the implied author, nor do they know everything about Jesus that would help the Matthean church members and other actual readers respond properly to Jesus.[57]

For Howell, discipleship does not mean membership in a character group, but concerns the values that Jesus and the implied author commend to their hearers/readers. The implied reader is able to learn from all the characters, both negatively and positively, what it means to follow Jesus.[58] Because of this, the

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[54] Lincoln, "Matthew—A Story for Teachers?" 105-6.

[55] Lincoln, "Matthew—A Story for Teachers?" 106.

[56] Lincoln, "Matthew—A Story for Teachers?" 124-125. This conclusion is quite similar to the assumption Paul Minear makes about actual authors and readers in the social setting of Matthew's community; Paul S. Minear, *Matthew: The Teacher's Gospel* (New York: Pilgrim, 1982), 3-28.

[57] Howell, *Matthew's Inclusive Story*, 235. Howell here follows the insightful study of the minor characters by Janice Capel Andersen, "Matthew: Gender and Reading," *Semeia* 28 (1983), 23-24.

[58] Howell, *Matthew's Inclusive Story*, 250-251.

implied reader is superior to every character in the story, and is driven to Jesus as the only worthy model for discipleship. Although both the disciples and Jesus are placed in similar circumstances, it is only Jesus who responds in a uniformly positive manner. Hence, "The parallels between Jesus and his disciples in Matthew drive the implied reader to look to Jesus and his behavior rather than to the disciples to learn what it means to live a life obedient to God. Jesus becomes a model of righteousness."[59]

*3. The actual and the ideal*

Another Matthean scholar who has applied literary-critical methodologies to the text of Matthew's gospel is D. Patte.[60] Patte takes special note of the small group of individuals called disciples in Matthew's gospel. That small group is what he describes as the "actual disciples" (e.g., Peter, Andrew, James, and John), who must be distinguished from the "ideal disciples" of Jesus' teaching.[61] The "actual disciples" are those who follow Jesus around and are the ones who have the responsibility to "make disciples of all nations" (28:19), yet since they are to teach these new disciples to obey all that Jesus as taught them, they are making "ideal disciples," not more of what they are as "actual disciples." At times Matthew brings into the narrative characters who function as "ideal disciples" since they embody what Jesus had taught (e.g., the women who followed and served Jesus).[62] The reader is to learn from the example of the "ideal disciples" of Jesus' teaching, leading them in turn to be "scribes 'trained' for the kingdom of heaven." Patte claims that, "Matthew's entire Gospel is aimed at training scribes 'for the kingdom.'"[63]

*4. Examples for Christians*

J. Kingsbury has long recognized the small group that constitutes the disciples in Matthew's gospel. In early redaction-critical works he suggested that Matthew generally identifies the disciples with the Twelve, although he does not exclude the existence of other disciples, and that this small group of disciples is representative of Christians or the church of Matthew's day.[64] In his later, literary-critical works Kingsbury continues to suggest that the reader identifies with the disciples and learns from them, both positively and negatively. For example, when looking at the "eager scribe" and the "reluctant disciple" in 8:18-22, Kingsbury draws "cardinal tenets of discipleship" from which the reader is to learn.[65] Kingsbury suggests that the disciples as a group are a single, primary character within Matthew's story. They are "round" because they not only possess numerous traits (like Jesus), but because they possess traits that conflict.

> Because the disciples possess conflicting traits, the reader is invited, depending on the attitude Matthew as narrator or Jesus takes toward them

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[59] Howell, *Matthew's Inclusive Story*, 247.

[60] Daniel Patte, *The Gospel According to Matthew: A Structural Commentary on Matthew's Faith* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987).

[61] Patte, *The Gospel According to Matthew*, 119, 136 n. 16.

[62] Patte, *The Gospel According to Matthew*, 391ff.

[63] Patte, *The Gospel According to Matthew*, 199, 105 n. 6.

[64] Jack Dean Kingsbury, *The Parables of Jesus in Matthew 13: A Study in Redaction-Criticism* (London: SPCK, 1969), 41-43. Cf. also, Jack Dean Kingsbury, "AKOLOUTHEIN," 56-73.

[65] Kingsbury, "On Following Jesus," 57.

on any given occasion, to identify with them or to distance himself or herself from them. It is through such granting or withholding of approval on cue, therefore, that the reader becomes schooled in the values that govern the life of discipleship in Matthew's story.[66]

Therefore, for Kingsbury, the small group of disciples constitute the example from which the reader learns. The reader is a member of the community.

### III. Insights from Joseph [of Arimathea] (Matt 27:57ff.)

The Matthean account of Joseph [of Arimathea] may help further our understanding of the circle of disciples around Jesus. We read, "When it was evening, there came a rich man from Arimathea, named Joseph, who was also a disciple of Jesus" (27:57 NRSV). The most important items for our discussion occur in the final clause, ὃς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμαθητεύθη τῷ Ἰησοῦ; viz., the particle καί and the verb μαθητεύω.

*A.* ὃς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμαθητεύθη τῷ Ἰησοῦ

*Μαθητεύω.* All four evangelists record Joseph's activities in procuring the body of Jesus. Mark refers to him as one "who was also himself waiting expectantly for the kingdom of God"[67] (Mark 15:43). Luke, somewhat similarly to Mark, says that he was one who "was waiting expectantly for the kingdom of God"[68] (Luke 23:51). John describes Joseph as one "who was a disciple of Jesus, though a secret one"[69] (John 19:38). By the use of ἐμαθητεύθη,[70] Matthew describes Joseph as one who was "a disciple of Jesus." This is the second of three times that Matthew uses this verb (cf. 13:52; 28:19), which is found only one other time in the NT (Acts 14:21).[71] There is some debate whether ἐμαθητεύθη is a true transitive passive (i.e., "was made a disciple," as is most likely true in 13:52) or a deponent active ("became a disciple," as is true in 28:19).[72] However, either way Joseph was described as a disciple of Jesus.[73] This is important, because although

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66 Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story*, 13-14.

67 ὃς καὶ αὐτὸς ἦν προσδεχόμενος τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦς θεοῦ.

68 ὃς προσεδέχετο τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ.

69 ὢν μαθητὴς τοῦ Ἰησοῦ κεκρυμμένος δε.

70 A variant reading, ἐμαθήτευσεν, of the intransitive active μαθητεύω, occurs in A B L W $f^{13}$ 𝔐. The reading of the Nestle and UBS$^3$ text has stronger support, occurring in ℵ C D Θ $f^1$ 33. 700. 892 *pc*.

71 Interestingly, μαθητεύω occurs 4 times in Ignatius' writings (Ign. *Eph.* 3.1.3; 10.1.4; Ign. *Rom.* 3.1.2; 5.1.4), although nowhere else in the apostolic fathers and only rarely in secular literature; Wilkins, "An Analysis of Discipleship Concepts in the Writings of Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch, in the light of Matthew's Gospel," 7n.17.

72 Μαθητεύειν meant first 'to be a disciple' (Plut., Mt 27:57 v.l.), then became a deponent (Mt 13:52; 27:57 v.l.), and from this developed a new active 'to make a disciple of' (Mt 28:19; Acts 14:21) (BDF §148 [3]).

73 This is the rendering of virtually all the translations and commentators. An exception is Albright and Mann, who suggest that ἐμαθητεύθη τῷ Ἰησοῦ should be rendered, "taught by Jesus." They contend that Matthew intentionally avoided μαθητής by using μαθητεύω because he did not want to imply that Joseph of Arimathea was a "disciple"; cf. W. F. Albright and C. S. Mann, *Matthew*, AB 26 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1971), LXXVII. Przybylski effectively refutes their arguments; cf. Benno Przybylski, *Righteousness in Matthew and his World of Thought*, SNTSMS 41 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 109-110; see also Wilkins, *The Concept of Disciple in Matthew's Gospel*, 161.

he is called a disciple, he was not assumed to be a part of the Twelve. Seen in conjunction with the other occurrences of μαθητεύω, the verb shows that disciples are people who have become (13:52-scribe; 27:57-rich man), or will become (28:19-nations), adherents to Jesus.[74]

*Καί.* The particle καί is also important for our discussion (cf. Mark 15:42). Although most commentators pass over its occurrence in this sentence,[75] it has significant implications. Functioning here as an adverbial adjective rather than as a connective, καί is either ascensive or adjunctive.[76] With an ascensive force, the phrase would read, "who even himself became/was made a disciple of Jesus" (cf. 5:46f.). With an adjunctive sense, the phrase would read, "who also himself became/was made a disciple of Jesus" (cf. 5:39). What does καί indicate? Ascensively, καί accentuates some aspect of Joseph (his riches? in contrast to 19:16-22?), and suggests that even this person had become a disciple. Adjunctively, there are several options for the meaning of καί. It could mean that, in addition to the Twelve, Joseph also was a disciple. The women in near context lead many to suggest that, in addition to the women just mentioned (27:55-56), Joseph also was a disciple[77] (some contend that any appearance of reference to the women is simply a redactional illusion, since they maintain that the construction in Mark less likely refers back to the women[78]). Some suggest that the reference may simply explain why this particular rich man would want to bury Jesus, and it may prevent a negative comparison between Jesus and John the Baptist, whose disciples retrieve and bury the body of their master in 14:12.[79] We shall return to these options momentarily, but for now the most that should be made of the expression is that Joseph is a disciple, yet is a disciple in some way that marks him as different from the Twelve.

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[74] Cf. Przybylski, *Righteousness in Matthew and his World of Thought;* Luz, "Die Jünger im Matthäusevangelium," 158. The expression "adherents to Jesus" expresses the central meaning of the relationship in typical first century usage; cf. Wilkins, *The Concept of Disciple in Matthew's Gospel,* 41-42, 124-125.

[75] Exceptions are: Alan Hugh McNeile, *The Gospel According to St. Matthew* [1915, rpt.; Grand Rapids : Baker, 1980], 426; Alexander Sand, *Das Evangelium nach Matthäus,* RNT (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1986), 569; Anderson, "Matthew: Gender and Reading," 19-20.

[76] Cf. BAGD, 394; BDF §442; A.T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research* (4th ed.; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman Press, 1934), 1180, 1181.

[77] E.g., McNeile, *The Gospel According to St. Matthew,* 426; Grant R. Osborne, "Women in Jesus' Ministry," *WTJ* 51 (1989) 275n43.

[78] E.g., Antoinette Wire, "Gender Roles in a Scribal Community," *The Social History of the Matthean Community: Cross-Disciplinary Approaches,* ed. David L. Balch (Minneapolis: Fortress, forthcoming), 31n.52 (of original paper); cf. also Stuart L. Love, "The 'Place' of Women in Certain Public Teaching Settings in Matthew's Gospel: A Sociological Inquiry," (Paper presented to the Social Science Study Group, SBL annual meeting, Anaheim, California, November 20, 1989). This introduces the problematic synoptic relationship.

For a dissenting opinion which understands the women at the passion scene in Mark to be "disciples," see Winsome Munroe, "Women Disciples in Mark?," *CBQ* 44 (1982) 225-241; Elizabeth Struthers Malbon, "Fallible Followers: Women and Men in the Gospel of Mark," *Semeia* 28 (1983), 29-48.

[79] Andersen, "Matthew: Gender and Reading," 20.

*B. The narrative setting*

The events that mark the transition from the passion narrative to the resurrection narrative may provide clues to Matthew's perspective.[80] Joseph appears as one of three minor character groups in 27:54-61, a section that provides a climax to the passion scene and a transition to the resurrection scene. These minor characters function as foils for the disciples in the sense that they minister to Jesus in ways the disciples could have been expected to do, but do not. The last time the disciples appeared was at 26:56, where they are said to have forsaken Jesus. At this critical time of Jesus' crucifixion, where his most intimate companions should have been expected to have been with their master, they are not. Instead, three character groups step forward to exemplify actions and values that the disciples should have displayed.[81]

*Roman guards.* The Roman centurion and the guards with him at the crucifixion scene are filled with awe and declare that Jesus was the Son of God (27:54). The evaluative point of view of these Roman guards thus agrees with that of God (3:17) and Peter (16:16), a confession that is now given publicly. Therefore, as a result of the soldiers' acclamation, in principle the way is now open for the task of "going and making disciples of all nations." Since the Roman soldiers are themselves Gentiles, "they attest in this way as well that the time for embarking upon the universal mission is at hand."[82]

*Many women.* The many women, including Mary Magdalene, Mary the mother of James and Joseph, and the mother of the sons of Zebedee, who had followed Jesus from Galilee, ministering to him, do not desert him at the cross, but witnessed the crucifixion from a distance (27:55-56). Mary Magdalene and the other Mary even maintain a vigil after Jesus is placed in the tomb (27:61). Whether these characterizations imply that the women are a part of the character group of disciples,[83] their exemplary behavior is in line with the norms and values that Matthew wishes the reader to understand as "discipleship." Their service to Jesus (διακονοῦσαι, 27:55) may characterize them as servants, but it is the role that the disciples should have pursued.[84]

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80 For our purposes, the most basic conventions of biblical narrative criticism will be employed here, especially as delineated by Moore, *Literary Criticism and the Gospels* and Powell, *What is Narrative Criticism?* with application to Matthew's gospel provided by Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story.* Since the reader of Matthew's gospel deals with a "reliable narrator," one who is in accord with the implied author, "Matthew" can designate both narrator and implied author (Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story,* 38.

81 Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story,* 27, 89-91; Bauer, *The Structure of Matthew's Gospel,* 102-104, 107; Howell, *Matthew's Inclusive Story,* 157-158; Weaver, *Matthew's Missionary Discourse,* 148-153. Cf. also Charles Homer Giblin, "Structural and Thematic Correlations in the Matthean Burial-Resurrection Narrative (Matt. xxvii. 57-xxviii. 20)," *NTS* 21 (1974-1975) 406-420.

82 Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story,* 90.

83 Among those who argue that these characteristics imply that women are disciples are Jane Kopas, "Jesus and Women in Matthew," *TToday* 47/1 (1990), 20; Osborne, "Women in Jesus' Ministry," 275; Ben Witherington III, *Women in the Ministry of Jesus,* SNTSMS 51 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 122-123; Gundry, *Matthew,* 578-579.

Among those who argue that these characteristics do not imply that women are disciples are Kingsbury, "AKOLOUTHEIN," 61; Andersen, "Matthew: Gender and Reading," 18-21.

84 Andersen, "Matthew: Gender and Reading," 19, 21, 24.

*Rich man.* The rich man from Arimathea, named Joseph, requests the body of Jesus and gives it proper burial. Because he is a rich man, his tomb becomes the fulfillment of the proper place for a burial spot for Jesus (Isa 53:9).[85] His courage in asking for the body and his service to Jesus are exemplary of what a disciple should do. Joseph, who had also become a disciple, is a fitting foil for the disciples who had forsaken Jesus (26:56).[86] Although the reader is not prepared to assume that he is part of the character group of disciples that preceded or will follow (27:64, 28:7, 8, 9, 13, 16), the reader is informed that Joseph is a disciple of Jesus.

*Religious Leaders.* After these three events, the element of conflict is reintroduced to the story as the religious leaders recall that Jesus had given them the "sign of Jonah" (12:40) and then join forces with Pilate to see to it that a guard secures the tomb (27:62-66). Their aim was to prevent "the disciples" from stealing Jesus' body and proclaiming a resurrection (27:64). Accordingly, not content to bring Jesus to the cross, the Jewish leaders continue their active opposition against Jesus even after he died.[87]

These events indicate several points about the circle of Jesus' disciples. First, the reintroduction of the expression "his disciples" (οἱ μαθηταὶ οὐτοῦ) in 27:64 illustrates the distinction between the character group "the disciples" and the minor characters of the preceding events (27:54-61). Second, although Joseph of Arimathea is a disciple, he is not a part of the character group. Third, the exemplary nature of the three minor characters implies that they should be taken as a unit. In the middle of all the rejection of the passion narrative, these "individuals who do not reject Jesus stand out: the Roman centurion confesses Jesus as Son of God (27:54), women who watch the crucifixion are named (27:55), and Joseph of Arimathea provides Jesus with a tomb (27:57ff.)."[88] Fourth, the expression to describe Joseph, ὃς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμαθητεύθη τῷ Ἰησοῦ, prepares the reader for the final commission, where the same verbal form occurs for the third and final time in Matthew's gospel. Since the event of the Roman centurion and guards who confess the crucified Jesus as Son of God also prepares for final commission, it is highly likely that the middle event should as well. Taken as a whole, these events lead the reader to believe that gentiles, women, and rich men will be included in the outreach program of the final commission. Fifth, these observations seem to indicate a literary difference between the noun μαθητής and the verb μαθητεύω in Matthew's gospel. The noun designates the character group called the disciples, and the verb designates a wider group of followers with which the reader is ultimately lead to identify. This is borne out by comparison with the other occurrence of μαθητεύω in Matthew's gospel (13:52). Whether or not the expression πὰς γραμματεὺς μαθητευθεῖς is a self-description of the

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[85] Cf. W. Boyd Barrick, "The Rich Man from Arimathea (Matt 27:57-60) and 1QIsa$^a$," *JBL* 96/2 (1977) 235-239.

[86] Gundry, *Matthew,* 580; Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story,* 27.

[87] Kingsbury, "The Developing Conflict between Jesus and the Jewish Leaders," 72.

[88] Howell, *Matthew's Inclusive Story,* 158.

implied author,[89] it indicates a category outside of the group called "the disciples."[90]

## IV. Named and Unnamed Disciples

*A. Specificity and ambiguity*

The term "disciples" (μαθηταί) designates a major character group within Matthew's story. The disciples are Jesus' intimate companions (9:23), the recipients of his teaching (5:1,2), his brother, sister, and mother (12:46-50) and those who share his outreach to the crowds (9:35-38). Throughout much of Matthew's story, the spotlight focuses on the Twelve, who at many points appear to be virtually co-extensive with the character group "the disciples." The Twelve give specificity to the character group.

However, from the very first occurrence of "disciples" in Matthew's gospel (5:1), a measure of ambiguity surrounds the term. There we find Matthew stating that Jesus saw the crowd, went up on the mountain, and "his disciples came to him." Up to this point, the word 'disciple' has not been used, and only four followers have been called (4:18-22). Moreover, at this juncture it is difficult indeed to identify the disciples with the twelve because at least one of them, Matthew the tax-collector, does not meet Jesus until 9:9. Who then are the disciples of 5:1? Davies and Allison answer the question in this way,

> The problem of 5.1 simply warns us that our evangelist was not overly interested in informing his readers as to who exactly was on the mountain when Jesus spoke. In 5.1, the unspecified disciples, who must be a group larger than the four of 4.18-22, are—and this is the key point—contrasted with the crowd and so represent the church. The disciples, in other words, stand for the faithful; they are transparent symbols of believers. So the sermon on the mount is spoken directly to Matthew's Christian readers.[91]

We may question the validity of bringing in the issue of transparency this early in the narrative, and we may want to clarify the identification of the readers, but the emphasis upon ambiguity surrounding "the disciples" is important. While the Twelve are often assumed to be implied in the use of the term, this is not uniform. Matthew speaks specifically of disciples other than the Twelve (8:21),[92] he implies a wider circle of disciples (10:24, 25, 42),[93] and he acknowledges through a related verb the existence of a disciple other than the Twelve, Joseph of

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[89] E.g., Pierre Bonnard, *L'Evangile Selon Saint Matthieu*, CNT I (1963; 2d. ed. Neuchâtel: Delachaux, & Niestlé, 1970), 210-211; Lamar O. Cope, *Matthew: A Scribe Trained for the Kingdom of Heaven*, CBQMS 5 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1976), 10n36.

[90] This is the consensus of virtually all commentators, although no consensus as to the identification of "scribe" has yet been reached; cf. Orton, *The Understanding Scribe*, 137-140, 230-232 notes 1-10.

[91] Davies and Allison, *Saint Matthew*, 1:425.

[92] Kingsbury, "On Following Jesus," 45-59. Gundry understands this disciple to be a professing, although false disciple (Gundry, *Matthew*), 150-152. For an attitude toward the scribe (Matt 8:19-20) which differs from Kingsbury, see Jarmo Kiilunen, "Der Nachfolgewillige Schriftgelehrte: Matthäus 8.19-20 im Verständnis des Evangelisten," *NTS* 37 (1991) 268-279.

[93] Weaver, *Matthew's Missionary Discourse*, 16.

Arimathea (27:57).[94] Matthew generally identifies the disciples with the Twelve, but he does not exclude the existence of other disciples. Unless Matthew states otherwise, he refers to the Twelve when he refers to the disciples, but he does not mean to imply that Jesus has no other disciples. The ambiguity surrounding this nameless, faceless circle of disciples creates elasticity. It allows the term to function as a referent for the inner circle of Twelve, yet allows it to expand to imply a wider circle of disciples as well.

*B. Disciples and crowds*

We saw earlier in our discussion of the features of the Matthean disciples that Jesus' objective was to make disciples from the crowd. The sign of faith is when one responds to Jesus' teaching by coming out of the crowd to call Jesus "Lord" (cf. 8:18,21; 17:14,15).[95] As an individual comes out of the crowd, he or she chooses either to exercise faith and become a believer, or chooses not to believe (cf. 19:16-22). The crowd is a neutral group, out of which come those who will become disciples of Jesus, or else those who will decide against him and ultimately be persuaded to join the religious leaders in opposing Jesus.[96] After the crowd is persuaded by the religious leaders to call for Jesus to be crucified (27:15-24), the crowd disappears from Matthew's narrative. Only the disciples and the religious leaders continue to play a part in the narrative until the end of the story.

Now the character contrast between those who are either with Jesus or against him is complete. There is no more middle ground. The introduction of the exemplary minor characters in 27:54-61 implies that they are "with Jesus." These minor characters do not have the name μαθητής applied to them, hence they stand outside of the developing plot. The "disciples" appear in contrast to the religious leaders (27:64; 28:13); the "disciples" will be the object of the resurrection announcement by the women (28:7, 8, 9), and as the "eleven disciples" they meet Jesus in Galilee to receive the final commission (28:16).[97]

*C. Disciples and discipleship*

We have noted that the "disciples" are a major character group within Matthew's story. They are Jesus' intimate companions (9:23), the recipients of his teaching (5:1, 2), his brother, sister, and mother (12:46-50) and those who share his outreach to the crowds (9:35-38). The Twelve normally are in view, but we see hints of disciples other than the Twelve from the very first occurrence of the term (5:1), and at various other points within the narrative (e.g., 8:21; 10:24, 25, 42; 13:52; 27:57). The label "the disciples" implies the Twelve, but it has enough ambiguity so that the character group is a bit more elastic. Since the disciples represent those who have come out of the crowd to be with Jesus, they become examples for the reader. As they respond with obedience to Jesus' call (4:18-22;

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[94] Cf. Przybylski, *Righteousness in Matthew and his World of Thought*, 108-110. So also Luz, "Die Jünger im Matthäusevangelium," 158.

[95] Günther Bornkamm, "End-Expectation and Church in Matthew," in *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew*, 40-41.

[96] Cf. Davies and Allison, *Saint Matthew*, 1:419-420.

[97] Among the evangelists, only Matthew has a nameless group of disciples in the resurrection narrative. The women appear by first name and then as a category of unnamed, faithful minor characters (28:1-10), but the disciples appear only as a nameless, faceless group of "disciples" (28:7, 8, 13), "brothers" (28:10) and "eleven disciples" (28:16).

9:9), as they come to him for instruction (13:10, 36), as they are rebuked for little faith (17:19-20) and self-aggrandizement (18:1-4), and as they recover from apostasy (26:56) to meet with the risen Jesus (28:16), the reader can empathize with their situation.

"Discipleship" is obviously related to the developing life of the disciples, but it is more expansive as well. Discipleship is exemplified in those who are not named as "disciples." Since the norms and values of the implied author are lodged with the narrator and Jesus, no one group embodies the author's ideology nor serves as a single role model. Not only the character group called "disciples" have come out of the crowd to be with Jesus. J. Andersen suggests,"

> This is why some actual readers call characters like the Canaanite woman and women at the cross and tomb disciples. If 'discipleship' is defined as the norms and values the implied author wishes the implied reader to adopt rather than as membership in the character group, then various male and female characters embody aspects of discipleship.[98]

The implied reader stands in a position of superiority by which all characters are evaluated. In addition to the disciples, therefore, a variety of minor characters contribute to the reader's understanding of discipleship. The faith (8:2; 8:5-13; 9:2; 17:14), humble station (18:2; 19:13), and servanthood (26:7; 27:55-60) of various minor characters act as a foil for the disciples, which is a postive example of discipleship for the readers. The use of impersonal, indefinite or inclusive pronouns and expressions in Jesus' teaching is another sign that Matthew extends the invitation and demands of discipleship beyond characters in the story.[99] The opposition to Jesus by the religious leaders, the rejection of Jesus by the crowds, and the apostasy of the disciples also become examples from which the implied reader is led to learn. In the end, one who comes out of the nations to be made a disciple to Jesus will be baptized and taught to obey all that Jesus has commanded (28:18-20).

> In the Great Commission the narrator and implied reader are placed in the same temporal position as the disciples; the time of mission following the resurrection and prior to the consummation of the age... With this backward glance at all Jesus has taught, the disciples and the implied reader are challenged to accept Jesus' call and be obedient to his teaching as it has been narrated in the Gospel.[100]

### V. Tension in the Matthean Disciples

Matthew's gospel has long been understood to operate within an inherent tension, usually noted in the particularistic/universalistic dimension.[101] Tension also characterizes Matthew's view of the disciples. The conflicting historical-critical and literary-critical portraits of the disciples described above reflect that

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98 Andersen, "Matthew: Gender and Reading," 23-24.

99 Howell, *Matthew's Inclusive Story*, 221-226.

100 Howell, *Matthew's Inclusive Story*, 226.

101 Cf. e.g., Roger Mohrlang, *Matthew and Paul: A Comparison of Ethical Perspectives*, SNTSMS 48 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), passim.; Ulrich Luz, *Matthew 1-7: A Commentary*, trans. W. C. Linss (1985; Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1989), 73-99.

tension. A few concluding observations may help identify some of the causes of the tensions in the disciples' portraits. First, although Matthew's worldview tends to limit the term "disciple" to the male inner circle around Jesus, especially the Twelve, the values embodied in various minor characters and teachings strain those boundaries to include within the discipleship relationship to Jesus those not normally expected. Wealth, occupation, gender, purity, ethnicity, and family ties are less important than the stance characters take in relationship to Jesus.[102] Second, Matthew intends his readers to understand that the Christian life is equivalent to being "with Jesus." We need to distinguish between the disciples as a character group within the narrative and the circle of disciples implied elsewhere in the minor characters and in the open-ended invitations offered to the crowds. Third, distinctions among Jesus' followers relate to function, not spiritual standing or commitment. The either-or nature of being with Jesus or against him excludes a two-class system of believers within Matthew's gospel. All those "with Jesus" are equal in relationship to him. Therefore, disciples are equal to those minor characters who have also come out of the crowd to be with Jesus. However, Matthew does focus on the function of the disciples, which sets them aside for particular service. This tension is seen in the Twelve, who were called both disciples (10:1) and apostles (10:2). As disciples they were equal to others who were with Jesus, yet as apostles they had a unique salvation-historical role (10:5-6; 19:28). Fourth, although Jesus is the ultimate model of the norms and values commended by the implied reader, the experience of the implied and actual readers is closer to that of those who are with Jesus (the disciples and others who come out of the crowd). Jesus' life is uniformly obedient to God; the disciples learn how to be obedient. The stumbling disciples provide an example for the readers of how Jesus would work with them.

Discipleship does not mean membership in the character group of disciples in Matthew's gospel. Discipleship is held open for all those who come out of the crowd to be with Jesus. All character groups are evaluated by the reader (both implied and real) as to their relationship to Jesus. The climactic commission that concludes Matthew's story offers a discipleship relationship to all persons.

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102 Andersen, "Matthew: Gender and Reading," 20-23.

# Triple-Form and Space/Time Transitions: Literary Structuring Devices in the Apocalypse

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Various related literary issues will be discussed in this paper, especially as they pertain to the structure of Revelation. Form-critically, the Apocalypse of John is fairly complex. Three distinct literary types have been superimposed upon one another by the author: apocalypse, prophecy, and epistle. After a brief discussion of these literary types, we will examine some of the paraenetic and literary functions of the apocalyptic and prophetic genres in Revelation on the one hand, and the epistolary form on the other.[1] Transitions in space and time, in which the seer is taken on other-worldly journeys that are characteristic of much apocalyptic literature, will be examined on a literary level, especially as they shed light on the structure of the Apocalypse as a whole.

### Revelation as Apocalypse

At the outset, Revelation is called Ἀποκάλυψις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (Rev 1.1), which is used in a quasi-titular fashion. Prior to the time Revelation was written, the term ἀποκάλυψις was not used to designate the genre of apocalyptic literature. Most likely it is this designation here that has given its name to apocalyptic literature in general.[2] The Apocalypse has most of the earmarks of apocalyptic literature: It includes visions, angelic interpreters, other-worldly journeys, and concerns itself with apocalyptic interests, including eschatological judgment,

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[1] Technically, prophecy and apocalypse are literary genres, while the epistle is a literary form, although there is a great deal of fluidity within the terminology. The prophetic call narrative, however, is a literary form found within the prophecy (Rev 1.9-20). To complicate matters, there are prophetic letters in the Hebrew Scriptures (Jer 29; 2 Chron 21.12-15), and the distinction between prophetic literature and apocalyptic literature is not always clear, as in the case of Zechariah. For the sake of convenience, the term 'triple-form' will be used when referring to all three. The non-capitalized use of apocalypse and revelation refer to the literary genre, and not the book.

[2] Even though the author of Revelation is almost certainly using the term ἀποκάλυψις in its original sense, namely as a revelation, rather than in the later technical sense of apocalyptic literature, the literary phenomenon existed, whether or not it was labeled as apocalypse or not. Modern terms have been developed in genre criticism and form criticism to discuss related literary types. For example, prophetic-call narrative is a useful label for discussing passages such as Isa 6, Ezek 1, and Rev 1.9-20.

resurrection, restoration of a (new) cosmos, to name only a few.[3] This revelation given to John, however, is said to be a prophecy,[4] which will now be considered.

### Revelation as Prophecy

The statement that Revelation is a prophecy is announced in the form of a blessing: μακάριος ὁ ἀναγινώσκων καὶ οἱ ἀκούοντες τοὺς λόγους τῆς προφητείας καὶ τηροῦντες τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ γεγραμμένα (Rev 1.3). As prophecy, Revelation has much in common with classical biblical prophecy. For example, the author of the Apocalypse receives a prophetic call (Rev 1.9-20). He identifies the circumstances of his call, giving a time and place (on Patmos, on the Lord's day, Rev 1.9-10; cf., Isa 1.1; 6.1; Jer 1.3; Ezek 1.1-3; Zech 1.1). Like Isaiah and Ezekiel, John has a theophanic vision in his call (Rev 1.10-20; Isa 6; Ezek 1-2). Like Ezekiel, John falls down (Rev 1.17; Ezek 1.28). Isaiah and Ezekiel are commissioned to proclaim God's message to his people (Isa 6.8-10; Ezek 2.3-3.11), while John is commissioned to write down the prophetic message (Rev 1.19).[5] In the conclusion to the prophecy, apocalyptic elements (viz., the sending of an angel to reveal the apocalypse) are followed by a beatitude that calls the work a prophecy (Rev 22.6,7; cf., 22.10,18,19). Since this was also found at the introduction (Rev 1.1-2,3), it suggests that Revelation is to be considered as both apocalyptic and prophetic.[6]

### Revelation as Epistle

In addition to sharing many characteristics of apocalyptic and prophetic literature literature, and visionary material of the apocalypse proper is presented within the form of a letter.[7] The epistolary introduction includes the identifica-

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[3] See the paradigm on the manner and content of apocalyptic revelation by John J. Collins, "Apocalypse: Toward a Morphology of a Genre," *SBL Seminar Papers, 1977*, 359-70, esp. 361-63. One significant difference, however, is that the Apocalypse is not pseudonymous. While we cannot identify with certainty the particular person named John who penned the work, it is generally not disputed that the author was someone named John.

[4] This has lead to a debate over whether Revelation is primarily an apocalypse or prophecy. Frederick Mazzaferri argues that Revelation is a prophecy, not an apocalypse. See his discussion on the issue, with numerous bibliographic references, in *The Genre of the Book of Revelation From a Source-Critical Perspective* (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1989), especially chapters 9-10.

[5] Jeffrey Vogelgesang also discusses the similarities and differences in John's commissioning in Rev 1.9-19 and Ezek 1.1-2.7; 3.4-11; "The Interpretation of Ezekiel in the Book of Revelation," (Ph. D. diss., Harvard University), 368-80.

[6] Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza considers the question of whether Revelation is either prophetic or apocalyptic to be misconstrued, *The Book of Revelation: Justice and Judgment* [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985], 168. See her discussion "Component Forms and the Complex Type or Literary Genre of Revelation," ibid., 164-70, and 175, where she states that in Revelation the "prophetic-apocalyptic pattern is integrated into that of the prophetic-apostolic letter."

[7] The epistolary form has tended to be overlooked or downplayed. Adela Yarbro Collins, for example, considers the epistolary form to be of secondary importance, *The Combat Myth in the Book of Revelation* (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1976), 5-8. Note, however, the work by Fiorenza, *Justice and Judgment*, 164-75; her book, *Priester für Gott: Studien zum Herrschafts- und Priestermotiv in der Apokalypse*, (Münster: Aschendorff, 1972), 168-79; and Vogelgesang, "The Interpretation of Ezekiel," 368-380, esp. 376-80.

tion of the sender (John) and the addressees (the seven churches in Asia, Rev 1.4), the greeting (grace to you and peace, Rev 1.4b-5a), and a doxology for the opening thanksgiving/blessing with an eschatological climax (Rev 1.5b-7 or 8). The body of the "letter" is the apocalypse proper (Rev 1.9-22.5). The body is followed by a paraenetic section (Rev 22.6-20), and the closing benediction (Rev 22.21).[8] The letter form is essentially complete.[9]

With these three literary types outlined, possible functions of this triple form will be considered, first with regard to the original audience, and then with regard to the book's literary structure.

## Triple-Form and the Original Audience

The use of the epistolary form for Revelation does more than place the work within a literary form that was familiar to the early Christian audience. The epistle emphasizes that the book is intended *for* a specific audience, in particular, the seven churches in Asia Minor. It is intended for the community of believers, and not for the world at large.

The fact that John calls this a revelation would have informed the reader from the start that the *contents* of the work are apocalyptic in nature. This would prepare the audience for its visionary character and apocalyptic themes, such as cosmic upheaval, eschatological judgment, new creation and restoration of the cosmos.

The literary genre of prophecy is equally important. Namely the contents of this revelation are *from* God, not from an angel or human being. Just as the Hebrew prophets understood their message to be authoritative because it was the word of the Lord, and not their own word,[10] so the author of the Apocalypse considers his work as authoritative, as a word from God. The authority of the prophetic word is stressed at the end of the book with the stern warning to anyone who would alter the content of the Apocalypse (Rev 22.18-19). The authoritative nature of the prophetic word is emphasized in the first beatitude: μακάριος ὁ ἀναγινώσκων καὶ οἱ ἀκούοντες τοὺς λόγους τῆς προφητείας καὶ τηροῦντες τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ γεγραμμένα (Rev 1.3). The reference to the public reader and the audience indicates that the work was to be read in the Christian assembly.[11] Thus the author is putting his work on the same level as the Hebrew Scriptures, which were also to be read during the service. The use of the term

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[8] William Doty, *Letters in Primitive Christianity*, Guides to Biblical Scholarship: New Testament Series (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973), 43.

[9] We note in passing that the more usual prayer of thanksgiving or blessing has been modified to a doxology, in keeping with the worshipful nature of the Apocalypse (Rev 1.5b). See the greeting and doxology in Gal 1.3-5, however, and Doty, *Letters*, 43. See also the discussion on the hymnic passages in Revelation by Klaus-Peter Jörns, *Das hymnische Evangelium: Untersuchungen zu Aufbau, Funktion und Herkunft der hymnischen Stücke in der Johannesoffenbarung* (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1971), esp. 20-21; and Fiorenza, *Priester für Gott*, 175ff.

[10] Formulas, such as כֹּה־אָמַר יהוה, or, נְאֻם־יהוה stress the divine origin of the prophetic word (cf., τάδε λέγει in Rev 2.1,8,12; 3.1,7,14; and Fiorenza, *Justice and Judgment*, 165). The prophet considered the prophecy authoritative due to the divine origin of the word, whether or not the prophet's audience accepted the word as authentic. See Amos 7.10-17, esp. vv. 15-17; and Jer 36, where Jehoiakim burned the scroll containing the message from Jeremiah.

[11] See Paul Minear, *I Saw A New Earth* (Washington/Cleveland: Corpus Books, 1968), 4-5.

προφητεία, coupled with the expression τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ γεγραμμένα, is further evidence that the work was considered by the author to be as authoritative as the Hebrew Scriptures.

The triple-form of the Apocalypse appears to have a definite paraenetic purpose that makes all three equally important. They act in consort to inform the original audience *from whom* this message came (i.e., it is an authoritative prophetic word of the Lord), *for whom* the message in intended (viz., an epistle to the believing community of the Lord in Asia Minor), and *what* the message is (viz., an apocalypse or revelation concerning the consummation of all things).

### Triple-Form and Literary Function

The triple-form—apocalypse, prophecy, and epistle—that is introduced in Revelation 1 and concluded in Revelation 22, seems to function as a literary framing device for the Apocalypse. The correspondences between the book's introduction and conclusion have frequently been observed.[12] There has not been consensus, however, over where the conclusion begins. Rev 22.6,8,9,10 have all been suggested.[13] The paraphrasing of the introduction to the apocalypse δεῖξαι τοῖς δούλοις αὐτοῦ ἃ δεῖ γενέσθαι ἐν τάχει, (Rev 1.1) in Rev 22.6 suggests that the conclusion to the apocalypse begins in Rev 22.6, and not later.

This fact that the apocalyptic literary genre and prophetic genre are interwoven, explains some of the disagreement over where the conclusion to the book begins. Apart from apocalyptic features, the recurrent admonitions are more characteristic of the final paraenetic section of an epistle. The reminders that the Lord is coming soon (Rev 22.7,12,20), beatitudes that are hortatory, (Rev 22.7b,14), the enjoinder to keep the words of the prophecy and not to seal up the words (Rev 22.7b,9,10), the warning not to add or subtract from the prophecy (Rev 22.18-19)—all these are paraenetic in nature. This hortatory conclusion to the apocalypse and prophecy is thus expressed within the paraenetic section of the epistolary form. This suggests that the epistolary form is more than an artificial literary device. On a literary level, the use of the epistolary form serves to separate the visionary material from the book's introduction and conclusion. The body of this letter contains the actual apocalyptic visions. The paraenetic section, with frequent admonitions to the readers (Rev 22.6-20), is distinct from the apocalyptic body of the letter (Rev 1.9-22.5), and literarily it forms the conclusion to the work as apocalypse and prophecy, which begins at Rev 2.6, and not later. The final verse is a benediction that is similar to others that conclude the normal New Testament epistolary form (Rev 22.21; cf., 2 Thess 3.18). In light of this, the epistolary form seems to be integral to the entire Apocalypse, and functions more than as simply a literary framing device.

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[12] See Fiorenza, *Justice and Judgment*, 175; Nils Lund, *Studies in the Book of Revelation* (Covenant Press, 1955), 52-56, 245-6. Both propose a concentric correspondence between the introduction and conclusion to Revelation. Note also the comparative fold-out chart "Synopsis of the Representative Outlines of the Apocalypse," by John Bowman, in "The Revelation of John: Its Dramatic Structure and Message," *Interpretation* 9 (1955), 436-53. The chart compares outlines of Revelation by eight scholars. There a frequent designation for the opening and closing of Revelation is prologue and epilogue.

[13] See Bowman's chart, "The Revelation of John"; Fiorenza, *Justice and Judgment*, 175; Charles Giblin, "Structural and Thematic Correlations in the Theology of Revelation 16-22," *Biblica* 55 (1974), 487-504, esp. 489.

Just as there is disagreement over the beginning of the conclusion in Revelation 22, there is also disagreement over where the introduction ends. A break is commonly seen between Rev 1.8 and 1.9.[14] A closer examination of the theophanic vision in Rev 1.9-20 is therefore needed. The question is whether this theophany belongs to the introduction or to the apocalyptic body of the work.[15]

### The Literary Function of the Prophetic Call Narrative

Although Revelation is called a prophecy in Rev 1.3, the prophecy proper does not really begin until Rev 1.9-10, when John sees the theophany, or christophany. Generally, the prophetic call, if present, occurs at the beginning of the prophetic work (cf., Rev 1.9-10; Hos 1.1; Mic 1.1; Zeph 1.1; Zech 1.1). Sometimes the call is accompanied by a theophany and/or commissioning. Jer 1.4-10 records Jeremiah's commissioning, while Ezekiel has a theophanic vision (Ezek 1.4-28), which is followed by the prophet's commissioning (Ezk 2.1-3.15). Isaiah 6 seems to be an exception.[16] Revelation actually has closest affinities with Ezekiel 1-3, which includes the call (Ezek 1.1-3; Rev 1.9-10a), theophany (Ezek 1.4-28; cf., 3.12-13; Rev 1.10b-17a), and commissioning (Ezek 2.1-15; Rev 1.17.b-20).

All this suggests that the theophany in Rev 1.9-20 functions on a larger level to introduce the material between Rev 2.1-22.5, and not merely the seven letters. The break that is frequently seen around Rev 1.9 consequently represents the transition from epistolary form to prophetic call narrative. With the triple introduction and triple conclusion, Rev 1.9-20 represents the third introduction to Revelation, that of the prophetic call narrative which introduces a prophecy.[17]

The prophetic call narrative, however, also functions on a smaller literary level, as well as on the larger level of the book as a whole. On this smaller level, the call narrative introduces the letters to the seven churches. The seer is commissioned to write in Rev 1.17b-20, and the immediate contents of what he is to write to each of the churches is in Revelation 2-3.[18] There are indications that the message the the seer is to write does not stop with the letter to Laodicea. First, the statement δείξω σοι ἃ δεῖ γενέσθαι μετὰ ταῦτα (Rev 4.1b) resumes that found in the prophetic commissioning: γράψον οὖν ἃ εἶδες καὶ ἃ εἰσὶν καὶ ἃ μέλλει γενέσθαι μετὰ ταῦτα (Rev 1.19). This suggests that Revelation 4ff is part of the prophecy that is to be written for the seven churches. Secondly, in the conclusion, the seer is commanded not to seal up the words of the prophecy (Rev 22.10). Taken together with the stern warning against adding to or subtracting

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14 See Bowman's chart, ibid.

15 Fiorenza, for example, sees Rev 1.9 as part of the letters to the seven churches (Rev 1.9-3.22), and not part of the introduction, *Justice and Judgment*, 175.

16 Isaiah 6.1-13 is frequently taken as a call narrative, but its location in chapter 6 instead of chapter one is unusual. Here, as in Revelation and in Ezekiel, theophany and commissioning are combined.

17 See, for example, R. H. Charles, who considers Rev 1.9-20 as a prophetic call, and includes the passage in the prologue to Revelation, in *The Revelation of St. John*, 2 vols., The International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T. &. T. Clark, Ltd., 1920), 1:20; 2:387. Lund considers Rev 1.9-20 as John's commission to the church, and also includes it in the prologue (*Studies in Revelation*, 52-58). Note, again, the chart by Bowman ("Revelation of John," 436-53); and Minear, who considers Rev 1.9-20 as the third introduction, in *I Saw a New Earth*, 19-22. See also Minear's discussion on the triple introduction in Revelation, ibid., 3-22.

18 The sections outlined by Fiorenza, *Justice and Judgment*, 175 reflects this.

from the book's prophetic words (Rev 22.1819), this indicates that the message John was commissioned to write in Rev 1.19 encompasses the entire book. In conclusion, the prophetic call narrative in Rev 1.9-20 seems to function on two levels in Revelation, first to introduce the immediate messages to the seven churches, and secondly to introduce the prophetic message of the entire Apocalypse.[19]

We now turn our attention to the transitions in space and time in the Apocalypse, beginning with the prophetic call narrative.

**Space/Time Transitions and the Literary Structure of Revelation**

There are four times John is said to be "in spirit" (ἐν πνεύματι, Rev 1.10; 4.2; 17.3; 21.9). Each of these reflects a transition in place, and some also reflect a transition in time. These transitions occur at key places in the book, and we will examine each in turn.

*1) The series of the seven lampstands*

The series of the lampstand takes place among seven lampstands that recall the menorah of the tabernacle and temple. The seer must enter a spiritual state in order to see the vision: "I became in the spirit on the Lord's Day," (ἐγενόμην ἐν πνεύματι ἐν τῇ κυριακῇ ἡμέρα, Rev 1.10; cf., 4.2; 17.3; 21.10). Here "One like a son of man" tells the seer: "Now write the things that you see: The things that are and the things that are about to happen after this" (γράψον οὖν ἃ εἶδες καὶ ἃ εἰσὶν καὶ ἃ μέλλει γενέσθαι μετὰ ταῦτα, Rev 1.19).

*2) The series of the seals, trumpets, and bowls*

After the seer's vision of the lampstands, he is shown the vision of the heavenly throne room (Revelation 4-5). Rev 4.1-2 represents both a shift in place and time. There are several indications that this shift has taken place, and that the seer is given another vision. First, change in spatial setting is explicit, since John must go through an open door, and must leave the place of the lampstands to enter the heavenly throne room. Second, a change in temporal setting is also suggested, since John is explicitly told that he will see "the things that must happen after this" (ἃ δεῖ γενέσθαι μετὰ ταῦτα, Rev 4.2). The expression μετὰ ταῦτα εἶδον introduces a new vision or scene within a vision (cf., Rev 4.1; 7.9; 15.5; 18.1; 19.1; 20.3; and 7.1 which has μετὰ τοῦτο).[20] The preceeding expression, ἃ δεῖ γενέσθαι, refers back to the command John was given at the beginning of his vision of the seven lampstands, but omits reference to the things that are, i.e., "the things that are and the things that are about to happen after these

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[19] The function of a literary unit on two levels can be found elsewhere. A clear example is found in the traditional Hebrew titles for the Pentateuch. For instance, the title "*Bereshit*" is the Hebrew title for the entire book of Genesis as well as the first section in Genesis, from Gen 1.1-6.8.

[20] Cf., Dan 7.6, 7; 8.4 (LXX), where μετὰ ταῦτα also introduces a new scene within a vision. Note that the sequence implied in the expression μετὰ ταῦτα is one that pertains to the sequence of the visions, and not necessarily one of temporal sequence between the visions. That is, the seer is shown one vision or scene, and then another vision after the previous one, and the sequence refers to the order in which the seer sees the vision. The temporal relationship between the visions, which may or may not involve a chronological or temporal sequence, is another issue.

things" (ἃ εἰσὶν καὶ ἃ μέλλει γενέσθαι μετὰ ταῦτα, Rev 1.19).[21] Third, the seer hears the same voice that he heard when he was shown the vision of the lampstands: "and the first voice which I heard like a trumpet" (καὶ ἡ φωνὴ ἡ πρώτη ἣν ἤκουσα ὡς σάλπιγγος, Rev 4.1; cf., 1.10). Finally, the seer enters the spiritual state for the visions, just as he did for the previous one: "I entered the spirit" (ἐγενόμην ἐν πνεύματι, Rev 4.2; cf., 1.10).

There are several reasons that the series of the seals, trumpets, and bowls belong together. These elements where the seer 1) hears a heavenly voice, 2) is transported (or goes) to a different place, and 3) enters the spirit, are found at the introduction to the series of the lampstands and at the introduction to the vision of the heavenly throne room, but do not recur within the series of the seals, trumpets, and bowls. These three elements are present in a modified form within the visions of the final judgment of the harlot and of the new heaven and earth. The absence of these elements indicates both that the visions of the seals, trumpets, and bowls belong together in some unique way, and also that they are to be distinguished both from the vision among the lampstands and from the culminating visions of the harlot. As well, the new heaven and earth are similarly to be distinguished from the previous septennaries.

Although the seer sees several different visions, introduced in various ways, such as, "and I saw" (καὶ εἶδον), or "after this I saw" (μετὰ ταῦτα/τοῦτο εἶδον), he does not enter a spiritual state and he is not transported in a spiritual state (ἐν πνεύματι), nor does the setting seem to change *from which* he views the visions, until the conclusion of the series of the bowls. While the visions themselves contain events that occur in heaven and earth, and affect the entire cosmos, each of the numbered series has its origin in heaven: The lamb opens the seals in heaven, which precipitate events on earth, as well as heaven. The angels blow their trumpets in heaven, and pour out the bowls from heaven, acts which bear consequences for the entire cosmos. The portents of the celestial woman, the dragon, and the seven bowls (Rev 12.1,3; 15.1) all occur in heaven. From the vantage point of heaven, John can see events depicted on heaven and earth. Consequently, we suggest that the setting of Revelation 4-5 holds for the series of seals, trumpets, and bowls (Revelation 6-16), which, according to the recapitulation theory adopted here, recapitulate the same sequence of events.[22]

*3) The final outcome: The visions of the harlot and the bride*

After the seventh bowl is poured out, the seer is shown the final outcome of judgment and vindication. The contrast between the visions of the harlot and the bride have been noted by others.[23] In order to see the outcome of the judgment

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[21] The omission seems deliberate. The same phenomenon occurs with the participial title for God. The penultimate references contain all three elements, although the order differs: ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος (Rev 1.4); ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος (Rev 4.8). Both of these references occur prior to the series of the seals, trumpets, and bowls. The references of the realized eschaton omit the participle ὁ ἐρχόμενος, precisely because the future has come, and it simply reads: ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν (Rev 11.17; 16.5).

[22] The recapitulation theory of Revelation has been accepted by many. See the discussion by Collins, *Combat Myth*, 8-13, 32-44. Note also the chart of the numbered series by M. Eugene Boring, *Revelation*, Interpretation (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1989), 120-21.

[23] The literary similarities between Rev 17.1-3 and 21.9-10 with regard to introduction, sequence, formula, and antithetical relationship between the harlot and the bride, both described as woman and city, have been discussed by others (cf., Giblin, "Thematic Correlations," 488-89; E.-B. Allo, *Saint Jean L'Apocalypse* (Paris: J. Gabalda et Cie, Éditeurs, 1933), 265; Ernst Lohmeyer, *Die Offenbarung des Johannes* (Tübingen: J.C.B.

against the harlot, the seer is spiritually transported to the wilderness: "[The angel] carried me to the wilderness in the spirit" (καὶ ἀπήνεγκέν με εἰς ἔρημον ἐν πνεύματι, Rev 17.3), and then similarly transported to a great high mountain, to see the vindication of the bride: "[The angel] carried me in the spirit to a great, high mountain" (καὶ ἀπήνεγκέν με ἐν πνεύματι ἐπὶ ὄρος μέγα καὶ ὑψηλόν, Rev 21.10). We see here a modification of the three introductory elements found at the beginning of the vision among the lampstands, and at the seer's transport to the heavenly throne room (Rev 1.9-20; 4.1-3): The seer 1) is told by an angel (Rev 17.1; cf., the heavenly voice in Rev 1.10; 4.1); 2) is transported to a different place (Rev 1.10; 4.2; 17.3; 21.10), and 3) travels in the spirit (Rev 17.3; 21.10; cf., "becoming" in the spirit in Rev 1.10; 4.2). In this manner, the sharp contrast between the final outcome of the harlot and the bride is emphasized.

While the outcome of the harlot and that of the bride is fairly clear, Revelation 17-22 has been an exegetical Gordian knot, especially in a chronologically sequential framework.[24] Several key problems can be cleared up if one accepts the finality of the seventh bowl in Rev 16.17-21, and that Revelation 17-22 represents the final outcome accomplished in Rev 16.17-21. From this perspective, Revelation 17-22 is not chronologically sequential to Rev 16.21, but reflects the final outcome of the judgment accomplished with the seventh bowl, when the seer is then shown the final outcome of the judgment of the harlot and the vindication of the bride (Revelation 17-22). The sequence is thematic and logical: It makes sense to be shown the final outcome of judgment after the judgment is executed. In order to do so, the author shows the judgment of the harlot *en toto*, that is, she is depicted in her final state just before divine judgment, in all her regal "glory" (Revelation 17). Her fall is then depicted in a single moment (Revelation 18), although this is accomplished over a period of time in the series of seals, trumpets, and bowls (cf., Rev 16.19). It is as if "before" and "after" pictures are being shown, the contrast of which serves to emphasize the totality and finality of the divine judgment against the harlot.

When the final bowl is emptied, a voice from the throne announces, "It is done!" (Γέγονεν, Rev 16.17) This announcement is repeated in Rev 21.6. The first announcement seems to signal the completion of the judgment, or recompense, of the harlot city (Rev 16.17-20), after which the seer is shown the totality of the judgment of the harlot. The second announcement seems to be resumptive, and signals the restoration of the heavenly city and the recompense to the conqueror (Rev 21.6-7), after which the seer is shown the Bride. The thematic development of this final outcome in Revelation 17-22 can be displayed in the following concentrism:

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Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1953), 172-73; Eduard Lohse, *Die Offenbarung des Johannes* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979) 109; Mathias Rissi, *The Future of the World: An Exegetical Study of Revelation 19.11-22.15*, Studies in Biblical Theology, Second Series 23 (Naperville, IL: Alec R. Allenson, Inc. ,1972), 52-53, 60.

[24] See, for example, Charles, *Revelation*, 2:144-54.

**A** – Judgment of the Harlot (Rev 17.1-19.10)[25]

**B** – Divine Warrior-Judge (Rev 19.11-16)

**C** – Beast and False Prophet Judged (Rev 19.17-21)

**D** – Satan Sealed for a Thousand Years (Rev 20.1-3)

**D′** – Saints Reign/Judge for a Thousand Years (Rev 20.4-6)

**C′** – Gog and Magog Judged (Rev 20.7-10)

**B′** – Divine Judge (Rev 20.11-15)

**A′** – Vindication of the Bride (Revelation 21.1-22.5; cf., 19.7-9)

The corresponding contrast between the harlot and bride **A-A′** has been established in numerous ways. This serves to frame the literary unit. Similarly, the center shows the thousand year imprisonment of Satan and the thousand year reign of the saints with the Lamb **D-D′**. With the frame and the center of the concentrism defined, other correspondences can be observed. Here the vision of the rider on the white horse who judges in righteousness (Rev 19.11-16) is seen to complement the vision of the great white throne and the last judgment (Rev 20.11-15) (**B-B′**).[26] Similarly, the battle of the beasts against the lamb and his army (Rev 19.17-21) and the battle of Gog and Magog against the holy city (Rev 20.7-10) form thematic pairs (**C-C′**).

We suggest that the battles of Rev 19.17-21 and 20.7-10 are doublets which recount from different perspectives the battle of Armageddon mentioned in the sixth bowl (Rev 16.14-16).[27] This conforms with our understanding that the

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[25] Rev 19.7-9 reflects the antithetical theme found in the corresponding section **A′** on the Bride's salvation (Rev 21.1-22.5). Similarly, Rev 21.8 expresses the theme of **A**. Although the reference to the marriage supper of the lamb in Rev 19.7-9 is in **A′**, this is not proleptic, even though it is mentioned before the battle scenes of Rev 19 and 20. Rather, the mention of the marriage theme in Rev 19 links the antithetical sections **A-A′** on the literary level. This linkage also occurs in the opposite direction in Rev 21, where reference to those who are polluted, etc., links **A′** back to **A**. Theologically, this linkage emphasizes that salvation is the corresponding side of judgment.

[26] Note that the divine warrior-judge "treads the wine press of the fury of the wrath of God the Almighty" (πατεῖ τὴν ληνὸν τοῦ οἴνου τοῦ θυμοῦ τῆς ὀργῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ παντοκράτορος, Rev 19.15), the wine of which the harlot was made to drink in the seven bowls that contained the wrath of God (Rev 15.1; 16.1). With the seventh bowl, she was already given as judgment "the cup of the fury of his wrath" (τὸ ποτήριον τοῦ οἴνου τοῦ θυμοῦ τῆς ὀργῆς αὐτοῦ, Rev 16.19; cf.,18.6). Rev 19.15 informs us that the divine warrior-judge is the one who treaded the winepress of this wrath that the harlot was forced to drink (cf., Rev 14.17-20).

[27] In addition to the concentric structure which suggests that the two battles are the same, both the battle scene in Rev 19.17-21 and that in 20.7-9 are dependent upon Ezekiel 38-39. The birds' banquet of the slaughtered kings and their armies in Rev 19.17-21 is drawn from the banquet the birds and beasts have on Gog and his armies in Ezek 39.17-20. Vogelgesang has also discussed the use of Ezekiel 38-39 in Rev 19.17-21 and Rev 20.7-10 ("The Interpretation of Ezekiel," 34-36). See especially his comparison of the verbal similarities between Rev 19.17-18,21b and Ezek 39.17-20, and between Rev 20.7-9 and Ezek 38.2 (ibid., 35-36).

In support of our argument that these two battles are the same, there are indications that Gog and Magog are alternate designations for the two beasts. First, the beast

totality of judgment and vindication is being depicted from start to finish in Revelation 17-22. It is interesting that in all three instances, no battle is actually mentioned. The beasts assemble the kings for battle (Rev 16.14-16; cf.,19.19), and the nations are gathered for battle (Rev 20.8-9), but the battle itself is mentioned only in Rev 17.14.

One of the problems with concentric structures is the subjectivity which often accompanies the structure. Several criteria here have been applied in the concentrism proposed here. First, the concentrism reflects a thematic correspondence between the corresponding sections. Secondly, breaks between sections should be independently reflected in other analyses and outlines. That is, a legitimate break will be recognized again and again by various scholars, whereas a questionable break will not be supported by other analyses.[28] Thirdly, the finality of the series of the bowls, which is expressed in the announcement Γέγονεν (Rev 16.17; cf., Rev 15.1; 16.17-21), is taken seriously. The pouring out of the seventh bowl represents the culmination of the wrath of God. The concentrism proposed here reflects this, since it depicts the totality of judgment and vindication, once this judgment has been meted out in the series of the seals, trumpets, and bowls. Finally, the concentrism clears up some of the difficulties in interpreting Rev 19-20, and accounts for doublets which are problematic in a chronologically sequential reading of Revelation. The concentric structure means that the sequence is developed thematically in inverse order, rather than chronologically.

## Conclusion

Various literary techniques to structure Revelation have been discussed in this paper. The major techniques are summarized here:

1) The triple-form of Revelation—apocalypse, prophecy, and epistle—serve to frame the work literarily, and to inform the early churches of the divine significance of the apocalyptic work that was addressed to them in particular.

2) The prophetic call narrative functions on the immediate level to introduce the series of the seven letters, as well as to introduce the entire book as a prophecy.

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in Rev 13;19.9 is generally considered to be an empire. In Ezek 38.2, Magog is an empire, and this is the case in Revelation, as well, since Gog and Magog are the *nations* at the four corners of the earth (Rev 20.8). While Gog and Magog are not mentioned in Revelation 19, the use of material from Ezekiel 38-39 makes them implicit. In Rev 20.8, the explicit mention of Gog and Magog and their assault against the beloved city recall the assault by Gog and his host in Ezekiel 38.

Finally, this is the only reference to Gog and Magog in Revelation, and it would be highly unusual for the author to mention something as significant as their assembly against the saints only once, especially since the author typically has several references to the same character or group of characters in his work. There are multiple references for the dragon (Rev 12.9,10), the harlot (Rev 11.8; 17.5,16,18), and the bride (Rev 21.2,9), to name only a few. The lamb has far more titles and designations than any other character in the book (cf., Rev 1.5,17-18; 5.5, among many others). Multiple references for a character serve to highlight different themes and to link various passages of Scripture. The reference to Gog and Magog links Ezekiel to Revelation, as well as Daniel, in the development of the theme of a world empire opposed to God's rule.

[28] See Bowman's chart, "Revelation of John." In spite of the diverse interpretations of the scholars represented there, a surprising consensus is found at several points. The breaks proposed for our concentrism have been recognized by some of those listed in Bowman's chart.

3) John's entering the spirit or being transported in the spirit seems to signal a transition in space and sometimes time in the Apocalypse, since they occur at key points (Rev 1.9-10; 4.1-3; 17.1-3; 21.9-10).

4) A concentric structure for the final outcome of the judgment of the harlot and the vindication of the bride solves some of the problems with regard to sequence in Rev 17-22.

# The Sweet and the Sour: Epics of Wrath and Return in the Apocalypse

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### The Apocalypse as a Macro-Genre

The Apocalypse, like other literature of its kind, has been frequently characterized as an example of a "macro-genre." Both John G. Gammie[1] and Klaus Koch[2] have included the composite nature of the apocalypse in their definitions of the genre, while G. von Rad refrained from considering "apocalyptic" a *bona fide* genre, but preferred to consider it a *mixtum compositum* of smaller forms.[3] The inclusive nature of pieces considered to be apocalypses has indeed been one of the major difficulties in drawing contours for the genre. Such contours must be comprehensive enough to include such different works as *1 Enoch* and *The Shepherd of Hermas*, but particular enough to distinguish the apocalypse from other revelatory genres. In a work which may contain narrative, vision, oracle, prayer, allegory, historical review, lament, paraenesis and other distinctive forms, the temptation has often been to analyze in terms of possible sources, rather than to consider the apocalypse at hand as a whole. The situation is complicated in the New Testament Apocalypse, where certain elements, such as lack of pseudonymity and an "open" rather than "sealed" quality give the work the appearance of an "anti-apocalypse," or at least an apocalypse in reaction against certain traditional details of the genre.

However, the composite character of the Apocalypse and the apocalypse has not been an insurmountable obstacle to understanding this piece as a particular representative of an intriguing genre.[4] The comprehensive nature of the book is a feature which was perceived, no doubt, by those who originally saw it as a suitable conclusion to the canon. As Northrop Frye points out in *The Great Code*,

[1] "The Classification, Stages of Growth and Changing Intentions in the Book of Daniel," *JBL* 95 (1976) 191-204. Gammie refers to his unpublished paper "Apocalyptic as a Major Literary Genre," in which the second criterion for apocalyptic [*sic*] is "a cluster of sub-genres, or component genres" (191).

[2] *Ratlos vor der Apokalyptik* (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1970).

[3] *Theologie des Alten Testaments* (1957; 4th edition Munich: Kaiser, 1965) II, 330.

[4] Despite some dissent, notably E. S. Fiorenza ("Visionary Rhetoric and Social-Political Situation," 1985), John Bowman ("The Revelation to John: Its Dramatic Structure and Message," 1955) and H. Koester (*Introduction to the New Testament*, II, 1982), there is a basic consensus concerning the genre of the Apocalypse, as the genre apocalypse is variously defined, but especially as it is set forth in volumes 14 (1979) and 36 (1986) of *Semeia*.

with the Apocalypse we reach "the antitype of all antitypes."[5] Within Frye's marriage of the Bible to subsequent literature, the book of Job is seen as "the epitome of the narrative of the Bible," whereas the Apocalypse is taken as "the epitome of its imagery."[6] However, the Bible, and the books it contains (including the Apocalypse) do have a *general* concern for narrative. What is remarkable is that Frye's view of the Bible as a totality corresponds, in a important way, to the definition of apocalypse set forth in *Semeia* 14. Frye points out that "the entire Bible is enclosed in a narrative framework,"[7] while John Collins defines an apocalypse as "a genre of revelatory literature with a narrative framework . . . ."[8] If the genre apocalypse is framed and characterized by narrative, we should not be surprised to find that the encyclopaedic quality of the Apocalypse extends beyond its imagery to its narrative features as well. Frye has demonstrated that it is not uncommon to find miniature epics within larger bodies of epic scope, so that we find the book of Job (a short epic, according to John Milton) within the corpus of the Bible, or the narrative of Michael within *Paradise Lost*.[9] It will be argued in this paper that Frye's categories of epics, particularly "epic of wrath" and "epic of return" are helpful in understanding the narrative direction and tensions of the Apocalypse, a work of epic scope which contains a miniature epic within its larger framework.

## Frye's Categories of Epics

Frye, in his *Anatomy of Criticism, The Great Code, Words with Power*[10], and forthcoming *The Double Vision*[11] sets forth two[12] major directions for narrative—directions which can be found in literature in general, but also in the Bible itself. The first, called an "epic of wrath" corresponds to the "natural cycle" of history, in which kingdoms wax and wane, or individuals are born and die. In the Bible, the natural cycle of the epic of wrath is coupled with a "final cadence" in which each rising and falling event ends in destruction, or judgement. The second narrative direction, an "epic of return," is a dialectical or completed cycle in which there may be seen a fall, followed by an upward movement, as in the rebuilt Zion of the Hebrew Bible, the "quest" story of the Christ, or the millennium of the New Testament. Within the Apocalypse, both narrative patterns are to be found. The patterns correspond roughly to the two "scrolls" (introduced at 5:1 and 10:2), which have been seen by Bornkamm, A. Y. Collins, and E. S. Fiorenza as important structuring devices for the book.

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5 *The Great Code: The Bible and Literature* (Academic Press Canada: Toronto, 1982), 138.

6 Ibid., 193.

7 Ibid., 198.

8 J. J. Collins, "Introduction: Towards the Morphology of a Genre," *Semeia* 14 (1979) 9.

9 "Theory of Genres," *Anatomy of Criticism* (1957; rpt. Princeton University Press, 1971) 324.

10 Words with Power: Being a Second Study of "The Bible and Literature," (Viking: Markham, 1990).

11 *The Double Vision*, three lectures delivered at the Emmanuel College Alumni Reunion in 1990, with a fourth added to complete the book, available to me in preliminary form.

12 Frye also speaks of the "contrast" epic and the "analogical epic," which are variations or composites of the epic of wrath and epic of return in *Anatomy of Criticism*, 317.

### The Sealed Scroll and the Little Scroll as Structuring Devices

Both scrolls are given special significance within the narrative by their dramatic introduction, and their explicit connection with the inscribed word of God. The sealed scroll of 5:1 comes from the right hand of God himself, and is committed to the potential opener of the seals by ἄγγελον ἰσχυρὸν; the open little scroll of 10:2 is presented by ἄλλον ἄγγελον ἰσχυρὸν, committed to the John by ἡ φωνὴ . . . ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, and is eaten by the prophet, becoming the source of his God-given prophecy. So then, the first scroll, the prerogative of God and the Lamb, is mysterious, while the second scroll, the intimate property of prophet John, is made manifest. The open quality of the second little scroll is emphasized by its contrast to the voices of the seven thunders (10:4) which John is instructed to seal up. Even the manner of presentation underscores this contrast: first, the angel with the scroll appears; next, John hears his cry and the sound of the seven thunders; then, John is forbidden to write what he has heard; finally he *is* instructed to take the scroll, eat it, and prophesy. The pattern of presentation, frustration, and final satisfaction is similar to that of chapter 5, where the sealed scroll is not able to be opened, where John weeps over this, and where the Lamb is presented as the one who can indeed take the scroll. With the sealed scroll, the mystery is maintained by its handling by the Lamb, and no other agent in heaven, earth, or below. With the little scroll, one gets the impression that the scroll is the substitute, the open part of the mighty angel's revelation, part of which remains sealed. The seven-sealed scroll is God's complete revelation; the little scroll is a particular word God has committed to the prophet, a word to be uttered ἐπὶ λαοῖς καὶ ἔθνεσιν καὶ γλώσσαις καὶ βασιλεῦσιν πολλοῖς (10:11).

### The Extent of the Sealed Scroll

The contents of the sealed and the little scroll have been differently delineated[13] within the structure of the Apocalypse. In the case of the sealed scroll, the heavenly setting for the scroll is sketched in chapters 4 and 5, and it is evident that the contents of the scroll begin at 6:1, when the first seal is opened. The conclusion of this scroll is more difficult to discern, however. The present author would argue, along with E. S. Fiorenza,[14] that the contents of the sealed scroll are interrupted at chapter 10 (where the little scroll is introduced) and resumed at 15:1,5 when the anger of God is "completed" with the seven bowls and the subsequent fall of Babylon. The numbering of the three woes introduced in 8:13 is of help in establishing this return to the large scroll:

> οὐαὶ οὐαὶ οὐαὶ τοὺς κατοικοῦντας ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν φωνῶν τῆς σάλπιγγος τῶν τριῶν ἀγγέλων τῶν μελλόντων σαλπίζειν.

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[13] G. Bornkamm designates the little scroll as chapters 10 and 11, in "Die Komposition der apokalyptischen Visionem in der Offenbarung Johannis," *Studien zu Antike und Urchristentum: Gesammelte Aufsätze Band II*, BEvt 28 (Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1959) 217 . Adela Yarbro Collins argues that the little scroll reaches from chapter 12 to the end of the Apocalypse, in *The Combat Myth in the Book of Revelation* (Missoula: Scholars, 1976) 26. E. Schüssler Fiorenza sees 10:1-15:4 as comprising the little scroll, in "The Composition and Structure of the Book of Revelation," (1977) in *The Book of Revelation: Justice and Judgment* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985) 159-180.

[14] "The Composition," 175.

The first woe is numbered at the end of the fifth trumpet (9:12), the second woe is numbered prior to the sounding of the seventh trumpet (11:14), but the third woe is not numbered as expected at the end of the seventh trumpet. Two problems present themselves: why is the numbering of the sixth trumpet/second woe delayed until 11:14, when we should naturally expect it following 10:21; and why are we told that the third woe is "coming soon," but never explicitly satisfied in this expectation?

The first problem is not so difficult, since the numbering of the second woe is delayed along with the sounding of the seventh trumpet. That is, if the last three trumpets followed sequentially and without interruption, the natural order would appear as follows:

Contents of the fifth trumpet

Link 1—First woe over, two to come

Contents of the sixth trumpet

Link 2—Second woe over, one to come

Contents of the seventh trumpet

Conclusion—All woes complete.

However, there is a break between the sixth and seventh trumpet, so that link 2 is also delayed. The question is really why the seventh trumpet is delayed, and this has been adequately explained by the technique which has been called variously "interlocking" (A. Y. Collins), "intercalation" (Fiorenza) and "loi de l'emboîtement" (E.-B. Allo).[15] To introduce link 2 at 11:4, and to say that the second woe is past, and the third will soon come, is a way of resuming the trumpet series. It is a signal that we will now move on to the seventh trumpet after a delay of a chapter and a half. The seventh trumpet, then, is tucked into the "alien material" of the little scroll, interlocking the two scrolls.

Why the third woe itself is not numbered after the contents of the seventh trumpet is a more perplexing question. Why is there no "conclusion" corresponding to links 1 and 2, which tells us that the woes are complete? By analogy to the fifth and sixth trumpet, it is often assumed that the seventh trumpet *is* the third woe, even though we are not told this directly. However, no plague or judgement is described during the seventh trumpet sequence (11:15-19); rather, the seventh trumpet episode depicts worship in heaven, declares the arrival of God and Christ's reign, and proclaims the time "for judging the dead" (11:18). The seventh trumpet is therefore an announcement of victory, and not a description of plagues, as were the other trumpets. Moreover, God's active visitation of plagues is arrested for three more chapters (until 15:1,5) as the drama of the "little scroll" is enacted.

It is not until chapter 15, then, that the process of God's judgement recommences in detail (although we are given a preview of it, from the perspective of heaven, in chapters 10-14, when the angel is sent to reap). The seals and trumpets

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15 *Saint Jean: L'Apocalypse*, EBib (4th ed. rev., Paris: Gabalda, 1933) LXXXII-LXXXV, cited by A. Y. Collins, *Combat Myth*, 49, n. 64. As Collins points out, her description of interlocking is more particular than the general observations of Allo. Fiorenza's intercalation is also precisely defined and differs slightly. All three conceptions, however, point to the deliberate foreshadowing of the next section's theme for the purpose of linking parts.

are followed by the third series of plagues, that is, the bowls. During the seventh trumpet, the worshippers in heaven were aware of ἀστραπαὶ, φωναὶ, βρονταὶ, σεισμὸς and χάλαζα μεγάλη (11:19)—a great hailstorm poured out upon humankind—although we are not told the effect of these. During the bowl, or vial sequence, we see the effect of God's wrath poured out. The renewal of the plagues is signalled by a renewed reference to God's temple (11:19 // 15:5). Moreover, with the completion of the series, with the seventh bowl, we are again told of ἀστραπαὶ, φωναὶ, βρονταὶ, σεισμὸς (16:18) and χάλαζα μεγάλη (16:21). It would seem, then, that just as the seventh seal merges into the trumpet visions (8:1-2), so too the seventh trumpet merges into the bowls, and finds its completion in the "fulfillment" of God's wrath. The bowls are the complete pouring out of judgement, and this process ends in the "remembrance" (16:19) of Babylon, when χάλαζα μεγάλη . . . καταβαίνει ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (16:21). It is as if the seventh trumpet "contains" the seven bowls, just as the seventh seal gave way to the seven trumpets. The pause in the momentum of judgement takes us to the perspective of heaven for a brief interval in the seventh trumpet, and for a longer retrospect and prospect in the contents of the little scroll (chapters 10-14, excluding the trumpet). The final woe is therefore not numbered, since it is not described until Babylon is finally judged: it is the end. This reading is confirmed in the Babylon "appendix," where God's judgement of the city is detailed, and where we are told three times "woe, woe, O great city" (18:10,16,19b). The third woe, the greatest, is thus accomplished when the great city falls. In the words of the great voice out of the temple of heaven, γέγονεν (16:17)—it is done.

It is therefore true that the final trumpet heralds the third and final woe, but we do not actually see this woe until the bowl plagues begin at 15:1,5. The sealed scroll begins (6:1,2) with the riding out of the white horse and rider νικῶν καὶ ἵνα νικήσῃ, moves through the seals, and then through the seven trumpets and seven bowls, to the judgement of Babylon, which is an extension of the last bowl (17:1). The fall of Babylon permits the grand finale of the sealed scroll, in which a dirge over the "great city" prepares the way for the great multitude in heaven, a multitude which acknowledges God's justice (19:1-3) and rejoices over the impending (or even, arrived) marriage of the Lamb and the Bride (19:6b-8). This is the picture of the sealed scroll which emerges: its setting and introduction in chapters 4 and 5; the first block of its contents (seals and trumpets[16]) found in 6:1 to 9:21; the second block (bowls and Babylon, and resulting joy) ranging from 15:4 to 19:8; and a conclusion in which John is enjoined to write a benediction and reacts in awe (19:9-10). Just as the scroll begins with the sight of heaven, the throne, the 24 elders and the multitude, so does it end. The multitude can now add to the initial praises of "holiness" (4:8) and of the redeeming Lamb (5:9) another song—the song of the Almighty One who reigns and the song of the marriage of the Lamb (19:6). The quest to conquer and to bring salvation has been completed, and the wedding feast can now begin.

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[16] The sounding of the seventh trumpet is displaced, and intercalated with the little scroll, although the events it heralds are described in the second block of the sealed scroll.

### The Centrality of the Little Scroll

Inserted into this action of the sealed scroll are chapters 10-14[17]—a picture of the whole of salvation history, and a look behind it into the heavenly and diabolical events which explain God's conquest. The sounding of the seventh trumpet heralds both God's judgement and his conquest: the kingdom has become God's and Christ's. How has this change occurred? Chapters 10-14 explain that this is a mystery: the seven thunders shout, but cannot be revealed. Instead, the prophet is given a little scroll to eat, a reed to measure the temple of God, and a commission to prophecy again ἐπὶ λαοῖς καὶ ἔθνεσιν καὶ γλώσσαις καὶ βασιλεῦσιν πολλοῖς. His prophecy, the little scroll, includes the vision of the two witnesses, the Woman and the Dragon, the two beasts, the Lamb with the 144,000 and the final judgement. The unity of chapters 10-14 may be demonstrated through symmetry. The two witnesses are foiled, for example, by the two beasts. This is underscored by the time-period used in both chapters (1,260 days = 42 months at 11:2,3 and 13:5), and by the early reference to the beast at 11:7. It is also highlighted by references to the miracles performed by each couple, by the resurrection of the witnesses and the false resurrection of the beast, and by the contrasting reactions to these wonders: ἔδωκαν δόξαν τῷ θεῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ (11:13) over against καὶ προσεκύνησαν τῷ δράκοντι (13:4). Again, just as all peoples, tribes, languages and nations refuse the witnesses burial (11:9), so all peoples, tribes, languages and nations follow the beast (13:7). The repetition of this phrase ties together the various scenes of the little scroll, the eating of which has prepared the seer to prophesy about, or before these groups.

If the sealed scroll may be represented in terms of a divine action, or conquest (an epic of return) in which judgement and salvation are carried out through the divine plan of God and the activity of Christ, opposed by demonic powers, then the little scroll may be seen as presenting a cosmic war (an epic of wrath) waged against humankind by the Dragon and opposed by Christ, Michael and the angels. Interestingly enough, the ordainer of the Dragon's war is also God, who brings about the preparation of his people through their chastisement.[18] The pattern of the sealed scroll extends beyond the scroll itself to the entire Apocalypse, as Fiorenza notes in her analysis of the seven letters and the beginning and concluding visions.[19] Fiorenza suggests an architectonic pattern in which 1:9-3:22 correspond to 19:11-22:9; the parallels in imagery, and the promise/fulfillment dynamic of these two sections are evident. Not only do these initial and concluding sections follow the same actantial pattern as the sealed scroll: they fill out the drama of the sealed scroll, providing a picture of the recipient Churches and the conquering Jesus in the first instance (1:9-3:22), and a full description of judgement and salvation at the end (19:11-22:9). The overall pattern of the Apocalypse, then, is one in which the primary actor is Christ, bringing salvation or judgement to the cosmos. The contrasting pattern of the little scroll is one in which the Dragon (albeit with the permission of God) wages war against humankind, and particularly the people of God, "the seed of the woman." Within the grammar of Frye's generic distinctions, the book as a whole may be considered an "epic of return," while the central chapters present an

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[17] Plus the concluding hymn of 15:2-4, which is intercalated with the return to the sealed scroll, at 15:1 and 5.

[18] See Fiorenza, "Composition," 174, for actantial models in which the two patterns are pictured.

[19] Ibid., 174-175.

enveloped "epic of wrath." The action of the Apocalypse begins with exile and promise and ends with fulfillment and return to Jerusalem and the garden. The little scroll begins with the persecution of God's people (11:7, 12:1) and is consummated by God's visitation upon the enemies (14:20).

### The Two Scrolls: Mirror-Images?

Now that the contents of the two scrolls have been sketched, we are in a position to consider their relationship to each other. In considering embedded texts, literary critics have pointed to the various relationships that the secondary fabula may have to the primary text: the embedded text may *explain* the story or it may *resemble* it. In the latter case, the embedded text may function as a kind of "mirror" to the primary story.[20] With the little scroll, we are not dealing technically with an embedded text, since embedded texts are signalled by direct or indirect speech, and occur when a particular character of the primary fabula relates a story, or even sequence of stories of his or her own (as in the stories of the endangered queen in the *Arabian Nights*). An actual example of embedded text within the Apocalypse would thus be the seven letters of Jesus to the churches, in which we forget, for a while, the visionary setting of the apocalypse. However, we may also see the function of the little scroll as analogous to the function of embedded text, since the events of chapters 11-14 transpire after John has eaten the scroll, and as a result of the commission to prophesy (10:8-11). The little scroll events thus do not represent the voice of the seer alone, but the direct and authoritatively written word of God. It is not the case of an *actor* in the primary narrative plunging into a second narrative, but that of an *actant* in the primary story (the scroll, a symbol of God's own word) telling its story through the mouthpiece of the seer. Just as the seventh seal contains the trumpets, and the seventh trumpet contains the bowls, the sealed scroll gives rise to the little scroll.

What is helpful about the analogy to embedded text is the idea that a secondary fabula may resemble the first text, and act as a "sign" for it, giving signals as to its interpretation or outcome.[21] Mieke Bal notes that the placement of the mirror-text in the primary story "determines its function."[22] Placed near the beginning, the subtext may give veiled hints concerning the outcome of the story. This is certainly the case in the complex of the seven letters, which function as promise ("tree of life," "second death," "new name," etc.) and give clues to the grand finale of the Apocalypse, the is, the visions of judgement and salvation (19:11-22:9). The veiled quality of the subtext's resemblance to the primary story maintains the suspense of the action. When a mirror-text is presented towards the end of the primary text, the function is usually not to provide suspenseful clues, but to "enhance" the significance of the story.

It would seem that the little scroll, coming dead-centre in the Apocalypse, fulfills both functions. In that the story interrupts the sounding of the trumpet, and the series of woes, and in that it provides an uncompleted story of the refugee woman and her seed, the little scroll maintains suspense. It also foreshadows both the conquering of Satan and the downfall of Babylon without telling the end of the story—that is, it refrains from giving a picture of the

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[20] Mieke Bal, *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative*, tr. Christine van Boheemen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 142ff.

[21] Bal, 146.

[22] Ibid.

wedding of the Lamb and the New Jerusalem. In chapter 14, we are given a glimpse of the 144,000, and told about the voice from heaven ὡς φωνὴν ὑδάτων πολλῶν καὶ ὡς φωνὴν βροντῆς μεγάλης (14:2) which sings the new song; it is not until 19:6[23] that we learn that this voice ὡς φωνὴν ὑδάτων πολλῶν καὶ ὡς φωνὴν βροντῆς is the song of a great multitude, and that the new song is the song of the reign of God and the marriage of the Lamb and his wife. One function of the little scroll, then, is to prefigure the outcome of the conquest. However, its function within the Apocalypse is also to explain and add significance to the overall narrative pattern. The understanding of events of persecution through the perspective of a cosmic battle—a battle which has already been won!—adds depth to the conquest larger epic of return.

The little scroll is curious because of finality of judgement is juxtaposed with open-endedness. Within the narrative, the reader is presented with both a *fait accompli* and an ongoing war. Michael and his angels have been successful in dislodging the pretender; the accuser of people of God has been cast down through the blood of the Lamb and through τὸν λόγον τῆς μαρτυρίας (12:11); and the salvation and power and reign of God and the Christ have come. However, the casting down of the dragon means also "woe" and "wrath" to the earth, and war for the seed of the woman. So, then, the little scroll acts as a "sign" for the understanding of the events of the entire Apocalypse, providing the σημεῖον μέγα (12:1) of the woman who is to be prepared and redeemed (12:6) and ἄλλο σημεῖον (12:3) of the dragon who is her enemy and over whom victory is sure. So then, the perspective of the little scroll is to portray the peace of heaven within the ongoing war. The presence of the victory song of 12:10-12 within the rehearsal of conflict provides an understanding of the victory not simply as future but as already accomplished in heaven—a powerful statement for those who see themselves embroiled within the battle. Even the battle, even the machinations of the dragon are under the control of God.

### Interplay Between the Two Scrolls

In describing primary and embedded texts, Mieke Bal refers to "text interference," that is, the "'mixture' of the two narrative levels."[24] If this is possible in the case of a secondary fabula introduced by indirect discourse, it is obviously possible in the case of our less well-defined embedded little scroll. Another way of looking at the vision of victory and peace within the little scroll's "epic of wrath" is to see this as a slippage from one level of narration to another. It is as though the victory of the sealed scroll, and its blissful ending, show through in the cracks of the little scroll. The ongoing cycle of rise and fall, captivity and death, announced in the oracle of the little scroll at 13:10, presents an all-too-familiar picture of inevitable doom, a picture about many peoples and nations and tongues and kings. The mystery is that this vicious cycle of normality is, through the death of the Lamb and the witness of the martyrs, linked to the victory of heaven. What is presented as a future hope, as a climax to the action in the larger Apocalypse, is given the appearance of a present reality in the little scroll. There

[23] The hymn of the intercalated 15:2-4, which properly belongs to the little scroll, does not bring the reader any further than judgement in the cycle of events. Its words are words of hope, not of realization, since God's actual reign is over the saints, and the worship of the nations is cast in the future.

[24] Bal, 138.

is an ambivalence concerning the palatability of this revelation: it is both sweet and sour. The little scroll is realistic about the "same dull round"[25] which ends in wrath; it also persists in viewing these events from the perspective of heaven, where victory is already accomplished and where peace reigns. The peace of heaven, accomplished through the casting down of the dragon in fact *initiates* the limited war on earth (12:12)!

So, then, the climax of the Apocalypse is brought forward in the little scroll, presenting a "timeful"[26] (rather than timeless) perspective from which to view the events of this world. The declaration of God's reign in 11:17 is preluded by the elders' thanks to the All-powerful God "who is and was . . . ." The lacuna is provocative! Presumably, we do not hear the elders say "is to come" because, from their perspective, God is never future. Frye speaks, in *The Great Code* about "the narrative framework of the Bible [which] is a part of its emphasis on the shape of history and the specific collision with temporal movement that its revelation is assumed to make."[27] In the Apocalypse, we seem to have the most acute expression of this collision, and enter into a bizarre world in which Lions are Lambs, martyrdom means victory and even the Enemy is used as a tool of God.

The unexpected hint of peace within the epic of wrath provides the Apocalypse with its characteristic perspective of hope. However, a corresponding slippage occurs from the epic of wrath into the epic of return, where we find the unthinkable hint that not all who name themselves as God's people will be reinstated. So, although the dominant reference to the action of the adversary in the letters is to suffering as a trial (2:10), there is also a living danger that wrath rather than return will be the final word for such churches as Ephesus or Laodicea. Again, even at the high point of the epic of return, where one would expect a distinct separation between foe and ally, the voice from heaven calls, "Come out of her, my people" (18:4). There is a threat that some may find themselves party to the beast which ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἐστιν (17:8), rather than allied to the God who was and is. The ambiguity of the status of those who will return lies in the anomaly that those quested for by the Conqueror have in some measure participated in the revolt, and are not simply victims of it. The slippage of the epic of return into the epic of wrath gives it the taste of honey; the contrasting touch of wrath within the epic of return lends John's vision a reality which may be unexpected in a piece where the people of God are ultimately idealized as Bride.

The infusion of the cycle of wrath with a vision of return, and the startling touch of the vision of return by the cycle of wrath, are performed in such a way as to maintain both a sense of the gravity of the continuing war, and the vivid hope of an ensured victory. Frye offers a reading of Job, in which the protagonist thinks he the victim of an epic of wrath, but is in fact an actor in an epic of return. When all is said and done, Job must look "up and down" at the God's offered vision of divine works (Job chapters 38-41), rather than looking forward and backward. The renewed perspective produces the change in Job which commentators have been hard-pressed to explain: "There is a creation that mystifies and a creation that reveals, and the latter is identical with the former."[28] A similar

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25 Frye, quoting William Blake in *Anatomy of Criticism*, 317.

26 Frye, The Double Vision, 63.

27 The Great Code, 198.

28 Words of Power, 311.

change in perspective would seem to be the prospect offered by the Apocalypse to its ideal reader. God's mysterious scroll has been unsealed through the course of the action and John is instructed not to seal the words of the prophecy of the book, although it will continue to mystify those who will not listen (22:10). Again, the earthly cycle of birth and death, rising and falling of kingdoms, freedom and captivity, has been exposed in the little scroll as having a mysterious and unexpected dimension: all this is part of the divine drama. There are two songs, one which never ceases, and one which is new; there are two scrolls, one which promises return, and another which explains the wrath. But in the end, there is one book of life, one City, one throne and one source of light. The monism of the final vision maintains, nonetheless, a certain complexity and realism, recalling the devastating effects of the natural cycle through reference to God's comfort (21:4) and never completely leaving behind the evil which has been conquered (21:8; 22:15). John envisages a glory in which τὰ πρῶτα ἀπῆλθαν; they have not, however, been minimized or forgotten.

# Technology and the Constructs of Social World Studies

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For academics and other authors, associating technology with history, religion, social world studies, and their constructs is an everyday experience. The "technology of the intellect" or "technology of writing," as the processes of written communication are labelled by Goody (1977: 151) and Ong (1982: 81-83; 1986: 23-50) respectively, make it impossible for individuals who read and write to avoid face-to-surface, first-hand involvement with technology.

The same circumstances affect archaeologists. Technology impinges on their discipline not only because today's expeditions comprise a cluster of diverse technologies and technologists, but also, as Tilley notes (1990a: 332), because artifacts and their attributes are inscribed in a textual medium and therefore are caught up in the problematic, transformative writing process. This does not diminish the importance of either non-literary data or data that are interpreted with the help of inscriptions and documents, but it emphasizes that in a literate society archaeological explanations and interpretations are affected by writing technology in the same ways as other written materials.

Writing qualifies as a technology because it employs tools and equipment (Ong 1985: 81-82). However, more importantly for criticism, historicism, and the constructs of social world studies, writing gives structure and restructures the consciousness of writers and readers alike. In fact, because the technology intersects with information in order to structure perspectives, knowledge, and communications, it leads onto a host of issues and approaches that flow across disciplinary boundaries. Narrative studies, the relationship between oral and written expressions, and the new and post criticisms associated with Ricoeur, Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, Geertz, Fish, Lentricchia, and others all come into play. In different ways, each impinges on past critical presuppositions—and critical suppositions about the past—to force rethinking among specialists in all disciplines and subdisciplines of the humanities and social sciences, especially in ancient history and religion (cf. Tilley 1990a; Veeser; Berman; also Brown; Goody 1987; Harlan; Himmelfarb; Hollinger; Megill; Toews; H. White). Moreover, because, as Ong observes (1982: 132-139; 1986: 36-45), the technology of writing is extended first by the printing press and subsequently by the computer, scholarship in humanistic endeavors today is increasingly influenced by paradoxical feelings that stem from writing.

Technology is both embraced and feared for its potential. It must be embraced, even for generating and disseminating knowledge, because it is avoidable only by withdrawing from society. But it can bring destruction and it imposes distances between data and interpretation, writer and interpreter, past and present, society and society. While Ong's description characterizes writing and its subsequent technologies as serial—as it were, three historical modes of communicating—we may also envisage them and other technologies as cumulative and nested. In this sense, technology is progressive, pervasive, and increasingly expansive, circular and concentric as well as sequential. The sled, wheel, and carriage each address needs and solve problems with increasing, serial sophistication, but the earlier technologies are not completely displaced by later inventions. They continue to be imbedded in the later developments where they function on their own and as part of the subsequent technology. So does writing endure beyond the press, and the press beyond the computer. Earlier technologies continue both to play their individual roles and to inspire humans to address other problems and seek fuller solutions. Therefore, consciousness is indelibly shaped by technology and continually reshaped by new technologies.

## 2

The terms "technology" and "science" are commonly linked in everyday discourse, but each has multiple meanings. For our purposes, we may follow McGinn's (1991: 14-17) highly selective, four-part divisions:

| **Technology** | **Science** |
|---|---|
| Technics | Knowledge |
| A technology | A field of systemic inquiry into nature |
| A form of human cultural activity | A form of human cultural activity |
| A total societal enterprise | A total societal enterprise |

Technology as technics refers to material artifacts, i.e., implements, tools, instruments, and the like. Technology as a technology means "the complex of knowledge, methods, materials, and if applicable, constituent parts (themselves technics) used in making a certain kind of technic" (McGinn 14). In this sense, the technic is not the technology but the entire process that produces a technic, for example, not the computer but the collectivity that yields computers. As a cultural activity, technology is the work, craft, and endeavor of technologists. In this sense, as law is to lawyers, so technology is to technologists. As a societal enterprise, technology is "the complex of knowledge, people, skills, organizations, facilities, technics, physical resources, methods, and technologies that, taken together and in relationship to one another, are devoted to the research, development, production, and operation of technics" (McGinn 15). This meaning contrasts with the second in terms of scope. For example, putting a human on the moon is an achievement of American technology as a social enterprise.

Similarly, the meanings of science range from specific to general. Fundamentally, science is an organized body of knowledge of natural phenomena, wherein "natural" specifies phenomena that may either occur spontaneously or be humanly created. The other meanings parallel technology: a domain of inquiry, a distinctive activity, and a complex devoted to understanding the natural world.

Using McGinn's categories, readers will have no difficulty in spreading the various meanings that studies on literacy compress under the single heading "technology." However, our case for the importance of technology in constructs studies will be furthered more quickly by exposing other examples that in several instances are historical parallels to the three phases, writing, printing, and computing.

### 2.1

Paula McNutt (1990) argues convincingly that the technology of ironworking was a societal enterprise in ancient Israel. By relating the experience of it, the transformations that it effected in the materials being forged, the societies that forged them, and the self-understanding of the Yahwist community, McNutt identifies early iron making as a defining technology (1990: 14-15). She follows Bolter's descriptions of the phenomenon:

> A defining technology develops links, metaphorical or otherwise, with a culture's science, philosophy, or literature; it is always available to serve as a metaphor, example, model, or symbol. A defining technology resembles a magnifying glass, which collects and focuses seemingly disparate ideas in a culture into one bright, sometimes piercing ray. Technology does not call forth major cultural changes by itself, but it does bring ideas into a new focus by explaining or exemplifying them in new ways to larger audiences (Bolter 1984: 11).

McNutt's study is most interesting for the way it links ancient Israel's technology, religion, and literature. Using archaeology and literary sources that are illumined by comparative African ethnography, she demonstrates that the advances and discoveries made at the beginning of the Iron Age, approximately the twelfth to tenth centuries BCE, literally shaped peoples' consciousness. Just as the processes of smelting and forging produced mysterious effects, so had a disparate people's forging into a single religious community been accomplished by a mysterious, marvelous power. The Yahwists perceived their own beginnings analogously to raw material entering a forge and after heating and tempering becoming a strong utilitarian substance. Egypt, remembered in myth if not history, was their iron furnace. The peoples' forging in Egypt, like that of the new metal, was a cultic and ritualistic religious act. Hence, when the Yahwists told their own story, McNutt claims, they purposely structured the narratives so that the account leads to and from Egypt like ore entering a furnace and coming out a metal. The Abrahamic and ancestral stories, on the one hand, and the Moses and wilderness accounts on the other, are arranged precisely in order to portray the people as the new metal, the new substance, that has been miraculously formed and transformed by their deity whose role was that of an ironsmith.

The hypothesis is illuminating. It serves as another reminder of the metaphorical, symbolic, and religious power of technology and its place in human consciousness and expression. It suggests as well that the practice of using technology as a heuristic tool for decoding ancient religious texts rests on a firm, long-standing, even biblical, tradition. As the ancients drew on technology while encoding the texts, modern interpreters now draw on technology when decoding them. A continuity of praxis links ancient and modern in a metalanguage rooted in humans' awe and respect for their own inventions. Dealing with unknowns in

the crafts and trades of daily life then as now provides experiences for understanding humans' relation to transcendent powers.

2.2

The litany of studies documenting the effect of technology on individual and communal self-perception since antiquity includes the work of historian Miriam Levin, especially her studies on the Eiffel Tower and more recently on portrayals of the tower in poster art of late nineteenth and early twentieth century France (Levin 1986; 1989). Both the structure and its representations *via* print technology, Levin argues, were used to fuse the social and cultural bonds of a nation in ways that transect economy, class, regionalism, and education. In sum, a nation's self-understanding and self-determination were nurtured by the power of technology symbolized by the Eiffel Tower and its images.

One might argue that this iron, pinnacled arch, built as a triumphal entry to a world exposition, constitutes an epiphany, a spatial moment, as it were, in the history of France, but a vernacular expression that by itself and through its print manifestations affirms the existence of a new state. For those who visit and stand in awe, it is a window onto the past and into the mind of another people. It speaks as lecturer to audience. Viewers read it from their own perspectives. For the French people themselves, however, it is their voice singing proudly of their ability to combine sensibility for fineness and individuating art with French technology and industry that give physical strength and national unity. In this sense, the tower's spire stands alongside France's gothic cathedrals as an expression of a peoples' deeply human religiosity and a sign of their belief in transcendence. Once again, eyes are raised and spirits moved to think beyond imminence, beyond time, and beyond space in order to seek means for surviving and excelling.

2.3

Levin's opinions that technology relates to the most profound human experiences and expressions is confirmed by Bolter's *Turing's Man* (1984), a study that influences McNutt's work and in some ways confirms and expands Ong's argument. In terms that McGinn would classify as a societal enterprise—but that Bolter labels a defining technology—this influential volume documents the effect of the computer on human consciousness and perception. These include fundamental concepts of space, time, language, memory, and human creativity. In this case, the new technology recalls old perspectives because Turing's Man shares ancient peoples' suspicions regarding limitlessness. Modern and classical societies, according to Bolter, are both fully aware of spatial and temporal capacity and limits, i.e., the fact that we live within a physically constrained and mentally defined world. The computer age, therefore, offers opportunity and freedom, but it also makes us fully aware of our imprecisions and false hopes.

2.4

*The Overview Effect* by Frank White (1987) examines a high tech enterprise that is made possible by computer technology. But in contrast to the restraints indicated by Bolter, the change in human consciousness caused by his example, space exploration—another societal enterprise technology—is toward feelings of both

limits and limitlessness. The experience of orbiting the earth and viewing it from the moon has transformed astronauts, cosmonauts, and earth-bound observers alike. The thesis is that those who have orbited the globe are consciously and unconsciously impressed by its seamlessness and massiveness. Those who have gone farther to enjoy extraorbital and lunar missions also speak mystically of "no frames and no boundaries" (F. White 1987: 34), but their perceptions of scale differ markedly. For the twenty-four people who have traveled to the moon's orbit and the twelve who have walked on its surface, in other words for those who have escaped the earth's systems and watched its orb grow smaller and smaller as it drew away, feelings are most profound and different. To them the earth is small and somewhat insignificant while the awesome grandeur of the entire universe is overwhelming. Its size and emptiness takes precedence and begins to be absorbed as a realized human experience.

These experiences, the thesis continues, mark a new stage in the evolution of human society and human self-understanding. They give new perspectives on the problems of life, and when permanent space settlement—the logical next step in the evolutionary process—is accomplished, then politics, religion, social relations, psychology, and science will be transformed. The list could be extended to demonstrate that artists, literati, religionists, scientists, and technologists share a curiosity about the unknown. Each pursues a distinctive quest for worlds beyond the immediate, beyond the perceived. The important point is that the technologies cited thus far—writing and printing, ironworking and tower building, space exploration and computer science—are affective on many levels. The argument of the authors cited is that the most important level is not the most obvious. It is not the physical product, i.e., the technic, but the social, cultural, conscious, and unconscious transformations that each technology symbolizes, evokes, effects, and is. This is the grounds of our intellectual obligation to seek continually religious meanings in technology and conversely to use technologies in order to understand subtle relationships that are felt in all their fearsomeness and exhilaration in the religious experiences of the human race.

## 3

In my own academic encounter with technology, I propose that the historiography of ancient Israel is holographic, the history of ancient Israel is a hologram, and images of biblical characters are holograms.

These are conclusions set forth as hypotheses in *David's Social Drama* (*DSD*) (1988), a beginner's attempt to understand and address some of the fundamental issues that plague so-called biblical history by appealing to holography for metaphors and models. The effort is made in spite of objections from one side by humanists who are often frightened by marriages between their disciplines, especially religion and technology, and from the other side by scientists who sometimes insist that models are not models unless they enable predictions, which mine does not. Against such worries, one can only appeal to pragmatism and humor: many humanists and scientists feel differently (cf. Pribram 1990: 97-98); and it is fun to try something different for a change.

The "methodology" thesis in *DSD* applies on several levels. Individual biblical characters such as David, extended textual units such as the books of Samuel, and historical approaches such as social world studies can be understood and described analogously with holograms and holography. Doing so shifts emphasis from the referential value of texts, and it opens new dimensionality by

enabling a variety of sources—literature, archaeology, and ethnography—to have a voice in historical hypotheses. Accordingly, the technology allows the cultural and social relationships in ancient societies and among the sources we use to emerge and be described.

The book relies heavily on analogies. Analogy is taken as a way of reasoning about metaphors. Hence, I set out to discover a model for separating and then integrating differing ontological categories of information. I also want to find a metaphor for depicting the images we create of the past. Metaphor is taken in its broad general sense as an image or figure of speech whereby one thing is spoken about in terms that are suggestive of something else (Soskice 1985: 15). By this I mean that *as a figure of speech* holograms are metaphors for the images and history of ancient Israel. A model is a coupling of a set of data to another organization, in this case linking the technical processes used in making holograms to a research design pertaining the Israel's ancient history.

Like holography which begins by splitting a monochromic (laser) beam into two parts before bringing it back together again in an interference pattern on an emulsion-backed plate, the first step in constructing the research model is to separate the data according to the proper ontological categories. Anthropologists guide us by insisting that understanding others and "otherness" requires researchers to separate two types of information, and to weigh them separately, before integrating the results of each in a cohesive, comprehensive social or cultural description. Their distinction between the domains of notions and actions, i.e., between peoples' expressions and experiences or between behavior and mental assertions, generally parallel the difference between the two "parts" of the laser. In turn, the differences parallel those between texts and textual information on the one hand and material and archaeological information on the other. Hence, in *DSD* I propose that the information biblical historians extract from texts must be treated separately and examined apart from information recovered archaeologically. Texts are treated as anthropologists' notions, and archaeological data as a record of actions. Separate images derived from the two sources can then be allowed to "interfere" as in holography. It is the interference pattern that historians illuminate.

Because the similarity/dissimilarity patterns in ancient sources also correspond positively with other societies, the relationship of the congruities and incongruities between the two sources can be illumined with the help of comparative sociological studies. The dissimilarities as well as the similarities in the text- and archaeological-based images are *positive* information. That is, apparent contradictions in the ancient sources are like those that divide other peoples' statements and actions. For example, in ancient texts pretentious claims to high centralization are often made by leaders of societies whose material resources deny the possibility. Such is the situation in the David stories compared with the archaeology of Iron Age IC. Should researchers both listen and observe, or for a past society read and excavate, they would note the discrepancy between ideology or propaganda on the one hand (the kind of information recorded in texts) and ecology and economy on the other hand (the type of information discovered in the material record). No doubt they would explain the difference by weighing the relationship between their sources rather than by forcing one to conform with the other. Such relationships, more than the information in either source separately or cumulatively, are important for understanding Israel's social world as well. The hologram metaphor and model assist us in seeing beyond the sources by treating each cautiously, positively, and yet with a researcher's suspicion.

Holography also helps in maintaining the distance between past and present, a problem that plagues both literary criticism and historicism. Although the ancient sources were encoded in the past, they exist now, and it is on the basis of the present information and modern analyses that hypotheses about the past are offered. As a hologram is illumined by projecting a light onto its surface in order to make the image imbedded in it visible, so by comparative sociological analogies do we illuminate, i.e., hypothesize, about "images" that occurred before and are imbedded in our sources. Viewing our task in this manner presumes a general ability to correlate textual and archaeological data chronologically, but situating the image historically in a specific time and place is a second step in the research project, not the first as traditional nineteenth century-based scholarship proposes.

In sum, *DSD* likens biblical historical research to the way that holograms are made, and it compares images of the past to the multidimensional now-you-see-it-now-you-don't images that are constituted when holograms are illuminated. Biblical images of the character David, archaeological information commonly assigned to the tenth century BCE, and comparative ethnographies from Middle Eastern societies are integrated according to the holography-based model and interpreted metaphorically as a holographic image. The conclusions are tentative and offered as hypotheses, as any reconstruction of the past must be. The proposals also raise a number of further questions and mask a number of hermeneutical and epistemological issues that are not taken up in the volume. Fortunately, however, the technology of holography is so complex that it has qualities, not exploited in *DSD,* that can be explored in the continuing attempt to understand the past—if there is a past and if knowing it is possible!

In *DSD,* technology is used in McGinn's first and second senses only. The physical hologram that hangs in a gallery or is embossed on the cover of a book is a technic. The holography used to make such a hologram is a technology as technology. But holographic technology is increasingly prevalent in research and in daily life. It is used to test the tensile strength of airplane fuselages, to examine the detailed physical features of "Bog Man," to prevent forgeries of Canadian and Australian currency, to identify authentic credit cards world-wide, and to scan prices at check-out counters. Medical and scientific research is increasingly dependent on the technology and its derivatives. However, although it can be protested that holography does not yet have the power of a defining technology, the use made of it in *DSD* opens logically onto McGinn's third and fourth senses of cultural activity and societal enterprise.

## 4

We shall not explore holography's potential for McGinn's other senses. Instead we shall suggest several areas where technology generally and holography specifically can stimulate discussion and understanding of the constructs of social world studies. The first pertains to integrative constructs studies as displacements for so-called interdisciplinary studies. The second pertains to the fundamental categories of space and time that emerge in discussions with the humanities, arts, and social, behavioral, biological, and hard sciences. Although, we shall expend little effort in linking the topics, there is a logical progression from the one to the other.

**4.1**

In terms of subject matter and approach, there is nothing really *inter*disciplinary about combining history, religion, and technology. McNutt, Levin, Bolter, and F. White (above), each in her or his own way have demonstrated the logic of their unity. It is their separation for analytical purposes into disciplines, not their integration, that is artificial.

The point can be made by pressing it to the extreme. To insist on "natural" disciplines would be analogous to claiming that an individual of mixed racial or ethnic origin is inter-human, or to asserting that a person living in nations other than one's own is fundamentally foreign. It would confuse perspectives on a fundamental category or manifestations of a category with the category itself. It would be like equating a perspective with truth and certainty. It would also blur past with present, giving the former absolute sovereignty over the latter by judging academic traditions solely on the basis of chronological appearance or numerical majority. In sum, how can one claim that one complex issue is properly religious and another technological and a third historical if the distinction is made only because an academic specialist from one discipline examined it before specialists from other disciplines? In this sense, the disciplines represent attempts to grapple with questions by breaking them up, and "interdisciplines" are attempts to see the whole again.

The prevalence of new programs of studies in universities, colleges, and professional societies testifies that traditional disciplines and their host agencies are increasingly unable to handle many of today's problems and interests. Because of complex environmental, social, and cultural challenges that call for more than solitary investigations pursued from single perspectives, many departments and disciplines are abandoning their traditional boundaries and frameworks. Consequently, they are either undergoing substantial metamorphoses in order to allow disciplinary guises to remain intact, or they are seeking refuge in so-called interdisciplinary studies.

But what constitutes interdisciplinary studies? It can be argued that the term is infelicitous, in part because it is often used synonymously with multi-disciplinary and cross-disciplinary, and in part because it shrouds news quests in the old robes they are trying to throw off. In the first instance, interaction among disciplines (as suggested by "multi-" or "cross-") is confused with aligning disciplines to make them coincide, i.e., simply adding perspective to perspective in hope of more weighty arguments. The second, the shrouding, implies that the traditional disciplines used in interdisciplinary studies are themselves privileged entities that should be preserved at the risk of ignoring new issues and approaches.

The challenges that are forcing scholars beyond the confines of a discipline or department are not simply a need for more data and methods or additional complexity in research designs and the conclusions that follow from them. Instead, it is today's world and the kinds of interests it raises on the one hand, and on the other hand, breakthroughs in theory and method that are not confined to a single discipline. Thus, answers to many of today's questions cannot be found or expressed either in a single discipline or a cluster of traditional disciplines. Interests are on the margins or outside the competency of established disciplines. What is between disciplines, the relationships among them, and the differences as well as the similarities within their data and approaches are now essential. Methods and approaches that expose the new information between and among

disciplines are required. The "inter-" part of interdisciplinary has become disciplinary.

Examples abound: environmental studies, feminist studies, comparative religious studies, and so on. In the Constructs Group, the issue of Israel's ancient history serves as a test case.

For generations, biblical archaeology has been a respected category and a field of inquiry with a venerable history. It still attracts attention, and for intellectual, political, religious, and cultural reasons would-be practitioners cling to the term and subject matter. However, both the label and the topic have become so bothersome that many would erase them from the academic slate.

Biblical archaeology exemplifies many traits common among practitioners of so-called interdisciplinary studies. First is the rush to attach interdisciplinary labels to all sorts of endeavors, even to individual disciplines. In this case, biblical and archaeological specialists would each claim that their respective disciplines are interdisciplinary and that biblical archaeology is doubly so. Such assertions deserve examination on a case by case basis, but collecting several kinds of data, examining a text and/or an object from several perspectives, or engaging in dialogue with scholars from several fields does not in itself guarantee an *inter*disciplinary approach.

The ferment that pervades these ancient studies and their numerous fields is typical of the turmoil that characterizes periods when major intellectual, cultural, and social transformations are occurring. The dogmas of the past and politics of the present, both in terms of allowable topics and of methods for investigating them, are perceived as exhausted or overdrawn. In an effort to shake off presuppositions inherited from the nineteenth century and before, research agendas specifically and higher education generally in the Western and Northern hemispheres are transformed. The causes are multiple, and the responses reciprocally are diverse.

First, today's world, linked by instantaneous communications and dominated by world powers that are both governmentally and economically multinational, raises new issues and new forces questions. Relationships, not independent parts or isolated issues, are paramount. Moreover, questions of moral and cultural values, ethnicity, sexuality, diversity, technology, and the like must be sought and grappled with, even if they are not immediately visible on the surfaces of the canons of traditional scholarship. To take such topics up or to set them aside leads quickly to heated debates about truth, knowledge, politics, and authority, whether it be the authority of a value system, cultural tradition, political ideology, or, as I hope to show, the authority of place or of the past itself. The world asks, are there privileged spaces in our world past or present, and are there temporal periods that bear more attention than others? Are the views of some peoples more precious than the views of others? And does the mode of communication used to transmit those views add weight, rhetorical or otherwise, that dictates the acceptance of some and the rejection of others?

A second set of causes for the ferment is a cluster of hermeneutical and epistemological issues that are not clearly delineated but are usually attributed to the post-critical, post-structuralist, or post-modernist age. For ancient studies the issues are particularly problematic because they challenge the referential value of artifacts and texts, and they deny or place in serious doubt the paradigms and methods for studying the past. Over the years, questions of old and new historicism, new criticism, deconstructionism, and a host of other "-isms" have eroded both the melioristic expectations of social evolutionism and the historical

confidence that scholars of antiquity invested in source criticism, historical criticism, and literary criticism inherited from the nineteenth century.

Painted in the broadest strokes, hopes for discovering the past (or a specific time in the past), for identifying the times and places of ancient personalities and events, for knowing their manner of acting and thinking, and for grasping their historical "meaning" and the meanings that the ancients may have understood as their own have given way. In their place stand what many consider to be total historical skepticism and others consider first-time historical relevance. In the betwixt and between, the faint-hearted, the indecisive, and the unconvinced are left the impossible task of compromising their views, trying to reconcile the differences, or abandoning the search.

## 4.2

The confusion surrounding interdisciplinary studies is one reason for proposing an alternative concept and terminology. "Constructs" may be substituted for "interdisciplinary." Although the change makes the advantages immediately apparent, now as before it is necessary to distinguish subject matters from disciplines and those from departments. The first, the subject matters, are the issues, problems, and data under investigation; the second the methods and approaches used in the investigations; and the third the administering agencies, typically the most resistant to change.

"Constructs" allows the dynamism in the sociology of knowledge to show through. For instance, fields like environmental and social world studies arise because a new set of related issues and problems is envisaged. The fields are responses to needs, but they also define those needs and, for purposes of analysis, set them apart for other issues. The cluster of issues constitute a new construct or set of constructs. The construct or portions of it can be understood as the content of a new analytical model such as those described by anthropologists.

The network of disciplines that emerges to examine these issues is also a construct, albeit of methods and approaches. The network can begin as a research design. At first, a manner of investigating is constructed from existing disciplines, perhaps in eclectic and piecemeal fashion. Eventually, the combination takes on a life of its own and becomes a quasi-discipline. This construct then begins to influence the parent disciplines which in turn influence again the new construct.

The late British archaeologist David Clarke described this continuing metamorphosis as a passage from consciousness to self-consciousness to critical self-consciousness to self-critical self-consciousness (1973: 9). Hence, the constructs both at the level of subject matter and approaches are constantly interacting and changing as new questions are included and new methods of responding are appropriated.

The shift to constructs and construct studies has several practical advantages. First, as suggested above, it replaces the bias toward the status quo within disciplines with an openness to change and diversity. Territorial claims and jurisdictional disputes dissolve more easily when both the subject matter and the approach are seen as beyond the capacity of previous disciplinary constructs.

Second, constructs allow categories of information to be sorted and separated according to their ontological statuses rather than by disciplines that claim custody over them. In social world studies, as noted above, material and textual

information are essentially different and deserve to be treated independently before being integrated.

Third, construct studies preserve the respective strengths of disciplines while the news ways in which they relate can be examined with clarity and precision. This pertains to the relational aspect of construct and social world studies.

Finally, research designs that serve as models for relating the constructs can be evaluated and their models described independently of both the subject matter and the disciplines from which they are adopted. In this sense, the relationships among perspectives become part of the research project along with the topics and data under investigation.

## 4.3

The ways in which hypotheses, data, and knowledge interact are central to construct studies. For understanding this, the work of Rom Harré, especially his *Varieties of Realism* (1986) is important.

Harré, a psychologist and philosopher of science, addresses the nature of scientific knowledge as problematic because "*our* knowledge and *the* real world are different kinds of being" (1986: 34; emphasis his). For him, the problem seems less acute in the social sciences. In light of the variety of criticisms current in the so-called post-modernist age, his comments are relevant for social world studies:

> In the social sciences our individual experience of social activities stands over against a public-collective cognitive object which is the independent social world. But it is independent only in the sense that it is not a product of the activities of any one human being. It is not independent of the collective of persons. Knowledge and the object known are metaphysically of a piece—they are both composed of meanings. The problem for realism in the social sciences arises because the independent collective social world is partially concealed from each individual knower by a screen of ideology, scale and time lapse. But the problem is not philosophically acute, precisely because our social scientific knowledge and the social world which is partially known by social scientists are beings of the same kind (1986: 34).

The physical sciences, on the other hand, deal with worlds that are largely unobservable. Although the difference is critical for Harré, we could argue that from the perspective of theory and methodology, knowledge is knowledge and unknowns are unknowns regardless of their location in the academic scheme of things. In fact, Harré seemingly comes close to this position in his "triadic theory of science" which he proposes because he "believe[s] that science disposes of three different methodologies, each appropriate to the study of a specific domain of beings, both natural and cultural" (1986: 70).

The three methodologies are differentiated according to their cognitive status, spelled out in terms of the generic concept of cognitive objects (1986: 70-73). Type 1 theories have cognitive objects with pragmatic properties. They pertain to observable phenomena. The cognitive objects of type 2 theories are iconic properties. Grounded in type 1 phenomena, these theories enable the representation of a physical system or mode of behavior that at the time has not yet been observed. Harré places the vast majority of theories in this class. Type 3 theories relate to cognitive objects with mathematical properties. They enable representation of non-picturable systems of behavior such as interrelations. Harré insists

that a corresponding set of distinctions can be made in the social and psychological sciences but that they would rest on a different ontology, "one involving meanings, cognitive processes, etc., as realities" (1986: 71).

Each type corresponds loosely to an epistemic realm (1986: 59). Realm 1 is the realm of common perception where science describes objects of common experience. Realm 2 is the realm of beings where, given historical and technical circumstances, science could observe beings. This is the level of possible experience, of theoretical abstractions, and of instruments like telescopes and microscopes that enable observation of beings that otherwise would pass unobserved. Realm 3, the most important for historians and religionists as well as physicists, is the realm beyond all observation, the transcendent level where science purports to describe objects beyond all possible experience.

Although the boundaries between realms are subject to change with history, the referents of type 1 theories exist in Realm 1. Type 2 theories are applied to Realm 1 and Realm 2. For Harré, type 3 theories pertain to Realms 1 and 2, but most importantly to Realm 3, the heterogeneous domain where we lack both experience and the senses to observe. Harré places social structures in this realm (1986: 73). It is interesting to note as well the similarity between the stratification of these realms and theories and that proposed by anthropologists and archaeologists who speak of technomic, sociotechnomic, and ideotechnomic aspects of civilizations.

For our use, it is important to note that Harré rejects what he calls "truth realism," i.e., the assumption that hypotheses are true or false because they conform or fail to conform to reality beyond themselves. To demand that scientific concepts must conform directly to their referents is too rigid for science. Instead, like others, he insists that science is a moral achievement and not just an epistemological victory (1986: 1-7). "Scientific knowledge," therefore, resides in the consensus and acceptance of the scientific community. Honesty is of the essence. This need for public consensus leads others such as sociologist of science John Ziman directly to the need for publishing, the forum where individuals, communities, and knowledge interact and intersect with openness and honesty in order to shape and reshape consensus (Ziman 1984: 5-12).

Harré displaces truth realism with referential or policy realism (1986: 97-99). Accordingly, hypotheses are not true or false, but adequate or inadequate. Moreover, they function not to identify in themselves the truth of a reality, but to frame or bracket, as it were, a set of data. A hypothesis allows a researcher to establish an analytical model, i.e., to lift a set of data out of its field so that it, the relationships in it, and the relationships between it and its field can be examined. This, I contend, is what we do in our studies on ancient history and religion, and it explains why disciplinary and interdisciplinary studies are giving way to new constructs of content and method.

## 4.4

Harré observes that in the sciences the duality, existence and description, emerges in the way that existence claims are based on both material and cognitive practices. The act of demonstrating the existence of a being requires that it be located on some referential grid, and that it be places there by a person who describes it. The choice is often a space-time grid that allows a physical relationship in terms of space and time between the being and the observer to be established. He notes, "Then there is the cognitive act of deciding whether we can

recognize the occupant of that location as a specimen of the kind in question" (1986: 66). He continues:

> The manifolds so far considered are discrete grids of actual existents. But the exigencies of human life and scientific practice require acts of reference beyond the current reach of those observable locations and moments that are marked by real things and events. Space and time are extensions of the grid of locations and moments, both 'outwards' to infinity and 'inwards' to the infinitesimal. As human constructions our ideas of these extended grids are clearly the result of cognitive rather than empirical activities. What then, is the ontological status of the manifolds which the concepts of space and time might be taken to denote? And how do the special and general theories of relativity affect this simple picture? (1986: 128).

For the non-scientist, it is easy to forget that physical scientists and technologists are in frequent contact with phenomena that cannot be comprehended according to the Cartesian space-time grid that structures everyday human life. Living and locating themselves according to the Newtonian referential grid, they examine and hypothesize about beings that can be understood only in light of Einsteinian hypotheses regarding spacetime. Likewise, psychologists must use a different referential grid that takes into account the logical grammar of "I," "we," and the like in the researchers' and subjects' languages (Harré 1983: 60). In studying conversations, persons are the referents, the array of persons becomes the primary referential grid, and conversational time is created by indexing speech acts (Harré 1986: 142-143). This manifold is more complex than that of physical space and time.

Two quotations can end our discussion of Harré and set the stage for further consideration of the space-time referential grid.

> ...we can now see that space-time is an abstract notation, facilitating the location of things and events relative to one another. It is a human construction on the basis of certain real relations of succession, coexistence and exclusion that obtain in the material world. Though conjoined into one manifold in relativity theory the spatial and temporal manifolds are ontologically distinct....Locating an event is finding a place in a story; locating a thing is finding a place in the world. There are other places from where we are now. There never has been, nor will there ever be any other time than the present. The construction of a full fledged space-time manifold, covering the material system with a dense network of actual and potential locations is not just a mathematical generalization of the material practice of locating things with respect to other things, but also of the cognitive practice of telling histories ordered by reference to the changes recorded by observers (Harré 1986: 141).

When Harré speaks of his Realm 3, the level of reality that cannot be seen or known, he points to physics and physicist/philosopher David Bohm.

> It is the conservative metaphysical predilections of physicists that push the ontology [toward space and time] and bring space-time with them as a referential grid which is to make location possible. Could there be a metaphysics for Realm 3 that was not particulate, and so did not smuggle in an isomorphism between the referential grids of the three epistemic realms? Few thoroughgoing alternatives have been seriously canvassed. David

Bohm's (1975[?]) 'implicate order' is a bold but so far isolated attempt (1986: 316).

## 4.5

Reference to Bohm brings us back to holography and holograms and forward toward a hypothesis about constructs studies and their contribution to historical, literary, and sociological social world studies.

The world in Bohm's philosophy and physics is interconnected and undivided, a world of unified, enfolded order. The world is not constructed from objects and events arranged in rows and series, as would be envisaged on a Cartesian referential grid. Instead, he imagines it to be like the holism of a hologram. There, every bit of information is spread across the entire plate, and conversely the entirety of information is enfolded in every space of the plate. For Bohm, "a *total order* is contained in some *implicit* sense, in every region of space and time" (1983: 149; emphasis his). This invisible enfolded or implicate order becomes visible when unfolded or made explicate in objects and events. He perceives the movement between the two orders in terms of wave function:

> So the thought occurred to me: perhaps the movement of enfoldment and unfoldment is universal, while the extended and separate forms that we commonly see in experience are relatively stable and independent patterns, maintained by a constant underlying movement of enfoldment and unfoldment. This latter, I called the *holomovement* (Bohm 1985: 118; emphasis his).

Similarly, Bohm links mind and matter by drawing an analogy between the whole/part characteristics of holography and the relationship between human unconsciousness and consciousness, the latter being an explicate manifestation of the former's implicate order (Bohm 1983: 196, 210). He argues that perception is comparable to the way that cartographers extrapolate relatively invariant features in an environment in order to create maps, and to the way that we recognize a friend whom we have not seen for years. In the map or the friend, the invariants are recognized first, and only later do the variable details become apparent. For example, a useful map does not portray a crack in the pavement or a tree at the corner, because these are apt to vanish. Instead, only the curve or crossroad is drawn, because they remain constant. Or again, the friend's "face" is recognized first, and only secondly do we notice changed features. If we fail to recognize a person we know, Bohm argues, it is not because the individual is an illusion or because of something "out there." It is because of problems with the relationship between the map stored in our memory and the present appearance of the person. The relationship to the wholeness, not only to the individual parts, has been lost.

It is interesting to note as well, that like Harré's, Bohm's view of scientific progress does not imply convergence toward an absolute truth, "but consists in the proposal of new theories, often based on radically new conceptual frameworks, which reveal the limitations of older theories, suggest new kinds of experiment and establish new criteria of relevance" (Curd 1981: 58).

Bohm's views are controversial, and they have been widely studied and criticized (e.g., Russell 1985; Griffin 1985, 1986; Peters 1985; Harré 1981; Sharpe n.d.; Schindler 1982). Regardless of the final judgment on them, however, they

contribute to the discussion of technology and construct studies in significant ways. First, they affirm philosophers' of science insistence that knowledge and theories are at best referential hypotheses and that those who propose them must be wary of implicit, controlling suppositions such as Cartesian concepts of space and time. Such categories may be valid and useful in some realms, but they may impede understanding when imported to other realms.

Second, Bohm's emphasis on holistic, enfolded, implicate order and movement and on the relationship of unconsciousness and consciousness suggests a physical and epistemological basis for developing new constructs rather than redesigning or restructuring old disciplines and interdisciplines. As with views of holograms, each construct offers a perspective on the whole phenomenon being investigated and is not merely a view of a part of it. For him, it is physically and metaphysically impossible to "construct" a whole from individual parts.

Third, Bohm's understanding suggests strong reasons for change within subject matters and disciplines. As explicate forms are only stable manifestations of implicate orders and movements, so content areas and approaches to them are temporary manifestations of underlying issues and currents that may emerge in different forms.

## 5

Throughout history the concepts of space and time have been studied from the perspectives of artists, historians, scientists, philosophers, and almost every other conceivable specialty in the humanities, social sciences, and sciences (Hughes 1990: 1-16; Heelan 1983; Flood and Lockwood 1986; van Fraassen 1985). It is impossible to summarize or analyze those studies here except to observe, as the authors cited above have claimed, that Euclidian three dimensional space, and Newtonian and Cartesian space and time referential grids have been succeeded, but not displaced, by the advances of Minkowski, Riemann, and Einstein who moved the world into a spacetime age. We may observe as well, again as above, that former literary and historical criticisms used for studying the literature, religion, history, and the material remains of the ancient Near East assumed the Cartesian grid that recent literary, historical, and archaeological criticisms reject.

For our purposes, three beginning points may be stated. First, biologists, psychologists, and neurologists have demonstrated that the human habit of locating ourselves by identifying our place and time is an acquired skill. In the evolutionary scheme, it takes a mammal's brain and binocular vision to work out this orientation, and as Piaget has shown, humans are usually between four and seven years old before they differentiate between space and time (Szamosi 1986: 112-114).

Second, many scientists and philosophers argue that the categories "past," "present," and "future" are cognitive attributes that humans assign to "now" or a series of successive "nows," the only real time (Harré 1986: 128, 141; Fraser 1987: 4-7). This means that the past is no more accessible, and our knowledge of it no more reliable, than is the future and our "knowledge" of it. They are, in fact, similar perspectives assigned to different orientations on the arrow of time.

Third, with the exception of traditionalists and a few others among archaeologists, historians, and literature specialists, criticism in the so-called postmodernist era tends to disavow interest in locating events and personalities on the

historical space-time grids of the past. Although the trend toward ahistoricism is rooted in epistemology and understandings of language and linguist modes of reality, text, and context, it seems that many who shun history share their traditionalist opponents' limited understanding of space and time. They reject a Cartesian concept more than the realities it presumes to locate.

Fourth, of the two concepts, space and time, the latter is the more problematic for social world studies, especially the concept of the past. Time, in fact, must often be expressed in spatial metaphors (Michon 1989: 30-36). Therefore, time more than space occupies our attention here.

## 5.1

We have already observed that philosophers of science distinguish among different kinds of time. Archaeologists also grapple with the meaning of time, its place in their endeavors, and the connection or difference between present and past (Shanks and Tilley 1987: 119-136; Tilley 1990b: 38).

Kinds of time, in fact, vary greatly. The divisions organized by Fraser are helpful (Fraser 1987b: 4-6; 1982: 14-29). He perceives the canonical forms of time to be nested and representative of various umwelts. This founder of the International Society for the Study of Time identifies five worlds and canonical forms of time. (1) The nootemporal world—named for Greek "mind" or "thought"—is the world of human thought where memory and expectation distinguish past from future and experience can be transformed into symbols and language. (2) The biotemporal is the world of biological functions where past and future, i.e., two kinds of "nowness," can be distinguished. The present is the physiological present where simultaneities of need are maintained in order for living organisms to survive.

(3) The eotemporal world pertains to astronomy where temporality has no present, past, or future. This world does not contain structures that are capable of protecting their identities like living organisms do. No meaning can be attached to the concept of now. Coincidences occur as simultaneities of chance, and future and past are meaningless except in terms of a present to which they are referred. It is a directionless, completely symmetrical time.

(4) The prototemporal world is the world of elementary particles where "now" and "then" cannot be distinguished and concrete instants lack theoretical or empirical meaning. This is the world of atoms where temporal positions can only be stated probabilistically. (5) Finally is the world of atemporal "time" of electromagnetic radiation where time has no meaning. This should not be mistaken for timelessness. Rather it is the world before creation, a universe composed entirely of particles traveling at the speed of light. It is the time of the most primitive universe (Fraser 1982: 29-32; 1987a: 111).

Fraser's divisions are guided by the *Umwelt* of species proposed by biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1921). Von Uexküll was concerned with the functional cycle of animals which is an information loop that passes through external signals. These become internal signals that are processed and evaluated in terms of the capacity of the animal to react or to integrate. The "world" that is admitted into this loop, as it were, that is relevant to the species, constitutes the species' umwelt. It is the circumscribed portion of the environment that is meaningful and effective for a given species (Fraser 1982: 21). Whatever is external to the umwelt is nonexistent from the point of view of the organism. Time, therefore, as tempo and as duration differs from species to species.

The distinct umwelts are ordered and are nested hierarchically. Therefore, as one progresses from inorganic to organic to mental worlds, the "lower" umwelts remain in place but are circumscribed by "higher" umwelts. This hierarchical ordering is today expressed in the concept of integrative levels, a category that Fraser adopts from Joseph Needham (Fraser 1982:25-29; see Needham 1944: 233-272). The levels are stable hierarchical levels of nature, i.e., successive levels of organization or of forms of order along a scale of complexity. Fraser proposes six:

(1) The world of particles with zero restmass, always on the move at the speed of light.

(2) The world of particles with nonzero restmass, always on the move but at speeds below that of light.

(3) The world of massive, ponderable masses gathered into stars, galaxies, and groups of galaxies.

(4) The world of living organisms.

(5) Man [*sic*] as a species and as an individual member of the species.

(6) The collective institutions of human societies to the extent that they function as semiautonomous structures. (Fraser 1982: 28-29)

Fraser insists that each level is distinct, i.e., that the structures and processes belonging to one level differ from those of another level more than members of the level differ among themselves. They are also stable, i.e., the levels are maintained for a long period of time. And they exist in a hierarchically nested relationship, as noted above. Therefore, the structures and processes of each level subsume and retain those of the levels below them.

The integrative levels are contrasted with others, called *mesoforms*. These are rare and unstable levels in the evolutionary scheme that fall between integrative levels but for unknown reasons do not survive or are unrecognized in the hierarchy of structures and processes that we know today. Needham's hypothesis allows, if not requires, the mesoforms in order to explain the chain of reality and species known by scientists. It is valid, therefore, to hypothesize their existence and, as a corollary, to hypothesize that each enjoys or enjoyed its own kind of time.

We need not defend the hypotheses in order for them to stimulate thoughts along other lines and about other circumstances. For example, we may use the concept of mesoform metaphorically to speak of a relationship between time and an entity that is essentially static or "non-temporal." For instance, it can be reasonably proposed that archaeological information is essentially spatial and that the assigning of time through various dating techniques—whether on the basis of a narrative, inscription, or lithic or ceramic typology—is to combine two essentially different kinds of information. What then is the time of an archaeological site? The site exists now, it probably has existed throughout many nows, and when excavators scar it beyond recognition they are doing so now. According to what we have seen, assigning dates other than "now" to the site or its elements is relative to the dates that are assigned or derived from something else which, in turn, is dated relatively. B.P. dates are constantly adjusted, at least mentally. Dates based on typologies depend on assumptions about the dates assigned—with equal uncertainty and arbitrariness—to lithics, ceramics, or other artifacts. Dates derived from inscriptions and texts require juggling so many human vari-

ables that critical theorists now abandon the effort almost entirely. In any case, the dating criteria, including technological methods such as radiocarbon and thermoluminescence dating, rest on external indicators that are then correlated with spatial information gained from stratigraphy and other physical and spatial indicators. Most, if not all dates, therefore, must be tentative and hypothetical.

Mesoforms, taken together with understandings of the past as a cognitive category assigned from the perspective of now, allow us to suggest tentatively that spatial and temporal information such as that combined by biblical, ancient, and other kinds of historians are mesoforms, i.e., hypothetical, not-so-stable integrative cognitive levels that bridge the gap between our sources, between our so-called disciplines, and between individuals, institutions, and worlds of the past. They are constructs that scholars establish by hypothetically lifting data from several fields in order to address needs and answer questions. They are, metaphorically, holograms in which the interference of information allows the researcher to illuminate the pattern with hypotheses that, in turn, enable new hypothetical images to be seen.

## 5.2

These proposals are neither more nor less than beginning working hypotheses to be tested and retested, changed and rechanged, as information and perspectives evolve, devolve, and dissolve in scholarly research. They are offered here for discussion and criticism by members of the Constructs of Ancient History and Religion Group in the hope of advancing our disciplines, first by attempting to identify several of the underlying obstacles that are often ignored but that seem to be leading to fragmentation and division within humanities and social scientific fields. The comments assume that technology and technologists offer models and inspiration for the way that information, approaches, and individuals can cooperate and integrate in addressing problems and seeking new insights.

Secondly, although discussion of modern critical theory has been omitted, the essay assumes that those theories and their proponents are challenging all fields of inquiry and are offering stimulating and provocative ways of addressing many of the same issues as are raised here. Their absence is dictated by the constraints of space and time rather than neglect or ingratitude.

Thirdly, holography and holograms, and metaphors and models based on them, are not final answers to epistemological and hermeneutical issues. But they are fun, the author and the public seem to be fascinated by them, and they are becoming ubiquitous. Their mystical, chiaroscuro quality evokes discussion and enjoyment. The holographic process and image as a technology that depends entirely on monochromic light waves seems useful for understanding and describing ideas and information. Light-imagery is grounded in religious and intellectual traditions globally, and lasers and laders, for good or for ill, are part of peacetime and wartime technology.

Fourthly, it is the integrative aspects of holography that this essay draws upon most heavily in the quest for a model and metaphor for constructs studies. Harré's referential realism, combined with holographic integration and production of images and with scientific views of time, may offer a way to think about the critical object-subject issues that divide both historical critics and literary critics. The information in a holographic plate, like a text or tell, is encoded with information about something other than itself. In a sense, it stands between the

object (now absent) and subject (now viewing) and, like a hypothesis, has lifted partial information out of its larger field. On the basis of that partial information, however, whole images are constituted, as a critic or historian attempts to constitute (dare I say reconstitute?) and fill the gaps in a text or artifact.

Finally, the essay has not addressed the difference between historical and archaeological information on the one hand and literary information on the other. The debate between new and old historicism, therefore, has been ignored. Again, space and time dictates.

That does not mean that the debate has not been weighed or that it could not be brought into the constructs discussion. Tilley's work (1990c: 266) that relates material culture to action rather than reflection is similar to the separation between actions and notions, behavioral and mental, outlined above. To go farther, we could explore the difference between experiential and intellectual knowledge, and we might find assistance for resolving the tension among historians who read sources as history and those who read them as literature (cf., Spiegel 1990; Zagorin 1990). Tradition and text would also come into play.

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# Artist/Technologist: Eiffel's Tower, Technology, and the Social Construction of Meaning

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## Introduction

I have been asked to talk about the method which historians of technology use in determining the significance of technological artifacts and of the historical import of particular technologies in a given society. My charge is also to base that discussion on my own work on the significance of the Eiffel Tower as a technological monument in late nineteenth century France.

All academics seem to like to talk about their work—what they have found that is new and how they found it. It is, however, not often that one is formally requested to scrutinize one's method in a systematic way for public inspection. Such an endeavor raises all sorts of epistemological issues, and sets them on a very personal level. What can I know and how do I know it—that is, those questions which Descartes posed to himself—I have to ask of myself. And in addition I have to add the questions of the historian: "What is it I would like to know about the past and what can I can know about any particular technology and its social context?" There are then certain assumptions or biases with which the historian approaches the past, as well as a collection of secondary and primary source materials available as resources for interpreting it. To Lowenthal's insight that the past is a foreign country and we must learn to speak the language there, I should say that we will never speak it like a native. To the historian's caveat that we are limited by the materials accessible to us, add the warning that our own biases lead us to create history that is to some extent a personal invention based on what we choose to identify as significant.

So much for the angst of the philosophy of history. It is, at any rate, technological artifacts and their material and symbolic significance that interest me and on which I have focussed my attention. Not surprisingly, the history of technology, even of modern technology (that is, since the advent of industrialization in the mid-eighteenth century) is a broad field, and there are several methodologies and approaches which characterize it. Yet, it is the techniques, tools and machines, as well as the methods of organizing these into a system for the production of goods and services which still manage to sit at the heart of the history of technology as a discipline. It is also these factors which tend to validate the notion that these artifacts are a point of departure for understanding the place of technology in the formation of social and economic relationships, organizations, and values, as well as the role human imagination plays in technologi-

cal development. This is so because they are to a large extent the product of such factors, and a means of defining and shaping them. One good example is Henry Ford's factory produced automobile, another as I hope I can convince you is the Eiffel Tower.

Technological artifacts embody or provide clues to the history of larger social and imaginative constructs because at the most creative level, technology is the skilled and imaginative transformation of the material world into usable forms; and people engaged in this process—whether formally designated as artists, artisans, engineers, or industrial designers, utilize these capacities in organizing productive activity. Not all people engaged in production utilize these skills, nor has every society valued this form of activity above all others or placed the same value on it. The Chinese have a long and strongly entrenched tradition of setting scholars above artisans and inventors in the social hierarchy and in government administration. In ancien regime France, the nobility distinguished itself legally from the rest of society as superior because they did not work with their hands, and there was great suspicion of people who did at the same time that certain forms of innovation were rewarded.

This definition of technology as the product of human skill and imagination has provided the basis for criticizing the way in which particular means of organizing production, dividing labor, and responsibility for product design tend to limit the number of people who are in control of technology. Certain forms of technology have been used to symbolize oppressive political and economic systems, impersonal social arrangements and unethical exploitation of workers and consumers. The novel 1984 is filled with such images, and the Eiffel Tower itself has been used to symbolize this as well as other more positive views of technology.

Thus, the Eiffel Tower is a good artifact to examine in light of the theme of this session. It is also, perhaps unexpectedly for some of you, quite appropriate for a paper presented at this particular set of meetings. For a variety of reasons, contemporaries identified the huge 300 foot edifice with the Biblical Tower of Babel, and this characterization has some bearing on the way in which the historical meaning of the Tower was unpacked. In talking about the Eiffel Tower, I want to begin, however, by exploring what and how this material object can tell us about the society that produced it. I also want to talk about it as a symbolic structure and what and how it tells us about the value that society invested in such cultural forms. The facts of its physical character, the material out of which it is made, and the use for which it was designed (its function) are not irrelevant to its social or symbolic significance.

Finally, I want to suggest that the questions I ask of it are different than those asked by others, although not necessarily better. The past is something of a fiction about which most of us care deeply. It is created by a self-guided searching, picking, choosing and processing of the material data existing in our own time in a manner to some extent analogous to the artist/technologist. The entire array of artifacts and texts available to the scholar provide a means of checking, corroborating or modifying the interpretation.

## The Meaning of the Tower

Unraveling the meaning of the Tower is to a great extent like a detective story, where one uses various kinds of evidence and looks for clues in the artifact itself, as well as the literature for an answer. I studied the Tower in two contexts

and attempted to find the points at which they mesh. First, the Eiffel Tower itself as architecture. Coming as I do from a background in art history and in studio arts and crafts, for me the tower was first and foremost, an amazing example of architecture, a tall, somewhat awkward latticework form standing isolated on the Champs de Mars, offering the visitor the possibility of extraordinary new ways of experiencing space and time.

The secondary literature on the Tower sets the edifice within the context of the development of iron architecture in the 19th century where it marks the inauguration of a new architecture of iron based on engineering principals. The Tower and the vast Gallery of Machines both constructed for the universal exposition of 1889 represented the triumph of iron as a building material, and with it the accession of iron and steel, of rational engineering principals and esthetics as the foundation for a new modern architecture. In these histories, the Tower stood somewhere between the Bibliotheque St. Genevieve and the Crystal Palace in Britain on the one hand and the American skyscraper on the other. Eiffel himself is depicted as the master builder, characterized by art historian Meyer Schapiro as an arch technocrat whose relentlessly logical structure symbolized a new, mechanistic era.

So far as the field of engineering is concerned, according to Prof. Billington, precedents for the Tower lay in forms developed for iron railroad bridges, and the use of iron as a new construction material in industrial structures—both fields in which Eiffel had been innovative. Thus, the Tower combined the forms of the arched spandrel and the supporting posts used by Eiffel to support spectacular bridges like that over the Druro River in Portugal.

The secondary literature, however, left a number of questions unanswered—questions arising from an examination of the Tower itself: How was it built? How was it used or intended to be used? Why was it built of iron when steel manufacturing processes had already been developed?

Examining the Tower one finds that the arched forms and the railings are not structural. They are there for aesthetic effect, as well as for safety in the case of the railings. Moreover, the Tower is comprised of thousands of small pieces which have a variety of shapes, many of them decorative rather than purely geometric in form. It is also an incredibly complex structure, as well as vast in scale, and it is made of cast, rather than wrought iron or steel. Moreover, it stands on a piece of Parisian landscape that is far from any source of iron or of iron manufacturing.

What can we conclude? That it was a unique edifice, made by a process which was essentially conservative for the time. Its complexity suggests a large number of people involved in its construction, and the absence of iron deposits in the Parisian region suggests that it was made far away from the site and assembled them from well-formed, pre-cast parts. It required a high degree of planning and management of people and processes to bring it into being, as well as a large budget and a well developed system of design, production, transportation and assembly to bring it into being. Thus, there was probably a master designer involved as well as a pre-existing production system staffed with people possessing a variety of skills. The aesthetic features, in addition to the stairways and elevator, suggest that it was made for more than purely functional or economic purposes, as more than simply a testimony to the abilities of French engineering. It was distinctly different from any work of architecture that had preceded it.

In the literature from the period, including the papers in the Eiffel collection, we find support for all these assumptions. The newspapers make it clear that the

Tower was built as the center piece for the universal exposition of 1889, celebrating the centennial of the French Revolution and marking the revival of France from the devastating defeat at the hands of the Germans in 1870. But there is more. We get a more vivid and detailed picture of the arrangements, of Eiffel's skill as an entrepreneur and manager, his earlier large-scale projects many of them done for the railroads in conjunction with the French iron industry, of the difficulties of constructing the Tower—not all of them technical—of the extent to which its construction required a vision and commitment that encompassed a host of different businesses, suppliers, workers with different skills, and the needs, fears, and demands of the public which would pay to mount its heights in elevators and via stairwells. It was a group project in which the people who actually designed the edifice were paid employees of Eiffel himself.

We also find in the literature Eiffel's explanation of what the Tower symbolized to him. He found it a beautiful structure which said to the world that the French were an industrious rather than frivolous people. It was also the result of cooperative effort on the part of workers with a variety of skills. Thus, to a great extent, the complexity of the Tower's form and the variety of shapes that comprise it signify the power of science and technology as well as the beneficial character of the social relations that made it possible; while they also bear the mark of Eiffel's distinctive style of producing such structures.

But what about the officially declared symbolic function of the Tower? What did it have to do with the celebration of the centennial of the Revolution? And to what extent does it reflect or re-present the realities of French society at the time? I can only briefly outline the answers to these questions here, and suggest the degree to which one needs textual information and the data of social and economic history for corroboration. The newly ensconced Republican government chose to define the Revolution as an event in the march of human Progress characterized as increasing social solidarity. As a technological artifact it's production marked the inauguration of an industrial society guided by science and based on liberal democracy, guaranteeing the freedom to work.

The Tower fulfilled the aesthetic criteria of its Republican supporters for a symbol of such a system. The multitude of small parts, each clearly articulated and composed of the same material, each reduced to its most efficient form and interlocked with the others to form an integrated, controlled, and dynamic system, was a paradigm of liberal democratic society. The thrust and counterthrust of the individual parts in resolving their tensions within the fluid upward movement of the Tower's form seem the embodiment of the progress toward a new order which rational, cooperative production would make possible. The very height to which it rises and the open latticework of its structure tent to merge it with the surrounding atmosphere suggesting a harmonious relationship between the progress of the French people and nature itself.

Yet, other evidence from the period suggests that we should not take the symbolic reading of the form as totally coincident with the social and economic circumstances in which it was produced. The Tower was not financed through speculation on the open market place. The government provided much of the initial money which Eiffel paid back with the profits made from operating the Tower as a concession; workers on the project were not constrained by Eiffel and the government from striking for higher wages; and finally, the public did not interpret the Tower as a symbol of a workers' Republic. Those who disliked it, called it a meaningless Tower of Babel; and those who were enchanted, found the Tower attractive for a variety of reasons. It was a new source of amusement. It

afforded an unprecedented view of the city. It was part of the new commercialized technological culture at century's end. For the ironworkers, however, it remained tied to Biblical mythology: the Tower of Babel as a symbol of inspired if misguided effort of cooperative human labor. It expressed their yearning for community, as well as standing as a sign that their desires had been partially realized. According to newspaper articles and published speeches, much of their view was shared by the official sponsors of the construction. At least as a symbolic form it did provide a common bond of experience among disparate groups in French society.

One final assessment of the Tower's impact on French society lies in the material evidence from the decade just following its construction. There was in French cities an enormous increase in the number of buildings and in the use of iron work in construction as French cities expanded. It seems to have marked the beginning of a burst of developers' enthusiasm for using this material and the revival of the iron industry which had suffered when the development of the railroads was completed.

## Conclusion

To some extent, I have tried to imagine what it would be like to come upon the Tower as an archaeologist might come upon a desert tel: it is a gigantic artifact in the midst of an undefined, but not empty, panorama. Perhaps my own political biases led me to ask the questions I did, centering on technological design as means of community building. There are other questions which one could undoutedly ask about the Tower and of what it can tell us about the society in which it was built. But the broadbased appeal of the definition of technology which I offered earlier on I think helps point the way to asking additional questions and suggesting the kinds of information needed to answer them. For example, if we can identify the sources of iron and the places where the parts of the Tower were manufactured, we can have some sense of the economic impact of the project. If we can find information identifying the names and origins of those working on the Tower we might gain a picture of how it served to disrupt social relationships in small villages and towns while encouraging the formation of new social subgroups at the construction site. The same would be true for visitors to the Tower—but harder to document. Then there is a special group of people, scientists and engineers who studied it, used it for scientific experiments. Harder and perhaps ultimately impossible to fully disclose would be the impact which the edifice had on people's imaginations, both on that of Gustave Eiffel, on those who assisted him, and on visitors to the Tower, those who read about it or saw pictures of it. It perhaps encouraged new concepts of fun or altered visions of Progress itself. Steven Kern in his book *The Culture of Time and Space* has tried to do this in a broadbrushed way. An analysis of photographs, cartoons, and illustrations of the period would certainly add to such knowledge—but it would still be difficult to generalize too much for such large populations. Finally, the manner in which the Tower strikes our own imaginations and sensibilies, that is the feelings aroused by our first encounter with it, should serve as an important guide to further enquiries into its past.

How might this approach work for smaller artifacts? For the conglomeration of things that have accreted at ever faster rates over the face of the earth? In partial answer to this question, let me make one more reference to the Tower of Babel and echo Victor Hugo's lament as he looked back over the past in an effort

to make sense for his readers of the aims of all human endeavor. He likened this accretion to a lugubrious Tower of things, pointing like the arrow of time to a future of increasing human solidarity. He also described it as a vast panorama of detritus to which the poet/artist brought coherence through the use of a method analogous to that used by a paleontologist reconstructing an entire animal from one metatarsal. A rather ambitious task, but a worthy challenge to us academics, nevertheless.

I leave the additional questioning of the subject to the panel of commentators.

# The Use and Significance of Models for Historical Reconstruction

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A significant gap has traditionally existed between the methods of a historian and the theory of a philosopher. As a result reconstructions made by practicing historians are rarely influenced significantly by philosophical considerations. Instead, historians tend toward arguing their particular estimation of the data without consideration of how data is organized into a reconstruction. The distance between theory and practice is no less significant in the study of the history of Israel and the Ancient Near East, and it has come about in large part because most historians in this field are not well acquainted with philosophical theory.

One of the more significant aspects of historical reconstruction is the way in which historical models are used in reconstruction. In particular, many reconstructions of Ancient Near Eastern history have made use of sociological and philosophical models to create data, and this usage has led to bewildering and conflicting results. The significance of models is that their usage depends on and reflects one's estimation of historical knowledge, and increasing historical knowledge is ultimately why a historical reconstruction is made. This paper is being presented toward the goal of bringing the problems of historical reconstruction into open discussion.

## How a Historical Reconstruction is Made

Essentially, historical reconstruction is a process in which a person, the historian, uses extant evidence or data to determine what happened in the past. This process involves the evaluation of various forms of data, some type of causal analysis, and the formation of a coherent whole from the singular bits of data. Reconstruction is distinct from literary representation as the latter is a written account which is undertaken to convince other persons of the correctness of a reconstruction. While one may argue that one makes a reconstruction in much the same way that one composes a narrative, a historian can reconstruct without composing a written text. Thus, encoding events into a text is a largely a literary process, while using data to reconstruct events is a process dependent on the data, the historian's life experiences, and his or her psychological profile. In other words, historical reconstruction is a process in which a historian interprets data according to his or her particular life experiences.[1]

[1] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd ed., trans. and eds. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Crossroad, 1984), 324, 460-474. Gadamer's work in this area is an extension of the work of Wilhelm Dilthey.

A reconstruction begins with singular and largely unconnected bits of extant data that concern the past events in question. This data is examined, evaluated, and subsequently incorporated into a framework which places data in relationship to other data. As a result the framework establishes a coherent account from the singular bits of data. Thus, the framework is a hermeneutical device which allows the historian to interpret the significance of data. The formation of the framework is dependent on the historian's beliefs concerning how historical events proceed. These beliefs, in turn, may have been taught to the historian, in which case they are most likely a function of the historian's culture, or they may be a function of his or her reflection. The importance of the framework for this discussion is that it is the historian's model for the flow of historical events. For the present purposes this type of philosophical model will be considered as macroscopic as opposed to sociological/anthropological models which are generally smaller in scale.

Most scholars are familiar with the more widely known speculative philosophical models of history. Saint Augustine, Hegel, Toynbee, Voegelin, Marx, and Spengler have all created speculative historical systems. These systems reflect a belief that patterns are inherent in the historical process, and that these patterns can be determined.

The problem with this type of philosophical model is that the patterns are not inherent in the events. Instead, the patterns are perceived as part of the events,[2] making the pattern a function of the data as well as the historian's psyche. Essentially, in an analysis of all history too many singular bits of data exist. In order to work with this abundance of data a historian will assimilate collected data into groups and patterns on the basis of theme, chronology, or cause and effect. This grouping occurs according to the historian's perception of the data, so that each bit of data is to a large degree defined by the parameters of its group.[3] The mental processes which a historian goes through to group data comprise his or her framework, and this framework is a hermeneutical construct in the sense that it interprets the nature, significance, and relationships of the historical data.

This description of the framework has been disputed, and since an understanding of its nature is vital to the arguments presented below, opposing arguments concerning the framework should be examined. Arguments against the relativistic conception of this framework have been best stated by Maurice Mandelbaum.[4] Essentially, he argued that a person forms a framework of ideas about historical events by establishing facts concerning individual events. These facts are compiled into a mental list which forms the framework for collating historical events. As more events are examined more facts are established, and as these facts are established the mental framework grows. Thus, for Mandelbaum, the framework with which one relates data into a coherent account is composed entirely of facts which are correct and therefore need no interpretation.

The difficulties with Mandelbaum's arguments are numerous and have been well discussed by many philosophers. For the present purposes a brief summary

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[2] David Carr, *Time, Narrative, and History*, Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University, 1986), 79.

[3] Raymond Aron, "Evidence and Inference in History," *Daedalus*, 87 (1958), 12. Also, David Carr, *Time, Narrative, and History* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986), 79.

[4] Maurice Mandelbaum, *The Problem of Historical Knowledge* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1938), 182-202.

of these problems will suffice. One difficulty is that Mandelbaum gave no concrete examples of how his theory works. While the supposition that a framework is based entirely on facts may be a worthy ideal, the reality is that everyone incorporates some degree of subjective evaluation into his or her framework. Second, Mandelbaum speaks of established facts, even though he gave no procedure to establish facts. At this point he most likely followed Teggart who postulated that facts are established by acceptance in the scholarly community.[5] Such thinking, however, is unrealistic as facts are not dependent on acceptance by the scholarly community. In a variety of cases throughout history the scholarly community has been wrong. Third, Mandelbaum did not explain how two equally competent scholars given approximately the same data could make differing reconstructions. If, as he suggested, an individual's framework is built on facts, then given the same data different people should reach approximately the same conclusion. Finally, he makes a sharp distinction between statements of value and statements of fact. Unfortunately, in history such a distinction cannot be maintained since virtually every statement of fact is in some way value laden.[6]

Thus, in contrast to Mandelbaum, the hermeneutical framework by which history is reconstructed varies depending on individual perception. While standardized accounts of many events are taught to students and thus generally accepted in the academic community, ultimately the understanding of an event depends on individual perceptions of it. Since a person perceives data about an event in light of other events which have already been established in his or her referential framework, the framework tends toward generalization. In other words, a person understands new events in light of events which have already been experienced. For the study of the Ancient Near East this statement means that the psychological framework in which one establishes what happened has to some degree been influenced by the study of events in other cultures from other times.

## The Function of Models

Once models are established as an intrinsic aspect of historical reconstruction, then the issue of how they function can be addressed. Three ways will be discussed here. First, a model is a device for establishing the relation between data or individual events. Second, models can and generally are used as a guide for the selection of data which is pertinent to the reconstruction. Finally, models have been used as a basis for establishing missing data.

*Relation Between Data.* Reconstruction has been characterized as a process in which singular pieces of data are shaped into a coherent whole. In such a process the relation between pieces of data must be determined before the data can be shaped into a continuum. While aspects of the data may suggest a relationship, the ultimate basis for determining any relationship between data is the historian's framework.

Determining the relationship between bits of data is essentially causal analysis. While cause and effect is perceived as part of the event, and thus

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[5] Frederick J. Teggart, "Causation in Historical Events," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 3 (1942), 3-11.

[6] The best discussion of value laden facts as they relate to historical discourse is Gordon Leff, *History and Social Theory* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama, 1969), 155-234.

dependent on the data and the event, it is also a function of the historian. As a function of the historian, causal analysis may be postulated differently by different historians and still be acceptable.

*Guide for Evaluation and Selection of Data.* Any historical reconstruction will necessitate the inclusion or exclusion of data on the basis of its relevance to the reconstruction. Such a task requires an evaluation of individual datum with criteria largely dependent on the historian's understanding of the general nature of historical events. Even that data which is generally accepted or rejected by the scholarly community requires evaluation before it can be used. The result of this process is that a historian does not deal with data that concern events of the Ancient Near East on a phenomenological basis. Instead, he or she interprets the event and its data on the basis of other events about which he or she has a better understanding.

The criteria for evaluation and selection of data extend from what the historian considers to be correct about historical events in general. While such criteria are influenced by the more or less accepted norms within the scholarly community, these criteria are primarily a function of the historian's hermeneutical framework

*Basis of Missing Data.* Some scholars have used their referential framework to supply data that is not directly attested to in the primary sources. Specifically, because of a lack of data many historical reconstructions of the Ancient Near East depend on this kind of procedure. Yet, this type of approach is problematic and needs to examined.

Information gained in this manner is not as certain as information derived from direct analyses of the data as it results from an extended analogy. While all historical knowledge can be said to result from analogy such analogies are not exact and can break down if extended. Also, the use of models in this manner assumes an underlying Positivistic philosophy in the sense that it assumes the model to be exact. Such models generalize, however, can only approach exactness. Further, Positivism cannot be substantiated as a viable philosophy for historical reconstruction.[7] Thus, data constructed solely on the basis that it fits the model should be considered suspect.

## The Use of Models

Reconstructions of Ancient Near Eastern History have used models in a bewildering variety of ways, a situation which has led to confusing and conflicting results. This situation is in need of examination so that it may, as space permits, be unraveled to determine who has achieved philosophically tenable conclusions.

### *No Model*

While many scholars have made reconstructions without detailing the models they used, at least some scholars have and will insist that a model is unnecessary for a reconstruction. According to this line of reasoning a model obscures the significance of the data, and if a model is used to relate the data the entire process becomes somewhat less empirical. For these scholars the data is sufficient, and

[7] For a discussion of Positivism's inadequacies as a philosophical basis for reconstructing history see Robin G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 123-133.

relationships between bits of data are apparent upon observation. Thus a hermeneutical framework can only distort otherwise apparent conclusions. One has only to find the data, set it into a correct sequence (usually chronological), and all of the necessary relations between data will be self-evident. Examples of scholars who hold this position include Israel Finkelstein and William Dever.[8] Dever's belief that the stones speak if one can only listen is perhaps the classic example of this position.[9]

Such ideas are directly descendent from the theory of Leopold von Ranke, including his dictum that history should be recorded as it actually happened. Like the work of von Ranke, this position is also quite Positivistic. Also, like von Ranke such a position presumes to be making a reconstruction that is virtually free of distorting tendencies and biases. Such a position, however, is entirely misleading for many reasons.

One reason is that the inclusion of data into this type of work implies significance to the data. Because too much data generally exists for a work to include all of it, a decision concerning which data will be incorporated must be made. A second reason is that ordering the data by a set of criteria indicates that the data belongs together, and thus implies an inherent cause and effect relationship. Cause and effect, however, are not inherent aspects of the data. Instead, they are perceived in the data and then assigned by the historian to the data partly on the basis of his or her referential framework. Finally, the ordering of data into a sequence is in itself a form of imposing a framework on the data.

Perhaps this type of work can be better classified as an assemblage of data. Of themselves assemblages of data are not implicitly wrong; however, they should not be mistaken for historical reconstructions. When such works are used as historical reconstructions, their user presumes that information is received apart from external presuppositions, thus ignoring the distorting tendencies of the observer. Since historical reconstructions require interpretation on the part of observer, and the observer stands in a definite spatial and temporal relation to the observered phenomenon, a degree of distortion will always exist.

*The Work of Albright*

Other scholars apart from those that believe a model is unnecessary have also held to a Positivistic philosophy of history. The most influential of these scholars was William F. Albright. While some of his work is now considered dated, his knowledge and understanding of the both the Analytical and Speculative traditions of the Philosophy of History has been unmatched by any orientalist since his time. Albright was acquainted with the speculative systems of Hegel, Marx, Voegelin, and Toynbee as well the Analytical work of Croce, Gallie, Mandelbaum, Dilthey, and others. He was also acquainted with Collingwood's idea of historical imagination. Further, he dealt with such issues as the nature of an appropriate model for reconstruction as well as how a model should relate to data. Because of the depth of his work and the considerable influence his reconstructions have had on historical scholarship his work merits attention.

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[8] Israel Finkelstein, *The Archaeology of the Israelite Settlement* (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1988). Finkelstein apparently believes that the key to reconstructing the Israelite settlement is the evidence from archaeology, especially his regional surveys.

[9] When and where Dever first made this comment is unknown to the present author. He did essentially repeat this comment in his presentation of the following paper. William Dever, "Archaeology, Material Culture, and the Early Monarchical Period in Israel." Society of Biblical Literature; Anaheim, California; November, 1989.

For Albright the process of making a reconstruction was to a large degree dependent on gathering sufficient information. He considered the use of archaeological data in a reconstruction a very good way to achieve this goal.[10] A secondary way to achieve this goal was to apply a process he termed historical analogy.[11] (Albright's "historical analogy" is approximately equivalent to the present idea of model.) Because he could see a high potential for misuse, Albright insisted that analogy be used only where a resemblance between multiple cultures existed. In this way he felt he could insure at least a high probability for whatever historical knowledge this process produced. Thus, for Albright models could be used to increase historical knowledge, if and only if they were used with considerable discretion.

As an additional way of increasing historical knowledge Albright became interested in discerning patterns in the context of history.[12] In his *From the Stone Age to Christianity* Albright developed a historical system which used the development of monotheism as its primary criteria. His system was somewhat eclectic as it depended on the works of Toynbee, Hegel, Voegelin, and his own independent observations. While his system was fairly sophisticated it was not without difficulties.

By his own admission Albright was heavily influenced by the theory and method of science. In one sense this preoccupation was appropriate in that he strove toward a rigorous method that would account for all the relevant data. On the other hand the scientific influence led him to believe that patterns actually existed in history, and that his system was a close approximation of these patterns. Such beliefs reflect the idea that any discipline could be improved if its methodology was like that of a science, an idea which was dominant in Albright's time. Yet, such beliefs led Albright to conclusions that have not withstood the test of time.

The problems which Albright faced also confronted other scholars; yet, very few scholars have dealt with these problems as extensively as he did. For example, when Malamát said that one could reconstruct the nature of the leadership of the judges by reading between the lines of the text,[13] he was content to accept a Positivistic model that insisted that the text of Judges was accurate without considering the implications of this position. Unfortunately, Malamat like so many other scholars was content to accept a Positivistic view that did not adequately account for the nature of historical reconstruction.

*Models in a Social Scientific Approach*

Models in a social scientific study of the Ancient Near East are used somewhat differently than are philosophical models. In order to facilitate a better understanding of both types of models they will be briefly analyzed and compared.

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[10] William F. Albright, "How well can we know the Ancient Near East?" *History, Archaeology, and Christian Humanism* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 113-117.

[11] William F. Albright, "The Historical Interpretation of Early Hebrew Literature," *Archaeology, Historical Analogy, and the Biblical Tradition* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State, 1963), 5-7.

[12] William F. Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity*. 2nd ed. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1957), 82-83.

[13] Abraham Malamat, "Charismatic Leadership in the Book of Judges," *Magnalia Dei: The Mighty Acts of God* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1976), 152-154.

*The Idea of a Model.* In the social scientific approach to the Ancient Near East, a model is a pattern which is used to illuminate poorly understood aspects of the ancient culture. The model is formed from general laws derived from examining more accessible societies in order to determine those aspects which are inherent to a situation for a particular type of society. Sociological models tend to be generalizing in that by relying on comparison they will lessen the uniqueness of aspects in a society. Yet philosophical models of history, including those models that comprise any historian's referential framework, tend to be generalizing. Since models are an intrinsic aspect of every reconstruction, some generalization cannot be avoided. All that any historian can do is lessen the generalizing tendency of the models he or she employes. The advantage that sociological models bring to a historical reconstruction is that they increase the amount of information available for use in the reconstruction.

Both sociological and philosophical models are formed from data as recorded by an observer; however, the perceived data is somewhat different in each case. For philosophical models the amount of data is generally very large and requires assimilation on the basis of perceived likenesses and differences. For sociological models data is generally recorded and is to some degree quantifiable. Further, while sociological data is not completely empirical it can be tested to a degree by comparison with data from other cultures.

The differences in perceived data illustrate a fundamental aspect of models. Macroscopic models tend more toward distorting data by generalization than do smaller scale models. This distortion occurs because the historian tends to perceive recognizable patterns in the data in trying to assimilate it. Smaller scale models with correspondingly less data tend to produce less distortion. Essentially, this data does not need the extensive patterning that data from macroscopic models require. Because every model is an analogy or approximation it distorts to some degree. Yet, the smaller in scope a model is, the less distortion it produces in its approximation of the event.

*The Use of Models.* The majority of social scientific studies use models in one of two ways. They have either been used like philosophical models to produce a macroscopic pattern or they have been used to produce information to explain individual events. Examples of the former style of use include work by Norman Gottwald[14] and Robert Coote and Keith Whitelam,[15] while an example of the latter is a work by James Flanagan.[16]

Like philosophical models the macroscopic use of sociological models rests on the presumption that patterns can be found in the study of history. For example, Coote and Whitelam see patterns in the settlement of the area of Palestine from the early Bronze Age until the Ottoman empire.[17] According to these two individuals such patterns can be correlated to and thus explain many of the social structures of the inhabitants of the land. Further, these pattern can be extrapolated to the time of Israel's first historical appearance to determine their particu-

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[14] For the sake of accuracy Gottwald's work should be described as equal parts of a Marxist philosophical model and sociological models. His main works of interest here are Norman Gottwald, *The Tribes of Yahweh* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1979). *The Hebrew Bible: A Socio-Literary Introduction* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985).

[15] Robert B. Coote and Keith W. Whitelam, *The Emergence of Early Israel in Historical Perspective* (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1987).

[16] James Flanagan, *David's Social Drama* (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1988).

[17] Coote and Whitelam, *The Emergence of Early Israel.*

lar settlement patterns. This type of procedure has been labeled as using a pattern to determine missing data, and as it was shown above this type of procedure is at best problematic. The problem with it is that these patterns are as much a function of the historian's psyche as the actual historical events. A further problem with Coote and Whitelam's work is that they have disregarded considerable data, especially whatever data is in the biblical text. The corresponding decrease in knowledge will offset whatever advances in knowledge are obtained from the use of sociological models.

The work of Coote and Whitelam, and also Gottwald, demonstrates what to this author is the main problem with using only one large macroscopic model. Rarely, if ever, are social or historical events, including the events of the Ancient Near East, so simple that their nature can be adequately explained on the basis of data obtained from one model. Events are the result of a multitude of causes, and these multiple causes cannot be encompassed with one model. In other words, while the particular criteria that a model uses may be important, it is not and cannot be all important.

The second form of sociological model usage is exemplified by works in which models are more limited in scope. In this type of usage the purpose of a model is to increase historical knowledge by increasing the amount of available information. While this additional information has to be integrated by a historical synthesis in order to be used in a reconstruction, its addition to the overall body of information is beneficial. Also, models used in this way do not require an underlying Positivistic philosophy or the search for patterns in history. While such a method does require a scholar to acquire a competency in sociology, it does facilitate an improved understanding of the Ancient Near East.

## Conclusion—Practical Considerations

Until now this paper has been largely theoretical. Yet, historical reconstructions, especially those of the Ancient Near East; are made by individuals who are generally unaware of the different theoretical positions. As a rule orientalists tend to rather naively incorporate someone else's theory instead of becoming sufficiently competent in that area to understand the differences in various theories. Thus, a need exists to show that the theory presented here can be incorporated into practical considerations.

The first consideration is a restatement of a conclusion reached elsewhere by many other scholars. This conclusion is that models are an intrinsic aspect of historical reconstruction. They are used by every historian whether or not he or she explicitly states them. They function as hermeneutical constructs in that they are used in order to make sense of events that are not well understood. Explanations or apologetic defenses for the use of models are unnecessary as they only belabor a mute point. Instead of such explanations a historian should explain why particular models were used as well as why they are appropriate for individual situations. The question of whether or not a general model has relevance in a particular situation is a vital issue which unfortunately is rarely addressed.

A second significant conclusion is that historical reconstruction cannot be made into an empirical science. Since reconstruction incorporates models, and models tend toward distorting the specific circumstances of an event, an event cannot be depicted exactly or with exact laws. While general historical laws are

usually cited as a rationale for parts of a reconstruction, such laws have enough exceptions that they cannot be considered as empirical.

Other reasons also exist for this conclusion. Historical knowledge concerns data about events which can not be studied directly. Instead, knowledge must be gleaned from evidence concerning an event. This knowledge is secondary and thus not empirical. Since historical knowledge, the basis of a historical reconstruction, is not empirical, historical reconstruction cannot be empirical. Further, the event cannot be repeated, meaning that knowledge is partial and cannot be accurately tested against other events. Further, a reconstruction requires that this knowledge be supplemented by the historian's theories about historical events. Because these theories emanate from and are influenced by the historian's own perception of events they too are not empirical. Thus, a historical reconstruction is not empirical. Perhaps, the most significant reason for this statement, however, is that history concerns the activities of people. People, unlike inanimate objects, do not always follow predictable patterns. While the actions of large groups taken as a whole tend to be more uniform, the history of such groups still concerns people and will always have anomalies.

A corollary of this point is that historical knowledge in general and concerning the Ancient Near East in particular cannot be made empirical or exact. Despite implied claims by some scholars to the contrary, historical knowledge cannot be made empirical by achieving a certain level of knowledge. Instead, all that can be accomplished is to increase historical knowledge by increasing the amount of available data.

Any reconstruction which attempts to achieve historical knowledge is a process of grouping data in a way that best explains all of the relevant data. Despite how thorough a reconstruction may be, in each case a certain amount of data will stand as evidence against that reconstruction. Thus, historical knowledge is a process of weighing evidence and determining the most likely way an event happened.

A spin-off from this corollary is that every reconstruction is in some manner uncertain because it has a certain amount of evidence which weighs against it. While on occasion the evidence against a reconstruction is so slight that is generally ignored, serious evidence can usually be brought to bear against a reconstruction. This observation is especially true for the study of the Ancient Near East.

A third consideration is the idea that one model or one historical system can comprise a framework for every historical event should be discarded. The historical equivalent of Physics' Grand Unifying Theory does not exist. The problem with the macroscopic model is that it was formed from a study of all history. When it is applied to specific examples it has little flexibility for the interpretation of data and events. Instead, models of a smaller scale should be used as this type of model tends to interpret the data with less distortion than a larger model. If such a procedure is eclectic, it is still superior to a macroscopic model that gives precedent to the model rather than the data.

The final consideration is that those individuals who would reconstruct historical aspects of the Ancient Near East should at the very least be influenced by philosophical theory. Historians should spend enough time studying relevant philosophers so that they are at least aware of problems that affect historical reconstruction.

A study of scholarship concerned with reconstruction will show that most scholars are unaware of the works of relevant philosophers. An example of this

problem is the recent work by Baruch Halpern.[18] To his credit Halpern has dealt with and demonstrated more awareness of philosophical theory than any of his contemporaries, and perhaps more than anyone since Albright. Yet, one searches in vain for mention of important works by Gadamer, Paul Ricouer, Raymond Aron, Hayden White or even Maurice Mandelbaum. While Collingwood is mentioned, Halpern misconstrued his contribution to the subject.[19] The result is that Halpern attempts to reconstruct Israelite history by correcting for Deuteronomistic distortions. He attempts to correct for these distortions by filtering the biblical accounts through his understanding of the culture in which the accounts were produced. Despite the fact that he produced adequate reconstructions, and his work has been reasonably well received, such a procedure is obviously untenable. As with many other works a more thorough study of philosophy would have prevented these errors.

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[18] Baruch Halpern, *The First Historians* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988).

[19] For the record, Collingwood's work is a reaction against the Positivism of his day. Halpern's attempt to correct Collingwood's relativism to make it more Positivistic is entirely misplaced. Halpern, *The First Historians*, 15. Also, Collingwood, *The Idea of History*.

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# The Guard at the Tomb (*Gos. Pet.* 8:28-11:49 and Matt 27:62-66; 28:2-4, 11-16): A Case of Intertextuality?

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*Gospel of Peter* 8:28-11:49 (hereafter, *GosPet*) forms the climax of the extant gospel: A Christ of gigantic dimensions emerges from the newly-opened tomb flanked by two huge heavenly beings. The actual moment of Christ's resurrection is witnessed by a party of Roman soldiers and Jewish leaders who have been guarding the heavily sealed tomb. According to several recent studies of the *GosPet*, here in *GosPet* 8:28-11:49, we see "all the proper features of a miraculous epiphany story," which, because the form is well preserved, "could be very old."[1] Furthermore, the Petrine story of the guard is said to be the source taken up by Matthew (Matt 27:62-66; 28:2-4, 11-16) and altered to suit his editorial requirements. These claims about the relationship between the Gospels of Matthew and Peter have provided the impetus the the present study. In this paper, two issues will be examined: First, the claim, based on observations about its form, that the *GosPet*'s version of the guard legend is older than Matthew's and was essentially the source used by Matthew; and, second, the question of whether these two texts are linked by a direct literary relationship—i.e., is this a case of intertextuality?

The earliest version of the argument that *GosPet* 8:28-11:49 is older than the parallel in Matthew appeared in the dissertation of B. A. Johnson, "Empty Tomb Tradition in the Gospel of Peter (Ph.D. diss., Harvard, 1965). H. Koester relies on Johnson for some of his own argument in the 1980 article cited above.[2] Johnson's work then influenced J. Denker (1975)[3] and J. D. Crossan (1985 and 1988)[4] The

[1] Here citing H. Koester in his 1980 article, "Apocryphal and Canonical Gospels," *HTR* 73 (1980) 128, 129. Koester says further that "various parts of this story are in fact preserved in the canonical gospels; however, they have been inserted into different contexts and are fragments of an older story that only the *GosPet* has preserved intact." These so-called fragments "seem to be preserved," he says, in Mark 15:39, as the centurion's confession at the cross, in Matt 27:62-66 and 28:2-4, 11-15, as the guard at the tomb, and, finally, in Mark 9:2-8 [Matt 17:2-6], as the transfiguration. For discussion of the other "fragments," see S. E. Schaeffer, "The *Gospel of Peter*, the Canonical Gospels, and Oral Tradition" (Ph.D. diss., Union Theological Seminary, NY, 1991).

[2] These same points are reiterated by Koester in *Ancient Christian Gospels* (Philadelphia: Trinity, 1990).

[3] Denker uses Johnson's analysis in making a case for the *GosPet*'s independence from the canonical gospels; however, he does not agree either with Johnson or Crossan that the *GosPet* is early. J. Denker, *Die Theologiegeschichtliche Stellung des Petrusevangeliums* (Frankfurt: Lang, 1975).

*GosPet*'s resurrection account is also considered to be early in an article by Walter (1972), who apparently was unfamiliar with Johnson's work.[5]

The point made in these recent studies is that *GosPet* 8:28-11:49 has "all the proper features" of an epiphany.[6] A number of these features also appear in Matthew's I have noted in parentheses in the chart that follows.

Form of the Epiphany:[7]

A. Introduction of the situation: The guard is placed at the tomb.
*GosPet* 8:28-9:34 (cf. Matt 27:62-66)

B. The event is described: The guard sees angels/an angel.
*GosPet* 9:35-44 (cf. Matt 28:1-4)

C. The witnesses report what they saw: The guard makes its report.
*GosPet* 11:45 (cf. Matt 28:11-15)

Motifs:[8]

1. Time announced (*epiphōskō*).
2. Cosmic sign (*phōnē megalē, GosPet; megas seismos*, Matthew).
3. Descent of divine beings (two men, *GosPet*; one angel, Matthew).
4. Light (*poly phengos, GosPet; astrapē*, Matthew).
5. The tomb is opened (*aph' heautou, GosPet*; by the angel, Matthew).

Where the event itself is described, *GosPet* 9:35-11:43 and Matt 28:1-4 contain a number of agreements in motifs 2 to 4.[9] The *GosPet* has additional epiphanic motifs: figures of great size (10:40), the anguish of the soldiers (*agiōniōntes megalōs*, 11:45), and the confession of the centurion and the soldiers (*alēthōs huios ēn theou*, 11:45).

Although Matthew's guard story strongly resembles the *GosPet*'s epiphany in its broad outline and in certain details, Johnson, Koester, and Crossan argue that Matthew interrupted the epiphany at the crucial moment of the resurrection because he preferred to follow Mark. Instead of a resurrection-as-epiphany, Matthew adapted the women's discovery of the empty tomb from Mark; thus the original epiphany-to-the-guard story took second place to Mark's account. As Johnson says, because we have the *GosPet* for comparison, we can now see that Matthew took an original "resurrection authentication story" and "reduced a proof of the resurrection to an apologetic anti-grave robbery legend.... In fact, Mt

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[4] J. D. Crossan, *Four Other Gospels: Shadows on the Contours of Canon* (New York: Winston, 1985) and *The Cross that Spoke* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988). Crossan holds that within the *GosPet* can be found a pre-70 C. E. text, "The Cross Gospel," which, he believes, is the source behind the canonical passion and resurrection narratives. Crossan's hypothesis is discussed in Chap. III of Schaeffer, "*Gospel of Peter*," which makes a case for seeing the *GosPet* as a unified document.

[5] N. Walter, "Eine vormattäische Schilderung der Auferstehung Jesu," *NTS* 19 (1972-73) 415-29.

[6] Koester, "Apocryphal Gospels" 128.

[7] Based on Johnson, "Empty Tomb" 58.

[8] See Johnson, "Empty Tomb" 80-81 and Denker, *Petrusevangelium* 44.

[9] Johnson, "Empty Tomb" 84, 87.

has given an apologetic bent to legendary (epiphanic) material."[10] The *GosPet*, in contrast, "retains its tradition of an epiphany story which [still] functions as a demonstration of the resurrection of Jesus."[11] Thus, "the material in no way allows for an explanation which assumes GP's dependence upon Matthew."[12]

Johnson, Koester, and Crossan have based their conclusions on the assumption that if there are two versions of a tradition—version A, which displays "all the proper features" of a particular form, and version B, which is less formally satisfying—the more "proper" version (A) is the earlier of the two. This assumption is not self-evident. The converse relationship could be the true one: Certain raw or primitive features in version B were re-shaped over time to become smoother and better integrated in version A in order to make a more "proper" and neater package? To take an example from outside biblical studies, in his classic work on oral tradition, J. Vansina commented that the results of field research showed, "The more perfect the structure of a text, the more likely it is that it has been altered for artistic reasons."[13]

Although there are probably numerous examples of smoothing out a passage in the synoptic gospels, one comes to mind from the passion narrative itself. In the scene of the mockery by the soldiers, Matthew and Mark have different arrangements in the order of events:[14]

| | Mark (15:15-19) | | Matthew (27:26-31) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15 | he delivered (*paredōken*) him *to be crucified* | 26 | he delivered (*paredōken*) him *to be crucified* | A |
| 17 | they *clothed* (*enididyskousin*) him in purple (*porphyran*) | 28 | they *stripped* (*ekdysantes*) him and *put on* (*periethēkan*) him a scarlet *robe* (*chlamyda*) | B |
| | they *put on* (*perititheasin*) him a thorny crown | 29 | they *put* [*on*] (*epethēkan*) a crown of thorns *upon his head* and a *reed* in his right hand | C |
| 18 | they saluted him | | kneeling before him they *mocked* (*enepaixan*) him saying | D |
| | "Hail, King of the Jews" | | "Hail, King of the Jews" | |

[10] Ibid. 57 and 102-3.

[11] Ibid. 103.

[12] Johnson, "Empty Tomb" 103.

[13] J. Vansina, *Oral Tradition, A Study in Historical Methodology* (Chicago: Aldine, 1965) 64.

[14] While Johnson does not deny that Matthew is dependent on canonical Mark, Koester, "Mark's Gospel" 55, believes that Matthew used an earlier form of Mark, which he calls "Proto-Mark."

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19 | they struck him on the *head* with a *reed* and knelt down in homage | 30 | they struck him with the *reed* and spat *on his head* | C′ |
| | and when they had *mocked* (*enepaixan*) him | 31 | and when they had *mocked* (*enepaixan*) him | |
| | they *took off* (*exedysan*) the purple | | having *stripped off* (*ekdysantes*) the *robe* (*chlamyda*) | B′ |
| 20 | and *put on* (*enedysan*) him his own clothes | | they *put on* (*enedysan*) him his own clothes | |
| | and *led* him *out* (*exagousin*) *to be crucified* | | and *led* him *away* (*apēgagon*) *to be crucified* | A′ |

Mark's version of the mockery is, essentially, straightforward prose, while Matthew's version has "all the proper features" of an almost-perfect chiasm. If, as most scholars think, Matthew used Mark, then Matthew's more elegant version is later than Mark's.[15] Somewhere in the retelling, the account now found in Matthew became more formally structured. By analogy, in the case of the guard story, is it not possible that the elements of the legend in Matthew may have been reshaped in the retelling to become a fully-formed and unified epiphany story in the *GosPet*—precisely because of the storyteller's interest in the miraculous per se?

According to Koester, Johnson, and Crossan, Matthew used the Markan empty tomb story as the centerpiece of his resurrection narrative, and we agree with this view. But, having said this, why do they force us to conclude that Matthew has truncated[16] an independent story of a resurrection-epiphany? If Matthew knew a complete story, why should he omit it? After the epiphany to the guard, he could have added the empty tomb account in a sequence similar to the *GosPet*. Matthew does not shy away from including angels and cosmic phenomena in his gospel. Surely an account of Jesus' resurrection would have provided a more satisfying conclusion to the gospel than the difficult narrative we have before us; Matthew's angel rolls back the stone to reveal that the grave is already empty (28:6). Surely the appearance of the Risen One to the women who followed him (28:9) is less suitable as proof than an appearance to neutral witnesses like the guard. Compared to the epiphany in the *GosPet*, the Matthean version of the resurrection qualifies as the more difficult reading. If that criterion has any meaning, the narrative in Matthew has the better claim to priority. It makes much more sense to see the history of the tradition flowing from Matthew to the *GosPet*, that is, from lesser to greater interest in providing proof of the resurrection, rather than the other way 'round.

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[15] Griesbachians would have to deal with the question of why Mark would choose to undo such a neat arrangement.

[16] Johnson says "emasculated."

As a proof, the *GosPet*'s version of the legend presents a "failsafe apologetic."[17] The heavily-guarded, seven-sealed tomb is not empty; when the stone rolls away the *neaniskoi* enter immediately and emerge with the Risen One. The company of witnesses, made up of both neutral and hostile persons, sees and hears everything. To underscore that fact, the *GosPet* repeatedly uses verbs of perception to tell the story:

9:34 The crowds came so that they might *see* (*hina idōsin*) the sealed tomb

35b A loud *noise* (*megalē phōnē*) was heard in heaven

36 The guards *saw* (*eidon*) the heavens open

10:38 So *seeing* (*idontes*), the soldiers woke up the centurion

39 When [they] told them what they *saw* (*eidon*), again they *see* (*horōsin*)

41 They *heard* (*ēkouon*) a voice

42 A response was *heard* (*ēkoueto*)

11:43 Again, the heavens were *seen* (*phainontai*) to be opened

45 *Seeing* (*idontes*) these things ... they told everything that they had *seen* (*eidon*)

47 ... command the centurion and the soldiers to tell no one what they had *seen* (*eidon*)

By using an abundance of perceptual verbs, the *GosPet* underscores the point that the guard, unlike Matthew's, did indeed see and hear the epiphany. In addition, *GosPet* 9:35 notes that the soldiers guarded "two by two" (*ana dyo*), to insure a changing watch that would remain alert, and in 10:38 we are told that the soldiers "woke up" (*exypnisan*) the centurion and the elders. The latter group missed the prologue, but they are wide awake to see the main event in 10:39-40. The loud noise (9:35) and the strong light (*poly phengos*) coming from the heavenly men (9:36) add further details to insure that no one could have been drowsing or that it would have been too dark to see the resurrection.

The Matthean account stands in marked contrast to the *GosPet*. While the guard falls down in fear, Matthew never says they "saw" anything (whether or not he means that they did). The verb "to see" is used only three times in the scene. Twice in speeches by the angel, once by Jesus.

28:6 The angel commands the women to *see* (*idete*) in the present the place where Jesus lay, to see the empty tomb.

7 And they are told, "you shall *see*" (*opsesthe*) in the future the risen Jesus in Galilee.

10 Jesus says, "There they shall *see* (*opsontai*) me."

Instead, the Matthean account appears to emphasize verbs of saying.

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[17] A phrase used by W. L. Craig in his article, "The Guard at the Tomb," *NTS* 30 (1984) 278.

28:6 He has risen just as he *said* (*eipon*).[18]

7 Go quickly and tell (*eipate*) his disciples that he has risen ... and ... you shall see him.

10 Go, tell/proclaim to (*apangeilate*) my brothers that they shall see me.

11 The guard came into the city to tell (*apēngeilan*) everything that happened (*hapanta ta genomena*).[19]

If vv. 5-10 are removed from Matthew's account (the Markan and special Matthean material), the remaining verses about the guard (1-4 and 11-15) contain no verbs of seeing, only verbs of saying. On the basis of vocabulary alone, Matthew's description of the event and the report of the witnesses bears rather remote resemblance to an epiphany story in general, and to the Petrine epiphany in particular.

If the original tradition Matthew used was an epiphany story, why does the canonical account of the guard legend lack any traces of the language of vision? Instead, the central verses (28:5-10), borrowed from Mark, report that the first witnesses to the resurrection "saw" only an empty tomb (28:6), and after that they were "met" by the Risen Christ (28:9). The witnesses are then told, twice, in parallel language, to proclaim, not so much what they had *seen*—and even touched in 28:9—(at least Matthew does not say so), but what they had *heard*. They are instructed to *tell* the *words* of the angel to other disciples that they have been promised a future seeing of the Risen Christ: "They *shall* see *him*" (28:7); "they *shall* see *me*" (28:10). The promise of seeing the Risen Christ, not proving the resurrection, is the point. Proclamation of the gospel is also the point. The promise of 28:7 and 10 is then fulfilled in 28:16-20, and, if the disciples in Matthew are representatives of Matthew's readers, then those who hear the gospel of Matthew are promised a future vision of the Risen Christ as well.

The theme of proclamation continues beyond 28:5-10. In the report of the guard to the Jewish leaders, Matt 28:11 says, "while [the women] were going, behold some of the guard came into the city [and] announced (*apēngeilan*) to the chief priests everything that had happened." The verb is deliberately chosen. In 28:10, the Risen Christ told the women, "Go, tell (*apangeilate*) my brothers that they should go to Galilee...." Now, in 28:11, the guard "announces" its own version of the events at the tomb. The women's announcement about the empty tomb results in the fulfilling of Christ's promise to the community—and the spreading of the good news through the true story of Jesus. The guard's announcement about the empty tomb results in the suppressing of the news, corruption, and the spreading of bad news through a false report. Further, the guards are taught to spread their false story by the Jewish authorities as a paralleling the disciples' teaching, given by Jesus in Matt 28:20, which is not an epiphany motif.

Elsewhere Matthew has crafted his gospel carefully. This care includes his choice of vocabulary.[20] In the light of our reading, Matthew seems to have used equal care here. If this be the case, his resurrection account (27:62-28:15) moves in

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18 This fulfills the prophecy recalled in 27:63 and proves that Jesus' *word* is true.

19 Note that they do not tell what they have seen. Compare *GosPet* 11:45, 47.

20 See D. Senior, *The Passion Narrative According to Matthew* (Louvain: Leuven, 1975) passim.

the direction of apologetic, but it is not just an apologetic. Through the promise given doubly to the women by the angel in 28:7 and Jesus in 28:10 ("There you/they will see him/me"), Matthew seeks to reassure the post-resurrection community that it will continue to be in relationship with the Risen Christ. The Matthean narrative is carefully and subtly crafted in order to serve both pastoral and apologetic purposes. Read in this light, Matthew's account of the guard at the tomb and the resurrection can scarcely be called a failed or a flawed account.

Is Matthew's resurrection narrative earlier than the *GosPet*'s? Very probably it is. Matthew's account of the resurrection, including the legend of the guard, seems more concerned with proclaiming than with proving the resurrection, although the guard story appears to be moving in the latter direction. The *GosPet*'s account, with its fully-awake neutral and hostile eyewitnesses, concentrates completely on establishing proof. *GosPet* 9:35-11:47 may have the form of an epiphany, but its detailed description of the resurrection play-by-play and moment-to-moment looks like an effort to fill in the holes[21] that an account like Matthew's, and certainly Mark's, clearly leaves open. Conversely, Matthew seems unconcerned about plugging holes in his narrative. The desire to prove or authenticate the resurrection, rather than to proclaim it, is an apologetic motive *par excellence*. Even if we eliminate as later redaction certain verses from the *GosPet* 9:35-11:47 because they seem apologetically motivated, as Johnson does,[22] the remaining story still reads like a proof authenticated by eyewitnesses. The verbs of seeing permeate the story at its most basic level (9:[34],36; 10:38,39; 11:43,45,47).

If, in reaction to the Christian proclamation "Jesus is risen," unbelieving Jews spread a rumor that the disciples stole the body from the tomb (as we may infer from Matt 28:15), Christians would seek to provide a rebuttal to this charge. The Christian response could have come through a legend that the tomb was guarded and so the body could not have been stolen.[23] One version of that legend appears in Matthew, but it still does not show Jesus' rising from the dead. The tradition may have continued as follows:[24] Gradually, the legend was re-told by Christian storytellers through a version in which the Risen One actually emerges from the tomb. With successive retellings the story was further embellished to include more and more supernatural elements. Finally, its form became more stylized, so that the events occurring prior to the women's discovery of the empty tomb were now fully narrated in the form of an epiphany.

In this analysis of the history of the tradition, the earlier version of the story had more gaps in it. In Mark, a gap of at least twenty-four hours intervenes between the burial at sundown on Friday (Mark 15:42) and the women's arrival at sundown on Saturday or sunrise on Sunday (Mark 16:17).[25] Matthew narrows

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21 K. Beyschlag ("Das Petrusevangelium," in *Die verborgene Ueberlieferung von Christus* [München: Siebenstern Taschenbuch, 1969] 44) suggests that filling in the narrative gaps explains some of the composition of the *GosPet*.

22 Johnson, "Empty Tomb" 65, 71, considers vv. 8:30 and 9:34 to be redactional additions to the original epiphany.

23 Craig, "Guard at the Tomb" 274-75, 278, suggests a similar line of thought.

24 While I describe the rationale behind the process, I do not suggest that these were reflective, deliberate steps.

25 The time indications are notoriously difficult to determine in both Mark 16:1-2 and Matt 28:1. The fact that the early Church gathered for worship on Sunday morning probably grew out of the historical memory. One cannot, however, discount the possible influence of the symbolic connection between the resurrection and the sunrise.

the gap somewhat in having the Jewish leaders approach Pilate on Saturday morning (Matt 27:62) in order to keep the disciples from claiming fulfillment of Jesus' prophecy that he would rise "after three days" (28:63). Meanwhile, the tomb has been left unguarded overnight. It seems highly implausible that the guard would seal an empty tomb; nevertheless, the time gap remains.

In the *GosPet*, every gap is filled. Following the burial, the Jewish leaders go to Pilate with no time lapse noted, and, after sealing the tomb, the guard pitches a tent (*GosPet* 8:33), apparently intending to spend the (Friday) night. The crowds arrive to see the sealed tomb "early, when the Sabbath was dawning" (*GosPet* 9:34), i.e., on Friday evening.[26] Finally, the events that culminate in the resurrection begin "in the night in which the Lord's Day dawned" (*GosPet* 9:35), i.e., in the wee hours of late Saturday night and Sunday after midnight. Thus we can see that the narrator does not allow any gaps in the sequence of chronology or action. This moment-by-moment time notation provides structure for the narrative and at the same time fulfills an apologetic function.[27]

In addition to the activity at the tomb, as a further proof, and filling in another gap, *GosPet* 7:27 carefully notes the whereabouts of the disciples prior to the resurrection. They stay in hiding from the time of the burial until after the tomb is sealed and guarded (*nyktos kai hēmeras hēos tou sabbatou*).[28] The disciples were nowhere near the tomb; thus, they could not have stolen the body. Thus the narrative assures us that the burial site is undisturbed by hoaxsters and that the resurrection is verified by objective witnesses.

In light of the foregoing discussion, two serious questions arise in response to the claim that Matthew used the guard tradition in the *GosPet*: (1) If Matthew knew a tradition that offered objective proof of the resurrection and showed definitely that the disciples could not have stolen the body, why did he refuse to use this evidence? Simply saying that he preferred Mark does not answer the question. Why should Matthew prefer the tradition of the women at the empty tomb, in spite of the difficulties this tradition presented for his apologetic aims, to a tradition that would solve many of these difficulties? (2) Why would Matthew edit the guard tradition in such a way as to *create* gaps in the narrative which were not found in the original tradition? It seems highly unlikely that such a careful writer as Matthew would have made such poor, incomprehensible choices if he had had the *GosPet*'s tradition close at hand. Moreover, the vast differences between these two documents in vocabulary and theme, as already discussed, severely weaken any suggestion that what we are seeing is a case of intertextuality *in either direction*.

In the foregoing discussion, we have precluded a relationship of literary dependence between Matthew and the *GosPet*, and we have presented evidence for regarding the *GosPet* as the later document. But what more can we say about the relationship between these episodes? Their differences are indeed great, but the striking similarities of plot, setting, and characters prevent us from asserting that the two are independent of one another—a position that has also had its

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26 The Jewish method of reckoning time is probably used here.

27 Concern about time figures prominently throughout the *GosPet*'s passion narrative as well, again, with both structural and apologetic aims. See Chap. VI of Schaëffer, "*Gospel of Peter*."

28 Whether the "Sabbath" refers to the next day or eight days later has been debated. In either case, the point seems to be to remove the disciples from the neighborhood of the tomb.

champions.[29] The alternative to literary dependence, however, need not be independence, because this is an equally unsatisfying option.

The solution to the dilemma of the two guard legends, we propose, is a relationship of dependence through oral tradition.[30] In his classic work, *Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical Methodology*, J. Vansina explains this relationship:

> If the texts of two versions [of a tradition] bear close enough resemblance between them by mutual borrowing or by common derivation from an earlier text, then the testimony may be said to be dependent. The same holds true of different chains of tradition, if analysis shows that at some time in the past they formed the same chain.[31]

Because we have only two traditions available, we lack the data to determine precisely whether the *GosPet* and Matthew are "derived from" a common ancestral tradition, or whether the guard legend in Matthew is the ancestral tradition behind the *GosPet*.[32] Nevertheless, in either case, Vansina would call these two episodes "dependent" traditions. Elsewhere, I have developed a view of the *GosPet* as a product of oral tradition that is "dependent" on the canonical gospels.[33] In the present instance of the guard legend, dependence through oral tradition serves to explain the similarities of plot, setting, and character, as well as the variations and freedom in vocabulary and theme between the *GosPet* and Matthew. If the relationship is non-literal, but still dependent orally, here is a case of having our "intertextuality" and eating it, too.

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[29] Most notably, Denker, *Petrusevangelium*.

[30] R. E. Brown hinted at such a relationship in "The *Gospel of Peter* and Canonical Priority," *NTS* 33 (1987) 321-43.

[31] Vansina, *Methodology*, 120.

[32] We have already suggested a possible history of the tradition which may have developed from a "Matthean" ancestor, pp. 11-12, above.

[33] Schaeffer, "*Gospel of Peter*," especially chaps. V and VI.

# The "Protevangelium of James" as an "Historia": The Insufficiency of the "Infancy Gospel" Category

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## Introduction[1]

The procrustean category of "infancy gospel" with which contemporary scholarship approaches the "Protevangelium of James" (PJ) impedes understanding of the text.[2] PJ is neither formally a gospel, nor is it primarily concerned with the birth and infancy of Jesus. The central editorial interest lies in interpretation of Jewish historical traditions as recorded in the Hebrew Scriptures. This concern situates PJ in second-century controversies and points to the historical significance of the text. PJ expresses a Christian hermeneutics, in which the Lucan theological premise of *Heilsgeschichte* is applied to the exegesis of historical material in the Hebrew Scriptures as well as Christian literature.

Pursuant to documenting the inadequacy of the "infancy gospel" category, this study essays a "paradigm-free" stylistic analysis. In terms of literary type, PJ's self-designation as an "historia" should be taken seriously. The term "historia" had a fixed meaning in Christian exegesis and was understood by the author as a literary genre whose function can be characterized as "exegetical narrative." By correlating this finding with currents in second-century Christianity,

[1] This paper emerged from a seminar in Christian Origins under the direction of Paul A. Mirecki at the University of Kansas. The author has benefited from Dr. Mirecki's review of several earlier drafts. Dr. Dennis R. MacDonald has also contributed valuable editorial suggestions.

[2] The title "Protevangelium" is not original. It was given to the text in 1552 by the French humanist Guliel Postel, who "discovered" it on a trip to the Near East. In a sense the formal misclassification of PJ begins with Postel, who regarded the text as the supposed missing infancy narrative from the Gospel of Mark. The only modern critical edition of PJ is that of De Strycker, and Smid points out certain deficiencies in this text; De Strycker himself acknowledged that his edition was "vorlaufigen." The main shortcoming is that De Strycker's text reflects a miniscule percentage of the extant manuscripts and versions of PJ. The most extensive listing of MSS is that of Daniels, supplemented by Zervos. Smid's work is the only modern commentary on PJ. *vide* E. de Strycker, *La forme la plus ancienne du Protevangile de Jacques* (Brussels: 1961); H. R. Smid, *Protevangelium Jacobi: A Commentary* (Assen: 1965); B. Daniels, "The Greek Manuscript Tradition of the Protevangelium Jacobi" (Duke Ph.D. diss., 1956); G. Zervos, "Prolegomena to a Critical Edition of the Genesis Marias (Protevangelium Jacobi)" (Duke Ph.D. diss., 1986).

it appears that PJ's central themes reflect a dialogue with extra- and intra-Christian disputes. The significance of the text is not, as the "infancy gospel" approach would suggest, narrowly confined to the traditions it contains about the birth of Jesus, but rather concerns the broader issue of how Jewish history was understood by this early Christian author.

## I. The "Infancy Gospel" genre and PJ

Contemporary scholarship is virtually unanimous in its literary taxonomy of PJ as an "infancy gospel."[3] The "Infancy Gospel of Thomas" is regarded as the other exemplar of this genre, while Matthew 1-2 and Luke 1-2 are understood as literary prototypes.

Perkins defines "infancy gospels" as "tales of the miraculous birth of Jesus and his equally miraculous powers as a child."[4] From this definition, and from the list of instances noted above, the following two points may be said to characterize an "infancy gospel":

1. The primary editorial interest is "christological"—Jesus is the main character in the narrative. This is the "gospel" component.

2. The narrative is primarily concerned with the birth and early years of the divine child. This is the "infancy" component.

Given these criteria, classification of PJ as an "infancy gospel" is not tenable. Narrative concerning Jesus figures in only five of the 25 chapters, representing one-fifth of the text. Moreover, the largest block of material concerning the miraculous character of the birth (the "I, Joseph" first-person narrative at 18:2) does not appear in the earliest manuscripts[5]. The rest of the text concerns Joachim and Anna, Mary and Joseph, and the martyrdom of Zacharias. The narrative concerning these characters unfolds without any reference or necessary connection to Jesus. In addition, only in the case of the birth and early years of Mary is there any other material that represents an "infancy" tradition. It is therefore manifest that PJ is neither a "gospel," in the sense that Jesus is not the central focus, nor is it primarily an "infancy" narrative.

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[3] There is a virtual scholarly *communio opinionis* concerning this position. PJ is classified as an "infancy gospel" in the still-influential 1899 *Ante-Nicene Fathers* (New York: 1899). This is the approach taken by Hennecke-Schneemelcher in the 1959 *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen*, which was followed in the English translation entitled *New Testament Apocrypha* (Philadelphia: 1963-65). This classic work fixed PJ's status as an "infancy gospel," and subsequently this is how the text has been treated in all major reference works: the *Jerome Biblical Commentary*, the *International Standard Bible Encyclopedia*, the *Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible*, the *Eerdman's Bible Dictionary*, and the *Encyclopedia of Early Christianity*. Stephen Gero in his 1988 *ANRW* article also classifies PJ as an "apocryphal birth narrative." *vide* S. Gero, "Apocryphal Gospels: A Survey of Textual and Literary Problems," in *Aufsteig und Niedergang der römischen Welt* Teil II, Band 25.5 (Berlin/New York: 1988, pp. 3969-3996).

[4] P. Perkins, "Infancy Gospels," *New Jerome Biblical Commentary* (Garden City: 1990, p. 1066).

[5] This material is not found in Papyrus Bodmer V, the earliest extant MS, or in the Ethiopic version, which reflects a very early stage of textual development. *vide* O. Cullman and A. J. B. Higgins, "The Protevangelium of James," *New Testament Apocrypha* (Philadelphia: 1963-65) for text of PBod V, and M. Chaine, *Apocrypha de Beata Maria Virgin* (Leipzig: 1909), for Ethiopic version.

Understanding PJ as an "infancy gospel" has created a climate of disinterest in the text. The "infancy gospel" genre is regarded as an especially popular, derivative, and historically unreliable branch of early Christian literature. This is the position reflected in the *Ante-Nicene Fathers*: "The supplementary character of the earliest of these writings is obvious. But what a contrast between the impressive silence of the New Testament narratives, and the garulity, not to say indelicacy, of these detailed descriptions of the Nativity!"[6]

This general bias extends to PJ, since scholars read it as a christocentric text with unreliable traditions. Commentators are therefore dismissive. Brown describes PJ as "obviously folkloric" and "highly legendary."[7] Goodspeed writes that "No gospel is more completely fiction."[8] Van Stempvoort concludes that "...the Protevangelium of James is exposed as a fiction."[9] These conclusions follow from the initial premise—if PJ is a christocentric text written to pass on traditions about the birth and infancy of Jesus, and if those traditions are historically suspect, then the text can be disregarded.[10] Given, however, that this premise is flawed, it is necessary to re-evaluate PJ outside the christological framework. The infancy traditions in PJ are in service to a larger editorial agenda, specifically, the development of a Christian hermeneutics in which Jewish history (as recorded in the Hebrew Scriptures) is employed as an exegetical vista from which to understand Christian origins.

Some commentators, noting that PJ is one of the earliest witnesses to the doctrine of Mary's *in partu* virginity, have suggested that PJ is an "infancy gospel" with a mariological emphasis. Mary is certainly more prominent in the text than Jesus, figuring in 15 of the 25 chapters and three of five major narrative blocks. As will be suggested below, PJ does reflect certain second-century controversies concerning Mary. Nevertheless, it is clear that PJ is not primarily interested in expounding mariological themes. Much of the text that has a definite mariological interest is demonstrably secondary.[11] Further, PJ lacks central characteristics of other early Christian witnesses to Mary's *in partu* virginity.[12] Understanding Mary as the organizing principle of the text leaves both the opening and the closing chapters unintelligible.

Both the standard "infancy gospel" approach, and the mariological variation upon this theme, are inadequate to the task of understanding PJ. To appreciate the text, one must attempt to approach it without the traditional categories.

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6 *ANF*, Vol. VII, p. 367.

7 R. E. Brown, *Birth of the Messiah* (New York: Doubleday, 1977, p. 33).

8 E. J. Goodspeed, *History and Literature of Early Christianity* (Chicago: 1966, p. 58).

9 P. A. Van Stempvoort, "The Protevangelium Jacobi, the Sources of its Theme and Style," *Studia Evangelica* Vol. III, Part II (Berlin: 1964, p. 425).

10 Except, possibly, as evidence of one stage in early popular christology.

11 Thus 7:5, emphasizing her painless delivery, which is not in the Ethiopic version, as well as substantial blocks of chapters 18 and 19 which do not appear in P Bod V.

12 Both the 19th "Ode of Solomon," as well as the "Ascension of Isaiah," stress the *absence* of a midwife when Mary gave birth to Jesus in order to emphasize the miraculous character of the event. *vide* H. Drijvers, "The 19th Ode of Solomon," *Journal of Theological Studies* (n.s. 31, October 1980: 337-355).

## II. Literary Analysis of PJ

PJ employs a stylistic technique Van Stempvoort calls "*Zweiheitsgesetz*," the "law of duplication."[13] This literary device presents characters and events as recapitulations of themes already familiar to readers from earlier traditions. In PJ, *Zweiheitsgesetz* is evident in internal parallels as well as utilization of LXX imagery. This functions to underscore the continuity of events in Christian history with their Jewish antecedents.

The first four of the five major narrative blocks of the text exhibit an A-B, A'-B' "diptych" structure in which each "literary panel" possesses similar elements. The first block concerns a "Holy Couple" (Joachim and Anna, prototypes drawn from Daniel and I Samuel respectively,[14] which leads to the concern of the second block, the "Holy Infant" (Mary). The third block again concerns a "Holy Couple," (Joseph and Mary), which again leads to a "Holy Infant" (Jesus).

Within this overall two-part structure there are numerous internal parallels. Joachim is paralleled with Joseph twice. In 1:3-10, Joachim is reproached, as is Joseph in 15:6-16:1; in 4:9-5-4, Joachim verifies his righteousness, as does Joseph in 16:2-6. In the Greek text this parallel is even more obvious. At 5:1, and 16:3, the same words are used for "manifest" and "sin," in the same basic sequence.[15]

At 4:3-8, Joachim and Anna rejoice at their vindication; in 16:7, Joseph and Mary do the same. At 5:6, Anna expresses "exaltation" at the birth of Mary; at 19:3, the midwife expresses "exaltation" at the birth of Jesus. In this case, the Greek parallel is even more obvious. In both passages the identical expression is employed.[16]

This structure of "parallels within parallels" is too obvious a feature of the text to be accidental. The overall effect is to identify Joseph, Mary and Jesus as "character types" which are in continuity with their predecessors Joachim and Anna. Since the latter are obviously drawn from Jewish traditions, the understanding implicit in the narrative is that Christian origins "replicate" Jewish history.

This point becomes even clearer when intertextual parallels are examined. The childlessness of Joachim and Anna and their subsequent deliverance by divine intervention obviously recalls the Abraham cycle of Genesis. This parallel

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13 Van Stempvoort, *op. cit.*, p. 411.

14 "Joachim" is known from the opening verse of the pericope concerning Susanna and the Elders from the LXX additions to Daniel. PJ demonstrably reflects the influence of the Susanna narrative; *vide* Van Stempvoort, pp. 415-417. The parallels between Joachim in PJ and Joachim in the Susanna text include: 1) the name (spelled identically); 2) the description of "Joachim" as wealthy (the identical phrase is employed—"Iôakeim plousios sphodora"); 3) both have "respect" in Israel; and 4) both are associated with gardens. Similar parallels connect "Anna" with Hannah of 1 Samuel. The points of contact include: 1) the name (spelled identically); 2) the motif of childlessness; 3) both sing lengthy canticles; 4) both pray to God for a child. These parallels are quite obvious and would have been immediately evident to an audience familiar with the LXX. The Greek text of PJ throughout this article is taken from A. de Santos Otero, *Evangelicos Apocrifos* (Madrid: 1975); text of the LXX from L. Brenton, *The Septuagint with Apocrypha* (London: 1851).

15 Daniels, *op. cit.*, p. II.1.178, II.2.610.

16 Of course this is also an intertextual reference to the "Magnificat" of Lk 1:47, in which the exact phrase also appears. The point is that exaltation at the saving activity of God is a recurring feature of Jewish-Christian religious experience. At Lk 1:47, the Greek text reads *"Megalynei ē psychē mou tou kyrion..."*; at PJ 19:3, the phrase is *"Emegalynthē ē psychē mou sēmeron..."*

Joash in 2 Chronicles and Herod in PJ. Both narratives end with a prediction of vengeance. These links bind the two scenes together, and suggest to the reader that the experience of Zacharias the Christian martyr is a recapitulation of that of Zacharias the Jewish martyr.

Significantly, Jews referred to Zacharias as the "last martyr," since 2 Chronicles is the last book in the Jewish arrangement of the canon. Similarly, the author of PJ chooses this narrative to be the last scene in his text, again underscoring the recursive character of both the text and the events of Christian history.

PJ "conflates" elements of the Zacharias of 2 Chronicles with the character of the same name in the Lucan infancy narrative. This "conflation," however, is not an accidental result of careless source-utilization, but rather serves a narrative purpose. The text parallels Zacharias and Simeon, who according to PJ 24:10 was chosen by lot to succeed Zacharias in his priestly function (a function derived from the Lucan account). In Luke, Zacharias, the father of John the Baptist, is the figure who delivers a prophetic utterance[19] about John, while Simeon gives a similar prediction concerning Christ.[20] Thus PJ suggests the Zacharias/Simeon relation parallels that of John the Baptist/Jesus.

In summary, the author of PJ has drawn upon themes and images from the LXX as well as infancy traditions from Matthew and Luke to construct a narrative which stresses the recapitulation of Jewish history in the formative events of Christianity. These stylistic characteristics of PJ reflect assimilation of the Lucan theology of *Heilsgeschichte*, but without the christocentrism of Luke-Acts.[21] The distinction between PJ and an "infancy gospel" is here most evident, and it is therefore appropriate to turn to the issue of PJ's genre.

## III. Genre

Because scholars have traditionally approached PJ with the *a priori* category of an "infancy gospel," they have failed to ask whether the text provides any clue as to its genre. What literary designation is most consistent with the stylistic characteristics discussed above? As it happens, the text itself supplies the answer. The best classification for PJ is "historia," a term with a fixed meaning in early Christian exegesis.

The incipit of PJ reads *"en tais historiais tōn dōdeka phylōn tou Israel..."* This mention of the "histories" of Israel refers to the historical narratives of the Hebrew Scriptures as found in the LXX. This is one sense in which early Christians used the term "historia." In the "Constitutions of the Holy Apostles," a fourth century text, this is the meaning of the term: "For if thou hast a mind to

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19 The "Benedictus" of Lk.1:67-79, *NAB*, p. 81-82.

20 The "Nunc dimittis," LK 2:29-32. *NAB*, p. 83.

21 The Lucan infancy narrative upon which PJ draws is explicitly christocentric. The chief concern of Luke's account of the birth of Jesus is to demonstrate the convergence of Jewish history in the birth of the Messiah. This centrism of the person of Christ is absent in PJ. If the emphasis in Luke is upon the *person*, Jesus, the accent in PJ is upon the *thing*, Christianity. PJ is interested in working out a "theology of history" in which Christianity is understood as the culmination and inheritor of the traditions of Judaism as reflected in the Hebrew Scriptures. PJ thus represents a logical second-century extension of the basic Lucan approach, reflecting the transition from explicit focus upon Jesus to apologetic interest in the Christian movement. This point is developed further *infra*, in section IV.

is made explicit in PJ 1:3, where Joachim compares his situation with that of Abraham. It is significant that the author of PJ would choose to begin the text with this reference and so associate the formative events of Christianity with the earliest period of Israelite origins.

The first two sections, comprising the narrative of Joachim and Anna and the birth and infancy of Mary, are built upon the structure of I Samuel 1-4. In I Samuel 1:10, Hannah makes a vow to God that she will dedicate her child to the Lord if he relieves her infertility. Anna repeats this vow at PJ 4:2 in similar language. Their prayer is heard in both cases.

In I Samuel 1:21, Hannah and her husband Elkanah discuss taking their child to the temple in order to dedicate him to God, and Elkanah suggests that Hannah delay doing so for a specified period. This motif is reproduced in PJ 7:1-3. I Samuel 2:18-20 contains a narrative about the infant Samuel who served in the temple and was blessed by the priests. Again, this motif is paralleled in PJ 7:6-7. The author clearly means to associate Hannah with Anna and the infant Samuel with the infant Mary.

Memory of an Israelite heroine is invoked in PJ 2:1-2, where Anna laments her "widowhood." This recalls Judith 8:6, in which Judith fasts all the days of her "widowhood." The Greek of PJ 2:2 echoes that of Judith 4:9 almost exactly,[17] and note that Judith 4:9 occurs immediately after a reference to "Joakim" (Hebrew for "Joachim"). It is quite likely that the author of PJ, familiar with the basic structure of mourning by a holy woman following narrative concerning Joachim, constructed this scene recalling that structure. It is otherwise difficult to explain Anna's reference to her "widowhood" since she is manifestly not a widow at the point at which she makes the remark.

Other intertextual parallels are also present, for example, Joachim's resolution to fast "forty days and forty nights" (PJ 1:10). By this point, however, the basic thesis of a "recursive theme" in the text is well attested. One further instance, however, is necessary to appreciate the editorial agenda at work in PJ.

The final narrative block in the text, chapters 23 and 24, concerns the martyrdom of "Zacharias." This story sums up the basic theme of *Heilsgeschichte* anticipated in Jewish history and realized in Christianity.

Although multiple traditions were associated in the second century with figures named "Zacharias,"[18] it seems clear that one figure recalled in PJ chapters 23-24 is Zechariah, the son of Jehoiada, whose martyrdom is recorded in 2 Chronicles 24:20-21 (and alluded to in Mt. 23:35). Numerous similarities in vocabulary and content suggest this identification. In 2 Chronicles 24, Zechariah (in LXX, "Zacharias") is killed in the court of the temple. In PJ 23:5, Zacharias is killed in the doorway of the temple. Both involve a king unfaithful to the Lord,

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[17] PJ 2:2 reads *"Eōs pote tapeinois tēn psychē sou; idou ēggiken ē ēmera kyriou ē megalē."* Judith 4:9 (LXX) reads *"kai etapeinousan tas psychas autōn en extenia megalē."* Combined with the obvious thematic relationship, this near-identity of vocabulary makes the thesis of literary dependence unavoidable.

[18] Berendts' (1895) study of legends concerning the martyrdom of Zacharias established that various traditions concerning the death of someone by this name were known to Christians in the second century. Confusion exists in Jewish and Christian literature concerning persons named Zacharias. Traditions about different individuals became conflated with one another. Harnack's thesis, that the Zacharias martyrdom represents a late accretion to the text, is discredited by universal attestation in the manuscript tradition. *vide* Smid, *op. cit.*, p. 179; A. Berendts, *Studien über Zacharias-Apokryphen und Zacharias-Legenden* (Leipzig: 1895).

read history, thou hast the books of the Kings."[22] Hippolytus also uses the term in the same sense in his "Commentary on Daniel," a text roughly contemporary with PJ, when he writes *"autē men oun ē historia ē anegnōsmenē..."* with reference to the story of Susanna and the Elders.[23]

Use of the term "historia" in the incipit thus references the texts from which PJ draws its themes and images. In the colophon in chapter 25, PJ describes itself as an *"historia:" "Egō de Iakōbos, ho grapsas tēn historian tautēn..."* Later in the same verse, the author thanks God for giving him the wisdom to compose *"historian tautēn,"* which are the concluding words. The next and final verse is almost certainly a scribal gloss in imitation of concluding formulae in the Pauline epistles.[24] As a result, the term "historia" both opens and closes the earliest recoverable stratum of PJ, and hence it functions as an inclusio. These "editorial brackets" reflect the author's understanding of the genre in which she/he wrote. The author conceived PJ as a "sacred narrative" in the manner of similar "historical" material in the LXX.

By utilizing this literary genre, the author plays upon reader familiarity with the "histories" in the Hebrew Scriptures to stress the continuity of Christianity with Judaism. This places PJ within one exegetical tradition of early Christianity, which read the "histories" of the Hebrew Scriptures as typological anticipations of Christ and Christianity. Origen, in his *De principiis,* is a spokesperson for this view:

> "But all the narrative portion, relating either to the marriages, or to the begetting of the children, or to battles of different kinds, or to any other histories whatever, what else can they be supposed to be, save the forms and figures of hidden and sacred things?"[25]

This method of reading scripture was widespread in early Christianity. Hippolytus, for example, takes the same approach in his exegetical treatises. In his "Commentary on Daniel," dealing with the story of Susanna, he writes:

> "All these things were figuratively represented in blessed Susanna, for our sakes, that we who now believe on God might not regard the things that are done now in the Church as strange, but believe them all to have been set forth in figure by the patriarchs of old, as the apostle also says: 'Now these things happened unto them for examples, and they were written for our instruction, on whom the ends of the world are come.'"[26]

Origen attests that even "the most simple of those who adhere to the word" understand "histories" from the Hebrew Scriptures to be "types," but "owing to the excessive difficulty of discovering things on the part of men, the nature of

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22 *ANF*, Vol. IV, p. 393.

23 Quoted in Van Stempvoort, *op. cit.*, p. 420.

24 The last line reads "And grace be with all who fear the Lord. Amen." In context this makes little sense, since the line that precedes it is a natural conclusion to the text. The sentence begins with the Greek conjunction "kai," which often signals a scribal gloss. Moreover, it is in clear imitation of the charis benediction with which the Pauline author closes epistles. Aune (p. 186) identifies three elements in the Pauline benediction: 1) "grace," 2) the divine source of that grace, and 3) those who benefit from that grace. All three elements are present in the verse from PJ. *vide* D. Aune, *The New Testament in its Literary Environment* (Philadelphia: 1987).

25 *De principiis*, IV.9, in *ANF*, Vol. VII, p. 358.

26 "Commentary on Daniel," in *ANF*, V, p. 192.

each particular regarding these (types) is not clearly ascertained."[27] An "historia" in this context therefore meant a scriptural narrative which was to be read in an allegorical-typological manner.

By calling itself an "historia," and building its episodes around characters and events from the LXX, PJ exercises allegorical-typological criticism in narrative form. It interprets the events and figures of the Hebrew Scriptures as typological anticipations of the Christian counterparts with whom it compares them. "Historia" in this context is the creative manipulation of the communal memory of events to convey a commentary on the significance of the past.

This is precisely where the christocentric interests of scholars seeking the "historical Jesus" lead them into misapprehending the type of literature PJ represents. These scholars, interested in biographical details of the *vita Jesu*, classify PJ as an "infancy gospel" because only the infancy component of the text even approaches an interest in the "historical Jesus." But clearly this is not what PJ is "about," and it makes little sense to classify ancient literature on the basis of modern interests. The designation of "historia" does more justice to the original intellectual environment in which the author wrote.

The best literary designation for PJ is therefore an "historia." This term is given in the text, and possessed an explicit meaning in early Christian thought. The author of PJ employed the term "historia" because it captured the aim of constructing a exegetical narrative consistent with an allegorical-typological reading of scriptural traditions. The term functions in PJ in exactly the same sense it possessed for Origen and Hippolytus and the exegetical tradition they represent. PJ achieves in narrative form what Origen, Hippolytus, et al., did in their commentaries. This utilization of "historia" as a literary genre opens new vistas on questions of redaction criticism.

## IV. Redaction Analysis

PJ is an "historia" whose central editorial theme is the "foreshadowing" of Christianity in Judaism. As such, PJ is an expression in narrative form of the same "theology of history" that guided early Christian exegetes to understand Jewish history as a "text" created by the Spirit in anticipation of Christianity. PJ thus emphasizes the continuity of Christianity with Judaism by utilization of the concept of *Heilsgeschichte* previously expressed in Luke-Acts. PJ develops this insight into a Christian hermeneutics, employing it to demonstrate the "meaning" of early Christian figures and events by reference to their typological anticipations in the Hebrew Scriptures. The question thus arises, what second-century impulses within Christianity gave rise to such a hermeneutic?

The composition of this narrative in a second-century context reflects contemporary controveries both outside and inside of the Christian community.

The primary external interlocutors for Christians in the second century were Jewish and pagan critics. The best known example is the Platonist philosopher Celsus, whose "*Alēthēs Logos*" (ca. 178) inspired Origen's "*Contra Celsum.*" Celsus drew upon Jewish objections to Christianity to polemicize against the "absurdities" of Christian history.[28] His main objection, however, had little to do

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[27] *De principiis*, IV. 9, in *ANF*, VIII, p. 358.

[28] Celsus drew upon rabbinical charges concerning Mary and the birth of Jesus, such as that Mary gave birth without witnesses, that she was an adulteress, and that she "spun for daily hire." Clearly many of the textual details within PJ respond to these

with these controversies. His central charge was that Christianity was a dangerous innovation, a pregnant allegation in the context of Roman religious policy. He compares the radicalism of Christianity with Judaism, concluding "the religion of the Jews may be highly peculiar, but it is at least the custom of their fathers."[29] This was the real issue with which early Christian apologists had to come to terms. Severan imperial authorities were unlikely to become exercised over Mary's virginity or pedigree, but the existence of a radical religious *collegia* threatening the *pax deorum* was a different matter.

It is in this context that PJ's utilization of the "historia" genre to stress the continuity of Christianity with Judaism serves an apologetic function. PJ, in consonance with the thrust of much of early Christian exegetics, argues that the Jewish history as recorded in the Hebrew Scriptures pointed to and prepared for Christianity. Christianity is the legitimate inheritor and culmination of Jewish history. Christianity is not in any sense "radical" or an offense to the God of Israel, but rather the product of his design. This presentation functioned to defend Christianity from the charge of desertion of its tradition.

Just as Celsus' main interests, therefore, are not essentially mariological, neither are those of PJ. Celsus, who represents the apotheosis of early anti-Christian Jewish/pagan polemic, is making a larger point about the nature of the Christian movement. The presentation of "historia" in PJ responds to this stream of criticism by stressing in narrative form the typological anticipation of Christianity in the scriptural records of Jewish history.

PJ's presentation served a double function in the context of second-century Christianity. The desire to sunder Christianity from its Jewish antecedents was not just a polemical device of external critics, but also reflected the theological program of the Marcionite stream of early Christian tradition.

Justin Martyr reports the existence of Marcionite communities throughout the Mediterranean in the second century.[30] The Marcionite approach to scripture, based upon the theological postulate of an opposition between the "Father" of Jesus and the God of the Jews, was to reject the Hebrew Scriptures and, in consequence, to reject an allegorical-typological exegesis. The Marcionite "canon" not only rejected the Hebrew Scriptures but excised references to the God of Judaism from Luke and the Pauline corpus.[31]

Marcion's "Antitheses" is the primarily textual exposition of this approach. In it, he quotes passages from the Hebrew Scriptures and juxtaposes Luke or Paul, the object being to demonstrate the difference between the creator-God of Judaism and the "Father" of Jesus. He quoted Exodus 12:11, for example, "Your loins girded, your sandals on your feet, and your staff in your hand..," and contrasted Luke 9:3, "Take nothing for your journey, no staff, no bag..." These fragments are preserved in patristic citations from an otherwise lost work, but the evidence suggests that the "Antitheses" proceeded in this manner through much of the Hebrew Scriptures.[32]

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charges. Nevertheless, it is the broader point about the relationship between Christianity and Judaism which forms the central interest. *vide* Van Stempvoort, *op. cit.*, p. 414.

[29] Quoted in H. Chadwick, *The Early Church* (London/New York: 1967, p. 68).

[30] *vide* H. Koester, *Intoduction to the New Testament*, Vol. II (New York/Berlin: 1982, p. 329).

[31] *ibid.*

[32] *ibid.*

The formal and stylistic characteristics of PJ therefore also perform an apologetic function in the context of this intra-Christian dispute. In contrast to the Marcionite approach of finding contradictions between the Hebrew Scriptures and early Christian sacred texts, the author of PJ utilizes a narrative format to convey their compatibility. In this context it is not at all surprising that the primary canonical text upon which PJ relies is the Lucan infancy narrative, since Luke is also the text Marcion used to argue for the inconsistency of Christian sacred texts with the Hebrew Scriptures. The author of PJ sets up a narrative whose central theme is the typological anticipation of the Lucan narrative in Jewish "history" (understood in the sense of "historia"). In this way PJ is in tension with the Marcionite exegetical program by advancing the views of the allegorical-typological tradition.

PJ thus responds to both external and internal pressures within early Christianity. In concert with the exegetical tradition it represents, PJ develops a theology of sacred literature in which the records of the past found in the Hebrew Scriptures are understood as "spiritual" texts in which Christianity has been foretold. The logical extension of this theology is that the Christian community stands as the legitimate heir of the Jewish tradition.

## Conclusion

The results of this study may be briefly summarized. Initially the inadequacy of the "infancy gospel" taxonomy was established. The expectations and assumptions implict in this category frustrate, rather than promote, understanding. Literary analysis of PJ reveals an overwhelming preoccupation with Jewish-Christian continuity, a point of emphasis which links PJ with the Lucan theological premise of *Heilsgeschichte*. An analysis of PJ's literary genre indicates that the best classification is as an "historia," a term internal to the text and with a fixed meaning in early Christian exegetics. A study of redactorial activity in PJ suggests that the author has shaped inherited traditions to respond both to pagan charges of Christian desertion of tradition as well as intra-Christian attempts to jettison Jewish scripture and tradition. Given these conclusions, PJ emerges as a narrative expression of a Christian hermeneutics, in which "history" is understood as an allegorical-typological record preserved to communicate not primarily the "what," but the "why," of past events.

The historical interest of PJ therefore has little to do with the "historical" value of the infancy traditions it relays, or its christology or mariology. Instead, it not only sheds light on second century controversies inside and outside the Christian community, but it also reflects the evolving Christian understanding of the scripture and tradition of its Jewish progenitors. For the exegetical tradition represented by PJ, the question of whether or not historical narratives in scripture or the Christian tradition "actually happened" was far less important than the more pressing issue of what they revealed about the present.

This study demonstrates the importance of the principle of "res ipsa loquatur" in approaching ancient texts. The interests of their authors are not those of a modern readership, and to appreciate their meaning in their original context requires a willingness to set aside dysfunctional taxonomic conventions. Breaking free of the exegetical blinder represented by the "infancy gospel" classification enables readers to encounter PJ on its own terms and appreciate its significance in the context of early Christianity.

# "A Perfect Fit": The Major Interpolation in the Acts of John

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### [1] Introduction

Previous scholarship on the *Acts of John* (*AJn*) is conspicuously silent about the relationship between cc. 94-96 (i.e., the Lord's secret sacrament) and the rest of the acts, leaving one with the impression that they accepted these chapters as an original part of the acts, though not necessarily the creation of the acts' author. E. Junod and J.-D. Kaestli broke this silence with their contention that cc. 94-102, and 109 are later additions to the acts.[1] However, Junod and Kaestli were not able to discover the reason for this material being in the *AJn*. This paper argues that a careful examination of these chapters and the rest of the *AJn* reveals that (1) cc. 94-96 had been part of a preexisting narrative before their insertion into the *AJn*; (2) cc. 97-102 were attached to the material of cc. 94-96, most likely by the interpolator, and (3) a specific reason for the major part of this interpolation (cc. 94-102) can be discerned on theological and practical grounds.

### [2] The Interpolation(s)

Although we have reservations about Junod and Kaestli's identification of these chapters as an interpolation,[2] it is the complexity of the major interpolation (cc. 94-102) and their explanations for it, that is the first concern of this paper. Concerning the latter, Junod and Kaestli see only two possible explanations for the origin of this interpolation.[3] Their first theory identifies the acts' author as the one who introduced these chapters into his composition without altering them. The author did this because he was interested in anything about the apostle John and his relationship with the Lord. This is why he did not hesitate to use these chapters, despite the incongruities between them and the rest of the acts. The author placed this interpolation after the apostle's discourse on the Lord's poly-

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[1] E. Junod and J.-D. Kaestli, *Acta Iohannis*, Corpus Christianorum, Series Apocryphorum (Turnhout: Brepols, 1983) 2:692f. Junod and Kaestli (Ibid., 641-642), further claimed that the hymn or sacrament of cc. 94-96 is a literary invention, based upon a pre-existing, non-Christian gnostic tradition. The original form of the (major) hymn included only the antithetical lines of c. 95.

[2] P. G. Schneider, *The Mystery of the Acts of John* (Lewiston: Mellen University Press, 1991) 209-219.

[3] Junod and Kaestli, *Acta Iohannis*, 2:700ff.

morphism to form a little gospel that concludes with an account of the Lord's passion. This interpolation also provided the author with a christology that his work sorely needed.

Junod and Kaestli see little merit in this explanation, because cc. 94-102 were crudely incorporated into the acts. They find it hard to believe that the act's author, who elsewhere freely adapted his sources for his own purposes would not do so here.[4] Junod and Kaestli's second and preferred theory attributes these chapters to a gnostic community that had acquired the *AJn*. These gnostics inserted this material into the Johannine acts because of their theological character and their association with the apostle John. Although Junod and Kaestli find it strange that a gnostic community would be so interested in the *AJn*, that they would insert this material into it, they do admit that the acts does present traits that would be attractive to those interested in secret and complex revelations.[5] What those traits are, Junod and Kaestli do not elaborate any further.

A major problem with both of Junod and Kaestli's theories is the appearance of the mystagogical instructions (c. 96) and the revelatory discourse (cc. 98-102). The instructions that were given to the disciples include themes that are also introduced in the revelatory discourse. That these two discourses share similar themes is not a problem. The revelatory discourse can simply be an amplification of the doctrines presented in the post-initiation instruction. The problem is that the revelatory discourse introduces these themes as if for the first time, and only to the apostle John. According to c. 97, the Lord had directed John to the Mount of Olives so he could receive the revelation (the Lord's gnosis), while everyone else is witnessing the crucifixion. Yet, according to c. 94, all the disciples had been initiated into the Lord's mystery, that is, they have all received the Lord's gnosis. This disparity between cc. 94-96 and 97-102 is ultimately underscored by John laughing at the inferior knowledge of those who are below in Jerusalem, among whom are presumably the other disciples who also have forgotten the very gnosis they received through the Lord's mystery sacrament. In addition, John also must be seen as ignorant of this gnosis, despite his having received it in the mystery.[6]

The logical explanation for the differences between the mystery rite with its framework and the revelatory discourse and its setting is that cc. 97-102 are a later creation.[7] The Lord's secret liturgy and gnosis had originally been associated with all the disciples, with John being just one of the twelve. It was only when the sacrament was introduced into the *AJn* that John became preeminent and the sole recipient of the sacrament's esoteric teachings. The person most likely responsible for this turnabout is our interpolator as the author of cc. 97-102. Junod and Kaestli, on the other hand, believe that the acts' sacrament is the interpolator's *literary invention*. Although they see the sacrament as an example of

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4 Ibid., 701.

5 Ibid., 702.

6 There might be a difference also in the way the salvific gnosis is transmitted. The disciples received the Lord's gnosis by participating in his dance. Although the revelatory discourse mentions the dance, and only briefly, it is the one who hears the Lord's voice, not the one who dances, who receives the gnosis and is transformed.

7 The original setting of the sacrament also included the first sentence of c. 97 as its conclusion. With the very next sentence there is an abrupt change with the description of the disciples' flight after Jesus' arrest, which suggests that cc. 97-102 are an addition to this material.

the Valentinian sacrament of redemption, they nevertheless maintain that it never existed outside the 'pages' of the *AJn*.

The differences between cc. 94-96 and 97-102 are strong arguments against seeing the interpolator as the creator of the mystery rite and its setting and the author of the revelatory vision and discourse. Furthermore, if we follow Junod and Kaestli's theory, we would have to assume that someone created a 'mock' sacrament by writing an opening hymn (c. 94); the initiatory hymn (c. 95); formulating liturgical instructions for the hymns and the dance; final instructions to the initiates (c. 96), and then a concluding doxology. Why would someone have gone to the trouble of creating a 'fake mystery rite'? It is better to see in cc. 94-96 a genuine sacrament, and not the creation of the author of the revelatory discourse. As for the brief account of when the Lord instituted this sacrament, it must have originated before the sacrament was incorporated into the acts; otherwise, we would have to explain why the author of the revelatory discourse created a setting for the hymn that contradicts c. 97. Therefore, not only do we have an actual sacrament, but one that already had a narrative setting.[8] So, what we have is a double interpolation, first with the addition of cc. 97-102 to the sacrament and its original setting, and then their insertion into the *AJn*.

With the recognition of the liturgy's independent origin from the *AJn* and from cc. 97-102, there is the question of why someone went to so much trouble. It is not a matter of either the interpolator or the acts' author adding more material about the apostle John into the acts, because John originally had no special relationship to the sacrament. It is cc. 97-102 that provide such a role, and if they originated from the interpolator's stylus, then the revelatory discourse is his interpretation of the sacrament and its gnosis, with an eye on the original contents of the acts. So, we need to ask why our interpolator did all this. This is the major task of this paper: Why did the interpolator choose the *AJn* and what 'connections' did he expect the acts' community-readers would make between his interpolation and the theology and motifs originally present in the acts? What was our interpolator's primary reason for inserting this material into the acts? To answer these questions, we need to look first at the Christianity presented in the undisputed chapters of the Johannine acts, and then the interpolation and the result of their combination.

## [3] The Christianity of the Acts of John

### *[3.1] Conversion-Resurrection-Transformation*

Like Apollos of Alexandria, the Egyptian author of the *AJn*[9] does not know Christian baptism. John did not convert people by baptizing them, but by raising them from the dead. For instance, the apostle resurrected a man who had been murdered by his son (cc. 48-54). Despite being brought back to life, the father is not happy, because, while he was dead, he did not have to endure his son's

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[8] According to Mark 14:26 (cf. Matt. 26:30), Jesus and the disciples sang a hymn after the Last Supper. The sacrament's setting is a variation of this tradition. Instead of singing presumably the Hallel (Pss. 113-118) at the end of the Passover meal, the Lord instituted his secret sacrament. One could argue that the existence of this narrative setting suggests that the sacrament could still be a literary creation. Yet, the problem still remains as to why someone would have gone to such lengths as to create an imitation liturgy.

[9] Junod and Kaestli, *Acta Iohannis*, 2:689-694.

abuse. John agrees with the father, but the apostle has raised him to a better life—the life of a Christian.

One does not need to be physically dead before becoming a Christian. The acts' author illustrates this point in the story about Callimachus (cc. 63-86). Under Satan's influence, Callimachus had fallen in love with Drusiana, the wife of Andronicus. Callimachus's friends told him that his love for Drusiana was folly, for not only was she married, but as a Christian, she was also celibate. Drusiana was so distressed over Callimachus' advances toward her, that she wills herself to death. The story does not end here, however, because Callimachus is so dominated by his lust, that he bribes Fortunatus, Andronicus' steward, to open Drusiana's tomb so he might have his way with her body. A snake miraculously stops the two men from committing this crime, by biting Fortunatus—killing him—and terrifying Callimachus into a 'dead' faint.

John and his companions discover the men's bodies the next day. The apostle raises Callimachus, who tells him that an angel, appearing as a beautiful young man, had said to him, "Καλλίμαχε, ἀπόθανε ἵνα ζήσῃς" (c. 76). Callimachus readily affirms the angel's words, for the man he once was, is now dead. Like the murdered father, Callimachus has not been restored to his previous life, but to the true life as a Christian.[10] Such is not the case, with the steward. When the revivified Drusiana raises Fortunatus from the dead, he vehemently rejects his resurrection, and eventually dies again from the serpent's bite. The point is made: It is not enough to be raised physically from the dead. One must be spiritually raised as a Christian. For our author and his community, this is the true resurrection.

*[3.2] Christian Life*

John's converts are not only noted for their spiritual resurrection-conversions, but for the tranquility of their souls. According to the acts' author and community, the true Christian lives vigorously, soberly and unhindered by all the things that cause emotional distress (cc. 68-69). John exhorts his fellow Christians to worship the Lord not with any part of their bodies, but with the dispositions of their souls (c. 104). The apostle is not rejecting physical worship (he does celebrate the Eucharist!), but encouraging his audience to live the true Christian life: sober, unhindered, tranquil and immovable. Our author also describes this Christian ideal with another set of positive and negative examples: Cleopatra and Lycomedes (cc. 19-24).

When John first met Cleopatra, she was in a coma. Lycomedes, her husband, was so distraught over his wife's condition that he lost control of himself and consciousness ('lifeless'). When John raised Cleopatra, she immediately asked about her husband. John ordered Cleopatra not to become upset about

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10 The acts' connection between these resurrections and conversion is not entirely unique. In the *Acts of Peter*, people are led to believe and to convert because Paul raised people from the dead (*Acts of Peter* 8:29; *Actus Vercellenses Aa* I, p. 78.), and in the *Acts of Andrew*, people were baptized because Andrew raised an Egyptian boy from the dead (c. 2). But, in the Johannine acts, there is very little distinction between 'resurrection' and 'conversion.' No mention is made of any of John's converts having been baptized. Other converts confess faith in John's god and prostrate themselves before the apostle. John then *raises them up* through prayer and speeches, but he never baptizes them (cc. 42-44). An excellent example is the episode of the dead priest of Artemis. It is only when the priest's relative had prostrated himself before the apostle that he is raised up as a Christian.

Lycomedes' condition, but to keep her soul "ἀκίνητον" and "ἀμετάτρεπτον" (c. 23). Cleopatra obeyed the apostle, and by following his instructions she raised Lycomedes. Thus, Cleopatra embodies the prototypical Christian, whose soul does not waver in the face of adversity and grief.

Our author's view of Christianity has much in common with another Egyptian author. Philo of Alexandria makes a division between people on the basis of their emotionally stability.[11] Abraham and Moses are Philo's prototypes of those who are immovable. Both men have stood before God (Gen. 18:22; Deut. 5:31), in that they remained unmoved by their emotions. Emotional stability is the hallmark of a wise man,

> ὅτι ἡ τοῦ σοφοῦ διάνοια χειμώνων μὲν καὶ πολέμων ἀπαλλαγεῖσα, νηνέμῳ δὲ γαλήνῃ καὶ βαθείᾳ εἰρήνης χρωμένη κρειττων μέν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ δὲ ἐλάττων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀγελαῖος ἀνθρώπειος νοῦς σείεται καὶ κυκᾶται πρὸς τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων, ὁ δ' ἄτε μακάριος καὶ εὐδαίμων ἀμέτοχος κακῶν· μεθόριος δὲ ὁ ἀστεῖος, ὡς κυρίως εἰπεῖν μήτε θεὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι μήτε ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄκρων ἐφαπτόμενον, ἀνθρωπότητι μὲν θνητοῦ γένους, ἀρετῇ δὲ ἀφθάρτου. (*De Somnii* 2.229-230)

Philo's blurring of the wise men's humanity is important because the apostle's humanity is also somewhat obscured in the *AJn*. The acts portrays John as God's intermediary, through whom God reveals his power and mercy. Yet, there are times when the acts' description of the apostle hints at his being divine, himself.[12] Like Philo's wise man, John is human, yet something more.

At the other end of the spectrum are those persons who are controlled by their emotions (*De Congressu* 59). It is the nature of such a foolish person to be

> . . .αἰεὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κινούμενος ἠρεμίᾳ καὶ ἀναπαύσει δυσμενὴς εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ μηδενὸς ἑστάναι παγίως καὶ ἐρηρεῖσθαι δόγματος. ἄλλοτε δοῦν ἀλλοῖα δοξάζει καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔστιν ὅτε μηδενὸς περὶ αὐτὰ συμβεβηκότος καινοτέρου τἀναντία, μέγας καὶ μικρὸς καὶ ἐχθρὸς καὶ φίλος καὶ πάνθ', ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τὰ μαχόμενα ἐν ἀκαρεῖ χρόνου γινόμενος. (*De Posteritate Caini* 24-25).

For Philo, Cain was the prototype of the unstable person, "ὃς ἀφάνταστον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν τοῦ ὄντος καταλέλοιπεν, τὸ ᾧ μόνῳ βλέπειν ἠδύνατο ἑκουσίως πηρώσας" (Philo *De Posteritate* 21; cf. 22-23). The emotionally frenetic Lycomedes is the prototype in the *AJn*.[13] By contrast, Cleopatra, like Philo's wise person, has stilled the swell and tossing of her soul (*Legum Allegoriae* 2.90). Although Cleopatra and Lycomedes faced the same predicament–a 'lifeless' spouse–they

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[11] I am especially indebted to Michael Williams' study of this motif in his *The Immovable Race, A Gnostic Designation and the Theme of Stability in Late Antiquity*, Nag Hammadi Studies 29 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985).

[12] For instance, Lycomedes had a portrait secretly made of John (cc. 26-29). When the portrait was finished, Lycomedes placed an altar before it, so that he and others could pray before it (worship the painting/the apostle?). When John discovers the painting, he believes it is the portrait of a god and chides Lycomedes for committing idolatry (c. 27). When Lycomedes tells John that the portrait is of him, the apostle does not rebuke Lycomedes for worshiping him as a god. For John, the problem with the portrait is that the painting only records the apostle's physical resemblance. But, the lack of a rebuke against worshiping an apostle as a god, suggests a distinctive understanding of the role of apostle.

[13] The acts' parricide (cc. 48-54) would be another example. His emotional instability resulted in murder and self-castration. It was only when he was *quiet* that he was truly able to repent and become a Christian.

reacted differently. The immovable Cleopatra can raise someone from the dead, while the frenetic Lycomedes can only faint (die). Thus, Cleopatra, too, is now something more than human for she can raise her husband from the dead.[14]

*[3.3] The Christology of the Acts of John*

The Johannine acts identifies Christ as the "God of all Ages," who is "exceedingly great," "incomprehensible" (c. 79), "invincible" (c. 104) and immutable (c. 104). The most well known characteristic of the acts' christology is the Lord's polymorphism. Not only does the Lord (Κύριος is the preferred title.) change his appearance, his 'body' also changes from hard to soft, from material to immaterial. And, since the Lord never had a real-human body, he naturally never blinked his eyes or ate; nor did he leave any footprints.

The significance of the acts' polymorphic christology can be seen in its account of the calling of James and John:

> ὅτε γὰρ ἐξελέξατο Πέτρον καὶ Ἀνδρέαν ἀδελφοὺς ὄντας, ἔρχεται πρός με καὶ τὸν ἀδελφόν μου Ἰάκωβον εἰπών· Χρῄζω ὑμῶν, ἔλθατε πρός με. Καὶ ὁ ἀδελφός μου τοῦτο εἶπεν· Ἰωάννη, τὸ παιδίον τοῦτο ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ καλέσαν ἡμᾶς τί βούλεται; Κἀγὼ εἶπον· Ποῖον παιδίον; Ὁ δέ μοι πάλιν· Τὸ νεῦον ἡμῖν. Κἀγὼ ἀπεκρινάμην· Διὰ τὴν πολλὴν ἡμῶν ἀγρυπνίαν τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν γεγονυῖαν οὐ σὺ ὁρᾷς ἀδελφέ μοῦ Ἰάκωβε; οὐχ ὁρᾷς δὲ τὸν ἑστῶτα ἄνδρα εὔμορφον καλὸν ἱλαροπρόσωπον; Ὁ δέ μοι εἶπεν· Τούτου οὐχ ὁρῶ ἀδελφέ· ἀλλ' ἐξέλθωμε καὶ ὀψόμεθα τὸ τί βούλεται.
>
> Καὶ οὕτως σιγῇ τὸ πλοῖον ἀγαγόντες εἴδομεν καὶ αὐτὸν ἅμα ἡμῖν βοηθοῦντα ὅπως τὸ πλοῖον ἐδράσωμεν. ὡς δὲ ἀπέστημεν τοῦ τόπου αὐτῷ βουληθέντες ὄπεσθαι, πάλιν ὤφθη ἐμοὶ ὑπόψιλον ἔχων, τὸ δὲ γένειον δασὺν καταγόμενον, τῷ δὲ Ἰακώβῳ ἀρχιγένειος νεανίσκος. ὑποροῦν μὲν οὖν ἀμφότεροι ὅ τι βούλεται τὸ ὁραθὲν ἡμῖν. (cc. 88-89)

By constantly changing his appearance, God is demonstrating that he has neither age nor size, and is therefore beyond description. But, there is more to this episode than that, for the Lord appeared in two pairs of *contrasting* forms. With James always seeing younger forms of the Lord, compared to those witnessed by John, it is easy see to the two brothers representing two groups of Christians, with John representing those who have a maturer christology or spirituality.[15] This division between Christians does not entail hostility, because James' visions of the Lord are not incorrect, just younger than those seen by John. That John and James are brothers should not be overlooked for both brothers/communities were called by the Lord. Plus, with James and John seeing progressively older

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[14] Perhaps John's prayer in c. 114 has a similar division in mind: " δεξιοὶ τόποι στηκέτωσαν, ἀριστεροὶ μὴ μενέτωσαν."

[15] We also find the acts' division between 'mature' and 'immature' Christians in its portrayal of Peter, James and John after the transfiguration (c. 91). Peter and James are somewhat vexed with John because he is talking with the Lord. They are also confused about what had happened, for they want to know who was speaking with the Lord. This question is puzzling, because we know from the acts' account that only John and the Lord were on the mountaintop. Yet, Peter and James ask John who was talking with the Lord. Wouldn't they have recognized John's voice? Why didn't John admit that the only other voice was his? It is possible that the divine voice was originally present in this version of the transfiguration, but our author deleted it because according to his christology, the Lord would be talking to himself. Why, then, didn't our author also omit their question? It is because he wanted to contrast Peter's and James' perplexity to John's growing awareness of the Lord's identity.

manifestations of the Lord, the spirituality of both groups of Christians should be seen as maturing.[16]

*[3.4] Salvation*

The surviving chapters of the original *AJn* do not address directly the question of salvation. When the apostle and others celebrate the Eucharist (cc. 72; 85; 109), no mention is made of the Lord's passion and death. This is not very surprising, since the acts' community believed that the Lord never had a body. Whatever significance that these Christians saw in Christ's death, it is unlikely that salvation was a part of it. So, we are left with a mystery: how did the acts' community understand Christ as savior and salvation? The acts does contain an episode that might suggest how the community understood salvation. In c. 92, the apostle reminisces about the time he secretly saw Jesus being visited by someone who descended from heaven. This supernatural being resembles the Lord, and says, "Ἰησοῦ, οὗς ἐξελέξω ἔτι σοι ἀπιστοῦσιν." Jesus agrees, "Καλῶς λέγεις· ἄνθρωπος γάρ εἰσιν." Does this mean that the disciples will never believe; or, will they become something other than human? Does salvation entail some sort of metamorphosis?[17]

## [4] The Gnostic of the Acts of John

The author of the *AJn* has left us with several questions. (1) How did the community of the Johannine acts continue the apostle's method of conversion?[18]

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[16] Origen (*Contra Celsum* 2.64) similarly claimed that Jesus did not appear in like fashion to all who saw him, but according to each disciple's power of perception. Thus, for Origen, Christ's polymorphism is a tool by which everyone can receive and understand him at their own level. These levels of capacity are not static, because as a Christian matures, the Logos' form also progresses (4.15-16). This scheme of spiritual progress can be seen behind the acts' account of the transfiguration (c. 90). When the Lord appeared as a supernatural giant (representing the highest level of understanding so far reached by John), the apostle became afraid and doubtful. The Lord responded to John's lack of spiritual maturity by transforming himself into a small man. So, John's shift in faith was visibly displayed by the Lord's transmutation from a *giant* to a *small* man.

[17] Origen once more offers us a parallel, because he connects the Logos' polymorphism to a change in Christians. According to Origen (*Contra Celsum* 6.68), Christ also transforms his disciples so they may see his glorious form. However, for Origen, the transformed Christians remain human (Just as Origen also affirms Christ's humanity?), whereas Jesus' reply in the Johannine acts suggests that the disciples will become something other than human.

[18] The acts does contain stories of other Christians performing resurrections (e.g., Cleopatra, Drusiana), but it is uncertain whether these resurrection-conversions continued after John had moved on to another town (or had died). The apostle does make a curious statement. In c. 84, the apostle curses Satan extensively, and says, "καταργήθητι ... ἀπὸ ἀναστάσεως τῆς πρὸς θεόν· ἀπὸ εὐωδίας ἧς κοινωνεῖν μέλλεις· ἀπὸ νηστειῶν· ἀπὸ δεήσεων· ἀπὸ λουτροῦ ἁγίου· ἀπό εὐχαριστίας. . . ." R. H. Miller ("Liturgical Materials in the Acts of John," *Studia Patristica* XIII [Papers presented to the Sixth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 1971; ed. E. A. Livingstone; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1975] 378.) sees in John's statement a reference to Christian initiation, "ἀναστάσις πρὸς θεόν," with "εὐωδία" referring to prebaptism anointing; "νηστεία" and "δέησις" alluding to the preparation before the sacrament, and then the "λουτρόν ἁγίον" (baptism) itself. The "εὐχαριστία" completes the act of initiation. The main problem with Miller's interpretation is that the phrase, "ἀναστάσις πρὸς θεόν," cannot be a reference to baptism, because John (and his community) does not baptize, but literally resurrects

(2) How did the acts' author and his community view salvation? (3) What is the significance to the Lord having a heavenly twin? (4) The *AJn* also provides us with a quandary over its view of humanity. In addition to a division between Christians according to their christology or spirituality, the acts' depiction of Callimachus and Fortunatus suggests another division between all humanity. Why is it that Callimachus, who wanted to commit necrophila, can be saved (resurrected) and transformed, and not Fortunatus?[19]

An unknown Christian gnostic 'filled in the gaps' by injecting into the *AJn* the material that became cc. 94-102. These chapters tell us that Jesus and his disciples performed a secret sacrament before his arrest,[20] and that the Lord appeared to John in a cave at the Mount of Olives during the crucifixion. In this cave, the Lord introduced John to a luminous, supernatural cross, which he (now a disembodied voice) identified as "Logos," "Jesus," "Christ," "Son," "Spirit," "Father" and "Grace" (c. 98). Thus, the Lord begins a long revelatory discourse (cc. 98-101), which functions as an introduction to the interpolator's gnosticism and as the bridge, by which the acts' community and readers are to understand the full ramifications of their Christian faith.[21]

The Cross of Light, strikingly similar to the Valentinian Stauros/Horos,[22] is not alone. The apostle sees a group of people outside the luminous cross, and

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people to God. Thus, the phrase could simply mean 'conversion.' As for the acts' interpolator, he could have understood the phrase as an allusion to the Lord's secret sacrament (or wanted the acts' readers to see it as such).

19 There must have been an essential difference because the snake bit Fortunatus and only wound itself around Callimachus. John does identify Fortunatus as the Devil's son (c. 86), because of his "unbending soul" and "unchanged nature" (c. 84). In contrast, even though Callimachus was driven by Satan to commit necrophila, he can be saved (resurrected) because his soul can be transformed. Such a difference between these two men suggests a division within humanity, that is, between those who are destined to be saved and those who are not. And, John does speak of "ψυχὰς δυναμένας ἐλπίσαι καὶ σωθῆναι" (c. 23), which implies that there are souls that cannot. Still, if this is true, why does John rebuke Callimachus' opposition to resuscitating Fortunatus? Why does the apostle allow Drusiana to raise Fortunatus, if there is no possibility of conversion? There is an additional question: What is the relationship between the two groups of Christians? Are only John's Christians destined to be saved?

20 There have been numerous attempts for reconstructing the hymn or sacrament. See: M. Brioso, "Sobre el 'Tanzhymnus' de Acta Iaonnis 94-6," *Emérita* 40 (1972): 31-45; D. I. Pallas, "'Ο ὕμνος τῶν πράξεων τοῦ 'Ιωάννου κεφ. 94-97," in *Mélanges Octave et Melpo Merlier*, t. II (Collection d'Institute Français d'Athènes 93, 1956) 221-244. J. Schattenmann, *Studien zum neutestamentlichen Prosahymnus*, (München: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1965), 97-100; Schneider, *Mystery of the Acts of John*, 147-160,223-226.

21 We should inject a word of caution. We can piece together a picture of our interpolator's gnosticism from his revelatory discourse, but we do not have the cosmogonic myth that lies behind it. Although it appears that our gnostic's cosmogony is simple, it might not be. There is no reason to assume that our interpolator felt obliged to reproduce every detail of his community's beliefs in his discourse.

22 The Lord describes the cross' function as the division of all things and the elevation of what is firmly fixed out of what is *unstable* (c. 98). This function is identical with that of the Valentinian Stauros-Horos, which can be described as also separating, 'the All from what is created and inferior; what is firm and what is without foundation' (cf. Irenaeus *adv. Haer.* 1.3.5). The Cross of Light was also responsible for the "harmonizing of wisdom," which naturally suggests our interpolator's cosmogony is comparable to the Valentinians', with the Cross of Light, i.e., Christ, healing the errant aeon of her

another group within it. Those who are outside the cross belong to the "inferior root" (cc. 98,100) and the cosmic-demonic forces (c. 98). Those within the cross are the gnostics, who bear a similar likeness, because, when

> ἀναληφθῇ ἄνθρωποι φύσις καὶ γένος προσχωροῦν ἐπ' ἐμὲ φωνῇ τῇ ἐμῇ πειθόμενον, ὃν νῦν ἀκούω με σὺ τοῦτο γενήσεται, καὶ οὐκέτι ἔσται ὃ νῦν ἔστιν. ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὡς κἀγὼ νῦν· μέχρι γὰρ μήπω ἴδιόν μου λέγεις ἑαυτὸν τοῦτο οὐκ εἰμὶ ὅ εἰμι· ἐὰν δέ με ἀκούσῃς, ἀκούων καὶ σὺ μένε ὡς κἀγώ. . . . (c. 100)

Salvation, therefore, is a series of actions: (1) the ascension of the gnostics; (2) the gnostics' union with the race that hears the Lord's voice, and (3) the gnostic's transformation into the Lord's image.

How, when and where does this metamorphosis take place? That is the purpose of the Lord's secret liturgy.[23] Its initiates are transformed into members of a spiritual race that hears and obeys the voice of the Lord. They are reborn to a new life as the Lord's kindred, and bear his image and likeness. The initiates' transformation is completed in the sacrament's dance, during which they spiritually ascend to the Pleroma and behold the Ogdoad and the Dodecad (c. 95).[24]

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passions and reestablishing the order that her actions had disturbed. With the discourse's single reference to the harmonization of wisdom, one could deduce also a simple cosmogonic myth behind it, with a single Sophia being detached from the Pleroma and a single redemptive intervention by the Cross of Light. Such a myth would be close to Valentinus' teaching and the Oriental Valentinianism (Theodotus), which also present a single Sophia and a single redemptive intervention. On one point, however, our hypothetical cosmogony disagrees with Valentinus' and Theodotus.' In their systems, the emission of the Demiurge and of the powers of the left and the right before Sophia has been healed of her passions. Our revelatory discourse has the order reversed (c. 98), and thus resembles Ptolemy's system (Irenaeus *adv. Haer.* 1.5.1), in which the advent of these powers is a consequence of Sophia's restoration. Because of this difference, Junod and Kaestli (*Acta Iohannis* 2:614, n.6.) do admit that it is not possible to completely assimilate the myth underlying cc. 94-102 to that of Valentinus and oriental Valentinians.

23 Schneider, *Mystery of the Acts of John*, 169-171, 174-178.

24 This sacrament can be understood as a prototype of the gnostics' destiny—when all of them will be finally gathered up into the Cross of Light, and become the Lord's kindred and members of the race that will obey the Lord. The closest parallel that we have to this mystery rite is possibly the Valentinian sacrament of redemption (*Gospel of Philip* NHC II,3 p. 67,9-27). Both sacraments express the desire for resurrection, rebirth and restoration. Like the initiates of the acts' mystery sacrament, the participants of this Valentinian sacrament are not only reborn and resurrected, they have also been empowered to return safely to the Pleroma (pp. 74,20f., 86,4-15). Irenaeus informs us that the Valentinians were very open about the 'liturgical manner' by which redemption was achieved (*adv. Haer.* 1.21.3-5): a bridal chamber, baptism, chrism (including an anointing as a last rite) as well as attaining redemption through nonsacramental means. Irenaeus also admits that there are even more versions of this sacrament (*adv. Haer.* 1.21.1). Irenaeus could have easily added the Johannine sacrament to his list of versions of the sacrament of redemption. And, many scholars have done just that (cf. Junod and Kaestli, *Acta Iohannis*, 2:631). I refrain from joining them, however, because we do not know our interpolator's cosmogonic myth, and what we do have is not exclusively Valentinian in character. For instance, his concept of salvation includes the transformation of his fellow gnostics into members of a spiritual race. This motif resemble the motif of the 'immovable race,' which is associated, but not exclusively, with what has been called 'Sethian' gnosticism. Nevertheless, a Valentinian would certainly feel at home with the theology of these chapters, although it is possible he or she might not feel so comfortable with the *entire* cosmogonic myth.

**[5] The Synthesis**

What did the gnostic interpolator see in the *AJn* that prompted him to insert all this material into it, and what was the result of this merger? The *AJn* describes the apostle's converts as those who had been spiritually resurrected. The interpolator saw and the acts' community would see in these resurrections, the gnostics' spiritual rebirth and transformation into the Lord's kindred.[25] Cleopatra, the acts' example of the transformed soul, is now the gnostic who has been transformed and united with the Lord. And, the appearance of the Lord's twin in c. 92 would remind the acts' community of the interpolator's spiritual race, and the sacrament's initiates becoming like the Lord.

The combination of the acts' polymorphic christology with its division between mature and immature Christians and the interpolator's transformation motif creates something very similar to what we find in the *Gospel of Philip*. This gospel presents a polymorphic Jesus, who appears in forms appropriate to one's capability to understand. According to this evangelist, Jesus "did not reveal himself in the manner [in which] he was, but it was in the manner in which [they would] be able to see him. . ." (NHC II,3 p. 57,28ff.). This gospel also divides Christians into two groups, for "[He revealed himself] to the great as great. He [revealed himself] to the small as small."[26] Our gnostic could have seen this scheme in the acts' account of the transfiguration. According to the *AJn*, Jesus transformed himself into a supernatural giant, whose head reached the heavens (c. 90). When John saw this manifestation of the Lord, he became afraid and doubted. The Lord responded to John's change of heart by becoming a small man. Thus, the Lord revealed himself to John as great, when John was great in faith. When John was small in faith, the Lord also became small.

The *Gospel of Philip* also presents a transformation motif. Like the participants of the Lord's secret sacrament, the Christians of the *Gospel of Philip* become Christ (II,3, p. 61,21ff.). Our interpolator could have seen and led the acts' readers and community to see in John's actions the result of such a transformation. For example, in c. 88, John tells those with him, "δεῖ με πρὸς τὰς ἀκοὰς ὑμῶν ἁρμόσασθαι, καὶ καθ' ἃ χωρεῖ ἕκαστος ἐκείνω ὑμῖν κοινωνήσω ὧν ἀκροαταὶ δύνασθε γενέσθαι," about the Lord's polymorphism. John's statement is reminiscent of the *Gospel of Philip*'s (and Origen's) Jesus appearing in forms appropriate for his audience's ability to understand. Why would the apostle mimic the Lord? Our gnostic interpolator provides the answer: John has already become one of the Lord's kindred (c. 100). Now that he is like the Lord, John also must conform himself to his audience's level of comprehension. It is only by doing so that John's audience will understand his stories about the Lord's polymorphism,

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[25] By itself, the acts' motif of resurrection as a spiritual awakening is reminiscent of Tertullian's remarks about the gnostics and their understanding of resurrection. According to Tertullian (*de Carnis resurrectione* 19), the heretics (gnostics) have an imaginary sense about the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. They allege that even death itself must be understood in a spiritual sense for death is not to be understood physically, but as being ignorant of God and it is only when one has access to the truth that he is resurrected from this death/ignorance. And, by being so resurrected, God has given the gnostic a new life. The apostle ordering Lycomedes to awaken his soul, and to cast off the heavy sleep (c. 21) is also reminiscent of the gnostic being told to "wake up and return, taste and eat the true food!" in the *Concept of the Great Power* (NHC VI,4 p. 39,33-40,4), and the awakening of man by Epinoia in the *Apocryphon of John* (NHC II,1 p. 21,15).

[26] E. Pagels, "The Gospel of Philip" in *Documents for the Study of the Gospels*, D. R. Cartlidge and D. L. Dungan (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980) 59-62.

which are (now) the first step toward their becoming the 'transformed hearers' of the revelatory discourse (c. 101).

The combination of the acts' ideal of the immovable soul and the revelatory discourse's spiritual race has a very close parallel in the *Apocryphon of John*, which speaks of an immovable race (II,1 p.25,24-26,6) made up of people who have received and accepted the salvific gnosis, and have transcended their passions. They are no longer agitated by anger, envy, jealousy, desire or greed, and can therefore endure the instability of the created world. These people will be saved immediately, and join the (spiritual?) immovable race of the heavenly Seth on the third eternal realm (II, p. 9,14). In the interpolated *AJn*, true Christians have transcended their passions and have become members of the Lord's spiritual race by participating in the Lord's sacrament. These Christians will eventually join the spiritual race in the Cross of Light. The apocryphon also speaks of souls that do not immediately respond to the power of the Spirit of life. Salvation is still attainable, though it might take several reincarnations before these souls receive the gnosis and are saved (p. 27,10f.). James and the Christians he represents can be identified as such, for although their perception of the Lord is not as mature as John's, it is progressing. They will be saved, though it will take them longer. According to the apocryphon, the only souls that are denied salvation are those who attained gnosis, but rejected it. It would take little effort for the acts' readers to identify Fortunatus as such a soul, because he encountered the gnosis (the spiritual resurrection), but rejected it. Thus, through a gnostic's eyes the acts presents a tripartite view of humanity.[27]

### [6] The Interpolator's Motives

There is one final question that needs to be addressed. Why did our gnostic alter the *AJn*? The first step toward answering this question is by looking first at his account of the crucifixion.

> καὶ ὅτε τῷ ἀρουβάτῳ ἀπεκρεμάσθη, ὥρας ἕκτης ἡμερινῆς σκότος ἐφ' ὅλης τῆς γῆς ἐγεγόνει. καὶ στὰς ὁ κύριός μου ἐν μέσῳ τοὺ σπηλαίου καὶ φωτίσας αὐτὸ εἶπεν· Ἰωάννη, τῷ κάτω ὄχλῳ ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις σταυροῦμαι καὶ λόγχαις νύσσομαι καὶ καλάμοις καὶ ὄξος τε καὶ χολὴν ποτίζομαι.

In this terse account, the full reality of the crucifixion is brought home. The vinegar and the Matthean gall are mentioned together, and while Matthew and Mark record Jesus being struck by a reed and the Johannine gospel tells us that Jesus was pierced by a lance, according to the acts, Jesus was pierced with both lances and reeds. Our gnostic wants his readers to have no doubts that the crucifixion did occur with all the pain and suffering associated with it, but he has also

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[27] Although this motif is found in documents that have been identified as representative of 'Sethian gnosticism' (*Gospel of the Egyptians*, the *Three Steles of Seth*, *Zostrianos*, the *Tripartite Tractate*, and the *Sophia of Jesus Christ*[?]), it is not uniquely 'Sethian' (Williams, *The Immovable Race*, 206-209). The Valentinian parallels and allusions in the interpolation could indicate that we are dealing with a variation of the Valentinian division of hylic, psychic and pneumatic. (We might remember also that according to Irenaeus [*adv. Haer.* 1.7.5; cf. Clement Alex. *Exc. Theodot.* 54.1; Tertullian *adv. Val.* 29], the Valentinians saw Seth as the symbolic progenitor and representative of the pneumatics. And, if the acts' description of a true Christian is related to Philo's emotionally stable wise men, then we should take note that for Philo, those who love virtue belong to the "race" of Seth [e.g., *de Posteritate* 42; cf. 173]).

created a paradox. It was during the crucifixion that the Lord appeared to John in the cave. The situation becomes even more confusing when the Lord tells John that he is not the man on the wooden cross. But, who is this man? Junod and Kaestli believe the interpolator is presenting something similar to what we find in the *Apocalypse of Peter*. According to the apocalypse, the Savior only withdrew from his physical body, perhaps taking another form. Christ then watched the crucifixion with the apostle Peter, and laughs at his persecutors' lack of perception because they were born blind. At first glance, the Lord who appears to John in the cave could be identified as the apocalypse's "living Savior," while "the man" on the cross is his physical body. Our gnostic, however, does not make such a distinction,[28] for he quotes the Lord as saying, "'Ιωάννη, τῷ κάτω ὄχλῳ ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις σταυροῦμαι καὶ λόγχαις νύσσομαι καὶ καλάμοις καὶ ὄξος τε καὶ χολὴν ποτίζομαι. σοὶ δὲ λαλῶ. . ." (c. 97). The Lord goes on to tell John,

> ἀκούεις με παθόντα καὶ οὐκ ἔπαθον, μὴ παθόντα καὶ ἔπαθον· νυγέντα καὶ οὐκ ἐπλήγην· κρεμασθέντα καὶ οὐκ ἐκρεμάσθην· αἷμα ἐξ ἐμοῦ ῥεύσαντα καὶ οὐκ ἔρευσεν· καὶ ἁπλῶς ἃ ἐκεῖνοι λέγουσιν περὶ ἐμοῦ ταῦτα μὴ ἐσχηκέναι, ἃ δὲ μὴ λέγουσιν ἐκεῖνα πεπονθέναι (c. 101).

Such paradoxical phrases are puzzling. How can the Lord say that he is not "the man" on the wooden cross (c. 99), and claim that he is (c. 97)? How can he say he suffered and that he hadn't? The Lord's paradoxical statements become clear when we see them as the interpolater's own 'division' of mature and immature Christians: it is appropriate for some Christians to understand the Lord as the one who had died on the cross.[29] As James saw 'younger' apparitions of the Lord, so the interpolator's immature Christians understand the Lord only as "the man." John, again the recipient of a maturer manifestation of the Lord, represents those Christians who have a higher christology (for lack of a better term).[30]

This paradox is not unique. The author of the *Gospel of Truth* can state that Jesus "was nailed to a tree," and affirm his "imperishability" (NHC I,3 p. 20,20-30; cf. 23,33-24,9). The *Tripartite Tractate* also declares the Savior, who "for their sake . . . became manifest in an involuntary suffering . . . ," but who is also the "eternally, and unbegotten, impassable Logos. . ." (113,35-38). Pagels[31] has found this paradox also in Irenaeus' remarks (*adv. Haer.* 1.7.2; cf. 3.16.6) about the

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[28] Nor could the author of the *AJn*, because he describes the Lord as never having had a physical body to escape from.

[29] Both the revelatory discourse and the liturgy's instructions (c. 97) allude to another level of suffering experienced by the Lord (c. 100), which has nothing to do with the earthly crucifixion and his polymorphism. For instance, the Lord will become himself once more with the completion of the figure in the cross. When all of the gnostics returned to the Cross of Light, the Lord (who is the cross) will be fully integrated again (c. 100). In the mystagogical discourse, 'suffering' originally referred to the spiritual suffering of the Lord and the gnostics on earth. It is possible that the Lord's paradoxical statements had a different originally had this meaning, but our interpolator is using them in the context of the acts' polymorphism and for a very specific purpose. A. Orbe, *Christologica Gnostica* (Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos: Madrid, 1976) 2:241; C. L. Sturhan, *Die Christologie der ältesten apokryphen Apostelakten* (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation; Göttingen, 1952) 28-31; Junod and Kaestli, *Acta Iohannis*, 2:600-607.

[30] Even the site of the revelation emphasizes the high christology because it occurred at the Mount of Olives, that is, above Jerusalem, the site of the immature manifestation.

[31] E. Pagels, "Gnostic and Orthodox Views of Christ's Passion," in The School of Valentinus, vol. 1, *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism*, ed. B. Layton (E. J. Brill: Leiden, 1980) 264.

Valentinians, when he reports their belief that the one who suffered was the psychic Christ, while the pneumatic Christ, the divine spirit didn't because it is both incomprehensible and invisible. Thus, the Valentinians could confess that the Savior suffered and died, in that it was the psychic Christ (i.e., his human nature). From Irenaeus' viewpoint, the Valentinians were wolves in 'Christian clothing' (*adv. Haer.* 3.16.8) because they could make such a confession. From the Valentinians' viewpoint, however, the problem is that the orthodox Christians only recognize the psychic Christ, while they, the mature and pneumatic Christians, not only believe and confess a Christ who suffered and died (his psychic nature), but who also know that Christ (his divine nature) could not and did not.

There is a certain similarity between the Valentinian view and the interpolation; not that we should see a suffering psychic Christ and a nonsuffering divine Christ, but the distinction between the Lord's manifestations. According to our gnostic, God appears as the crucified one for those who are spiritually immature, while for those of a higher capability of understanding (or for those who have received his gnosis), he reveals himself as the one who transcends the suffering of the wooden cross. The acts' community would easily see the interpolator's position as a natural extension of their own division of mature and immature Christians. Our interpolator, however, wants them to go a step further.

*[6.1] The Question of Martyrdom*

In her paper for the International Conference on Gnosticism at Yale (1978), Pagels[32] demonstrated the relationship between gnostic and orthodox views of Christ's passion and their position on martyrdom. At one end of the spectrum are the orthodox, for whom, martyrdom vindicates the reality of Jesus' earthly mission, and likewise justifies their own (e.g., Ignatius, *Trallians* 10.1; *Smyrnaeans* 4.2), and at the other end are those gnostics, represented by the *Testimony of Truth*, who deny the reality of Christ's passion and reject martyrdom. With their 'dual' understanding of the Lord's passion, Pagels suspected that the Valentinians' position on martyrdom might run the same course. Pagels' only source for the Valentinians' attitude toward martyrdom was Heracleon (Clement Alex. *Stromata* 4.71f.). Pagels admits that Heracleon's remarks are somewhat ambiguous,[33] yet they seem to point toward a rejection of martyrdom. According to Heracleon, there are two different ways to confess Christ. The first type is orally confessing the Lord, which the psychic Christians consider the only confession. The Valentinians, on the other hand, believe that faith and conduct are the true confession of Christ. Heracleon supports his argument by pointing to Matthew, Philip, Thomas and Levi, because they confessed Christ through their faith and conduct, not before magistrates. Since these disciples were often used to typify gnostic initiates, Pagels believed that Heracleon could be implying that the gnostic Christian might be exempt from making an oral confession and can therefore avoid martyrdom. Yet, there are times when the pneumatic Christian must orally confess Christ. At a trial, it might become necessary for the pneumatic to confess Christ orally, because one of the elect can never deny him.

For Pagels, Heracleon's statements are also important for what he does not say, namely, that a Christian's martyrdom is an imitation of Christ's.[34] Pagels

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32 Ibid., 262-283.

33 Ibid., 276.

34 Ibid., 276.

believed that Heracleon and the Valentinians saw a direct relationship between Christ's two natures and the issue of martyrdom. Thus, she theorized that while some gnostics completely reject martyrdom (e.g., *Testimony of Truth, Apocalypse of Peter*), the Valentinians viewed martyrdom as 'appropriate,' but only for the psychic Christians, because this was the fate of the psychic/human Christ. Martyrdom could not be appropriate for the Valentinians because they know that the pneumatic Christ could not suffer.

It could very well be that our intepolator saw and wanted the acts' community to see the apostle John taking a similar stance. When the apostle admonished his listeners to worship the Lord, "*μὴ δακτύλοις, μηδὲ στόμασιν, μηδὲ γλώσσῃ, μηδ' ἑνὶ ὅλως σωματικῷ ὀργάνῳ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ διαθέσει*" (c. 104), he did so in the context of persecution.[35] By exhorting his fellow Christians not to worship the Lord with any part of their bodies, John is now understood rejecting martyrdom as an appropriate form of sacrifice or worship. After all, the Lord did not suffer on the cross because that was only one of his manifestations. It is the disposition of one's soul, the Christian's state of repose, that is required for confessing the Lord, not martyrdom or mere oral confession.[36] That John is the one making this speech adds a unique dimension, because of all the apocryphal acts, only the hero of the *AJn* did not suffer a martyr's death, but a 'natural' one of his own choosing.

Our gnostic's stance on martyrdom goes beyond Heracleon's, because salvation for him includes one being transformed into the Lord's image and being united with a spiritual race. It is also no mere coincidence that our gnostic introduced the Lord's esoteric sacrament, his description of the crucifixion and the revelatory vision immediately after John's speech on the Lord's polymorphism and before he exhorts the brethren to worship the Lord by the disposition of their soul and not their bodies.[37] Our interpolator is not only telling the act's commu-

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[35] In the very same sermon, John also said, "*καὶ γρηγορήσωμεν, ὅτι καὶ νῦν φυλακαῖς παρεδρεύει δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ μνημείοις, δεσμοῖς καὶ δεσμωτηρίοις, ὀνείδεσι καὶ ὕβρεσι, θαλάσσῃ καὶ ξηρᾷ, μάστιξι, καταδίκοις, ἐπιβουλαῖς, δόλοις, τιμωρίαις· καὶ ἁπλῶς ἅπασιν ἡμῶν συνὼν πάσχουσι συμπάσχει καί αὐτὸς ἀδελφοί·*" (c. 103). The acts also records an Ephesian praetor's animosity toward the apostle (c. 31). John's speech in the Ephesian theater also bears notice (c. 37), for he condemns all rulers, whether good or bad, to eternal misery. Should we understand the community of the *AJn* as undergoing some kind of persecution? John's two speeches and the praetor's antipathy do point us toward such a conclusion.

[36] A similar admonition can be found in c. 69, with the apostle condemning the soul that "*τὴν στόματι μὲν λέγουσαν ναί, ἔργῳ δὲ ἑαυτῇ οὐ δεικνύουσα.*"

[37] Our gnostic might have drawn a closer connection between his community's esoteric sacrament and the question of martyrdom by making some additions to the sacrament's final instructions (c. 96). The statement, "*ὅτι σὸν ἐστιν τοῦτο τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πάθος ὃ μέλλω πάσχειν,*" could be a reference to the crucifixion, since the only *ἄνθρωπος* mentioned in the interpolation is the man on the wooden cross. This identified is supported by the fact that this suffering has yet to occur ("*ὃ μέλλω πάσχειν*"), that is the crucifixion. If this is correct, then this phrase was inserted into the speech as part of the interpolator's attempt to conform the mystery rite to the acts' narrative, and to stress the theme of physical suffering. With this deletion, we have the following construction: 'You who dance, consider what I do, for you are unable at all to understand what you suffer unless to you I was sent by the Father as Logos.' The focus is now upon the spiritual suffering of the initiates.

Two other lines ("*εἰ τὸ πάσχειν ᾔδεις, τὸ μὴ παθεῖν ἂν εἶχες. τὸ παθεῖν σύγγνωθι καὶ τὸ μὴ παθεῖν ἔξεις.*") are also possible additions for the same reasons. It is conceivable that the subject of these lines is the spiritual suffering of the gnostic initiates or the spiritual

nity/readers that they should not seek martyrdom, but if persecution and martyrdom cannot be avoided, they should not be upset. The Lord did not suffer on the wooden cross because this was only one of his manifestations, so neither will his kindred. By becoming like the Lord, their physical bodies are only a manifestation of their true selves. If these Christians have been worried about salvation because of persecution, they should no longer fear. This sacrament will guarantee their souls' safe journey to heaven (that is, their ascent to the Cross of Light). Thus, our gnostic offered an alternative to persecution and martyrdom: membership in his own community.[38] Whether our interpolator was convincing cannot be confirmed. Nevertheless, we can see why the acts would be so inviting for a gnostic interpolator and how its community could be open to such an effort.

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suffering manifested in the mystery of the dance. Consequently, only the knowledge of this spiritual *πάθος* makes possible "the absence of suffering," that is repose. However, because of the revelatory discourse, and our interpolator's possible tampering with this speech, physical suffering could very well be the subject of these lines. Since the initiates now possess the gnosis and have been transformed by the dance, they will know how to endure persecution. Again, it is possible that this suffering should be understood as the gnostics' plight in this world, but such an announcement could also be an extension of the revelatory discourse's and the interpolator's 'suffering-nonsuffering' theme. And, with the deletion, the line of thought flows smoothly between lines eight and eleven: 'And what I am you will see when you come. What you do not know I myself will teach you.' When the pneumatics have been gathered up into the Cross of Light (or the Pleroma), they will fully understand who the Lord is, because this is when the Lord will teach them what they still do not know.

The interpolator did not add these lines to the sacrament's instructions for the sole purpose of assimilating the liturgy into the acts' narrative. (If that were true, he would also have attempted to dispel the incongruities between his own composition [cc. 97-102] and the sacrament and its setting [cc. 94-96].) The purpose of his 'micro-interpolations' is to shift the focus from the initiates' and the Lord's spiritual suffering to the revelatory discourse's teaching about the crucifixion, and the practical benefits of this sacrament.

[38] If we have correctly perceived the circumstances that instigated the interpolation—to proselytize Christians at a time of persecution—then our interpolator would not have been alone. Tertullian bears witness to such opportunists: "Hoc apud Christianos persecutio est. Cum igitur fides aestuat, et Ecclesia exuritur de figura rubi, tunc Gnostici erumpunt, tunc Valentiniani proserput, tunc omnes martyriorum refragatores ebulliunt, calentes et ipsi offendere, figere, occidere. Nam quod sciant multos simplices ac rudes, tum infirmos, plerosque vero in ventum, et si placuerit, Christianos, nunquam magis adeundo sapiunt, quam cum aditus animae formido laxavit; praesertim cum aliqua atrocitas fidem martyrum coronavit" (*Adversus Gnosticos Scorpiace* 1). What better vehicle than a historical novel to attract the "artless," the "inexperienced," the "weak," *and* the 'educated.' With his interpolation, our gnostic revealed to the acts' readers the gnosis lying just beneath the acts' stories about John and his converts, and the means by which one can become like the Lord and escape persecution.

# Thomas Tradition and the *Acts of Thomas*

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This study explores aspects of the inheritance and use of Thomas tradition in the *Acts of Thomas*; its main focus is embodiment and its permutations, polymorphism and docetism, and the controversy over its post-mortem counterpart, physical resurrection. The Thomas community which looked to this apostle for inspiration and spiritual legitimacy and created the Thomas tradition originated in the period prior to the writing of the canonical Gospels. It produced the Gospel of Thomas and the Book of Thomas (the Contender), and evoked from the community of the Beloved Disciple the Doubting Thomas pericope of John 20. These works show a significant consistency of viewpoint. The GTh emphasizes among other things the importance of the soul over the body, denigrates involvement in the world, denies physical resurrection, and presents an enlightenment ("gnostic") mode of spirituality, a "realized eschatology" which results in equality of the disciple with Jesus. These doctrines are confirmed by the BTh, while the dangers of sexuality are strongly, even stridently, accentuated. The Gospel of John, on the other hand, presents a recalcitrant Thomas who is corrected into becoming "orthodox" (sc. Johannine): Thomas touches the physical resurrected body of Jesus (thus confirming resurrection of the flesh), "believes," and submits to Jesus as Lord and God. Such polemical use of this literary character is evidence that the writer of John knew the substance of the Thomas tradition on these issues.[1] The GTh and BTh are consistent in the opposites: the rejection of the body and the denial of physical resurrection, the emphasis on *gnosis* and enlightenment in place of faith, and the spiritual equality of Thomas and Jesus.

The ATh are in conscious continuity with this tradition. As a Christian "romance," the ATh were part of a genre used and read by both "orthodox" and "heretic" alike. The nature of the text as "story" made it susceptible to elaboration and expansion: for example, the "Hymn of the Pearl" is not found in all manuscripts; several of the prayers, and even whole sections of text, are of quite different lengths in different manuscripts. In reference to the sacraments, the Greek and Syriac texts reflect different rites, apparently built over a core of earlier sectarian liturgy.[2] The text which has survived did so in the main through

[1] This position was worked out in excruciating detail in my 1990 Ph.D. dissertation, "Doubting Thomas: Controversies between the Communities of Thomas and John."

[2] According to Bornkamm, "The liturgical portions thus clearly point to a Gnostic sect which knew only the unction as a sacrament of initiation": G. Bornkamm, "The Acts of Thomas," in Hennecke-Schneemelcher, *New Testament Apocrypha*, 2. 438. This is prob-

orthodox hands, and underwent revision and assimilation to this developing viewpoint.[3] Yet there was, it seems, a "living link between the milieu wherein an apocryphal Acts originated and circles representing a traditional current" in an apostolic community.[4] Genuine Thomas tradition has been both preserved and "corrected" in an effort to make it more palatable to the mainstream;[5] the ATh reflects not only tradition derived from the GTh and the Thomas community,[6] but that of the larger Church, its Scriptures and confessions. Nevertheless, and apparently more so than in other Apocryphal Acts, the ATh arose within and bears the mark of its community.[7]

Elements unique to the Thomas tradition are found in many passages of the ATh.[8] For example, the apostle is expressly named "Judas" and "Judas Thomas" often, as in the GTh and BTh, but not in the canon. Thomas is the recipient of the "secret words" of Jesus, as in the *incipit* of both prior works (10 and 31). He is further the hearer of the "three words," which Jesus had spoken to him privately in *GTh* 13.[9] Perhaps the single most striking element of Thomas tradition and its signature feature is the designation of Thomas as the twin brother of Jesus. He is so named by a demonic serpent (31), and a donkey's colt (39). In addition, the Holy Spirit is addressed as "the Holy Dove that bears the twin young" (50). Jesus appears more than once in the exact form of Thomas: he appears as Thomas to two different dead individuals in the realm of the dead (34 and 54-55); he leads two female disciples out of a locked room to the real Thomas (151-152), for which he earns the title, "Jesus of many forms" (153; cf. also 48); he appears to an affianced couple and must say that he is Thomas' brother to explain his identical appearance (11). Likewise, before his death, Thomas finds it necessary to declare, "I am not Jesus" (160).

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ably too narrow. Baptism was apparently part of the Thomas tradition, and both baptism and Eucharist are present in the ATh as we now have them. Jewish Baptismal sects of several doctrinal types predate Christianity, and therefore baptism is not foreign to groups on the margins of the Church.

[3] "... the scribes who transcribed these materials often shared with Eusebius and Photius an insistence on canonical orthodoxy, a desire for carefully crafted theological positions, and a skepticism of myth, legend or fanciful narrative": Dennis Ronald MacDonald, "Introduction: The Forgotten Novels of the Early Church," in idem, ed., *The Apocryphal Acts of Apostles* (Semeia 38; Decatur: Scholars Press, 1986) 5.

[4] Francois Bovon and Éric Junod, "Reading the Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles," in MacDonald, ed., *The Apocryphal Acts of Apostles*, 163.

[5] This is especially true in the Syriac versions, which reflect "... Syriac Christianity at a later stage in which special attention was paid to man's free will and the resurrection of the body." Cf. A. F. J. Klijn, *The Acts of Thomas*, 16. According to Bornkamm, the Syriac "displays numerous catholicizing revisions": G. Bornkamm, "The Acts of Thomas," 2. 428. Also, cf. Yves Tissot, "Les actes de Thomas, exemple de recueil composite," in F. Bovon, et al., eds., *Les Actes apocryphes de Apôtres: Christianisme et monde païen* (Publication de la faculté de théologie de l'Université de Genève, 4; Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1981) 223.

[6] Cf. J. Michael LaFargue, *Language and Gnosis: The Opening Scenes of the Acts of Thomas* (Harvard Dissertations in Religion, 18; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985) 216.

[7] Cf. Éric Junod, "Creations romanesques et traditions ecclésiastiques dans les Acts apocryphes des Apôtres," in *Augustinianum* 23 (1983) 284-285.

[8] Cf. G. Bornkamm, "The Acts of Thomas," in Hennecke-Schneemelcher, *New Testament Apocrypha*, 2. 427.

[9] GTh 13: "... He [Jesus] took him [Thomas]. He withdrew; he spoke three words to him." The words are not disclosed in either the GTh or the ATh.

The polemic against the body and its dangers which is present in the GTh and so much in evidence in the BTh is also found, in its own form, in the Acts. Sexuality is again one of the main targets of attack in both story and teaching (cf. for example, ATh 28, 84, 96, 101),[10] based in part on the doctrine that for God there is no sexual differentiation, "no male or female."[11] But not only are the sexes not part of the divine world, sexuality is pollution. A newly married couple is persuaded on their wedding night to "abandon filthy intercourse," remain in chastity, and "marry" the eternal spouse in heaven, Jesus (11-15).[12] Again, not only is the producing of children evil, but children themselves are the cause of evils, the majority of whom become evil (12; also 79, 126). Thomas fasts,[13] and eats only sparingly (water, bread and salt: 20, 104; fasting, 139); in fact he is described as not eating or drinking at all (96; cf. 5). He takes nothing from anyone, in payment for healing or otherwise (20). He recommends that all give away their possessions (100). This is in accord with the instruction that the believer must serve God "free from all bodily pleasures" (126).

There are important similarities with earlier Thomas tradition in the description of the body.[14] As in GTh 71, the body is a dwelling of the soul and spirit, even the "temple" of God (94). But, as in the BTh (139.3-4; 140.31f.), the body is set apart from the divine world by its mutability: it changes, grows old, and loses its beauty (88). The body is the storehouse of worthless deeds and desires, of money and possessions, clothing and beauty, all of which vanish; believers are to raise themselves out of "the whole body in which all these are stored and which growing old becomes dust, returning to its own nature" (37). It is a garment of the soul (147), in fact a dirty garment (126). So Thomas describes himself as "a man clothed with a body" (66).[15] The Savior is the "nourisher, preserving and giving us rest in alien bodies, the Savior of our souls" (39).

This last point is emphasized often, that it is the soul which is saved; the body is not said to be raised or endure or be renewed in eternity.[16] Death is "not death,

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[10] It is worth noting how old in the Thomas tradition is encratism, going back, as so much else, to Greek philosophical body/soul dualism. It does not appear merely to have been included because of the requirements of the *genre*, but to have had genuine prior historical place in the community.

[11] Chapter 129. Cf. Dennis Ronald MacDonald, *There is No Male and Female: The Fate of a Dominical Saying in Paul and Gnosticism* (Harvard Dissertations in Religion, 20; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987).

[12] Another work probably from Edessa, the Gospel of Philip, describes the spiritual marriage to one's heavenly partner as an actual sacrament of the community. This again shows that the inspiration for such encratism is no mere literary *topos*, but local church practice. The Gospel of Philip has clear affinities with the Thomas tradition.

[13] GTh 14: "If you fast, you will beget sin for yourselves..." (cf. also, 6 and 104). This is an interesting contradiction. The fasting condemned in the GTh is clearly Jewish and Jewish-Christian ritual fasting (as in the *Didache*). Such ritual is not visible in the ATh. Thomas fasts continually (20), and "boasts of poverty and philosophy and humility and fasting and prayer and fellowship with the Holy Spirit and with my brethren who are worthy of God" (139). This seems far more a description of a (proto-)monastic community.

[14] For other parallels, cf. Han J. W. Drijvers, "Thomasakten," in Edgar Hennecke, *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen in deutscher Übersetzung*, ed. Wilhelm Schneemelcher (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1989) 291.

[15] Cf. the "body as clothing" sayings in GTh 21, 37.

[16] Perhaps others will read the ATh differently on this point. There are a few passages which seem to be based on creedal formulations, and may stem from later redaction. Even these omit specific reference to resurrection of the body. One passage, however, in

but deliverance and release from the body" (160; 163; cf. GTh 21, 37).[17] We are told that "Jesus alone abides forever, and the souls which hope in him" (117). It is salvation of souls alone which is described (157), even though there is miraculous healing for the body. Jesus is the one who saves the soul, and "restores it to its own nature" (141). The restoration to its own nature finds explanation in the journey of the soul through the heavenly archons, the demonic "powers and dominions" of the regions between earth and heaven. Thomas prays that he might journey safely up to the judgment seat of God (148, 167), and thus that his soul might return to God (cf. GTh 50). For the bridegroom, describing the apostle's teaching, says that Thomas "showed me to seek myself and to recognize who I was and who and how I now am, that I may become again what I was" (15; cf. GTh 3, 18). So the "Hymn of the Pearl" describes the heavenly origin, descent, and reascent of the soul: it clothed itself in garments of Egypt on its arrival (= the body: 109.29), and then "took off and left in their land their dirty and unclean garment" (111.62-63) at its reascent. Thomas tells his disciples that "So long as we are in the body we cannot speak and declare what he is to give to our souls" (36; cf. GTh 37); the gift, as in the Hymn, is clothing of the world above. Embodiment changes even the relationship of God to humans: God is Father to pure souls, but Judge of embodied souls. Thomas prays to God as "Lord of all and Father—but Father not of souls that are in bodies, but of those that are gone out; for of the souls that are in pollutions you are Lord and judge" (30).

The influence of the canonical figure of Thomas in the Gospel of John is also present. In the GTh, Jesus states to Thomas directly that he is not Thomas' "Master,"[18] based on the Thomas doctrine of the equality of the disciple and Jesus. The figure of Thomas in the Gospel of John, however, is made to submit to Jesus as a superior being and to address Jesus as "my Lord and my God" (John 20:28). In the ATh, all these titles are used of Jesus in his relationship with Thomas: a merchant asks Thomas if Jesus is his master, and Thomas replies that he is his Lord (2); the donkey's colt calls Jesus the "Lord and Teacher" of Thomas (40); a wild donkey calls Jesus all three, "Master, Teacher, and Lord" of Thomas (78). More significantly, Thomas himself prays to Jesus as "my Lord and my God" (10; 167), exactly as he addresses Jesus in John 20:28. In a prayer to raise two women from the dead, the formerly doubting Thomas says, "My Lord and my God, I do not doubt concerning you, nor do I call upon you in unbelief..." (81). The author of the Acts shows that Thomas has learned his Johannine lesson.

The other lesson of the Thomas pericope in the Gospel of John, however, that Jesus had a physical post-resurrection body, is nowhere in evidence. The Jesus of the ATh had a physical pre-Easter body which was handled by the disciples

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a very "orthodox" account of the passion of Jesus, includes the words,"for the new grave and burial let us receive renewal of soul and body [=healing]. Because you rose and came to life again, let us come to life again and live and stand before you in righteous judgment" (158). No other text in the Acts comes this close to physical resurrection.

[17] Even those who are condemned to hell are released from the body. A young woman whom Thomas raises from the dead describes a tour of Hell, during which she sees souls being tormented in their offending "body" parts. Cf. Martha Himmelfarb, *Tours of Hell: An Apocalyptic Form in Jewish and Christian Literature* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983) 11-13, 132-133.

[18] The salient part of GTh 13: "Thomas said to him: Master, my mouth will not at all be capable of saying whom you are like. Jesus said: I am not your master, because you have drunk and have become drunk from the bubbling spring which I measured out."

(143), was crucified and poured out blood (153). After three days he rose from the dead (59; cf. also 80, 156, 158). But the post-resurrection body of Jesus is something other than the very same flesh in which he was crucified. He is the Jesus of "many forms" (48; cf. 80 Syr., 153), a phrase used elsewhere only of demons who have no bodies (44).[19] Furthermore, he is seen not only as Thomas. He appears to the new disciples, King Gundaphorus and his brother, with the same introduction he used to Thomas in John 20, saying "Peace be unto you." But the two men cannot see him, since they had not yet been sealed by the Holy Spirit. After the sealing, he is visible as a young man carrying a blazing torch, which outshines all other lights. This leads to the exclamation: "Beyond our comprehension, O Lord, is your light, ... for it is greater than our sight."[20] Not only is the light of the Lord beyond sight, but so is the Lord himself. Thomas describes his epiphany thus: "Jesus, who appears to us at all times, ... you who are not seen with our bodily eyes, but are never hidden at all from those of our soul, and in your form are indeed hidden..." (53). In a remarkable reference to the transfiguration story of the Gospels, Thomas declares, "his appearance we saw transfigured with our eyes, but his heavenly form we could not see upon the mount" (143). When the captain of King Misdaeus asks the apostle to show him Jesus that he may believe, Thomas answers, "Stretch your mind upward as much as you can, for he does not appear to these bodily eyes, but is found with the eyes of the mind" (65). Jesus did appear to a dead young man beyond the grave, whom Thomas later raised, but his form is described as one of "beauty" and "radiant countenance," an "effulgence of light" (35).

From early in the history of the Christian movement, there had been sharp differences of opinion over the doctrine of physical resurrection. The ATh stems from a period when this controversy was joined by some of the most influential Christian writers. The strict division between soul and body which had been developed in Greek philosophical and eastern religious tradition was inherited by the Thomas tradition and a large part of the early Church. This division was attacked, especially in the West, as a means to substantiate claims for the necessity of bodily resurrection: the human being was not merely a soul imprisoned in a foreign and temporary body, but a totality, a "whole" composed of body and soul together. So Irenaeus, in the later second century, writes (*Adv. Haer.* 5.6.1):[21]

> The soul and spirit can be considered *a part* of the human being, but in no way comprise the whole person; for the complete "human" is a mixture and uniting of the soul receiving the spirit from the Father with that flesh which has been formed according to the image of God.

The body, he goes on to say, is the "temple of God" (citing 1 Cor 3:16), and therefore it is the "utmost blasphemy" to assert, as some clearly were doing, that the body will not share in salvation, but simply be destroyed (5.6.2). Tertullian, a younger contemporary, asserts that belief in the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh had faltered under the attacks of the "unbelief and perverseness" of

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[19] In both AJn 89 and APt 21 Jesus appears (among other forms) as an old man and a youth. In the ATh, Jesus appears only as Thomas and as a youth. The only other polymorphic being (who, interestingly, appears as an old man and a youth) is a demon (ATh 43).

[20] Chapter 27. A similar appearance in "great light" is described of Thomas: 118.

[21] Cf. also Tertullian, *De Resurrectione Carnis*, 32.8: tam enim corpus homo quam et anima; Athenagoras, *De Resurrectione*, 15. Cf. Lynn Boliek, *The Resurrection of the Flesh: A Study of a Confessional Phrase* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962) 25.

heretics, but that God had "now dispersed all the perplexities of the past," and their "self-chosen allegories and parables,"[22] by the spiritual outpouring of the New Prophecy (i.e., Montanism; *De Resurrectione Carnis*, 63). These "heresies" of the past, of course, predated by centuries any heresies encountered by Tertullian; the allegories and parables were old hermeneutical strategies used by Greek philosophers to interpret Homer and the poets, and by Hellenistic Judaism and "heretical" Christianity to meld the Scriptures with Greco-Roman culture. The waning of faith in physical resurrection to which Tertullian refers was of course nothing of the sort: the doctrine which he and Irenaeus were advocating was being invented and developed in the late first and second centuries by themselves and their fellow advocates, like so many other doctrines which eventually found there way into the creeds.

The thought world of the ATh is quite different from that which prompted the physical demonstrations of the body of the risen Jesus in the Gospels of John and Luke, and the polemic of Irenaeus and Tertullian. The Thomas tradition, as did Greek philosophical tradition before it, emphasized the division of soul from body and the corrupting influences and perishability of the body, ideas found to a somewhat lesser extent elsewhere in the canon itself. Both the GTh and BTh deny the resurrection of the physical body (GTh 71; BTh 143.10ff.). Every element of the Doubting Thomas pericope is used and quoted in the ATh, but for the touching of the post-Easter body of Jesus. One must assume that it was by conscious choice that this single aspect was omitted: Jesus had no post-Easter physical body in the Thomas tradition. In spite of "orthodox" readership and revision, the ATh preserves this community emphasis on the "spiritual resurrection" of Jesus.

The physical transformations of Jesus found in the ATh and referred to above raise an important issue for the Thomas tradition and its relationship to the ATh: did Jesus have a pre-Easter physical body? The subject of the polymorphism and associated docetism of Jesus in three of the apocryphal Acts (AJn, APt, ATh) has been discussed in a perceptive and creative article by D. Cartlidge.[23] The Acts of John clearly present a docetic Jesus, and use the Transfiguration story of Mark 9 as a basis for understanding Jesus in his docetic polymorphism. For Cartlidge, the use of the Transfiguration story points to a docetic Jesus in the ATh also.[24] The claim for docetism in the ATh is based on his interpretation of the following passage in ATh 143:

> and he *was called* [ἐκλήθη] the son of virgin Mary, and *was termed* [ἠκούσθη] son of carpenter Joseph. This one, whose smallness with the eyes of our body, but [whose] greatness we received by faith; and we saw this in his works. Whose human body we handled with our hands, but whose aspect we saw changed with our eyes, but whose heavenly type we were not able to see on the mountain.

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22 Meaning their two-level method of interpretation: literal meaning for Tertullian and his friends, and spiritual meaning reserved for the elite. Cf. James M. Robinson, "From Jesus to Valentinus (or to the Apostles Creed)," in *JBL* 101 (1982) 26-37.

23 David R. Cartlidge, "Transfigurations of Metamorphosis Traditions in the Acts of John, Thomas and Peter," in MacDonald, ed., *The Apocryphal Acts of Apostles*, 53-66.

24 *ibid.*, p. 57-58. This is a minor point in a fine article which hardly merits the treatment it receives here. It is mentioned to show the affinity of conception between the AJn and ATh.

The underlined words (italicized in Cartlidge's article) are taken to mean that Jesus had a docetic body in the ATh as he does in the AJn. If the ATh were composed later than,[25] and in some sense were dependent on or influenced by the AJn and the APt,[26] then one would expect the ATh to display a similar docetic Christology based on a similar (derivative) polymorphism. The earlier two Acts base their polymorphism in the Transfiguration story and make similar claims: (1) that Jesus was or could be different in appearance to different people during his earthly life; (2) the polymorphic ability of Jesus in the "present" of the these Acts was a continuation of his prior, pre-Easter transformations; (3) his pre-Easter "form" was something other than normal human embodiment, for the APt a polymorphic form at least,[27] and for the AJn a clearly docetic body. One would expect the ATh to follow this pattern, and Cartlidge concludes that it does. The implications of such a claim are not negligible. This would constitute a decided break with earlier Thomas tradition, since nowhere in the earlier Thomas texts is there a docetic Jesus. It would also be a revision of the tradition not in the direction of "orthodoxy," as is the norm for this work (best seen in the Syriac texts), but away from it in the direction of docetic sectarianism as is found in the AJn. This could be support for a case that the ATh arose not in a community which valued and preserved a living Thomas tradition, but perhaps in the circles which produced the AJn, which then produced another apocryphal Acts under the name of another apostle (adding a few bits of lore about Thomas for *verisimilitude*) as further buttress for its positions.

One aspect of polymorphism not discussed by Cartlidge is the historical background of such physical transformations of More-Than-Human beings in the pre-Christian world, and therefore the possibilities and limitations in the minds of those who created and transmitted such stories. Early Christians did not compose tales about Jesus and their other heroes except in continuity with ideas available in their culture. Thus, for example, a virgin could be impregnated by God and bear a divine-human child, animals could speak the wisdom of God, the dead could be raised and the sick restored, etc., because Semele, horses of the *Iliad* and Balaam's ass, Asclepius and Elijah, and numerous others had experienced and accomplished these and many other wonders in both Greco-Roman and Semitic sacred stories available for centuries before the Christian period.

Such stories in their variety provided not only a great number of possible miraculous events which could be used and adapted in tales about the apostles, but also several possible relationships between the divine and humans spheres, several "proto-christologies," which influenced the ideas of early Christian theorists as they worked out their views of the relationship of Jesus to the world. Heroes and the sons and daughters of the gods were not merely of one sort, and the several Christologies of the early church reflect this diversity. These differing types of divine-human beings provided the models for the "different Jesus" of each community, and delimited the possibilities for polymorphism and docetism. Three of the many sons of Zeus, each born of a virgin human mother, may serve as illustrations of two major types of divine-human being: Dionysus, the son of Semele, as representative of the fully divine human; Herakles, the son of

[25] So Éric Junod, "Creations romanesques," 271.

[26] So D. R. MacDonald, *The Acts of Andrew and the Acts of Andrew and Matthias in the City of the Cannibals* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990) 28.

[27] Peter connects the polymorphic appearances to the widows of APt 21 with his account of the Transfiguration in the final sentence of that section.

Alkmene, and Sarpedon, son of Europa, as two variations of the divinized hero. Dionysus was from his birth a full deity in human form, impervious to attack, able to appear and disappear, to suffer without suffering, and to effect miracles. He belonged at all times among the gods of Olympus. Olympians were, of course, free to appear to humans in whatever form was convenient for their purposes; they had unrestricted freedom for polymorphism. Herakles, at a stage lower, had to struggle through a real human life as a man, yet had divine strength and destiny; he suffered the persecution of a divine opponent and died an excruciating death before being assumed into Olympian company and the worship of the masses. He was not polymorphic or docetic while alive, but made numerous appearances post-mortem as a god to help his petitioners. Sarpedon, at an even lower level, his divine parentage notwithstanding, stood in a similar relationship to the divine world as did almost any other mere mortal. He fought in the Trojan war (on the wrong side), died and went to Hades. He could never have been docetic or polymorphic while alive, yet he, his fellow combatants, and innumerable others, became post-mortem heroes in cult nonetheless. They received worship and made appearances to help, warn or punish the living, sometimes in different forms: the dead hero Astrabacus, for example, had sexual relations with and fathered a son by the mother of Demaratus in the form of her husband Ariston, for whom she mistook him (Herodotus 6.69); the dead hero Protesilaos appeared as (or in) a dead salt fish, roasting on a grill yet alive, to threaten Artaÿctes with impending doom (Herodotus 9.118f.).

Polymorphism and docetism, therefore, are seen to depend on the conception of the individual hero or god: those viewed as divine from birth, like Dionysus or the Olympian gods in human form, may be polymorphic and docetic during "normal life" (if such terms apply at all to these beings), while heroes such as Herakles, Sarpedon and Astrabacus provide a model for a Jesus more or less human while alive, and polymorphic and docetic only after death. That the post-mortem spirit of an otherwise normal human hero may on occasion take another form is well within the religious expectations of the ancients. That an individual should do so before death marks him or her as a divine being, as a god on the model of the Olympians in human guise. These differences are reflected in the Apocryphal Acts: the polymorphic and docetic Jesus of the AJn is of a different, more divine order than the Jesus of the ATh and the Thomas tradition; the AJn has a more Olympian Christology than that of the ATh. In the AJn, Jesus is "God unchangeable, God invincible, God who is higher than all..." (104); so he himself declares "I am your God" (96.44). This is Zeus, or Dionysus at least, with an immortal and non-fleshly body, who has appeared in one form and then another to confound those outside his will. So John is told to "despise those who are outside the mystery" (AJn 100). The Jesus of the ATh as we have them is a humbler being, far more the Jesus of the GTh and the Great Church. One is hampered severely in investigating the Christology of the ATh because of the orthodox revision. Yet even so, in the passages which describe his polymorphic appearances, it is his care for and identification with the lowly which is said to motivate the epiphanies (cf. 153). In the passage quoted above (ATh 143), the argument is based on a juxtaposition of high and low, the exalted divine nature of Jesus in contrast with his humble incarnation. So Thomas and his fellows saw the "smallness of his body" with their physical eyes, but the invisible "greatness" they had to accept by faith; they "handled his human body" with their hands, but could not see his heavenly reality. This rather standard incarnational Christology: John 6:42 "Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and

mother we know? How can he now say, 'I have come down from heaven'?" (cf. GTh 101). The words "was called" and "was termed" do not refer to docetism, but to *kenosis*.

The polymorphism of the Jesus of the ATh is based on the model of the Hero, such as Herakles or Astrabacus: a (divinely generated) hero with a real human body who becomes a polymorphic spirit after death. There did develop at some time in the first century a docetic view of Jesus, visible in the negative through the contrary polemic in Ignatius of Antioch (*Tral.* 9-10; *Smyr.* 2-3). But the Thomas tradition does not have a docetic Jesus, any more than did Homer portray a docetic Sarpedon, or Plato a docetic Socrates. The Thomas tradition is not afraid of suffering, nor does it deny embodiment. Neither is Jesus fundamentally different from his disciples, that he alone should "seem" (δοκεῖν) to be physically embodied, while his disciples are in fact so. The supra-mundane history of the soul and body in Plato is quite similar in outline to the story of both the Living Jesus and the disciple in the GTh. The soul for Plato has its origin in the divine and takes on a body as a "dwelling" or even "prison." As Jesus is the pre-existent savior who comes to earth, takes on a body (GTh 28), then leaves it behind to return to the Father, so the disciple "existed before being born" (GTh 19) and will return to the beginning (GTh 18) after leaving the body behind to its "owners" (GTh 21). Just as is the history of Jesus, so is the history of the individual disciple; the two are equalized by self-knowledge meted out by Jesus (GTh 13 and 113).

That Jesus had a real body in the GTh and was not a docetic "semblance" of a human being is clear from several passages. He is the non-apocalyptic "son of man" (86), a human being [28] with a human lineage and body. In GTh 28, the pre-existence and earthly descent of Jesus is implicit; his "standing" in the flesh is stated directly. The disciples also "came into the world" and will "go out again" (also in GTh 28). If the collocation of the sayings at points in the GTh is a clue to the interpretation placed on them by the community, then this reading of GTh 28 is strengthened by the following saying (GTh 29): "I marvel at how this great wealth [= the spirit] has made its home in this poverty [= the body]." The disciples who do not come to self-knowledge are not only "in poverty" but "are poverty" (GTh 3). This is not seeming poverty, but real poverty. Their souls are impoverished by dependence on the flesh; so Jesus pronounces "woe on the soul which depends on the flesh" (GTh 112; cf. 87). In the ATh, likewise, Jesus has a real body, which the disciples "handled with their hands" (143). The pre-Easter Jesus is described as "man, slain, corpse, buried" (47). This is not docetism.

The ATh stands at a point between the growing confessional viewpoint of the Great Church and the Thomas tradition. One may observe conflicting passages in the Acts (especially between the Greek and Syriac texts) concerning several doctrinal matters, yet the eschatology of physical resurrection is absent.[29] Jesus of the GTh declares that his body will not be raised (GTh 71). We are not told whether in the opinion of the community of the ATh the tomb of Jesus was empty on Easter morning. Yet one analogy may be enlightening. When the women approached the tomb of Jesus in the Gospel of Mark, an angel told them,

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[28] So Koester, "Introduction: The Gospel according to Thomas" in Bentley Layton, ed., *Nag Hammadi Codex II, 2-7*, 1.43.

[29] Cf. Han J. W. Drijvers, "Thomasakten," in Hennecke-Schneemelcher, *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen in deutscher Übersetzung*, 295.

"He is risen; he is not here" (Mark 16:6). Likewise in the ATh, while two disciples pass the night sitting next to the tomb of Judas, the twin brother of Jesus, he appears to them and says: "I am not here" (169). Yet his body remained in the grave.

# The Death of Jesus and the Rending of the Temple Veil (Luke 23:44-49): A Window into Luke's Understanding of Jesus and the Temple

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## 1. Introduction

Luke may have been gaining ground in his recognition as a narrative theologian in the last three decades, but there is much ground to recover. Outside the arena of soteriology, nowhere have scholarly instincts to assume in Luke a Pauline or Markan voice been more apparent than with regard to the theology of the temple and its destruction. This essay focuses on one significant aspect of Luke's portrait of the temple—namely, the rending of the temple veil (Luke 23:45b)—by examining the Lukan account of the tearing of the temple curtain within the context of his account of Jesus' death (23:44-49), and against the backdrop of his larger treatment of the temple in Luke-Acts.

Luke's account of the rending of the temple veil is curious for two reasons. First, if Luke were following Mark (or Matthew) he has transposed this "event" to an anterior position vis-à-vis Jesus' expiration. Second, Luke's overall treatment of the temple is much more positive than Mark's and, surprisingly (if Mark's interpretation of the rending of the temple veil as a sign of the temple's end is presumed), Acts continues this largely positive portrait. These phenomena give rise in this essay to a source-critical analysis of the death scene in Luke 23, and to a literary-theological and sociological reading of the temple material in Luke-Acts. This essay argues that the rending of the temple veil in Luke is of a piece with the larger Lukan emphasis on the obliteration of the barriers between those peoples previously divided by status and ethnicity.

## 2. Luke 23:44-49: A Question of Sources

Even though our primary focus is on the report of the rending of the temple veil in Luke 23:45b (*eschisthē de to katapetasma tou naou meson*), the question of Luke's source(s) cannot be so narrowly defined. Assuming Luke's use of the Second Gospel as a source,[1] it is easy enough to account for this clause as a

[1] In this essay we presuppose the two-documentary hypothesis; see Christopher M. Tuckett, *The Revival of the Griesbach Hypothesis: An Analysis and Appraisal*, SNTSMS 44 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1983). *Contra* Vincent Taylor (*The Passion Narrative of St. Luke: A Critical and Historical Investigation*, ed. Owen E. Evans, SNTSMS 19 [Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1972]) and Joachim Jeremias, (*Die Sprache des*

Lukan reworking of Mark 15:38 (*kai to katapetasma tou naou eschisthē eis duo ap' anōthen heōs katō*): Luke often substitutes *de* for Mark's *kai*, and the adverbial *meson* follows classical and Lukan usage (cf. Luke 22:55; Acts 1:18).[2] However, this does not account for (1) the noticeable transposition of this narrative report from its posterior position vis-à-vis Jesus' death in Mark's account to its anterior position in Luke's, nor (2) the slim possibility that this detail would have been available to Luke independent of some sort of more complete, narrative report of Jesus' death. Although any argument for or against Luke's use of a non-Markan, continuous passion source must be cumulative,[3] for the purposes of this essay, we may restrict our analysis to Luke's account of Jesus' death, 23:44-49.

Joseph Fitzmyer has conveniently cataloged the primary points at which the Lukan and Markan accounts diverge:

> (1) [Luke] has supplied an explanation for the darkness, the failure of sunlight (v. 45a); (2) he has moved up the notice about the rending of the Temple veil to join it to the cataclysmic darkness (in Mark it occurs *after* Jesus has breathed his last [15:38]), thus creating a more dramatic backdrop for the event; (3) he has eliminated Jesus' Aramaic cry of dereliction and the subsequent association of it with Elijah (Mark 15:34-36); (4) he makes use of a different OT psalm to explain the "loud cry" of Mark 15:37, as Jesus breathes his last (v. 46); (5) he has changed the comment of the centurion who stood by; and (6) he has created his own ending of the episode (vv. 48-49), slightly modifying what he retains of Mark 15:40a.[4]

Some discussion of Lukan terminology and style is inevitable, but our primary interest embraces the importance of these six points of departure for our source-critical analysis.

*2.1. The Darkness and the Temple Veil (23:45).* Luke's explanation of the phenomenon of darkness in 23:44—*tou hēliou eklipontos* (23:45a)—and the rending

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*Lukasevangeliums: Redaktion und Tradition im Nicht-Markusstoff des dritten Evangeliums*, KKNT [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980]), we do not assume that, if Luke possessed a non-Markan source for his narrative of Jesus' death, it must have formed an integrated source L with its own characteristic vocabulary. Nor do we follow the conclusion of Etienne Trocmé (*The Passion as Liturgy: A Study in the Origin of the Passion Narratives in the Four Gospels* [London: SCM, 1983]), that Luke used an early copy of the Gospel of Mark which did not include chapters 14-16; see Joel B. Green, review of *The Passion as Liturgy: A Study in the Origin of the Passion Narratives in the Four Gospels*, by Etienne Trocmé, in *EvQ* 56 (3, 1984) 185-188.

2 See Taylor, *Passion*, 95; Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to S. Luke*, 5th ed., ICC (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1901) 538.

3 For recent, opposing viewpoints on the question whether Luke used a non-Markan passion narrative, see (for) Joel B. Green, *The Death of Jesus: Tradition and Interpretation in the Passion Narrative*, WUNT 2:33 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1988) 24-104; and (against) Marion L. Soards, *The Passion according to Luke: The Special Material of Luke 22*, JSNTSS 14 (Sheffield: JSOT, 1987); and the series of articles by Frank J. Matera: "Luke 22,66-71: Jesus before the *Presbyterion*," in *L'Évangile de Luc—The Gospel of Luke*, revised and enlarged edition of *L'Évangile de Luc: Problèmes littéraires et théologiques*, ed. F. Neirynck, BETL 32 (Leuven: Leuven University, 1989) 517-533; "Luke 23:1-25: Jesus before Pilate, Herod, and Israel," in *L'Évangile de Luc—The Gospel of Luke*, 535-551; and "The Death of Jesus according to Luke: A Question of Sources," *CBQ* 47 (3, 1985) 469-485.

4 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J., *The Gospel according to Luke: Introduction, Translation, and Notes*, 2 vols., AB 28-28A (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1981/85) 2:1512.

of the temple veil may be treated together since a number of scholars see them as two parts of one interpretive whole, attributable to Luke. Thus, after noting how Luke fails to supply a realistic explanation for the three hours' darkness ("as eclipses cannot coincide with a full moon"), Michael Goulder writes, "He brings the rending of the Temple veil forward, so as to have the portents together: both signify God's anger with Jewry, the second the coming destruction of the Temple."[5] Anton Büchele likewise wants to interpret them together—as apocalyptic signs rooted in Joel 3:4 LXX: wonders in heaven, signs on the earth.[6] The most sustained argument of this nature, however, is by Frank Matera. In an article published in 1985,[7] he concludes that, in narrating the death of Jesus, Luke had access to one source only—namely, Mark 15:33-39; and that every dissimilarity between the two stories of the death of Jesus is due to Lukan redaction. On the specific issue of the transposition of the temple veil, Matera reasons:

> First, [Luke] wishes to avoid the impression that the death of Jesus is the end of the temple and its cult. The temple will still have a positive role to play in Acts and Luke's attitude toward it is basically benevolent. Therefore, he has altered Mark's account lest his own narrative give the impression of the temple's final destruction. Second, Luke has altered Mark's order in order to align the torn curtain with the sun's failure and the three hours of darkness... The tearing of the temple curtain, alongside the sun's failure, becomes a portent that the "last days" have been set in motion by Jesus' death.[8]

As has now been repeatedly argued, Luke's attitude toward the temple is much more positive than that of Mark;[9] hence, Matera is surely correct in his move away from interpreting the torn veil as a portent of temple destruction. But a puzzle remains. If Luke had been motivated by the desire to avoid the impression that the death of Jesus is the end of the temple and its cult, why include *any* mention of the rending of the temple veil in this context? Just as Luke excised the threat of temple destruction from the account of Jesus before the Jewish council (Mark 14:57-58; Luke 22:66-71; cf. Acts 6:13-14), could he not have chosen to delete this detail here? By simply transposing the order of these two events, Jesus' death and the rending of the temple veil, has Luke really succeeded in disassociating them?

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[5] Michael A. Goulder, *Luke: A New Paradigm*, 2 vols., JSNTSS 20 (Sheffield: JSOT, 1989) 2:769.

[6] Anton Büchele, *Der Tod Jesu im Lukasevangelium: Eine redaktionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zu Lk 23*, FTS 26 (Frankfurt am Main: Josef Knecht, 1978) 52. So also Gerhard Schneider, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas*, 2 vols, OTKNT 3 (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1977) 2:486. Joseph B. Tyson (*The Death of Jesus in Luke-Acts* [Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina, 1986] 108) regards these as apocalyptic signs related to Luke 21:6, 26; Acts 2:20, and sees in the torn veil a portent of the destruction of the temple.

[7] Matera, "Death of Jesus," 469-485.

[8] Matera, "Death of Jesus," 475.

[9] See, e.g., Michael Bachmann, *Jerusalem und der Temple: Die geographisch-theologischen Elemente in der lukanishen Sicht des jüdischen Kultzentrums*, BWANT 109 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1980); Dennis D. Sylva, "The Meaning and Function of Acts 7:46-50," *JBL* 106 (1987) 261-275; Francis D. Weinert, "Luke, the Temple and Jesus' Saying about Jerusalem's Abandoned House (Luke 13:34-35," *CBQ* 44 (1982) 68-76; idem, "The Meaning of the Temple in Luke-Acts," *BTB* 11 (1981) 85-89.

Moreover, what are we to make of Matera's suggestion that, in its Lukan redaction, the torn curtain has become a portent of the last days? He thus, with Büchele and others, sees here a sign on the earth (Joel 2:30). Elsewhere, Luke clearly reveals his understanding that the fulfillment of Joel's prophecy signifies the "last days" (see the addition of *en tais eschatais hēmerais* to the Joel citation in Acts 2:17). There is, however, no evidence that Luke anticipated any such fulfillment of the rest of Joel 2:30-31,[10] and in any case Luke's concern with signs and wonders lies elsewhere—with the miraculous activity of Jesus (Acts 2:22) and his witnesses (Acts 2:43; 4:16, 30; 5:12; 6:8; 8:6, 13; 14:3; 15:12). Matera's case, therefore, is not ultimately convincing.

A different approach has been taken by J. Bradley Chance, who believes Luke's motive for rearranging Mark's order is obvious upon close examination:

> Luke wished to bring into close proximity the motif of darkness (representing the satanic character of the Jewish leaders of Jerusalem), the rending of the veil (representing the destruction of Jerusalem), and the death of Jesus (representing the rejection of Jesus by the Jewish leaders). In so doing, he has affirmed once again the direct relationship between the destruction of the temple and Jerusalem and the rejection of Jesus.[11]

However, after altering the death cry of Mark 15:34 and so deleting the material in Mark 15:35-36, which Luke has done in any case, it is not clear why Luke needed also to rearrange Mark's order to make his point. Would not these three—darkness, death, and torn veil—already be brought into close proximity? Moreover, Luke's concern to interpret the torn veil as a portent of temple destruction is difficult to square with the continued used of the temple by pious followers of Jesus in the Acts of the Apostles. Indeed, the evidence Chance assembles to show that the tearing of the veil might portend the temple's destruction is all extraneous to Luke and is relatively late. Chance helpfully points out how the darkness at the cross is related to Jesus' words about darkness at his arrest (22:53), as well as how Jesus' crucifixion must be read against the backdrop of the conflict he encountered throughout his public ministry. Nevertheless, assuming Luke knew no other source for his account of Jesus' death, his motive for rearranging the Markan order remains elusive.

The explanation of the darkness is not so troubling from a source-critical perspective. Cast as a genitive absolute and setting forth the apparent combination of the supernatural (darkness) with the physical (failure or eclipse of the sun), Luke's insertion in v 45a is likely just that, his insertion.[12]

The transposition of the narrative statement of the rending of the veil is not easily explained, not least because even in its present position it seems to work against Luke's overall understanding of the temple. Not without good reason might someone argue that Luke's fidelity to his source (*Sonderquelle*) has gotten in the way of his redactional agenda. That this source-critical escape hatch has not been taken more often seems less a function of the ability of Lukan scholars

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[10] I. Howard Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, NIGTC (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm.B. Eerdmans, 1978) 875.

[11] J. Bradley Chance, *Jerusalem, the Temple, and the New Age in Luke-Acts* (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University, 1988) 120.

[12] See Taylor, *Passion*, 96; C.F. Evans, *Saint Luke*, TPINTC (Philadelphia: Trinity, 1990) 876. On the conjunction of the supernatural and physical in Luke, see 1:20; 3:22; Acts 2:2-3; 9:18; et al.

to correlate the torn veil with Luke's theology of the temple than their failure to appreciate how their theories about its meaning (e.g., a portent of temple destruction) fly in the face of the general force of Luke's attitude toward the temple. Interestingly, at the same time, narrative exegetes seem largely to have failed to grapple with this tension at all.[13]

2.2. *The Last Words of Jesus (23:46).* In place of Jesus' two shouts from the cross in Mark—the first citing Ps 22:1, the second only an outcry—Luke has recorded one, in which Jesus cites Ps 31:5. This allows Luke to drop the reference to the Elijah-material in Mark 15:35-36, motivated as it is in the Markan narrative by the crowd's apparent misunderstanding of Jesus' words (hearing *ēlias* for *elōi*—presuming a Hebrew original, as in Matt 27:46?). Luke's introductory *kai phōnēsas phōnē megalē ho Iēsous eipen* is an understandable redaction of Mark's *ho de Iēsous apheis phōnēn megalēn* (15:37): *eipen* is a necessary addition since Luke (unlike Mark) goes on to record the content of Jesus' loud outcry, and *phōnēsas phōnē* reflects Lukan style (cf. Luke 22:15; Acts 5:28; 16:28[!]; 28:10). What, then, of the saying itself? Has Luke provided the psalmic quotation; or has he taken it from a non-Markan source? The arguments in favor of an alternative source here are well-known and may be rehearsed briefly.[14]

First, the citation of Ps 22:1 was certainly offensive and one need not suppose that the early churches had to wait for the Third Evangelist to find for them a substitution. Second, the language of Ps 31:5 as quoted by Luke (*paratithemai to pneuma mou*) coincides with the way Matthew (*aphēken to pneuma*—27:50) and John (*paredōken to pneuma*—19:30) have each reported the moment of Jesus' death. The case for a traditional-historical connection here is so strong that C. K. Barrett argues that John's language is based on Luke's, while Goulder suggests Luke was inspired by Matthew.[15] Assuming (as we do) Luke's independence from Matthew and John's independence from the Synoptics as sources,[16] shared, early tradition seems likely. Third, the citation of Ps 31:5 in Luke 23:46 is explicable solely in terms of a translation from the MT, even if is also very close to the LXX; this is consistent with Luke's use of a pre-Lukan source. On a related point, the appearance of the vocative of *pater*, found neither in the LXX or MT, may reflect Jesus' use of the familiar "Abba." Finally, Barnabas Lindars, noting the use of Ps 31:5 in Acts 7:59 and 1 Pet 4:19, has postulated the early use of this psalm in the

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13 Thus, e.g., Luke 23:45 does not even appear in the indexes of Robert C. Tannehill, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts: A Literary Interpretation*, 2 vols., FF (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986/1990); Robert L. Brawley, *Luke-Acts and the Jews: Conflict, Apology, and Conciliation*, SBLMS 33 (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars, 1987). Similarly, Robert J. Karris (*Luke: Artist and Theologian: Luke's Passion Account as Literature*, TI [New York/Mahwah: Paulist, 1985]) explores the literary art of Luke, but has little to say about Luke 23:44-45 (104-107). For him, "...it is inadequate to read Luke 23:45 simply as another reference to the destruction of the temple" (106); this verse should he read in conjunction with v 46, he asserts, but it is not clear how it thus functions. One outstanding exception is the essay by Dennis D. Sylva, "The Temple Curtain and Jesus' Death in the Gospel of Luke," *JBL* 105 (2, 1986) 239-250. Sylva *assumes* that Luke's order represents a Lukan repositioning of the Markan order, then goes on to attempt to interpret the rending of the veil within its local co-text. On Sylva's proposed explanation of Luke's agenda, see below.

14 See Green, *Death of Jesus*, 97-98, 304-305.

15 C. K. Barrett, *The Gospel according to St. John*, 2d ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1978) 554; Goulder, *Luke*, 2:770.

16 On John and the Synoptics, see Green, *Death of Jesus*, 105-134.

face of imminent death.[17] Not without good reason does Fitzmyer, who is otherwise inclined against an alternative source for Luke's account of the death of Jesus, leave open the possibility that Luke knew and preferred another tradition for Jesus' last words.[18]

*2.3. The Confession of the Centurion (23:47).* Vincent Taylor's objection notwithstanding,[19] there is no prima facie reason to favor an alternative source here. Luke substitutes for Mark's Latinism, *kentyriōn* (15:39), his own *hekatontarchēs* (NT—21x; Luke-Acts—17x). Mark's phrase, *ho parestēkōs ex enantias autou,* is omitted altogether, apparently unnecessary in Luke's mind. Mark's *hoti houtōs exepneusen* is too restrictive for Luke, who writes to genomenon instead; the centurion's confession embraces much more for Luke than "how Jesus died," for it interprets Jesus' entire career as the Righteous One.[20] "He praised God" is a Lukan addition, fully consistent with Luke's interests elsewhere—where "what happens" around Jesus and his followers leads people to give God glory (2:20, 28, 38; 5:25-26; 7:16; 13:13; 17:15; 18:43; Acts 4:21; 11:18; 21:20). The content of the centurion's confession, *ho anthrōpos houtos dikaios ēn,* is fully Lukan, as Acts 3:13-14, which also draws a direct connection between Jesus' death and affirmation as God's Righteous One (cf. Isa 52:13-53:12), indicates.

*2.4. The Response of the Crowds (23:48).* Mark has no parallel for this narrative report in Luke, and Matera believes it stems from Luke's creativity. He offers two reasons: (1) The linguistic agreement between 23:48 (*typnontes ta stēthē*) and 18:13 (*etypten to stēthos*) would be difficult to explain if Luke were following a source at 23:48; and (2) Luke's interest in showing how repentance is the appropriate response to Jesus' death is illustrated here.[21] Of these two arguments, the first is less significant, as it has long been recognized that Luke consistently stamps his narrative material with his own style. Other words may be added to those Matera noted as indicators of the presence of Luke's redactional hand—i.e., *pas, ginomai, ochlos, sun-,* and *hypostrephō*.[22]

More substantive is Matera's observation that, for Luke, "the death of Jesus should and does lead to repentance."[23] Some may doubt whether the connotation of "repentance" is present here.[24] *Hypostrephō,* a favorite word for Luke (NT—35x; Luke-Acts—32x), should probably be rendered "to return home"; it is not a synonym for *metanoeō* in Luke, even if a *double entente* may be intended here (perhaps also, e.g., 2:20; 17:15, 18). On its own, the report of the crowds' "beating their breasts" suggests sorrow or mourning, not repentance, and this suggestion is supported both by the contrast between those guards who beat Jesus (*derō*—

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[17] Barnabas Lindars, *New Testament Apologetic: The Doctrinal Significance of the Old Testament Quotations* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1961) 93-95.

[18] Fitzmyer, *Gospel of Luke,* 2:1513.

[19] That Luke would thus modify Mark is "very improbable" (Taylor, *Passion,* 96).

[20] See Joel B. Green, "The Death of Jesus, God's Servant," in *Reimaging the Death of the Lukan Jesus,* ed. Dennis D. Sylva, Athenäum[S] Monografien: Theologie; BBB 73 (Frankfurt-am-Main: Anton Hain, 1990) 1-28, 170-173; Brian E. Beck, "'*Imitatio Christi*' and the Lucan Passion Narrative," in *Suffering and Martyrdom in the New Testament: Studies Presented to G. M. Styler by the Cambridge New Testament Seminar,* ed. William Horbury and Brian McNeil (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981) 28-47.

[21] Matera, "Death of Jesus," 484.

[22] Cf. Jeremias, *Sprache,* 308-309; Taylor, *Passion,* 95.

[23] Matera, "Death of Jesus," 484.

[24] So, e.g., Marshall, *Gospel of Luke,* 877.

22:63) and these people who beat themselves (*typtō*), and by the framing of the execution with acts of grief (Jerusalem's daughters—v 27; the gathered crowds—v 48). On the other hand, the linguistic parallel with 18:9-14 invites a positive comparison between the humble, justified tax collector (18:9-14) and the assembled crowds (23:48). Moreover, the structural parallel between vv 47-48—

47: *idōn de ho hekatontarchēs*

48: *kai pantes hoi symparagenomenoi ochloi...,*

47: *to genomenon*

48: *theōrēsantes ta genomena,*

47: *edoxazen ton theon legōn...*

48: *typtontes ta stēthē hypestrephon—*

places the crowds in a most favorable light in Luke's story, encourages a reading of their action as penitential, and indicates the importance of seeing these two verses as recording parallel responses to Jesus' death.

At the same time, even if we could be certain in locating a reference to repentance in 23:48, the relationship between Jesus' death and repentance in Luke-Acts is not as straightforward as Matera asserts. In Acts 2:38; 3:19; 5:30-31, the notion of repentance is related to Jesus' death, but also, and more directly, to God's having exalted the crucified Jesus. Elsewhere (e.g., Acts 17:30; 20:21), repentance is less narrowly focused. Hence, although Luke 23:48 may contribute to the larger theme of repentance, it seems imprudent to make too much of it.

Verse 48, then, is difficult to assess from a source-critical standpoint. More dramatic parallels to the response of the crowd appear in the Old Syriac and in *Gos. Pet.* 7.25, and this might suggest an early tradition,[25] but this is speculative.

*2.5. Conclusion.* On the basis of the foregoing discussion, we are justified in concluding that Luke had before him some traditional material other than the Second Gospel while writing his account of Jesus' death. What sort of "material" Luke possessed—whether oral or written, fragment(s) or sustained narrative—is impossible to determine without further investigation, and even then a decision on this question belies certainty. But even this limited conclusion is significant since the case for a non-Markan source behind the Lukan passion story reaches here its lowest ebb. Indeed, even a scholar like Howard Marshall, whose commentary on Luke suggests the Third Evangelist made extensive use of a non-Markan source (in addition to the Markan material) in constructing his passion account, concedes that "...the case for a separate passion narrative used by [Luke] is at its weakest here."[26]

For our central purpose, to understand the significance of the rending of the temple veil in 23:45, this brief foray onto the source-critical battlefield has only heightened the problem. If Luke followed no alternative tradition in ordering the events related to Jesus' death, but was himself solely responsible for the transposition of the tearing of the veil, we must ask, Why? Even if he was following another source, however, the question remains, for then Luke has acted in

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25 On the possibility that the Old Syriac has been directly influenced by early, non-canonical tradition, see Matthew Black, *An Aramaic Approach to the Gospels and Acts*, 3d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967) 262-269.

26 Marshall, *Gospel of Luke*, 874.

preference to this tradition over against the Markan account. Why? In the end, the simple fact that Luke has retained this report, irrespective of source-critical questions, begs for attention, for we must still examine the significance of the rending of the temple veil for the Third Evangelist.

### 3. The Temple and the Torn Veil in Luke

*3.1. Torn Veil: Communion with the God of the Temple?* What is the significance of the rending of the temple curtain in Luke? In a recent essay, Dennis Sylva proposes a novel thesis that attempts to root Luke 23:45b more firmly in its narrative context. After conducting a survey of scholarly opinion on the meaning of the torn curtain in Luke, and noting how disappointingly superficial previous explanations have been, he goes on to construct his alternative thesis. First, he argues that the rending of the veil is linked primarily with Jesus' death cry in 23:46, and not with the failed sun of 23:44-45a. Then, observing the close parallelism between Luke 23:45b, 46a and Acts 7:55, 56, 59, Sylva concludes "...that Jesus' commitment of his spirit is an address to the God revealed to him by the tearing of the temple curtain, as Stephen's commitment of his spirit is an address to the Lord revealed by the opening of the heavens."[27] He finds corroborative evidence in two further observations. First, Luke records Jesus' death at the ninth hour, an hour which otherwise functions for Luke as a time of prayer (e.g., Acts 3:1; 10:3, 30). Jesus' final words, then, comprise a prayer to the God of the temple. Second, the centurion's praise (23:47) and the crowds' beating their breasts (23:48; cf. 18:13) establish the relation of the time of Jesus' death and temple prayer.

Sylva's proposal is commendable for the degree to which it tries to locate the significance of this episode within Luke's narrative strategy. Others have noted the parallels between Stephen and Jesus in their dying moments, but these have never been exploited with reference to the interpretation of Luke 23:45b. Nevertheless, three questions may be raised against Sylva's thesis. First, while noting the parallels between Jesus and Stephen, Sylva failed to comment on the relation between Luke 23:34 and Acts 7:60, wherein the protagonists intercede before God on behalf of their executioners. Clearly in the case of Jesus, access to God is available in the passion before the tearing of the curtain (cf. also 22:39-46). Second, Sylva has not dealt definitively with the relation of vv 45b and 46 as narrative events; as we will show, an alternative way of showing how v 45b prepares for vv 46-48 is preferable. Third, Sylva's proposal restricts rather narrowly the possible meaning of the torn veil for Luke-Acts as a whole. According to this reading it need have no function at all within the larger portrayal of the temple in Luke-Acts. We will argue that this is not the case.

In what follows, therefore, we propose to sketch an interpretation of the torn curtain that attends more closely to the local co-text of this note (i.e., 23:44-48). Given Brown and Yule's axiom—"The more co-text there is,...the more secure the interpretation is"[28]—as well as the nature of the temple material in Luke-Acts, we will then expand our horizons to see how Luke 23:45b meshes with Luke's larger portrait of the temple.

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[27] Sylva, "Temple Curtain," 245. Cf. the related view in Weinert, "Luke, the Temple and Jesus' Saying."

[28] Gillian Brown and George Yule, *Discourse Analysis*, CTL (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1983) 50.

*3.2. Torn Veil and Response to Jesus' Death.* What is the significance of the rending of the temple curtain in Luke? As Sylva recognized, critical to any attempt to treat this question is the recognition that the tearing of the veil and the death of Jesus are very closely related. This is true in spite of the transposition of the Markan order represented in the Lukan account, even if the role of the torn veil vis-à-vis Jesus' death has consequently been altered. In Mark, Jesus' death led to the veil's being torn in two; in Luke, somehow, the torn veil anticipates Jesus' death and the subsequently narrated responses to that death. The relation between these two events, the tearing of the veil and the death of Jesus, does not depend solely on how one punctuates the relevant clauses (Sylva's focus), but also, and even more so, on how Luke stages these final events: (1a) darkness/failure of the sun, (1b) rending of the temple curtain, (2) Jesus' final outcry and death, (3a) confession of the centurion, and (3b) response of the gathered crowds. Following the general rule of staging, that what comes before prepares for and is assumed by what comes after,[29] we can appreciate that vv 44-45 prepare for, lead to, and already begin interpreting the climax of this scene, vv 46-48. How do they do so?

We may begin by recalling from our earlier discussion the parallelism of the two responses to Jesus' death in vv 47-48. Then, we noted the similarity of these two structurally: Having observed what had happened, the centurion and the crowds respond—the centurion by glorifying God and proclaiming Jesus' vindication as the Righteous One, the crowds by acts of penitence. We also noted that, though in different ways, in both cases the characters respond favorably to Jesus and are interpreted positively within the narrative with respect to their standing vis-à-vis Jesus. We may go on to observe that, just as in Mark (15:38-39) the death of Jesus has repercussions for both Gentile (the centurion) and Jew (rending of the temple veil),[30] so Luke balances Gentile and Jew. Unlike Mark, however, whose rending of the temple veil signifies the end of the temple, Luke narrates two positive results: the favorable and far-reaching confession of the centurion and the penitential reaction of the gathered crowds. Both Jew and Gentile respond positively, then, and this provides us with a clear reminiscence of Simeon's prophecy in Luke 2:30-32, that God's salvation would embrace all peoples—Gentile and Jew.

In order for salvation to move out beyond the borders of the people of Israel, what would be required? According to Acts, the rejection of Jesus—first by the Jewish leadership in Jerusalem (Acts 1-8), then by some Jews in other locales (e.g., 13:44-49; 14:1-18; 18:2-6; 28:17-29)—leads to the widening of the mission to embrace all peoples, both Jew[31] and Gentile. This emphasis in Acts is anticipated here, in Luke 23:44-45a, in Luke's announcement that the sun's light failed and darkness covered the whole land for three hours. We have been prepared for this "period of darkness" already, at the scene of Jesus' arrest (22:47-54a). The time

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29 See Brown and Yule, *Discourse Analysis*, 133-134.

30 *Contra* David Ulansey ("The Heavenly Veil Torn: Mark's Cosmic *Inclusio*," *JBL* 110 [1, 1991] 123-125), who sees in Mark 15:37-39 a linear cause-effect progression: Jesus' death leads to the torn veil and the torn veil to the centurion's confession. As Mark has it, the centurion responds not to the torn veil, but to how Jesus died (*hoti houtōs exepneusen*). Thus, v 37 leads directly to v 38 (on the parataxical use of *kai* to introduce a result, see BAG, 392), and v 37 leads directly to v 39 (as is clear from the repeated reference to *ekpneō*).

31 Even if Paul expresses his intention to focus on a Gentile mission, the narration repeatedly shows his continued missionary attempts among Jews.

when Jesus' opponents, the Jewish leadership related to the temple,[32] come to arrest Jesus is interpreted by Jesus as "your hour, the power of darkness" (22:53). Coming as it does in the wake of Luke's multiple references to *peirasmos* (22:28, 40, 46) and satanic activity in the passion story (22:3, 28, 31), and in light of the identification of "darkness" and "satanic rule" in Acts 26:18, we can only read the activity of the Jewish leaders as the manifestation of satanic power. That is, the rejection of Jesus by the Jewish leadership is an expression of the reign of darkness, culminating in the scene of Jesus' death.

In order for God's salvation to embrace all peoples, a further innovation was required—namely, the resolution of the barrier separating Gentile and Jew, the temple. For Luke, this did not require the temple's destruction; indeed, the temple would have important roles to play within the early Christian mission, particularly with regard to matters of piety, teaching, and even receiving divine revelation. In some way, however, the power of the temple to regulate socio-religious boundaries of purity and holiness had to be neutralized. God's response to the rejection of Jesus (symbolized in the time of darkness) is the tearing of the temple curtain (reading *eschisthē* as a divine passive)—an action, then, that does not symbolize for Luke the destruction of the temple (as in Mark), but the extension of the good news to those outside the social boundaries determined by the temple itself.[33]

How does the death of Jesus lead to the responses of the centurion and gathered crowds? What prepares us for this narration? Verses 44-45 prepare the way by showing, first, that Jesus' death was the work of the Jewish leadership who rejected him, and second, that with the rejection of Jesus by the Jewish leadership and his subsequent death the way of salvation could be opened to all.

That Luke is concerned with the operative symbolism of the temple is not immediately clear in v 45b even if, under our hypothesis, it is presupposed by vv 44-48. It now remains, then, for us to examine Luke's larger portrayal of the temple in order to show the role of v 45b within that context. Even if space constraints will not allow a full examination of the temple material in Luke-Acts, we can make a limited number of pertinent observations derived from a chronological examination of the temple and related language—*hagios*, *bōmos*, *thysiastērion*, *hieron*, *katapetasma*, *naos*, *oikos*, *skēne*, *tois*, and *topos*[34]—in the Lukan material.

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[32] According to Luke, the arresting party consisted of chief priests, officers of the temple, and elders (22:52)—people among whom Jesus had been teaching daily in the temple (v 53).

[33] Chance (*Jerusalem*, 119) rejects this kind of proposal because, he argues, Luke is not interested in atonement-theology. The degree of interest in atonement-theology one attributes to Luke is immaterial for our purposes, since (as elsewhere), Luke is more concerned with narrating *that* the capacity of the temple to determine the boundaries of holiness has been compromised than with describing the *mechanism* by which this change has occurred.

[34] The use of *hagios* and *topos* in Acts 6:13-14; 21:28 follows the traditional association of holiness with places associated with the cult (cf. Horst Balz, "*hagios*," in *EDNT*, 1:17). The use of *tois* in Luke 2:49 is determined by 2:46-48, and refers not only to the temple but also (inasmuch as the temple is God's house) to matters pertaining to serving God. Not every usage of these words in Luke-Acts has significance for this study—e.g., *bōmos* is used in Acts 17:23 as elsewhere in the Greek Bible for altars of foreign gods (as opposed to *thysiastērion*).

*3.3. Torn Veil and Lukan Temple Theology.* 3.3.1. In his recent essay on "The Temple in Image and Reality,"[35] David Knipe develops the notion of temple as sacred space within three sub-categories: as abode of the deity, as nexus between human and divine, and as inviolable territory. He thus builds on Mircea Eliade's earlier work, wherein Eliade had argued that, for people, space is not homogeneous; that some space is experienced as sacred; and that this sacred space connects and supports earth and heaven, establishes the order of the world, and provides the center point around which human life is oriented.[36] Historically, the Jerusalem temple functioned in this way, with its system of restricted spaces, segregating Gentile from Jew, Jewish female from Jewish male, Jewish priest from non-priest, and high priest from other priests. This symbolism becomes formalized in *m. kel.* 1.6-9, which describes degrees of holiness as concentric circles around the Holy of Holies: the land of Israel is more holy than any other land, the walled cities of Israel are holier still, the city of Jerusalem is holier still, the temple mount is holier still, the rampart is holier still, the Court of Women is holier still, the Court of the Israelites is holier still, the Court of the Priests is holier still, the area between the porch and altar is holier still, the sanctuary is holier still, and the Holy of Holies is holier still.

The temple as the abode of God is a notion deeply embedded in Israel's religion,[37] even if there exists a certain, long-recognized tension between the idea of a transcendent God and the belief in the temple as God's house. According to 1 Kings 8:27—"But will God indeed dwell on the earth? Even heaven and the highest heaven cannot contain you, much less this house I have built!" (NRSV)—Solomon already recognized this, and so other conceptions were used to denote the temple as the place wherein God revealed his presence.[38]

So integral is this understanding of the temple as God's dwelling to the existence and activity of the temple that we might justifiably assume its presence in the Lukan writings. A handful of texts indicate the validity of this assumption—i.e., those that identify the temple as a place of service, worship, and sacrifice to God (1:8-23 [1:9: "house of the Lord"]; 2:22-24, 36-38; 24:53; Acts 2:46-47; 3:1; 21:26; 22:17; 24:18); those that place the reception of divine revelation in the temple (1:18-23; Acts 22:17); 19:46, where, quoting the voice of God in Isa 56:7, Jesus proclaims, "*My house* shall be a house of prayer..."; and 2:49, where Jesus asks his mother, "Were you not aware that I must be in my Father's house, caring for his interests?" This last text is of particular importance since the staging of the dialogue between Jesus and his mother is specifically designed to raise the

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35 David M. Knipe, "The Temple in Image and Reality," in *Temple in Society*, ed. Michael V. Fox (Winona Lake: Eisenbraus, 1988) 105-138 (107-112).

36 Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1959) 20-65. See also, idem, *The Myth of the Eternal Return* (New York: Pantheon, 1954) 3-48; idem, *Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1969) 27-56; Kees W. Bolle, "Speaking of a Place," in *Myths and Symbols: Studies in Honor of Mircea Eliade*, ed. Joseph M. Kitagawa and Charles H. Long (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1969) 127-139.

37 See Menahem Haran, "Temple and Community in Ancient Israel," in *Temple in Society*, 17-25 (17-20); Roland de Vaux, O.P., *Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961) 325-327.

38 See G. Ernest Wright, "The Significance of the Temple in the Ancient Near East: Part III. The Temple in Palestine—Syria," in *The Biblical Archaeologist Reader*, vol. 1, ed. G. Ernest Wright and David Noel Freedman (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1961) 169-184.

question, Who is Jesus' father? To whom does he owe loyalty and obedience? Together with this, the locative reference to the temple in v 46 and the thematic reference to teaching in vv 46-47 make clear that the ambiguous *en tois tou patros mou* of v 49 must refer to God's household—God's temple and the affairs of God's temple.[39]

The identification of the temple in Jerusalem as the locus of God's presence has important repercussions. Clearly, the temple is the meeting place of God and humanity—as suggested in the Lukan material by 18:10; 19:46; Acts 21:26; 22:17.[40]

Moreover, that God "abides" in the temple establishes the temple as inviolable territory, its architecture "...a reinforcement of the manifold separation of the ranks of society according to function and status."[41] Hence, while (by this time) Israel's *one* temple unified Israel under *one* God (cf. Philo, *Spec. Leg.* 1.12 §67), the temple also functioned to segregate people—most fundamentally Jew from non-Jew, but also Jew from Jew. Hints of this reality appear in Luke-Acts, first when Zechariah is chosen by lot to enter the sanctuary and offer incense while the people remain outside to pray (1:8-10). Later, Paul is accused of bringing Greeks into "this holy place" and thus defiling the temple (Acts 21:27-30). At issue here is the question of the relative purity of different segments of society as a correlate of the relative holiness attributed to the zones within the temple.[42] Although the temple was a powerful politico-economic force in antiquity, its exercise of a different form of power is more at issue in Luke-Acts.[43] Luke is more concerned with the dominance of the temple as a sacred symbol of socio-religious power—a cultural center[44] whose segregating zones extend out from the temple mount to determine social relations and the experience of fictive kinship between Jew and Samaritan, Jew and Gentile. The gravity of this concern for Luke has recently been shown by Philip Esler.[45]

Esler's argument is too far-reaching to be represented in full here. Painting with broad strokes, however, we can note that he sees Luke's attitude toward the

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[39] That these "affairs" relate especially for Luke to teaching is clear from Luke 19:47; 20:1; 21:37-38; Acts 5:20-21, 25, 42.

[40] Cf. Jacob Neusner (*From Politics to Piety: The Emergence of Pharisaic Judaism*, 2d ed. [New York: Ktav, 1979] 3): Even if some might have focused their lives away from or in opposition to the temple, for the most part it represented the nexus between heaven and earth.

[41] Knipe, "Temple," 122.

[42] On the relation of holiness and purity, see Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966).

[43] The economic and political import of the temple for Luke is noted by Halvor Moxnes (*The Economy of the Kingdom: Social Conflict and Economic Relations in Luke's Gospel*, OBT [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988] 70-74), but he nuances this significance by observing (1) that Luke seems to distinguish between the temple cult as locus of God's presence and those Jewish leaders who wield the power of the temple, and (2) that certain functions contributing to the economic centrality of the temple historically (on which see Joachim Jeremias, *Jerusalem in the Time of Jesus: An Investigation into Economic and Social Conditions during the New Testament Period* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969], e.g., 21-30) go unmentioned by the Third Evangelist.

[44] On the divine legitimation of world-ordering centers, see Clifford Geertz, *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* (New York: Basic, 1983) 121-146.

[45] Philip Francis Esler, *Community and Gospel in Luke-Acts: The Social and Political Motivations of Lucan Theology*, SNTSMS 57 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1987) 131-163.

temple as ambivalent—largely positive, as others have shown, but nevertheless containing a radical interpretation of the idea of God's dwelling in a temple made by human hands as idolatrous (cf. Acts 7:48; 17:24). For him, then, the basic question revolves around the significance of this ambivalence, not least as related to the experience of Luke's God-fearers vis-à-vis the temple. Given the temple as a symbol of Jewish election and the temple's zones of ever-increasing holiness and concomitant narrowing of the type of person who could proceed further into its depths, how might the God-fearer encounter the temple and its cult?

> His [*sic*] attitude to the Temple is fundamentally ambivalent. On the one hand, he experiences great satisfaction that he has come to the Temple of his God and has viewed its overwhelming beauty; on the other, at the same time, he is greatly dissatisfied that he is prevented from approaching as closely as possible to the presence of God on earth and being a full participant in his cult. As he stands there, the very architecture of the place brings home to him that, for all his devotion, he is an outsider and will remain so unless he undergoes circumcision, an operation which is both painful and utterly at odds with his Hellenic distaste for self-mutilation in any form. In sociological terms, such a person is 'marginalized.'"[46]

According to Esler, then, Luke was concerned to do away with the barrier between Jew and non-Jew. We agree, and note that, although one has to wait until Acts 7, 10-11 for the theological case for this innovation, it is already present symbolically in the scene of Jesus' death: "The veil of the temple was torn down the middle" (23:45b).

3.3.2. A second aspect of Luke's portrait of the temple is its role as a center of teaching (Luke 19:47; 20:1; 21:37, 38; 22:53; Acts 5:20-21, 25, 42) and pious observance (Luke 2:37; 18:10; 19:46; Acts 3:1-10; 21:26; 22:17). Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the relation between the Gospel and Acts on these points—e.g., just as Jesus teaches daily in the temple (Luke 22:53), so do his apostles (Acts 5:42); Jesus insists that the temple is a house of prayer (Luke 19:46), and so it is (Luke 24:53; Acts 3:1; 22:17). In this respect, the symbolic action against the temple in 19:45-46 is clearly foundational, for (apart from 2:46-47) it is after this event that activity within the temple becomes the norm for Jesus and his followers.[47]

Of special interest is Jesus' citation of Isa 56:7 sans the final clause "for all peoples"—an omission made even more noteworthy by Mark's inclusion of these words (11:17). The eschatological vision of all peoples coming to Jerusalem to worship Yahweh is well-established in the era of the Second Temple.[48] This, along with Luke's well-documented bias toward citing OT texts that are universalistic in focus (see the extension of Mark's citation from Isa 40 to include the phrase "and *all humanity* will see the salvation of God" [Mark 1:2-3; Luke 3:4-6]

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46 Esler, *Community and Gospel*, 156.

47 See Chance's (*Jerusalem*, 56-58) critique of Hans Conzelmann's (*The Theology of St. Luke* [London: Faber & Faber, 1960; reprint ed., London: SCM, 1982] 75-78) interpretation of this event as Jesus' taking possession of the temple. He observes the helpfulness of Conzelmann's image insofar as it shows how this prophetic act establishes Jesus' authority in relation to the Jewish leaders, while also noting Conzelmann's overly-negative interpretation of the Jews and the temple.

48 See, e.g., Scot McKnight, *A Light among the Gentiles: Jewish Missionary Activity in the Second Temple Period* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991) 47-48; Joachim Jeremias, *Jesus' Promise to the Nations*, SBT 24 (London: SCM, 1958) 57-62.

and the continuation of Joel's prophecy in Acts 2:17-21 to include the universalistic thrust of Joel 2:32: "And *everyone* who calls on the name of the Lord will be saved"), might raise a question about Luke's redactional activity in 19:45-46. However, according to Luke, the last days have dawned, the time of salvation is present, and, far from serving as a sacred place for the worship of God by Gentiles (and Samaritans), the temple has come to function as a segregating force, symbolizing socio-religious demarcations between insider and outsider. The time of the temple is not over. It will serve as a place of prayer and teaching. But it is no longer the center around which life is oriented. Rather than serving as the gathering point for all peoples under Yahweh, it has now become the point-of-departure for the mission to all peoples.

3.3.3. This transformed role for the temple is underscored by a third aspect of Luke's temple theology, the role of the temple as a place of divine revelation. It is true that two instances of revelation in the temple seem restricted to showing how God's salvific activity is directed to Israel only (1:8-23 [v 16]; 2:36-38); given the universalistic strands of some post-exilic anticipation, though, even promises related to Jerusalem's or Israel's restoration may be seen to have a more cosmic referent. Others transparently point outward to a universalistic audience, and this is remarkable above all since it is within the temple—that segregating cultural force—that God's integrating message of salvation is revealed. Thus, in 2:25-32, the righteous and devout Simeon, looking for Israel's consolation, prophesies a salvation for all peoples. Similarly, in Acts 2, the outpouring of the Spirit has universalistic implications (cf. 2:5-11, 21, 39).[49] Here, the idea of divine revelation is communicated both by the outpouring of the Spirit at the outset, and by the use of the verb *apophthengomai* in 2:4, 14, thus suggesting that in 2:14-36 Peter spoke as he was enabled by the Spirit.

Finally, in Paul's speech of defense in Acts 22:1-21, after recounting his experience on the road to Damascus, he reports:

> "After returning to Jerusalem, while praying in the temple, I fell into a trance. I saw him saying to me, 'Hurry, leave Jerusalem quickly, for they will not accept your witness concerning me.' And I replied, 'Lord, they themselves know that in every synagogue I imprisoned and beat those who believed in you. They know that, while the blood of Stephen your witness was shed, I was standing by, approving, and watching the coats of those who killed him.' But he said to me, 'Go, for I will send you far away to the Gentiles.'" (Acts 22:17-21)

On one level, this is a seemingly fail-proof apologetic. It was *in the temple* that *he* (left ambiguous intentionally?) told me *twice*, against *my* objections, to go to the

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[49] Ernst Haenchen (*The Acts of the Apostles: A Commentary* [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971] 168) insists that the location of the Pentecost story cannot be the temple since Luke "always" uses *to hieron* for "temple." What, then, does he make of Luke's use of *oikos* for "temple" in Luke 6:4; 11:51; 19:46; Acts 7:47-49? F. F. Bruce (*The Acts of the Apostles: The Greek Text with Introduction and Commentary*, 3d ed. [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1990] 114) thinks that the reference to sitting (*ton oikon hou ēsan kathēmenoi*) disqualifies a reference to the temple here. See, however, Luke 2:46: *heuron auton en tō heirō kathezomenon en mesō tōn didaskalōn....* Hence, while Luke does not specifically designate the "house" in Acts 2:1-2 as the temple, there seems to be no good reason to exclude this interpretation. Given Lukan usage elsewhere, the continued presence of Jesus' disciples in the temple (see the summaries in Luke 24:53 and Acts 2:46), and the size of the audience that gathers (Acts 2:5-11, 41), the identification of this *oikon* as the temple makes good sense.

Gentiles. On another, we find here yet one more divine witness to the destruction of the symbolic world that had as its center the Jerusalem temple. Gentiles do not come to the temple to find Yahweh; now, the Lord goes out, through witnesses like Paul, to the Gentiles. The veil is torn, the barriers are down, so all, Jew and Gentile, may respond on equal footing to "the grace of the Lord Jesus" (Acts 15:11).

*3.4. Conclusion.* The fundamental problem with previous interpretations of the torn veil in Luke is their incapacity to correlate this narrative event and Luke's overall temple theology. The popular view that the torn veil signifies the destruction of the temple is difficult to square with the continuing, positive function of the temple in Luke 24 and Acts. The less popular but widely-held view that the torn veil signifies the opening of the temple to all humanity does not account for the fact that non-Jews do not gain entry into those temple precincts previously denied them, nor does it make sense of Luke's redaction in Luke 19:46.

Close attention to the staging of Jesus' death scene in Luke, to the portrayal of the temple in Luke-Acts, and especially to the socio-religious function of the temple has pointed to a different perspective that tries to integrate the variety of pertinent data. We have attempted to show that the torn veil works symbolically to neutralize the dominance of the temple as a sacred symbol of socio-religious power predetermining insider and outsider.

## 4. Conclusion

We began this investigation with a lament that, in spite of three decades of progress toward letting Luke be Luke, he has still been read through alien eyes with reference to his perspective on the temple. Our source-critical analysis, while inconclusive in uncovering with any specificity the sorts of non-Markan tradition(s) Luke might have known, did underscore the responsibility of the Third Evangelist for staging the death scene; hence, one ought not simply retreat into a debate over sources to explain the transposition of the rending of the temple curtain as represented in Luke vis-à-vis the Markan account. Accordingly, we have addressed the question, What is the significance of the tearing of the temple curtain in Luke? with particular regard to literary-theology and sociological perspectives. Primarily, we have focused on the role of Luke 23:45b in the Lukan death scene and within the larger mural of Luke's temple theology. Although a full exploration of Luke's temple theology lies far beyond the scope of this essay, what we have examined indicates a consistent concern with the continued but transformed role of the temple. Even if the temple remains as a place for prayer and teaching, it no longer occupies the position of cultural center, the sacred orientation point for life; its zones of holiness no longer prejudge people according to relative purity. Other stories and speeches in Acts will develop the theological rationale, but in the torn veil Luke has already demonstrated symbolically that the holiness-purity matrix embodied in and emanating from the temple has been undermined.

# The Divine Hand and the Divine Plan in the Lukan Passion

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Many passages in Luke-Acts refer to the divine activity in the passion events and the divine plan behind these events. Jesus' announcement that "it is necessary (*dei*) for the Son of Man to suffer many things ..." (Luke 9:22), for example, refers to the divine necessity behind his impending passion, while a prayer in Acts 4 asserts that the human actors in the passion events had done what the divine "hand and plan had predestined to occur" (Acts 4:28). References to the divine role in the passion events occur not only in the passion narrative (Luke 22-23) but also in the chapters which precede the passion narrative (Luke 1-21), the chapter which follows the passion narrative (Luke 24) and various chapters in Acts.

Luke[1] referred to the divine activity/plan in the passion events by using 1) the verb *dei*, 2) the verb *mellō* ("be about to"), 3) references to "what is written," 4) various other distinctive words, 5) divine passives, and 6) explicit references to God. The goal of this paper is to examine the artistry reflected in Luke's use of these various ways of referring to the divine activity/plan in the passion events. To appreciate the Lukan artistry, it will be necessary to survey the passion references in the order in which they appear in Luke-Acts. The first section of this paper will discuss the relevant passages in Luke 1-21, the second section will examine those in the Lukan passion narrative, the third section will consider those in Luke 24, and the fourth section will focus on those in Acts.[2] The fifth section will review the various ways in which Luke referred to the divine activity/plan in the passion events.[3]

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[1] We will refer to the author of Luke-Acts as "Luke" without necessarily assuming that an individual named "Luke" actually wrote these books.

[2] We are assuming that the same author wrote both Luke and Acts, and we are also assuming that this author wrote the Gospel before Acts. For a discussion of these assumptions, see R. Maddox, *The Purpose of Luke-Acts* (Edinburgh: Clark, 1982) 3-6 and 24 n. 14.

[3] For studies of the passion references in Luke-Acts, see G. Schneider, *Verleugnung, Verspottung und Verhör Jesu nach Lukas 22,54-71* (SANT 22; München: Kösel, 1969) 174-81; W. E. Pilgrim, *The Death of Christ in Lukan Soteriology* (diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1971); A. Büchele, *Der Tod Jesu im Lukasevangelium* (Frankfurter Theologische Studien 26; Frankfurt: Knecht, 1978) 115-70; A. George, *Études sur l'oeuvre de Luc* (SB; Paris: Gabalda, 1978) 185-212; D. L. Tiede, *Prophecy and History in Luke-Acts* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980) 97-125; E. Richard, "Jesus' Passion and Death in Acts," *Reimaging the Death of the Lukan Jesus* (ed. D. D. Sylva; BBB 73; Frankfurt: Hain, 1990) 125-52, 204-10. Cf. also F. Bovon, *Luke the Theologian: Thirty-Three Years of Research (1950-1983)*

This study will focus on the final form of Luke and Acts. Although various source and redactional questions will be addressed, the focus will be kept on the final form of these books.[4] To provide terminological variety, we will use the expressions "the divine activity/plan in the passion events," "the divine role in the passion events" and "the divine dimension in the passion events" as synonymous ways of referring to "the divine activity in the passion events and the divine plan behind these events."

## I. Luke 1-21

The first eight chapters of the Gospel contain only one passage which may refer to the divine role in the passion events. Jesus' reference to the days "when the bridegroom is taken away from them" (5:35) seems to be a veiled reference to his death,[5] and the passive verb in these words may be a divine passive.[6] Chapters 9-20, however, contain a series of direct references to the divine role in the passion events.

*Luke 9.* In the first announcement of the passion, Jesus declared that "it is necessary (*dei*) for the Son of Man to suffer many things and to be rejected by the elders and chief priests and scribes and to be killed ..." (9:22). *Dei* is the only word in this passion announcement which refers to the divine dimension in the passion events.[7] Luke frequently used *dei* to refer to the divine necessity driving various major and minor events,[8] though this is the first occurrence of this verb in a reference to any of the major events in the story of salvation.[9] *Dei* also occurs in the Markan parallel (8:31); however, it will be seen that most of the Third Gospel's references to the divine role in the passion events have no Synoptic parallels.

During the story of the transfiguration, the narrator reported that Moses and Elijah were talking with Jesus about "his exodus which he was about (*ēmellen*) to

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(PTMS 12; Allison Park, PA: Pickwick, 1987); F. van Segbroeck, *The Gospel of Luke: A Cumulative Bibliography 1973-1988* (BETL 88; Leuven: University Press, 1989).

4 This study presupposes the solution of the Synoptic problem commonly called the two-source hypothesis. This hypothesis remains a matter of debate; for a recent bibliography covering this debate, see T. R. W. Longstaff and P. A. Thomas, *The Synoptic Problem: A Bibliography, 1716-1988* (Macon, GA: Mercer, 1988).

5 I. H. Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978) 226; J. Nolland, *Luke 1-9:20* (WBC 35A; Dallas: Word, 1989) 248; but see also J. A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke* (2 vols.; AB 28-28A; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981-85) 1.599; and F. Bovon, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas* (EKKNT 3/1; Zürich: Benziger; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1989) 1.261.

6 George (*Études*, 202) and J. Jeremias (*Die Sprache des Lukasevangeliums* [MeyerK Sonderband; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980] 122) identify this verb as a divine passive, but most commentators do not suggest this possibility. It has been claimed that Simeon's oracle (2:34-35) hints at Jesus' passion and that Jesus' rejection at Nazareth (4:28-30) foreshadows his rejection by Israel. Cf. Pilgrim, *Death*, 182-84; Büchele, *Tod*, 116-24; but see also Fitzmyer, *Luke*, 1.429-30. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that neither of these passages refers to the divine role in the passion events.

7 Though the infinitive "to be raised" in 9:22 is a divine passive, it refers to the resurrection rather than the passion events. Scholars do not generally agree with Büchele (*Tod*, 125) that the other passive infinitives in this verse could be divine passives.

8 Concerning *dei* in Luke-Acts, see J. T. Squires, *The Plan of God in Luke-Acts* (diss., Yale University, 1988) 246-63, and the works which he cites on p. 247.

9 Luke had previously used *dei* in 2:49 and 4:43.

fulfill in Jerusalem" (9:31). The words "about to fulfill" anticipate an imminent fulfillment, and the "exodus" which Jesus was about to fulfill was either his death or his death, resurrection and ascension.[10] The noun "exodus" suggests the exodus from Egypt, and Moses and Elijah are figures known from the scriptures. Whether or not Luke intended Jesus' exodus to resemble the exodus from Egypt,[11] this passage does not explicitly refer to the fulfillment of "what is written" in the scriptures. What this passage does clearly proclaim is the certainty that Jesus is "about to fulfill" his exodus. This passage has no Synoptic parallels.

While *dei* in 9:22 refers to the divine necessity behind the passion events, *mellō* in 9:31 points to the certainty that Jesus' exodus was about to happen. This certainty reflects the place of Jesus' exodus in the divine purpose.[12] Both 9:22 and 9:31 refer to a future which has already been determined by God; nevertheless, neither passage explicitly refers to God.

In the second announcement of the passion, Jesus claimed that "the Son of Man is about (*mellei*) to be handed over to (the) hands of people" (9:44). In contrast with the Markan parallel (9:31), which says that the Son of Man "is being handed over," this Lukan passage contains the verb *mellō* and the passive infinitive "to be handed over."[13] As in 9:31, the verb *mellō* points to an imminent future event whose certainty stems from its place in the divine purpose. The passive infinitive is probably a divine passive.[14]

*Multiple-envoy passages.* Several passages claim that God sent various envoys to God's people and that these people persecuted and even killed many of these envoys. These passages, which we have named "multiple-envoy passages," have three basic elements:

1. Divine sending of envoys to God's people.
2. Persecution and killing of some or all of these envoys by God's people.
3. Divine judgment.[15]

These elements occur in two sayings (11:49-51; 13:34-35) and a parable (20:9-16).

Jesus declared in 11:49-51 that "the Wisdom of God said, 'I will send them prophets and apostles, and some of them they will kill and persecute,'[16] so that the blood of all the prophets ... may be required from this generation, from the blood of Abel to the blood of Zechariah ..." This passage contains all three of the

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10 C. F. Evans (*Saint Luke* [London: SCM; Philadephia: Trinity, 1990] 418), for example, defends the former alternative, while Büchele (*Tod*, 140-41) defends the latter.

11 Cf. S. R. Garrett, "Exodus from Bondage: Luke 9:31 and Acts 12:1-24," *CBQ* 52 (1990) 656-60.

12 Schneider, *Verleugnung*, 178-79; C. H. Cosgrove, "The Divine *DEI* in Luke-Acts," *NovT* 26 (1984) 174; Bovon, *Lukas*, 496; Evans, *Luke*, 418.

13 This difference probably reflects Lukan redaction. Cf. Fitzmyer, *Luke*, 1.812; Bovon, *Lukas*, 516; Evans, *Luke*, 425.

14 J. Ernst, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas* (RNT; Regensburg: Pustet, 1977) 310; George, *Études*, 202; Marshall, *Luke*, 394; Jeremias, *Sprache*, 122; H. Schürmann, *Das Lukasevangelium: Erster Teil* (HTKNT 3; 3d ed.; Freiburg: Herder, 1984) 573.

15 These three elements can be compared with tenets B-C-D of the Deuteronomistic view of Israel's history identified by D. P. Moessner (*Lord of the Banquet* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989] 81-257) on the basis of the work of O. H. Steck, *Israel und das gewaltsame Geschick der Propheten* (WMANT 23; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1967).

16 It is unclear if the quotation concludes at this point or continues beyond this point.

elements found in multiple-envoy passages (divine sending, human persecution and killing, divine judgment). The role of the Wisdom of God in the "passion" of her prophets and apostles consists of *sending* them to a people who will kill and persecute some of them. Does this passage provide evidence concerning the divine role in Jesus' passion? Although Luke otherwise identified Jesus as a prophet (e.g., 4:24; 7:16; 13:33), this passage does not explicitly include Jesus among the prophets being discussed.

The multiple-envoy pattern also occurs in 13:34-35. Jesus accused Jerusalem of "killing the prophets and stoning those who are sent to her" (13:34). The passive participle behind the words "who are sent" is a divine passive; God sent "those who are sent," and it can be assumed that God also sent the prophets. This saying indicts Jerusalem for killing and stoning these heaven-sent envoys, and 13:35a warns that "your house" will be "abandoned" or "forsaken" following the implied divine judgment.[17] All three of the elements found in multiple-envoy passages (divine sending, human killing, divine judgment) are therefore present. Although this saying does not state that God sent prophets and emissaries to Jerusalem *so that* they would be stoned and killed, it acknowledges that stoning and death await those who are sent.[18]

Jesus declared in 13:33 that "it is necessary (*dei*) for me to go today and tomorrow and the next day, because it is not possible for a prophet to perish outside of Jerusalem." The verb *dei* identifies the divine necessity compelling him "to go" rather than the divine necessity behind his impending death; however, the distinction is minor, for the divine necessity will drive him (a prophet) to Jerusalem, the city which kills the prophets.[19]

The meaning of 13:32 is disputed. After being warned that Herod wished to kill him (13:31), Jesus declared that he would continue his ministry "today and tomorrow" and that "on the third day *teleioumai*" (13:32). It is unclear if the verb *teleioumai* should be translated as a middle or a passive. If this verb is translated as a passive ("I am brought to an end, perfected") and read as a reference to Jesus' death, it can be interpreted as a divine passive.[20] No certain conclusions can be drawn.

*Luke 17-18.* The passion announcement in 17:25 asserts that "it is necessary (*dei*) for him (the Son of Man) to suffer many things and to be rejected by this generation." This prophecy repeats some of the language found in 9:22, including *dei*, the verb of divine necessity. Like 9:22, this saying does not explicitly refer to God or the scriptures.

Jesus announced in 18:31 that "everything that is written through the prophets about the Son of Man will be accomplished," and he prophesied in 18:32-33 that the Son of Man would be handed over to the Gentiles and would be mocked, insulted, spat upon, scourged, and killed before rising on the third day.

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[17] Concerning the interpretation of 13:35a, see Fitzmyer, *Luke*, 2.1035; R. J. Miller, "The Rejection of the Prophets in Q," *JBL* 107 (1988) 238-39; J. B. Chance, *Jerusalem, the Temple, and the New Age in Luke-Acts* (Macon: Mercer, 1988) 115; Moessner, *Lord of the Banquet*, 116, 235, 237.

[18] These verses are in Q material; see Matt 23:37-39.

[19] Verses 13:31-33 have no Synoptic parallels. Although 13:33 also contains the verb "it is not possible," scholars do not tend to associate this verb with divine necessity.

[20] Concerning this possibility, see Marshall, *Luke*, 572; Jeremias, *Sprache*, 234; Fitzmyer, *Luke*, 2.1031. For additional possibilities, see BAGD 809-10; Evans, *Luke*, 562. Cf. also J. D. M. Derrett, "The Lucan Christ and Jerusalem: *teleioumai* (Lk 13:32)," *ZNW* 75 (1984) 36-43.

Note that the conjunction *gar* ("for") links 18:32-33 with 18:31; verses 18:32-33 disclose various specifics concerning how "everything that is written through the prophets about the Son of Man will be accomplished." Luke elsewhere expressed the conviction that God and the Spirit had spoken through the prophets (Luke 1:70; Acts 1:16; 2:17; 3:18, 21; 4:25; 28:25), and the passive verb "will be accomplished" probably is a divine passive.[21]

Although 9:30-31 refer to Moses, Elijah and Jesus' exodus, 18:31 is the first passage to announce that "everything that is written through the prophets" about the Son of Man would be "accomplished" in the passion and Easter events. These words, which are not found in the Markan parallel (10:33), introduce an important Lukan theme. While earlier passion announcements spoke of the divine necessity behind the passion events (9:22; 17:25; cf. 13:33) and the certainty of Jesus' imminent betrayal and death (9:31, 44), they did not explicitly relate this necessity and certainty to "what is written" in the scriptures. The Lukan Jesus provided this important link in 18:31-33. Although Luke delayed writing this link until 18:31-33, he must have already assumed such a link when he wrote *dei* in the first passion announcement in 9:22.[22] He was an artist who chose to add additional touches to his portrait of the divine activity/plan in the passion events one at a time.

*A multiple-envoy parable.* The parable of the wicked tenants (20:9-16) tells a multiple-envoy story. The lord of the vineyard sent three slaves to the tenants, but the tenants beat two and wounded the third (20:10-12). The lord then sent his beloved son (20:13), but the tenants seized and killed him (20:14-15). The lord of the vineyard will therefore destroy the tenants and give the vineyard to others (20:16).

This parable is actually an allegory in which the lord of the vineyard is the Lord God, the slaves are various envoys of God (the prophets?), and the beloved son is Jesus. All three of the elements found in multiple-envoy passages (divine sending, human persecution and killing, divine judgment) are clearly present. Note that the only role which the lord of the vineyard (God) played in the death of his son (Jesus) was in *sending* him to the recalcitrant tenants. The lord of the vineyard did not plan his son's death; indeed, he sent his son in hopes that the tenants would respect him (20:13). Like the multiple-envoy passages in 11:49-51 and 13:34-35, this allegory indicates that persecution and death await God's emissaries, but unlike these earlier passages, this allegory claims that the tenants killed only one emissary, the beloved son.[23]

Jesus interpreted the scriptural quotation in 20:17 as a prophecy of his rejection and exaltation. His introductory question, "What then is this that is written?" contains the redactional participle "written" (*gegrammen-*), the same participle which Luke added to the passion announcement in 18:31.[24] The first line of this prophecy, "the stone which the builders rejected," is the line which

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[21] Ernst, *Lukas*, 507; Jeremias, *Sprache*, 122; Fitzmyer, *Luke*, 2.1209. E. Schweizer (*The Good News According to Luke* [Atlanta: Knox, 1984] 288) claims that the passives in 18:32 are divine passives.

[22] Cosgrove ("Divine *DEI*," 174), for example, writes that "*Dei* is therefore a typical Lukan vehicle for describing the necessity that God's plan, as expressed in Scripture, be fulfilled."

[23] Although Luke 20:9-16 parallels Mark 12:1-9 at many points, Mark 12:5 indicates that the tenants also killed some of the slaves.

[24] Mark 12:10 refers to "this scripture."

foretells Jesus' rejection.[25] Although this line does not mention God, it provides an example of how God's plan concerning Jesus' passion can be found in "what is written."

*Overview*. The passion references in Luke 9 use *dei* to refer to the divine necessity behind the passion events (9:22) and *mellō* to proclaim the certainty that Jesus' passion was about to happen (9:31, 44). These passion references are closely followed by the announcement that Jesus had set his face to go to Jerusalem (9:51).[26] The central section of the Gospel contains two multiple-envoy sayings (11:49-51; 13:34-35), one of which is prefaced by Jesus' reference to the divine necessity (*dei*) which was driving him to Jerusalem (13:33; cf. also 13:32). The central section also contains at least two other references to the passion events (17:25; 18:31-33).[27] The passion announcement in 17:25 emphasizes the divine necessity (*dei*) behind Jesus' passion, while the passion announcement in 18:31-33 provides the first explicit link between the passion events and the scriptures. While teaching in the temple, Jesus spoke the parable of the wicked tenants (20:9-16) and quoted a psalm which foretold his rejection and exaltation (20:17). Although the passion references located prior to the passion narrative probably contain several divine passives (5:35 [?]; 9:44; 13:32 [?], 34; 18:31), none of these passages explicitly refers to God. The first such reference does not occur until the passion narrative.

## II. Luke 22-23

Although Luke referred during the passion narrative to both the divine role and the human role in the passion events, he did not tend to intermix these references. The portion of the passion narrative which most explicitly refers to the divine plan and the divine will (22:7-46) is sandwiched between two sections which frequently refer to Jesus' adversaries but say little or nothing about the divine role in the passion events (22:1-6; 22:47-23:56).

*Luke 22:1-6*. The third verse of the passion narrative declares that "Satan entered into Judas" (22:3), and the subsequent verse indicates that Judas conspired to betray Jesus. The only other characters who appear in 22:1-6 are various human adversaries of Jesus. These verses never mention God, and they never refer to the divine plan behind the passion events.

*Luke 22:7-46*. Jesus frequently referred to his impending death during the subsequent verses, especially when addressing his apostles during and after the Last Supper. His words in 22:15 imply the imminence of his passion, as do his pronouncements in 22:16 and 22:18 and his textually uncertain words in 22:19b-20. Yet these verses do not explicitly refer to God's role in the passion events.[28]

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[25] This line also occurs in Mark 12:10.

[26] Although the "taking up" mentioned by 9:51 may include Jesus' passion, this passage does not speak of the divine role in this "taking up."

[27] It is unclear if the saying concerning Jesus' "baptism" in 12:50 should be read as a reference to his passion. Even if this saying is read in this manner, it is unclear if any of its passive verbs should be read as divine passives. Jeremias (*Sprache*, 122-23), for example, does not include any of these passive verbs in his lengthy list of Lukan divine passives.

[28] Although the passive verb in 22:16 may be a divine passive (see, e.g., J. B. Green, *The Death of Jesus: Tradition and Interpretation in the Passion Narrative* [WUNT 2/33; Tübingen: Mohr, 1988] 34), it presumably points beyond Jesus' death to a future event. H. Schürmann (*Der Einsetzungsbericht Lk 22,19-20* [NTAbh 20/4; Münster:

Three passages in 22:22-42 refer more directly to the divine role in Jesus' passion. In 22:22, Jesus declared that "the Son of Man is going in accordance with what has been determined (*kata to hōrismenon*)."[29] The passive participle "determined" is a divine passive;[30] God, not Satan or Jesus' other adversaries, is the One who has determined the passion of the Son of Man. This is not the first announcement of this theme, for the Son of Man sayings located prior to 22:22 have already emphasized the divine necessity behind the passion of the Son of Man (9:22; 17:25), the certainty of the events which await him (9:44) and the assurance that "everything that is written" about him will be accomplished (18:31). What is new in 22:22 is the word "determined."[31]

Assuming that the words *kata to hōrismenon* are redactional,[32] it must be asked why Luke wrote these words instead of the formula "as it is written" found in Mark 14:21. Luke occasionally wrote this formula (Luke 2:23; Acts 7:42; 15:15; cf. Luke 3:4; Acts 13:33), and he had already associated the passion events with the fulfillment of scripture (Luke 18:31; 20:17). Having already introduced this theme, he was free to use other language in 22:22. By writing the passive participle "determined," he not only added a divine passive but also employed a significant verb which he had not previously used to describe the divine role in establishing the divine plan. It will be seen that 22:22 is the first of five passion references in Luke-Acts which contain a distinctive vocabulary.

The narrator's reference to "the one who is about (*ho mellōn*) to do this" in 22:23 underscores the certainty of Jesus' imminent betrayal, and Jesus' words in 22:37 stress several themes found in earlier passion references. After declaring that "it is necessary (*dei*) for this that is written to be fulfilled in me" (22:37a), Jesus cited a brief quotation from Isaiah (22:37b). Given the contents of this quotation, it can be assumed that the fulfillment will take place during the passion events. Jesus' words in 22:37a contain three key words which have occurred in earlier passion references: the verb *dei* (9:22; 17:25; cf. 13:33), the participle "written" (18:31; 20:17) and the verb *teleō* ("accomplish, fulfill," 18:31). Verse 22:37a is the first verse which contains all three of these words. In addition, the passive infinitive "to be fulfilled" may be a divine passive.[33] Jesus' brief saying in 22:37c also refers to the fulfillment of this Isaian scripture.[34]

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Aschendorffsche, 1955] 20-21) doubts that the passive participle in 22:19 is a divine passive, though Marshall (*Luke*, 803) and Evans (*Luke*, 790) do not rule out this possibility. None of these scholars interprets the passive participle in 22:20 as a divine passive.

29 Concerning this translation, see BAGD 407.

30 F. Rehkopf, *Die lukanische Sonderquelle: Ihr Umfang und Sprachgebrauch* (WUNT 5; Tübingen: Mohr, 1959) 18; Marshall, *Luke*, 809; Jeremias, *Sprache*, 288; Fitzmyer, *Luke*, 2.1410; R. C. Tannehill, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts: A Literary Interpretation* (2 vols.; Philadelphia, Minneapolis: Fortress, 1986-90) 1.257.

31 George (*Études*, 202) notes that "Luc exprime la même pensée sous diverses formes ..."

32 H. Schürmann, *Jesu Abschiedsrede Lk 22,21-38* (NTAbh 20/5; Münster: Aschendorffsche, 1957) 4-8; V. Taylor, *The Passion Narrative of St Luke* (SNTSMS 19; Cambridge: University Press, 1972) 59-61; Green, *Death*, 43-44; cf. M. L. Soards, *The Passion According to Luke: The Special Material of Luke 22* (JSNTSup 14; Sheffield: JSOT, 1987) 48. Rehkopf (*Sonderquelle*, 15-19) argues that 22:22a rests on an independent tradition.

33 Jeremias, *Sprache*, 293; Fitzmyer, *Luke*, 2.1432.

34 Luke 22:37 has no Synoptic parallels. Schürmann (*Abschiedsrede*, 124-29, 133-34) and Fitzmyer (*Luke*, 2.1429) identify several evidences of Lukan redaction in this verse, though Jeremias (*Sprache*, 292-93) doubts some of these conclusions.

While praying on the Mount of Olives, Jesus said, "Father, if you are willing, take this cup from me; nevertheless, not my will but your (will) be done" (22:42). Although the parallel Markan prayer (14:36) contains the verb *thelō* ("will"), this Lukan prayer contains both the verb *boulomai* ("will") and the noun *thelēma* ("will"). This prayer, which may preserve a non-Markan tradition,[35] is the only passion reference in Luke-Acts which contains either of these words, though the noun *boulē* ("plan, purpose") occurs in the passion references in Acts 2:23 and 4:28. Like the Son of Man saying in 22:22, the prayer in 22:42 uses language which did not appear in the passion references in Luke 1-21. Note that Luke introduced this language just prior to Jesus' betrayal.

Jesus' prayer in 22:42 is not only the first passion reference to refer to the Father but also the first passion reference to refer explicitly to God.[36] Both the conditional clause, "if you are willing," and the imperatival clause, "take this cup from me," are in words addressed *to* the Father; neither of these clauses indicates what the Father "did." The final clause, "... your (will) be done," is another imperatival clause addressed to the Father. Although the reader may assume that the Father's will was "done" during the passion events, this clause does not state what the Father "did." The first passion reference containing a main clause in which God is the subject of an active indicative verb does not occur until Acts 3:18.[37]

*Luke 22:47-23:56.* Verses 22:47-23:56, which tell the story from Jesus' betrayal to his burial, frequently report the actions of Jesus' adversaries (e.g., 22:47, 54, 66-67) but never directly claim that the divine hand was executing the divine plan of salvation. Since Jesus had previously announced that "everything that is written ... about the Son of Man" would be accomplished during the passion and Easter events (18:31-33), it might have been expected that Luke would have frequently referred to the fulfillment of "what is written" in 22:47-23:56. Although Luke used scriptural language when describing the casting of lots for Jesus' clothing (23:34b), when reporting Jesus' dying words (23:46), and on various other occasions,[38] he did not explicitly claim that the passion events had fulfilled any of these scriptures; indeed, he did not even explicitly identify the scriptural basis of these passages. Jesus' textually uncertain prayer in 23:34a asks the Father to forgive his adversaries, and his prayer in 23:46 declares that he committed his spirit to his Father's hands. Although the reader may make assumptions concerning the Father's responses, neither of these prayers indicates what the Father "did" and neither of them overtly refers to the divine plan.[39] Luke failed to indicate if the darkness at the crucifixion scene (23:44-45a) should be attributed to

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[35] Cf. Taylor, *Passion Narrative*, 69-72; J. W. Holleran, *The Synoptic Gethsemane: A Critical Study* (Analecta Gregoriana 191; Rome: Gregoriana, 1973) 170-98; Soards, *Passion*, 72, 98; Green, *Death*, 53-58.

[36] We are excluding from consideration the references to "the kingdom of God" in 22:16 and 22:18.

[37] According to Luke 22:43, an "angel from heaven" appeared and strengthened Jesus on the Mount of Olives. This textually uncertain verse provides the only reference to an angel in the Lukan passion narrative.

[38] Note especially the sayings in 22:69 and 23:30, which look beyond the passion events to future events.

[39] The saying in 23:34a asserts that Jesus' adversaries did not know what they were doing. If this saying refers to the divine plan (cf. Acts 3:17-18; 13:27), it does so only indirectly. Although Jesus' death represents at least the first step in his "exodus" (9:31), Luke did not refer to his "exodus" in 23:46.

the divine power or "the power of darkness" (22:53),[40] and he also failed to interpret the significance of the tearing of the temple curtain (23:45b).[41] There may be other references to the divine hand and the divine plan in 22:47-23:56;[42] however, none of these references unambiguously declares that God was executing the divine plan during the passion events.

Luke referred more directly in 22:47-23:56 to the plans and intentions of the various human participants in the passion events than to the plan and will of God. Herod had been "wanting" to see Jesus for a long time (23:8), and Pilate repeatedly announced his intention to release Jesus (23:16, 20, 22). When reporting Pilate's compliance with the insistent demands of Jesus' Jewish adversaries, Luke stated that Pilate granted "their demand" (23:24) and handed Jesus over "to their will" (23:25). When introducing Joseph of Arimathea, Luke identified him as a council member who had not agreed with the council's "plan and deed" (23:51). Luke had announced the religious leaders' intention to destroy Jesus prior to the passion narrative (19:47), and he portrayed them resolutely pursuing this goal throughout the passion events.[43]

Luke tended to place the references to the divine role and the human role in the passion events in different sections of the passion narrative. The principal passages which identify the divine role (22:22, 37, 42) are in a section which seldom directly refers to Jesus' adversaries (22:7-46),[44] while most of the passages which refer to Jesus' adversaries are in sections which say little or nothing about the divine role in the passion events (22:1-6; 22:47-23:56). In contrast, most of the passages in Luke 1-21 which identify the divine role in the passion events also mention the human role in these events (9:22, 44; 13:31-35; 17:25; 18:31-33; 20:9-19). The first announcement of the passion, for example, refers to both the divine necessity (*dei*) behind the passion events and the opposition of "the elders and chief priests and scribes" (9:22). Other passages in Luke 24 and Acts also refer to both the divine and the human roles in these events (Luke 24:7; Acts 2:23; 3:17-18; 4:25-28; 13:27-29). These passages express the Lukan view that both the hand of God and the enmity of Jesus' human adversaries effected the passion events.

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[40] The latter option has been widely accepted. Cf. Büchele, *Tod*, 51; Fitzmyer, *Luke*, 2.1519; Chance, *Jerusalem*, 119; S. R. Garrett, *The Demise of the Devil: Magic and the Demonic in Luke's Writings* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989) 54-55. In contrast, D. L. Tiede (*Luke* [Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1988] 423) speaks of the darkness as a sign of divine displeasure.

[41] K. H. Rengstorf (*Das Evangelium nach Lukas* [NTD; 8. Aufl.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958] 274) is one of the few scholars who reads the passive in 23:45b as a divine passive. For a survey of the interpretations of 23:45b plus a new interpretation, see D. D. Sylva, "The Temple Curtain and Jesus' Death in the Gospel of Luke," *JBL* 105 (1986) 239-50.

[42] The obscure saying in 23:31 can be read as a reference to God's role in the passion events if 1) the third person plural verb "they do" is a circumlocution for the divine name and 2) the words "these things" refer to the passion events. Both points are disputed. The reaction of the second criminal, "Do you not fear God" (23:40), witnesses to the sovereignty of God in the midst of this scene. When the centurion who was present at Jesus' crucifixion saw what had happened, he "praised God" (23:47). Does this reference to God testify to the divine role in the passion events?

[43] Commenting on the Third Gospel as a whole, Tiede (*Luke*, 391) argues that "Luke's narrative revolves around a conflict of wills."

[44] Jesus' betrayer is mentioned (but not by name) in 22:21-23, and Satan is mentioned in 22:31. The Jewish religious leaders are not mentioned.

Given Luke's conviction that the divine hand had determined the passion events, it is notable that he did not load 22:47-23:56 with references to the divine hand and plan. The virtual absence of such references from 22:47-23:56 helps to maintain the tension between the divine role and the human role in these events.

*Overview*. The principal references in Luke 22-23 to the divine role in the passion events are in Jesus' words in 22:22, 22:37 and 22:42. Two of these passages employ terminology not previously found in the passion references (22:22, 42), while the third is the first Lukan passage to use *dei* to stress the divine necessity behind the fulfillment of a scriptural prophecy in the passion events (22:37). Jesus' prayer on the Mount of Olives (22:42) is the first Lukan passion reference which explicitly refers to God.

### III. Luke 24

Luke 24, the final chapter of the Gospel, contains several passages which identify the divine role in the passion events. The first of these passages indicates that two "men" in dazzling clothes reminded the women at the tomb that Jesus had told them "it is necessary (*dei*) for the Son of Man to be handed over to (the) hands of sinful people and to be crucified ..." (24:7). These "men" claimed that Jesus had spoken this passion announcement in Galilee (24:6), and many of the words in this passion announcement occur in the passion announcements in 9:22 and 9:44.[45] These words include *dei*, which occurs in 9:22. This is the final passion reference in Luke-Acts which speaks of the Son of Man.

During the Emmaus story, the risen Jesus asked the travelers, "Was it not necessary (*edei*) for the Christ to suffer these things ...?" (24:26).[46] Jesus' first passion announcement (9:22) closely followed Peter's identification of Jesus as "the Christ of God" (9:20), and various speakers voiced the title "the Christ" during the passion narrative (22:67; 23:2, 35, 39); nevertheless, Jesus' rhetorical question in 24:26, which anticipates a positive response, represents the first explicit declaration that it was necessary for the *Christ* to suffer.

Before posing this rhetorical question, Jesus chided the travelers for being slow to believe "everything that the prophets have spoken" (24:25). The passion announcement in 18:31 referred to "everything that is written through the prophets," and Luke treated various scriptural references to Jesus' passion as prophecies. In 24:27, the narrator reported that "beginning from Moses and from all the prophets, he (Jesus) interpreted to them the things about himself in all the scriptures." Having just read 24:26, the reader will assume that these "things" must have included scriptural references to Jesus' passion. Although earlier passion references did not speak of "Moses" or use the term "the scriptures," several earlier passion references referred to "what is written" (18:31; 20:17; 22:37). The three verses in 24:25-27 contain not only the first declaration that it was necessary for the *Christ* to suffer but also the first association of this declaration with references to "Moses," "all the prophets" and "the scriptures."[47]

The three verses in 24:44-46 introduce several new words and repeat various "old" words while presenting variations on various "old" themes. The risen Jesus

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[45] Luke 24:7, which has no parallels in the final chapters of the other Synoptics, is probably redactional. Jeremias (*Sprache*, 311) claims that the passive infinitive "to be handed over" is a divine passive.

[46] Luke 24:20 mentions only the human role in the passion events.

[47] These verses have no Matthean or Markan parallels.

declared in 24:44 that "it is necessary (*dei*) for everything that is written in the law of Moses and the prophets and psalms about me to be fulfilled." Various Lukan passages have indicated that "what is written" includes prophecies concerning Jesus' passion (e.g., 18:31-33; 20:17). Although 24:44 is the first passion reference to use the verb *plēroō* ("fulfill") and the terms "the law of Moses" and "psalms," earlier passion references have used the verb *teleō* (18:31; 22:37), referred to "Moses" (24:27) and cited the psalms (20:17; cf. 23:34b, 46). The emphasis on fulfilling "everything that is written" is reminiscent of 18:31, while the emphasis on the necessity (*dei*) of fulfilling what is written is reminiscent of 22:37.

After opening his followers' minds to understand the scriptures (24:45), Jesus stressed that "it is written (*gegraptai*) that the Christ would suffer ..." (24:46). Although the perfect passive indicative *gegraptai* has not appeared in earlier passion references, the perfect passive participle "written" (*gegrammen-*) has frequently appeared (18:31; 20:17; 22:37; 24:44). Both *edei* in 24:26 and *gegraptai* in 24:46 are followed by the words *pathein ton christon* (literally, "the Christ to suffer"). While *edei* in 24:26 identifies the divine necessity behind the suffering of the Christ, *gegraptai* in 24:46 indicates that the scriptures foretold his suffering. Luke had previously emphasized this theme in 24:25-27.[48]

*Overview.* Several passages in Luke 24 emphasize the divine dimension in the passion events. Three passages use *dei* to refer to the divine necessity driving these events (24:7, 26, 44), and one of these passages contains the first declaration that it was necessary for the Christ to suffer (24:26). Several passages claim that the scriptures foretold Jesus' passion (24:25, 27, 44-46; cf. 24:32), and one of these passages stresses that "it is written that the Christ would suffer" (24:46). These passages contain a series of words not found in earlier passion references, including "the scriptures" (24:27, 45), "Moses" (24:27), "the law of Moses" (24:44), "psalms" (24:44), *plēroō* (24:44) and "it is written" (24:46). These words stem from the Lukan development of an important claim which the Lukan Jesus voiced prior to entering Jerusalem, namely, that "everything that is written ... will be accomplished" (18:31).

## IV. Acts

Acts contains various passages which identify the divine role in Jesus' passion. We will begin by examining the three passages in 2:23, 3:18 and 4:28.

*Three passages.* During his speech on Pentecost, Peter claimed that Jesus had been "delivered up" in accordance with "the determined plan and foreknowledge of God" (2:23). His words contain a series of significant details. First, Peter used the noun *boulē* to refer to the divine "plan." Although Jesus had used the verb *boulomai* and the noun *thelēma* in his prayer on the Mount of Olives (Luke 22:42), Peter's words in 2:23 represent the first passion reference to use this noun. Second, Peter utilized the passive participle "determined" when speaking of "the determined plan." Luke had previously employed this participle when writing the redactional construction "what has been determined" in Luke 22:22. Third, Peter used a *pro-* word when referring to the "foreknowledge" (*prognōsis*) of God. Even though Luke frequently used *pro-* words in Acts,[49] he had never written a *pro-* word in a passion reference in the Gospel. Fourth, Peter qualified the phrase "the determined plan and foreknowledge" with the genitive "of God" (*tou theou*).

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48 Verses 24:44-46 have no Matthean or Markan parallels.

49 S. Schulz, "Gottes Vorsehung bei Lukas," *ZNW* 54 (1963) 105-06; Squires, *Plan*, 3.

Jesus had addressed God as "Father" in Luke 22:42 and several other passages in the Gospel,[50] and various passion references in the Gospel contain divine passives; however, Acts 2:23 is the first passion reference to contain the noun *theos*. Peter's reference to "the determined plan and foreknowledge of God" therefore contains three nouns ("plan," "foreknowledge," "God") which Luke had not used in the passion references in the Gospel and a participle ("determined") which Luke had redactionally added to the passion reference in Luke 22:22.[51]

During his speech in Solomon's portico, Peter announced that "God in this way fulfilled what he had foretold through (the) mouth of all the prophets, that his Christ would suffer" (3:18). This statement is a direct theological statement in which "God" (*theos*) is the subject of two aorist active indicative verbs, "fulfilled" and "foretold."[52] The active voice of the verb "fulfilled" (*eplērōsen*) contrasts with the passive voice of this verb in Luke 24:44 (cf. Luke 18:31; 22:37), while the verb "foretold" (*prokatēggeilen*) provides another example of a *pro-* word, a category of words not found in the Gospel's passion references.

The words "God fulfilled" are the subject and verb of the first main clause in a passion reference in Luke-Acts in which "God" is the subject of an active indicative verb. But what does this clause say that God "did" during the passion events? Although the passion references in Acts claim that Jesus' adversaries "laid violent hands" on him (5:30), "fastened" him to the cross (2:23), "hung" him on a tree (5:30; 10:39), "crucified" him (2:36; 4:10) and "killed" him (2:23; 3:15; 10:39; cf. 5:28; 7:52), Luke never made "God" the subject of any of these verbs. The blunt character of these accusations contrasts with the tone of the statement "God in this way fulfilled." Yet the adverb "in this way" (*houtōs*) points back to the actions of Jesus' adversaries (3:13-15, 17), and this adverb indicates that God "fulfilled" what God had "foretold" through the repugnant actions of these adversaries.

It is interesting to compare Peter's statement in 3:18 with Paul's statement in 13:27. Peter identified God as the subject of the verb "fulfilled" (*eplērōsen*) in 3:18, and Paul used this same verb in 13:27 when declaring that the inhabitants of Jerusalem and their rulers had unknowingly "fulfilled" (*eplērōsan*) the utterances of the prophets. God "fulfilled" what God had "foretold" (3:18) when Jesus' adversaries unwittingly "fulfilled" the utterances of the prophets (13:27).

The prayer of the community in Acts 4 states that "both Herod and Pontius Pilate with (the) Gentiles and peoples of Israel gathered together ... to do whatever your hand and plan (*boulē*) had predestined to occur" (4:27-28). According to this prayer, Jesus' adversaries had done what Psalm 2 had prophesied they would do. Since this prayer is addressed to the Lord (*despota*, 4:24), the words "your hand and plan" (4:28) refer to the divine hand and the

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[50] R. L. Mowery, "God the Father in Luke-Acts," *New Views on Luke and Acts* (ed. E. Richard; Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 1990) 124-28.

[51] It is unclear if the adjective "delivered up" (*ekdoton*) in 2:23 refers to the agency of God. Cf. F. F. Bruce, *The Acts of the Apostles* (3d ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990) 123.

[52] The term "direct theological statement" is being used as in R. L. Mowery, "Direct Statements Concerning God's Activity in Acts," *Society of Biblical Literature 1990 Seminar Papers* (ed. D. J. Lull; Atlanta: Scholars, 1990) 196-211.

divine plan.[53] The quotation from Psalm 2 also refers to God as "the Lord" (*tou kyriou*, 4:26).

The passion reference in Acts 4:28 contains several verbal similarities with the passion references in Luke 22:22 and 22:42 and Acts 2:23 and 3:18. The noun *boulē* also occurs in Acts 2:23, while the verb *boulomai* occurs in Luke 22:42. Although the verb "predestined" (*proōrisen*) does not otherwise appear in Luke-Acts, this verb is a compound form of the verb *horizō* ("determine") which occurs in Luke 22:22 and Acts 2:23. The verb "predestined" is a *pro-* word; other *pro-* words occur in Acts 2:23 and 3:18. The vocabulary found in these five verses represents a distinctive vocabulary which is virtually absent from the other passion references in Luke-Acts.[54]

Like Luke 22:42, the passion reference in Acts 4:28 is in a prayer. The passion references in Acts 3:18 and 4:28 represent two of the three passion references in Acts which contain direct theological statements in which "God" (or "your hand and plan") is the subject of one or more active or middle verbs. The third reference is in 20:28.

*Other passages.* The other passion references in Acts 1-7 stress the human role in the passion events. Peter and the other Christian speakers repeatedly indict the members of their audiences ("you [pl.]") for handing over, denying and crucifying Jesus (2:36; 3:13-15, 17; 4:10-11; 5:30; 7:52; cf. 5:28). Several of these indictments contrast these human actions with God's action in raising and glorifying Jesus (2:36; 3:13, 15; 4:10-11; 5:30);[55] however, unlike the passion references in 2:23, 3:18 and 4:28, these passages do not mention God's role in Jesus' passion. Chapters 1-7 contain more references to the human role than the divine role in the passion events.[56]

Most of the passion references in Acts 8-28 refer to the scriptures. The Ethiopian eunuch was reading a passage from Isaiah (Acts 8:32-33). Despite Luke's failure to interpret this passage, his reference to Philip's use of it (8:35) implies that he read it as a prophecy concerning at least Jesus' passion.[57] In his speech at Pisidian Antioch, Paul reported the actions of Jesus' adversaries who unknowingly "fulfilled" the utterances of the prophets (13:27) and "accomplished everything that is written about him" (13:29). The key words in

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[53] According to BAGD (880), the noun "hand" virtually has the meaning of "will" in this verse. See also G. Schneider, *Die Apostelgeschichte* (2 vols.; HTKNT 5; Freiburg: Herder, 1980-82) 1.359.

[54] The *pro-* word in Acts 7:52 occurs in a clause which refers to those who foretold Jesus' coming rather than his passion. Concerning the occurrence of *boul* in 20:27, see the discussion of 20:27-28 below.

[55] M. Rese, "Die Aussagen über Jesu Tod und Auferstehung in der Apostelgeschichte—Ältestes Kerygma oder lukanische Theologumena?" *NTS* 30 (1984) 344-47.

[56] The brief reference to Jesus' suffering in 1:3 does not mention either the divine role or the human role in his suffering. Peter's words in 1:16 concerning the fulfillment of scripture probably refer to the destiny of Judas' "homestead" (1:20a) rather than Judas' role in the passion events. See, e.g., R. Pesch, *Die Apostelgeschichte* (EKKNT 5; Zürich: Benziger; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1986) 1.87. In 4:11, Peter cited a psalm which had prophesied the religious leaders' rejection of Jesus. Jesus had quoted the same passage in Luke 20:17; however, unlike Jesus, Peter did not explicitly identify this passage as a scriptural quotation.

[57] Cf., e.g., Richard, "Jesus' Passion," 146. Peter's speech in Cornelius' house refers to only the human role in the passion events (10:39).

these passages occur in various earlier passion references in Luke and Acts.[58] At Thessalonica, Paul argued from the scriptures that "it was necessary (*edei*) for the Christ to suffer ..." (17:3). The four Greek words translated by these words also occur in Luke 24:26 in the context of references to the scriptures. During his speech before Agrippa, Paul declared that the prophets and Moses had spoken about "the things which were about (*mellontōn*) to be" (26:22). According to 26:23, these "things" included the suffering of the Christ.

Virtually all of the passion references in Acts 8-28 refer to the scriptures. A major exception occurs in 20:28 in Paul's speech to the Ephesian elders. Assuming that the original text of this verse included a reference to "the church of *God*" and that the latter portion of this verse should be translated as "the church of God, which God obtained through the blood of his Own,"[59] this verse contains a direct theological statement in which God is the subject of the middle verb "obtained."[60] No other passion reference in Luke-Acts voices this claim. Given this claim in 20:28, Paul's reference to "the whole purpose (*boulēn*) of God" in 20:27 presumably includes the passion events.

*Overview*. The three passion references in Acts 2:23, 3:18 and 4:28 explicitly refer either to "God" (2:23; 3:18) or the divine "hand and plan" (4:28), and these passages and those in Luke 22:22 and 22:42 contain a distinctive vocabulary which is virtually absent from the other passion references in Luke-Acts. The other passion references in Acts 1-7 emphasize the role of Jesus' adversaries. Several passages scattered throughout Acts 8-26 claim that the scriptures prophesied Jesus' passion (13:27-29; 17:2-3; 26:22-23; cf. 8:32-33), but only one passage in these chapters explicitly refers to God (20:28). Only one passion reference in Acts contains *dei* (17:3), and only one passion reference in this book contains *mellō* (26:22).

## V. Six Ways of Referring to the Divine Activity/Plan

This paper has surveyed the passion references in Luke-Acts which refer to the divine activity/plan in the passion events. While the first four sections have examined these passion references in the order in which they appear in Luke-Acts, this final section will review the six ways in which Luke referred to the divine activity/plan in these passion references. These six ways include the use of 1) the verb *dei*, 2) the verb *mell* , 3) references to the scriptures, 4) various other distinctive words, 5) divine passives and 6) explicit references to God.

1. Most of the passion references in Luke-Acts which contain the verb *dei* are in the Gospel. *Dei* occurs in three Son of Man sayings (9:22; 17:25; 24:7), where it refers to the divine necessity behind the suffering of the Son of Man. This verb also appears in a saying which identifies the divine necessity behind Jesus' journey to Jerusalem, the city which kills the prophets (13:33). *Dei* also occurs in two passages which stress the divine necessity behind the fulfillment of the scriptures (22:37; 24:44) and two passages which emphasize the divine necessity

[58] Cf. Pesch, *Apostelgeschichte*, 2.37. Cf. also the discussion of Acts 3:18 above. This is the last passion reference which refers to Jesus' adversaries.

[59] For a discussion of these issues, see B. M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* (London, New York: United Bible Societies, 1971) 480-82; Pilgrim, *Death*, 167-77; H.-J. Michel, *Die Abschiedsrede des Paulus an die Kirche Apg 20,17-38* (SANT 35; München: Kösel, 1973) 24-25, 88-89; G. A. Krodel, *Acts* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1986) 389.

[60] Concerning the translation of this verb, see BAGD 650; Pilgrim, *Death*, 171-72.

behind the suffering of the Christ (24:26; Acts 17:3). While the occurrence of *dei* in Luke 9:22 has a Markan parallel, the six other occurrences of *dei* in the Gospel's passion references are in special Lukan material or are redactional.

*Dei* occurs in only one passion reference in Acts (17:3). Although Luke frequently used *dei* in Acts to refer to the divine necessity behind various other events,[61] he tended to use other words when speaking of Jesus' passion. Why did Luke seldom use *dei* in the passion references in Acts? Several suggestions can be offered. First, all seven of the Gospel's passion references containing *dei* are in words of Jesus, either the words of the earthly Jesus (9:22; 13:33; 17:25; 22:37), the words of the risen Jesus (24:26, 44), or a word attributed to the earthly Jesus (24:7). Such passages do not occur in Acts, for none of the passion references in Acts was spoken by Jesus. Second, Jesus spoke of *himself* in all seven of the Gospel's passion references, referring to himself as the Son of Man (9:22; 17:25; 24:7), the Christ (24:26), or "me" (13:33; 22:37; 24:44). Several passages in Acts speak about the suffering of the Christ, and Luke used *dei* in one of these passages (17:3); however, Luke never spoke about the passion of the Son of Man in Acts, and, as noted above, the risen Jesus never spoke about his own passion in this book. Third, Luke explicitly referred to God in several of the passion references in Acts (2:23; 3:18; 4:26, 28; 20:28). Although the "impersonal" verb *dei* refers in Luke-Acts to the divine will of a "personal" God, it does not explicitly speak of God. Indeed, none of the eight passion references in Luke-Acts which contain *dei* explicitly refers to God. Luke regularly used other words in the passion references which explicitly refer to God.

2. *Mellō* occurs less frequently than *dei* in the Lukan passion references. Proclaiming the certainty of events which are "about to" happen, this verb occurs in three passion references in the Gospel: in the narrator's report that Moses and Elijah were talking with Jesus about the exodus which he "was about to fulfill" (9:31), in Jesus' announcement that the Son of Man was "about to be handed over" (9:44), and in the narrator's report that the apostles were asking one another about the identity of the one who was "about to" betray Jesus (22:23). All three of these occurrences of *mellō* are in special Lukan material or are redactional. Although two of these three occurrences are in Luke 9, only one of these three is in a saying of Jesus (9:44).

Acts 26:22 is the only passion reference containing *mellō* which is located after the passion narrative. It may have been easier for Luke to use this verb in references to events which were "about to" happen than in references to events which he had already narrated.

3. Only in the final six chapters of the Gospel and in Acts did Luke associate Jesus' passion with the scriptures. The first such reference occurs in Luke 18:31, and only one other reference occurs prior to the passion narrative (20:17). Only one passage in the passion narrative explicitly claims that a scriptural prophecy would be fulfilled during the passion events (22:37), though two other passages virtually quote the scriptures when referring to passion events (23:34b, 46). Many passages in Luke 24 and Acts, however, claim that the scriptures foretold Jesus' passion (Luke 24:25-27, 44-46; Acts 3:18; 4:25-28; 8:32-33, 35; 13:27-29; 17:2-3; 26:22-23; cf. 4:11). Although several passion passages which contain *dei* either refer to the necessity of the fulfillment of the scriptures or stand in contexts which refer to the scriptures (Luke 22:37; 24:26, 44; Acts 17:3), none of these passages precedes the passion narrative.

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61 See Cosgrove, "Divine DEI," 172-83.

The reference to the scriptures in Luke 18:31 is a redactional addition to a Markan passion announcement, and the references to the scriptures in Luke 22:37, 24:25-27 and 24:44-46 are in passages which have no Synoptic parallels. Only the quotation in Luke 20:17 and the virtual quotation in Luke 23:34b have Markan parallels.

Luke skillfully introduced the authoritative role of the scriptures in prophesying Jesus' passion. The authoritative voice of Jesus spoke most of the passion references in Luke 9-17, though the authoritative figures of Moses and Elijah once spoke about Jesus' exodus (9:31). When Jesus announced in 18:31 that "everything that is written through the prophets about the Son of Man will be accomplished," he authoritatively introduced the authoritative role of the scriptures in prophesying his passion. Jesus repeatedly emphasized this role throughout the closing chapters of the Gospel (20:17; 22:37; 24:25-27, 44-46). Although the risen Jesus did not speak about his passion in Acts, the authoritative Christian preachers and the community continued to stress the authoritative role of the scriptures in prophesying Jesus' passion (e.g., 3:18; 4:25-28; 13:27-29).

4. Several passages in Luke 22 and Acts 2-4 contain a distinctive vocabulary. The pertinent portions of these passages are listed below:

Luke 22:22, "what has been determined"

Luke 22:42, "Father, if you are willing, ...; nevertheless, not my will but your (will) be done"

Acts 2:23, "the determined plan and foreknowledge of God"

Acts 3:18, "what God foretold"

Acts 4:28, "whatever your hand and plan predestined"

These passages contain various words which are virtually absent from the other passion references in Luke-Acts, including the nouns "will" (*thelēma*, Luke 22:42), "plan" (*boulē*, Acts 2:23; 4:28) and "foreknowledge" (*prognōsis*, Acts 2:23), the verbs "will" (*boulomai*, Luke 22:42), "foretell" (*prokataggellō*, Acts 3:18) and "predestine" (*proorizō*, Acts 4:28), and the participle "determined" (*hōrismen-*, Luke 22:22; Acts 2:23). Three of these words are *pro-* words ("foreknowledge," "foretell," "predestine"), and all three are in Acts. None of these distinctive words can be traced to Mark. The reference to "what has been determined" in Luke 22:22 is redactional, while Jesus' prayer in Luke 22:42 may reflect a special Lukan tradition.

All of these distinctive words are in direct discourse. Two are in words of Jesus spoken during the passion narrative (Luke 22:22, 42), two are in speeches of Peter (Acts 2:23; 3:18) and one is in a community prayer (Acts 4:28). Unlike the passion references which contain *dei* or *mell* , four of the five passages containing these distinctive words explicitly refer to the "Father" (Luke 22:42), "God" (Acts 2:23; 3:18), or the divine "hand and plan" (Acts 4:28). The fifth passage contains a divine passive (Luke 22:22).

Although Luke introduced this language in Luke 22, he excluded it from the passion references in Luke 24, and although he reintroduced it in Acts 2-4, he virtually excluded it from the passion references located after Acts 4:28.[62] While it may be impossible to explain these patterns, two comments can be made. First, most of the passion references in Luke 24 and most of those located after Acts

[62] See note 54.

4:28 emphasize the scriptures. Although the passion references in Acts 3:18 and 4:28 employ several of these distinctive words when referring to the scriptures, none of the other passages containing these words explicitly refers to the scriptures. Luke may have concluded that other language was better suited to the task of associating Jesus' passion with the scriptures. Second, having "made his point" by using these distinctive words in five passages, Luke may have felt no need to continue to use them in additional passion references.

5. Most of the passion references which contain divine passives are in the Gospel, though some of these passives can be more confidently identified as divine passives than others (Luke 5:35 [?]; 9:44; 13:32 [?], 34; 18:31; 22:22, 37; 24:7 [?]; Acts 2:23). Most of these divine passives are in words of Jesus, and most of them are either in sayings which lack Synoptic parallels (Luke 13:32; 22:37; 24:7) or in redactional alterations of Markan sayings (18:31; 22:22; cf. 9:44).

6. The only explicit references to God in the Gospel's passion references are the references to the Father in Jesus' prayers during the passion narrative (22:42; 23:34a [?], 46). The passion references in Acts 2-4 contain explicit references to "God" (2:23; 3:18), "the Lord" (4:26) and the divine "hand and plan" (4:28), but only one passion reference located after these chapters directly refers to God (20:28). The explicit references to God are therefore virtually limited to Luke 22-23 and Acts 2-4.

Only a few passion references contain direct theological statements which indicate what God "did." Although Jesus prayed to his Father on two or three occasions during the passion narrative (22:42; 23:34a [?], 46), none of these prayers directly indicates what the Father "did." In contrast, Acts contains three statements in which "God" (3:18; 20:28) and the divine "hand and plan" (4:28) are the subjects of a total of four active or middle aorist verbs. Although two of these verbs indicate that God "foretold" (3:18) and "predestined" Jesus' passion (4:28), the other two indicate that God "fulfilled" what God had foretold (3:18) and "obtained the church" through the blood of Jesus (20:28).

To gain some perspective on these direct theological statements, it will be useful to compare them with the direct theological statements concerning God's role in another event, Jesus' resurrection. Although Luke never directly stated in the Gospel that God raised Jesus, he frequently voiced this claim in Acts (2:24, 32; 3:15; 4:10; 5:30; 10:40; 13:30, 33, 34, 37; 17:31).[63] Like the direct theological statements concerning Jesus' passion, these direct statements occur only in Acts; indeed, Luke was generally more willing to write direct theological statements in Acts than in the Gospel.[64] Yet the direct statements which identify God's role in Jesus' resurrection greatly outnumber those which identify the divine role in Jesus' passion. A second comparison is even more telling. While Luke frequently said that God raised Jesus, he never said that God killed Jesus.

*First occurrences.* The passion references which contain the first occurrences of these Lukan ways of referring to the divine activity/plan in the passion events can be identified as follows:

Luke 9:22, the first passion reference containing *dei*

Luke 9:31, the first passion reference containing *mell*

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63 Mowery, "Direct Statements Concerning God's Activity in Acts," 200, 211.

64 In a study currently in progress, the author has found that Acts contains about twice as many direct theological statements as the Gospel.

Luke 9:44, the first passion reference containing a divine passive[65]

Luke 18:31, the first passion reference that points to the scriptures

Luke 22:22, the first passion reference containing a word from the distinctive vocabulary

Luke 22:42, the first passion reference that explicitly refers to God

Note the progression from 9:22 to 22:42; while the former passage contains the "impersonal" verb *dei*, the latter passage refers to God as the "Father."

*High points*. At the risk of oversimplification, we will conclude by identifying five "high points" in the Lukan presentation of the divine role in Jesus' passion. The first high point is provided by the trio of passion references in Luke 9:22, 9:31 and 9:44. These passion references are located just prior to the central section of the Gospel. The second high point is provided by Jesus' announcement that "everything that is written ... will be accomplished" (18:31). These words, which are preceded by Jesus' declaration that "we are going up to Jerusalem," provide the first announcement of the role of the scriptures in prophesying Jesus' passion. The third high point is provided by the trio of passion references in Luke 22:22, 22:37 and 22:42. These references, which are located just prior to Jesus' betrayal, prepare the reader for the narrative of the passion events in 22:47-23:56, a narrative which never directly claims that God was executing the divine plan during the events being narrated. The fourth high point is provided by the passion references in Luke 24, especially those which stress the role of the scriptures in foretelling Jesus' passion (24:25-27, 44-46). The fifth high point is provided by the passion references in Acts 2-4, especially those in 2:23, 3:18 and 4:28. Located near the beginning of Acts, these references overtly stress God's role in planning and executing the passion events. No equally significant high point occurs elsewhere in Acts; however, just as most of the passion references in Luke 24 stress the role of the scriptures in prophesying Jesus' passion, most of the passion references in Acts 8-28 emphasize the same point.

The goal of this study was the examination of the artistry reflected in Luke's use of various ways of referring to the divine activity/plan in the passion events. Luke gradually added various touches to his portrait of God's role in these events, and his artistry is impressive.[66]

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65 Excluding the possible divine passive in Luke 5:35.

66 Krodel (*Acts*, 281) claims that "Luke never says everything at once, but expands and unfolds earlier themes as he moves step by step from one episode to another."

# The Cup, The Bread, and the Salvific Effect of Jesus' Death in Luke-Acts

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No textual problem of Luke's two-volume work is more theologically significant than the variant accounts of the Last Supper in Luke 22:19-20.[1] Nor has any other generated such critical debate or, one might add, occasioned such scholarly confusion. The issues transcend the problems of the MSS, transcend even the problems of NT theology. For the theology of early Christianity did not come to an end with the completion of the canonical writings. Christian reflection and theological controversy continued, and the polemical situations that evolved came to affect the texts of "Scripture" that were in circulation. Luke's writings in particular proved vulnerable to the vicissitudes of transmission, as the theological proclivities of individual scribes made themselves known in the copies they produced.[2] In this paper, I will argue that the text of Luke 22:19-20 was changed in just such a polemical milieu, that the text found in the vast majority of MSS represents a corruption effected by Christian scribes of the second century, scribes who wanted to stress, in the face of various kinds of docetic christologies, that Christ really did shed blood and die, and that this shed blood and death were themselves salvific. This passage, then, represents an instance of the "orthodox corruption of Scripture."[3]

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[1] In addition to the works mentioned in note 5 below, useful discussions can be found in Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *Gospel According to Luke (X-XXIV)* (AB 28A; Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1985) 1386-95; E. Earle Ellis *The Gospel of Luke* (Century Bible; London: Marshall, Morgan, & Scott, 1974) 254-56; H. Schürmann, "Lk 22, 19b-20 als ursprunglische Textüberlieferung," *Bib* 32 (1951) 364-92; 522-41; Martin Rese, "Zur Problematik von Kurz- und Langtext in Luk xxii.17ff," NTS 22 (1975) 15-31; J. H. Petzer, "Luke 22:19b-20 and the Structure of the Passage," *NovTest* 3 (1984) 249-52; and idem, "Style and Text in the Lucan Narrative of the Institution of the Lord's Supper," *NTS* 37 (1991) 113-29.

[2] Especially, of course, in the Western text of Acts. See the convenient discussion of Bruce M. Metzger, *Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* (Stuttgart: United Bible Societies, 1971) 259-72. On theological character of the Western text in Acts, see Eldon Jay Epp, *The Theological Tendency of Codex Bezae Cantabrigiensis in Acts* (SNTSMS, 3; Cambridge: University Press, 1966).

[3] For a justification of this designation and a discussion of several other examples drawn from the Gospel of Mark, see Bart D. Ehrman, "The Text of Mark in the Hands of the Orthodox," in *Biblical Hermeneutics in Historical Perspective*, ed. Mark Burrows and Paul Rorem (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, forthcoming). I deal with other examples in "1 John 4:3 and the Orthodox Corruption of Scripture," *ZNW* 79 (1988) 221-43, and with Mark A. Plunkett in "The Angel and the Agony: The Textual Problem of Luke 22:43-44," CBQ 45 (1983) 401-16.

**Documentary Considerations**

The NT MSS present Luke 22:19-21 in six different forms of text, four of which can readily be dismissed as altogether lacking adequate documentary support and internal claims to authenticity.[4] Of the two remaining forms, one is conveniently labeled the "shorter text," because it lacks vv. 19b-20, reading (19a, 21):

> "And taking bread, giving thanks, he broke it and gave it to them saying, 'This is my body. But behold, the hand of the one who betrays me is with me at the table.'"

The longer text includes the familiar material (underlined) between these two sentences (vv. 19b-20):

> "And taking bread, giving thanks, he broke it and gave it to them saying, 'This is my body that is given for you. Do this in my remembrance.' And the cup likewise after dining, saying, 'This cup is the new covenant in my blood that is poured out for you. But behold, the hand of the one who betrays me is with me at the table.'"

The shorter text is one of Westcott and Hort's famous "Western non-interpolations." As the ill-famed designation suggests, it is a text preserved only in Western witnesses (D a d $ff^2$ i l) that has (for Westcott and Hort) all the earmarks of originality, despite the attestation of a longer form in all other MSS, including those Westcott and Hort labeled—with equal disingenuousness—"Neutral."[5] The sparse support for the shorter reading has naturally led most other commentators and textual specialists to reject it virtually out of hand. To move too quickly in this direction, however, would be a mistake. For Westcott and Hort did not depart from their beloved Neutral witnesses without compelling reasons. For the present text, their reasons were rooted in intrinsic and transcriptional probabilities, about which I will be speaking momentarily. But here, as with all the Western non-interpolations, Westcott and Hort also found documentary reasons for thinking the Western tradition original, even though they understood it normally to be corrupt. This is because the shorter reading, which appears to be original on internal grounds, represents the opposite pattern of corruption evidenced elsewhere in its supporting documents. The "Western" text is almost invariably expansionistic, as opposed to the normally succinct attestations of its Alexandrian counterparts (including Westcott and Hort's "Neutral" text). When Western witnesses, then, support an uncharacteristically shorter text in the face of an Alexandrian expansion, the reading in question must be given the most

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[4] See the convenient chart and discussion in Metzger *Textual Commentary*, 173-77. Three of the four readings are each attested by only one form of the Syriac, the fourth by two OL MSS (b e). All four are readily understood as derived from one or the other of the two remaining forms; all four circumvent the major stumbling block of the text by reversing the sequence of cup and bread.

[5] See Westcott and Hort, *The New Testament in the Original Greek* (Cambridge: University Press, 1881) II. 175-77, and the general discussion of Metzger, *Textual Commentary* 191-93. Among those who call the entire theory of "Western non-interpolations" into question are Joachim Jeremias, *The Eucharistic Words of Jesus*, tr. A. Ehrhardt (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955) 84-106; Kurt Aland, "Die Bedeutung des P75 für den Text des Neuen Testaments: Ein Beitrag zur Frage des "Western non-interpolations," in *Studien zur Überlieferung des Neuen Testaments und seines Textes*, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967) 155-72; and dependent upon these two, Klijn Snodgrass, "Western Non-Interpolations," *JBL* 91 (1972) 369-79.

serious consideration. Westcott and Hort's decision to accept several such readings as original (not all of them, since a case must be made for each) is commonly disparaged as tendentious. But in fact, it is the least tendentious aspect of their entire system: these few readings virtually proved their cherished notions about a "neutral" tradition mistaken.[6]

The upshot is that the nearly unconscious tendency to discount readings found "in only a few" witnesses must be laid aside when dealing with this kind of MS alignment, in which a shorter reading finds its chief support within the Western tradition. In such cases, both readings, the shorter and the longer, must have been available to scribes of the second century. But the external evidence can take us no earlier, cannot, that is, determine for us the reading of the autograph. The investigation, then, must be moved to the realm of internal evidence. And here, in fact, is where a compelling case can be made for the originality of the shorter reading of Luke 22:19-20. The bottom line will be an argument from transcriptional probability: unlike the more commonly attested reading, there is simply no plausible way to explain the Western text if it is not original. Before reaching the bottom, however, we do well to turn our initial attention to the question of which reading is more intrinsically suited to the writings of Luke-Acts.

## Intrinsic Probabilities

*Vocabulary, Style, and Theology*

It has sometimes been argued that the main difficulty with the longer text is its non-Lukan vocabulary and style.[7] This is probably overstating the case, even though the concatenation of non-Lukan features should certainly give us pause.[8] What is even more striking, however, is that precisely the non-Lukan features comprise the key elements of the longer text: the phrase ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ("for you") occurs twice in this passage, but nowhere else in all of Luke-Acts,[9] the word for "remembrance," ἀνάμνησιν, occurs only here in Luke-Acts,[10] and never elsewhere does Luke speak of the "new covenant," let alone the new covenant "in my blood." Were the Gospel of Luke our only base of comparison for this

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[6] Here I should also point out that Westcott and Hort's dependence on the text of Codex Vaticanus was not based on sheer prejudice for the oldest MS, as it is sometimes misunderstood to be; nor did they blindly follow the Neutral text without regard for other considerations. The text of Vaticanus was judged superior by a careful analysis of the *internal* quality of its readings: whenever clear textual decisions could be reached on the basis of intrinsic and transcriptional probabilities, Vaticanus was seen to attest the original text. For Westcott and Hort, this suggested that in ambiguous cases its text was also likely to be correct. As a whole, then, their system was not built simply on "external" or "documentary" evidence, but was based on a thorough assessment of the internal quality of textual variations and their supporting witnesses.

[7] Most recently by Joel Green "The Death of Jesus, God's Servant," in *Reimaging the Death of the Lukan Jesus*, ed. Dennis Sylva (Theologie Bonner biblische Beiträge 73; Frankfurt: Anton Hain, 1990) 4.

[8] In addition to the stylistic features I cite here, see the list in in Green, "The Death of Jesus," 4. On the difficulties of basing a text-critical judgment strictly on such stylistic features, however, see Petzer, "Style and Text."

[9] Nor do the closely related phrases ἀντὶ ὑμῶν or ὑπὲρ πολλῶν.

[10] Nor, interestingly, does Luke preserve either of Mark's two uses of the verbal form ἀναμιμνήσκω, omitting Mark 11:21 altogether for other reasons, and changing the word in Mark 14:72 to ὑπομιμνήσκω (22:61).

distinctive vocabulary, the evidence might not be so telling; but given the ample opportunity afforded the author to refer back to the momentous event of the Last Supper in his second volume, the absence of any subsequent allusions to these significant words and phrases must be seen as more than a little discomforting for proponents of the longer text.[11]

But far more important than the mere absence of this vocabulary from the rest of Luke-Acts is the matter of its ideational content. It is surely significant that the understanding of Jesus' death expressed by these words and phrases is otherwise absent from Luke's two-volume work. When Jesus says in Luke 22:19b-20 that his body is given "for you" (*ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*) and that his blood is shed "for you" (*ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*), he is stating what Luke says nowhere else in his long narrative: in neither his Gospel nor Acts does he portray Jesus' death as an atonement for sins.[12] Even more significantly, Luke has actually gone out of his way to *eliminate* just such a theology from the narrative he inherited from his predecessor, the Gospel of Mark. This is a key factor in recognizing the secondary character of the longer text, a factor that has been surprisingly underplayed by most previous studies of the problem.

The data are by now familiar and here I will simply mention those that are particularly germane to the textual problem. Never in his two volumes does Luke say that Jesus died "for your sins" or "for you." Significantly when he summarizes the significant features of the "Christ event" in the speeches of Acts, with remarkable consistency he portrays the death of Jesus not as an atoning sacrifice, but as a miscarriage of justice that God reversed by vindicating Jesus at the resurrection (Acts 2:22-36; 3:12-16; 4:8-12; 7:51-56; 13:26-41). The only apparent exception, and I will later argue that it is in fact only apparent, is the difficult text of Acts 20:28. Before turning our attention to the exceptional, however, we do well to stress the invariable. In none of these speeches is Jesus said to die "for" anyone, a surprising fact, given the number of opportunities Luke had to introduce the notion. In one passage in particular one might expect some reference, however distant, to Jesus' atoning death, only to find the expectation altogether frustrated. In Acts 8 Luke introduces the Ethiopian eunuch reading the text of Scripture used most widely by early Christians to explain Jesus' death as a vicarious atonement: Isaiah 53. But somewhat remarkably, when Luke cites the passage, he includes not a word about the Servant of the Lord being "wounded for our transgressions" (Isa. 53:5), being "bruised for our iniquities" (53:5), or making himself "an offering for sin" (53:10). Luke has instead crafted his quotation to affirm his own view of Jesus' passion: he died as an innocent victim who was then vindicated (Acts 8:32-33). Particularly telling is Luke's decision to stop

[11] Schürmann ("Lk 22,19b-20") is followed by Ellis (*Gospel of Luke*) in arguing that backward glances to the longer text in the subsequent narrative demonstrate its presence in the original form of the text. But none of the proposed examples prove at all convincing: there is no reason to think that the *πλὴν ἰδοὺ* of v. 21 refers back to *ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*, or that "this cup" of v. 42 alludes to "the cup" of v 20 (why not v. 17!) or that the verbal form *διατίθεμαι* in v. 28 requires the establishment of the *διαθήκη* in v. 20.

[12] Scholars traditionally have pointed to Luke 22:19-20 and Acts 20:28 as the only two exceptions to the rule. I will deal with the latter momentarily. In addition to the commentaries, see Richard Zehnle, "The Salvific Character of Jesus' Death in Lucan Soteriology," *TSt* 30 (1969) 420-44; Augustin George, "Le sens de la mort Jésus pour Luc," *RevBib* 80 (1973) 186-217; and the consensus that is reflected now in the collection of essays edited by Sylva, *Reimaging*, esp. Green, "The Death of Jesus," 1-28; Earl Richard, "Jesus' Passion and Death in Acts," 125-52; and above all John T. Carroll, "Luke's Crucifixion Scene," 108-24.

just short of the final statement of the Isaian text he quotes, a statement that does in fact intimate the vicarious nature of the Servant's suffering: he was "stricken for the transgression of my people" (53:8). It should not be overlooked, in this connection, that Luke's only other allusion to the Song of the Suffering Servant also supports his view that Jesus was unjustly killed but then glorified. In Acts 3:13 Peter states that the God of Israel "glorified his servant" Jesus (Isa. 52:13), but says nothing about Jesus' atoning sacrifice.

It is particularly important to stress that Luke has not simply overlooked or avoided making such references; he has in fact gone out of his way to *eliminate* notions of atonement from the one source we are virtually certain he had before him, the Gospel of Mark. Mark makes two poignant references to the salvific significance of Jesus' death and Luke changed them both. The first and most obvious comes in the famous words of Jesus in Mark 10:45: "For the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life a ransom for many." If Luke found this theology acceptable, it is virtually impossible to explain why he omitted the verse altogether.[13]

The other reference is more subtle, but nonetheless forms a kind of linchpin for Mark's theology of the cross. It has to do with the events surrounding the moment of Jesus' death, and to recognize the significance of Luke's portrayal of the event we have to understand how it was presented in his source. As is well known, Mark records that Jesus' death is immediately followed by two signs that demonstrate its meaning: the temple curtain is ripped in half and the Roman centurion confesses him to be "the Son of God" (15:38-39). The tearing of the curtain has been subject to two major interpretations over the years, depending on whether it was the outer or inner curtain of the Temple that was torn.[14] Both interpretations are plausible within a Marcan context, the first probably indicating a divine judgment against the temple, the second a not unrelated notion that God now comes to humans (from the Holy of Holies behind the curtain) no longer through temple sacrifice but through the death of Jesus.[15] The latter interpretation is perhaps to be preferred, since (a) the only other use of the verb σχίζω in Mark occurs at the baptism (1:10), where again the idea of an advent of God occurs (the heavens rip and the Spirit descends), and (b) the second event of 15:38-39—the centurion's confession—indicates a moment of salvation rather than, purely, of judgment. If this interpretation is correct, then Mark uses the ripping of the curtain to indicate that in the death of Jesus God has made himself available to human beings, who correspondingly now have direct access to him. And the confession of the centurion represents the first (and only) instance of a

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[13] Joel Marcus has suggested to me that instead of deleting Mark 10:45, Luke has placed in its stead his characteristic understanding of Jesus: "But I am among you as one who serves" (22:27). See further Marion L. Soards, *The Passion according to Luke: The Special Material of Luke* 22 (JSNTSup 14; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987) 30-31.

[14] In addition to the commentaries, see e.g. Frank J. Matera, *Passion Narratives and Gospel Theologies* (New York: Paulist, 1986) 47, and the literature that he cites. Most recently David Ulansey ("The Heavenly Veil Torn: Mark's Cosmic *Inclusio*," *JBL* 110 [1991] 123-25) has argued that Mark refers to the outer curtain, because on it was drawn a likeness of the cosmos (Josephus *Jewish Wars* 5. 5. 4) that would then correspond symbolically to the "the heavens" of Mark 1:10. It is an interesting theory, but it may be supposing too much of Mark's implied readers (that they would catch the allusion that most other interpreters have missed); these readers otherwise do not evidence any particular knowledge of Palestinian Judaism (cf. 7:1-3!).

[15] Or it may be that the emphasis is to be reversed, that with the ripping of the curtain humans now have access to God in his holy place.

person in Mark's Gospel who fully recognizes who Jesus is:[16] he is the Son of God who had to die, whose death was not alien to his divine sonship but was instead constitutive of it. In short, the ripping of the curtain and the confession of the centurion reveal Mark's understanding of Jesus' death as an atoning sacrifice (in it God provides access to himself; cf. 10:45) and as the key to salvation (by the profession of faith in the Son of God who died).

Luke's account of Jesus' death is in no small measure dependent upon Mark's.[17] Here too there is a tearing of the temple curtain and a confession of the centurion. But, strikingly, both events are modified so that their significance is transformed. The tearing of the curtain in the Temple no longer results from Jesus' death, because in Luke it occurs *before* Jesus dies (23:45). What the event might mean to Luke has been debated, but since it is now combined with the eerie darkness that has come over the land,[18] it appears to represent a cosmic sign that accompanies the hour of darkness ("this is your hour and the power of darkness" 11:43). It may well, then, represent the judgment of God upon his people who have rejected his gift of "light to those who sit in darkness and the shadow of death" (1:79), a judgment that falls in particular on the religious institution which his people have perverted to their own ends (Luke 19:45-46).[19] In Luke's account the ripping of the temple curtain does not show that Jesus' death has opened up the path to God; it now symbolizes God's judgment upon his own people who prefer to dwell in darkness.

So too Luke has changed the confession of the centurion. No longer does it indicate a profession of faith in the Son of God who has died ("Truly this man was the Son of God," Mark 15:39); now it coincides with Luke's own understanding of Jesus' death: "Truly this man was innocent" (δίκαιος, Luke 23:47).[20] The

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16 Throughout Mark's Gospel Jesus is portrayed as the Son of God who must suffer and die, but who is universally misunderstood. His family thinks he has gone mad (3:21), the Jewish leadership thinks he is inspired by the Devil (3:22), his townspeople think that he is simply the local carpenter (6:1-6), and his own disciples are never able to understand either who he is or what he means (6:52; 8:1-14). When they do begin to understand, they understand only partially at best (8:27-38). When Jesus tells them he must go to Jerusalem to die, they object (8:31-32); when he describes his coming rejection by those in power, they argue among themselves concerning who is the greatest (9:30-37; cf. 10:33-45). At the end he is betrayed by one of his disciples, denied by another, and deserted by all the rest. He is crucified a lonely, forsaken man, crying out in his despair, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" before breathing his last (15:34-37). Only then, in his death, does his identity become known (15:39).

17 The source questions are particularly difficult here. In addition to the commentaries, see esp. Franz Georg Untergaßmair, *Kreuzweg und Kreuzigung Jesu: ein Beitrag zur lukanischen Redaktionsgeschichte und zur Frage nach der lukanischen "Kreuzestheologie"* (Paderborner theologische Studien 10; Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1980) 97-101.

18 Luke has added an explanation to Mark's terse notation "there was darkness over the whole earth until the ninth hour," by indicating that it was because the sun had failed (τοῦ ἡλίου ἐκλιπόντος). On the textual problem and meaning of the phrase, see e.g. Fitzmyer *Gospel according to Luke*, 1517-18.

19 In addition to the commentaries, see the diverging opinion of Dennis Sylva, "The Temple Curtain and Jesus' Death in the Gospel of Luke," *JBL* 105 (1986) 239-50 and the more popular treatment of Donald Senior, *The Passion of Jesus in the Gospel of Luke* (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1989).

20 For a strong case that the text should be rendered "Truly this man was righteous," see Robert J. Karris, "Luke 23:47 and the Lucan View of Jesus' Death," in *Reimaging*, 68-78. In my judgment, Carroll ("Luke's Crucifixion Scene," 116-18 and notes) is more likely

death of Jesus in Luke-Acts is not a death that effects an atoning sacrifice. It is the death of a righteous martyr who has suffered from miscarried justice, whose death is vindicated by God at the resurrection.[21] What matters chiefly for our purposes is not the theological adequacy of such a view, but rather the consistency with which Luke has set it forth: he was able to shift the focus away from the atoning significance of Jesus' death only by modifying the one account of that death which we are certain he had received. What has this to do with our textual problem? As we will stress momentarily, only one of our two textual variants, the shorter reading, coincides with the Lukan understanding of Jesus' death; the other attests precisely the theology that Luke has otherwise taken pains to suppress.

Before returning to this text-critical issue, however, we must first deal with Acts 20:28, the one passage that is frequently treated as an exception to Luke's understanding of the death of Jesus. In fact the passage is an exception only in appearance. For even here the notion of atonement does not derive from the text but has to be imported into it. In his farewell address to the Ephesian elders, the Apostle Paul exhorts them to "pastor the church of God, which he obtained through the blood of his Own" (τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ ἰδίου). The phrasing is enigmatic and has led to several interesting textual modifications.[22] Despite its ambiguity ("His own blood"? "The blood of his unique [Son]"?) the phrase almost certainly refers to Jesus, whose blood God used to acquire an *ekklesia*.[23] But even here, I must point out, the text does not speak of Jesus' self-giving act as an atoning sacrifice for sin, but of God's use of Jesus' blood to acquire (NB, not "redeem") the church. And so the thrust of the allusion is not strictly speaking soteriological; the foci are God's prerogatives over the church which he obtained through blood, and the elders' corresponding need to exercise appropriate supervision over it. Only by inference can one find a word concerning the expiatory benefits of Christ's death; even here there is no word of atonement, no claim that Christ died "for your sake."

But what does it mean to say that God obtained the church through Christ's blood? The problem interpreters have typically had with the verse is that they have seen in it a remnant of Pauline soteriology, and thought then that Luke either *did* accept the notion of an atoning sacrifice or that he here unwittingly reproduced an undigested fragment of tradition.[24] In fact, neither conclusion is necessary, because the verse makes perfectly good sense if one suspends any

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correct that one should not press too far the difference between "righteous" and "innocent," since if Jesus is one, he is also the other.

21 See esp. Carroll, "Luke's Crucifixion Scene," 116-20.

22 Parts of the Byzantine tradition change the text to read τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος, which, when not accompanied by a preceding change of θεοῦ to κυρίου, results in the exchange of predicates familiar from the writings of second-century fathers from the time of Ignatius, "the church of God which he purchased with his own blood"!

23 *Contra* Waldemar Schmeichel, "Does Luke Make a Soterological Statement in Acts 20:28," *Society of Biblical Literature 1982 Seminar Papers* (Chico CA: Scholars, 1982) 501-14 who argues that τοῦ ἰδίου refers to Paul, who establishes the church by his self-giving ministry and eventual death. But for Luke, the church was "obtained" well before Paul's ministry and sacrifice!

24 In addition to the commentaries, see the recent study of Lars Aejmelaeus, *Die Rezeption der Paulusbriefe in der Miletrede (Apg 20:18-35)* (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1987) 132-42, who goes yet further to claim an actual literary dependence of 20:28 on 1 Thess. 5:9-10 and Eph. 1:7. This is part of Aejmelaeus' larger thesis that Pauline allusions in Acts are invariably due to Luke's knowledge of the Pauline letters.

previous knowledge of (or commitment to) Pauline thought, and allows it to draw its meaning from its Lukan context. On only one other occasion does Luke mention the "blood" of Jesus, and this should be the first place to turn in trying to understand the reference in 20:28. In Acts 5:28 the Jewish leaders in Jerusalem accuse the apostles of working to make them the culprits for "the blood of this man." When Peter hears this, he launches into one of his patented speeches, proclaiming that even though "You killed [Jesus] by hanging him on the tree," "God raised him from the dead, exalting him to his right hand as Ruler and Savior." He then ties Jesus' reversal of fortune to a typically Lukan notion of soteriology. God exalted the unjustly executed Jesus so that he could give "repentance and forgiveness of sins to Israel" (5:31). How then, one might ask, does Luke understand that "God obtains the church through blood'? The blood of Jesus produces the church because it is his blood that brings the cognizance of guilt that leads to repentance.[25]

I should point out that this understanding of Jesus' blood is perfectly consistent with Luke's soteriology otherwise, in which repentance and forgiveness of sins are the perennial keynotes. The constant refrain of the speeches of Acts is: "You killed Jesus, but God raised him from the dead." In each instance the claim represents an appeal to repentance, which brings forgiveness of sins.[26] Failure to repent, on the other hand, results in judgment.

Moreover, this construal is consistent with the other references to "blood" throughout Luke-Acts. While the word can certainly refer neutrally to such things as the blood of menstruation or of edible beasts (Luke 8:43-44, Acts 15:20, 29; 21:25), or to cosmic signs of the eschaton (Acts 2:19-20), it most frequently refers to the unjust and violent suffering of the people of God—especially prophets and martyrs (Luke 11:50; 13:1; Acts 22:20). Strikingly Luke sees Jesus himself as, above all, a prophet and martyr.[27] Somewhat ironically, the term "blood" can also symbolize the fate of those who refuse to repent when confronted with the apostolic preaching of Jesus (18:6). I should note that the term is used in just this way within the immediate context of 20:28: Paul states his relief at being guiltless of "the blood" of the Ephesian elders—meaning that he fulfilled his obligation to preach to them his message of salvation, a message that can save from the coming judgment.[28] Only when his hearers repent in the face of Jesus' blood can they be saved from spilling their own.

This contextual understanding of Acts 20:28 shows that at least for Luke, the tradition of God obtaining the church through Jesus' blood—if it is a tradition—has in fact nothing to do with the Pauline notion of atonement. One can only conclude that interpreters have read such a notion into the text because their knowledge of Paul (and of later developments) naturally leads them to see atonement whenever they see blood. Acts 20:28 neither requires nor intimates such a construal, however, so that it is not at all the exception to an otherwise consistent Lukan soteriology. Even this text makes good sense within the narra-

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[25] See Carroll, "Luke's Crucifixion Scene" for the Lukan emphasis on guilt and repentance.

[26] See e.g. Luke 24:47; Acts 2:38; 3:19; 5:31; 8:22; 17:30; 11:18; 20:21; 26:20.

[27] See Carroll, "Luke's Crucifixion Scene," 113-20, and the literature he cites there.

[28] Interestingly, he also predicts that "fierce wolves" will be set loose upon the congregation who will not "spare the flock" (i.e., who will bring them to a violent end) unless the elders protect them (20:29). Blood is spilled when one does not repent and believe in the one God has vindicated.

tive of Luke, and the sense it makes is not related to the idea of vicarious suffering.

What this means is that in no case does Luke understand Jesus' death as an atonement for sins. As I have already said, this is not at all to disparage Luke's own theology of the cross. It is simply to say that he understands the death of Jesus differently from both the predecessor of his Gospel (Mark) and the hero of his Acts (Paul).

How does this consistent reconstrual of the salvific importance of Christ's death affect our query into the original text of Luke 22:19-20? In fact only one of the two readings conforms with the theology of Luke otherwise, and specifically with his demonstrable handling of his Marcan source. The verses of the longer reading stress the atoning significance of Jesus' death for his disciples. How can they be original when they emphasize precisely what Luke has gone out of his way to *deemphasize* in his entire two-volume narrative? How could Luke have blatantly eliminated from the accounts of Mark any notion of Jesus' death as an atoning sacrifice (Mark 10:45; 15:39) only to assert such a notion here in yet stronger terms? The conclusion appears unavoidable: Luke has either constructed his narrative with blinding inconsistency, or he has provided us with a shortened version of Jesus' last meal with his disciples.

*The Structure of the Passage*

Before turning to the arguments of transcription that, in my judgment, serve to cinch the argument, we do well to consider one other matter of instrinsic probability, namely, the competing virtues of the passage's structure as presented in the two forms of the text. It is here that advocates of the longer text feel confident in the superiority of their claims. Most frequently it is simply noted that without the addition of vv. 19b-20 the text appears to end abruptly, so abruptly that it is difficult to imagine a Christian author not supplementing the account with additional material. As E. E. Ellis puts it, the reader naturally expects to find a word about the cup after the word about the bread.[29]

One certainly does expect to find such a word, which is exactly what makes this argument so suspect. For as with most arguments of this kind, the expectation of a reader can cut both ways. Readers who are thoroughly conversant with the eucharistic liturgy feel that something is "missing" when Jesus' words over the bread are not followed by his passing of the cup. But of course this is not only the case for modern critics who assume that Luke could not have ended the passage with such abruptness, but also for ancient scribes who were equally accustomed to the traditions of Jesus' Last Supper. How this proves decisive for the longer text of Luke 22, however, is more than a little perplexing. What would be more natural for scribes conversant with what "really happened" at Jesus' last meal than to supplement Luke's version with the words drawn from a tradition with which they were otherwise familiar?

Interestingly, this "other tradition" (i.e., vv. 19b-20 in the longer text) is not only anomalous within Luke's Gospel itself, it also has very few connections with Luke's *Vorlage*, the Gospel of Mark. Instead, as has been frequently noted, the additional words practically mirror the familiar form of the institution preserved in Paul's first letter to the Corinthians.[30] The fact that the words of the longer text

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[29] *Gospel of Luke*, 254-55.

[30] Where again Jesus refers to τὸ σῶμα τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, to "doing this in my remembrance" (τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν), to his taking "likewise the cup after din-

of Luke are not *precisely* those of Paul should not be used, as it sometimes is, to argue that they could not have been added secondarily to the text of the Gospel. No one need think that a scribe referred to his manuscript of 1 Corinthians to check the accuracy of his interpolation into Luke. Instead, the addition has all the marks of a familiar narrative based on or at least parallel to Paul's account of Jesus' Last Supper.

The question of whether the shorter text of Luke's account is too truncated to be considered original has been treated with greater sophistication by J. H. Petzer in his recent study of the literary structure of the passage.[31] Petzer notes that when one considers the broader context of vv. 15-20, the longer text preserves a number of literary parallelisms which speak in its favor as original. According to Petzer, the passage evidences a bipartite parallel structure, each part of which comprises two "signs" and their "explanations:" vv. 15-18 record a first "sign" (eating) and its "explanation" (it will be fulfilled in the Kingdom of God), then a second "sign" (drinking) and its comparable "explanation" (it too will be fulfilled in the Kingdom). Corresponding to this is the text of vv. 19-20 in its longer form, in which two "signs" (the bread v. 19a; the cup v. 20) receive appropriate explanations ("This is my body..."; "This cup is the new covenant in my blood"). The passage can then be structured as follows:

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| I | A | a | τὸ πάσχα φαγεῖν | sign: | eating (bread) | (15, 16a) | a |
| | | b | τῇ βασιλείᾳ | explanation: | Kingdom | (16b) | b |
| | B | a′ | τὸ ποτήριον, πίω | sign: | drinking (cup) | (17, 18a) | a′ |
| | | b′ | ἡ Βασιλεία | explanation: | Kingdom | (18b) | b′ |
| II | A′ | a″ | ἄρτον | sign: | bread | (19a) | a″ |
| | | b″ | τὸ σῶμά μου | explanation: | body | (19b) | b″ |
| | B′ | a+ | ποτήριον | sign: | cup | (20a) | a+ |
| | | b+ | τὸ αἷμά μου | explanation: | blood | (20b) | b+ |

For Petzer this structure demonstrates that the longer text is original: removing vv. 19b-20 destroys the bipartite parallelism. His comments here are worth quoting:

> The structure of the passage is thus very much inclined in favour of the long reading. This conclusion is not reached because of the mere fact that there is *a* structure in the passage. It is surely possible to identify *a* structure in almost any given New Testament passage. It is rather the nature of the structure which is convincing. Luke used a parallelism, a structure very well known to the authors of both the Old and New Testaments. Had

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ing" (ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ ποτήριον μετὰ τὸ δειπνῆσαι), and to his pronouncing that "this cup is the new covenant in my blood" (τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη [ἐστιν] ἐν τῷ αἵματί μου).

31 J. H. Petzer, "Luke 22:19b-20."

any other structure, not as commonly used as the parallelism, been identified, the argument would have been much weaker.[32]

Petzer is certainly right that one can find a structure wherever one looks; structural analyses are often as fascinating for what they reveal about the creativity of the critic as for what they reveal about the text. But to claim that the structure he uncovers is compelling *because* it is common is really rather hard to evaluate.[33] Here I cannot help but note that if we simply accept Petzer's own categories of "sign" and "explanation," and modify his structure by removing the words of the longer text, we have not simply eliminated the bipartite parallelism, we have also uncovered a chiasmus (A—B—A), a structure that is vying with parallelism for most favored status among NT exegetes who look for such things.[34]

I regret to say, however, that I do not think the passage is structured chiastically, in part because Petzer's categories do *not* work very well, and in part because v. 19a is better seen as the beginning of the *following* pericope, rather than the conclusion of the preceding. Interestingly enough, *this* pericope (vv. 19a, 21-22) is shaped through a parallelism comparable to what one finds in vv. 15-18. Here again one may simply be finding a structure wherever one looks, but in this instance there are specific linguistic indicators of the structure, indicators that are missed when v. 19a is isolated from the verses that follow.

Before laying out the structure of vv. 19a-22, however, I should say something about Petzer's analysis of vv. 15-18. I think that he is right in claiming that they form a self-contained unit in which Jesus first expresses his desire to eat the passover with his disciples, describing his action in terms of the Kingdom of God; he then distributes the cup, again speaking of the Kingdom. The structure is suggested in part by the author's use of the phrase λέγω γὰρ ὑμῖν to introduce the words of the kingdom in both vv. 16 and 18. But is the category of "explanation" really the most suitable for understanding these words? Are the disciples to distribute the cup because Jesus will drink no more wine until the kingdom comes? No, these words instead seem to provide a contrast between Jesus' eating and drinking with his disciples at this meal and his eating and drinking in the future kingdom. Or to put the matter differently, the contrast is between Jesus sharing food and drink with the faithful in the present, and his own eating and drinking in the eschatological future.[35]

What would lead one to take v. 19a as the opening of the following pericope (vv. 19a-22, without vv. 19b-20)? In brief, because doing so reveals a formally similar parallelism: Jesus makes a statement and then a contrast. But now the contrast does not involve his participation in the future Kingdom, implicitly related to the disciples who share his fellowship; it is now a contrast between Jesus' ignominious fate on earth and the one follower who is responsible for delivering him over to it. As was the case with the earlier pericope, so too here the linguistic indicator of the structure appears in the repetition of a key transi-

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32 Petzer, "Luke 22:19b-20," 251, emphasis his.

33 If parallelism is half again as common as some other structure in the NT, will this argument for the original text be half again as valid?

34 There are other problems with Petzer's structure. It requires, e.g., the phrase τὸ πάσχα φαγεῖν to be understood as a reference to eating "bread," (as in v. 19), when in fact it appears simply to mean "to celebrate the Passover."

35 The γάρ, then, does not function causally, but to express continuation or connection. See BAGD, 151.

tional term at the beginning of each contrast. Whereas the contrasts of vv. 16 and 18 were introduced with the words λέγω γὰρ ὑμῖν, here they are indicated by the word πλήν, one of Luke's favorite conjunctions.[36] Furthermore, Jesus' opening statement in each part concerns his coming fate, and in each case the contrast is made to the one who betrays him (παραδίδωμι both times):

A And taking bread, giving thanks, he broke it and gave it to them saying, This is my body (v. 19a)
  B But (πλήν) behold, the hand of the one who betrays (τοῦ παραδιδόντος) me is with me at the table (v. 21)
A1 For the Son of Man goes as it was ordained for him; (v. 22a)
  B1 But (πλήν) woe to that man through whom he is betrayed (παραδίδοται; v. 22b)

This structure, as indicated, is able to account for the repetitions of πλήν and παραδίδωμι in the passage, something left out of account in Petzer's analysis, and serves better to highlight the contrasting character of the two pericopes (vv. 15-18; 19-22) when considered together.[37] In the first Jesus discusses his fate in light of the coming Kingdom of God, a fate associated with his faithful followers who partake of his bread and cup (perhaps suggesting that they too will share his vindication as they continue to break bread with him; cf., e.g., Luke 24:35); in the second he focuses on his approaching martyrdom, in which his body will be broken because of the betrayal of an unfaithful follower, whose destiny is not the joys of the eschatological kingdom but the sufferings of the eschatological woes.

The plausibility of this structure is only heightened by the circumstance that it avoids the words and theology of the longer text that are found nowhere else in Luke-Acts.

It also avoids the problem of having to explain how the text came to be changed in the course of its transmission, a problem that proves insurmountable for all advocates of the longer text. Petzer's explanation of the omission is as typical as it is illuminating: "A scribe must have omitted these disputed words in order to avoid the difficult cup-bread-cup sequence so that Luke's account of the institution of the Lord's Supper could be harmonised with the other institution narratives."[38] A remarkable comment, this, for precisely here is the problem: the shorter text does not at all solve the problem of the sequence of the narrative nor effect a harmonization with the other three NT accounts of the institution. The order of cup-bread occurs in none of the other passages, and the closest verbal parallels with any of them occurs only in the *longer* text's similarities to 1 Cor. 11. The shorter text is by no means a harmonization to any of our other accounts. How then can one explain an omission if the longer text is original?

### Transcriptional Probabilities

In point of fact, no one has been able to provide a convincing explanation for how the shorter text came into existence if the longer is original. One of the stan-

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36 Mark uses it once; Luke, in the Gospel alone, fifteen times.

37 It should be noted that the sequence in which the followers are mentioned are reversed: the faithful who partake with him in his final meal are mentioned in the first element of each member of the first pericope (vv. 15, 17), the unfaithful one who betrays him is both times named second in the one that follows (vv. 21; 22b).

38 "Luke 22:19b-20," 252.

dard explanations is that a scribe who either could not understand or did not appreciate the appearance of two cups in Luke's narrative eliminated one of them to make the account coincide better with all the others. The explanation has proved popular because it has all the appearance of plausibility. But in fact it is only an appearance; Hort showed why the theory does not work over a century ago and nobody has been able to refute his arguments.[39] If a scribe was concerned with harmonizing the account to its parallels, why did he eliminate the *second* cup instead of the first? It is the first that is problematic, since it is distributed before the giving of the bread; and it is the second that is familiar, because the words of institution parallel so closely those of Paul in 1 Corinthians. Anyone wanting to eliminate the problems of two cups and of sequence would have excised the earlier cup, not the latter. Still more damaging, this explanation cannot at all account for the omission of v. 19b, where the cup is not yet mentioned. Why did this alleged scribe, concerned to eliminate the second cup, take away with it the words of institution over the bread? Did he just happen to excise the words and theology that otherwise appear intrusive in Luke's Gospel but reflect the words of institution known from Paul? Whatever the motivation for the change, it was not simply to eliminate the mention of a second cup or to harmonize the account with the others.

The frustration scholars have had in explaining the shorter text is seen especially in a theory that for all its popularity represents little more than a counsel in despair. Advocated originally by Jeremias,[40] it is the claim that the text was abbreviated by scribes concerned not to allow the sacred words of institution to become a part of the public domain, lest they be used by non-believers for insidious magical purposes. In Jeremias' hands this theory of the so-called *disciplina arcani* provided a panacea for all kinds of problems in the Gospels: it explained why, e.g., Mark refused to reveal the words Jesus spoke to the Devil in the wilderness during the days of his temptation in Mark 1:12-13, and why he ended his Gospel in 16:8 without disclosing the parting words of Jesus to his disciples. Apart from these curiosities, one must ask how well the theory resolves the textual problem of Luke 22:19-20. Whom exactly did these second-century scribes, fearful of the misuse of the text, envisage as their readers? Were they planning to sell their MSS at the local book mart? If the words of institution were problematic, why did the scribes in question not eliminate them in their entirety? Why, e.g., did they leave v. 19a intact? And, still more perplexing, why was the *same* motivation not operative in the transmission histories of Matthew, Mark, and 1 Corinthians, where the texts are liable to precisely the same abuse but nonetheless survived the penknives of the second-century scribes unscathed?[41] Even most proponents of the longer text have failed to be convinced.

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[39] Westcott and Hort, *New Testament in the Original Greek*, I. Appendix, "Notes on Selected Readings," 63-64.

[40] *Eucharistic Words*, 87-106.

[41] Jeremias' solution to these problems is to say that a particular scribe was asked by a particular pagan for a copy of Luke's Gospel, which he produced leaving out the words in question (19b-20). But he retained v. 19a as a hint to Christian insiders of what happened next at the meal. It is a creative solution, but is nonetheless entirely implausible. Where is the evidence of such an unlikely sequence of events (how many pagans asked scribes for copies of Scripture? what scribes were fearful of the magical abuse of their texts? if the text was for a pagan, why was the hint of v. 19a left in? etc.)? Furthermore, Jeremias can still not explain why similar motivations played no role in the transmission

This leaves us, however, with our query concerning the origin of the shorter text if the longer is original. Virtually the only explanation that might account for it is that vv. 19b-20 dropped out by accident. Unfortunately, this proves to be as problematic as the theory that the text was cut on purpose. For it would be remarkable indeed for thirty-two words to drop out of a text for no apparent reason (such as homeoeteleuton). Is it an accident that these thirty-words just happen to supply precisely what is missing in the account otherwise, a notion that Jesus' body and blood would be given on behalf of his disciples? Is it an accident that this theological construal, found in this passage only in the disputed thirty-two words, is otherwise alien to Luke's entire two-volume work? Is it an accident that these words, and only these words, parallel the words found in 1 Corinthians? An intriguing accident indeed!

In short, it is well-nigh impossible to explain the shorter text of Luke 22:19-20 if the longer text is original.

But it is not at all difficult to explain for an *interpolation* of the disputed words into Luke's brief account of Jesus' last supper.[42] As we have seen, Luke's two-volume work otherwise avoids all mention of Jesus giving his body and shedding his blood *for* his followers (ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν); Luke eliminated or changed the Marcan references to Jesus' atoning sacrifice; he chose not to quote Isa 53 to depict Jesus dying for sins, even though he quoted the passage otherwise; he referred back to Jesus' death in the book of Acts simply as if it were a miscarriage of justice that God set right in raising Jesus from the dead. To be sure, this author's account of Jesus going to his death proved useful for proto-orthodox Christians of the second century who themselves emphasized the necessity of martyrdom and the need to emulate the tranquility of Jesus in the face of it.[43] But it was not at all useful when they wanted to stress, in direct opposition to certain groups of docetic opponents, that Christ experienced a real passion in which his body was broken and his blood was shed for the sins of the world.

We know of a number of Christians who embraced docetic christologies from at least the beginning of the second century onwards (i.e. from precisely the period in which the Lukan text must have been corrupted). Representatives of such views were found among the secessionists from the Johannine community and were known in the communities addressed by Ignatius.[44] Christians of this persuasion are known by name to second- and third-century heresiologists, with the arch-heretics Marcion, Saturninus, and Basilides heading the list. Despite the differences among their views, these Christians were unified in thinking that Christ did not have a real flesh and blood existence. He was a phantasm, a spectre. By implication, at least in the eyes of their proto-orthodox opponents, such a view necessarily devalued the salvific significance of Christ's death,

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of other NT passages that reflect Christian liturgical passages, let alone the other narratives of institution.

[42] On the character of the Lukan redaction, in which he changes Mark's understanding of the meal as the Institution of the Lord's supper to depict it instead as Jesus' last Passover meal with his disciples, see Rese, "Zur Problematik."

[43] On different views of martyrdom in the period, see esp. Elaine Pagels, "Gnostic and Orthodox Views of Christ's Passion: Paradigms for the Christian's Response to Persecution?" in *Rediscovering Gnosticism*, ed. Bentley Layton (Leiden: Brill, 1980) I. 262-83.

[44] See my comments on 1 John 4:3; 5:6; 1:1-3 in my article "1 John 4:3 and the Orthodox Corruption of Scripture," 233-41; also Ign. *Smyrn.* 1:1-2; 3:1-2; 4:1-2; 5:2; Ign.*Trall.* 9:1-2; 10:1.

indeed necessarily denied that Christ "really" died and shed real blood, let alone that he shed blood "for you."[45]

For the proto-orthodox, on the other hand, it was precisely the sacrifice of Christ's flesh and the shedding of his blood that brought redemption to the fallen race of humans. For them, Jesus was a man not in appearance only but in reality; he had real flesh and real blood, he suffered real pain and died a real death. And most importantly for the textual history of this passage, Jesus' suffering and death were not incidental to salvation but constitutive of it. Jesus' body was given for believers, and it was his blood that established the new covenant.

It is no accident that Tertullian refers on one occasion to Christ's consecration of the wine as his blood to disparage Marcion's view that he was merely a phantom (*Treatise on the Soul*, 17), while on on another occasion he cites the entire institution narrative as known from 1 Cor. 11 and the longer text of Luke to the same end:

> [Jesus] declared plainly enough what He meant by the bread, when He called the bread His own body. He likewise, when mentioning the cup and making the new testament to be sealed "in His blood," affirms the reality of His body. For no blood can belong to a body which is not a body of flesh. Thus from the evidence of the flesh, we get a proof of the body, and a proof of the flesh from the evidence of the blood." (*Adv. Marc.*, 40)

In using the text in this way, Tertullian is closely allied with other proto-orthodox authors of the second and third centuries. Somewhat earlier Irenaeus had also refuted Marcion by asking how his docetic christology could be reconciled with Jesus' insistence that the bread represented his body and the cup his blood (*Adv. Haer.* IV, 33, 2). Yet more significantly, Irenaeus attacked other unnamed docetists for refusing to see that Christ's shed blood alone is what brings the redemption of humans, and that for this blood to be efficacious it had to be real: real blood shed to bring real salvation, Christ's real flesh given to redeem our human flesh (*Adv. Haer.* V, 2, 2).

It is precisely this emphasis on Jesus' giving of his own flesh and blood for the salvation of believers, as represented in the physical elements of the bread broken "for you" and the cup given "for you," that made the longer text of Luke 22:19-20 so attractive to the proto-orthodox heresiologists of the second century. And it is the same theological concern that can account for the genesis of the text, which as we have seen, cannot have come from the pen of Luke himself.

## Conclusions

It would appear then that the interpolation of the familiar words of institution into Luke 22:19-20 represents the work of proto-orthodox scribes seeking to make the evangelist's message even more applicable to the polemical context of their own day.[46] Here we need to remember what NT exegetes and textual critics have

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[45] See, e.g., Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.* III, passim; *Carne Christi* passim; Iren. *Adv. Haer.* IV, 22; V, 1-2.

[46] As examples of how similar motivations affected the text of the NT elsewhere, we can cite the scribal additions of διδόμενον, κλώμενον, and esp. θρυπτόμενον to the tradition of 1 Cor 11:24; the change of σώματος to αἵματος in MSS of Heb. 10:10; the later changes of ὀνόματος to αἵματος in Acts 10:43; and the various amplifications of Mark 14:22, 24 that serve to emphasize Jesus' body "broken for you" and "blood shed for you" for the

all too often been prone to forget: Christians of the second and third centuries were involved in a wide range of theological disputes about the nature of God, the disposition of the material world, the person of Christ, and the status of Scripture. Scribes were not isolated from the implications of these disputes. Theological polemics played a significant role in the texts of the "New" Testament that were circulating, particularly among Christians who represented views that were later to be championed by the victorious party, the so-called "orthodox" believers who determined the shape of the creed and established the contours of the canon. Especially in this early era, when the allegedly apostolic writings were just beginning to be seen as authoritative, scribes who reproduced them were not at all disinclined to modify what they had received so as to make them more servicable in their polemical milieu. This is by all appearances what has happened to the text of Luke 22:19-20. Whereas it served Luke's purposes well in portraying his understanding of Jesus' last meal with his disciples and his view of Jesus' death, it did not prove as servicable to later Christians for whom the atoning death of Jesus, a death that involved the real shedding of real blood for the sins of the world, had taken on a special importance. And so the text was modified by means of a partial assimilation to the familiar institution narrative reflected in Paul's letter to the Corinthians. In changing the text in this way, these scribes were part of a much larger phenomenon that has left its abiding mark on the MS record of the NT, for they have provided us here with another instance of "the orthodox corruption of Scripture."[47] [48]

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remission/forgiveness of sins. See also Ehrman and Plunkett, "The Angel and the Agony," for a discussion of the famous "bloody sweat" interpolation into Luke 22:43-44.

[47] See the works mentioned in note 3 above.

[48] I would like to thank my graduate student Rod Mullen for commenting on an earlier draft of this article, and my friend Joel Marcus, whose critical insights and stylistic suggestions were, as always, extremely useful.

# Proclaiming the Lord's Death: 1 Corinthians 11:17-34 and the Forms of Paul's Theological Argument

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This paper discusses exegetically 1 Cor 11:17-34 in order to reach an understanding of Paul's theology in the passage, both as considered on its own and in relation to the rest of the letter. The aim is, as part of the work that is being done in the Pauline Theology Group, to consider what wider conclusions for an understanding of Paul's theology may be drawn from focusing on one particular passage in reasonably close exegesis. As it happens, the reading I shall offer is in line with the change of direction in the search for Paul's theology that Jouette Bassler argued for in a 1989 communication to the group: "we should self-consciously begin to construe Paul's theology as an activity ... Instead of focusing exclusively on the outcome of this activity or seeking to isolate a core of his theology, instead of looking for a set of doctrines, for example, or theological propositions, we need to address the far more complicated question of how Paul theologized."[1] However, to judge from Bassler's own attempt to apply this insight in an analysis of 1 Thessalonians,[2] there may be several ways of understanding even this.[3] Thus the reading offered in the present paper may be seen as a different application of the idea that *the theology is the theologizing*.

It should not be thought, however, that all that is basic to Paul's theology/theologizing in substantive terms will come out from considering a single passage, no matter how central it may appear to be. The first obligation in a paper with the aim of the present one lies in remaining faithful to the particular passage that is being studied. In fact, one cannot either be sure that all that is basic to Paul's theology/theologizing viewed in formal terms (the kind of thing that it is) will come out from considering a single passage. Thus I would in general argue that we must look for Paul's theology quite straightforwardly in the overall meaning of his letters (instead of looking for something that "lies

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[1] Jouette M. Bassler, "Paul's Theology: Whence and Whither? A Synthesis (of sorts) of the Theology of Philemon, 1 Thessalonians, Philippians, Galatians, and 1 Corinthians," *SBL 1989 Seminar Papers*, 412-23, p. 423.

[2] Ibid., pp. 420-3.

[3] Thus I found it somewhat disappointing to see Bassler construe the search for "the activity that is Paul's theology" (p. 419) as a search for "the fundamental presuppositions or convictions that lie behind and influence all the arguments," "the basic convictions that undergird its argument" (ibid.). To me this looks far too much like a return to a "propositional" understanding of Paul's theology. Merely turning propositions into *pre*-suppositions and *underlying* convictions does not make them any less "propositional."

behind" what is being said in them) and that we must find this overall meaning in the intersection of *everything* that is being said *and done* in and through them. But it will require some ingenuity to show in relation to a single passage that this is in fact the proper formal understanding of Pauline "theology."

The exegesis that I offer will be exclusively concerned with questions that are directly relevant to determining the overall meaning of the passage. Questions that are outside the present horizon include all broader issues concerning the celebration of the Eucharist in the early church, the history of the various traditions of Christ's words at the Last Supper, and the like. My interest here lies only in determining what is being said in the passage (in its immediate context and in comparison with a few other passages in 1 Corinthians) and what this shows about Paul's theology here and in the letter as a whole.

For obvious reasons the passage has received its fair share of exegetical attention in modern scholarship too. I shall argue, however, that insufficient attention has been paid to the very type of argument that Paul is deploying: what he is doing as opposed to what he is merely saying—and what he is *not* doing (and saying). When the question of type of argument is given its due, we shall see that there are many tempting exegetical moves in the passage that should in fact be left untaken. For they will result either in overinterpretation or in direct misinterpretation.

## The Context

The ties of the passage with what precedes it are very close. At 11:2 Paul has adopted the stance of praising (ἔπαινος) the Corinthians for (i) remembering him and (ii) sticking to the traditions (παραδόσεις) that they had received from him. 11:3-16 is intended by Paul to be understood in the light of such praise—though he is in fact most likely trying, somewhat tentatively and in the end inconclusively, to *correct* the way in which the Corinthians have apparently applied and developed a genuinely Pauline tradition (the "rule of no distinction" that Paul is obliquely referring to in 11:11).[4] By contrast, in 11:17-34 Paul is *withholding* his praise,[5] and precisely, as the transition from v 22 to v 23 makes clear,[6] because the Corinthians have *not* stuck to the tradition which Paul had received from the Lord himself and passed on to them.[7]

Paul's adoption of the particular perspective of praise and blame is not just accidental. On the contrary, he is highly concerned throughout the letter to state explicitly the character of his own relationship with the Corinthians as expressed in his various instructions to them: Should he come to them with a rod in his hand, or with love and a spirit of gentleness (4:21)? Some things he writes not in order to shame them, but to admonish them as his beloved children (4:14). Other things he says to shame them (6:5 and 15:34). Also, he is most careful to specify

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[4] I argue for this interpretation in "I Corinthians 11:16 and the Character of Pauline Exhortation," *JBL* 110,3/4 (1991, forthcoming).

[5] Note the emphasis on οὐκ in οὐκ ἐπαινῶ (11:17): In giving you these instructions, I can *not* give praise for the fact that you etc. The idea is repeated at the end of v 22: On this point I do *not* praise you.

[6] Note the contrastive ἐγὼ and γὰρ at the beginning of v 23.

[7] In concentrating on the praise element in 11:2 I neglect another important one, which is to emphasize the consistency between Paul's present statements and instructions and his behaviour and statements when he was with the Corinthians. That emphasis runs through the whole letter.

his warrants for the various instructions he gives, e.g., a number of times in chap. 7 (7:6, 10, 12, 25, 40).

Two points are important here. First, the very fact that Paul is so careful in specifying in each particular case the exact character of his attitude towards his addressees and the relative weight behind his instruction is noteworthy. Why does he write like that? Is he, e.g., "defending" himself against potential or actual critics? Or is there something more to his stance, e.g., that the particular instructions he gives and more specifically *his giving* them must constantly be related to a wider setting or space of discourse, which includes the addressees in the one direction and Christ or the gospel in the other, with Paul himself standing as it were in the middle? I shall argue for something like the latter view. Secondly, the question of when Paul speaks authoritatively and when not should be given due attention. What does this show about the relative weight, on Paul's own view, of his various instructions?

The relationship between 11:3-16 and 17-34 provides a good example of seeing the importance of these points. Even though the Corinthians may not in the end have heeded Paul's instruction concerning head-covering, the whole issue is placed by Paul under the rubric of praise. Presumably, therefore, though important (and Paul certainly does start out very emphatically), the issue is not *that* important. By contrast, his remarks about the Eucharist are placed under blame (literally: non-praise); moreover, Paul is *entitled* to administer blame, he implies, since here the Corinthians have not stuck to the tradition that he did transmit to them. It is appropriate, therefore, and in keeping with the pervasive awareness on Paul's part of what stance he is adopting towards the Corinthians and what warrants he has for each particular instruction, that he should end up in the Eucharist passage with a highly authoritative, almost threatening "The rest I will settle (διατάξομαι) when I come" (11:34). But it is also noteworthy that in spite of this sharpening of Paul's tone of voice Paul is careful throughout the passage not to write off altogether those members of the Corinthian congregation whose behaviour he is criticizing.[8]

So, by choosing the perspective of praise and blame Paul adopts a stance of some authority, which he is careful to back up by reference to the traditions and to his own having transmitted these traditions to them. But by distinguishing carefully between the attempt to correct the Corinthians in the two sections under the rubrics of praise and blame respectively, he also draws attention to the difference in relative weight of the two types of behaviour he is criticizing.

We should conclude that in 11:17-34 Paul brings his most powerful warrants into action: a tradition from the Lord,[9] which the Corinthians did receive from him (23), but from which they have departed, thereby laying themselves open to explicit (though not quite *stated*, 17 and 22) and authoritative (34) blame by one

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[8] Cf. μέρος τι πιστεύω in 18 and ἀδελφοί μου in 33. V 22 is interesting in this respect since it is a mixture of (i) a wry sneer ("Can't you eat and drink at home?"—note the almost proverbial meaning of "eat and drink," for which see also 1 Cor 15:32), (ii) irony ("What do you want me to say? Praise you?")—and (iii) Paul not explicitly stating his blame.

[9] No matter what exactly he means by "from (ἀπὸ) the Lord." I have nothing to add on παραλαμβάνειν/παραδιδόναι. Functionally the idea has a clear purpose as part of that of vv 23-26 as a whole, on which I spend some time below. (Here too the close similarity with Paul's use of the same idea in his introduction to chap. 15 is relevant.) But I cannot see that it matters whether we place the παραλαμβάνειν/παραδιδόναι idea in one or the other tradition (Jewish or Greek).

who is most conscious and explicit about the precise character of his stance towards them and the warrants for his various instructions. But we have also noted a certain circumspection in Paul's way of speaking. Clearly, the issue he is addressing is no small matter, though he chooses to be integrative as opposed to divisive in relation to it. What is the issue?

### The Practical Problem

Paul is sufficiently clear, even to us, on the immediate problem that he is addressing. When the Corinthians come together "as a congregation" (18), i.e. for formal meetings of the ἐκκλησία and in particular in order to celebrate the Eucharist, they divide up into disagreeing groups in such a way that they are not able to eat the Lord's Supper in the manner in which, according to Paul, it should be done. The character of the divisions and the number of the groups (18-19) should be understood as being defined by vv 20-22 and 33-34 and there seems to be no cogent reason to connect them in any detail with Paul's enigmatic reference to a Paul-party, an Apollos-party etc. in 1:12 and hence, possibly, with a special, theological interpretation of the various divisions. There need not have been two sharply delimited "parties" in Corinth with clearly defined, mutually opposed but internally consistent and fully worked out theologies and practices.

On the other hand, it does seem natural to connect the very existence of the σχίσματα and αἱρέσεις referred to in 11:18-19 with the existence of those σχίσματα and ἔριδες referred to in 1:10-11, at least to the extent that 1 Corinthians as a whole constitutes a response to a state of internal division in the Corinthian congregation that had become known to Paul through reports that were opposed to the congregation's more official communications to him. Thus (i) ἀκούω in 11:18 fits particularly well with ἐδηλώθη . . . μοι περὶ ὑμῶν in 1:11 (in neither place is Paul responding to issues raised officially by the Corinthians in their letter and delegation to Paul)[10] and (ii) "Chloe's people" of 1:11 fit particularly well as spokesmen vis-à-vis Paul on the part of the have-nots of 11:22. The resulting picture is in complete conformity with what one learns from other passages in the letter (e.g. chaps. 5 and 8-10). Paul is taking issue with certain socially more powerful members of the congregation who are behaving in a way that is shocking to the sensibilities of certain other, less powerful members. He is (in effect, not always in "theology," chaps. 8-10) siding with the latter group, but also doing his utmost to satisfy the former one.[11]

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[10] Cf. also 5:1: ἀκούεται.

[11] This also explains Paul's integrative manner of arguing in 11:17-34 as noted above. I shall in general refrain from attempting to define a "theology" of the people whom Paul is criticizing in 1 Corinthians (if they are indeed the same throughout the letter). I agree with Alan F. Segal, who has recently re-argued the case for seeing them as in the main gentile Christians who were not bothered by the issues arising from not applying the ceremonial laws of Torah, e.g. in relation to food. (See Segal's convincing reading of Paul on the weak and strong in Corinth, in *Paul the Convert: The Apostolate and Apostasy of Saul the Pharisee*, New Haven/London: Yale University Press (1990) pp. 228-41.) In trying to form an opinion on their "theology," scholars have (rightly) focused on Paul's more or less explicit quotations from their letter and direct ascriptions to them of a theological view (e.g. in 15:12). But first, do we know that these people (who are of course not "opponents" of Paul, rather his partners in the Corinthian congregation *together with* those whose case Paul is arguing) did have a fully developed "*theology*"? And secondly, to the extent that we find traces of such a thing in the letter, can we be sure that this is not something Paul is *ascribing* to them in *his* "*theological*" reading of the controversies?

What, then, is the behaviour in connection with the Eucharist on the part of the richer people in the congregation that has caused dissension and, as Paul sees it, made a proper celebration of the Lord's Supper impossible? Much unnecessary writing has been caused by the failure of scholars to understand properly the two connected verbs προλαμβάνειν (usually translated "take beforehand") in v 21 and ἐκδέχεσθαι (usually translated "wait for") in v 33. In order to settle the meaning of these two verbs, however, it is necessary first to decide on the actual order of the Eucharist, in terms of blessing of bread, blessing of cup, and meal proper, as celebrated in the Corinthian congregation. Fortunately, the two issues have been settled, to my mind conclusively, by Otfried Hofius in a paper from 1988.[12]

First on the order of the Eucharist. In a long and learned discussion, Hofius shows the untenability of the view of R. Pesch and P. Stuhlmacher, according to which the famous phrase μετὰ τὸ δειπνῆσαι in v 25 goes attributively with τὸ ποτήριον to signify the third cup of the Passover meal. On the contrary, for purely linguistic reasons μετὰ τὸ δειπνῆσαι *must* be understood adverbially as going with an ἔλαβεν that is implied in ὡσαύτως.[13] This means that Paul is certainly presupposing, in his rendering of Jesus' words, the following order of Jesus' meal with his disciples: blessing and distribution of bread—δεῖπνον (i.e. the meal proper)—blessing and handing round of the cup.

But furthermore, if it is in fact "unthinkable" (as claimed, again rightly to my mind, by Gerd Theissen)[14] that Paul should have quoted a holy, cultic formula with the express claim that that and no other way is how he had received it, but then gone on to presuppose tacitly a *different* order of the Eucharist as celebrated in Corinth—then we may also conclude that the order presupposed in Paul's rendering of Jesus' words is the very order in which the Eucharist was in fact celebrated in Corinth. This conclusion goes against what was a sort of mid-century scholarly consensus,[15] according to which the situation had changed in Corinth from the order presupposed in Paul's rendering of Jesus' words to an order that placed the sacramental eating of bread and drinking of the cup last, with the meal proper taking place almost before the Eucharist itself. What lies behind this understanding is precisely the two verbs προλαμβάνειν and ἐκδέχεσθαι. But that is to put the cart before the horse. We must not let these two verbs decide our view of the order of the Eucharist in Corinth. On the contrary, we should let the order *evidently presupposed* by Paul decide the meaning of the two verbs—if that meaning can be taken in different ways.

The crucial verse is v 21. Here ἐν τῷ φαγεῖν certainly means ἐν τῷ τὸ κυριακὸν δεῖπνον φαγεῖν. But then, since it is (again) inconceivable that anybody should have begun eating the meal proper as *preceded* by the blessing and distribution of

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12 "Herrenmahl und Herrenmahlsparadosis: Erwägungen zu 1Kor 11,23b-25," *ZTK* 85 (1988) 371-408.

13 Hofius, pp. 377-9. Hofius' arguments on pp. 379-82 against connecting Christ's acts as described by Paul in vv 23-25 with the Passover meal in particular are equally convincing, but in fact supererogatory. The linguistic argument is sufficient.

14 "Soziale Integration und sakramentales Handeln," in Theissen, *Studien zur Soziologie des Urchristentums*, WUNT 19, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2nd ed. 1983, 290-317, p. 299.

15 Eloquently formulated by Günther Bornkamm in "Herrenmahl und Kirche bei Paulus," *ZTK* 53 (1956) 312ff, also in Bornkamm, *Studien zu Antike und Urchristentum*, Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie 28 (1959 and later) 138-76, to which I refer. See in particular p. 144.

the bread (the order of the Eucharist presupposed by Paul) *before* everybody had turned up (on the usual interpretation of προλαμβάνειν), we can conclude that προλαμβάνειν *must* mean something else.[16] Now scholars have already seen that although the word most often has a temporal sense (as e.g. most likely in Mark 14:8), it can also be used identically with the simplex[17] thus meaning just "consume." I suggest, however, that in the present passage the προ- has the additional connotation of signifying taking (or consuming) "in preference" or "for oneself." Thus understood it will (i) fit in closely with ἕκαστος and ἴδιον earlier in the sentence and (ii) parallel the only other NT occurrence of the word (in addition to Mark 14:8),[18] which is in Paul himself (Gal 6:1: ἐὰν καὶ προλημφθῇ ἄνθρωπος ἔν τινι παραπτώματι . . .). Here LSJ translates the word as "detect," which is all right, but the connotation seems to be that of some people as it were spying on others in order to expose them: the προ- refers to those *doing* the detection (as opposed to those *being* detected)—which is precisely what gives rise to Paul's appended instruction "Look to yourself, lest you too be tempted."

With this understanding of the order of the Eucharist at Corinth and the meaning of προλαμβάνειν it is also clear what the practical problem was that Paul is addressing. Participants in the Eucharist were expected to bring with them food and drink to be shared by all during the δεῖπνον . . . which was part of the Eucharist itself. But some (who had brought much) took for themselves what they had brought of their own[19] and consumed it as a private meal (ἴδιον δεῖπνον) in the middle of the Eucharist, the result being that whereas the δεῖπνον was obviously meant to be a *shared* meal with everybody having the *same* amount of

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[16] Hofius [above n. 12] adds two more difficulties with taking προλαμβάνειν in the usual way: (a) ἕκαστος is imprecise, since only some members of the congregation will have been present; (b) the sentence in v 21 introduced by the consecutive καὶ ὃς will be somewhat incongruent with its supposed "protasis," since the ἕκαστος-sentence refers to the time *before* everybody has arrived and the καὶ ὃς-sentence to the time *after*. These two difficulties could be handled, but the one I have emphasized cannot. I had noticed the crucial difficulty before reading Hofius' paper. It is inexplicable to me how, e.g., Theissen [above, n. 14] can take προλαμβάνειν *both* in its usual sense of "taking *beforehand*" (p. 297-8) *and* (p. 300) in the neutral sense of "consume" with explicit reference to the phrase ἐν τῷ φαγεῖν and based on the view of the order of the Eucharist (adopted on p. 299) which places the δεῖπνον between the bread and the cup. Similarly, the otherwise admirable Johannes Weiss states without argument: "trotz en tôi phagein schon vor Beginn der Versammlung"! (Weiss, *Der erste Korintherbrief*, Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament (H.A.W. Meyer) V, 9th ed., Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht (1910) p. 281.) Gordon Fee sets out well "three basic options" for understanding v. 21, but concludes: "Some form of the third [option] seems most likely, although one cannot rule out altogether the possibility that something like option 2 is also involved." (Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, The New International Commentary on the New Testament, Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans (1987) pp. 540-1.) It seems to me that commentators should be more cautious about using the *non liquet*. Using it is a sign of wisdom—but only when it is used sparingly. For *reaching* the *liquet* is of course the *raison d'être* of a commentary. (The fact that so *many* scholars say so *much* is no warrant for "caution".)

[17] See Hofius [above n. 12] p. 386 referring among others to Moulton/Milligan and Theissen.

[18] Here too the connotation of preference *may* be present.

[19] Greek: ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων. As Theissen [above n. 14] suggests (pp. 294-6), Paul's ἴδιον δεῖπνον most likely plays on this phrase.

food and drink, some (the have-nots, who had brought little or nothing) would be hungry while others would be drunk.[20]

### The Practical Solution

The practical solution that Paul suggests is twofold. He first states that if the rich want to "eat and drink," then they can do it at home (22). The somewhat mocking tone is absent in v 34, when Paul repeats his suggestion: if they are hungry, they may eat at home in order to still that hunger. The implication is that there may not in fact be enough food (and drink) present at the Eucharist to satisfy the rich people's appetite when the food is divided equally—and so they may make up at home for any deficiencies that they may feel.

This implication shows, however, that it is part of Paul's solution (in fact, its second part) that the food and drink brought to the Eucharist *should* be divided equally between all participants. Paul does not explicitly say so, but it is clearly implied. Otherwise, the implication of Paul's criticism in v 21 would be that henceforth *everybody* should be *hungry* and *thirsty* at the Eucharist: if the rich are no longer allowed to take their lion's share of what they had themselves brought and if what had been brought was *not* equally divided between all participants, then the result of Paul's new instruction would be that all went away both hungry and thirsty! The famous "love-patriarchalist compromise" that Theissen found in this text is more complex than he suggests. When Theissen says that it would have been more consistent with the idea of fellowship if Paul had demanded an equal sharing of the ἴδιον δεῖπνον (instead of merely instructing the rich to eat *at home*),[21] we should answer that he does demand precisely that—though not in so many words.[22]

This, then, also gives us the meaning of ἀλλήλους ἐκδέχεσθε in v 33. As Hofius shows, ἐκδέχεσθαι can mean "receive," "entertain" and the like, and it is very far from true that it always has a temporal sense ("wait for").[23] Its present use is closely analogous to προσλαμβάνεσθε ἀλλήλους in Rom 15:7, the only difference being that there Paul is speaking more generally, whereas here he is focusing specifically on the meal.[24]

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20 This again implies a full meal (between the bread and the cup). Some do not even get enough *food* (so they are hungry), whereas others even get more than enough to *drink*.

21 Theissen [above n. 14] p. 311.

22 J. Weiss [above n. 16] saw this (p. 282—though on the basis of a false understanding of προλαμβάνειν): "Es folgt also, dass bei den Mahlzeiten die ärmeren Brüder mit verpflegt werden sollten ... aus den von den Bessergestellten mitgebrachten Vorräten." Conzelmann declares: "Das wird ja gerade nicht verlangt!"—without argument (H. Conzelmann, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther*, Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament (H.A.W. Meyer) V, 12th ed., Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht (1981) p. 237).

23 Hofius [above, n. 12] pp. 388-9. Hofius' entirely justified attack on Bauer's Lexicon is worth quoting (p. 388 n. 101): "Der Exeget, der zu 1Kor 11,33 lediglich das Bauersche Wörterbuch heranzieht, wird notwendig in die Irre geführt."

24 Again noted by Hofius [above, n. 12] p. 389 n. 108. It is interesting to compare and contrast προλαμβάνειν in 1 Cor 11:21 (active voice and with προ- in the sense given above) with προσλαμβάνεσθαι in Rom 15:7 (medial voice and προσ-).

## The Textual Issue

We now know what practical problem Paul is addressing and what his solution is. But this only leads to the basic *textual* issue, which is that of settling the exact connection between 11:17-22 and 33-34 on the one hand and the intervening section on the other. What does Paul mean by his "Ωστε at the beginning of v 33? How should we spell this out?

There is one way in which this issue should *not* be understood, viz. as concerning two independent spheres or levels, a social one (of vv 20-22 and 33-34) and a religious one (of vv 23-32). Theissen refers with approval to the claim of Johannes Weiss that "the real problem of the passage" lies in seeing how the "sacramental perspective" of vv 23-32 is brought to bear on the "social" issue of the surrounding verses.[25] Theissen himself takes this distinction between two "levels" much further when he distinguishes between the social *conditions* of the Corinthian conflict and the theological or religious *interpretation* of it by those involved (e.g. Paul) and claims that these two are mutually inconsistent in such a way that we are faced with a "hermeneutic conflict" between what is actually going on (socially speaking) and the religious "interpretations and sublimations" that Paul is responsible for.[26] "Still," Theissen claims,[27] "all these interpretations and sublimations are *functionally* connected—also beyond their own intention—with the social reality."

This way of construing the relationship between supposed social facts and religious talk is certainly valid in itself. But it is not relevant to the present passage (and Theissen's introduction of it here is again due to his "love-patriarchalist" interpretation of the passage as tending towards covering up social differences whose existence Paul recognizes, but does not confront directly). Rather, what we find reflected in it is the fact that Paul's religious talk is directly *about* social phenomena in the sense that a certain view of proper social (and in that sense "moral") behaviour is—not just correlated with it or even "implied" in it in some looser sense, but implied in it *logically*.[28] Paul, therefore, is moving to (what *we* call) the religious "level" with no compunction at all, thinking that he will there find a direct warrant for the kind of behaviour at the Eucharist that he is advocating.

The textual issue is, then, what exactly this warrant is.

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[25] Theissen [above, n. 14] p. 312 referring to Weiss, *Das Urchristentum*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht (1917) pp. 509-10.

[26] I am quoting from the final section of Theissen's paper [above, n. 14], pp. 311-17.

[27] P. 313 (my emphasis)—with a revealing "Aber ...."

[28] Paul's religious understanding *requires* his particular understanding of the proper social behaviour because his statements concerning the latter spell out the very meaning of the former. Taken by itself Paul's religious talk is semantically indeterminate. It is *made* determinate when Paul sets forth its social and moral "consequences" in his constant attempt to "apply" it in practice. But this fact (as I take it to be) concerning the (two-directional) relationship between religious and social talk in Paul evidently does not prevent Paul himself from taking a one-directional view of that relationship (from religious truths to social ones). In fact that is the very logic underlying his parenesis as brought out by himself, e.g., in the famous verse Gal 5:25 "If we live by the spirit, let us also walk by the spirit." (My apology for being somewhat compressed here.)

## One Possible Solution

Although few scholars would probably agree that the relationship between religious and social talk in Paul should in fact be understood as being one of *logical* implication (in the sense hinted at), almost all interpreters of the present passage have been looking for indications in it of how certain types of social behaviour should be seen to follow from, and others conversely to be excluded by, participation in the Eucharist when this is taken to have the *meaning* that Paul (so it is believed) is pointing to in the passage.

That, in fact, is a most sensible approach. Think of 1 Cor 8:11-12, where Paul is backing up his insistence that the strong care for the weak by reminding the latter that the weak person is "your brother for whom Christ died."[29] Or think of 10:14-22, where Paul is emphasizing the idea of κοινωνία in direct connection with the Eucharist and even stating that "we are all one bread, one body, inasmuch as we all participate in one bread" (10:17).[30] Or think finally of 12:13 where Paul introduces his "baptismal reunification formula,"[31] or "rule of no distinction," possibly with a play on the Eucharist[32] and certainly with emphasis on the single body that all Christians are.[33]

So is it not possible to formulate a Pauline *theology* of the Eucharist combining in some precise conceptual way the idea of Christ's death (and possibly his resurrection), which is celebrated in the Eucharist, with ἀγάπη viewed as a social norm that consists in not seeking one's own but that of others (to quote 10:24)? Moreover, would this not fit in exceedingly well with something which has good claims to being Paul's "theology" (in one sense of this term, see below) in 1 Corinthians as a whole, viz., the religious *cum* social "vision" that Paul *formulates*

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[29] Hofius [above, n. 12] uses this passage in his attempt to find Paul's theology of the Eucharist expressed in 11:17-34, not least in the ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν of 11:24: "Rücksichtslosigkeit, Gleichgültigkeit und Lieblosigkeit gegenüber dem »Bruder, für den Christus gestorben ist«, sind deshalb nichts Geringeres als die Leugnung des ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν,—eine unerhörte Missachtung des heilschaffenden Sühnetodes Christi" (p. 407). Hofius goes on to speak persistently (pp. 407-8) of the importance, according to Paul in 11:17-34, of understanding properly the *meaning* ("Wesen" and "Bedeutung") of the sacramental acts—since this will imply that one cannot in principle act in the way criticized by Paul. He thereby exemplifies directly the approach I am describing (and eventually rejecting).

[30] In his attempt to develop Paul's theology of the Eucharist as contained in 11:17-34, Ernst Käsemann took his point of departure precisely here, in the motif of the *Christusleib*. (See Käsemann, "Anliegen und Eigenart der paulinischen Abendmahlslehre," *Evangelische Theologie* 7 (1947/8) 263-83, also in *Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen I*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 6th ed. (1970) 11-34, from which I quote, pp. 11-16.) When Käsemann finally turns to 11:17-34 (pp. 21ff) he notices (pp. 31-2) that the emphasis on the *Brotwort* is strangely missing here (though not quite; witness 11:29 διακρίνων τὸ σῶμαῳ, which fits in: "Für Paulus selbst hat das Abendmahlselement des Leibes eine stärkere Bedeutung als das des Blutes, weil er von da aus seine eigene Konzeption vom Abendmahl besser begründen kann" p. 27). Instead, Paul seems to emphasize the *Kelchwort*. However, this only gives Käsemann additional material for a rich development of his *own* theology. For "die neue Diatheke [which is of course introduced by the *Kelchwort*] hat *inhaltlich* gesehen den Christus*leib* zu ihrem Gegenstand" (pp. 30-1, my emphases). Argument?

[31] In the felicitous formulation of Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul*, New Haven/London: Yale University Press (1983) p. 161.

[32] Weiss [above, n. 16] finds this "ganz unwahrscheinlich" (p. 303), but can ποτίζειν mean anything other than "give to drink" (in relation to human beings, that is)? (10:4 is of course relevant here.)

[33] Cf. again Käsemann [above, n. 30] pp. 15-16.

in 2:2 as the only content of his knowledge,[34] and the meaning of which he *develops* in chaps. 1-4 as an introduction to his discussion in the rest of the letter of how to *apply* this vision in the actual Corinthian practice—the vision, namely, that Jesus is Christ and that he (i.e., Jesus *as* Christ) was crucified?[35]

To these two questions I will answer 'Yes.' But if it is then suggested that this supposed theology of the Eucharist is also being developed, or even hinted at, *in 11:23-32*, then my response will be 'No.' There is more to Pauline "theology" (used here in a general and unspecified way) than that. Paul, I shall try to show, is *presupposing*, in the present passage, his "theology of the Eucharist" and presupposing that his addressees already know it. He is not trying to teach them anything new nor even (as so often and as he might well have done) *reminding* them of something he has previously taught them, in the form of a set of ideas or beliefs, a doctrinal, cognitive understanding of the (religious cum social) meaning of the Eucharist. In that sense of "theology" Paul is not doing theology in 11:17-34. *Nothing* can be learned, therefore, from that passage for an understanding of Paul's "theology of the Eucharist" in that sense. And if one approaches the passage with such an aim (as almost all scholars have done), one will invariably over- and misinterpret it. In another respect, by contrast, the passage is highly informative about Paul's "theology" by showing that this entity is very far from consisting in a set of ideas or beliefs alone.[36]

## No Solution

I shall begin by registering the negative results of my own initial search for clear and unmistakable indications in the passage of a Pauline theology of the Eucharist in the above sense.

1. Is Paul describing Jesus' last meal with his disciples in unmistakable terms as a Passover meal with any connotations that this might have for ascribing to Jesus' death a sacrificial meaning (cf. 1 Cor 5:7)—and with any implications that this latter idea might then have for the social issue? No.[37]

2. Is the phrase *τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν* an unmistakable hint in the same direction?[38] No. Evidently, the phrase does introduce the idea of atonement, but there is no emphasis on it to show that it is intended by Paul to be in any special way signif-

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34 At least when he came to the Corinthians for the first time.

35 Tradition has it that we should translate *καὶ τοῦτον ἐσταυρωμένον* (as the grammatical object of *εἰδέναι*) as "and him crucified" (RSV) or in German: "und zwar als gekreuzigter" (so also REB: "I would not claim to know anything but Jesus Christ—Christ nailed to the cross"). I have no idea why *καὶ τοῦτον ἐσταυρωμένον* should not be translated according to the ordinary behaviour in Greek of *οἶδα* followed by an accusative with a participle: I resolved that (while I was) with you I did not (i.e., would not claim to) know anything but Jesus as Christ and that he was crucified.

36 We should not, of course, go to the other extreme of denying ideas and beliefs any role whatever as part of Paul's "theology." It is just that there is much more to it than that: social and moral ideas and beliefs (as opposed to the specifically religious ones that *we* might be tempted to distinguish), formulations of experiences and of human relationships—and practices (both implied in the letters and actual in the letter-writing itself). It is at the place of intersection of all these different types of thing that we should find Paul's theology.

37 Compare Hofius' [above, n. 12] careful discussion of the passage in relation to the Passover meal, pp. 379-82.

38 As claimed by Hofius p. 407.

icant. The same holds of everything said in the rest of vv 24-25[39] (not least when this is compared with Luke's version)—until one comes to ὁσάκις ἐὰν πίνητε in 25.

3. ὁσάκις ἐὰν πίνητε looks significant. (i) It has no counterpart in the synoptic gospels. (ii) Syntactically, it is slightly—if not awkward, at least special, since it breaks up the neat sentence τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν, which was used straightforwardly in v 24. (iii) It is taken up most emphatically in v 26, which is Paul's own comment on the tradition that he has just recapitulated.[40] So ὁσάκις ἐὰν πίνητε probably *is* significant—but it goes no way towards hinting at a Pauline theology of the Eucharist in the above sense.

4. Apart from the repeated emphasis on ὁσάκις in Paul's comment in v 26, the meaning of τοῦτον (in τὸν ἄρτον τοῦτον) is intriguing. It evidently takes up the idea contained in τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν (and so goes closely with ὁσάκις ἐὰν πίνητε/ἐσθίητε), but it does not thereby introduce any theology of the Eucharist in the sense specified.

5. But what about the rest of v 26: τὸν θάνατον τοῦ κυρίου καταγγέλλετε ἄχρι οὗ ἔλθῃ? It is likely that the phrase is highly significant inasmuch as it expresses the central core of Paul's comment on the tradition that he has just recapitulated, his spelling out (indicatively)[41] the very meaning of participation in the Eucharist as Christ wanted this to be understood.[42] And indeed, the violent, almost oxymoronic phrase τὸν θάνατον τοῦ κυρίου καταγγέλλετε cannot but be potent with meaning.[43] It strongly brings to mind Paul's claim in 2:2 about knowing only that Jesus is Christ and that he was crucified. Still, it is far from immediately obvious that the phrase actually introduces a Pauline theology of the Eucharist in the earlier sense. (More on this below.)

There are other important issues in this verse. (a) καταγγέλλετε: Is Paul saying that when the Corinthians eat "this" bread and drink the cup ("this" cup, no matter which text one prefers), they are *eo ipso* proclaiming the Lord's death? Or

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[39] Fortunately, I am not alone in having this feeling: "Der Abschnitt enthält Theologoumena, die Paulus zwar aus der Tradition aufnimmt, aber nicht selbst entwirft und entfaltet: Sühne, Stellvertretung." (Conzelmann [above, n. 22] p. 239 n. 41). Käsemann's [above, n. 30] terribly contrived interpretation (pp. 28-34) of the implications of Paul's reference to the new covenant in v 25 seems to support this view *e contrario*.

[40] It is highly unlikely that v 26 is intended by Paul as part of Jesus' speech. It would be very strange, if Paul suddenly had Jesus speak of himself in the third person (τοῦ κυρίου and ἔλθῃ). Cf. Fee [above n. 16] p. 556 n. 58. On ὁσάκις ἐὰν πίνητε I agree with Fee's suggestion (p. 556) that these words "are in fact a Pauline insertion into the words of command to bring out his own special emphasis."

[41] Paul is clearly spelling out here the point of the Eucharist (as relevant to his immediate purposes) *in the way of* reminding the Corinthians of what they are *in fact* doing when they participate in the Eucharist in conformity with its true content. καταγγέλλετε is therefore indicative. The fact that it *could* be imperative is totally irrelevant.

[42] The importance of 11:26 as the verse on which the whole passage turns is well brought out by Beverly Roberts Gaventa in her brief, but excellent paper "'You Proclaim The Lord's Death': 1 Corinthians 11:26 and Paul's Understanding of Worship" (*Review and Expositor* 80, 1983, 377-87) when she states (p. 378) that "verse 26 serves not simply as the recapitulation of the tradition but as the basis for the connection between the tradition and the difficulties in the Corinthian congregation's practice of the Lord's Supper." I was not able to get a copy of Gaventa's paper until I had virtually finished this paper. The amount of substantial agreement that I shall note is reassuring.

[43] As Gaventa notes (p. 380) the fact that Paul has reversed normal word order here suggests that "the phrase 'the death of the Lord' receives special stress."

is he referring to some kind of *verbal* proclamation that may have accompanied the eating and drinking? The first must be right.[44] For (i) throughout the passage Paul aims, as we shall see, to focus his addressees' attention on the very act of eating and drinking that constitutes participation in the Eucharist on the part of each individual. (ii) Nor is there any indication elsewhere that each individual (and the individual too is in focus throughout the passage) would do any verbal proclaiming as part of participating in the Eucharist. (iii) Finally, *if* there is any verbal proclamation involved in celebrating the Eucharist, v 26 itself suggests that it will be the one implied in (τὸν ἄρτον) τοῦτον, thus referring us back to the sayings of vv 24-25. (More on this below.)

(b) ἄχρι οὗ ἔλθῃ: What is the point? Syntactically the phrase goes with καταγγέλλετε, but this only makes sense logically if καταγγέλλετε is then taken closely with ὁσάκις κτλ. For the meaning is surely not that the Corinthians *go on* proclaiming the Lord's death until he comes. They proclaim his death until he comes *whenever* they participate in the Eucharist. Is Paul's claim then that they proclaim the Lord's death whenever they participate in the Eucharist—but that this combination, this proclaiming whenever they celebrate the Eucharist, *will only last until* the Lord comes? Such a claim would spark off odd questions about what will happen *when* the Lord has come and the very perversity of this reveals that what is really being qualified by the phrase ἄχρι οὗ ἔλθῃ is τὸν θάνατον τοῦ κυρίου: whenever they partake in the Eucharist, the Corinthians proclaim the Lord's *death*, until he comes, *i.e.* as an interim phenomenon only. Logically, then, ἄχρι οὗ ἔλθῃ qualifies the talk of the Lord's death. It says that (by God's grace) the death of the Lord, his actually having died and being dead, is only an interim phenomenon. And so it softens, to some extent, the harsh idea of proclaiming the Lord's death.[45]

But only to some extent. In fact, the reason why Paul has felt the need to soften the reference to the Lord's death is precisely the harshness of that idea. This harshness, then, presumably gives us a clue to the point Paul is trying to make by recapitulating Jesus' words and explicating them in the way he does in v 26.

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[44] Hofius [above n. 12] belongs on the side of the kerygmatics ("καταγγέλλειν ist immer eine Sache des Wortes"!—p. 402 with references for the various possibilities). The use of καταγγέλλειν here is in fact intriguing, since the idea cannot immediately be the most usual one of making a verbal proclamation towards *outsiders*. But that precisely gives point to the use of the term here: when the Corinthians eat and drink from the consecrated bread and cup, they are *doing* something *within* the group which *equals proclaiming* the Lord's death towards *outsiders*. They are not just having a pleasant in-group meal together.- Gaventa [above n. 42] argues carefully (pp. 380-3) for the conclusion that "Paul understands the Supper itself as an act of proclamation" (p. 383). I agree, but some of Gaventa's examples, while certainly showing that καταγγέλλειν is *not* always "eine Sache des Wortes," are not exactly parallel with the meaning that must be Paul's, e.g. when καταγγέλλειν should be translated "demonstrate" or "portend."

[45] I cannot, however, find any indication whatever that ἄχρι οὗ should have a final as opposed to purely temporal meaning here, as claimed by Hofius [above n. 12] pp. 405-6, following Joachim Jeremias. In addition, how is it possible both to agree with Hofius and Jeremias that "ein finales Moment" is lurking in the ἄχρι οὗ and also to make the following claim about Paul's view of the Eucharist: "Das Abendmahl ist nicht Vorwegnahme des Mahles der Seligen, sondern Stiftung *für die Zeit der Kirche* von der Auferweckung *bis zur* Parusie Christi"? (Conzelmann [above n. 22] p. 246, my emphases.)

This reading of v 26 implies that Paul is not trying to develop, or even hinting at, a theology of the Eucharist in the way I have understood this. It is true that *τὸν θάνατον τοῦ κυρίου* recalls 2:2, but Paul does not use the idea in anything like the same way as there, where he is extensively elaborating and developing the very meaning of the *λόγος τοῦ σταυροῦ*. In 11:23-26 he is doing something else. He is going back to "the night in which the Lord Jesus was betrayed," he is quoting Jesus' own words, which contain clear references to his death (*τὸ σῶμα τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, ἀνάμνησιν, ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ αἵματι*), he is emphasizing (by inserting *ὁσάκις ἐὰν πίνητε* in v 25) those words of Jesus' which provide a bridge between the situation in which Jesus said those words and the Christian re-enacting of that situation in the Eucharist, and he is commenting that *whenever* Christians eat *this* bread and drink *this* cup, they are proclaiming the Lord's death (albeit his interim death only). In short, Paul is doing one thing and one thing alone. He is impressing on the Corinthians the tremendous *importance* of doing just this: eating *this* bread and drinking *this* cup. It is, after all, a matter of celebrating the Lord's *death*.

If I am right here, the consequences for evaluating scholarly efforts in relation to the passage are momentous. Any attempt to find hints in the passage of a Pauline "theology of the Eucharist" (in the above sense) is misguided. It will either overinterpret formulations in the text that remind scholars (in itself quite rightly) of formulations in other passages where something like a theology of the Eucharist is in fact being developed, or else it will directly misinterpret what Paul is saying.[46] When reading the scholarly literature on the passage one should mark in red any passage which implies that Paul is in one way or the other working with his developed theology of the Eucharist in the present text too. There will be a lot of markings!

## Ritualization

In view of the content of Paul's application in vv 27-32 of what he has said in vv 23-26 it is necessary to look at a few more, well-known issues in these earlier verses. (i) How are we to understand Jesus' claim (according to Paul) that "this" (*τοῦτο*, i.e., the bread that Jesus has taken, blessed and broken) "is" his body? (ii) What is the referent of *τοῦτο* in *τοῦτο ποιεῖτε*? (iii) What is the character of the *ἀνάμνησις* that Jesus is talking about? (iv) Finally, what is meant by "*this* bread" (*τὸν ἄρτον τοῦτον*) in v 26?

(i) Scholars often try to explicate *ἐστιν* in v 24 by referring back to Paul's question in 10:16: "The bread that we break: is (*ἐστιν*) it not a sharing (*κοινωνία*) of the body of Christ?" But first, in 10:16 Paul is talking not of a thing (the bread)

[46] This is most clearly so in the case of the phrase *ἄχρι οὗ ἔλθῃ* in v 26, but the reference to the new covenant in v 25 is also a frequent victim. The most dangerous temptation lies in bringing in the ideas of Christ's resurrection and return and the salvation of mankind implied in these events. This whole side of the Christ event is *not* in focus in Paul's text. On the contrary, Paul wishes to talk about the Lord's death and just that. It is difficult, however, to find a commentator who does not speak of the other side too. Even Gaventa [above n. 42], who is right on target with statements like this one: "The community's celebration of the Lord's Supper is not a time for rejoicing in one's salvation. Instead, the celebration of the Lord's Supper proclaims the death of Jesus," adds to the last sentence "and awaits his return" (p. 385) and elsewhere speaks of believers proclaiming the death of the Lord (when celebrating the Eucharist) "in its eschatological significance" (p. 383). (The scholar who fares best on this point is probably Johannes Weiss.)

but of an act (the bread that we *break*, i.e. breaking the bread).[47] And secondly, the grammatical predicate too is of an entirely different type (κοινωνία vs. σῶμα). Perhaps, then, 10:17 is a better parallel, since here Paul is saying that "we are all one bread, one body"? However, Paul goes immediately on to explain this claim: "for we all partake of a single bread." Here the idea of "partaking" of the bread is presumably a quite straightforward one. What makes the case special is just that what we partake in is in some sense *one*. So what does this tell us about a special sense of ἐστιν in 11:24?

The point is this. Both 10:14-22 and 11:29-32 show that in Paul's universe there is a lot of power around, which is activated at the Eucharist (and similarly in rituals for other [quasi-]divine beings), but there is no indication that this fact is tied specifically to an infusion of power into the "elements" *independently of* the whole ritualized setting to which the bread and the cup belong. *In itself* a phrase like "partaking in (the) one bread" has no additional meaning compared, e.g., with "partaking in one meal" (as said of several people). "All being one bread or body" similarly equals "all being one family" (or the like). The verb "is" in "This (bread) is my body"[48] similarly means just "signifies," "stands for," "represents," "pictures," "images" or the like. *When* the whole ritualized setting is introduced, however, one may well locate "in" the "elements" (or the acts performed in relation to them) the power that is being activated—and understand the phrases just quoted accordingly. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with this, and it ties in with the fact that Paul connects the point of the Eucharist as brought out in vv 23-26 very emphatically with the concrete acts of eating and drinking. But locating the power "in" the "elements" (or the accompanying acts) is in no way required by the Pauline text, and it is potentially dangerous since it runs the risk of removing attention from the *overall* ritualization that seems to be in focus.

What is the form and character of this overall ritualization?

(ii) The question of the referent of τοῦτο in τοῦτο ποιεῖτε is relevant here. What Paul is referring to must be at least taking the bread, blessing it, breaking it—and handing it round for consumption (as we may conclude from the repeated references later in the passage to eating). Will it also include saying (cf. εἶπεν in v 24) what Jesus said on that night? This is unfortunately one question on which it is difficult to reach complete certainty. (a) Still, one can ask: How can the Christians celebrate the Eucharist in memory of Jesus, if there has been no *mention* of him as part of the act? We do not know the content of the blessing that Paul is evidently presupposing will be said over the bread. But since this is most likely the usual Jewish thanksgiving prayer, and since there is no indication that Jesus was mentioned in any other way, the most plausible inference is that Paul understood τοῦτο in τοῦτο ποιεῖτε to refer *also* to a recitation of Jesus' own words as given by Paul himself. (b) A further argument in support of this conclusion is that this view will give added point to the fact that Paul does recapitulate Jesus' words. If these words were actually spoken as part of the Eucharist as it was celebrated at Corinth, then Paul's rehearsal of them is a powerful rhetorical device to impress upon the Corinthians his point that when they celebrate the

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47 Cf. e.g. the translation in REB: "When we break the bread, is it not ...?"

48 Add: "that which is given for you" instead of "and it is given for you"—another clue to the fact that there is absolutely no emphasis on the idea of the bread Jesus is holding as *being* his body in some specious sense. (The idea itself is peculiar: Did Jesus have *two* bodies when he said those words?)

Eucharist they are themselves, *through* those words, doing no less than proclaiming the Lord's death.[49]

With such an understanding it will be clear what I meant by an overall ritualization. Jesus' words, as quoted by Paul, not only speak into the particular situation in which they were spoken, but also in themselves contain a bridge to future situations where they will again be spoken (τοῦτο ποιεῖτε κτλ.). They thereby set up or even create a ritual (and so are genuinely "institutional"), since this is defined precisely by the fact that a later set of activities is understood as *re-enacting*[50] an earlier one.

More immediately important for our purposes is that if I am right in taking Paul expressly to formulate in 11:23-25 the set of words (Jesus') which *set up* the Eucharist as a ritual, then what Paul is himself doing in formally repeating those words is *re-ritualizing* the Eucharist. And if doing theology is taken to cover any handling and use of a religious vocabulary, then we can conclude that one way in which Paul is doing theology in our passage is by re-ritualizing the Eucharist. He is invoking a specifically religious (because ritual) character of a certain activity so as to impress its importance on his addressees.

Some readers will say that that is a very meagre result of a long and convoluted argument. Is it not in fact rather obvious that this is what Paul is doing? I agree—but it has appeared to many that he is doing a whole lot of *other* things. That is precisely not so.

(iii) With such an understanding of the overall strategy of vv 23-26 there is little difficulty in answering the questions relating to the meaning of ἀνάμνησις and *this* bread (τὸν ἄρτον τοῦτον in v 26). As commentators usually stress, the remembering of Jesus that is part of the Eucharist is not just any ordinary thinking back on something or other. For it is precisely *ritualized* "remembering." Similarly, the meal that is being eaten "in memory of Jesus" is not just any ordinary *Gedächtnismahl*, since it is so heavily ritualized. On the other hand, that realization is really sufficient. In particular, there is no point in, and indeed no warrant for, locating the character of the ἀνάμνησις (and the meal that incorporates it) in any special "tradition" in the Hellenistic melting-pot. For ritualization of this general kind is certainly found in any of those traditions.

(iv) Finally, *this* bread that Christians are eating during Eucharist (and *the* one bread of which they partake, 10:17) is nothing but bread that has been ritualized by being inserted into the overall framework that Paul has restated in vv 23-25.

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[49] Hofius [above n. 12] (pp. 395-406) asks the right question when he looks for something done in relation to the bread and the cup that will give them their "sacramental quality," some kind of "consecrating" act. His denial that this is a recitation of the institutional words themselves is based solely on the observation that the opposite claim would argue *e silentio* (p. 397—and so he finds the road open for a highly speculative account of καταγγέλλειν, ἀνάμνησις and ἄχρι οὗ ἔλθῃ, from which he concludes that the consecrating act may [!] have been an epicletic prayer for the descent of the Holy Spirit and for the sending of God's Son at the *parousia*). In general, of course, objecting to an argument from silence is a good point—if it *is* that kind of argument. However, τοῦτο in τοῦτο ποιεῖτε κτλ. must mean "whatever I do here"—and this of course includes the saying. It seems to me that the fact that Jesus' words are so clearly given by Paul in a way that makes them bridge the gap between the "original" situation and any later ones virtually demands that they will have been repeated in those later situations.

[50] Whatever that means. I am not trying to *explain* ritualization.

## Application

In 11:23-26 Paul has re-ritualized the Eucharist and impressed upon his addressees that participation in the Eucharist is a matter of life and death—the Lord's *death*. In vv 27-32 he draws out the consequences of this for the question of how one *should* participate in the Eucharist, *when* this ritual is understood as being what Paul has brought out in the preceding verses—or rather, he is drawing out the consequences with respect to how one should *not* participate in the Eucharist, thereby implying that the people he has been criticizing in vv 17-22 run the risk of incurring the consequences that he is about to set out. The first half of v 27 expresses this line of thought with total precision: "*So that* the one who eats the bread and drinks the Lord's cup *in-appropriately*[51] ...". What, then, are the consequences that the Corinthians risk incurring and how do these particular risks in fact follow from the character and content of the Eucharist as stated by Paul in vv 23-26?

Before turning to these questions we should note how exceedingly strongly Paul carries his general ritualization of the Eucharist (as given in vv 23-26) over to the concrete situation of each Corinthian individual eating "the" bread and drinking "the" cup. Thus in the three verses of 27-29, "eating (the bread) and drinking (the cup)" makes its appearance four times as an almost haunting refrain. Even if Paul had not explicitly said so, nobody could miss that there is a need to διακρίνειν τὸ σῶμα! Nor should it come as a surprise when Paul states that one may even *eat and drink* judgement upon oneself. Clearly Paul is wanting to concentrate all the weight he has attributed to the Eucharist on those very acts that each individual participant in the Eucharist will personally (and rather intimately)[52] do.

What, then, are the consequences of eating the bread and drinking the Lord's cup ἀναξίως? There are two: (i) being ἔνοχος . . . τοῦ σώματος καὶ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ κυρίου (27) and (ii) κρίμα ἑαυτῷ ἐσθίειν (29). What do the two formulations mean and how are they related?

(i) ἔνοχος is a powerful word and the sense that it has here is certainly not just that of being "guilty of offending against the body and blood of the Lord" (REB). Rather, by participating ἀναξίως in the Eucharist one becomes (logically) "liable to action", i.e., *responsible*, for the Lord's death.[53] How? Paul's intended logic is not difficult to grasp. If, as he has just reminded the Corinthians, participation in the Eucharist means proclaiming the Lord's death, and if one participates in a proclamation with this radical content without oneself *conforming* to it, then one will immediately move over to the other side and belong to those of "the present world" who actually crucified the Lord (1 Cor 2:8) and are therefore responsible for his body and blood. In other words, participation in the Eucharist ἀξίως or ἀναξίως is a matter of no less a thing than either being or not being a

[51] The term ἀναξίως evidently also has the connotation, contained, e.g., in "unworthily," of "living up" to something, but due to its slightly moralistic overtones in modern English that translation misses the crucial element of not *conforming* to the content of the Eucharist (as stated by Paul in the preceding verses).

[52] Since it is a matter of eating and drinking, i.e., of using one of those bodily "orifices" that social anthropologists are so fond of speaking of. See for one attempt to elucidate the passage from this perspective Stephen C. Barton, "Paul's Sense of Place: An Anthropological Approach to Community Formation in Corinth," *NTS* 32 (1986) 225-46. Barton's summary statement of "the anthropology of social boundaries" (pp. 226-9) is very helpful. To my mind his discussion of 1 Cor 11:17-34 (pp. 234-42) yields less.

[53] Thus also Käsemann [above n. 30] p. 24.

Christian. It is no wonder, therefore, that at the beginning of the passage (11:19) Paul almost welcomed the divisions in the Corinthian congregation over how to celebrate the Eucharist on the ground that they would show who among them would prove δόκιμοι, i.e., who could pass the test.[54]

V 28 goes immediately on to bring in the notion of δοκιμασία: "Let everyone test himself (REB, rightly) and then (only then!) eat from the bread and drink from the cup." This is apparently the positive counterpart to the negative ἀναξίως of the preceding verse. But exactly what is the connection? Will δοκιμασία by itself ensure that one eats and drinks ἀξίως? Hardly. Rather, what one must test is whether in eating and drinking one is oneself in fact proclaiming the Lord's death. There is *something* one should test and if one passes the test one may eat and drink without risking becoming responsible for the Lord's death. By contrast, Paul continues (29), eating and drinking is eating and drinking judgement upon oneself if one does *not* "discern the body."

The logic, then, appears to be this: If one eats and drinks ἀναξίως, one will *eo ipso* fall away from being a Christian. One must therefore test oneself before eating and drinking. (What one should look for is whether or not one will be proclaiming the Lord's death in eating and drinking. If one will be doing this, one can go on to eat and drink without risking to fall away from being a Christian.) By contrast, if one does eat and drink *without* discerning the body, one will eat and drink judgement upon oneself.

I shall return to the κρίμα and the question of the mutual relationship of the two consequences of eating and drinking ἀναξίως distinguished above. First we should consider the notion of "discerning the body." By now some of the mystery that has surrounded this phrase should be dispelled. For we already know that no matter how the phrase should be understood in detail, the general sense will be that of attending to the overall point of the Eucharist acts and "elements," viz. that *in* eating *this* bread and drinking *this* cup one is proclaiming the Lord's death. But exactly what, on this understanding, is the σῶμα?

Many commentators take it to refer specifically either to the bread (as opposed to the cup) or to Christ's body (again as opposed to his blood) and therefore suggest that διακρίνειν should mean either "distinguish" (or "separate") the body, viz. the consecrated bread, from other types of food, or else "discern" the body, viz. Christ's body *in* the consecrated bread. There is one grave obstacle to either suggestion, which is that it is not at all clear why Paul should have decided to concentrate on the *bread* or on Christ's *body* alone when in the very

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54 δόκιμος/δοκιμή is a key word. Whereas in ordinary Greek δόκιμος has the somewhat generalized sense of "acceptable," "approved" or "esteemed" (cf. LSJ s.v.), in Paul the meaning is closer to the basic sense of the parallel verb, δοκιμάζειν: "assay," "test," "put to the test" (LSJ s.v.). δόκιμος in Paul is one who has passed the test, to be contrasted with the one who turns out ἀδόκιμος or (REB:) "disqualified" (e.g. Paul himself in 1 Cor 9:27). Similarly, the substantive δοκιμή is not so much a "tried *or approved* character" (LSJ s.v. 2, with reference only to Phil 2:22 and 2 Cor 2:9) as "proof" or "test" (LSJ s.v. 1) or at most a "tried character." The REB translations look strange when placed next to each other: Phil 2:22 (of Timothy's δοκιμή) "you know that he has been at my side" (?!); 2 Cor 2:9 "I wrote ... to see how you stood the test" (right), 1 Cor 11:19 "show which of your members are genuine" (?). 2 Cor 13:3-7 is of course highly relevant—as is the fact that δοκιμάζειν turns up again in 1 Cor 11:28! On this understanding of δοκιμασία in Paul, a passage like 1 Cor 10:13 on πειρασμός becomes relevant too—as shown again by 2 Cor 13:5, which glosses ἑαυτοὺς πειράζετε as ἑαυτοὺς δοκιμάζετε.

same verse he speaks, even twice, of eating *and drinking*.[55] Therefore, if there is any way at all in which the σῶμα can be taken to refer to both what is eaten and what is drunk, that way will be intrinsically preferable. Note, however, that *if* there is such a way, then on that reading σῶμα will no longer be able to stand for *Christ's* body or blood for the simple reason that it is highly unlikely that there should be any viable sense of σῶμα that would also cover Christ's *blood*. So is there a viable sense of σῶμα in the Greek of the period that will allow the word to cover both what is eaten (the bread) and what is drunk (the cup with its content: wine)?

Indeed there is. For σῶμα is very often used in philosophical and philosophically influenced literature to stand for a body in the sense of "any corporeal substance" (LSJ s.v. III) as opposed, e.g., to the void or to such entities as place and time (if these were not also construed as corporeal).[56] Stoicism in particular had given currency to this sense, since the Stoics were famous for being "materialists" precisely because they insisted that only what is bodily or corporeal, only τὰ σώματα, exists.[57] But the Stoics may be even more relevant since they also reckoned with something which though not an "existent" in this more restricted sense is still very much part and parcel of the world, viz. "sayables" (λεκτά) or meanings, i.e. whatever is or may be said *of* "bodies."[58] Without in any way implying that Paul is taking up here philosophical, or even specifically Stoic, language, we may at least consider whether understanding him to be using σῶμα here in this general sense will fit into the passage as a whole—in spite of the fact that two verses earlier he has used the word to stand for Christ's (dead) body?[59]

I think it will. Johannes Weiss paraphrased διακρίνειν in the phrase we are considering as "grasping and handling something correctly in accordance with its specific value"[60] and this is exactly the sense that will make the whole phrase fall into place. What Paul is demanding is that the person who eats and drinks from the consecrated bread and cup διακρίνει or "pay attention to" the "body" in the sense of the concrete, corporeal stuff that he or she is actually eating and drinking (putting into the mouth), so as to remember *its* meaning—viz., that in eating and drinking from the consecrated bread and cup one is (or should be) proclaiming the Lord's death. There are two things involved: what is consumed (the σῶμα or corporeal substance) and the meaning that it has (or the meaning of "handling" it, as Weiss had it—eating and drinking it). That meaning is the one that Paul has been trying to bring out in vv 23-27 and he now states that if one does not pay attention to that meaning as attaching to the "body," i.e. to the bread and the wine (and the handling of them: the concrete eating and drinking), then one eats and drinks judgement upon oneself. What, then, does the latter claim mean?[61]

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[55] But of course it is always possible to use this fact as a stepping-board for doing *theology*, as Käsemann [above n. 30] did.

[56] For an example of this use of σῶμα see Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos* X 215-218.

[57] Cf. e.g. Plutarch, *De Communibus Notitiis* 1073E: ὄντα γὰρ μόνα τὰ σώματα καλοῦσιν.

[58] See again the passage in Sextus Empiricus referred to in note 56.

[59] This, however, has not kept scholars from taking the σῶμα in v 29 in other ways.

[60] Weiss [above n. 16] p. 291: "eine Sache in dem ihr eigentümlichen Wert richtig erkennen und behandeln."

[61] The only other viable way of understanding the σῶμα in 11:29 that I know of is that of taking it as a reference to the Eucharistic congregation, on the basis of the reference to the "one body" in 10:17. This interpretation has close affinities with Käsemann's view

(ii) Paul is quite obviously and explicitly referring to God's exercizing his power so as to punish the offenders with illness or even death—for pedagogical purposes (32) but presumably also due to the fact that God has been provoked by a non-discerning participation in the Eucharist in the same way that Christ would be provoked by Christian participation in non-Christian cults (10:22 with 10:9). The *literal* sense of this is clear and the same goes for its function, which from a rhetorical point of view is quite straightforwardly to threaten the Corinthians into celebrating the Eucharist ἀξίως- by "discerning the body."[62]

We should ask: Is God's judgement and punishment, which is the second consequence of eating and drinking ἀναξίως, related to the first consequence (that one becomes responsible for Christ's death) in such a way that what one is punished *for* is precisely that one has become responsible for Christ's death? The question may seem contrived, but it has often been raised and it will turn out to be quite important.

The answer, I suggest, is 'No.' For in spite of the fact that the reference to God's punishment is clearly meant as a threat, it is, in a sense, the *least* awful consequence: becoming responsible for Christ's death is worse. For whereas the latter means falling completely out of being a Christian, the former means staying in (though also being mercifully chastized by God). This means that the reference to God's κρίμα is introduced in vv 29-32 in order both to point to one further, and as Paul believes quite concrete and tangible, consequence of not celebrating the Eucharist ἀξίως, a consequence with which Paul may directly threaten the Corinthians due precisely to its concrete and tangible character—and also (and at the same time, with characteristically Pauline duplicity) to *soften* the harshness both of the threat and of the fatal consequence introduced in v 27. Metaphorically speaking, in vv 29-32 Paul is applying both the stick and the carrot in order to make the Corinthians come over to a proper way of celebrating the Eucharist.

What comes out of this discussion of the consequences of celebrating the Eucharist ἀναξίως is the insight that the basic issue and the basic consideration that Paul is appealing to and impressing upon his addressees is that of *staying in* (and hopefully only being chastized if one has already been celebrating the Eucharist ἀναξίως)—or of *falling out completely* with all the dire consequences of that (including, presumably, being κατα-κριθεὶς σὺν τῷ κόσμῳ as opposed to merely παιδευθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ κυρίου).

## Summary

What, then, does "Ωστε in v 33 mean, i.e. how is what Paul says in the central part of the passage (vv 23-32) relevant to the concrete issue he is addressing of social behaviour during the Eucharist?

I have argued that Paul is *not* trying to show his addressees that the Eucharist *means* something that implies that one will need to ἐκδέχεσθαι each other during the ceremony in the sense that we saw this term to have: sharing equally with

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(cf. above note 30), and it suffers from the same defect of having to bring in a highly specific understanding of the σῶμα from outside the passage itself. By contrast, the understanding that I have suggested fits in immediately with the heavy emphasis right back from 11:23 and up to this very verse on the concrete stuff that must be handled properly, i.e. in accordance with its actual meaning as part of the ritual itself.

[62] For the notion of threat compare v 34: ἵνα μὴ εἰς κρίμα συνέρχησθε.

each other the food which some (the rich) had brought to the common meal. Such a "theology of the Eucharist" is certainly genuinely Pauline and it can be developed on the basis of other passages in 1 Corinthians. It also ties in completely with the richly varied way in which he develops and makes use of the notion of ἀγάπη throughout the letter. But it is not either itself developed or even hinted at in the present passage. Rather, it is (and evidently very importantly) *presupposed* in it.

Thus the line of thought underlying the Ὥστε in v 33 runs like this: You behave in a certain way during Eucharist (17-22). Now the Eucharist has the following point ... (proclaiming the Lord's *death*, 23-26—which is such a startling thing that either you do it or you don't). Participation in it *therefore* requires total commitment *lest* you fall away altogether from being a Christian (27-28) or at least be chastized by God (29-32). But *since* being a Christian (and you are required to be totally committed to being that—certainly while participating in the Eucharist) *requires*—and *here* comes the presupposed "theology": agapic behaviour, *therefore* etc. (33-34).

Or in a shorter version: if you do not behave in the way that goes with being a Christian while participating in the ritual that *defines* Christianity, then you *stop* being a Christian. Therefore etc.

### 11:17-34 as an Example of Pauline Theologizing

It is now time to connect the reading I have given of 11:17-34 with the question of Paul's "theology" or "theologizing."

The passage, as I have interpreted it, offers a good case for the claim that we should not construe Paul's theology merely as a more or less clearly worked out set of beliefs. For if we consider the direction of Paul's argument in the passage, then, as I have argued, there is no theology in that sense in sight as the goal that the passage is working towards. But of course a theology in that sense is in fact, as I have also repeatedly claimed, *presupposed* by Paul's argument. So, is that not the theology of the passage—the whole set of ideas centering on the crucified Christ, on ἀγάπη as the only valid social norm based on the total *Umwertung der Werte* brought about by the Christ event and the like? One serious problem with this view, however, is that it leaves out far too much in the passage. So much more is being said and done in it that merely settling for that view seems inadequate. Of course, if one just *wants* (for whatever reason) to extract from the passage a theology in the form of a certain set of beliefs, then that is perfectly possible. But by doing it one will not do justice to the passage itself.

If, then, we look more carefully at what is going on in the passage and if, as a consequence and as it were driven by the passage itself, we begin to look for its theology more in the form of its theologizing, then what is the result? Not just any handling of a religious vocabulary will do. Earlier I have spoken of finding Paul's theology in general at the place of intersection between various types of talk and practice in (or implied by) the letters. Similarly here we shall only have found the theology in the theologizing once we can see some distinct and characteristic point that comes out in and through the theologizing. What could that point be?

I need a distinction here between two general types of argument that may be used in order to convince other people of some favoured way of understanding the world or acting in it. One is the type that goes into *teaching* people something new or *reminding* them of something they already know. What defines this mode

of argumentation is that it is essentially an appeal to the understanding. Thus the interlocutors must, in a sense that it is unfortunately far from easy to define, *by themselves* come to *see* what the teacher wishes to convey to them. Similarly, when they are reminded of something, an appeal is made to *their own* previous understanding. The other type is the one that goes into *threatening* people into complying with a favoured understanding or practice. Here too the understanding of the interlocutors is in some sense being addressed, but there is no appeal, no wish that the interlocutors should as it were by themselves become convinced. On the contrary, the less they understand the better! Here, then, we may speak of forcing them (by cognitive and emotional means) into compliance.

This rough and ready distinction is at least as old as Plato (where it is of course the distinction between "philosophy" and "rhetoric"). It will be called into question by many moderns, and I am not arguing that it expresses a deep metaphysical truth. I *am* claiming that at some level the distinction is valid and indeed extremely helpful, and I am suggesting that it may also be of use in trying to sort out different ways of Pauline theologizing.

If we apply this distinction to the present passage, we should say that its argumentation belongs basically under the mode of forcing the Corinthians into compliance. Paul is not teaching them anything new, nor is he primarily reminding them of something they already know. Instead, by re-ritualizing the Eucharist and by threatening them with God's punishment, he is attempting to force them emotionally into compliance. However, this is not all there is to be said. On the contrary, although I have insisted that in 11:23-32 Paul is not primarily appealing to the understanding in the above sense, it is worth noting, and in fact highly revealing for a broader understanding of Paul's theologizing, that his argument runs in such a way that the distinction between appealing and forcing becomes relevant again *within* Paul's use of rhetorical force in the passage.

The point is this. We saw that of the two different consequences of not participating in the Eucharist ἀξίως that Paul develops in vv 27-32 the first (stated in v 27) follows directly on Paul's recapitulation of Jesus' words to his disciples and Paul's comment on the point of those words in such a way that it is appropriate to say that bringing out this *first* consequence is what Paul is driving at right from the beginning of the section. We also saw that throughout vv 23-28 (in fact even including v 29 with its repeated refrain of "eating and drinking") Paul is ritualizing participation in the Eucharist. This fits in with my claim that he is using rhetorical force. But now we should also take notice of the fact that in vv 26 and 27 Paul is *also* appealing to his addressees' understanding in a different way from what we find in vv 29-32. For even though he is certainly not developing or hinting at the *wider* meaning of the Eucharist, he *is reminding* them of its most immediate and obvious point (that celebrating the Eucharist is proclaiming the Lord's death) and making direct use of this reminder in his statement of the first consequence of not celebrating the Eucharist ἀξίως. So, although Paul is "ritualizing" in 23-28, he is also here appealing to the understanding of his addressees: they must themselves make up their minds whether they want to stay in or not—now that Paul has made clear to them (by rhetorical means) what is at stake. It is no wonder, therefore, that he goes on to exhort them *individually* to test their attitude before participating in the Eucharist (v 28).

By contrast, in his statement of the *second* consequence of participating ἀναξίως Paul is not so much appealing to his addressees' own understanding of what is involved in the Eucharist and their own decision for or against staying in. Rather, he is threatening them with consequences of their acts which are extrin-

sic, tangible and concrete. Here, then, there are very few traces of an appeal to the understanding in the more restricted sense.

If this is right, then it is also noteworthy. For there can be little doubt that it is the line of thought leading to Paul's formulation of the *first* consequence of celebrating the Eucharist ἀναξίως which is the basic one. In fact, his argument would have been complete had he moved on directly from v 28 to v 33 (and reformulated the ἵνα-clause in v 34 accordingly). I am not suggesting, of course, that "these verses are not part of the original text" (or something similar). Nor am I saying that Paul's use in vv 29-32 of the religious vocabulary he had at his disposal is uncharacteristic of him. On the contrary, we shall see that it is in fact rather characteristic. But we shall also see that his primary impulse goes in the less overtly rhetorical direction and that he only uses the other approach in special cases like the present one: which?

## Crucial and Less Crucial Issues

(1) In chap. 5 Paul addresses the issue of an especially offensive case of πορνεία in the Corinthian congregation. His reaction is violent. He calls on the Corinthians, when assembling together with him "in the name of our Lord Jesus" (though Paul is himself only present "in the spirit"), to hand over the offender "through the power of our Lord Jesus" to Satan for the destruction of his body etc. Here there is no genuine arguing and appeal to the understanding, only a direct use of the idea that Christians are in contact with more-than-human powers which define and circumscribe their sphere of action. Gradually, however (from v 6), a more reasoned language takes over, from the use of a proverbial saying (6—though still with a play on the idea of μίασμα, 7) to a sort of "moral translation" of the saying (8) and a calmer reasoning (9ff).

What we learn from this is that when Paul feels he is, as it were, standing against the wall, he lashes out by making direct use of the belief in a *Geisterwelt* that he shares with his addressees. But his wish lies in *arguing*, in making his addressees *see* for themselves.

Why does Paul react violently to that particular case of πορνεία at Corinth? The chapter itself shows why: not so much because of the offence itself as because the Corinthians have *not* reacted to it in the way Paul ends up by saying they should, viz. by neither mixing with such a person nor (certainly) eating with him (presumably at the Eucharist). In other words, what is at stake is not just a case of πορνεία (however heinous) but the identity of the group. Boundaries must be respected. Otherwise Paul will attack—though only to back down quickly.

(2) In 10:14-22 Paul again invokes the *Geisterwelt*. In spite of its complexity the passage is so revealing in my context that I need to spend a few (relatively unargued) words on it.

The basic issue that I shall address is whether in warning against idolatry Paul is here (and right from the beginning of chap. 10) speaking of a different topic from the one he addresses in chap. 8 and 10:23ff, viz. the eating of idol meat. I shall suggest that in all three passages he is addressing exactly the same topic: the eating of idol meat. Only his form of argument changes.

Chaps. 8-10 are similar to 11:17-34 in that in both passages Paul is addressing the behaviour of the socially powerful in the Corinthian congregation. The difference is that in the former passage Paul is in principle in agreement (both religiously and practically) with the position of those whose behaviour he is addressing and in fact wanting to *change*, whereas in the latter passage he is

clearly not. Thus in both chap. 8 and 10:23ff he repeatedly goes out of his way to endorse the position of the strong that there is no idol in the world nor any god but the One God (8:4). Still, he insists, if the weaker brothers take offence at anybody "lying down for a meal in a heathen temple" (8:10) or eating meat that somebody has indicated to be idol meat (10:28-29), then that person should stop eating out of concern for his weaker brother's conscience.

Paul is in a really difficult position.[63] For what his primary addressees (the strong, who are presumably mainly gentiles) are arguing and practising is precisely what he had himself been arguing in his letter to the Galatians and what he had presumably also been preaching to the Corinthians themselves. Still, he now wants to insist that out of concern for the weaker brothers, who are presumably mainly Jews, the strong Corinthians should *restrict* the freedom which according to Galatians is the very identity mark of being a Christian.

Paul's main argument is that precisely by refraining from enforcing their own freedom the strong Corinthians will be *practising* Christian freedom, viz. the freedom of ἀγάπη. And he introduces his own behaviour in relation to the Corinthians and others as a prime example of such behaviour (chap. 9). But he also does something else—in 10:1-22. He impresses on the strong the fear that *while* eating meat bought in the market (which in itself is all right, 10:25-26), *while* accepting an invitation from a non-Christian (which in itself is also all right, 10:27), *while* eating meat that they *know* to be idol meat (which in itself is all right too, 10:28-30) and *while* lying down for a meal in a heathen *temple* (where lots of heathen ceremonies will be taking place—but again, having a meal there is in itself *also* all right, 8:10)—in short, while doing all these things, which as a matter of principle they are free to do, they *risk* switching over from doing them for social purposes only (without paying any attention to their religious content, that is) to being ensnared by that very content, which is actually present due to the fact that it is attributed to the meat by those *non*-Christians of whose religious ceremonies the meat is part. What Paul is doing, in other words, is trying to scare the strong Corinthians away from practising the freedom which on Paul's own principles (and "theology") they do have, by pointing out that they risk being ensnared in non-Christian religious ceremonies (if they "forget" their own sound principles that will otherwise dissociate them from what they are also participating in)—with the dire consequences that this will have when they will in this way πειράζειν Christ (10:9) and παραζηλοῦν the Lord (10:22).

If this account is anywhere near the truth, what we find is that Paul is both arguing (extensively and ingeniously, chap. 9) for his claim that in the given situation the strong should abstain (certainly from the more obvious situations of being in contact with idol meat) out of concern for their weaker brothers—and also using a somewhat more indirect type of "argument": using the *Geisterwelt* to scare the Corinthians away from applying their (in themselves correct) principles to the issue of eating idol meat.[64]

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[63] See again Alan Segal's [above n. 11] excellent discussion in *Paul the Convert* pp. 228-41.

[64] With this interpretation I in a sense applaud the position that Hans von Soden argued famously against in "Sakrament und Ethik bei Paulus" (in *Marburger Theologische Studien* 1, 1931, 1-40; also in von Soden, *Urchristentum und Geschichte 1*, ed. Hans von Campenhausen, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1951, 239-75, from which I quote). In essence von Soden attempted to show that in 10:14-22 Paul is *not* playing on a second motive (as against the demand of love) for complying with his instructions, viz., a spiritual δεισιδαιμονία or a superstitious, magical invocation of their personal danger in not

Since 10:14-22 is so highly relevant to 11:17-34 it is worth noticing one point of detail about the passage. Paul's argument in it evidently turns on the notion of κοινωνία. The point of this term might be to emphasize the community *of believers* that comes from their all sharing in Christ's blood and body. 10:17, which commentators often see (rightly to my mind) as a sort of explanatory parenthesis, suggests this understanding—and then the road would be open for finding the full, Pauline theology of Christ's death and ἀγάπη developed in the passage in confirmation of Paul's plea for restraint out of concern for one's brother. Clearly, however, that is not in fact the sense of κοινωνία that is operative outside 10:17, but a different one, according to which one shares with *Christ* or with *demons* when one is participating in a religious ceremony, no matter what one's relation is with other *people*. (This type of κοινωνία might in principle be a wholly individual matter.) This observation shows particularly strikingly that what Paul is up to in 10:14-22 (going right back to 10:1) is not developing any further his "theology" proper, but using the notion of the *Geisterwelt*—for the same *purpose* (of making the strong Corinthians refrain since their behaviour has proved offensive to the weaker people), but in a quite different *type* of argument.

Why, then, does Paul turn also to this rhetorical argument as part of chaps. 8-10? Again I believe the reason to be that Paul saw the issue to be a crucial one, one so divisive that it risked tearing the congregation apart. In such a situation, not only did Paul develop a whole "theology" of refraining from exercizing the freedom that one does have: he also attempted to *scare* his addressees into compliance.

(3) Finally 11:2-16 on women's head-covering during service. I have argued elsewhere for my understanding of this passage. What we see is Paul starting out making grandiloquent use of far-fetched religious imagery in support of a type of behaviour which goes against his own "rule of no distinction" (2-10), then abruptly introducing a form of that very rule (11) and finally backing down step by step from his initial instruction (12-15) so as in effect to leave the matter, at the very end, to the decision of his addressees (16). Why such reasonableness in the end when Paul did start out making authoritative use of a potent weapon in his religious armoury? Obviously because the issue was *not* crucial to the continued existence of the group.

## Conclusion: The Point of Paul's Theologizing in 11:17-34

If we now turn again to 11:17-34, can we see a distinct and characteristic point to Paul's theologizing in that passage?

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complying (p. 259). But that is precisely what Paul *is* doing. Behind the whole of von Soden's ingenious argument lie two unargued assumptions, one concerning the kind of sacramentalism that we should ascribe to Paul the Christian (see, e.g., a clear formulation of it on p. 274 where von Soden glosses "der volle, sakramentale Sinn des Paulus" as follows: "dass man mit Gottes Handeln und Wirken als einem gegenwärtigen und freien ernsthaft rechnet"!) and one concerning the kind of sacramentalism among the Corinthian, "Hellenistic gnostics" whom Paul is arguing against (for this see e.g. pp. 259 and 262 where von Soden speaks of those people—without any argument whatever—as "überspannte Enthusiasten des Pneumaglaubens" and of their sacramentalism as "der mehr oder weniger sublimierte, animistische Naturalismus"). The fact that von Soden repeatedly states (p. 264 n. 32, p. 266 n. 38, p. 267) that Paul did not himself clearly distinguish between the two supposed types of sacramentalism should have made him pause. In fact, as we can now see, von Soden was doing theology instead of exegesis.

What we have seen is that Paul was quite prepared to attempt to use emotional force towards the Corinthians whenever he felt that the issue he was addressing was of crucial importance to the continued existence of the group. We have also seen that he very often uses a different type of argument that basically appeals to the understanding of his addressees. This happens when the issue is perceived by Paul to be less crucial. But then we also noted that this mode of argumentation creeps in even in contexts where Paul felt the need to use the other mode too. It is in the interplay of these two types of argument that the distinct and characteristic point of Paul's theologizing lies even in 11:17-34 where the appeal to the understanding is not so emphatic. Let me explain.

The interplay between the two modes of argumentation that we also noted in the three earlier passages in 1 Corinthians is itself an expression of Paul's own understanding of the gospel as he has developed this in chaps. 1-4 of the letter. Here he has given an interpretation of the λόγος τοῦ σταυροῦ in terms, basically, of ἀγάπη as *the* social norm, a norm that Paul then makes use of throughout the letter (e.g. in such a centrally placed maxim as 10:24: "each should look after the interests of the other, not his own") and which provides the basis for his idea of the congregation as a single σῶμα. I have not spoken much about this whole set of ideas, since I have been wanting to show that it is precisely not at the forefront in 11:17-34. But it *is* strongly present elsewhere in the letter (and as we know presupposed in 11:17-34 itself).[65] Indeed, it is even applied by Paul himself to his own practice in addressing the Corinthians. This happens, and surely not accidentally, at the very end of chaps. 1-4, where (as I take it) he has precisely developed that interpretation of the λόγος τοῦ σταυροῦ. Here Paul explicitly contrasts ἐντρέπειν ("putting to shame")[66] the Corinthians with "admonishing" them (νουθετεῖν) ὡς τέκνα μου ἀγαπητά (4:14) and asks them whether they want him to come with a rod in his hand or with ἀγάπη and the spirit of gentleness (4:21). There can be no doubt that Paul himself saw the method of approaching the Corinthians which he obviously preferred precisely as an application of the gospel as he has developed its meaning up to that point in the letter. Paul's "admonishment" of the Corinthians in his preferred mode is an application of the gospel, and one can see why: in its basic form of an appeal to the understanding of his addressees it expresses the attitude of "not looking to one's own interests but to those of the others."

How, then, should we understand the *combination* of the two approaches that we have found in the four passages? In particular, where does the use of emotional force fit in? I suggest the following answer. Paul's basic drive in writing—reflected even in a passage like 11:17-34, where he is not primarily appealing to the understanding—is towards arguing his case, towards making the addressees see the connections of meaning and make up their minds for themselves. Thus in his writing he attempts to go as far as he can in giving up his own (rightful) claims to truth. But where there is a genuine risk that giving up

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[65] I have argued for this in "The Gospel and Social Practice According to 1 Corinthians," *NTS* 33 (1987) 557-84, where I discuss chaps. 1-4 in some detail and attempt to show their relevance for the rest of the letter including Paul's favouring the argumentative mode of appealing to his addressees' understanding.

[66] The basic meaning of ἐντρέπειν appears to be "make somebody turn about or hesitate" by impressing something on him, hence "make him feel misgiving or compunction" (cf. LSJ s.v. I 2 and II 1). Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrhoneae hypotyposes* III 135, where ἐντρέπειν is parallel with δυσωπεῖν, "put out of countenance, abash" (LSJ s.v.) or "make (visibly) uneasy."

these claims would mean giving up the whole thing altogether, there Paul takes his stand. What we have, then, is an interplay between the two modes of argumentation which is not just an accidental or basically innocuous one. Rather, it constitutes a genuine tension characterized by the fact that Paul will not give up either mode. Indeed, he cannot do so. On the contrary, on the basis of the way Paul keeps the tension alive in his actual writing we can claim to find in his practice a total application on Paul's part of his own understanding of the gospel: going as far as he can in giving up his own (rightful) claims, but taking a stand where giving up would mean giving up the whole thing altogether. Paul's theology and theologizing aims at maintaining boundaries while also breaking them as open as is compatible with their still being maintained. The distinct and characteristic point of Paul's theologizing in 11:17-34 lies in the place where his argumentative practice intersects with his understanding of the gospel as set forth earlier in the letter.

If this is anywhere near the truth, then it becomes even more noteworthy that in the passage towards the end of chap. 4 that I referred to a little earlier, Paul contrasts the agapic mode of address with another one—ἐντρέπειν and coming with a (metaphorical) rod in his hand—which is precisely the other mode that I have identified, of using emotional force in order to make the Corinthians comply. In other words, Paul *himself* expresses an awareness of the dual form of argument that we have seen him to be actually using. This, it seems to me, is strong support for the view that the distinct and characteristic point of Paul's theologizing in 11:17-34 (when seen in the light of the rest of the letter) does lie precisely in the area of tension between different modes of argumentation that are themselves applications of different elements in Paul's understanding of the gospel.

But then we can also see why, as we started from noting, Paul first places 11:17-34 within the framework of praising or not praising, next declares that *here* he can *not* give praise, and only then turns to an authoritative (though still integrative) form of argument. We *could* of course say that in showing himself aware of different types of argument Paul is first and foremost betraying himself as the consummate rhetorician who knows that the best way to persuade his addressees is the integrative one of giving praise even while criticizing them and only turning to explicit criticism where that is deemed absolutely necessary. On such a view the issue of Paul's rhetorical strategy would be merely formal, merely a matter of his "rhetoric," with whatever theological content we might wish to talk of placed in a wholly different sphere. But we now know that being integrative is itself part of Paul's theological point and that by starting out in terms of praise Paul is doing more than being just rhetorical. He is applying his theological insight in practice—and we should *find* his theology in his practice.

The reason, on this background, why Paul argues in 11:17-34 in the particular way I have attempted to elucidate is the obvious one that participation in the Eucharist is as it were the *locus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae*: here one proclaims the Lord's death.

# Death in Us, Life in You: The Apostolic Medium

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### Introduction: Situating the Present Attempt

It is unnecessary to rehearse the difficulties of producing a Pauline theology for this group; the hurdles are well known. The problems involved with creating historical settings for the letters, assessing their oblique portraits of Paul's opponents and the nature of his theological disputes are necessary elements of any attempt to explain the way in which the letters reflect a "coherency" in Paul's thought. That Paul's theological work in the letters is situation-dependent few of us deny, but the more a Pauline theology is predicated upon its historical and rhetorical circumstances the more just those things recede from our grasp.

Nowhere is this more the case than in 2 Corinthians. On the one hand, Paul is severely constrained by circumstances in Corinth in what he can say and how he can say it. The rift between Paul and the Corinthians (which must have been deep due to his failure to make promised visits and the disastrous visit which he did make), turns almost every statement into a form of "apology" or defense. He also seems to write with an eye towards his perceived opponents or rivals which gives a polemic edge to the apologies and suggests that Paul sensed that his words would be taken in ways which he did not intend. Any exposition of the epistle has to recognize the limiting factors under which the letter was written and read. On the other hand, the reasons for the Corinthian/Pauline misunderstandings, the nature of the opposition to Paul, and the manner it had affected the congregation are shrouded in historical and social mists.[1] Thus even though every interpretation of this letter must be a product of historical decisions made by the exegete, the questions about the letter's integrity, the possibility and nature of charges brought against Paul, and the oblique manner in which he refers to them make a detailed description of the historical/rhetorical situation extremely difficult. The result is that every analysis of the letter is necessarily

[1] Both the integrity of the letter and the nature and positions of Paul's opposition are immensely complex problems. For the purposes of this paper I assume the unity of chapters 1-9 (except for 6:14-7:3) and that chapters 10-13 form a separate letter which followed the letter composed of 1-9. In this I have followed generally the comments of Victor Furnish since they attempt to provide a judiciously contoured hypothesis about rival apostles and are helpful in their approach to the letter's literary integrity. Victor Furnish, *II Corinthians* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1984) pp. 48-54 and 35-40 respectively.

tentative in both its historical and theological reconstruction. As such, every reconstruction is always open to radical revision; this one is no exception.

Recent work in this seminar reminds us that particular problems like these are compounded by a second, related set of hurdles. One former working supposition was that (at least as a working hypothesis) Paul's beliefs could be treated as stable entities despite the provisional shape they assumed in individual letters. So, we argued that, given sufficient time and insight, we could: 1) discern a comprehensive set of convictions and 2) produce a map of their internal relationships so that the expression of these convictions in the individual letters could be sufficiently accounted for. However, as we have moved from letter to letter that assumption has become increasingly difficult to maintain. While most all of us have posited the coherency of Paul's thought (in some fashion), the actual demonstration of that coherency has been more difficult to produce than we imagined. The various categories and expressions of convictions which we took to be stable continued to shift, not only between, but sometimes within a letter. With that came broader terms for coherency: narrative, apocalyptic framework, etc. But these categories began to lose their heuristic value as they became less specific. The working hypothesis subsequently became difficult to maintain.

In response various members of the seminar have suggested that there be a shift in our focus away from coherency of structure to matters of process and function. Their point is that, even if we could agree on the set of convictions that make up Paul's beliefs we would still need to explain how he chooses among them in order to describe adequately his activity as a theologian. Thus while continuing to seek the main contents of Paul's beliefs and thought we have become increasingly aware that his use of such convictions is equally important in understanding them. The dynamic relationship between the convictions and the dynamic involved with their linguistic expression would have to be part of any account of Paul as a theologian.[2]

The matter of which convictions, or combination of convictions, and how they are given expression is obviously complex and made more so by the fact that Paul was a complex human being. In the case of 2 Corinthians it is impossible to ignore the personal elements which must have played a role in his perception of the world and his choice of expression, even though such factors throw wild cards into the process. In her model, Jouette Bassler attempts to address this personal element by suggesting that Paul's foundational convictions underwent two transformations; first they were refracted or filtered through his experiences and then through "the prism" of the circumstances he faced when writing.[3]

Because it includes efforts to indicate the fluid nature of Paul's theologizing and because it satisfies the need to see Paul's thought as contingent upon both his experience and the situation he addressed, the model is a helpful one. However, there were also times when his convictions made sense of Paul's expe-

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[2] So especially Victor Furnish's formulations of the problem in, "Theology in 1 Corinthians: Initial Soundings," 1989 SBLSP (Atlanta: Scholar's Press, 1989) 247 and "Paul the Theologian" in *The Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul and John in Honor of L. Louis Martyn* eds. R. T. Fortna and B. R. Gaventa (Nashville: Abingdon, 1990) 19-34 and Jouette Bassler, "Paul's Theology: Whence and Whither? A Synthesis (of sorts) of the Theology of Philemon, 1 Thessalonians, Philippians, Galatians, and 1 Corinthians," in 1989 SBLSP, 412-423. These suggestions were followed by Calvin J. Roetzel, "Election/Calling in Certain Pauline Letters: An Experimental Construction," SBLSP 1990 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1990) 552-569.

[3] Bassler, "Whence and Whither?, 417-418.

riences, so that the movement in the model is in the opposite direction; from convictions to experiences thus producing a cyclical reinterpretation of both. Similarly, the "prism" of the perceived situation while affecting the linguistic expression of his convictions itself was shaped by them. In this regard Bassler's model needs modification.

To demonstrate how this occurs I suggest that we consider the conviction of Jesus's death and resurrection as an instance of conceptual metaphor. Using a theory of metaphor which distinguishes its ability to re-construe our conceptions and which offers some sense of its pragmatic nature, I will argue, in Part I, that metaphor can serve as a means of understanding how the conviction that Jesus died and was raised by God functions: 1) to structure Paul's thought about himself and 2) to challenge and so restructure the evaluative framework of his hearers. In Part II of the paper, I want to illustrate how this occurs by first providing the pattern of death/resurrection derived from 5:14-21 and then by analyzing how that pattern comes to expression in 4:7-15, part of Paul's discussion of the ministry. Then, in a briefer section I will suggest that the pattern prompts a new understanding of the collection for Jerusalem. I will try to show that the death and resurrection of Jesus can be well understood when it is considered as a conceptual or "generative" metaphor, that is, one which may take various forms of specific expression but which reflects a particular construction of relations between its constituent terms. This part of the paper depends on a particular view of metaphor as a linguistic expression. However, since I also think that viewing religious expressions as metaphor helps to explain their function within a community of belief and so clarifies how such statements are used theologically, I offer in a concluding section (Part III) some thoughts on the nature of metaphorical statements for conceiving of Paul as a theologian.[4]

## I. A Working Theory of Metaphor

Since the term "metaphor" has such a contentious history and because it is often thought of as an ornamental use of language with no place in serious discussion, it is necessary for me to provide a brief explanation of how I am using the term. The overview is not complete since the matter of defining metaphor, assessing its cognitive value, and determining the exact nature of its function in language have engendered significant debate among both philosophers of

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[4] It is obvious that this paper can be no more than a beginning point, but that is how I understand the intended function of our focal papers. This would be the case even if the paper dealt with death and resurrection using only more conventional methods, but because of the disputes concerning the nature and function of metaphor, its inchoate status is even more true. A complete project of this sort would require an argument for at least the following: 1) the chosen working definition of metaphor, 2) a study of metaphor's cognitive status and how metaphors make reference, and 3) how metaphorical speech is used by theologians. All of these are beyond the scope of this paper. Recent explorations into the use of metaphor in theological talk include those of, W. Alston, "Irreducible Metaphors in Theology," in *Divine Nature and Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) 17-38 and Garrett Green, *Imagining God: Theology and the Religious Imagination* (New York: Harper and Row, 1989). I have also found the unpublished paper of Ben C. Ollenburger, "We Believe in God...Maker of Heaven and Earth: Metaphor, Scripture, and Theology," (1990), quite helpful and thank him allowing me to see it.

language and linguists.[5] Nevertheless, in order to clarify how the term functions in this essay some attention to the theory is in order.

Eva Kittay's discussion of metaphor is congenial for my purposes because her theory combines a semantic and pragmatic understanding of metaphor.[6] The semantic and therefore cognitive element of her thesis enables me to suggest how Paul's thinking and the interpretation of his experiences have been structured by the theme of death and resurrection. The pragmatic functions of metaphor she describes provide the reasons why such restructuring could be valuable for Paul as tools for communication, especially in situations like those he faced in Corinth. Finally, because Kittay situates metaphor alongside literal language and argues that both are context dependent for meaning she provides an approach which does not dismiss or denigrate metaphor as merely figurative language and therefore somehow less valuable or truthful than literal propositional language.

Kittay starts from an argument for the contextual nature of all language. According to her, "Language itself is a bringing together of diversities into a unity of meaning which is contextually supported."[7] In other words *any* sentence or phrase (literal or figurative) brings discrete entities into a new constellation which takes on a meaning potentially different from any of the terms which make up that sentence. More prosaically, words and sentences are contextually dependent for meaning. Metaphor is a means of enhancing and distilling this process "by juxtaposing ideas which are distinct and incongruent,...."[8] In this way metaphor is distinct from, but continuous with, literal language.

On this account both literal as well as metaphorical language can perform operations of comparison. But, whereas literal comparison takes place within fixed or given categories, metaphor conjoins categories normally kept distinct, making it "the paradigmatic device for pointing out analogies and making comparisons which cross the bounds of our usual categories and concepts."[9] Formally speaking then, metaphor is a linguistic expression of a concept by which an object "n" is simultaneously presented in two modes A and B, where A and B are incompatible. In its typical usage the object is classified under category A but in the metaphor it is also brought under the classification of category B and this produces an anomaly.[10]

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[5] For a convenient and insightful overview of this debate see the introduction to *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor* (ed. Mark Johnson; Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1981), 3-47.

[6] Contemporary metaphor theory contains an ongoing debate about the cognitive status of metaphors. The strongest case against a cognitive view is made by Donald Davidson in "What Metaphors Mean,"in *On Metaphor*, (ed. S. Sacks; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) 29-46. Davidson's argues that metaphors have no special cognitive, only a pragmatic force. Kittay considers Davidson's arguments in her work and offers a critique of his position there (pp. 96-123). Even if Davidson's position turns out to be the correct one, I do not think the general thrust of the paper is greatly altered. One would need to focus only on the fact that thought is prompted by metaphor and leave conceptions of how this occurs out of the discussion.

[7] Kittay, 17. Colin Gunton provides an important discussion of metaphorical language and truth claims for theology in *The Actuality of the Atonement* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1989).

[8] Kittay, 17.

[9] Kittay, 19.

[10] The categories A and B are best understood as semantic fields or content domains. In Kittay's analysis "[a]ny experiential, phenomenal, or conceptual domain may be a content domain, for example, colour, fishing, electricity, etc. In other words, anything we

The anomaly that metaphor creates is important for our study because of its potential to reorient one's conceptual framework. With the creation of anomaly metaphor not only transfers the unknown to a given context of learning, but can change the context of learning itself.[11] Under usual conditions the statements we hear or read are assimilated into a context produced by our understanding of the conditions in the world but with an unusual expression like a metaphor an incongruity disrupts those "default" assumptions and causes us to rethink the statement.[12] If there is no reason to assume that the statement is a lie or that the speaker is incompetent in the language then we seek a proper context for interpretation. Thus we conclude that a statement is an indirect speech act, an instance of hyperbole or irony, etc. As Samuel Levin has suggested, usually, "given an incompatibility between [an] utterance and conditions in the world, the conditions are taken as fixed, and it is the utterance that must be construed. Now this is not a logically necessary position. We may, if we like, assume that, in the face of an incompatibility between what is asserted in an utterance and conditions as they obtain in the world, we regard the utterance as fixed and construe the world. Instead, that is, of construing the utterance so that it makes sense in the world, we construe the world so as to make sense of the utterance."[13] Further, on this account, "'defectiveness' is located in the world (i.e., the actual world), not in the utterance. "Deviant" utterances are taken literally; they mean what they say—what gives is the world."[14]

My proposal is that precisely this function of metaphor makes it valuable for Paul's problems with the Corinthians. Functioning within "normal" or given parameters his statements about himself and his ministry are conceived by the Corinthians in such a manner as to disqualify him as a proper representative of God. But with the metaphor of death and resurrection Paul disqualifies the given construction, what gives is not his ministry, but the criteria and framework the Corinthians have used to evaluate it.

As we have just noted, a metaphor's important feature is its ability to point out unseen similarities and analogies because it introduces an incongruity that causes us to reflect on our normal mode of evaluation. It is also the case that the

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may want to talk about, and which would require a set of related terms to talk about it, could serve as a content domain" (p. 34), In a complementary fashion a *semantic field* is a content domain which is structured in some specifiable way by certain relations of affinity or contrast. These relations include, but are not limited to, synonymy, hyponomy, cyclical series, noncyclical series, and ranking. When such relations are applied to a content domain it becomes a semantic field. Kittay uses the distinctions in order to allow for cases of metaphor where the topic is not easily conceived. In her analysis, "the topic is also a part of a system of ideas. From the imposition of one system upon another system, we arrive at meaning" (p. 35). Despite the possibility of confusion with other descriptions of semantic field I have used her terms because they help us realize that as a conceptual device the topic of a metaphor is not always well ordered. Kittay offers a full discussion of her understanding of semantic fields and content domains on pages 224-230.

[11] H. Petrie, "Metaphor and Learning," in *Metaphor and Thought*, (ed. Andrew Ortony; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) 441.

[12] On the matter of usual and unusual speech utterances see H. P. Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word Meaning," *Foundations of Language* vol. 4 (1968), 225-42.

[13] S. Levin, "Standard Approaches to Metaphor and a Proposal for Literary Metaphor," in *Metaphor and Thought*, 131.

[14] Levin, p. 131.

introduction of this incongruity "is related to the fact that when we categorize metaphorically we are guided by special interests—interests different from those which guide our usual classifications."[15] The use of metaphor enables us to highlight some aspects of the structured field and diminish others; it creates certain connections among terms and disallows other relationships; in short a metaphorical transfer is an intentional one made in order to structure the target domain in ways that accomplish the speaker's goals. Further, just as "classification and categorization are both orderings, the intrusion of an incongruity is a disordering—one that forces a reordering if the structure of our conceptual organization is to retain a coherency. A new perspective is achieved—a new, if tenuous, point of view on the issues in hand."[16] It is this intentional use of incongruity which allows Paul the reference point to continue his argument with the Corinthian understanding of the apostolic ministry.

In this description of metaphor I have suggested several reasons for seeing it as important in evaluating how death and resurrection functions within the letter's argument. I want to make these explicit now (1-3) and add two more (4 and 5) before turning to the analysis of 2 Corinthians:

1) Metaphor has a cognitive value in that it results in a reconceptualization of the topic under discussion so that properties of that topic are made conspicuous which before were not noticed and concepts held about the topic are reorganized. Metaphors map one conceptual structure onto another permitting the digitalization of information previously in analog form.[17] In this sense, metaphor, while a linguistic expression is also a way of structuring thought and so not dismissible as "ornamental language."

2) The introduction of an incongruity by metaphor causes us to pause and reconsider how we have conceived of the world, creating momentary disequilibrium in our cognitive framework. This in turn calls into question the default assumptions with which we normally interpret the data and experiences the world provides.[18] Further, metaphor not only creates cognitive disequilibrium; but helps resolve it by providing new ways in which to interpret and organize

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[15] Kittay, 22. Note here also Nelson Goodman's comments on how we make and remake our worlds in *Ways of Worldmaking* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978) 7-17. According to Goodman, we use mechanisms of composition and decomposition, relative weighting of kinds, orderings of entities, deletion and supplementation, and deformation, in order to construct the world in manners that suit our purposes for discussion or activity. Paul's use of the death and resurrection as criteria for evaluating the world can be understood as a combination of these methods by which the Corinthian perception of the world is altered and thus shown to be a made not a given reality.

[16] Kittay, 22.

[17] Kittay, 170.

[18] Default assumptions are "those assumptions upon which speakers rely, in both verbal and non-verbal behaviour, in the absence of any contextual evidence canceling or questioning such assumptions. Because speakers are scarcely conscious of employing such assumptions, they presume, again with little consciousness of making such presumptions, that their audience has the same assumptions. They are *default* assumptions because they are what we assume in the absence of any contradictory evidence. Therefore, they only become conscious when something occurs which jars, such as the use of 'she' rather than 'he' when the context does not indicate the gender of the subject. When attempts to communicate fail because the interlocutors each proceed from different (default) assumptions, or when the world as normally experienced is altered by social, economic, political, or natural (gradual or cataclysmic) forces, our assumptions may be jarred." Kittay, 57.

our concepts and experience. The jolting of those default assumptions is crucial to the success or failure of Paul's letter.

3) For the purposes of description I distinguish between "rhetorical metaphors"—those which appear within an argument at the level of explicit expression and "generative metaphors" which are tacit in an argument and which set the framework for seeing problems and solutions to those problems.[19] The disturbance of default assumptions brings generative metaphors into the open and allows a fresh description of the problem. The death and resurrection of Jesus is in this sense a "generative metaphor;" the phrase "bearing the death of Jesus" is an example of a rhetorical metaphor.

4) One can extend metaphors in that they invite further reflection the newly formed relations, and so can imply other relations which the metaphor does not make explicit. They are therefore expandable and productive, and so open-ended. In this sense metaphors invite participation on the part of the hearer. Understanding a metaphor means being able to use its analogies to broaden the structural model it provides and to make connections the author does not explicitly state.

5) In their invitation to participation metaphors create what David Cooper refers to as "special intimacy": "the bond which unites those who are reasonably deemed capable of hearing [an utterance]—and indeed, uttering it—with understanding."[20] The other side of this coin is that metaphors are also a challenge to a hearer in that they may not be understood. This permits one to consider Paul's use of metaphor as both invitation to an intimate relationship with him and as a matter of challenging address. This is both pragmatically important given the discord between Paul and the Corinthians, and theologically important in that it shows how metaphor can embody the essence of the gospel.[21]

I can now state my thesis with more precision. I am arguing that the structure by which terms such as death, life, the glory of God, and power are related to one another by the resurrection of Jesus from the dead is transferred by Paul to the terms of his ministry and by extension to the life of the Christian in the present time before the eschaton. This provides a structure for that ministry, and a way in which it, or any other ministry claiming to represent the gospel, can be adequately evaluated. Further, the understanding of life as eschatological is structured by the understanding that the raised Christ is the crucified Lord, or as Käsemann states it: "Christ, exalted above the cross in his sublimity, is misunderstood if one separates the exaltation from the cross, and so reduces the relationship to that of two merely consecutive events. The Risen and Exalted One remains the Crucified One; and his sovereignty is not understood and acknowledged if the cross is merely made the last station on his earthly way...."[22] In concrete terms this pattern of life requires practical demonstration and so Paul's call to the Corinthians for participation in the collection is not an optional request but a claim that truly understanding the nature of the gospel's soteriological

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[19] For a discussion of how generative metaphors work and are created see, Donald Schön, "Generative Metaphor: A Perspective on Problem-Setting in Social Policy," in *Metaphor and Thought*, 254-283.

[20] David Cooper, *Metaphor* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 156.

[21] Eberhard Jüngel discusses the way in which metaphors are appropriate forms of theological talk in "Metaphorical Truth: Reflections on Theological Metaphor as a Contribution to a Hermeneutics of Narrative Theology," in *Theological Essays* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989) 16-71.

[22] E. Käsemann, *Jesus Means Freedom* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968), 67.

faculty also means a commitment to its demands for a life lived for another. In other words, participation in the new existence results in actions which are embodiments of the crucified Lord, which can take place in an apostle as well as a believer.

## II. Analysis of 2 Corinthians

*A. Overview of the Problems*

The letter reveals a deep breach in the relationship between Paul and the Corinthians which seems to have been the result of a number of events and perceptions. On the one hand, the Corinthians are deeply disappointed by Paul's failure to visit them after receiving his promises to do so (1:15-2:2). They perceived this as a lack of affection on his behalf or perhaps as an indication that Paul was only a flatterer who promised one thing and did another. On the other hand, Paul was disappointed in the Corinthians' failure to support him when he was embarrassed and insulted on his last visit (2:5-11). Since then the relationship had become strained and the amount of reciprocal trust minimal.

There also appears to have been an element of distrust towards Paul as a sincere, competent messenger of God (1:12, 2:17, 3:5, 4:2, 5:11, and 6:3). For whatever reasons; perhaps a lack of success for his preaching (4:3), or his personal demeanor (4:7-15, 6:4-10), or perhaps an insufficient demonstration of charismatic signs which they thought appropriate to the apostolic office (5:12-13a), the Corinthians failed to see in him enough evidence of the power of God. This lack of trust also seems to extend to the collection and Paul's participation in it, about which the Corinthians had misgivings. Since he had so adamantly rejected their offers of financial help previously they wondered why the sudden reversal (1 Cor 9:15, 2 Cor 8:16-24, 9:1-5). Finally, other teachers had come to Corinth who appeared to be better representatives of the gospel than Paul and it was insinuated that his credentials were inadequate or inferior to theirs (2:14-3:6). For his part Paul perceived the activities of these other missionaries as potentially destructive for the community's well being and implied that they preach the gospel in a "watered down version" for their own gain (2:17, 4:1).

The combination of these social and theological misgivings resulted in the shutdown of mutual affection between Paul and the Corinthians (6:11-13, 7:2-3). Paul writes to restore this relationship, and to restore their understanding and trust in him as an apostle of God. This attempt forms the bulk of 2:14-7:4. If he were to be successful in that, he would desire the Corinthians to participate in the collection for Jerusalem which will demonstrate their correct understanding of the gospel and the reestablishment of his relationship with him (9:13).

It is clear that to accomplish these goals Paul must produce a credible defense of his activity as an apostle. But this already difficult matter is complicated because there were no set criteria for determining apostolic legitimacy until after Paul's death.[23] Not having an "objective" standard against which to be measured, and, matched to the missionaries now present in Corinth (against whom he does not compare well), Paul's major problem, from the standpoint of communication, is how to establish proper criteria without participating in the same self-commendation that he condemns in his rivals. Specifically this becomes

[23] So John Schütz, *Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 21.

clear when we consider how Paul answers the questions raised about his ministry.

In previous correspondence and preaching Paul had claimed that his preaching came with power (1 Cor 1:24, 2:4-5), and in this letter he argues that his ministry is one of surpassing glory (3:4-11), but there remained for the Corinthians a question of how this glory became manifest. Paul's discourse on apostolic ministry (2:14-5:21) is an attempt to answer that question, but in order for it to be successful, he must establish a proper set of criteria for judging words and actions that demonstrates why standard connections between power and demeanor were not acceptable. It is incumbent upon him to demonstrate that his gospel and life are consonant with "the gospel" and to do that he must dislodge the framework of evaluation used by the Corinthians.

Paul cannot avoid these charges against him: what he must do is re-orient the Corinthians' understanding of the presence and purpose of adversities in his life. He must demonstrate that these "disqualifiers" were actually direct manifestations of God's power. His success or failure in defense hangs upon the ability to make the Corinthians realize that the charges and the critics who have made them are using the wrong criteria for passing judgment. His reflections upon, and use of, the death and resurrection of Jesus as a interpretive key for his life and experiences as an apostle provide him with the needed criteria. The manner in which he applies the death and resurrection of Jesus metaphorically to his ministry can be demonstrated by considering 4:7-15.[24]

### B. The Structure of Death and Resurrection 5:14-21

In order to gain access to the interpretive structure which the death/ resurrection holds for Paul a consideration of 5:11-21 would be helpful. In that passage one encounters the most specifically theological (in Furnish's use of the term, i.e., critical reflection on a belief) interpretation in 2 Corinthians and perhaps in the Pauline corpus. Admittedly this is a section which is at least partially controlled by apologetics as verses 11-13 suggest. Paul is still involved with demonstrating the legitimacy of his own mission and of denying that legitimacy to his rivals. Thus, he offers a manner of defense to the Corinthians and, if verse 13 refers to charismatic activity, explains why these manifestations are not featured in his proclamation. Nevertheless, the assertions which appear in this section seem to go beyond polemic or apologetic interests, and as long as we are mindful of their apologetic tint they serve our investigation well.

The explicit claims in verses 18 and 19 and the ἵνα and ὥστε clauses of verses 15, 16, 17, and 21 provide important keys for determining Paul's understanding of the scope, nature, and implications of Jesus's death and resurrection. At least these four things can be stated: 1) God's reconciling action is given specific manifestation in the death and resurrection of Jesus, and according to 5:20 that same activity is presently manifested in the ministry of Paul. That is, the shape of his ministry is defined by its founding events, and God's appeal for reconciliation is extended through this ministry. Moreover, the giving of this ministry (to all

[24] In "Theology in 1 Corinthians" Furnish proposes moving from those passages in which Paul is most deliberate about reflecting upon a topic concerning the gospel to others in which these conceptions are developed, as a way to understand how Paul does theology (248-249). I consider 5:14-21 to be one of those passages where the fundamental topic death/resurrection is reflected upon and that the ramifications of death/resurrection are developed with regard to the ministry in 4:7-15.

believers, as the ἡμᾶς in 18c shows) is part of God's reconciling activity.[25] 2) The reconciling action is cosmic in scope (5:19) which implies that proper understanding of soteriology cannot be privatistic. The "all" of verse 14b is emphasized, and then extended to verse 14c with the ἄρα οἱ πάντες. The consequence is that an ontological shift on a universal scale has taken place, the death of the one means that all have died.[26]

We may infer from 5:15 that the eschatological purpose of Christ's death and resurrection is not simply for personal soteriological gain, but so that the "ones who live will no longer live for themselves, but for the one who died and was raised on their behalf."[27] Dying with Christ means dying to self, but living for Christ, following the clue in 4:5, (the διὰ Ἰησοῦν) is given form when one takes up the mission of Christ and lives in the service of others.[28] 3) The ὥστε clause of verse 16, which follows the ontic shift in verse 15 (no longer living for themselves but for the Christ) means that a new way of understanding has been effected. And the ὥστε clause in verse 17 which also draws an inference from verses 14 and 15 maintains that a cosmic transformation has occurred, thus claiming that the death and resurrection transform the world and its understanding of reality. Verses 16 and 17 are parallel statements but the ontological shift of verse 17 provides the context and basis for the epistemological shift of verse 16. Thus, one can talk of a new epistemology but only as a result of and consonant with a new ontology. Paul's point is not that a new knowing occurs (although it is a goal of the apology), but that knowing is now controlled by a new being, a new ontic reality. A new evaluative set of criteria has been established as a result of a new existence, and both are effected and demonstrated in the death and resurrection of Jesus. Proper knowing is, therefore, the result of proper being.[29] The ability to see κατὰ σταυρόν is predicated upon living κατὰ σταυρόν. Thus, proper knowing is not based on externals or standards of the world; rather it functions as a living κατὰ σταυρόν.[30] 4) Finally, the death and resurrection has as its ultimate goal, the reconciliation of the entire cosmos to God (v. 19a). Though it is manifest in God's actions toward and for humanity (v. 21) the reconciling message is finally a

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[25] Thus the phrasing in 4:1, ἔχοντες τὴν διακονίαν ταύτην καθὼς ἠλεήθημεν, the ministry is Paul's due to God's mercy.

[26] As Furnish suggests: "It (v.14) is perhaps better understood in relation to Paul's conviction that everything old has come to an end (v. 17). The perspective here, then, would be cosmic and eschatological: all have died in the sense that all without exception are the objects of God's love and as such have been drawn, quite apart from anything they have done (cf. Rom 5:6-11), into the sphere of God's saving purpose and power" (*II Corinthians*, 327-28).

[27] I take the two participles ἀποθανόντι καὶ ἐγερθέντι to be governed by the prepositional phrase τῷ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν.

[28] So also Furnish, who after recourse to Galatians and Rom 14-15 as a means of explication concludes: "This association of living for Christ and living for others gives point to the present passage as well. Paul wants his readers to recognize that apostleship is not demonstrated by external characteristics of the apostles themselves (v.12b), even should those be of an impressively 'religious' sort, like ecstatic utterances (v. 13a). Rather, the apostle, like every believer, is called to serve Christ by serving others. That is one claim Paul can and does make for his apostolate" (*II Corinthians*, 328-329).

[29] So also R. Tannehill, *Dying and Rising With Christ: A Study in Pauline Theology* (Verlag Alfred Töpelmann: Berlin, 1967), 69.

[30] So J. Louis Martyn, "Epistemology at the Turn of the Ages," in *Christian History and Interpretation: Studies Presented to John Knox*, (eds. W. Farmer, C.F.D. Moule, and R.R. Niebuhr; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) 285.

message that extends to all of creation, and it is therefore the demonstration of God's power and sovereignty.

Thus, death and resurrection supply a structure for Paul that clarifies the manner of present existence. It is an existence that is lived not for oneself, but for Christ and therefore in service of others. Secondly, it directs one's manner of knowing, and by extension shows how one makes known the truth. The founding events as redeeming events make clear that Christ's love is expressed in his death (v. 14). To the extent that one is controlled by that love (συνέχει) one will live in a manner in which his death is expressed. Similarly, the founding events serve as the canon by which one's life is shaped, and one's ministry is conducted. It is on this structure that Paul conducted his own ministry, interpreted its circumstances, and argued for its truth.

### C. The Structure in the Human Form of Paul's Ministry 4:7-15

The comparison between the prior ministry of Moses and the one now granted to the apostles culminates in the claim that those who have accepted this new message no longer have veiled minds, but behold the glory of the Lord and are being progressively transformed from one degree of its intensity to the next (3:16,18). But given the relationship between Paul and the Corinthians and their perceptions of him, this claim could not be stated without explanation. This Paul attempts in 4:1-6 and 4:7-15. Shifting the metaphor's plane from the divine action in Christ, he applies it to the divine action in his ministry. The function of the Christ as a bringer of life through death is mapped onto Paul's own activity. The mapping is not isomorphic, given Paul's understanding of the death/resurrection of Jesus as a one time event, but highlights the daily dying of the apostle as the means by which God continues the ministry of reconciliation to create new life.

The διὰ τοῦτο of 4:1 suggests that this transformation is the basis for the section which follows in 4:1-6.[31] Rather than shrink away from the gospel the apostle and his associates speak as a result of the power that causes this transformation. Hence, Paul argues that he and his associates, by the full disclosure of the truth (τῇ φανερώσει τῆς ἀληθείας), continue to preach only the gospel message; neither tampering with its content nor adopting a style which is inconsonant with its shape (v. 2), thus demonstrating their sincerity. This is expressed in more detail with the contrast in verse 5b where Paul interprets both the content of the preaching as Jesus Christ as Lord, and the manner of the apostolic presence as being a slave of others for Jesus' sake.[32] Thus the gospel is presented

[31] Bultmann points out the close connection of 3:7-18 to 4:1-6; noting that (1) the ἔχοντες in 4:1 takes up the ἔχοντες of 3:12; ( 2) the διακονία in 4:1 corresponds to that of 3:7; (3) the καθὼς ἠλεήθημεν in 4:1 corresponds to the διὰ Χριστοῦ of 3:4; and (4) the κεκαλυμμένον in 4:3f refers back to the κάλυμμα of 3:13-18 and the blinded νοήματα of 4:4 refers to the hardened minds of 3:14f just as the αὐγάσαι in 4:4 refers to the ἀτενίσαι in 3:13. R. Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1985) 99.

[32] Furnish, following Bultmann's suggestion that it is questionable to see Paul as referring to himself as part of the gospel, argues that Paul cannot intend to include the apostle's role as part of the preaching given the statement in v. 5a, even though the phrase is grammatically dependent on the κηρύσσομεν (*II Corinthians*, 223). However, taken as a statement of the apostle's behavior with the Corinthians and not as a form of preaching about oneself, it seems to me that the grammatical form can be followed. This, Bultmann actually seems to allow. (cf. C.K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the Second Letter to the Corinthians* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 134.

in both the speech and bearing of the apostle who labors for the Lord and the benefit of the Corinthians. Here the paradox, so evident in the next section, is expressed as the antithesis of those who are deceitful in presenting the gospel. Thus, the combination of what Paul preaches and how he conducts himself is what makes his ministry commendable both to the conscience of all and before God.

This section also introduces once more the paradox of the gospel. Paul's gospel *is* and *is not* veiled depending on the manner in which it is received. Paul, despite external indications to the contrary, claims not to veil, but reveal the gospel. Proper understanding of the message and its form enables one to see the glory of Christ; without it one remains blinded. The gospel as such is equivocal only in that it does not yield to "this-world reasoning" but rather calls that form of reasoning into question. Thus the gospel is the entity which causes a judgment, not on itself, but on its hearers (v. 4). The "glory of Christ" is seen when one accepts that it is the glory of the crucified Christ. God, who illumines, counters the god of this age who blinds (v. 4), causing knowledge and enlightenment in the hearts of believers (v. 6). Those who are enlightened by the knowledge of the splendor of God are just the ones who comprehend the paradox—glory is in the face (the person) of the one who was crucified. The structure of the message has implications for the apostolic role, and Paul turns to those in verses 7-15.

As most commentators note, 4:7-15 is part of the larger unit that extends through 5:10. Furnish refers to its subject as "apostolic confidence," and so it is a continuation of the discussion begun in 2:14. Still, as he notes, "beginning in 4:7 another and special subject is present, initially formulated as the suffering of apostles (4:8-9), then enlarged to the topic of mortality (4:11), and thereafter further extended to include the situation of all believers (4:18ff.). Here Paul acknowledges that the sufferings and generally unglorious careers of himself and his apostolic associates might be (and evidently have been) taken by some as invalidating their claim to be ministers of a new covenant of surpassing glory (3:7-4:6). These mortal adversities he now interprets as an integral and appropriate part of true apostleship (4:7-15),..."[33] The previous section has claimed that the δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ is present in Paul's ministry; the question he now attempts to answer is how, given the fact that his life does not display the expected manifestations of God's glory, this can be so.

The pericope can be divided into four units: the thesis statement (v. 7), the catalog of hardships presented by the antitheses in verses 8-9, the theological interpretation of those adversities by verses 10-12, and the implication and extension of that interpretation to show that these adversities are for the ultimate purpose of "the overflowing of thanksgiving to the glory of God" (vv. 13-15).[34] Two parts of the metaphoric structuring become evident in these verses: the

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[33] Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 277. Lambrecht refers to the section as "a meditation on the paradox of a process of death which bears within itself, and already manifests, life, and which, ultimately, through the resurrection will culminate in an eternally lasting and glorious existence. What is mortal will, finally, be swallowed up by what is life without further ado (cf. 5,4). Because Paul meditates here on the relationship between suffering and eventual glory, we can distinguish this section of his apology from what precedes (2,14-4,6) and follows (5,11-7,4). "The Nekrôsis of Jesus Ministry and Suffering in 2 Cor 4, 7-15" in *L'Apôtre Paul* (ed. A. Vanhoye; Leuven: University Press, 1986), 122-123.

[34] Lambrecht makes another division vv. 7-12, 13-14, and 15, arguing that separating verse 15 like this emphasizes the ultimate purpose of apostolic service; God's glory. "The Nekrôsis of Jesus," 128.

reinterpretation of suffering as death and the understanding of the ministry as an extension of resurrection life. Paul as one who is dying is also the one in whom the power of God to produce life can be seen. As the crucified Christ was the locus of God's most significant demonstration, so too in the his present afflicted existence is the apostle the visible manifestation of that power.

Paul uses a form of the peristasis catalog, common in both Jewish apocalyptic and hellenistic philosophy, to show that his ministry is located in, and by, God's power, despite appearances to the contrary.[35] However, in distinction from those catalogs, Paul does not deny the real nature of the adversity that he has endured, nor, as in Stoic forms, does he argue that this endurance was the result of his own efforts. Rather, here as in 1:8-10, Paul applies the generative structure of life from death, and so interprets his deliverance in terms of the God who raises the dead. The same power that raised Jesus from the dead (1:10) is active in delivering Paul from peril and afflictions. In both passages, Paul's experiences are interpreted and given meaning by his conviction that God acts to bring life from death.[36] Though the afflictions are not Paul's desire, nor sought by him, they are intrinsic to his ministry because in them God shows the incomparable power which is God's alone. Thus, the afflictions are not only a demonstration of God's power, but an actual manifestation of the gospel. For, in the apostle the embodied nature of God's redemptive power—strength in weakness, life in death, light from darkness—is revealed (4:10-12). What the Corinthians have understood as evidence which proves the apostle's illegitimate claim to the apostolic office is reconstrued by means of the metaphoric exchange as direct evidence of God's activity in his life. The evidence remains the same, but by means of the new structure its assessment is reversed.

The terms *θησαυρόν* and *ὀστρακίνοις σκεύεσιν* (v. 7) reflect backward and forward respectively to 4:1-6 and 4:8-9. The treasure, whether taken to be the ministry or the gospel, is embodied in the mortality of the apostles. The primary idea of the phrasing is to conjoin the treasure and earthen vessels. That is, the concept Paul desires the Corinthians to grasp is the contrast between treasure and earthen vessels. A vessel's worth comes from what it holds, not from what it is. The treasure is found in vessels which are surprisingly different from their content. The outward appearance cannot be taken as a sure guide to the inner contents; rather the outward container must be judged by what it holds.

For Paul however, this contrast is not only an illustration, but a principle of the ministry. Guided by the relationship between death and power that is created by the resurrection, Paul argues that not only can the treasure be found in earthen vessels, it must be. To be a message about this event and therefore to

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35 See on this Wolfgang Schrage, "Leid, Kreuz und Eschaton: Die Peristasenkataloge als Merkmale paulinischer theologia crucis und Eschatologie," *EvT* 34 (1974) 141-75, Robert Hodgson, "Paul the Apostle and First Century Tribulation Lists," *ZNW* (1983) 59-80, and J. Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: an Examination of Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence* (Atlanta: Scholar's Press, 1988).

36 In 1:8-9 the phrasing *ὥστε ἐξαπορηθῆναι ἡμᾶς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν· ἀλλὰ αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὸ ἀπόκριμα τοῦ θανάτου ἐσχήκαμεν* implies that from a human standpoint Paul was certainly dead. There existed no deliverance from the situation which he faced. When he did survive he understood it as an instance of God's power and an attestation that God raises the dead. Moreover, this is a continuing factor in God's being and in Paul's life as the future tense *ῥύσεται* (v.10) shows. Paul learns in this incident that the ministry, indeed, his own life is dependent at all times on the power of God, and that alone. Dependence on self or others is impossible. Thus, here he understands existentially the religious affirmation, "God raises the dead."

properly present it, the gospel message requires a form consonant with its content, whether in the type of speech employed or in the one speaking. Not only must the message be shaped by the event, but also the messenger. Here one sees the generative metaphor's effect. The bearer of the message cannot act on its own, but in obedience to the message's content. As the death/resurrection scheme maintains that the Christ must act in accord with the redemptive actions, so also the representative of God. Thus, as the metaphoric structure is transferred to the field of apostleship an indispensable correlation between the mortality of the apostles and the message which they proclaim is created. The gospel/ministry must be presented by those whose lives are fragile, in order to show that the power comes from God alone (v. 7b).

Here, the point Paul had made concerning his mode of preaching in 1 Cor 1:17-18, *οὐ γὰρ ἀπέστειλέν με Χριστὸς βαπτίζειν ἀλλὰ εὐαγγελίζεσθαι, οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου, ἵνα μὴ κενωθῇ ὁ σταυρὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ. Ὁ λόγος γὰρ ὁ τοῦ σταυροῦ τοῖς μὲν ἀπολλυμένοις μωρία ἐστίν, τοῖς δὲ σῳζομένοις ἡμῖν δύναμις θεοῦ ἐστιν* (see also 1 Cor 2:1-5) is directly applied to his life as an apostle. Not only the message, but the speaker must convey the gospel and this means that life proceeding out of death must be manifest in him. Only when the mode of speech and the presence of the speaker are consonant with the cruciform nature of the message can the word of the cross occur and so be the power of God (1 Cor 1:18). Any other manifestation robs the cross of its power; hence, Paul's innuendoes about "peddlers of God's word" and "tampering with the word of God" in 2:17 and 4:3 when striking out at his rivals.

The *ἐν παντί* of verse 8 governs all four of the contrasts made in verses 8-9, which makes it clear how the treasure is born in the mortal bodies of the apostles; not as incidentals, nor as accident, but as a continuing part of the ministry. This reference to "in every way" is picked up in verse 10 with the use of the temporal adverb *πάντοτε* and in verse 11 with the use of *ἀεί*. The result is that both in the report and in its interpretation, the adversities are understood as a typical and constant part of Paul's ministry, not exceptions or anomalies. But why the adversities are always present as a part of the ministry is explained by the interpretations found in verses 10-11 and the resulting conclusion given in verse 12, which ground them in death/resurrection and its present mode of manifestation.

The cognitive function of metaphoric structure is evident in this construction of Paul's ministry. Paul's conception and understanding of adversity and its relationship to his life is shaped by the relationship of death and life found in the paradigm of the Christ event. Thus, in order to proclaim the gospel rightly, the instances of dying which the apostle experiences are no less necessary than the death which Christ experienced. For the life of the gospel to appear, dying is a necessary part of the ministry, both within the "logic" of the gospel and because it is the embodiment of that gospel. With these verses Paul interprets the adversities in light of the death and resurrection of Jesus and concludes that the afflictions of the apostle result in the life of the community of belief. In this way he embodies the founding events of the gospel, which produces new life by the dying of the Christ. The life and ministry is thus given shape and organized by the generative metaphoric structure.

In effect the metaphor transfers these relationships to the apostle's own existence and so shifts the relationship between his adversities and the demonstration of power. What was formerly disjoined is now conjoined. The dying of the apostle is the potential for life in others. As a sharer of death, Paul understands himself as a recipient of God's life, but not for himself alone. The life is given so

that it may be engendered in others. The pattern found in 5:14-15 is here utilized to present the apostolic existence in a new light. Paul rather than a fraud is a representation of God's activity in Christ. As Christ died to bring life, so the apostle brings life through his "death." The adversities are not coincidental to Paul's life, but a necessarily constant part of his ministry, for they give form to his preaching and are an integral part of his message. Indeed, they are visible manifestations of what he says. As verse 10 makes clear, the adversities are the "dying of Christ."[37]

The ἵνα clause of verse 10 (which is parallel to the those found in vv. 7 and 11) makes certain that the reason for this dying is not missed. Bearing the dying of Jesus in his body means that the life of Jesus is disclosed. This life is, of course, the resurrection life of Jesus, which is the incomparable demonstration of the power of God.[38] Thus, the apostle's manner of existence is a physical expression of the gospel's message. Bearing the dying of Jesus, he reveals the resurrection life of Jesus and it is because of this belief in the resurrection that Paul makes such an audacious claim for his own calamities.[39] Thus, the generative metaphor functions to interpret the experiences so that the sufferings of Paul are expressed by the rhetorical metaphor as the *νέκρωσις τοῦ Χριστοῦ*.

This same thought is given further breadth in verse 11 which is structurally and materially parallel to verse 10. The "bearing of the dying in his body" is now explained. This life of constant dying happens because Paul's life follows the pattern established by the death of Jesus. It is in his mortal flesh that the resurrection life is made manifest. Thus διὰ Ἰησοῦν does not mean for Jesus's sake, but because of Jesus. That is, just as the death of Jesus brings life, so must it be with those who are representatives of him.[40] Hence, on the apostle's understanding adversities cannot be avoided or seen as disqualifications because they are the necessary medium for the gospel's expression. The life of Jesus breaks through in this existence, not by overcoming adversities, but by re-interpreting them. Thus Paul calls these afflictions and persecutions dying, metaphorically structuring them so that they are, therefore, not to be denied (nor sought in some form of Christo-masochism) but understood in light of the definitive action God has taken in the death and resurrection of Christ. Situated between the founding events and their future completion (4:14), the Christian resides now in hope, established and informed by the metaphorical use of those events.

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[37] The phrase *τὴν νέκρωσιν τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι φανερωθῇ*, though an unusual term for Paul (*νέκρωσις* elsewhere only in Rom 4:19), is used here in a way similar to *θάνατος*, as v. 11 shows. Nevertheless, here the word takes on the aspect of the process of dying. Thus, as Bultmann suggests, "Paul uses *νέκρωσις* instead of *θάνατος*, since in this passage dying with Christ is not meant in that basic sense of a once for all (anticipatory) event in the Baptism, but in the sense that it continually occurs in concrete historical life" (*Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 117).

[38] The 'life of Jesus' of which Paul speaks in vs. 10 corresponds to the 'power of God' of vs. 7. Just as the power of God manifests itself in the experiences of physical deliverance summed up in vss. 8-9, so this 'life of Jesus' manifests itself 'in our body,' that is, in the same experiences of physical deliverance. Thus the 'life of Jesus' is another way of referring to this divine power" (Tannehill, 84).

[39] Note here the use of *φανερωθῇ* which connects the apostle's life to his preaching (2:14; 4:2). Just as his preaching is an open statement of the truth, so is his "life of dying" an open manifestation of God's power to give life. The power of God, as expressed in the resurrection life, is revealed in the apostle's life. As the death of Jesus is a necessary part of the giving of life so the apostle understands his own bearing of that dying to be a necessary part of the ministry.

[40] So also Furnish, (*II Corinthians*, 257) against Barrett, 140.

It is also evident that this section exploits the interpretive and jarring nature of the metaphor which is a necessary part of Paul's rhetorical goals. The apostle's ministry and life are interpreted as manifestations of the death and resurrection of Jesus. Those foundational events produce the proper relationship between death and life: not as opposites, but as necessary complementaries. This proposed understanding challenges the Corinthians' own manner of evaluation because it provides as proof of the apostle's legitimacy just that evidence which they understood as his disqualification. In so doing Paul provides a new way of interpreting the evidence of the apostle's life and with this metaphoric structure of death in life calls the Corinthians to reevaluate not Paul, but themselves. That is, the cognitive framework in which they have understood apostleship and Christian life is rejected by the apostle. If before they were able to assimilate his language and life into their conceptual framework, it is Paul's present contention that this framework is incompatible with the new existence. With the new metaphoric structure the roles have been reversed. Those whose value are threatened are not those who manifest the death of Christ, but those who refuse to do so. The new life, the transformation from glory to glory, is present and can be seen, but only by those who evaluate the evidence properly.

Thus Paul claims, the resurrection life, though it will not be perfectly materialized before the eschaton (4:14; 5:2-5), is nevertheless present now. The questions how the apostle can be a representative of the gospel and how the glory of God can be now present, are answered in these verses. The presence of God's power is most clearly expressed in the afflictions and adversities of this mortal existence. Thus, the pithy formulations of 12:10 and 13:4 are already foreshadowed here. The weakness of the apostle is a determinative proof of the presence of the power of God and an integral part of his ministry. As Furnish has stated: "the labors, risks, and sufferings of the apostle are not to be regarded as just the unfortunate consequences of his Christian witness, or as impressive evidence of the strength of his faith. Rather, they constitute the very essence of his witness, because they disclose the life-giving death of Jesus. They are in and of themselves *kerymatic*."[41]

In verse 12 the consequence of this existence is stated. God acts through death to cause life. The verb form ἐνεργεῖται is most likely a passive, like φανερωθῇ in verses 10-11.[42] The meaning then becomes that God uses death to bring life and so uses the "dying lives" of the apostles to bring life to the Corinthians. Paul's ministry then extends to the Corinthians to give life through his death. Thus, the thesis statement of verse 7 is once more brought into view. The external adversities have been interpreted not as happenstance occurrences, but as the work of God in the apostle which enables life to spread to the Corinthians. Here too the pattern of Christ is evident, for it is through the death of the Christ that God brings the world new life.

This understanding of his mission leads Paul to the concluding verses of the section. Drawing on Ps. 115 (LXX), Paul compares his faithful actions to those of the psalmist. Using the terms "believing" and "speaking" he claims that, like the Psalmist he speaks in adversity. He preaches because it is just that action which

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41 V. Furnish, "Paul the MARTUS," in *Witness and Existence: Essays in Honor of Schubert M. Ogden* (eds. Philip E. Devenish and George L. Goodwin; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 78

42 So too Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 257, following Norbert Baumert, *Täglich sterben und auferstehen. Der Literalsinn von 2 Kor 4,12-5,10* (München: Kösel-Verlag, 1973), 72-73.

demonstrates his faith. Believing in the God who raised Jesus means understanding God to be working now in his life; therefore Paul's preaching stems from faith. Though his outward appearance is that of dying, Paul understands this existence to be part of his faithful witness to the one who raises the dead, and who will ultimately raise him, together with the Corinthians on the final day. Thus, Paul claims that the legitimacy of his ministry will be known with a final test, that is, the readers' future resurrection with Jesus will demonstrate the faithfulness of his preaching to them. This leads him to the ultimate goal of the preaching which he expresses in verse 15. The syntax of this verse is quite convoluted, although its sense is generally clear.[43] It is true that all of Paul's ministry is for the sake of the Corinthians (as opposed to the self-serving he perceives in his rivals), but this is not its ultimate aim, which, for Paul, must be seeking to give glory to God. This goal however, is achieved as more and more of the creation recognizes God's saving purposes and so contributes to the thanksgiving which gives God the glory for that action. Here then, like in 1:11, Paul insists that truly comprehending God's power means moving past an understanding of χάρις "for me," to its expansion throughout the world.[44]

Thus, in this section of the letter Paul's conviction about the death and resurrection of Christ is used metaphorically to reconstitute his adversity-filled life by means of the death/resurrection life structure, his adversities are to be understood as a dying which brings life. He thus presents the main address of the gospel itself. As the cross will not be fit into reigning understandings of reality so also Paul's life will not be fitted into preset understandings of power and value. As an expression of God's actions in the death and resurrection of Christ Paul's ministry forces a reexamination of the self. Here the pragmatic function of metaphors is evident. The anomaly of the gospel as presented in Paul's ministry cannot be assimilated into former world construals; they are incompetent to do so. Rather, the gospel claims that its reality is the framework for construing the world. Thus, understanding the gospel also means restructuring one's world. With his characterization and enactment of the ministry as a "dying life" Paul has produced a metaphor that forces the same decision. To recall Levin's words about metaphors, what gives is not the utterance, but the world. Like the gospel Paul's ministry calls the hearer into question by its very form and that is what provides its legitimacy.

### D. The Pattern Expanded 2 Cor 8-9

Briefly I would like to suggest that the expandable nature of metaphor is also present in the epistle by considering Paul's oblique references to the collection as demonstrations of διακονία. In 8:1 a similar pattern to that of 4:7-15 is used to describe the Macedonian participation in the collection. Out of their affliction and depth of poverty comes a wealth of liberality. Just as life has come from death in Paul's ministry so here the Macedonians give liberally from their scarce monetary resources. Interestingly, in verse 4 this is referred to as τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς διακονίας. Paul repeats this use of διακονία in 9:1 and especially in 9:12 and 13; each time as a reference to the collection. Of particular note in the latter instance is that this participation results in increased thanksgiving to God (v. 12) and the

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[43] For discussions of the syntactic difficulties see Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 259-260.

[44] Cf. George Boobyer, *"Thanksgiving and the 'Glory of God' in Paul* (Borna-Leipzig: Universitätsverlag von Robert Noske, 1929) 79-80.

glorifying of God by the Corinthians (v. 13). Moreover, this is a test of their service, a way in which they can bring glory to God, and an acknowledgement of the gospel which is a display of their obedience to the pattern established by that gospel in Christ (cf. 8:8, 24). All of this suggests that the collection is itself structured by the generative metaphor (death/resurrection) that structures Paul's conceptions of his ministry. There is thus a double transfer of the metaphor's structure; from the field of the death and resurrection of Jesus, to the field of Paul's ministry, to the matter of the collection. The Macedonians give shape to their belief, they enact in their giving the pattern of the founding events. From their participation comes the confirmation that they belong to God and to Paul (8:5).

Casting the collection in this light makes the matter of the Corinthian participation more imperative than Paul's language appears to suggest on first sight. The collection was an obvious point of difficulty, and Paul chooses his language quite carefully in this section. Still, by creating the link between the collection and the form of ministry which he argues is the only form proper to the gospel, Paul implies that it is through the collection that the Corinthians demonstrate their commitment to the gospel. Thus, in 8:8-9 he makes reference once more to the Christ event and its consequences and suggests that this model is to be followed by the Corinthians, so that they may prove their love for others. The delicate matter of participation, about which Paul is deeply concerned, could not be approached directly by command (v. 8), but through the transitive use of the metaphor Paul's rhetorical objective can be achieved.[45]

Thus, the metaphor is extended and the invitation of interpretation broadened to include a praxis for the gospel. The gospel understood means the gospel embodied as living out the mission in the service of others. This implies that the collection is not an option that can be ignored. The giving of money (an imminently tangible symbol of power) is a visible display of not trusting in one's own means for sufficiency, but understanding that all means of power are ultimately related to and dependent upon God. Thus, Paul's hope that the glory of God will

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[45] In her discussion Kittay has suggested how this ability of metaphor to structure a distant field implicitly occurs. Referring to R. Buckminster Fuller's geodesic structures she notes how three equilateral triangles can be situated contiguously to form two more: a fourth formed by the interior sides of the initial three and a fifth that incorporates all four as one large triangle. Thus, with the appropriate placement of the first three triangles the others are formed. This she suggests can be an appropriate use of metaphor. Situating the boundaries of one field in a particular relation to another "yields a concept that need never be explicitly stated, and whose existence need not be explicitly asserted, for it to be operative in our understanding of the metaphor" (Kittay, 277). This I think is the logic of chapters 8 and 9 in the letter. Though the explicit arguments of the first seven chapters are not specifically invoked, it is not because they are forgotten, Rather the understanding of ministry lies behind Paul's references to the collection in these chapters. Thus an understanding of the ministry which follows Paul's conception naturally results in the participation in the collection. By creating the double extension from death resurrection to the collection Paul makes his claim without an explicit demand.

So also John Koenig, who asks, "Is it merely a coincidence that in 2 Corinthians 8-9 Paul repeatedly names the collection for the poor believers in Jerusalem ἡ διακονία—and always with the definite article (8:4, 9:1,12,13)? See also 9:13, where the apostle envisions that the Corinthians' help in this project will bring about a significant glorification of God by the Jerusalem church. It appears that for Paul the next step forward to be taken by the Corinthians in the ministry of reconciliation is the completion of their part in the collection." John Koenig, "The Knowing of Glory and Its Consequences (2 Corinthians 3-5)," in *The Conversation Continues*, 169, n.25

reach further and further is given concrete form when the Corinthians realize that their participation in the gospel is a faithful rendering of their own understanding of God's grace.

### III. Metaphor and Theology

It is clear that an analysis such as this is only a beginning point. Incomplete as it is, I think the study does suggest that metaphor is a fruitful way forward in assessing how the core convictions which Paul held could function in structuring his thought. This suggests three other matters that one would want to consider.

First, the open-ended nature of metaphor which allows for its extendibility has positive and negative features. On the positive side the manner in which metaphor provokes thought allows a "non-syllogistic" logic to be proposed when we consider how Paul's thoughts cohere. There is an organic nature to Paul's thinking and considering how metaphor plays a role in structuring thought allows us to see how the links Paul makes, even, and especially, when they do not appear to be syllogistically evident ones. On the negative side metaphors can be taken in directions which the utterer had not intended. Here one sees how Paul's preaching, teaching, and letters could be interpreted in ways which differed from his desires or intent; not because of outside influence or a desire to refute the apostle, but because the metaphors themselves allow for this. This helps explain why Paul was sometimes misunderstood and why part of his task as a "theologian" was to create contexts which narrowed the possible avenues of interpretation to those consonant with other aspects of the gospel.[46]

This suggests another feature of the theological task. The relationship of one metaphor to another needs attention. To conceive of Paul's theology we must ask if there are metaphors which are hierarchically more important than others; more to the point one will need to consider which analogies are better interpretations of belief and which are not. Metaphors, because they are structural reorderings do not allow for complete paraphrase by their very nature. We can present some paraphrases, but not all of them and this point has important exegetical implications. Our exegeses must present adequate paraphrases, but we cannot forget that they will inevitably be incomplete.

But this also reminds us of an important theological condition provided by metaphor. Metaphor is a necessary part of religious and theological language because it is a form of expression that will not yield to a replacement expression. There are times when metaphor resists complete paraphrase not only because it is intrinsic to this form of linguistic expression, but because it is theologically necessary. We want certain expressions to serve as challenges, to present address, and to invite the hearer to participation in their understanding. As this occurs the world of the hearer is brought into question, allowing for its reorientation by the structure that the metaphor provides. As this represents the nature of metaphor it suggests that attention to those expressions which are significant metaphors need proper interpretation which preserves just this orienting nature.

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46 "[E]ven if the utterer of the metaphor intended only one such contrast, the reader is free to construe as many as will in fact result in interesting induced relations. Such a reader will not properly be accused of misreading the metaphor. What we commonly say here is that the metaphor reveals more than what was intended by its creator. Our representation provides a nice mechanism by which to account for the multifarious and non-exclusive possibilities inherent in metaphorical interpretation." Kittay, 172.

Finally, metaphor is no fool-proof therapy, despite its potential to capture much of what religious language attempts. Offering a new metaphor to replace an older one which no longer serves the community's needs, or proposing analogies for interpreting metaphors which do is an ongoing task. These attempts at expressing the beliefs of the religion may fail, even when the metaphors are apt. Metaphorical theology is not an alternative to interpretation, but an intrinsic part of interpretation, thus it cannot be forgotten in our attempts to discover Paul's theology or write that theology anew. However, if the letter to the Corinthians is any indication, even those metaphors which are expressed in a forceful and striking manner may not result in the desired goal. Like all expressions that reflect the gospel there is always the possibility that they will not be heard, but this too is in keeping with a gospel that insists on its nature as address.[47]

[47] I would like to thank Beverly Gaventa and J. C. Beker for discussions about this paper and especially Hendrikus Boers for considerable help in both its conceptual and actual construction.

# The New *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule*: The Quest for Jewish Christology

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On the back cover of Larry W. Hurtado's book, *One God, One Lord* (Philadelphia, 1988), Martin Hengel has a statement to the effect that "a new 'Religionsgeschichtliche Schule'" appears to be in formation. From the book itself, it can be inferred that the prime champions of the 'new' History of Religions School include Christopher Rowland, Alan Segal, and the present author, as well as Hurtado himself. We must now also add the name of Carey Newman, the chair of the new SBL Consultation of which the present article is the pilot paper.[1]

Reading Hurtado's book, it will be realized that he does not embrace his collaborators all the time. There was also some disagreement among the members of the *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule*, as is especially evident in their reviews of the works of their fellow scholars. But however much the members of the two respective History of Religions Schools may be seen to differ among themselves, it can also be ascertained that they share the same general outlook.

The focus of the 'new' School is *Christology*. This was not the pivot of the old *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule*, at least not to begin with. In 1903, however, Hermann Gunkel published a book on the *teaching about Jesus*.[2] Gunkel argued that the New Testament teaching about Jesus was indebted to Oriental saviour myths which had made their way into certain Jewish quarters. The religion of John and Paul, as well as the Jewish form of religion on which it was based, was a 'syncretistic religion.'

In his hitherto unparalleled work, *Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter* (Berlin, 1903; 2nd ed., 1906),[3] Wilhelm Bousset argued that Judaism in the first century CE was no simple continuation of the old religion of Israel, but had become heavily influenced by Oriental religion, especially Persian lore. Bousset asserted that the Christian concept of a heavenly, pre-existent

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[1] See his Dissertation, *Glory of God in the Face of Jesus* (Baylor University, 1989), to be published in the series, NovTSup.

[2] See *Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Verständnis des Neuen Testaments* (FRLANT 1; Göttingen, 1903). The book is based on lectures given in the autumn of 1901.

[3] 3rd edition by H. Gressmann, *Die Religion des Judentums im späthellenistischen Zeitalter* (HNT 21; Tübingen 1926 and reprints).

Messiah was indebted to a Jewish preoccupation with *Mittelwesen*, i.e, angels and divine hypostases, which in turn owed to Persian ideas.[4]

In 1921, Richard Reitzenstein, a classical philologist who had become attracted to the *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule*, published a book on an allegedly ancient 'Iranian redemption mystery' which he dedicated to Bousset.[5] This 'mystery of redemption' constituted the heart of Gnosticism, a powerful form of religion in late antiquity which Bousset already had tried to derive from Oriental sources.[6] Reitzenstein argued that the kernel of Gnosticism was as follows: In primordial times, a heavenly being descended to the realm of darkness, where the evil powers managed to sequester his soul. They then made the material body of the first human being after the image of the heavenly figure whom they had seen, and imprisoned his soul or spirit in this creation. Thus, the heavenly Man had to descend for a second time in order to gather to himself his own soul or spirit, now dispersed throughout the human race. This originally Iranian concept of a saviour being substantially identical with humankind allegedly lay behind the Christological title of 'the Son of Man,' meaning simply 'Man,' and Paul's phrase, 'the Man from heaven.'

In his various works on the Gospel of John, the eminent New Testament scholar Rudolf Bultmann drew on Bousset and Reitzenstein.[7] The Fourth Gospel, where we can find an intimate relationship between the redeemer and his disciples, thus turned out to be the most primitive Gospel insomuch as it was seen to contain a pre-Christian 'Christology.' The Gospel of John could be regarded as a kind of demythologized Gnostic Gospel.

Having studied religion and theology at Norwegian Universities in the latter part of the sixties and the first part of the seventies, I started out as a disciple of Bousset, Reitzenstein, and Bultmann, whose influence in Scandinavia was rather overwhelming at that time. In 1975, however, I got the opportunity to move to The Netherlands, where I stayed for thirteen years, after which period I accepted exile in the United States. At the University of Utrecht, Gilles Quispel, who eventually became my *Doktorvater*, and in the beginning also Willem Cornelis van Unnik, whose untimely death in 1978 was most deplorable, introduced me to a new perspective. In various other ways (best told by themselves), Rowland, Segal, Hurtado, and Newman were exposed to the same kind of perspective.

One should not kid oneself. Whatever my collaborators may think of themselves, I for one realize that I shall never become a scholar of the caliber of Bousset, Reitzenstein, or Bultmann. But the point is that they were wrong, whereas I am right.

The *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule* arose at a time when the results of source criticism had been accepted. In Old Testament studies, Julius Wellhausen had demonstrated that the Pentateuch was made up of four different sources. In New Testament studies, Heinrich Julius Holtzmann had formulated the two-document hypothesis (which still would seem to work, at least in the classroom). But

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4 See especially the last chapter, pp. 448-93 (first edition). It should be noted that Bousset here places the concept of Christ as a heavenly, preexistent being quite early; cf. Hurtado, 137 n. 17.

5 See *Das iranische Erlösungsmysterium* (Bonn, 1921).

6 See, above all, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis* (FRLANT 10; Göttingen, 1907).

7 See especially his magisterial commentary, *Das Evangelium des Johannes* (Meyer K 2; Göttingen, 1941 [first edition], 1968 [19th edition]). A handful of Bultmann's articles on the Gospel of John can be found in his *Exegetica* (ed. E. Dinkler; Tübingen, 1967).

what about the stage *before* the written text? The antiquity of a term or concept does not coincide with its manifestation in the text of the Bible. The Biblical texts have a written and/or oral pre-history. The basic aim of the religious historical approach is to find the origin of the terms and motifs used in the Biblical texts.[8]

Now it must be emphasized that this does not imply that the old or the new School was/is insensitive to the particular way in which the Biblical authors may employ traditional material. Already Bousset was well aware of the adaptation that the traditional material often underwent at the hand of the Biblical writers. But in order to understand fully the usage of a term or concept in the text under consideration, knowledge of the *original* meaning is mandatory.

The basic difference between the two History of Religions Schools is that the 'new' School looks *elsewhere* than the German school for the materials of primitive Christology. The German *Schule* looked to the imperial cult, the mystery religions, and Oriental religion, especially Iranian tradition. It is true that some parallels can be established between the Cult of the emperor and early Christianity: The emperor was called *kyrios*, he was seen as a universal *sōtēr*; he was *kosmokratōr*; his birth, accession to the throne, and his various decrees could all be referred to as *euangelion*.

Now this does not amount to more than a terminological correspondence with early Christianity, because the Christians put another meaning into these terms than what was done in the imperial cult. Moreover, the derivation of these epithets is to be found in the East. The imperial cult and Christianity could have adopted/adapted these terms more or less independently of one another.

Parallels can also be seen between the mystery gods and Christ. The Christian saviour as well as the gods of the mystery religions dies but then rises on the third day. However, the connection is probably indirect, for evidence for the existence of the mystery religions is not demonstrably older than the New Testament. On the other hand, it cannot be doubted that the *root* of the idea of the dying and resurrected god is very old (its influence being seen already in the Old Testament, e.g., Hos 6:2). Thus, we probably have to do with different versions of the same Near Eastern *theologoumenon*.

As for the theory of Iranian influence upon nascent Christianity, we enter into the crucial question of the origin of Gnosticism. The present author is in full accord with the old *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule* that Gnostic texts should be used in elucidating the New Testament. I think it would be very advantageous to have a running commentary on the New Testament based on Gnostic sources, a kind of Gnostic 'Strack & Billerbeck.'

Bultmann did something of this sort for the Gospel of John. He furnished a host of parallels from chiefly Mandean sources to a whole series of statements about the Son and his relationship to the Father in the Gospel of John.[9] Since the parallels from the Gnostic religion of the Mandeans occur in full mythological frameworks, Bultmann deemed them basically older than the brief turns of phrase and technical expresssions in the Fourth Gospel. The relationship is thus:

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[8] See H.Gressmann, *Albert Eichhorn und die Religionsgeschichtliche Schule* (Göttingen, 1914) 30.

[9] See 'Die Bedeutung der neuerschlossenen mandäischen und manichäischen Quellen für das Verständnis des Johannesevangeliums,' *ZNW* 24 (1925) 100-46 (= *Exegetica* 55-104). Cf. W.Bauer, *Das Johannesevangelium* (HNT 6; 2nd ed.; Tübingen, 1925), which appeared when Bultmann's article was in print.

John
↑
Mandaism

Exactly the *opposite* conclusion was reached by another fine exegete, Charles Harold Dodd, who, in his sober interpretation of John's Gospel, says: "But I cannot believe that any unprejudiced reader of the several passages would suppose for a moment that the shorter form is dependent upon the longer."[10] Thus, according to Dodd, the relationship between John and Mandean Gnosticism should be diagrammed like this:

Mandaism
↑
John

Who is right? Bultmann or Dodd? Neither, I submit (although I do believe that the one is more right than the other).

Dodd argued that Bultmann only could be considered right if it could be established that Mandaism was older than the Fourth Gospel. Dodd wrote at a time when the Mandean fever had subsided. Then, in the beginning of the fifties, it was believed that Mandaism did not have any connections whatsoever with John the Baptist, whereas the *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule* had considered it probable that it was the Baptist sect which had conveyed the "Iranian redemption mystery" to the basic source(s) of John's Gospel. It has now become clear, however, that Mark Lidzbarski was right and that it cannot be maintained that Mandaism is a late phenomenon of eastern origin heavily indebted to Syrian Christianity.

Study of Mandean terms has shown that Mandaism has a western origin. As for the time of its origination, it has been demonstrated that some Coptic Manichean Psalms are more or less literal translations of certain Mandean hymns. Thus, the latter must have been in existence in the beginning of the third century CE.

As for the figure of John the Baptist, it has been shown that Mandean traditions about this highly interesting figure—e.g., the legend about his birth—cannot be derived from Christianity. That John the Baptist appears in Mandean writings at all is highly noteworthy; he and Jesus are the only historical persons whom the Mandeans cite. Why would they invoke John if they did not have some historical connection with him? It is true that there can be discerned a rivalry between the Jesus sect and the sect of the Baptist already in the New Testament, but this discernment requires the exegetical skill of a person well versed in the Gospels. There is no evidence to the effect that the Mandeans were well acquainted with the New Testament.[11]

Thus, Bultmann is right insofar as a Palestinian provenance of Mandaism must be granted, while Dodd is right insofar as a pre-Christian origin of

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10 *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge, 1953 and reprints) 123. I wish to point out that Bultmann does not list 'several' passages; he gives *many*.

11 On the research on Mandaism, see *Der Mandäismus* (Wege der Forschung 167; ed. G. Widengren; Darmstadt, 1982).

Mandaism cannot be proven. How, then, should we explain the similarities between the Gospel of John and the Mandean religion?

I submit that both the Fourth Gospel and the Mandeans books emanate from the same world of ideas, even a *Jewish* world. My alternative diagram thus looks like this:




The reason for the quotation marks will become evident below.

It is fashionable today to say that the New Testament is evidence for a Jewish form of religion. Jesus was a Jew and so were his first followers—no one can deny that. But is it common to find accounts of Judaism which recognize this fact? Conversely, do works on early Christianity treat it as a form of Judaism at that time?

Paul is a conspicuous New Testament author. Paul was a Pharisee. As a matter of fact, he is the only Pharisee about whom we are somewhat well informed. But do we have accounts of Pharisaism taking Paul into consideration?

What was 'Judaism' in the first century CE really like? Are we at all justified to speak about 'Judaism' in that century?

It is entirely apt that we possess a commentary on the New Testament made up of quotations from Rabbinic writings.[12] Two things ought to be kept in mind however. In the first place, all Rabbinic texts are later than the New Testament, The Mishnah, the oldest part of the literature of the Rabbis, was put together around 200 CE. Admittedly, this does not have to mean that we should not use this literature when studying the New Testament, for it undoubtedly reflects many Jewish concerns in the first century CE. Teachers of the first Christian century are quoted in Rabbinic literature.

In the second place, and this is much more important, it must be borne in mind constantly that the texts marshalled in Strack & Billerbeck represent a *specific form* of Judaism. Now can we assume that something like the Rabbinic religion was the common form of Judaism in the first century CE?

There actually are some authors who hold that Rabbinism was, if not the common form of Judaism in the first century CE, at least the *only legitimate* form of Jewish religion in that century. Bousset's *Religion* was criticized by Felix Perles, who said that the author should have footed on Rabbinic sources instead of the so-called apocryphal and pseudepigraphic texts.[13] This pointer was taken up by

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[12] I.e., Str.-B. (Munich, 1922-28), six Parts (seven Volumes).

[13] See Bousset's *Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter kritisch untersucht* (Breslau, 1903). E. E. Urbach, *The Sages* (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1987 [translated by I. Abrahams from the 2nd Hebrew edition of 1973]), commends Perles' critique on the ground that Bousset describes Judaism 'primarily on the basis of external sources [sic?!]—the apocryphal literature and the Hellenistic literature—and relies only to a small extent on Rabbinic literature, [...] without sufficient knowledge' (6). In his response, *Volksfrömmigkeit und Schriftgelehrtentum* (Berlin, 1903), Bousset admitted that he had used the Rabbinic sources without first-hand knowledge, but maintained that his selection of sources was correct, since the Mishnah and the Talmud were later than the apocrypha and pseudepigrapha, and represented a certain rationalization of the religion of the people. Although Urbach knows this pamphlet by Bousset, he does not cite the latter's rejoinder.

George Foot Moore, who classified Bousset among the anti-Jewish Christian writers[14] and wrote a three volume work on *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era* based on Rabbinic sources.[15] In the first paragraph of his Preface, Moore states that his aim is to represent Jewish religion of this period as 'it presents itself in the tradition which it has always regarded as authentic.' Moore asserts that the methodological principle to be heeded when describing any religion must be to describe the religion in question as it is represented by teachers and writings regarded as being in the line of the catholic or orthodox tradition.

A true scholar of the history of religion cannot agree with such a judgement. The approach of Perles and Moore is anachronistic.[16] It regards the earlier period through the glasses of the later codifiers of the party that prevailed in the end. Orthodoxy, however, is the outcome of a lengthy dialectical process in which various views works upon each other. What Walter Bauer has demonstrated for Christianity[17] also holds true for Judaism: heterodoxy preceded orthodoxy (both concepts being here used anachronistically, since there can be no heresy if there is no orthodoxy—but I hope the reader will see my point).

The Rabbis who began to consolidate their religion after 70 CE came from the ranks of the Pharisees. Modern students of Jewish religion commonly take it for granted that, even though Rabbinic Judaism had yet not developed in the first century CE, something quite like it was the general form of religion in that century. But the view that the Pharisaic party enjoyed some sort of authority before 70 CE is absurd. It makes the Sadducean party *dissident*, thereby implying that the spiritual leader of the Jewish nation, the high priest, was a *dissenter*.

Let us imagine that Catholicism will start to dwindle and in the end become extinct, while Protestantism just surges. Would a future historian of the Church on account of this be justified in labelling the Pope a dissident Christian?

When studying the religion of Israel at the end of the Second Temple period, we are faced with a great problem—the *problem of terminology*. This religion, which now has been dead for nearly 2,000 years, was the mother of Christianity and Judaism—Rebecca's children, as Alan Segal calls them.[18] Christian and Jewish theologians may discuss the right application of the prophecy in Gen 25:23, but a historian cannot enter into the question of the birthright of the two religions. To the historian, the matter is simple: The first-born of the two religions is Christianity, whose father was a messianic sect. The youngest child is Judaism, whose father was the Pharisaic party. Since the Pharisees made up only one of the many parties or sects which existed within the spectrum of Israelite religion when the Temple still was standing, it is actually unfortunate to refer to Israelite religion in that period as 'Judaism.' This usage inevitably creates the impression

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14 See 'Christian Writers on Judaism,' *HTR* 14 (1921) 197-254, esp. pp. 241-48.

15 Cambridge, Mass., 1927, Vol. 1; 1930, Vols. 2-3.

16 Moore was criticized already by F. C. Porter, 'Judaism in New Testament Times,' *JR* 8 (1928) 30-62, who correctly suggested that Moore's work should have been entitled, 'The Judaism of the Tannaim.' Note the change of Moore's subtitle, 'The Age of the Tannaim'! Jacob Neusner and his school have now, by means of tradition history and form criticism, showed that Moore's position is untenable. Still, an updated Bousset-Gressmann has not yet seen the light of day.

17 See *Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum* (BHT 10; Tübingen, 1934; reprinted with minor additions and corrections, plus two supplementary essays by Georg Strecker in 1964).

18 See *Rebecca's Children* (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1986).

that the religion which was shaped by Pharisaic Rabbinism and is commonly called by the same name is the natural and legitimate outgrowth of the religion of Israel, whereas Christianity and the other children of Rebecca's are hybrids or bastards.

I am afraid that there is no way in which we can successfully change the well-established terminology.[19] I can only advice teachers and authors to emphasize the complexity of 'Judaism' around the turn of the common era.

As suggested above, this complexity included nascent Gnosticism. Now is Gnosticism older than her sister, Christianity (as argued by the *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule*)? Or was she the younger sister (as maintained by cautious scholars like Dodd)? We do not know. But this does not matter. 'It is widely acknowledged that Gnosticism, especially in its earliest forms, displays a fundamental indebtedness to Jewish concepts and traditions.'[20] The important point to bear in mind is that Gnosticism was roughly contemporary with infant Christianity and also had arisen out of the same matrix. This actually goes a good part of the way in explaining the rivalry which developed between them.[21] When the New Testament and other early Christian books are found to contain terms and themes which have equivalents in Gnostic texts, these similarities should as often as not be regarded as stemming from the common underlying tradition rather than being the result of an influence either way. This would seem to be especially evident where a *non*-Christian Gnostic work can be seen to parallel what is found in early Christian literature.

The 'new' History of Religions School has a *tertium comparationis*, which the *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule* did not possess. The 'new' School can point to Jewish textual evidence when explaining the relationship between Christianity and Gnosticism. Our knowledge of the so-called apocryphal and pseudepigraphic literature which was produced by the Jews has been greatly enriched since Bousset's time.[22] One of the more interesting of the pseudepigraphic works is the Third Book of Enoch, which was unknown to Bousset. Many of the statements about Jesus in the Gospel of John can be parallelled by what is said about the angel Metatron in 3 Enoch.[23] This accounts for the diagram which I offered as an alternative to the respective positions of Bultmann and Dodd.

It is true that 3 Enoch is a rather late literary composition (? 5th/6th century), but is it probable that John could have influenced both 3 Enoch and Mandean literature? If this is maintained, we must ask *why* two different non-Christian groups would adopt/adapt elements from the soteriology of the Fourth Gospel.

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[19] I am, however, in complete empathy with the concerns expressed by M. Smith, 'Terminological Boobytraps and Real Problems in Second Temple Judaeo-Christian Studies,' *Traditions in Contact and Change* (Editions SR 3; Waterloo, Canada, 1983) 295-306, esp. pp. 301 ff.

[20] B. A. Pearson, 'Jewish Sources in Gnostic Literature,' *Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period* (CRINT II/2; ed. M. Stone; Philadelphia and Assen, 1984) 443.

[21] It is perhaps not insignificant that, although the Rabbis combatted people who disclaimed the unity of God and the doctrine that God had given the Law (see J. Fossum, *The Name of God and the Angel of the Lord* [WUNT 36; Tübingen, 1985] 23 n. 90 ), there is relatively little polemics against the Jews in Gnostic texts as compared to what we find in Christian literature.

[22] I subscribe to the dissatisfaction of Smith, 295-330, as regards the usage of these terms.

[23] See G. Quispel, 'Het Johannesevangelie en de Gnosis, '*NedTTs* 11 (1956/57) 173-203, esp. pp. 179-80.

One religion does not simply borrow from the other; there must be something indigenous which functions as a connection for the new material.[24]

It would seem that the representation of the angel Metatron in 3 Enoch is some sort of systematization of, and elaboration upon, everything that was said about the principal angel in older sources, works outdating even John. We may think of the angelic 'Man from heaven' (apparently Michael) in Joseph and Asenath,[25] the angel with the twice-theophoric name, Yaho-El, in the Apocalypse of Abraham, or the heavenly figure Melchizedek, called 'god' (*El*), in one of the Qumran fragments.

We are in a much better situation than the pioneers of the old History of Religions Schools in that we have all this material at hand. And we know that there is substantial material from Qumran still awaiting publication!

Another body of Jewish material which only recently has come more fully into light, owing to the editorial work headed by Peter Schäfer, is the so-called 'mystical' literature, the Hekhalot and Merkabah texts. Although the oldest of these texts, Hekhalot Rabbati, probably was not written before the 2nd or 3rd century CE,[26] Jewish 'mysticism' undoubtedly contains traditions which can be shown to be quite old.

Recently, Christopher R. A. Morray-Jones, a pupil of Christopher Rowland's, has concluded that 'an esoteric tradition involving both secret teachings and visionary-mystical practices was inherited by some of the Tannaim from intertestamental apocalyptic circles. ... A major focus of this tradition was Ezekiel 1, together with other accounts of the visions of God.'[27] The mystics, however, did not see the essential Godhead, but the divine Glory (Kabod) in the 'likeness as the appearance of a man' (Ezek 1:26). An allusion to the meaning of the root *kbd*, 'to be heavy,' is found in a prayer to God by the personified Throne Of Glory in Hekhalot Rabbati 3:2, "... God of Israel, make Yourself heavy (*htkbbd*) and sit upon me ... ."[28] Thus, the Kabod is the solidified form of the essentially uncorporeal Godhead; it can 'be understood as a theophanic manifestation of the invisible Godhead which is objectively distinct from, though subjectively identical with, God's transcendent being.'[29]

It is in this kind of 'mysticism' that we find the origin of the Christological epithets, 'the Son of Man,' 'the heavenly Man,' and 'the Man from heaven.' The 'Iranian redemption mystery' has been shown to be a scholarly phantom.[30] It was a genuinely Jewish teaching centering upon the vision of God in human form

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24 See H. Ringgren, 'The Problems of Syncretism,' *Syncretism* (Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis 3; ed. S. Hartmann; Uppsala, 1969), 7-24.

25 Cf. Paul's descriptions of Christ in 1 Cor 15:47-49. See J. Fossum, 'The Figure of the Heavenly Man in Recent Research,' to be published in a forthcoming Volume of *ANRW*.

26 See I. Gruenwald, *Apocalyptic and Merkavah Mysticism* (AGJU 14; Leiden, 1980) 142. This book contains a summary of all the 'mystical' texts. For a short inventory, see P. Schäfer, et al., *Übersetzung der Hekhalot-Literatur* II (TSAJ 17; Ttlbingen, 1987), pp. VII-XII. This volume contains the translation of Hekhalot Rabbati.

27 *Merkabah Mysticism and Talmudic Tradition* (Diss.: Cambridge, 1988) 306.

28 *Synopse zur Hekhalot-Literatur* (TSAJ 2; ed. P. Schäfer; Tübingen, 1981) $ 99.

29 Morray-Jones, 111-12. This was also the view of Gershom Scholem; see now the first chapter of his book, *On the Mystical Shape of the Godhead* (New York, 1991), which includes the revisions made in the Hebrew translation of the original German version.

30 See C. Colpe, *Die religionsgeschichtliche Schule* (FRLANT 87; Göttingen, 1961); H.-M. Schenke, *Der Gott 'Mensch' in der Gnosis* (Göttingen, 1962).

which 'made a significant contribution to the emergence of Christianity.'[31] And, we have to add, it contributed significantly to the origination of Gnosticism as well.

The reader will hopefully appreciate the following amendment of my former diagram:




This diagram must not be taken to imply that there did not exist Gnostic forms of Christianity, nor that there were no Jewish (=Israelite) Gnostics or Christians, nor that there were no Rabbis who were mystics. Gnosticism, Christianity, and Judaism are only generic names of Rebecca's children. There were obviously many individual siblings who exhibited various combinations of the three general types produced by their prolific mother.

31 Morray-Jones, 307.

# Repeated Language in Matthew: Clues to the Order and Composition of Luke and Mark

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## Introduction

Let me begin with some presuppositions, some discussion of the approach to be taken here, and a listing of the synoptic contexts to be considered.

With regard to presuppositions, I first assume that the Synoptic Evangelists utilized scrolls rather than codices in their original compositions. Second, I assume that these autographs of the gospels had no chapter or verse designations assigned to them, but that these conveniences were added to the gospels centuries after their original composition. If these assumptions are valid, it would be more difficult than it is today to cross reference material within any single gospel or to cross reference similar or identical material between any two or three of the Synoptic Gospels.

It was probably, at least in part, for ease in cross referencing within and among the gospels that the codex form of publication, chapter designations and versification were introduced into the texts of the gospels over time. The need for cross referencing among the gospels also eventually gave rise to Ammonius' canons that, as adapted by Eusebius, provided the basis for the first gospel harmonies and, eventually, for synopses.

But, in the absence of such conveniences, in the earliest Christian communities, how might cross references within and among the gospels have been made? Although one might imagine that the second and third Evangelists marked the scroll(s) of their source material for cross referencing, such a marking process must remain a matter of speculation, since the autographs of the Synoptic Gospels are no longer extant. All that we can be more or less certain about, conceding the variants within the manuscript tradition, are the texts of the Synoptics. Can the texts alone help explain some of the synoptic phenomena? I believe they can.

In this paper I intend to use certain linguistic clues within the text of Matthew to hypothecate about some of the literary history (*Redaktionsgeschichte*) of the Synoptics. Specifically, assuming the Two Gospel Hypothesis, I will attempt to explain some of Luke's and Mark's compositional procedures assuming they have joined together two or more separated literary contexts from Matthew.

All of the separated literary contexts in Matthew that I will discuss contain not only similarities in content, but also similarities or identities in language. By

contrast, neither the literary contexts in Mark nor those in Luke, parallel to these units in Matthew, contain much, if any, of this repeated language of Matthew.

I will argue that Luke and/or Mark may have utilized some of these similarities and/or identities in language within the text of Matthew to point them to separated literary contexts in Matthew. I will then go on to explain how Luke and/or Mark would have united these separated literary contexts in Matthew into new literary units in their texts parallel to Matthew.

I would argue further that the opposite literary history, where Matthew would be taken to be literarily dependent on either Mark or Luke, is less likely. That is, it seems less likely that Matthew would have (1) divided single literary contexts in his source material; then, (2) moved at least one part of these once united literary contexts to a different literary context within his gospel; and, finally (3) introduced similar and/or identical language into each of his, newly separated, literary contexts.[1]

If such were Matthew's literary procedure, he would have left trails of repeated language in separated literary contexts by which the readers of Matthew, including ourselves, might retrace his compositional footsteps back to a single literary context within his source material, assuming that source material was either Mark or Luke or both. Why would a later author choose to divide single literary contexts within his source material and then introduce literary clues to its original unity into his separated literary contexts? Such a literary process seems, at best, inconsistent and at worst, self-contradictory.

Since I do not believe that authors intentionally follow inconsistent or self-contradictory literary procedures, I find this hypothetical literary procedure less likely than a literary procedure whereby a later author would choose to unify separated literary contexts on the basis of common theme and shared language within those contexts.

Here I will discuss the following synoptic contexts:

First, I take up what I take to be the parallels between Matthew's Sermon on the Mount (Matt 4:23-7:29), Luke's Sermon in Nazareth (Luke 4:16-30 [32?]), and Mark's Sermon in Capernaum (Mark 1:21-22).

In this discussion, I will suggest a literary history that helps to explain why Luke 4:16-32 shares elements with both Matthew's Sermon on the Mount (Matt 4:23-7:28) and Matthew's version of Jesus' Rejection at Nazareth (Matt 13:53-58). I will argue that there are literary clues in Matthew's gospel that might suggest that these separated literary contexts in Matthew could be brought together (Matt 7:28-29/Matt 13:54-55). By contrast, these literary clues are absent from the texts of Mark parallel to Matthew (Mark 1:21-22 and 6:1-6) and, therefore, can be of no help in explaining Luke's use of Mark in these contexts.

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[1] Frans Neirynck seems to argue for Markan priority to Matthew in similar, but not quite the same, ways in his work on Matt 4:23-5:2 and parallels, "The Two-Source Hypothesis Textual Discussion. Matthew 4:23-5:2 and the Matthean Composition of 4:23-11:1," in *The Interrelations of the Gospels. A Symposium led by M. É. Boismard—W. R. Farmer,—F. Neirynck Jerusalem 1984*, ed. David L. Dungan (Leuven: Leuven University Press/Uitgeverij Peeters, 1990): 23-46. It is, I believe, on the plausibility of this third point that Neirynck's approach most differs from mine. If the Synoptic Gospels are any indication, on any source theory that posits direct literary dependence among the gospels, later authors can and do both unite and separate literary units taken from their source material. But, after dividing a united literary context in a source, would a later author, then, introduce verbal similarities into these newly separated contexts? What would be the purpose?

Second, I will discuss the block of controversy stories found in Luke 5:29-6:11/Mark 2:15-3:6 (cf. Matt 9:10-17 and 12:1-13). Again, one can find repeated language within two separated literary contexts in Matthew (Matt 9:13/Matt 12:7/Hosea 6:6) that might suggest why and where these separated literary contexts in Matthew might be joined. Once again, the literary clues in Matthew are absent from the parallel texts of both Mark and Luke.

Third, I will discuss the literary context that follows this block of controversy stories in Luke immediately (Luke 6:12-7:1). This block of material contains three elements: the call of the twelve disciples (Luke 6:12-16/Matt 10:1-4/Mark 3:13-19), the gathering and healing of many crowds (Luke 6:17-19/Matt 12:15-16/Matt 4:23-5:2/Mark 3:7-12), and Luke's Sermon on the Plain (Luke 6:20-71/Matt 4:23-7:29, the Sermon on the Mount). In this case, there are two different literary clues within the text of Matthew that could be used to unite three separated literary contexts in his gospel. One might be used to unite Matt 12:15-16 with Matt 4:23-5:2 and the other might be used to unite Matt 4:23-5:2 with Matt 9:35-10:2. Two of these contexts in Matthew (9:35-10:2 and 12:15-16) are united to one another through their different literary links to a common literary context, Matt 4:23-5:2. This time, the literary clues that might be taken to unite these three literary contexts in Matthew find fragmentary parallels in the texts of Mark and Luke.

Fourth, I will discuss Matthew's unit on "Little Ones and Scandals," (Matt 18:1-14) and how Mark's parallel unit (Mark 9:33-48 [50]) may have come to include materials not only from Matthew 18, the contextual parallel to Mark 9:33ff. (Matt 18:1-3a, 5/Mark 9:33-37b and Matt 18:6-7/Mark 9:42; cf. Luke 17:1-2; Matt 18:8-9/Mark 9:43-48), but also from Matthew 10:40/Mark 9:37c; cf. Luke 9:48, Matt 10:42 (cf. Mark 9:41) and Matthew 5:29-30 (=Matt 18:8-9/Mark 9:43-48) that are not contextually parallel to Mark 9:33ff.

Fifth, I will discuss Mark 10:13-16/Luke 18:15-17/Matt 19:13-15 and how these sections of Mark and Luke may have come to include parallels not only to Matthew 19:13-15, the contextual parallel to Mark 10:13-16/Luke 18:15-17, but also to Matthew 18:3 which is contextually parallel to Mark 9:36-37/Luke 9:47-48. Obviously, the literary history of this fifth synoptic context to be discussed is related to that of the fourth above since Matt 18:3 is included in Matt 18:1-14.

## I.

### *Luke's Sermon in Nazareth (Luke 4:16-30 [32?])*
### *Matthew's Sermon on the Mount (Matt 4:23-7:29)*
### *Mark's Sermon in Capernaum (Mark 1:21-22)*

Matthew introduces the Sermon on the Mount (Matt 4:23-7:29) into his gospel when only four of the twelve disciples have been called (Matt 4:18-22; cf. the call of the twelve in Matt 10:1-4).

On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, when Luke comes to the introduction to the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew (Matthew 4:23-5:1), he determines not to include that Great Sermon (Matthew 5:2-7:29) until after all twelve of the disciples have been called in his gospel (Luke 6:12-16). Only after the call of the twelve (Luke 6:12-16) and after the gathering together of a great crowd to hear the sermon and to be healed by Jesus (Luke 6:17-19), does Luke introduce an

edited version of the Sermon on the Mount (Matt 4:23-7:29) as his Sermon on the Plain (cf. Luke 6:20-7:1).[2]

Luke does provide, however, an indication that he found the Sermon on the Mount in this context, (Matt 4:23-7:29/Luke 4:16-30) rather than later (Luke 6:20-7:1), by introducing an alternate sermon, the one in Nazareth, (Luke 4:16-30) at this point paralleled by Matthew's Sermon on the Mount.

While the idea of a sermon at this point in Luke's gospel (Luke 4:16-30) may have come to him from the appearance of Matthew's Sermon on the Mount at this point (Matt 4:23-7:29), some of the content for Luke's Sermon in Nazareth seems to have been taken from another literary context in Matthew, namely Matthew's story of Jesus' rejection in his own country. (Matt 13:53-58/Luke 4:16-30; cf. Mark 6:1-6).

The separated literary contexts that contain Matthew's Sermon on the Mount (Matt 4:23-7:29) and Matthew's story of Jesus' rejection in his own country (Matt 13:53-58) could be linked in the reader's mind by the similar language that concludes Matthew's Sermon on the Mount (Matt 7:28) and immediately precedes Matthew's story of Jesus' rejection in his own country (Matt 13:53)

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Matt 7:28 | καὶ ἐγένετο ὅτε ἐτέλεσεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς | τοὺς λόγους | | τούτους |
| Matt 13:53 | καὶ ἐγένετο ὅτε ἐτέλεσεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς | τὰς παραβολὰς | | ταύτας |

These verses, of course, are only two members of a larger set of verses within the gospel of Matthew in which this formula reoccurs (Matt 26:1, 7;28, 19:1, 13:53, cf. 11:1).

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Matt 26:1 | καὶ ἐγένετο ὅτε ἐτέλεσεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς | πάντας | τοὺς λόγους | τούτους |
| Matt 7:28 | καὶ ἐγένετο ὅτε ἐτέλεσεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς | | τοὺς λόγους | τούτους |
| Matt 19:1 | καὶ ἐγένετο ὅτε ἐτέλεσεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς | | τοὺς λόγους | τούτους |
| Matt 13:53 | καὶ ἐγένετο ὅτε ἐτέλεσεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς | | τὰς παραβολὰς | ταύτας |
| Matt 11:1 | καὶ ἐγένετο ὅτε ἐτέλεσεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς[3] | | | |

As is well known, Matthew uses these formulas to conclude each of five discourses attributed to Jesus within his gospel: the Sermon on the Mount (Matt 4:23-7:29), the Mission Discourse (Matt 9:35-11:1), the Parables Discourse (Matt 13:1-53), the "Church" Discourse (Matt 18:1-19:1), and the Last Eschatological Discourse (Matt 24:1-26:1).

The linkage of these two Matthean contexts (Matthew 4:23-7:29 and 13:53-58) by these potential cross references within the text of Matthew could explain why Luke's literary context (Luke 4:16-32) parallel to Matthew 4:2-7:29 contains verbal similarities both to Matthew's Sermon on the Mount (See esp. Matt 7:28-29/Luke 4:32) and to Matthew's story of Jesus' rejection in his own country (See esp. Matt 13:54-55, 57/Luke 4:22; 24).

The formulas that potentially link these separated literary contexts in Matthew (Matt 7:28 and 13:53) find no place in the parallel literary contexts in Mark (cf. Mark 1:21 and 6:1). It is, therefore, less obvious why Luke would have

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[2] Bernard Orchard notes that, "Despite a number of important differences there can be no doubt that Luke's Sermon on the Plain is in essence the same as Matthew's Sermon on the Mount (see Chart IIA). Each has the same beginning, middle and ending, though Luke's is much shorter. . . ." See his *Matthew, Luke and Mark*, The Griesbach Solution to the Synoptic Question, Volume One (Manchester: Koinonia Press, 1976): 43.

[3] See Dennis Gordon Tevis, *An Analysis of Words and Phrases Characteristic of the Gospel of Matthew* (Ph.D. diss. Southern Methodist University, 1982; photocopy, Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1984; Microfilm, 1985): Table 1.

seen the two separated literary contexts in Mark as related and brought them together (Mark 1:21-22 and 6:1-6) than it is to see how Luke would have seen the parallel contexts in Matthew as related and brought them together (Matt 4:23-7:29 and Matt 13:53-58).

In this case, advocates of the Two Gospel Hypothesis can appeal to objective literary data within the text of Matthew that may be used to help explain how Luke could have made use of Matthew in these contexts. Since these data are not present in the text of Mark, advocates of the Two Document Hypothesis cannot use them to help explain Luke's use of Mark in these contexts.

**Luke's Potential Combination of Matthew's Rejection in Nazareth with Matthew's Sermon on the Mount**

| *Jesus' Rejection in His Own Country*<br>Matt 13:53-55a; 57b-58; [Matt 5:2] | *Jesus' First Sermon in Nazareth*<br>Luke 4:16, 22-24 |
|---|---|
| 53 Καὶ ἐγένετο<br>ὅτε ἐτέλεσεν<br>ὁ Ἰησοῦς<br>τὰς παραβολὰς ταύτας,<br>μετῆρεν ἐκεῖθεν. | |
| 54 καὶ ἐλθὼν<br>εἰς τὴν πατρίδα αὐτοῦ | 16 Καὶ ἦλθεν<br>εἰς Ναζαρὰ<br>οὗ ἦν τεθραμμένος,<br>καὶ εἰσῆλθεν<br>κατὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς αὐτῷ<br>ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῶν σαββάτων |
| ἐδίδασκεν αὐτοὺς<br>ἐν τῇ συναγωγῇ αὐτῶν, | εἰς τὴν συναγωγὴν<br>καὶ ἀνέστη ἀναγνῶναι. . . .<br>22 . . . Καὶ πάντες<br>ἐμαρτύρουν αὐτῷ<br>καὶ ἐθαύμαζον<br>ἐπὶ τοῖς λόγοις τῆς χάριτος<br>τοῖς ἐκπορευομένοις<br>ἐκ τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ, |
| ὥστε ἐκπλήσσεσθαι αὐτοὺς. . . | καὶ ἔλεγον· |
| Matt 5:2<br>Καὶ ἀνοίξας τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ<br>ἐδίδασκεν αὐτοὺς λέγων·<br>13:54b . . . καὶ λέγειν·<br>πόθεν τούτῳ<br>ἡ σοφία αὕτη<br>καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις; | |
| οὐκ οὗτός ἐστιν<br>ὁ τοῦ τέκτονος<br>υἱὸς;. . . | οὐχὶ υἱός ἐστιν<br>Ἰωσὴφ<br>οὗτος;<br>23 καὶ εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτούς·<br>πάντως ἐρεῖτέ μοι<br>τὴν παραβολὴν ταύτην·<br>ἰατρέ,<br>θεράπευσον σεαυτόν·<br>ὅσα ἠκούσαμεν γενόμενα |

| | |
|---|---|
| | εἰς Καφαρναοὺμ<br>ποίησον<br>καὶ ὧδε<br>ἐν τῇ πατρίδι σου. |
| 57b ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· | 24 εἶπεν δὲ·<br>ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι |
| οὐκ ἔστιν προφήτης ἄτιμος<br>εἰ μὴ<br>ἐν τῇ πατρίδι<br>καὶ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ αὐτοῦ<br>καὶ οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἐκεῖ<br>δυνάμεις πολλὰς<br>διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν αὐτῶν. | οὐδεὶς προφήτης δεκτός ἐστιν<br>ἐν τῇ πατρίδι αὐτοῦ. . . . |
| *Jesus' Move from Nazareth to Capernaum*<br>Matt 4:13 | *Introduction to Healing of Possessed in Capernaum*<br>Luke 4:31-32 |
| 13 καὶ καταλιπὼν τὴν Ναζαρὰ<br>ἐλθὼν κατῴκησεν<br>εἰς Καφαρναοὺμ<br>τὴν παραθαλασσίαν<br>ἐν ὁρίοις Ζαβουλὼν<br>καὶ Νεφθαλίμ· . . . | 31 Καὶ<br>κατῆλθεν<br>εἰς Καφαρναοὺμ<br>πόλιν τῆς Γαλιλαίας. |
| *Conclusion to Jesus' First Sermon On the Mount*<br>Matt 7:28-29 | |
| 28 Καὶ ἐγένετο<br>ὅτε ἐτέλεσεν<br>ὁ Ἰησοῦς<br>τοὺς λόγους τούτους, | |
| | καὶ ἦν διδάσκων αὐτοὺς<br>ἐν τοῖς σάββασιν· |
| ἐξεπλήσσοντο οἱ ὄχλοι<br>ἐπὶ τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ·<br>29 ἦν γὰρ διδάσκων αὐτοὺς<br>ὡς ἐξουσίαν ἔχων<br>καὶ οὐχ ὡς οἱ γραμματεῖς αὐτῶν. | 32 καὶ ἐξεπλήσσοντο<br>ἐπὶ τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ·<br>ὅτι ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ<br>ἦν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ. |

Although Luke, on the Two Gospel Hypothesis, changed the location in Matthew from "Jesus' own country," πατρίς, (Matt 13:54/Mark 6:1) to "Nazareth" (Luke 4:16 cf. Matt 13:54), Luke's dependence upon Matthew is revealed when πατρίς appears later in the text of Luke where there is evidence of copying between Luke and Matthew (Luke 4:24/Matt 13:57/Mark 6:4; Also see Luke's repetition of πατρίς at Luke 4:23).[4] Luke's choice of Nazareth as a

[4] Some commentators suggest that "Capernaum" was Jesus' "own country" (Mark 1:21, 2:1, and 9:33), but Luke explicitly rejects this identification because, in Luke 4:23, the crowds request that the miracles performed in "Capernaum," not recorded earlier in Luke's text, also be performed in a different location, "Jesus' own country."

location for Jesus' first sermon may have been influenced by the reference to "Nazareth" at Matt 4:13.[5]

If Mark had access to both Matthew and Luke, when he came to Matthew 4:23-7:27/Luke 4:16-30, he was faced with two different sermons, Matthew's Sermon on the Mount and Luke's Sermon in Nazareth. Rather than try to conflate these two sermons, Mark chose to omit both and provide a substitute summary.[6] Mark does, however, give evidence of having known a sermon at this point in his gospel by providing a Markan summary passage about Jesus entering "Capernaum" and "teaching in the synagogue." (Mark 1:21)[7]

Mark 1:22 also shares the language of the ending of the Great Sermon in Matthew with Matthew (Matt 7:28-29) as does Luke (Luke 4:32), but Mark's text is closer to the text of Matthew than is Luke. Note that neither Mark nor Luke share the "completion" formula that most characterizes Matthew's redaction here and that might be used to unite Matthew's Sermon on the Mount (Matt 4:23-7:29) with Matthew's version of Jesus' Rejection in His Own Country (Matt 13:53-58).

| Matt 7:28-29 | Mark1:22 | Luke 4:32 |
|---|---|---|
| 28 Καὶ ἐγένετο<br>ὅτε ἐτέλεσεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς<br>τοὺς λόγους τούτους<br>ἐξεπλήσσοντο<br>οἱ ὄχλοι<br>ἐπὶ τῇ διδαχῇ<br>αὐτοῦ·<br>29 ἦν γὰρ διδάσκων<br>αὐτοὺς<br>ὡς ἐξουσίαν ἔχων | 22 καὶ<br><br><br>ἐξεπλήσσοντο<br><br>ἐπὶ τῇ διδαχῇ<br>αὐτοῦ·<br>ἦν γὰρ διδάσκων<br>αὐτοὺς<br>ὡς ἐξουσίαν ἔχων | 32 καὶ<br><br><br>ἐξεπλήσσοντο<br><br>ἐπὶ τῇ διδαχῇ<br>αὐτοῦ,<br><br><br>ὅτι ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ<br>ἦν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ. |
| καὶ οὐχ ὡς<br>οἱ γραμματεῖς αὐτῶν. | οὐχ ὡς<br>οἱ γραμματεῖς. | |

[5] William O. Walker has called attention to seven literary features (Walker calls them "clues") that Matt 4:12-17 shares with Luke 4:14-32, including the reference to "Nazareth." Walker concludes that these shared features should be explained by Matthew and Luke's independent use of a common source, but all of the literary data Walker discusses, particularly in light of additional data provided here, could be explained just as well, if not better, on the basis of the Two Gospel Hypothesis. See William O. Walker, "'Nazareth': A Clue to Synoptic Relationships?" in *Jesus, the Gospels, and the Church. Essays in Honor of William R. Farmer*, ed. E. P. Sanders (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1987): 105-118.

[6] On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, Mark also summarizes the temptation story at Mark 1:12-13 (cf. Matt 4:1-11/Luke 4:1-13) and the ending of the Last Eschatological Discourse at Mark 13:33-37 (cf. Matt 24:13-25:15/Luke 21:34-36, 12:37-44).

[7] That Mark 1:21 is from the hand of the author of Mark is supported by the appearance of πάλιν at Mark 3:1 and at Mark 2:1. Both refer back, in different ways, to Mark 1:21; Note that εἰς Καφαρναούμ appears both prior to Matthew's Sermon on the Mount at Matt 4:13 and almost immediately following Matthew's Great Sermon at Matt 8:5. A reference to Capernaum also immediately follows Luke's Sermon in Nazareth at Luke 4:31 (cf. Matt 4:13) and at the conclusion his version of the Great Sermon at Luke 7:1 (cf. Matt 8:5); See also διδάσκων ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς αὐτῶν at Matt 4:23/καὶ αὐτὸς ἐδίδασκεν ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς αὐτῶν at Luke 4:15; εἰς τὴν συναγωγήν at Luke 4:16. These summary references to "teaching in the synagogue(s)" are both immediately prior to Matthew's Great Sermon (Matt 5-7) and to Luke's Sermon in Nazareth (Luke 4:16-30).

In the Gospel of Matthew one finds a formula repeated at Matt 7:28 and Matt 22:33:

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Matt 7:28 | | ἐξεπλήσσοντο | οἱ ὄχλοι | ἐπὶ τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ |
| Matt 22:33 | οἱ ὄχλοι | ἐξεπλήσσοντο | | ἐπὶ τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ[8] |

In Matthew the formula is identical in both cases with the exception of the reversal of word order of subject and verb. The plural, ὄχλοι, is characteristic of Matthew's text and constitutes part of a redactional formula traceable to the hand of the author of that gospel.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Matt 4:25 | καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ | ὄχλοι | πολλοί | (cf. Mark 3:7, Luke 6:17) |
| Matt 19:2 | καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ | ὄχλοι | πολλοί | (cf. Mark 10:2) |
| Matt 8:1 | ἠκολούθησαν αὐτω | ὄχλοι | πολλοί | |
| Matt 12:15 | καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ | [[ὄχλοι]] | πολλοί | (cf. Mark 3:7)[9] |

In the Gospel of Mark one finds a formula repeated at Mark 1:22 and Mark 11:18.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mark 1:22 | και | ἐξεπλήσσοντο | ἐπὶ τῇ διδαχῇ | αὐτοῦ |
| Mark 11:18 | πᾶς γάρ ὁ ὄχλος | ἐξεπλήσσετο | ἐπὶ τῇ διδαχῇ | αὐτοῦ[10] |

In Mark the formulas vary a good bit more than they do in Matthew. Καί in Mark 1:22 parallels γάρ in Mark 11:18; the subject is unexpressed in Mark 1:22. The subject, πᾶς ὁ ὄχλος, appears in Mark 11:18; πᾶς ὁ ὄχλος appears as the subject of a sentence in Mark 2:13, 4:1, and 9:15 and can be traced to the hand of the author of Mark. The verb in 1:22 is plural while the verb in Mark 11:18 is singular to agree with the expressed subject, πᾶς ὁ ὄχλος.

In the Gospel of Luke one finds a similar formula at Luke 4:32, but nowhere else in that gospel: καὶ ἐξεπλήσσοντο ἐπὶ τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ.

Matt 7:28 is parallel to Mark 1:22 and Luke 4:32. Matt 22:23 may or may not be parallel to Mark 11:18. Inasmuch as the formula is repeated in both the text of Mark and the text of Matthew, but only occurs in the text of Luke in a passage in parallel with both Matthew and Mark, one may conclude that the presence of this formula in the Gospels of Matthew and Mark is due to some preference on the part of the redactors of those gospels, while its presence in the Gospel of Luke may readily be accounted for by copying.

Luke is secondary to Matthew or Mark on the basis of this evidence alone. What then is the indication of the direction of literary dependence between Matthew and Mark?

An independent view of the data in the Gospels of Matthew and Mark reveals that the evidence for redactional kinship is greater in the Gospel of Matthew than it is in the Gospel of Mark. If Mark 11:18 is parallel to Matt 22:33, there is nothing in either text of Mark which appears to be redactional, ἐπὶ τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ, which could not be explained by Mark's dependence upon Matthew. The reverse is not true. The plural subject, οἱ ὄχλοι, which is characteristic of the author of Matthew, and the plural verb in both texts of Matthew cannot derive from Mark.

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8 Tevis, *Matthew* , Table 42.

9 Tevis, *Matthew*, Table 4.

10 Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, Table 31, p. 43.

It would appear that the text of Mark represents a fragmentary perservation of a formula traceable to the author of Matthew. One of the modifications in Mark's text when compared to Matthew, the use of πάς ὁ ὄχλός at Mark 11:18/Matt 22:33, conforms to Markan style elsewhere in his Gospel (Mark 2:13, 4:1, 9:15).[11]

If Matt 22:33 is not parallel to Mark 11:18, then the direction of literary dependence is inconclusive from these data alone inasmuch as both Matthew (22:33) and Mark (11:18) can use the formula in contexts independent of one another as well as in parallel with one another (Mark 1:22/Matt 7:28).[12]

On the Two Document Hypothesis, the choice of Matthew and Luke to insert extended, though different, sermons (Matt 4:23-7:29 cf. Luke 4:16-31) into the Markan outline at this point (Mark 1:21-22) represents a significant compositional agreement of Luke and Matthew against Mark. How is it to be explained on the basis of the Two Document Hypothesis?

Further, as noted above, the text of Luke in these contexts can be explained on the basis of Luke's use of repeated language within the text of Matthew to link together separated literary contexts in Matthew into a single literary context in Luke. Since the language that might be used to link separated literary contexts in Matthew does not appear in the parallel texts of Mark, it cannot be used to help explain how Luke might have used Mark in these contexts.

## II.

*A Block of Controversy Stories*
*Luke 5:29-6:11/Mark 2:15-3:6*
*(cf. Matt 9:10-17 and 12:1-13)*

Two separated literary contexts in Matthew contain controversy stories (Matthew 9 and 12).

Two of the controversy stories in Matthew, Matthew 9:14-17 and Matthew 12:1-8, contain a quotation from Hosea 6:6, ἔλεος θέλω καὶ οὐ θυσίαν.[13] In addition to the similar themes and literary forms to be found in these two separate Matthean literary contexts (Matt 9:10-17 and 12:1-13), these identical quotations from Hosea 6:6 might also have linked these two contexts in Matthew together in the mind of a reader.

But whatever their literary history may be, two separated controversy contexts in Matthew (Matt 9:10-17 and 12:1-13) are united in the parallel passages in Luke and Mark (Luke 5:29-6:11/Mark 2:15-3:6).

Further, the two controversy stories in Matthew that contain these identical quotations from Hosea 6:6 (Matt 9:14-17 and Matt 12:1-8) are immediately joined together in the parallel Lukan and Markan contexts (Luke 5:33-6:5/Mark 2:18-28 cf. Matt 9:14-17 and 12:1-8).

If Matthew had used either Mark or Luke as source material for his gospel at this point, he would have (1) divided the controversy stories he had found joined together in his source material into two parts, (2) moved one or both parts of this

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[11] Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, Table 85.

[12] Compare "The Late Secondary Redaction of Mark's Gospel and the Griesbach Hypothesis: A Response to Helmut Koester," in *Colloquy on New Testament Studies: A Time for Reappraisal and Fresh Approaches*, ed. Bruce C. Corley (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1983): 87-132, esp. 121-122.

[13] Tevis, *Matthew*, Table 345.

formerly single literary unit to other literary contexts within his gospel,[14] (3) maintained the order of the four stories as he found them in his source material and (4) introduced a quotation from Hosea 6:6 into the two, now separated, controversy stories (Matt 9:14-17 and 12:1-8) that he had found immediately joined in his source material (Luke 5:33-6:5/Mark 2:18-18). By introducing these identical quotations from Hosea, Matthew would have left a kind of trail of his editorial activity for the reader, marking just where he had separated what was once united.

On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, Luke could have noticed the similar themes and literary forms contained in these separated Matthean literary contexts (Matt 9:10-17 and 12:1-13) and the repeated quotations from Hosea 6:6 in two of them (Matt 9:13 and 12:7). Having been drawn by these literary similarities and identities within the text of Matthew to compare these separated Matthean literary contexts (Matt 9:10-17 and 12:1-13), Luke would have chosen to join them together into a single literary unit containing controversy stories (Luke 5:29-6:11).

Scriptural quotations can be demonstrated to be of relatively less importance to Luke than they are to Matthew, so one should not be surprised to find Luke omitting the quotations from Hosea in his text parallel to Matthew where such scriptural quotations are found (9:13 and 12:7).

On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, Mark would have followed Luke's order and content more closely than Matthew in this section of his gospel (Mark 2:15-3:5/Luke 5:29-6:11 cf. Matt 9:10-17 and 12:1-13), including Luke's choice to omit the two quotations from Hosea 6:6 found in Matthew.

The Two Document Hypothesis and the Two Gospel Hypothesis explain the literary relationship between Mark and Luke in this context in similar ways. Only the direction of literary dependence between these two gospels is different. The problems to be explained on each hypothesis are about the same.

But on the Two Document Hypothesis, Matthew's use of Mark in this context is more difficult to understand. On the Two Document Hypothesis, Matthew first removes a unity in Mark's text by dividing his single literary context into two parts and then promotes unity between those parts by introducing verbal identities into his now separated literary contexts. Such a literary procedure seems inconsistent or even self-contradictory. Is it likely that an author would proceed in such a manner?

By contrast, on the Two Gospel Hypothesis, Luke and Mark's literary procedures in this context seem clear and consistent. Because of verbal identities (identical quotations from Hosea 6:6) and a common literary form (controversy stories) in separated literary contexts in Matthew, Luke has been led to bring a unity to separated parts of Matthew; and Mark has followed Luke rather than

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14 What material has been moved by a second or third Evangelist is a judgement call made by every synopsis maker that is influenced, at least in part, by one's source theory. See David L. Dungan, "Theory of Synopsis Construction," *Biblica*, 61 (1980): 305-329 and "Synopses of the Future," *Biblica* 66 (1985): 457-92, reprinted in *The Interrelations of the Gospels. A Symposium led by M. É. Boismard—W. R. Farmer,—F. Neirynck Jerusalem 1984*, ed. David L. Dungan (Leuven: Leuven University Press/Uitgeverij Peeters, 1990): 317-347. Neirynck's article on the "Synoptic Problem," [in *The New Jerome Biblical Commentary* (1990): 587-595], compares Mark with Matthew apart from Luke and suggests that neither Matt 9:1-17 nor 12:1-16 was moved when Matthew used Mark. To accomplish this, Neirynck has to have Matthew move Mark 4:35-5:43 and Mark 6:6b-11 instead.

Matthew. On balance, the literary history of these synoptic contexts is explained better on the Two Gospel Hypothesis than on the Two Document Hypothesis.

## III.

*Luke 6:12-7:1 and parallels*
*The Call of the Twelve Disciples*
*(Luke 6:12-16/Matt 10:1-4/Mark 3:13-19),*
*The Gathering and Healing of Many Crowds*
*(Luke 6:17-19/Matt 12:15-16/Mark 3:7-12)*
*Luke's Sermon on the Plain*
*(Luke 6:20-71/Matt 4:23-7:29, the Sermon on the Mount).*

On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, when Luke concludes the unit of controversy stories (Luke 5:29-6:11) that he has created by making use of controversy stories found in two separated literary contexts in Matthew (Matt 9:10-17 and 12:1-14) he comes naturally to the very next verse in Matthew (12:15). Here he reads, Ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς γνοὺς ἀνεχώρεσεν ἐκεῖθεν καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ ὄχλοι πολλοί, καὶ ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτοὺς πάντας. These words are similar to those recounted on an earlier occasion in Matthew when "many crowds followed Jesus and he healed them," namely in Matthew's introduction to the Sermon on the Mount (Matt 12:15 cf. Matt 4:23-5:1, esp. 4:24c-25).

| Matthew 12:15 | Matthew 4:24c-25 |
|---|---|
| Ὁ δὲ Ἰησους | |
| γνοὺς | |
| ἀνεχώρησεν ἐκεῖθεν. | |
| | καὶ ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτούς. |
| καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ | καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ |
| ὄχλοι πολλοί, | ὄχλοι πολλοὶ |
| καὶ ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτους πάντας, | |

Like the "completion formulas," highlighted in Section I of this paper, the words which link together these two literary contexts in Matthew (Matt 4:24-25/Matt 12:15) also constitute repeated formulas that characterize the text of the gospel of Matthew.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Matt 4:25 | καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ | ὄχλοι | πολλοί | (cf. Mark 3:7, Luke 6:17) |
| Matt 19:2 | καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ | ὄχλοι | πολλοί | (cf. Mark 10:2) |
| Matt 8:1 | ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ | ὄχλοι | πολλοί | |
| Matt 12:15 | καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ | [[ὄχλοι]] | πολλοί | (cf. Mark 3:7)[15] |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Matt 4:24 | καὶ ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτούς | |
| Matt 12:15 | καὶ ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτούς | (cf. Mark 3:10, Luke 6:18) |
| Matt 19:2 | καὶ ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτούς | |
| Matt 21:14 | καὶ ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτούς | |
| Matt 15:30 | καὶ ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτούς | |
| Matt 12:22 | καὶ ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτούς[16] | |

[15] Tevis, *Matthew*, Table 4.
[16] Tevis, *Matthew*, Table 5.

Having been drawn back from Matthew 12:15 to the beginning of Matthew's Sermon on the Mount (Matt 4:24-25) by these similar summary passages and the linguistic identities used within them, one who reread the entirety of Matthew's introduction to the Sermon on the Mount (Matt 4:23-5:2) could be reminded of yet a third literary context in Matthew. Even a casual reader of Matthew's gospel would note the similarities between Matthew's introduction to Jesus' first great discourse, the Sermon on the Mount (Matt 4:23-5:2) and his introduction to Jesus' second great discourse, the Mission Discourse (Matt 9:35-11:1), with its opening call and commissioning of the twelve disciples (Matt 9:35-10:2).

| Matthew 4:23-5:2 | Matthew 9:35-36a,10:1-2a |
|---|---|
| 23 Καὶ περιῆγεν<br>ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ Γαλιλαίᾳ, | 9:35 Καὶ περιῆγεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς<br>τὰς πόλεις πάσας<br>καὶ τὰς κώμας, |
| διδάσκων ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς<br>αὐτῶν<br>καὶ κηρύσσων<br>τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς βασιλείας<br>καὶ θεραπεύων πᾶσαν νόσον<br>καὶ πᾶσαν μαλακίαν<br>ἐν τῷ λαῷ. | διδάσκων ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς<br>αὐτῶν<br>καὶ κηρύσσων<br>τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς βασιλειάς<br>καὶ θεραπεύων πᾶσαν νόσον<br>καὶ πᾶσαν μαλακίαν. |
| 24 καὶ ἀπῆλθεν ἡ ἀκοὴ αὐτοῦ<br>εἰς ὅλην τὴν Συρίαν·<br>καὶ προσήνεγκαν αὐτῷ<br>πάντας τοὺς κακῶς ἔχοντας<br>ποικίλαις νόσοις<br>καὶ βασάνοις συνεχομένους<br>καὶ δαιμονιζομένους<br>καὶ σεληναιζομένους<br>καὶ παραλυτικούς,<br>καὶ ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτούς. | |
| 25 καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ<br>ὄχλοι πολλοὶ<br>ἀπὸ τῆς Γαλιλαίας<br>καὶ Δεκαπόλεως<br>καὶ Ἱεροσολύμων<br>καὶ Ἰουδαίας<br>καὶ πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου. | |
| 5:1 Ἰδὼν δὲ τοὺς ὄχλους | 36a Ἰδὼν δὲ τοὺς ὄχλους. . . |
| ἀνέβη εἰς τὸ ὄρος·<br>καὶ καθίσαντος αὐτοῦ<br>προσῆλθαν αὐτῷ<br>οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ· | 10:1 Καὶ προσκαλεσάμενος τοὺς δώδεκα<br>μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ |
| 2 καὶ ἀνοίξας τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ<br>ἐδίδασκεν αὐτοὺς λέγων, | ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς<br>ἐξουσίαν πνευμάτων ἀκαθάρτων<br>ὥστε ἐκβάλλειν αὐτὰ<br>καὶ θεραπεύειν πᾶσαν νόσον<br>καὶ πᾶσαν μαλακίαν<br>2 Τῶν δὲ δώδεκα ἀποστόλων<br>τὰ ὀνοματά ἐστιν ταῦτα· |

By cross references such as these, it is easy to see how a reader of Matthew's gospel, having reached Matthew 12:15, could have followed Matthew's repeated language into three separate, but linguistically closely related, contexts in Matthew:

(a) Matt 12:15-16, a context where "many crowds followed Jesus and he healed them."

(b) Matt 4:23-5:1, another context where "many crowds followed Jesus and he healed them" and where "Jesus went around. . . teaching in their synagogues and preaching the gospel of the Kingdom and healing every sickness and every weakness in the people" after which Jesus immediately preached the Sermon on the Mount to his disciples (Matt 5:2-7:29).

(c) Matt 9:35-38, another context where Jesus "went around. . . teaching in their synagogues and preaching the gospel of the Kingdom and healing every sickness and every weakness in the people" after which Jesus immediately called his twelve disciples (Matt 10:1-4).

By means of linguistic clues such as these, Luke could have brought together these three literary contexts in Matthew (12:15-16; 4:23-5:2 and 9:35-10:4) and could have composed Luke 6:12-7:1 from them. Matthew 12:15-16 would have provided the context for Luke 6:12-7:1. Matthew 4:23-5:2 and 9:35-10:4 would have provided some of the content.

Luke's use of Matthew from Luke 6:12-7:1 could be schematized as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| A Step in a Plot Against Jesus | Luke 6:11 = Matt 12:14 |
| The Setting on the Mount | Luke 6:12 = Matt 5:1 |
| The Call of the Twelve | Luke 6:13-16 = Matt 10:1-4 |
| The Gathering of Crowds | Luke 6:17-19 = Matt 12:15-16 (cf. the doublet [Matt 4:24-25] within Matt 4:23-5:2) |
| The Great Sermon | Luke 6:20-7:1 = Matt 5:3-7:29 |

If Luke, at Luke 6:11-19, did have these three literary contexts in mind, he could have used them as follows:

| Matt 12:14 | Luke 6:11-19 |
|---|---|
| 12:14 ἐξελθόντες<br>δὲ οἱ Φαρισαῖοι<br><br>συμβούλιον ἔλαβον<br>κατ' αὐτοῦ<br>ὅπως αὐτὸν ἀπολέσωσιν. | 11 αὐτοὶ δὲ<br>ἐπλήσθησαν ἀνοίας,<br>καὶ διελάλουν<br>προς ἀλλήλους<br>τί ἂν ποιήσαιεν τῷ Ἰησοῦ. |

| Matthew 4:23-5:2 | Matthew 9:35-36a. . .10:1-2a; 12:15 |
|---|---|
| 4:23 Καὶ περιῆγεν<br>ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ Γαλιλαίᾳ,<br><br>διδάσκων ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς<br>αὐτῶν<br>καὶ κηρύσσων<br>τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς βασιλείας<br>καὶ θεραπεύων πᾶσαν νόσον<br>καὶ πᾶσαν μαλακίαν<br>ἐν τῷ λαῷ.<br>24 καὶ ἀπῆλθεν ἡ ἀκοὴ αὐτοῦ | 9:35 Καὶ περιῆγεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς<br>τὰς πόλεις πάσας<br>καὶ τὰς κώμας,<br>διδάσκων ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς<br>αὐτῶν<br>καὶ κηρύσσων<br>τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς βασιλείας<br>καὶ θεραπεύων πᾶσαν νόσον<br>καὶ πᾶσαν μαλακίαν. |

εἰς ὅλην τὴν Συρίαν·
καὶ προσήνεγκαν αὐτῷ
πάντας τοὺς κακῶς ἔχοντας
ποικίλαις νόσοις
καὶ βασάνοις συνεχομένους
καὶ δαιμονιζομένους
καὶ σεληναιζομένους
καὶ παραλυτικούς,
καὶ ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτούς.
25 καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ
ὄχλοι πολλοὶ

ἀπὸ τῆς Γαλιλαίας
καὶ Δεκαπόλεως
καὶ Ἱεροσολύμων
καὶ Ἰουδαίας
καὶ πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου.
5:1 Ἰδὼν δὲ τοὺς ὄχλους
ἀνέβη

εἰς τὸ ὄρος·
καὶ καθίσαντος αὐτοῦ

προσῆλθαν αὐτῷ

οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ·
καὶ ἀνοίξας τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ
ἐδίδασκεν αὐτοὺς λέγων,

[cf. Matt 12:15
καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ
ὄχλοι πολλοί,
καὶ ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτοὺς πάντας

9:36 Ἰδὼν δὲ τοὺς ὄχλους. . .
.
.
[[Matt 9:36b-38 omitted]]

10:1 Καὶ προσκαλεσάμενος
τοὺς δώδεκα
μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ

ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς
ἐξουσίαν πνευμάτων ἀκαθάρτων
ὥστε ἐκβάλλειν αὐτὰ
καὶ θεραπεύειν πᾶσαν νόσον
καὶ πᾶσαν μαλακίαν
2 Τῶν δὲ δώδεκα

ἀποστόλων
τὰ ὀνόματά ἐστιν ταῦτα·
Σίμων
ὁ λεγόμενος Πέτρος
καὶ Ἀνδρέας
ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ
καὶ Ἰάκωβος
ὁ τοῦ Ζεβεδαίου
καὶ Ἰωάννης
ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ,
3 Φίλιππος
καὶ Βαρθολομαῖος,
Θωμᾶς
καὶ Ματθαῖος
ὁ τελώνης,

Ἰάκωβος ὁ τοῦ Ἁλφαίου
καὶ θαδδαῖος
4 Σίμων
ὁ Κανανταῖος

καὶ Ἰούδας ὁ Ἰσκαριώτης
ὁ καὶ παραδοὺς αὐτὸν

12 Ἐγένετο δὲ
ἐν ταῖς ἡμεραῖς ταύταις
ἐξελθεῖν αὐτὸν
εἰς τὸ ὄρος προσεύξασθαι
καὶ ἦν διανυκτερεύων
ἐν τῇ προσευχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ.
13 Καὶ ὅτε ἐγένετο ἡμέρα,
προσεφώνησεν
τοὺς
μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ

καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ἀπ' αὐτῶν

δώδεκα
οὓς καὶ
ἀποστόλους
ὠνόμασεν·
14 Σίμωνα
ὃν καὶ ὠνόμασεν Πέτρον,
καὶ Ἀνδρέαν
τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ,
καὶ Ἰάκωβον

καὶ Ἰωάννην

καὶ Φίλιππον
καὶ Βαρθολομαῖον

15 καὶ Ματθαῖον

καὶ Θωμᾶν,
καὶ Ἰάκωβον Ἁλφαίου

καὶ Σίμωνα
τὸν καλούμενον Ζηλωτὴν
16 καὶ Ἰούδαν Ἰακώβου,
καὶ Ἰούδαν Ἰσκαριώθ,
ὃς ἐγένετο προδότης.
17 Καὶ καταβὰς

| | |
|---|---|
| | μετ' αὐτῶν |
| | ἔστη ἐπὶ τόπου πεδινοῦ, |
| | καὶ ὄχλος πολὺς |
| | μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ, |
| | καὶ πλῆθος πολὺ τοῦ λαοῦ |
| | ἀπὸ πάσης τῆς Ἰουδαίας |
| | καὶ Ἰερουσαλὴμ |
| | καὶ τῆς παραλίου |
| | Τύρου καὶ Σιδῶνος, |
| | 18 οἳ ἦλθον ἀκοῦσαι αὐτοῦ |
| | καὶ ἰαθῆναι |
| | ἀπὸ τῶν νόσων αὐτῶν· |
| | καὶ οἱ ἐνοχλούμενοι |
| | ἀπὸ πνευμάτων ἀκαθάρτων |
| | ἐθεραπεύοντο. |
| | 19 καὶ πᾶς ὁ ὄχλος |
| | ἐζήτουν ἅπτεσθαι αὐτοῦ, |
| | ὅτι δύναμις παρ' αὐτοῦ |
| | ἐξήρχετο |
| | καὶ ἰᾶτο πάντας. |
| | 20a Καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπάρας |
| | τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτοῦ |
| | εἰς τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ |
| | ἔλεγεν, |
| Matthew 5:3-7:29 | Luke 6:20b-7:1 |
| Sermon on the Mount | Sermon on the Plain |

To begin his new unit, Luke would have composed an introduction depicting Jesus at prayer (Luke 6:12). The picture of Jesus engaging in prayer as a prelude to an important event in his life is typical of the Lukan gospel.[17] Luke locates this scene of Jesus at prayer "on the mount," εἰς τὸ ὄρος, probably in dependence upon Matthew's setting for the Great Sermon (Luke 6:12 cf. Matt 5:1, εἰς τὸ ὄρος). Luke will relate his version of the Great Sermon only eight verses after this scene (Luke 6:20-7:1), immediately following a gathering of crowds (Luke 6:17-18) and his version of the call of the twelve (Luke 6:13-16).

Luke next has Jesus call his disciples, καὶ προσεφώνησεν, (Luke 6:13) in language similar to Jesus' call of his disciples in Matthew 10:1 (cf. καὶ προσκαλεσάμενος); From this larger group, Luke has Jesus "name twelve apostles" (Luke 6:13 cf. Mark 3:14). The names of the twelve "apostles" in Luke (Luke 6:14-16) are essentially the same as those in Matthew (10:2-3) although Luke substitutes "Judas of James" (Luke 6:16) for "Thaddeus" (Matt 10:3/Mark 3:18).

After having Jesus come down "to a level place" with these twelve, Luke records the gathering of crowds who come to hear and to be healed by Jesus. Luke says that the crowds are from Judea and Jerusalem (Luke 6:17), perhaps in dependence upon Matthew's collection of crowds that introduce his Sermon on the Mount (Matt 4:25). To these, Luke adds references to persons from Tyre and

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[17] Compare Luke 3:21, following Jesus' baptism and prior to his "anointing" as Son of God by the Holy Spirit; 5:16, between Jesus' cleansing of the leper and his healing of a paralytic; 6:12, prior to Jesus' call of the twelve and the Sermon on the Plain; 9:18, prior to Peter's "confession" of who Jesus is; 9:28, 29, prior to Jesus' transfiguration; 11:1, prior to Jesus' teaching his disciples "the Lord's Prayer;" Luke 22:41, prior to Jesus' arrest in Gethsemane; and 22:45, prior to Jesus' chastizing the disciples for sleeping in the Garden of Gethsemane prior to his betrayal.

Sidon (Luke 6:17/Mark 3:8). Jesus heals them all, πάντας, as in Matthew (Luke 6:19/Matt 12:15) but in contrast to Mark who says that Jesus healed "many" (cf. Mark 3:10, πολλούς. . .ὅσοι εἶχον μάστιγας).[18]

Luke's Sermon on the Plain follows immediately (Luke 6:20-7:1; cf. Matthew's Sermon on the Mount, 4:23-7:29).

On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, having made use of Matt 12:14 in composing Mark 3:6 (cf. Luke's quite different wording at 6:11), Mark also comes to Matt 12:15/Mark 3:7. The unique features of Mark's text in comparison to Matthew at Mark 3:6/Matt 12:14 are consistent with Markan redaction of Matthew. See the footnotes accompanying this synoptic display.

| Matt 12:14 | Mark 3:6 | Luke 6:11-19 |
|---|---|---|
| 14 ἐξελθόντες δὲ | καὶ ἐξελθόντες | 11 αὐτοὶ δὲ |
| οἱ Φαρισαῖοι | οἱ Φαρισαῖοι | ἐπλήσθησαν ἀνοίας, |
| | εὐθὺς[19] | |
| | μετὰ τῶν Ἡρῳδιανῶν[20] | |
| συμβούλιον ἔλαβον | συμβούλιον ἐδίδουν[21] | καὶ διελάλουν |
| κατ' αὐτοῦ | κατ' αὐτοῦ | πρὸς ἀλλήλους |
| ὅπως αὐτὸν ἀπολέσωσιν. | ὅπως αὐτὸν ἀπολέσωσιν. | τὶ ἂν ποιήσαιεν τῷ Ἰησοῦ. |

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[18] The Greek word, μάστιξ, appears in the Gospel of Mark 3 times, (Mark 3:10, 5:29, 34). Twice it appears in the phrase ἀπὸ τῆς μάστιγος. cf. Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, Table 142, p. 84. There are no Synoptic parallels either to the vocabulary item or to the phrase in Mark that includes this vocabulary item. The word never appears in the text of Matthew. It does appear, however, once in the Gospel of Luke in a context where there is no Markan parallel (Luke 7:21, ἀπὸ νόσων καὶ μαστίγων), even in a phrase similar to those found in Mark 5:29, 34. It also appears once in Acts (22:24). Hebrews 11:36 completes the New Testament usages of this word. Since Luke can use this vocabulary word in a context independent of Mark (Luke 7:21), and even use it in a phrase similar to the one repeated in Mark, why, on the Two Document Hypothesis, does Luke avoid the word and the phrase every time it appears in Mark in a context paralleled by Luke (Mark 3:10, cf. Luke 6:19; Mark 5:29, cf. Luke 8:44; Mark 5:34, cf. Luke 8:48)?

[19] εὐθύς is generally recognized to be a Markan literary characteristic (42Xs in Mark). See Frans Neirynck, ed., in collaboration with Theo Hansen and Frans van Segbroeck, *The Minor Agreements of Matthew and Luke Against Mark with a Cumulative List*, BETL 37 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974): 274-76 and many other scholars. cf. Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, Table 5, p. 36. The word suggests Markan priority to Matthew since Matthew uses it (7Xs) less frequently than Mark (42Xs) and never apart from a Markan parallel. It is, with a ratio of comparative usage of 6 to 1, one of the most impressive vocabulary items in favor of Mark's priority to Matthew. Luke, in contrast to Matthew, does use it once apart from a Markan parallel (Luke 6:49) and once in Acts (10:16). The appearance of εὐθύς in the texts of Mark and Luke is, therefore, inconclusive with regard to the direction of literary dependence between these two gospels.

[20] The Herodians are characters that appear only in three contexts in the New Testament, twice in Mark and once in a Matthean parallel to Mark (here at Mark 3:6 and at Mark 12:13/Matt 22:16). See Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, Table 92, p. 65. This feature, too, could be taken to suggest Mark's priority to Matthew.

[21] The combination of συμβούλιον with a form of λαμβάνω is characteristic of the text of Matthew (Matt 22:15, 12:14, 27:1, 27:7, and 28:12). See Tevis, *Matthew*, Table 114. Twice in Matthew the subject of this construction is "the Pharisees" (here at Matt 12:14 and Matt 22:15). Mark fragmentarily preserves this Matthean literary characteristic in his parallel to Matthew on two occasions (Matt 12:14 cf. Mark 3:6 συμβούλιον ἐδίδουν and Matt 27:1 cf. Mark 15:1 συμβούλιον ἑτοιμάσαντες). This evidence suggests Matthew's priority to Mark.

| Matthew 12:15 | Mark 3:7-9 | Matt 4:25 | Luke 6:17-18a |
|---|---|---|---|
| 15 Ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς γνοὺς | 7 Καὶ ὁ Ἰησοῦς<br>μετὰ τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ | | 17 Καὶ καταβὰς<br>μετ' αὐτῶν<br>ἔστη ἐπὶ τόπου<br>πεδινοῦ,<br>καὶ ὄχλος πολὺς<br>μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ |
| ἀνεχώρησεν ἐκεῖθεν. | ἀνεχώρησεν<br>πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν·[22]<br>καὶ πολὺ πλῆθος<br>ἀπὸ τῆς Γαλιλαίας | | καὶ πλῆθος πολὺ<br>τοῦ λαοῦ |
| καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ<br>ὄχλοι πολλοί, | ἠκολούθησεν,<br>καὶ ἀπὸ<br>τῆς Ἰουδαίας | 25 καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ<br>ὄχλοι πολλοὶ<br>ἀπὸ τῆς Γαλιλαίας<br>καὶ Δεκαπόλεως | ἀπὸ<br>πάσης<br>τῆς Ἰουδαίας |
| | 8 καὶ ἀπὸ Ἰεροσολύμων<br>καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰδουμαίας<br>καὶ πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου<br>καὶ περὶ Τύρον<br>καὶ Σιδῶνα,<br>πλῆθος πολὺ<br>ἀκούοντες ὅσα ἐποίει<br>ἦλθον πρὸς αὐτόν. | καὶ Ἰεροσολύμων<br>καὶ Ἰουδαίας<br>καὶ πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου. | καὶ Ἰερουσαλὴμ<br>καὶ τῆς παραλίου<br>Τύρου<br>καὶ Σιδῶνος,<br>18 οἳ<br>ἦλθον<br>ἀκοῦσαι αὐτοῦ<br>καὶ ἰαθῆναι<br>ἀπὸ τῶν νόσων<br>αὐτῶν· |
| | 9 καὶ εἶπεν τοῖς μαθηταῖς<br>αὐτοῦ<br>ἵνα πλοιάριον<br>προσκαρτερῇ αὐτῷ<br>διὰ τὸν ὄχλον<br>ἵνα μὴ θλίβωσιν αὐτόν·[23] | | |

[22] The phrase πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν appears twice in the text of Mark (here at Mark 3:7 and at Mark 4:1). In both instances the phrase finds no parallel in the texts of either Matthew or Luke (Mark 3:7, cf. Matt 12:15/Luke 6:17 omit; Mark 4:1 cf. Matt 13:2/Luke 8:4 omit). The phrase is not found anywhere in the New Testament outside of Mark and is, therefore, distinctive in the text of Mark. On the Two Document Hypothesis, why do both Matthew and Luke avoid it in their parallels both times it appears in Mark? The evidence is consistent with the Two Gospel Hypothesis. Mark would have added these details to the conflated text he created from Matthew and Luke.

[23] Here in Mark "a little boat" is set aside to protect Jesus from the crowd. It is presumably this boat that is used to protect Jesus later at Mark 4:1. cf. Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, Table 96, p. 67. The parallels to Mark 3:7 (Matt 12:15/Luke 6:18) do not so anticipate Jesus' need for a boat, although Matthew does shares the motif of the protec-

Mark's literary dependence upon Matthew in this context is indicated by Mark's use of ἀνεχώρησεν at Mark 3:7 in parallel with Matthew's usage of this same word in Matt 12:15. The verb ἀναχωρέω appears in the text of Matthew 10 times and only one other time in the Synoptic Gospels, in the gospel of Mark, in this passage parallel to a Matthean usage (Mark 3:7/Matt 12:15).

In the third person singular aorist active indicative, the word forms part of a repeated formula within the text of Matthew.

Matt 12:15 ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς γνοὺς ἀνεχώρησεν ἐκεῖθεν (cf. Mark 3:7)
Matt 14:13 ἀκούσας δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς γνοὺς ἀνεχώρησεν ἐκεῖθεν[24]

The presence of ἀναχωρέω in the Gospel of Matthew is due to some preference on the part of the redactor(s) of Matthew while its presence in the Gospel of Mark may readily be accounted for by copying.

One of the Greek terms for crowds that appears in this context, πλῆθος πολύ, appears only six times in the New Testament; twice in Mark, both in this context parallel to a Lukan usage (Mark 3:7 and 8, cf. Luke 6:17), twice elsewhere in Luke (Luke 6:17 and 5:6) and twice in Acts.[25] It appears to be a literary characteristic of Luke's writing that Mark has borrowed and repeated within the same immediate context in conformity with his literary preference for "duality."[26] It constitutes evidence for Mark's literary dependence upon Luke in this context, even as the appearance of ἀναχωρήσεν within the text of Mark suggests Mark's literary dependence upon Matthew.

Mark introduces the gathering and healing of the crowds into his gospel (Mark 3:7-12) immediately prior to the call of the twelve disciples (Mark 3:13-19). This is in contrast to Luke who introduced the gathering and healing of the crowds (Luke 6:17-19) after the call of the twelve disciples/apostles (Luke 6:12-16). If an explanation for Mark's reversal of this order of events in Luke is needed, one could explain, with others, that Mark may have felt the need to gather a crowd from which the twelve might be called. Or one might explain, on the Two Gospel Hypothesis, that Mark took the healing of the crowds first from Matthew (Matt 12:14-16/Mark 3:6-12) and then the choice of the twelve from Luke (Luke 6:12-16/Mark 3:13-19a). On the latter view, the order of Mark would be the consequence of conflation rather than an intentional altering of the Lukan sequence of events. The two explanations are not, of course, necessarily mutually exclusive.

The places of origin of the members of these crowds are more numerous in Mark (3:7-8) than in any of the other potentially parallel literary contexts within the Synoptic gospels (cf. Matthew 12:15-16, 4:23-5:2 and Luke 6:17-19).

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tive boat with Mark later at Mark 4:1/Matt 13:2. This evidence could be taken to support Mark's priority to Matthew but not to Luke. διὰ τὸν ὄχλον to mean "on account of the crowd" is used twice in the text of Mark (Mark 2:4 and 3:9). Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, Table 73, p. 58. The Markan usage at 3:9 finds no parallel in either Matthew or Luke and the Markan usage at 2:4 carries the meaning "through the crowd" in the Lukan parallel at 5:19. This usage has no parallel in Matthew 9:2. The evidence is consistent with the Two Gospel Hypothesis.

24 Tevis, *Matthew*, Table 13.

25 See J. G. F. Collison, *Linguistic Usages in the Gospel of Luke*, (Ph. D. diss. Southern Methodist University, 1977, photocopy, Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1984, microfilm, 1978), 175-176.

26 Frans Neirynck, *Duality in Mark: Contributions to the Study of the Markan Redaction*, BETL 31 (Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1972).

Luke's references to crowds from Judea and Jerusalem (Luke 6:17) may have suggested to Mark that he check Matthew's introduction to the Sermon on the Mount, as Luke had before him (Matt 4:25/Luke 6:17/Mark 3:7-8). But whatever the reason, Mark (3:7) includes members of the crowds from Judea and Jerusalem, in agreement with both Matthew 4:25 and Luke 6:17.

Mark's context also includes crowds from Galilee (3:7) in agreement with Matthew 4: 25, but in contrast to Luke 6:17; and crowds from Tyre and Sidon in agreement with Luke 6:17, but in contrast to Matthew 4:25. On the Two Document Hypothesis, how is one to explain this division of references to geographical regions between Matthew and Luke and Matthew's removal of his references to an earlier literary context (Matt 4:25 instead of 12:15)?[27] For one who is not convinced of the validity of the Two Document Hypothesis, "Matthean anticipation" is not a credible explanation.[28]

Mark's reference to crowds from Idumea is unique to him (Mark 3:8). To these representatives, Mark adds crowds from "across the Jordan" in agreement with Matthew 4:25. In doing this, Mark again demonstrates his literary dependence upon Matthew. The phrase "across the Jordan" appears three times in the gospel of Matthew, twice in parallel with Mark and once without a Markan parallel (Matt 4:15 No Parallel; Matt 4:25/Mark 3:8; and Matt 19:1/Mark 10:1).

The phrase, "across the Jordan," (πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου) appears for the first time in Matthew in a quotation from Isaiah 9:1-2/Matt 4:15-16. The quotation immediately follows one of the fulfillment of prophecy formulas so characteristic of the text of Matthew (Matt 4:14), ἵνα πληρωθῇ τὸ ῥηθὲν διὰ Ἡσαΐου τοῦ προφήτου λέγοντος[29]

In the most immediate context, this prophecy functions to explain Jesus' withdrawal into "Galilee" (Matt 4:12, cf. 4:15), and his move to Capernaum, "by the sea" (Matt 4:13, cf. 4:15) which is in the "regions of Zebulun and Napthali" (Matt 4:14, cf.4:15).

But there is a larger compositional motive for Matthew introducing this quotation from Isaiah 9:1-2 at the very beginning of Jesus' public ministry, as that is described in Matthew. The quotation implies that "the light," Jesus, must go not only "to the lost sheep of the house of Israel" in Jerusalem and Judea, but also "across the Jordan" into "Galilee of the Gentiles."

Matthew uses this phrase, "across the Jordan" in two major compositional passages (Matt 4:23-25 and 19:1). In the first (Matt 4:25), Matthew indicates that crowds from "Galilee and the Decapolis and Jerusalem and Judea and across the

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[27] For one answer, see Frans Neirynck, "The Two-Source Hypothesis Textual Discussion. Matthew 4:23-5:2 and the Matthean Composition of 4:23-11:1," in *The Interrelations of the Gospels. A Symposium led by M. É. Boismard—W. R. Farmer,—F. Neirynck Jerusalem 1984*, ed. David L. Dungan (Leuven: Leuven University Press/ Uitgeverij Peeters, 1990): 23-46. Neirynck's decision to focus on two of three Synoptic pairs, Matt-Mark and Mark-Luke, in his defense of Markan priority, distinguishes his approach from that of advocates of the Two Gospel Hypothesis who, in illustrating their hypothesis, focus on the pair, Matt-Luke (Luke's use of Matthew), and on Mark's simultaneous relationship to both Matt and Luke (Matt>Mark<Luke).

[28] cf. Frans Neirynck, "Matthew 4:23-5:2 and Matthean Composition," esp. p. 46 and, by the same author, "Synoptic Problem," in *The New Jerome Biblical Commentary* (1990): 587-595, esp. 588-89

[29] See Tevis, *Matthew*, Table 17: τὸ ῥηθὲν (ὁ ῥηθεὶς) + διά + (prophet's name) + τοῦ προφήτου Matt [26:56], 21:4, 1:22, 2:15, 2:23, 13:35, 2:17, 27:9, 4:14, 8:17, 12:17, 3:3, 24:15.

Jordan (πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου)" followed Jesus. His ministry begins among those from Galilee of the Gentiles.

Later in Matthew's gospel (Matt 19:1), and as a major geographical transition, Jesus returns "from Galilee and came into the regions of Judea across the Jordan (πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου)." The gospel of Matthew includes both a ministry among the Gentiles in Galilee of the Gentiles and a ministry among "the lost sheep of the house of Israel" in Judea. The geographical transition is marked in Matthew by the pregnant phrase, πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου, that the author of Matthew derives from the programmatic quotation of Isaiah 9:1-2 with which Jesus' public ministry begins in Matthew.

Mark includes in his gospel the two later references to πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου (Mark 3:8/Matt 4:25 and Mark 10:1/Matt 19:1), but has no parallel whatsoever to the quotation from Isaiah 9:1-2/Matt 4:14-16 that provides the rationale for these later references. Mark has fragmentarily preserved a major compositional feature of the gospel of Matthew. The presence of πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου in the Gospel of Matthew is due to some preference on the part of some redactor(s) of Matthew, probably the author, while its presence in the Gospel of Mark may readily be accounted for by copying. It constitutes evidence for Mark's literary dependence upon Matthew at the compositional level of both gospels.

It is highly unlikely that Matthew would have noticed the two scattered references to "across the Jordan" in Mark (3:8 and 10:1), used them in expanded redactional contexts of his own (Matt 4:23-25 and 19:1-2) and then, prior to both of these, provided a Scriptural quotation to give them a significance (Matt 4:12-17 cf. Isa 9:1-2) that he did not find in his source. This reconstruction of the history this synoptic tradition on the basis of Markan priority is an example of what some advocates of the Two Document Hypothesis label "Matthean anticipations." If one is convinced of Markan Priority, one must say that Matthew has "anticipated" a Markan theme in this case and the literary history of these traditions must be similar to the one just outlined on the basis of Markan priority. But such a reconstruction of the literary history of the text of Matthew on the Two Document hypothesis seems to me to be not only difficult, but incredible.

*Appended Note on the Doublet to Matt 4:23*
*Matt 9:35/Mark 6:7*

The use of καὶ περιῆγεν. . . διδάσκων at Mark 6:7/Matt 9:35 (cf. Matt 4:23) is also evidence of the secondary nature of Mark to Matthew in that passage. These words are clearly traceable to a formula only found in the Gospel of Matthew. See the synoptic displays of Matt 4:23 and 9:35 above. The words καὶ περιῆγεν, in fact the root verb, περιάγω itself, is found nowhere in the Markan Gospel outside of Mark 6:7/Matt 9:35/Matt 4:23. The presence of the long redactional formula in the Gospel of Matthew at Matt 4:23 and 9:35 is due to some preference on the part of the redactor(s) of Matthew, probably the author, while its presence in the Gospel of Mark may readily be accounted for by copying. It constitutes evidence at the compositional level of Mark's literary dependence upon Matthew.

To this reconstruction of the history of this synoptic tradition one may compare one that appeals to Matthean "anticipations."

On this view, at Matt 4:23, the Evangelist, Matthew, anticipates that the lone occurrence of the word περιάγω in the text of Mark is coming up later (Mark 6:6/Matt 9:35). Matthew anticipates that when he arrives at Mark 6:6/Matt 9:35, he

will create a redactional phrase from this lone Markan usage of this vocabulary item. With this in mind, Matthew decides to anticipate the text of Mark by including the phrase that he anticipates developing in his parallel to Mark 6:6b (Matt 9:35) in this earlier context of his gospel (Matt 4:23).

## IV.

*Matthew's Unit on "Little Ones and Scandals" (Matt 18:1-14)*
*Mark's parallel unit (Mark 9:33-48 [50])*
*and*
*Additional Parallels to Mark at Matthew 10:40, 10:42, and 5:29-30*
*(See also Luke 9:43-50, 17:1-2; Matt 12:30/Luke 11:23)*

Matthew's story of the Temple Tax (Matt 17:24-27)[30] immediately follows the second prediction of the passion in Matthew (Matt 17:22-23).[31]

The story of the Temple Tax in Matthew is introduced by a reference to Jesus and his disciples "coming into Capernaum" ( Ἐλθόντων δὲ αὐτῶν εἰς Καφαρναούμ . . . , Matt 17:24) and "coming into a house (καὶ ἐλθόντα εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, Matt 17:25). Similar situation indicators may be found in the immediately following and parallel literary unit in Mark, Καὶ ἦλθον εἰς Καφαρναούμ. καὶ ἐν τῇ οἰκία γενόμενος (Mark 9:33 cf. Matt 18:1, Ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ὥρᾳ προσῆλθον οἱ μαθηταὶ τῷ Ἰησοῦ λέγοντες).

Luke's parallel setting for the discussion of True Greatness is vague, "a dialogue came in among them." (Luke 9:46; cf. Luke 22:24). Matthew introduces the literary unit on True Greatness, immediately following his unique story of the Temple Tax (Matt 17:24-27), with a similarly vague situation indicator and a question on the lips of the disciples, "In that hour the disciples came to Jesus saying, 'Who then is greatest in the Kingdom of the heavens?'" (Matt 18:1).

In Matt 18:4, Jesus provides an answer to this question, in wording similar to the original question. The question and the answer focus not simply on "Who is greatest?" but more specifically on "Who is greatest *in the kingdom of Heaven*?" This question and answer structure provides an *inclusio* around the opening pericope of Matthew 18 (Matt 18:1-4).

Matt 18:1 Τίς ἄρα μείζων ἐστιν ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν;

Matt 18:4 οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ μείζων ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν.

Note that Matt 18:3 fits beautifully into this section of Matthew (18:1-5), concerned as it is, both with "the kingdom of the Heavens" (cf. Matt 18:1, 3 and 4) and "children" (cf. Matt 18:2, 3, 4, and 5). Mark and Luke agree against Matthew, however, on the placement of the logion in Matt 18:3 (Mark 10:15/Luke 18:17). See the discussion in Section V below.

A section relating to "one of these little ones" (Matt 18:6-10, esp. 18:6, 10, and 14) immediately follows this unit concerned with "children" in Matthew (Matt 18:1-5).

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[30] David Daube has affirmed that the story of the Temple Tax in Matthew is "an occurrence as authentic as anything in Mark." Does he intend to impute the authenticity of Mark or to elevate the authenticity of Matthew? See David Daube, "Temple Tax," in *Jesus, The Gospels, and the Church*, 121-134, the quotation is from p. 134.

[31] For a Two Gospel perspective on the Passion Prediction Passages, see W. R. Farmer," The Passion Prediction Passages and the Synoptic Problem: a Test Case," *New Testament Studies* 36/4 (October 1990): 558-570.

A question and answer structure also characterizes the parallel to Matthew 18:1-5 in Luke 9:46-48.[32]

Luke 9:46 Εἰσῆλθεν δὲ διαλογισμὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς, τὸ τίς ἂν εἴη μείζων αὐτῶν.
Luke 9:48 ὁ γὰρ μικρότερος ἐν πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ὑπάρχων, οὗτός ἐστιν μέγας.

In Matthew, the disciples openly question Jesus about "Who is the greatest in the Kingdom of Heaven?"

In Luke, the disciples seem to question one another, rather than Jesus directly, about this matter. But Luke seems to imply that the dialogue was not open. Jesus, in Luke, is able to discern this dialogue in the hearts of his disciples (Luke 9:47).

In Mark, the disciples do not question Jesus at all. Rather, Jesus questions the disciples and the question is about why they were dialoguing "in the way."[33]

Mark 9:33 . . . ἐπηρώτα αὐτούς· τί ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ διελογίζεσθε;
Mark 9:34 πρὸς ἀλλήλους γὰρ διελέχθησαν ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ τίς μείζων.

The statement that the disciples had been dialoguing about "Who is greater?" is retrospective in the gospel of Mark, but Mark does not provide an earlier literary context within his gospel when this dialogue took place. Could Mark's statement be retrospective to literary contexts in his (earlier?) source material (Matthew 18:1; cf. Luke 9:46)?

Within this literary context, Matthew and Luke agree against Mark not only in language but also in literary structure. Both Matthew and Luke frame their parallel literary units with a question from the disciples (Matt 18:1/Luke 9:46) and an answer from Jesus in language similar to the original question (Matt 18:4/Luke 9:48). Mark, by way of contrast, does not so frame his parallel unit in this way (cf. Mark 9:33-37) nor does he have the disciples question Jesus at all. Rather, the narrator in Mark refers to an earlier questioning by the disciples but, in this context, it is Jesus who questions the disciples. The question in Mark is also focused differently than the questions in the parallel passages in Matthew and Luke.

Such agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark in wording, theme and literary structure are not likely to be the result of accidentally concurrent editorial policies by two independent authors (Matthew and Luke) making use of a common source (Mark). Such agreements represent serious anomalies for the Two Document Hypothesis.

After the disciples ask the question about "Who is the greatest in the Kingdom of Heaven?" in Matthew, Jesus is depicted as calling "a child" whom Jesus stands "in the midst of them." This statement, "in the midst of them," ἐν

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[32] See also the other literary unit (doublet?) in Luke 22:24-27, following the institution of the Lord's Supper (Luke 22:14-23), where the disciples question Jesus a second time in that gospel about "Who is greater?" and where a similar literary structure may be found (Note the repeated language in Luke 22:24 and 27).

[33] The term "in the way," ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ is redactional in Mark. Mark 8:3, 27; 9:33, 34; 10:32, 52. See Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, Table 178, p. 93. The phrase is sometimes shared with the parallels (Mark 8:3=Matt 15:32; Mark 10:32=Matt 20:17) but, more often, it is absent (Mark 8:27 cf. Matt 16:13/Luke 9:18 omit; Mark 9:33, 34 cf. Matt 18:1/Luke 9:46 omit; Mark 10:52, cf. Matt 20:34/Luke 18:43 omit). Both Matthew and Luke, however, can use the phrase in contexts independent of Mark or alter a Markan context where a different usage is to be found (Matt 5:25/Luke 12:58; Matt 21:8/Luke 19:36 cf. Mark 11:8 εἰς τὴν ὁδόν; Luke 24:32, 35NP).

μέσῳ αὐτῶν, may serve in the gospel of Matthew as the opening of another *inclusio* that does not conclude until Matthew 18:20, ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν.

Chapter 18 of Matthew may be divided into two parts. The first part begins when the disciples come (προσῆλθον) to Jesus and speak to him (Matt 18:1). The second part begins when Peter comes (προσελθῶν) to Jesus and speaks to Him (Matt 18:21).[34] The words ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν are found both at the beginning of this first unit (Matt 18:2) and at its end (Matt 18:20). If this repeated language in Matthew is not accidental, then Matthew, by the way he has structured this unit, may be suggesting that the child who is set "in the midst" of his disciples (Matt 18:2), is none other than Jesus himself (Matt 18:20). This way of understanding Matt 18:20 is supported by Matt 18:5 where Jesus is depicted as saying, "Whoever should receive one such child in my name, receives me." It is also supported within the text of Matthew by his unique parable of the Last Judgement (Matt 25:31-46). Note the verbal, as well as the ideological, link between these two literary contexts in Matthew, Matt 18:8 and 25:41.

Matt 18:8 εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ αἰώνιον (cf. Mark 9:43)
Matt 25:41 εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ αἰώνιον[35]

Matthew begins chapter 18 of his gospel by having Jesus call and stand a child in the midst of the disciples as part of Jesus' answer to the disciples' initial question about "Who is greatest in the kingdom of Heaven?" With the child as a visual aid, Jesus then gives three admonitions. First, he says that those who do not turn and become like *children* really won't enter *the Kingdom of Heaven*. (Matt 18:3) Second, whoever will humble himself, like this *child*, this one is the greatest in *the Kingdom of Heaven*. (Matt 18:4) This statement answers the disciples' initiating question. (Matt 18:1) Third, whoever receives one such *child in the name of Jesus* is said to receive Jesus (Matt 18:5).

Matthew has Jesus conclude his speech prior to the entry of Peter (Matt 18:21) with the statement that 'Where two or three are gathered together *in the name of Jesus*, there is Jesus in the midst of them.' This statement repeats two earlier themes from the larger literary context of Matthew 18:1-20, namely, the theme of Jesus/the child 'in the midst' of his disciples noted above (cf. Matt 18:2 and 20) and the theme of receiving/gathering "in the name" of Jesus (cf. Matt 18:5 and 20).

Mark shares the first ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν with Matthew (Matt 18:2/Mark 9:36 cf. Luke 9:47 παρ' ἑαυτῷ) but neither Luke nor Mark share the latter usage (Matt 18:20). Similarly, both Mark and Luke share Matthew's earlier reference to receiving a child "in Jesus name" (Matt 18:5/Mark 9:37/Luke 9:48) but neither Mark nor Luke share the latter reference to "Jesus' name" (Matt 18:20). Both Mark and Luke can be seen to have fragmentarily preserved a literary structure traceable to Matthew within the parallel contexts of their gospels and such constitutes evidence of literary dependence of Mark and Luke upon the text of Matthew.

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[34] Robert H. Gundry [*Matthew: A Commentary on his Literary and Theological Art*, (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 1982): 358] says of Matthew 18 that "We may discern subtopical shifts from time to time. But with the exception of v. 21a Matthew does not signal these shifts with the conjunctions and introductory grammatical constructions that would make them clear. Rather, the subtopics flow one into another almost imperceptibly. . . ."

[35] Tevis, *Matthew*, Table 236.

Mark has glossed the text of Matthew with the statement that Jesus "embraced" the child (καὶ ἐνακαλισάμενος αὐτό) (Mark 9:36). This is the same detail that Mark, on the Two Gospel Hypothesis, also added to his conflated text at Mark 10:16 (καὶ ἐναγκαλισάμενος αὐτά).[36] On the Two Document Hypothesis, Matthew and Luke have accidentally agreed in omitting both Markan uses of this detail from their texts parallel to Mark (See Mark 9:36, Matt 18:2-3/Luke 9:47-48 omit and Mark 10:16, Matt 19:14-15/Luke 18:17-18 omit).

Following this initial unit in Matthew 18 (Matt 18:1-5) in which a child is used to illustrate three teachings of Jesus (Matt 18:3, 18:4 and 18:5), comes a section (Matt 18:6-14) that deals with the consequences of "scandalizing" (Matt 18:6, 7 [3 Xs], 8, 9) "the little ones" (Matt 18:6, 10, 14).

Already included in Matthew's story of the Temple Tax is a reference to "scandals" (Matt 17:27), the theme that characterizes this immediately following material in Matthew (18:1-9, esp.18:6, 7, 8, 9).

Mark and Luke record some, but not all, of the references to "scandals/scandalizing" in their texts parallel to Matthew 17:24-18:9. The appearance of the verb σκανδαλίζω within the Synoptic tradition supports the literary dependence of both Mark and Luke upon the text of Matthew and the appearance of the noun, σκάνδαλον, provides further support for the literary dependence of Luke upon Matthew.[37]

The phrase, "one of the(se) little ones" (A Form of εἷς + τῶν μικρῶν τούτων), is a literary characteristic of Matthew's text.[38] The phrase recurs within the Gospel of Matthew and appears elsewhere in the New Testament only in one Synoptic parallel to Matthew where there is evidence of copying (Matt 18:6/Mark 9:42/Luke 17:2; See also Matt 10:42NP; Matt 18:10NP; Matt 18:14NP). Based upon the method for making linguistic characteristics of service in solving the Synoptic Problem as developed by Eduard Zeller, the evidence provided by the appearance of "A Form of εἷς + τῶν μικρῶν τούτων" within the Synoptic Gospels suggests the literary dependence of both Mark and Luke upon the text of Matthew.[39]

It is just this phrase within the text of Matthew that might have suggested to Mark that he should go to another literary context in Matthew and include Matthew 10:42 (/Mark 9:41) in his parallel to Matthew 18:1-9/Luke 9:46-50/Mark 9:33-41. Note, however, that the phrase that unites Matt 10:42 with Matt 18:6-9 within the Gospel of Matthew, "A Form of εἷς + τῶν μικρῶν τούτων," is not present in Mark's parallel to Matthew 10:42 (cf. Mark 9:41). But it does appear in the very next verse in Mark (9:42/Matt 18:6; cf. Luke 17:2) where it

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36 Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, Table 209, p. 102.

37 Matt 17:26/No parallel context in either Mark or Luke; Matt 18:6/Mark 9:42/Luke 17:2; Matt 18:7 (three uses)/cf. Mark 9:42 No Parallel/Luke 17:2 (one use); Matt 18:8/Matt 5:30/Mark 9:43, 45/No Parallel Context in Luke; Matt 18:9/Matt 5:29/Mark 9:47/No Parallel Context in Luke). Matt 11:6/Luke 7:23; Matt 13:21/Mark 4:17; Matt 13:57/Mark 6:3; Matt 15:12NP; Matt 17:27NP; Matt 24:10/Mark 14:27; Matt 26:31/Mark14:29; Matt 26:33NP complete the usages of σκανδαλίζω within the Synoptic gospels. Matt 13:41, 16:13, 18:7 (three times)/Luke 17:1 exhaust the Synoptic usages of σκάνδαλον.

38 Tevis, *Matthew*, Table 306.

39 See my article on "Chapters in the History of the Linguistic Argument for Solving the Synoptic Problem in *Jesus, the Gospels and the Church. Essays in Honor of William R. Farmer*, ed. E. P. Sanders (Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 1987): 47-68, esp. 61-65 on Zeller.

may be used to indicate Mark's literary dependence upon Matthew (18:6 [and 10:42?]).

Let us look briefly at the Matthean literary context (Matt 10:40-42) in which Matt 10:42 is found. It is a context that features several "reception sayings" and includes numerous other similarities in language and content to Matt 18:5-14.

| Matthew 18:5-6, 10a, 14 | | Matthew 10:40-42 |
|---|---|---|
| καὶ ὃς ἐὰν δέξηται | a | Ὁ δεχόμενος |
| ἕν παιδίον τοιοῦτο | b | ὑμᾶς |
| ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματί μου, | c | |
| ἐμὲ δέχεται. | de | ἐμὲ δέχεται, |
| | ab | καὶ ὁ ἐμὲ δεχόμενος |
| | d | δέχεται |
| | e | τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με. |
| | a | ὁ δεχόμενος |
| | b | προφήτην |
| | c | εἰς ὄνομα προφητου |
| | f | μισθὸν προφήτου |
| | | λήμψεται, |
| | a | καὶ ὁ δεχόμενος |
| | b | δίκαιον |
| | c | εἰς ὄνομα δικαίου |
| | f | μισθὸν δικαίου |
| | | λήμψεται. |
| Ὃς δ' ἂν σκανδαλίσῃ | a | καὶ ὃς ἂν ποτίσῃ |
| ἕνα τῶν μικρῶν τούτων | b | ἕνα τῶν μικρῶν τούτων |
| τῶν πιστευόντων | | |
| | | ποτήριον ψυχροῦ μόνον |
| εἰς ἐμέ, | c | εἰς ὄνομα μαθητοῦ |
| | | ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, |
| συμφέρει αὐτῷ | | |
| ἵνα κρεμασθῇ | b | οὐ μὴ ἀπόληται |
| μύλος ὀνικὸς | f | ὁ μισθὸς αὐτοῦ |
| περὶ τὸν τράχηλον αὐτοῦ | | |
| καὶ καταποντισθῇ | | |
| ἐν τῷ πελάγει τῆς θαλάσσης. | | |
| | | |
| Ὁρατε μὴ καταφρονήσητε | | |
| ἑνὸς τῶν μικρῶν τούτων· | | |
| οὕτως οὐκ ἔστιν θέλημα | | |
| ἐμπρόσθεν τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν | | |
| τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς | | |
| ἵνα ἀπόληται | | |
| ἕν τῶν μικρῶν τούτων. | | |

It is not difficult to see how a reader of Matthew might relate Matt 18:5-14, a section of Matthew's "Church Discourse (Matt 18:1-19:1) to Matt 10:40-42, a section of Matthew's Missionary Discourse (Matt 9:35-11:1).

One section of Matthew's Missionary Discourse (Matt 9:35-11:1) is marked off by similar formulas which introduce two parts of that Discourse. The first part

(Matt 10:14-39) deals with conditions to be faced by the disciples and by those who "do not receive" the disciples (Matt 10:14).

The second part (Matt 10:40-11:1) deals with the rewards of those who "do receive" the disciples.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Matt 10:14 | καὶ | ὃς ἂν μὴ | δέξηται | ὑμας. . . |
| Matt 10:40 | | Ὁ | δεχόμενος | ὑμας. . . |

The second of these two parts opens with the affirmation that the one who receives the disciples receives Jesus and further affirms that he who receives Jesus also receives the one who sent Jesus (Matt 10:40). Next follow two examples of rewards that are forthcoming from certain types of reception.

"The one who *receives* a prophet *in the name* of a prophet will receive *a reward* of a prophet." (Matt 10:41a)

"The one who *receives* a righteous man *in the name* of a righteous man will receive *a reward* of a righteous man." (Matt 10:41b)

The teaching of this part of Matthew (Matt 10:40-42) closes with the affirmation that "whoever should give a drink of cold water to *one of these little ones* only *in the name* of a disciple. . . surely his *reward* is not lost." (Matt 10:42)

This last logion (Matt 10:42) is tied to the two previous logia by the *Stichwörter*, "in the name" (εἰς ὄνομα, Matt 10:41bis, 42) and "reward" (μισθόν, Matt 10:41bis, 42).

The idea of "receiving in the name" also links the first two examples of reward in Matt 10:41 with the similar teaching found in Matt 18:5, "And whoever *receives* one such child *in my name* receives me."

The subsequent verses in these two Matthean contexts, (Matt 10:42 and 18:6) may also be connected in the mind of a careful reader of Matthew's gospel by their common concern for εἷς τῶν μικρῶν τούτων. It would not be difficult to imagine a reader of Matthew's gospel seeing a connection between the literary context at Matt 10:40-42 and that at Matt 18:1-6 since they are united by the common themes of (1) receiving Jesus (10:40, 18:5) (2) receiving in the name (10:41, 18:5, cf. 10:42, 18:6 and 18:20) and (3) concern for "one of these little ones" (10:42, 18:6, 10, 14).

If one were to compare the teachings on reception within these two literary contexts (Matt 10:40-42 and 18:1-6), one might reason as follows.

Matt 10:40 teaches that he who *receives the disciples, receives Jesus.*

Matt 18:5 teaches that the one who *receives a child* in Jesus' name also *receives Jesus.*

Matt 10:40 further teaches that the one who *receives Jesus receives the one who sent Jesus.*

If the *one who receives Jesus* may be *either* someone who *receives a child* in Jesus' name (Matt 18:5) or someone who *receives a disciple* (Matt 10:40), one could change Matt 10:40 from "The one who receives you (i. e. *a disciple*) receives me, and the one who receives me, receives the one who sent me" to an equivalent saying, "One who receives *a child* in my name receives me, and the one who receives me, receives the one who sent me."

This, in fact, is precisely what the text of Luke says at 9:48, namely, "Whoever receives this child in my name, receives me, and whoever receives me, receives the one who sent me."

From this logical development from the text of Matthew to the text of Luke one could then logically remove the middle term in these two statements, i. e.

"the one who receives Jesus," and produce an equally valid statement such as "Whoever receives this child in my name, receives the one who sent me."

And this is what, in effect, the text of Mark (9:37) affirms, "Whoever receives one of such children in my name, receives me and whoever receives me, *does not receive me*, but the one who sent me."

These various statements dealing with "reception" within the Synoptic Tradition develop logically from the text of Matthew through the text of Luke to the text of Mark. But the logical development of these parallel texts within the Synoptic Tradition will not unfold if one tries to explain the texts of Matthew and Luke as independent developments of the text of Mark.

If one uses the logician's shorthand the argument may be schematized as follows:

Let U = A person who receives you
Let M = A person who receives me
Let S = A person who receives Him who sent me
Let C = A person who receives a child
Let N = A person who does not receive me, but
Matt 10:40
U > M
M > S
Therefore: U > S
Matt 18:5
C > M
Together these will yield:
(U > M) . (C > M)
(U v C) > M
Therefore: C > M
and: C > S
This will support the development in Luke.
Luke 9:48:
C > M
M > S
Therefore: C > S

There is nothing in the text of Luke that cannot be derived from the two contexts in Matthew, but the development cannot be reversed. Not all of Matthew can be derived from Luke. Specifically, Matthew's statement that U > M cannot be derived from Luke.

Mark 9:37
C > M
M > ~ M
M > S
Therefore: C > S

Again, there is nothing in the text of Mark that cannot be derived from either Matthew or Luke, but, as was the case between Matthew and Luke, the development cannot be reversed between Matthew and Mark. There is something in Matthew that cannot be derived from Mark, namely, that U > M. Mark's statement that M > ~ M looks like a gloss on the text of Luke 9:48 that only make senses if one has access to statements like those found in either Matthew or Luke.

If one assumes a direct literary relationship among the Synoptics and does not unnecessarily hypothecate other, oral or written, sources for these gospels, the logical development of these "reception" sayings in the Synoptic gospels may move from Matthew to either Luke or Mark, but not from either Luke or Mark to Matthew.

What appears to be a development from Matthew to either Luke or Mark on the basis of logic may be confirmed by literary criticism.

First, the text of Luke 9:48b-c appears to be a conflation of Matthew 10:40 and Matthew 18:5.

| Matt 10:40 | Luke 9:48b-c | Matt 18:5 |
|---|---|---|
| Ὁ δεχόμενος | Ὃς ἐὰν δέξηται | καὶ ὃς ἐὰν δέξηται |
| ὑμᾶς | τοῦτο τὸ παιδίον | ἓν παιδίον τοιοῦτο |
| | ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματί μου, | ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματί μου, |
| ἐμὲ δέχεται | ἐμὲ δέχεται· | ἐμὲ δέχεται· |
| καὶ ὁ ἐμὲ δεχόμενος | καὶ ὃς ἂν ἐμὲ δέξηται, | |
| δέχεται | δέχεται | |
| τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με. | τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με. | |

Second, the text of Mark 9:37 appears to be a glossed expansion of the text of Luke 9:48b-c, perhaps with some influence from the parallel text of Matt 18:5 (ἕν + a form of τοιοῦτος).

| Matt 10:40 | Mark 9:37 | Luke 9:48 | Matt 18:5 |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· | καὶ |
| Ὁ δεχόμενος | Ὃς ἂν | Ὃς ἐὰν δέξηται | ὃς ἐὰν δέξηται |
| ὑμᾶς | ἓν τῶν τοιούτων παιδίων δέξηται | τοῦτο τὸ παιδίον | ἓν παιδίον τοιοῦτο |
| | ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματί μου, | ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματί μου, | ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματί μου, |
| ἐμὲ δέχεται | ἐμὲ δέχεται. | ἐμὲ δέχεται· | ἐμὲ δέχεται· |
| καὶ ὁ ἐμὲ δεχόμενος | καὶ ὃς ἂν ἐμὲ δέχηται, οὐκ ἐμὲ | καὶ ὃς ἂν ἐμὲ δέξηται, | |
| δέχεται | δέχεται ἀλλὰ | δέχεται | |
| τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με. | τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με. | τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με.[40] | |

On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, the apparent literary relationship of Mark 9:37 to Matt 10:40 could be explained by Luke's having previously conflated the text of Matt 10:40 with Matt 18:5. In that case, Matt 10:40 would have only indirectly influenced the text of Mark 9:37 by having previously influenced the text of Luke 9:48b-c.

That Mark depended upon Luke, apart from Matthew, within this literary context would be supported by the parallels between Mark 9:38-40 and Luke 9:49-50, the story of the Strange Exorcist, a story that does not appear in Matthew at all. On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, Luke has added the story of the Strange

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[40] Here I gratefully acknowledge the counsel I received on these "reception sayings" and their logical development within the Synoptic Gospels from Professor Thomas R. W. Longstaff and, indirectly, from his colleague in Philosophy, at Colby College in Waterville, Maine and from Professor John Walker, my colleague at Nebraska Wesleyan University in the Department of Philosophy.

Exorcist (Luke 9:49-40) to Matt 18:1-5/Luke 9:46-48 on the basis of the common theme, "in the name" (Luke 9:49, cf. Luke 9:48/Matt 18:5 and Matt 18:20NP).

Again, on the Two Gospel Hypothesis, Mark follows Luke in expanding even further on the theme, "in the name." Mark accepts Luke's addition of the Strange Exorcist which includes this theme (Luke 9:49-50/Mark 9:50), but also, in the process of editing Matt 18:1-5, draws in even further Matthean contexts on this same theme. Mark adds Matt 10:40/Mark 9:37b immediately following his edition of Matt 18:1-5/Mark 9:33-37a and then adds Matt 10:42/Mark 9:41 immediately following his edition of Luke's story of the Strange Exorcist (Mark 9:38-40/Luke 9:49-50).

| Matt 10:42; 18:6-7 | Mark 9:41-42a | Luke 17:2, 1 |
|---|---|---|
| 10:42 καὶ ὃς ἂν ποτίσῃ | 41 ὃς γὰρ ἂν ποτίσῃ | |
| ἕνα τῶν μικρῶν τούτων | ὑμᾶς | |
| ποτήριον ψυχροῦ μόνον | ποτήριον ὕδατος | |
| εἰς ὄνομα | ἐν ὀνόματι | |
| μαθητοῦ, | ὅτι χριστοῦ ἐστε, | |
| ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, | ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι | |
| οὐ μὴ ἀπόληται | οὐ μὴ ἀπολέσῃ | |
| ὁ μισθὸς αὐτοῦ. | τὸν μισθὸν αὐτοῦ. | |
| 18:6 ὃς δ' ἂν σκανδαλίσῃ | 42 Καὶ ὃς ἂν σκανδαλίσῃ | |
| ἕνα τῶν μικρῶν τούτων | ἕνα τῶν μικρῶν τούτων | |
| τῶν πιστευόντων εἰς ἐμὲ, | τῶν πίστιν ἐχόντων, | |
| συμφέρει αὐτῷ ἵνα | καλόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ μᾶλλον | 2 λυσιτελεῖ αὐτῷ |
| | εἰ | εἰ |
| | | λίθος μυλικὸς |
| κρεμασθῇ | περίκειται | περίκειται |
| μύλος ὀνικὸς | μύλος ὀνικὸς | |
| περὶ τὸν τράχηλον | περὶ τὸν τράχηλον | περὶ τὸν τράχηλον |
| αὐτοῦ | αὐτοῦ | αὐτοῦ |
| καὶ καταποντισθῇ | καὶ βέβληται | καὶ ἔρριπται |
| ἐν τῷ πελάγει | εἰς | εἰς |
| τῆς θαλάσσης. | τὴν θάλασσαν. | τὴν θάλασσαν |
| | | ἢ ἵνα σκανδαλίσῃ |
| | | τῶν μικρῶν τούτων ἕνα. |
| [cf. Matt 18:3, 1] | | 1 Εἶπεν δὲ |
| | | πρὸς τοὺς μαθητὰς |
| | | αὐτοῦ· |
| 7 οὐαὶ τῷ κόσμῳ | | |
| ἀπὸ τῶν σκανδάλων· | | |
| ἀνάγκη γὰρ | | ἀνένδεκτόν ἐστιν |
| ἐλθεῖν | | |
| τὰ σκάνδαλα, | | τοῦ τὰ σκάνδαλα |
| | | μὴ ἐλθεῖν, |
| πλὴν οὐαὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ | | πλὴν οὐαὶ |
| δι' οὗ τὸ σκάνδαλον ἔρχεται. | | δι' οὗ ἔρχεται· |

The same clues that were available to Luke in the text of Matthew would also have been available to Mark on the Two Gospel Hypothesis. But the parallel to Matt 10:40 at Luke 9:48 would have provided one more clue for Mark than Luke

had to turn to Matt 10 when he was working with Matt 18. As a result of his work, Mark brought into a single unit in his parallel to Matt 18 (Mark 9:33-50) the one verse in Matthew that makes reference to "one of these little ones" that is not in Matt 18 (Matt 10:42/cf. Mark 9:41, Matt 18:6/Mark 9:42, 18:10NP and 18:14NP), but the parallel in Mark to Matt 10:42 (Mark 9:41) makes no reference to "one of these little ones." This, on the Two Gospel Hypothesis, is evidence that Mark is not building a unit of sayings about "little ones," but expanding a unit about acting "in the name of Jesus" suggested to him, on the Two Gospel Hypothesis, by Luke (Mark 9:37/Matt 18:5/Luke 9:48; Mark 9:38/Luke 9:49, Matthew is absent; Mark 9:39, a Markan dualism to the usage at Mark 9:38, No parallel in either Luke or Matthew; Mark 9:41/Matt 10:42).

If Mark is expanding Luke's unit on acting "in the name of Jesus" (cf. Luke 9:48 and 49) this would explain, on the Two Gospel Hypothesis, several features not only of Mark 9:37-41 but also of Matthew 18:5 and Matt 10:40-41.

First, on the Two Gospel Hypothesis, why has Mark left behind the two logia in Matt 10:41 although he has adopted logia on both sides of it (Matt 10:40/Mark 9:37b following the lead of Luke 9:48 and Matt 10:42/Mark 9:41 without having Luke as a guide)?

The logical development of Matt 10:40 and Matt 18:5 through Luke 9:48 into Mark 9:37 has been discussed above. The Two Gospel Hypothesis assumes that Luke attached Luke 9:49-50 to Luke 9:46-48/Matt 18:1-5 on the basis of the common theme found in Matt 18:5/Luke 9:48 and Luke 9:49 of "acting in Jesus' name." It is this Lukan theme (Luke 9:48 and 49) that Mark adopts (Mark 9:37/Luke 9:48/Matt 18:5; Mark 9:38/Luke 9:49) and expands (Mark 9:39bNP; Mark 9:41/Matt 10:42) throughout Mark 9:37-41.

The three logia in Matt 10:41-42 are not on the theme of receiving "in the name of Jesus," but rather on the themes of receiving in the name of a *prophet*, receiving in the name of a *righteous man*, and receiving in the name of a *disciple*.

If Mark was going to adopt any one of these three sayings, he would have to modify it to make it conform to his concerns. Given Mark's choice, why did he choose the third of the three? Was it because it immediately precedes another of Matthew's "completion formulas" (Matt 11:1), and thus completes a section of Matthew and has prominence as a concluding word? Or what is one to make of the fact that the logion preserved in Matt 10:42, unlike the two preserved in Matt 10:41, is the only one of the three that contains a reference to "one of these little ones?" If Matt10:42 is to immediately precede Matt 18:6 in Mark's parallel (Mark 9:41-42) and it does, the phrase, "one of these little ones" provides appropriate *Stichwörter* for such a linkage. That Mark is aware of these *Stichwörter* in the text of Matt is indicated, on the Two Gospel Hypothesis, by the presence of them in Mark 9:42/Matt 18:6. But that these words were not important for the unit Mark is building is indicated by their absence in Mark 9:41/Matt 10:42.

On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, once Mark has chosen to attach Matt 10:42 to Matt 18:6, in addition to eliminating the unnecessary *Stichwörter* that directed his attention to Matt 10:42, Mark must make a further modification to Matt 10:42 in order to make it more appropriate for his unit on acting in Jesus' name. Specifically, he modifies Matthew's "in the name of a disciple" to the somewhat awkward, "in the name because you are of Christ" which is more in the direction of Mark's theme of acting in Jesus' name (Mark 9:37, 38, 39, 41). Such would be the development of this literary context on the Two Gospel Hypothesis. What of the Two Document Hypothesis?

Advocates of the Two Document Hypothesis are faced with the following:

First, as stated above, the logical development of the reception saying preserved at Mark 9:37 cannot logically develop either into the saying recorded at Luke 9:48 or into those preserved in Matt 10:40 and 18:5 when taken together.

Second, form critically, Luke 9:48 appears to be a conflation of Matt 10:40 with Matt 18:5 while Mark's text appears to be a gloss on the text of Luke. This form critical development is not self-evidently reversible either.

Third, why does Matthew remove both Mark 9:37/Matt 10:40 and Mark 9:41/Matt 10:42 from one one Markan context (parallel to Matt 18) and move them to the same earlier context in Matthew (Matt 10)? And how did Matt 10:40 and 10:42 come to provide different, but equally impressive *Stichwörter* so that Matt 10:41 links with Matt 10:40 in one way via δεχόμενος and to Matt 10:42 in another way via εἰς ὄνομα and μισθός? Did the author of Matthew move these two logia from Mark 9 and then create two other logia to attach them together in this new context (Matt 10:41)? If there was nothing in Matthew 10 that would have encouraged Matthew to move logia from Matt 18/Mark 9 into that earlier chapter, why did he move them?

Fourth, why does Matthew, after removing Mark 9:41 from the contextual parallel in Matthew 18 with its theme, "one of these little ones," and after relocating it in Matthew 10, then modify his version of Mark 9:41/Matt 10:42 by reintroducing the theme of Matt 18, "one of these little ones" into Matt 10:42 when it was not to be found in his source, Mark 9:41? Again, on the Two Document Hypothesis, Matthew's literary procedure in this case seems inconsistent if not self-contradictory.

When Luke comes to Matthew 18:6-7, he chooses to move the logia prior to the section on "Moral Surgery (Matt 18:8-9/Mark 9:43-48) to his Central Section (Luke 17:1-2/Matt 18:6-7; cf. Mark 9:42). The origin of this material (Luke 17:1-2) in Matthew 18:6-7 is indicated by the appearances in Luke of the following literary characteristics of Matthew: the verb σκανδαλίζω (Luke 17:2/Matt 18:6, 8, 9), the noun σκάνδαλον (Luke 17:1/Matt 18:7 [three times],), and the phrase "one of the little ones" (Luke 17:2/Matt 18:6, 10, 14; cf. Matt 10:42).

On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, all of these terms appear also in the Markan parallel to Matt 18:6-9 (=Mark 9:42-48) because they have been borrowed from Matthew (σκανδαλίζω in Mark 9:42=Matt 18:6, in Mark 9:43, 45= Matt18:8/Matt 5:30, in Mark 9:47=Matt 18:9/Matt 5:29 and ἕνα τῶν μικρῶν τούτων in Mark 9:42=Matt 18:6; See footnote 14 and the discussion of "one of such little ones" above).

When Mark comes to Matt 18:6-7, he follows the text of Matthew closely (Matt 18:6-7/Mark 9:42), but may have included a few details from the parallel in Luke 17:2. See especially περίκειται (contrast Matthew's κρεμασθῇ/) and εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν (contrast Matthew's ἐν τῷ πελάγει τῆς θαλάσσης). If an explanation of Mark's omission of Matt 18:7/Luke 17:1 is necessary, one could appeal to the reversed order of Matt 18:6-7 in Luke 17:2, 1. If one has trouble imagining Mark turning to Luke 17:1-2 when he is utilizing Matt 18 as his major source at this point, it should be remembered that the parallel contexts, Luke 17:2/Mark 9:42/Matt 18:6, contain the only other occurrence of "one of these little ones" outside of Matthew 10 and18 anywhere in the Synoptics. And it is just this phrase that characterizes this section of Matt 18.

On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, when Mark arrives at Matt 18:8-9 (=Mark 9:43-48), he is not constrained by any parallels to the teaching on Moral Surgery within the gospel of Luke. Luke has none. But Mark, no doubt, would have been able to recognize the doublet to this teaching in Matt 18 that is preserved in

Matthew's Sermon on the Mount (Matt 5:29-30), previously omitted by Mark at Matt 4:23-7:29/Mark 1:21-22. See Section I of this paper.

| Matthew 5:30, 29 | Matthew 18:8-9 |
|---|---|
| καὶ εἰ | Εἰ δὲ |
| ἡ δεξία σου χεὶρ | ἡ χείρ σου ἢ ὁ πούς σου |
| σκανδαλίζει σε, | σκανδαλίζει σε, |
| ἔκκοψον αὐτὴν | ἔκκοψον αὐτὸν |
| καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ· | καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ· |
| συμφέρει γάρ σοι | καλόν σοί ἐστιν |
| ἵνα ἀπόληται | εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ζωὴν |
| ἓν τῶν μελῶν σου | κυλλὸν ἢ χωλόν, |
| καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸ σῶμά σου | ἢ δύο χεῖρας ἢ δύο πόδας ἔχοντα |
| | βληθῆναι |
| εἰς γέενναν | εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ αἰώνιον. |
| ἀπέλθῃ. | |
| εἰ δὲ | καὶ εἰ |
| ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου ὁ δεξιὸς | ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου |
| σκανδαλίζει σε, | σκανδαλίζει σε, |
| ἔξελε αὐτὸν | ἔξελε αὐτὸν |
| καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ· | καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ· |
| συμφέρει γάρ σοι | καλόν σοί ἐστιν |
| ἵνα ἀπόληται | μονόφθαλμον |
| ἓν τῶν μελῶν σου | |
| καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸ σῶμά σου | |
| | εἰς τὴν ζωὴν εἰσελθεῖν |
| | ἢ δύο ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχοντα |
| βληθῇ εἰς γέενναν. | βληθῆναι εἰς τὴν γέενναν |
| | τοῦ πυρός. |

As in several of the other synoptic contexts discussed above, there is significant duplication in language, as well as in content, in these two Matthean contexts (Matt 5:29-30/Matt 18:8-9). And, as in other contexts described above, some of this similar language in the two Matthean contexts finds no parallel either in the text of Luke, who omits both contexts, or in the text of Mark who certainly shares the context of Matt 18:8-9 with Matt (Mark 9:43-47).

One of the literary features that unites these two contexts in Matthew are the words, καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ, (4Xs; Matt 5:29 and 30 and Matt 18:8 and 9). Only one fragmentary form of this redactional phrase within the two Matthean contexts is preserved within the text of Mark (ἔκβαλε αὐτόν, cf. Matt 5:29 and 18:9). It is these words, combined with others that do appear in the parallel text of Mark, that would allow a reader of Matthew to cross reference the two Matthean contexts. These Matthean doublets have similar bipartite structures as well as impressive verbal similarities and identities.

There are several features of the text of Mark, when compared with both contexts in Matthew, that are noteworthy from the perspective of the Two Gospel Hypothesis.

| Matthew 5:30, 29 | Mark 9:43, 45, 47-48 | Matthew 18:8-9 |
|---|---|---|
| 30 καὶ εἰ<br>ἡ δεξία σου χεὶρ | 43 Καὶ ἐὰν | 8 Εἰ δὲ<br>ἡ χείρ σου<br>ἢ ὁ πούς σου |
| σκανδαλίζει σε, | σκανδαλίζῃ σε<br>ἡ χείρ σου, | σκανδαλίζει σε, |
| ἔκκοψον αὐτὴν<br>καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ·<br>συμφέρει γάρ σοι<br>ἵνα ἀπόληται<br>ἓν τῶν μελῶν σου<br>καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸ σῶμά σου | ἀπόκοψον αὐτήν·<br>καλόν ἐστίν σε<br>κυλλὸν | ἔκκοψον αὐτὸν<br>καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ·<br>καλόν σοί ἐστιν |
| | εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ζωὴν | εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ζωὴν<br>κυλλὸν |
| | ἢ τὰς δύο χεῖρας<br>ἔχοντα | ἢ χωλόν<br>ἢ δύο χεῖρας<br>ἢ δύο πόδας<br>ἔχοντα |
| εἰς γέενναν ἀπέλθῃ. | ἀπελθεῖν εἰς τὴν γέενναν,<br>εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ ἄσβεστον. | βληθῆναι<br>εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ αἰώνιον. |
| | 45 καὶ ἐὰν<br>ὁ ποὺς σου<br>σκανδαλίζῃ σε,<br>ἀπόκοψον αὐτόν·<br>καλόν ἐστίν σε<br>εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ζωὴν<br>χωλὸν<br>ἢ τοὺς δύο πόδας<br>ἔχοντα<br>βληθῆναι<br>εἰς τὴν γέενναν. | |
| 29 εἰ δὲ<br>ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου ὁ δεξιὸς<br>σκανδαλίζει σε,<br>ἔξελε αὐτὸν<br>καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ·<br>συμφέρει γάρ σοι<br>ἵνα ἀπόληται<br>ἓν τῶν μελῶν σου<br>καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸ σῶμά σου | 47 καὶ ἐὰν<br>ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου<br>σκανδαλίζῃ σε<br>ἔκβαλε αὐτόν·<br>καλόν σέ ἐστιν<br>μονόφθαλμον | 9 καὶ εἰ<br>ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου<br>σκανδαλίζει σε,<br>ἔξελε αὐτὸν<br>καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ·<br>καλόν σοί ἐστιν<br>μονόφθαλμον |
| | εἰσελθεῖν<br>εἰς τὴν<br>βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ | εἰς τὴν<br>ζωὴν<br>εἰσελθεῖν |
| | ἢ δύο ὀφθαλμοὺς<br>ἔχοντα | ἢ δύο ὀφθαλμοὺς<br>ἔχοντα |
| βληθῇ | βληθῆναι | βληθῆναι |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| εἰς γέενναν. | εἰς τὴν γέενναν, | εἰς τὴν γέενναν |
| | ὅπου ὁ σκώληξ αὐτῶν | |
| | οὐ τελευτᾷ | |
| | καὶ τὸ πῦρ | τοῦ πυρός. |
| | οὐ σβέννυται. | |

First, one may note the "minor agreement" of the two texts of Matthew against Mark (Matt 18:8/Matt 5:30 cf. Mark 9:43) in preserving the words καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ where Mark has no parallel or equivalent.

Second, and related to this phenomenon, is Mark's choice of the phrase, ἔκβαλε αὐτόν, at Mark 9:47. On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, this is Mark's combination of ἐκ and αὐτόν from Matthew's repeated phrase ἔξελε αὐτόν (Matt 5:29 and 18:8) with βάλλω from Matthew's even more repeated phrase that is otherwise missing from Mark, καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ (Matt 5:29 and 30 and Matt 18:8 and 9).

Third, three times Matthew describes the place of separation as "Gehenna" (Matt 5:29, 30, and 18:9) and once, as "the eternal fire." Mark also makes reference to "Gehenna" three times, once in agreement with both Matt 18 and Matt 5 (in the logion on "the eye," Mark 9:47/Matt 18:9 and Matt 5:29), once in agreement with Matt 5 alone (in the logion on "the hand," Mark 9:43/Matt 5:30), and once in contrast to Matt 18 (in the logion on "the foot," Mark 9:45 cf. Matt 18:8).

The logion relating to the hand in Matthew 5:30 concludes with the words, "lest your whole body should go away into Gehenna." The logion relating to the hand (and the foot) in Matt 18:8 concludes with the words that it is better to be crippled than to "be cast into the eternal fire." Mark's parallel logion on "the hand" concludes with the double statement that it is better to be crippled than to "go away into Gehenna" (in words similar to Matt 5:30) "into the asbestos fire" (in words similar to Matt 18:8).

The language of Mark, "into the asbestos fire," seems to interpret the term "Gehenna" at Mark 9:43 even as the words from Isaiah 66:24, "where their worm does not die and the fire is not quenched" seem to interpret the same term, "Gehenna," in Mark 9:47-48. Mark's interpretative comment at 9:43 makes good sense if one has both Matt 18:8 and 5:30 in view. And the extensive agreements between Matt 18:8-9 and Matt 5:29-30 would invite a reader of Matthew's gospel to compare the two contexts.

On the other hand, if Mark 9:43 were the source of both Matt 5:30 and 18:8, one would be hard pressed to explain why one half of Mark's duplicate expression in 9:43 found its way into Matt 5:30 and the other, into Matt 18:8. This would not be a case where two authors would have allegedly split a Markan double expression between them, but a case where one author, Matthew, would have split the double expression in Mark and then moved one half of the expression to a different literary context. Are the data within Matthew and Mark in this context the result of a Mark-Q overlap? If so, what is the control for the text of Q? Luke has no parallel to either Matt 5:29-30 or to Matt 18:8-9. Or are we to assign Matt 5:29-30 to Q simply because it has a doublet in Matthew with a Markan parallel (Matt 18:8-9/Mark 9:43-47)?

Or is the text of Mark 9:43 the result of Markan conflation of Matt 18:8 with 5:30? Since we do have access, in this case, to the sources that Mark might have conflated (Matt 18:8 and 5:30) and we do not have access to the text of Q, the latter explanation of the literary history of this verse has the benefit of some scientific controls whereas the former explanation does not.

Mark's logion on the hand in Mark 9:43 agrees with Matt 5:30 in the use of the verb, ἀπέρχομαι, and εἰς γέενναν; while contrasting with Matt 18:8 which uses βληθῆναι in contrast to Mark's ἀπελθεῖν and εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ αἰωνιον in contrast to Mark's εἰς τὴν γέενναν.

At the same time, Mark's logion on the foot in Mark 9:45 agrees with Matt 18:8 in the use of βληθῆναι in contrast to Matt 5:30, ἀπέλθη, while agreeing with Matt 5:30 in the use of "Gehenna" in contrast to "the eternal fire" of Matt 18:8. Again, is this evidence of a Mark-Q overlap or Mark's conflation of the doublet in Matthew?

Fourth, both of the twin sayings in Matthew 18:8-9 contain the words, "it is better for you to enter life." Both Mark 9:43 and 9:45 share this saying with Matt 18:8, but Mark 9:47 contains the phrase "kingdom of God." This element in Mark 9:47 not only breaks up Mark's own poetic structure, characterized by "entering life" (Mark 9:43 and 45), but also the poetic structure of the parallel in Matthew as well (Matt 18:8-9). The words, "kingdom of God" in Mark 9:47 represent a secondary feature both when Mark's text is considered alone and when it is compared to the parallel in Matthew. Has Matthew managed to reconstruct the more original parallelism of the logia from the broken structure of Mark or has Mark broken the poetic structure in Matthew? The latter is the more likely literary history. Matthean reconstruction of parallelism could be taken as an example of Matthew "rejudaizing" Mark, but "rejudaizing" is just as incredible an explanation of the history of the synoptic tradition for those not committed to the Two Document Hypothesis as are "Matthean anticipations."

The literary unit, Mark 9:33-50, concludes with logia on salt (Mark 9:49 and 50) whose meanings are illusive. These logia, however, seem to be connected to the immediately preceding material in Mark by the *Stichwörter*, "fire" (Mark 9:49, cf. Mark 9:43 and 47), καλόν and ἐάν (Mark 9:50, cf. Mark 9:43, 45, and 47).

| Matt 5:13 | Mark 9:49-50 | Luke 14:34-35 |
|---|---|---|
| 13 Ὑμεῖς ἐστε | 49 Πᾶς γὰρ πυρὶ ἁλισθήσεται | |
| | 50 καλὸν | 34 Καλὸν οὖν |
| τὸ ἅλας | τὸ ἅλας· | τὸ ἅλας |
| τῆς γῆς· | | |
| ἐὰν δὲ τὸ ἅλας | ἐὰν δὲ τὸ ἅλας | ἐὰν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἅλας |
| μωρανθῇ | ἄναλον γένηται | μωρανθῇ, |
| ἐν τίνι | ἐν τίνι | ἐν τίνι |
| ἁλισθήσεται; | αὐτὸ ἀρτύσετε; | ἀρτυθήσεται; |
| | ἔχετε | |
| | ἐν ἑαυτοῖς | |
| | ἅλα | |
| | καὶ εἰρηνεύετε | |
| | ἐν ἀλλήλοις· | |
| | | 35 οὔτε εἰς γῆν |
| εἰς οὐδὲν | | οὔτε εἰς κοπρίαν |
| ἰσχύει ἔτι εἰ μὴ | | εὔθετόν ἐστιν, |
| βληθὲν ἔξω | | ἔξω βάλλουσιν αὐτό. |
| καταπατεῖσθαι | | |
| ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. | | |
| | | ὁ ἔχων ὦτα ἀκούειν |
| | | ἀκουέτω. |

If Mark 9:49-50 is to be related in some way to the logia in Matt 5:13/Luke 14:34, as the verbal relationships might indicate, it is worth noting that the word "fire" in Mark 9:49, that serves as one of the potential *Stichwörter* uniting these verses in Mark to what has preceded, finds no parallel either in the text of Matthew or in the text of Luke. If Mark has borrowed these sayings from some other context, in Matthew, in Luke or both, he would need to provide some sort of connection between these sayings and other materials in his immediate context. "Fire" would provide this.

On the other hand, Mark does share the other potential *Stichwörter*, ἐάν with both Matthew and Luke and καλόν with Luke but not with Matthew.

If Mark 9:49-50 is supposed to be the source of Matt 5:13/Luke 14:34, then there are a number of minor agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark in this context that would require some explanation on the Two Document Hypothesis (ἄναλον γένηται in Mark, cf. μωρανθῇ in Matt/Luke; Future Active in Mark, Future Passive in Matt/Luke; αὐτό in Mark, Matt/Luke omit; a form in γῆ in Matt/Luke, absent from Mark; a negative in Matt/Luke, absent from Mark; εἰς in Matt/Luke, absent from Mark; a form of βάλλω + ἔχω in Matt/Luke, absent from Mark).

On the Two Gospel Hypothesis one would have to explain Luke's move of the logion in Matt 5:13 in Matthew's Great Sermon (Matt 4:23-7:29) to Luke 14:34 within Luke's "Central Section" (Luke 9:51-18:14 [34? 19:45? etc.]).

In the literary context of Matt 18:1-20/Mark 9:33-50/Luke 9:46-50 we have again examined literary evidence that is at least consistent with the Two Gospel Hypothesis, if it does not, in fact, demonstrate the superiority of the Two Gospel Hypothesis to the Two Document Hypothesis

## V.

### *Mark 10:13-16 and Parallels to Matthew 19:13-15 and 18:3*

The preceding Synoptic literary unit (Matt 17:24-8:35/Mark 9:33-50/Luke 9:46-50 is followed immediately in both Matthew and Mark by a unit on family matters: sex, marriage, divorce, children, celibacy, etc. (Matt 19:1-15/Mark 10:1-16)

The verse in Luke (9:51) that immediately follows the literary contexts considered in Section IV above opens Luke's Central Section, with its focus on Jesus' going up to Jerusalem (See especially Luke 9:51, 53, 17:11, 18:31 [and 19:11?]). Luke shares only part of the material in the next literary units in Matthew and Mark (Matt 19:1-15/Mark 10:1-6) with Matthew and Mark, and only at or toward the conclusion of Luke's Central Section (cf. Luke 18:15-17/Matt 19:13-15/Mark10:13-16).

The verses that mark the transition (Matt 19:1/Mark 10:1) between the synoptic contexts discussed in Section IV of this paper (Matt 18:1-35/Mark 9:33-50/Luke 9:46-50) and the contexts that follow here (Matt 10:1-15/Mark 10:1-6) have already been discussed in section III above. There it was argued that the appearance of the phrase "across the Jordan" in the texts of Matthew and Mark indicate Mark's literary dependence upon the text of Matthew at the compositional level. Matthew 19:1-2 is clearly a major compositional passage within the text of Matthew and Mark 10:1 is equally important for understanding the themes and the structure of Mark.[41]

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41 See Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, esp. 137-139.

But in addition to the phrase "across the Jordan," there is another feature of the shared texts at Matt 19:1-2/Mark 10:1 that indicates Mark's literary dependence upon Matthew, the plural, ὄχλοι. Mark 10:1 is the only occurrence of the plural, ὄχλοι, within the text of Mark. By contrast, the plural frequently appears in the text of Matthew and is one of the elements of a longer redactional formula that is characteristic of the text of Matthew. See the synoptic displays of Matt 4:25, 19:2, 8:1 and 12:15 above. The fragmentary preservation of this Matthean redactional formulation within the parallel text of Mark is further evidence of Mark's literary dependence upon Matthew.

The public teaching on divorce (Matt 19:3-9/Mark 10:2-12) that follows these equally redactional verses in both Matthew and Mark (Matt 19:1-2/Mark 10:1) is similar in the two gospels. The most important difference between the two gospels is Mark 10:10 that separates Jesus' private teaching to his disciples who were questioning him in a house from the preceding public instruction on the same topic (Mark 10:10-12, cf. Matt 19:8-9 where there is no break for private teaching).

| Matthew 19:9 | Mark 10:10-11 | Matthew 5:31-32 |
|---|---|---|
| | Καὶ εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν<br>πάλιν<br>οἱ μαθηταὶ<br>περὶ τούτου<br>ἐπηρώτων αὐτόν. | |
| | | Ἐρρέθη δέ,<br>Ὃς ἂν ἀπολύσῃ<br>τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ,<br>δότω αὐτῇ ἀποστάσιον, |
| λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι<br>ὃς ἂν ἀπολύσῃ<br>τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ<br>μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ<br>καὶ γαμήσῃ ἄλλην<br>μοιχᾶται. | 11 καὶ λέγει αὐτοῖς<br>ὃς ἂν ἀπολύσῃ<br>τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ<br><br>καὶ γαμήσῃ ἄλλην<br>μοιχᾶται<br>ἐπ' αὐτήν. | ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι<br>πᾶς ὁ ἀπολύων<br>τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ<br>παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας<br><br>ποιεῖ αὐτὴν<br>μοιχευθῆναι,<br>καὶ<br>ὃς ἐὰν ἀπολελυμένην<br><br>γαμήσῃ<br>μοιχᾶται. |

Jesus' withdrawal into a house to provide private instruction for his questioning disciples is a central feature of Markan redaction and it is virtually, when not completely, absent from the parallel texts of Matthew (and Luke) every one of the four times it appears in the text of Mark (Mark 4:10, 7:17, 9:28 and 10:10).[42] This evidence, too, is anomalous for the Two Document Hypothesis inasmuch as it represents a network of material throughout the Markan gospel that can be iden-

42 Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, 139-141 and W. R. Farmer, "The Minor Agreements of Matthew and Luke Against Mark and the Two Gospel Hypothesis," (unpublished seminar paper prepared for a Symposium on the "Minor Agreements" at Georg August Universität, Göttingen, Germany, 26-27 July 1991) working manuscript pages 50-57.

tified with the hand of the author that is almost universally absent from the parallels in Matthew and Luke. On the Two Document Hypothesis, how and why would Matthew and Luke have come to agree in making such a universal omission of material that is so characteristic of the author of Mark?

On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, by contrast, the absence of this material is easily explained as the additions of the author of Mark to the conflated text he created from Matthew and Luke. Matthew and Luke could not possibly have included this material in their gospels because their gospels, on the Two Gospel Hypothesis, were written before Mark.

The whole of the synoptic tradition on Divorce, as analyzed by David L. Dungan, also supports the Two Gospel reconstruction of the history of the Synoptic Tradition.[43]

Within the gospel of Matthew, following the tradition on Divorce (Matt 19:1-9/Mark 10:1-12) that begins the unit on "family matters," Matthew adds a section on "Eunuchs" (Matt 19:10-12). Neither Luke, who has gone his own way at Luke 9:51, nor Mark shares this tradition with Matthew.

Immediately following this unique section in Matthew (19:10-12) comes a section that deals with children (παιδία, Matt 19:13=Mark 10:13, cf. Luke 18:15, βρέφη; Matt 19:14=Mark 10:14=Luke 18:16).

In Section IV above, it was noted that Mark and Luke agree against Matt on the placement of the logion found in Matt 18:3 (Mark 10:15/Luke 18:17; cf. Mark 9:36-37/Luke 9:47-48 omit) in spite of the fact that Matt 18:3 fits beautifully into that section of Matthew (18:1-5), concerned as it is, both with "the kingdom of the Heavens" (cf. Matt 18:1, 3 and 4) and "children" (cf. Matt 18:2, 3, 4, and 5).

Again, if one is looking for an explanation, on the Two Gospel Hypothesis for why Luke and Mark would have moved Matt 18:3 to an alternate context, the answer would seem to lie in the similarity between Matthew 18:3 and Matt 19:14, the immediately preceding verse for the parallels to Matt 18:3 in the new contexts of both Mark (10:13-16) and Luke (Luke 18:15-17).

| Matt 18:3 | Matt 19:14 |
|---|---|
| καὶ εἶπεν, | ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν, |
| Ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, | |
| ἐὰν μὴ στραφῆτε | |
| καὶ γενήσθε | Ἄφετε |
| ὡς τὰ παιδία, | τὰ παιδία |
| | καὶ μὴ κωλύετε αὐτὰ |
| | ἐλθεῖν πρός με, |
| οὐ μὴ εἰσέλθητε | τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐστὶν |
| εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν | ἡ βασιλεία |
| τῶν οὐρανῶν. | τῶν οὐρανῶν. |

The literary unit in Matt 19:13-14, as noted above, is concerned with "children" (Matt 19:13 and 14). Matt 18:3 also deals with "children" (Note the plural). The parallel in Luke 18:15-17 to Matt 19:13-14 contains the plural of children once (Luke 18:16) and the variants, "child" (Luke 18:17, same word but

[43] David L. Dungan, *The Sayings of Jesus in the Churches of Paul. The Use of the Synoptic Tradition in the Regulation of Early Church Life* (Philadelphia: Fortress; Oxford: Blackwell, 1971).

different number) and "infants" (Luke 18:15, different word but same number) otherwise.

Luke's parallels in this context to Matthew's Jewish locution, "the kingdom of the Heavens" is, as always, "the kingdom of God." On this, Mark also always agrees with Luke against Matthew. On the Two Document Hypothesis, this is could be understood as another example of Matthew's "rejudaizing tendency." This explanation is as convincing to those who do not advocate Markan Priority here as it is wherever it is invoked by those who do advocate Markan Priority.

On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, Luke has moved Matt 18:3 (cf. Luke 9:48) to a later position in his gospel (Luke 18:17) almost immediately following the close of his Central Section (Luke 9:51-18:14) and has joined it to a verse in the contextual parallel in Matthew (Matt 19:14/Luke 18:16-17) with which it has striking affinities.

In moving Matt 18:3 from its contextual parallel in Luke 9 to Luke 18, the author of Luke, on the Two Gospel Hypothesis, also modified the saying. When compared with Matthew, Luke's modification of Matthew's verbs, "turn and become," to "receive" (δέχομαι) is striking. It is just the "reception" theme that unites Matt 18:5 with Matt 10:40-42. Is this a coincidence? Or is Luke 18:17, followed by Mark 10:15, a conflation of Matt 18:3 with Matt 18:5? If so, it would represent one more step in the the development of "reception" sayings within the Synoptic Gospels discussed above in Section IV.

To reverse the process, and have Matthew modify Mark 10:15 or Luke 18:17 and move this modified saying from a contextual parallel in Matt 19 to an earlier context in Matt 18:3 creates a problem, not only because it is a step backwards, but because the theme of "reception" is already present in this new context, Mark 9:37/Luke 9:48/Matt 18:5. If Matthew is using Mark, why does he create problems for himself by modifying a reception saying (Mark 10:15/Luke 18:17) into something else (Matt 18:3), if he plans to insert it into a literary unit that already includes another reception saying (Mark 9:37/Luke 9:48), a saying that Matthew approves of because he will also adopt it (Matt 18:5/Mark 9:37/Luke 9:48) and only two verses away from his modified text of Mark 10:15/Luke 18:17 (cf. Matt 18:3)?

On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, Mark has followed Matthew through Matt 19:1-12, thereby passing over Luke's Central Section and rejoining the common order of Matthew and Luke at Matt 19:13/Luke 18:15/Mark 10:13. At this point (Mark 10:13), Mark moves from Matthew and begins again to take Luke as his basic guide for Mark 10:13-17, copying faithfully, and including Luke 18:17/Mark 10:15 that Luke has taken, moved, and modified from Matt 18:3.

One of the important differences between the text of Luke and Matthew, on the one hand, and the text of Mark, on the other, in this context is the additional detail of Jesus "embracing the children" in Mark 10:16. As noted above, Mark glossed the text of Matthew with the statement that Jesus "embraced" the child (καὶ ἐνακαλισάμενος αὐτό) at Mark 9:36. On the Two Document Hypothesis, Matthew and Luke have accidentally agreed in omitting both Markan uses of this detail from their texts parallel to Mark (see Mark 9:36, Matt 18:2-3/Luke 9:47-48 omit and Mark 10:16, Matt 19:14-15/Luke 18:17-18 omit).

On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, these details are Markan additions to the conflated text he has created from his sources, Matthew and Luke.

It is not possible to collect in summary form all of the literary details that have been included in the course of this paper nor even to summarize the several conclusions of these investigations that have also been drawn from these details.

One can only hope that the presentations made here will enable persons to see the viability of the Two Gospel Hypothesis when applied to large compositional problems within the Synoptic Tradition, if not the superiority of the Griesbach Hypothesis to the Two Document Hypothesis in contributing to a solution of those problems.

# Intercalation in Mark and the Synoptic Problem

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### Introduction

The Synoptic Problem continues to be an area of contention in Synoptic Gospel studies. The two most common positions held are the Two Document Hypothesis (Matthew and Luke separately utilizing Mark and Q) and the Two Gospel Hypothesis (Mark utilizing Matthew and Luke).[1] Robert Stein summarizes the data which, he contends, supports Markan priority:

1. Mark is the shortest gospel.
2. Mark has the poorest writing style.
3. Mark has numerous harder readings.
4. Mark has many agreements in wording with Matthew against Luke and with Luke against Matthew; in comparison, there are few Matthew-Luke agreements against Mark.
5. Matthew and Luke never agree against Mark in the order of the material, and their deviation from Mark is more understandable than the reverse.
6. Certain literary agreements are best understood on the basis of the priority of Mark.
7. Markan redactional characteristics tend to appear more frequently in those sections of Matthew that contain the triple tradition, but Matthean redactional characteristics do not tend to appear in the triple tradition of Mark or Luke."[2]

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[1] For the basic arguments see B. H. Streeter, *The Four Gospels* (London: Macmillan, 1951); H.-H. Stoldt, *History and Criticism of the Marcan Hypothesis*, trans. D. L. Niewyk (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1980); William R. Farmer, *The Synoptic Problem: A Critical Analysis* (New York: Macmillan, 1964); Robert H. Stein, *The Synoptic Problem: An Introduction* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1987); and Brad H. Young, *Jesus and His Jewish Parables: Rediscovering the Roots of Jesus' Teaching*, ed. Lawrence Boadt, Theological Inquires (New York: Paulist Press, 1989), 129-163 (representing the Lukan priority position). See Thomas R. W. Longstaff and Page A. Thomas, *The Synoptic Problem: A Bibliography, 1716-1988*, New Gospel Studies, no. 4 (Mercer, GA: Mercer University Press, 1988), for an extensive bibliography on the Synoptic Problem.

[2] Stein, 127. On pp. 127-128 Stein lists six indications that Matthew and Luke did not use or know each other's Gospel.

William Farmer expresses the position for the Two Gospel Hypothesis in a series of sixteen theses.[3] While it is not possible to list all sixteen of his theses in the space allotted here, they may be summarized as follows:

1. The close ties between Matthew, Mark, and Luke strongly implicate a literary relationship between them. The primary place for investigating this literary relationship is to try interrelate the three Gospels rather than first suggesting other hypothetical source documents. Of the possible interrelationships between these three Gospels only six are really viable.
2. The best explanation of the data concerning order and content, and the minor agreements between Matthew and Luke, is that Mark made use of Matthew and Luke. A redactional process of the Gospel writer of Mark based on the Griesbach hypothesis is reasonable.
3. The best explanation of the close verbal connection between Matthew and Luke is found in the thesis that one used the other, and Luke making use of Matthew fits the data best.
4. The weight of external evidence favors Luke using Matthew, and Mark being the last of the three Synoptic Gospels written.

One is reminded of the text in Proverbs 18:17, "He who states his case first seems right, until the other comes and examines him" (R.S.V.). One of the patterns which occurs in arguments between those holding to the differing theories is a tendency to minimize the importance of the objections of the opposing position.[4] It is interesting to note how, once one decides which solution is the "most reasonable," the other data is "quite explainable" via the favored theory. The purpose of the present paper is not to offer some overarching explanation of all the data, but rather to contribute a fresh look at several Synoptic parallels via an understanding of a story pattern in the Gospel of Mark.

## Markan Intercalation

Markan intercalation is a storytelling pattern which has been recognized for more than sixty years.[5] It is a literary technique in which one story is begun only to be interrupted by a second story. After the conclusion of the second story the first story is rejoined and completed.[6] This literary technique occurs at least six

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[3] See Farmer, 199-232.

[4] The agreements between Matthew and Luke are termed "minor." At times it is suggested that these agreements constitute a "minor problem," cf. Stein, 128. Cf. Farmer's dismissal of the problem of Mark's poorer grammar and style, Farmer 230.

[5] See Ernst von Dobschütz, "Zur Erzählerkunst des Markus," *Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 27 (1928): 193-198.

[6] See George Al Wright, Jr., "Markan Intercalations: A Study in the Plot of the Gospel" (Ph.D. diss., Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1985), 14-17. Other terms are also used for the same storytelling technique in Mark. These include "interpolation," Howard Clark Kee, *Community of the New Age: Studies in Mark's Gospel* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), 54-56; "framing," David Rhoads and Donald Michie, *Mark as Story: An Introduction to the Narrative of a Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 51-53; "bracketing," Augustine Stock, *Call to Discipleship: A Literary Study of Mark's Gospel*, Good New Studies, vol. 1 (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1982), 43-44; and "sandwiching," Frans Neirynck, *Duality in Mark: Contributions to the Study of the Markan Redaction*, rev. ed. with supplementary notes, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum

times in Mark, although a total of twenty passages have been suggested.[7] The six most commonly identified intercalations in Mark occur at 3:20-35, 5:21-43, 6:7-32, 11:12-25, 14:1-11, and 14:53-72.[8] It was the purpose of my doctoral dissertation to define Markan intercalation and to explain its function in Markan storytelling. The method I utilized to accomplish this twofold goal was narrative analysis, an approach to the text in which I analyzed the story and discourse of the narrative in six categories, settings, characters, actions and plot, time, narrator and implied reader, and stylistic features.[9]

In the limited time allotted here it is only possible to summarize my findings.[10] Markan intercalation may be defined narratively via a set of literary patterns which recur in each of the six passages which formed the basis of my study. This set of definitive characteristics is as follows:

1. Apart from initial focalization, the outer story is the temporal border of the inner story.
2. There is a unique pattern of focalization and defocalization of the two stories which includes incomplete defocalization of the outer story at the point where breakaway occurs to the inner story. This creates a 'gap' for the outer story across the inner story.
3. A new character or newly named character is noted at the reentry into the outer story.
4. Active character crossover does not occur between the two stories, except for Jesus.
5. Parallel actions are done by contrasting groups or contrasting actions are done by parallel groups in the two stories.
6. The outer story has an elliptical action which crosses the inner story and contrasts with the actions of the inner story.
7. The plots of the two stories interlink following a 'turn—return' pattern.
8. An ellipsis of the outer story occurs across the inner story.[11]

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Lovaniensium, vol. 31 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1988), 133. German authors have used the terms "Ineinanderschachtelungen," Erich Klostermann, *Das Markusevangelium*, Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, 4th ed. (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1950), 36; "Verschachtelungen," Heinz-Wolfgang Kuhn, *Ältere Sammlungen im Markusevangelium*, ed. Karl Georg Kuhn, Studien zur Umwelt des Neuen Testaments, vol. 8 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), 200-201; and "Verschmelzungen," Julius Schniewind *Das Evangelium nach Markus*, translation of New Testament text by Herman Strathmann, Das Neue Testament Deutsch (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958), 148.

[7] For a list of the twenty passages suggested and the authors who do so see Tom Shepherd, "The Definition and Function of Markan Intercalation as Illustrated in a Narrative Analysis of Six Passages" (Ph.D. diss., Andrews University, 1991), 388-392 (available from U.M.I.). A majority of the scholars in the list I provide agree that the six passages I list in this paper do illustrate Markan intercalation.

[8] There is disagreement as to where exactly the borders of the literary units reside. See Shepherd, 106, for a discussion.

[9] See Shepherd, 32-107, for a full delineation of my method and a comparison of it to other methods of approaching the text.

[10] For a full description of my findings see Shepherd, 108-310. For the explication of their meaning and a defense of my conclusions see Shepherd, 311-383.

[11] Shepherd, 327. The "turn – return" pattern noted in 7 has to do with the way the outer story returns at its end to a norm presented in the inner story. See Shepherd, 322-323, for further discussion.

Along with this definitive set of characteristics are other literary patterns which help to make up the entire pattern of Markan intercalation but which are not unique to it alone. These include:

1. A spatial, social, or moral border is broken in one or both stories.
2. Story time NOW continues throughout both stories as a unit.
3. Anachronies serve as markers of the dramatized irony between the two stories.
4. The expected reader knowledge is different between the two stories.
5. *Leitwort* or motif interconnection occurs between the two stories.
6. The stories have dramatized irony between their major characters and actions.[12]

Combining all of these characteristics together we can summarize their defining activity as follows:

> Intercalation is the Markan literary style by which the Evangelist interrupts the flow of one story with another individual story in order to produce a dramatized irony between key characters and their actions. Intercalation is a process by which the Evangelist brings the two stories together, and yet maintains their separateness, in order to produce the dramatized irony.[13]

In the process of setting forth the definition of Markan intercalation I have alluded to its function in Markan storytelling. Intercalation in Mark has the function of setting up a dramatized irony between the two stories, particularly between the main characters of the two stories.[14] Dramatized irony contains three controlling characteristics, (1) a two-storey phenomenon (duality), (2) an inherent opposition of terms, and (3) alazony.[15] This is exactly what occurs in intercalation in Mark. The two stories are brought together in the discourse but held separate by the lack of active character crossover and by other story features. There are numerous parallels and contrasts between the two stories (opposition of terms), and the reader is elevated above the characters with an understanding of the intercalation process which makes one or more characters the alazon. The dramatized irony so produced creates a new or heightened conception about one or more of the major theological themes of the Gospel.

The most succinct way to set forth this entire pattern is to give an example. In the intercalation in Mark 14:1-11 the outer story (14:1-2,10-11) deals with the plot of the religious leaders against Jesus and the betrayal plan of Judas. The inner story (14:3-9) concerns an unnamed woman who anoints Jesus' head with very expensive perfume and the commotion this action precipitates. The two characters brought into a pattern of dramatized irony are Judas (and the religious leaders) in the outer story, and the woman in the inner story. The opposition of terms is illustrated by the fact that:

> Judas is one of the Twelve but joins the plot on Jesus' life, the woman is unnamed, but by her act of devotion she prepares Jesus' body for burial.

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12 Shepherd, 327-328.

13 Ibid., 328.

14 It is not possible here to give an extensive defense of this finding. See Shepherd, 328-348, for a complete explanation and defense.

15 See D. C. Muecke, *The Compass of Irony* (London: Methuen & Co., 1969), 19-20.

> The woman expends her costly gift on Jesus rather than giving ( δίδωμι, 14:5) it to the poor, while Judas goes away to betray (παραδίδωμι, 14:10-11) Jesus to the rulers. The woman's gift is very costly, worth more than three hundred denarii. Judas accepts a *promise* of some unspecified sum of money. Judas takes part in a terrible secret death plot and seeks how he can betray Jesus conveniently (εὐκαίρως, 14:11). The anonymous woman's good action (καλός εὖ, 14:6,7) becomes an open memorial in the proclaimed Good News (εὐαγγέλιον, 14:9).[16]

The alazony is illustrated by the following:

> In Mark 14:1-11 the secret plot of the rulers and Judas forebodes disaster and a cruel end to the powerful ministry of Jesus. But the 'handing over' (παραδίδωμι, 14:10-11) becomes a gift given (δίδωμι, 14:5), where the woman's anointing of Jesus becomes, in his interpretation, a memorial which will form part of the Good News proclaimed throughout the world. Thus Judas and the rulers are the alazons. Their crafty plot which they think will do away with Jesus turns out to be part of the Good News.[17]

Thus Markan intercalation, an intentional storytelling technique, has a definitive pattern where it occurs and a specific purpose in the Markan narrative.

### Markan Intercalation and the Synoptic Problem

This storytelling pattern in Mark is intriguing, but one may wonder how it impinges upon the Synoptic Problem. A little reflection, however, illustrates its importance. All of my research leads me to the conclusion that intercalation in Mark is an intentional, planned storytelling device. As such it illustrates, or reveals, the Evangelist's hand.[18] It follows that if Matthew and Luke utilized Mark's manuscript as a primary source for their Gospels, intercalation ought to be reflected in their work, or, on the other hand, a clear *redaktionsgeschichtlich* reason ought to be explicable for their shift away from both the Markan wording and theological point. To postulate that a shift from the Markan wording is due to the other Evangelists merely not recognizing this Markan storytelling

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16 Shepherd, 334-335.

17 Ibid., 337.

18 Robert Stein contends that for there to be redactional significance in an intercalation it must fulfill four criteria, (1) the arrangement must come from the Evangelist's hand, (2) the events must not have "just happened" in this order historically, (3) the stories must have more than mere thematic connection, and (4) the two stories must interpret one another. See Robert H. Stein, "The Proper Methodology for Ascertaining a Markan Redaction History," *Novum Testamentum* 13 (1971): 193-194. However, Stein's viewpoint fails to take into account the significance and function of telling a story. The telling is always done for a purpose and this purpose resides in the author's intentions of communication. To suggest that historical time relationship between stories rules out significance in the telling is to suggest that the author's intentions cannot impinge upon the telling of historical events. The "mere telling" of events is an essential part of story. It is integral to the genius of plot and significant in the expressive communication of the author. Stein's contention that temporal relation of a historical nature rules out redactional significance, cannot rule out storytelling significance for the events so narrated.

I demur from those who would suggest that the appearance of the "Evangelist's hand" necessarily implies literary invention. There are any number of ways to present a "true" depiction of factual events. One event can contain or imply several lessons for life and all of the ways of telling it be true to life and faithful to the facts.

technique, is really to abdicate the redaction critical endeavor at a key point. Intercalation is not merely a matter of a few words added here or there, it is a *pattern*, a *design* for telling a story to make a theological point. For the other Evangelists to leave out intercalation without a traceable reason is tantamount to admitting that they did not have the Markan text before them when writing.

What then does the data reveal about the appearance of Markan intercalation in the texts of Matthew and Luke? We will first look at a some general data and then at two specific Markan texts and their parallels, Mark 5:21-43 and 14:53-72. In terms of the overall picture of the six intercalations analyzed in my study only *one* of the intercalations is found in Luke and *three* in Matthew. The Lukan passage is the story of Jairus and the woman with the hemorrhage (Luke 8:40-56). No other of the Markan intercalations is reflected in the text of Luke as a united discourse such as is found in Mark. This finding itself is rather destructive for the thesis that Luke utilized Mark as a primary source text. It would require that in at least five of the cases of intercalation in Mark the Lukan Evangelist shifted away from Mark for redactional reasons. While time does not allow a review of all the pertinent passages it does seem to stretch the concept of dependence to insist that Luke utilized Mark as a primary source and then departed from him so much with regards to this storytelling device.[19]

The three Markan intercalations found in Matthew reflect in some way a closer relationship between these two Gospels. The passages are the stories of Jairus and the woman with the hemorrhage (Matt 9:18-26, Mark 5:21-43), the death plot and the anointing at Bethany (Matt 26:1-16, Mark 14:1-11), and the denial by Peter and Jesus' trial (Matt 26:57-75, Mark 14:53-72). In two of these cases, Matt 9:18-26 and Matt 26:57-75, the point of the dramatized irony as found in Mark is lacking in Matthew.[20] In the third case, the death plot and the anointing at Bethany (Matt 26:1-16), are a number of omissions and shifts in Matthew which either efface or eliminate the Markan dramatized irony.[21] For a clearer

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[19] Furthermore, it seems facile to suggest that Luke, the master storyteller, just did not recognize intercalation. Cf. the excellent story of Acts 12 with the Apostle who is set free from prison but cannot get into the church, the angel who enters the locked prison but the congregation thinks he is outside the house unable to come in, and the King and the Apostle both struck (πατάσσω Acts 12:7,23) by the Angel of the Lord, one unto life and freedom, the other unto death. It seems unlikely that Luke would pass by such wonderful stories as the Markan intercalations.

[20] See below for a further explication.

[21] In Mark the discourse of the inner story is characterized by series of "threes." There are three centers of action, the woman's act, the reaction of "some," and the response by Jesus. Each of these centers of actions is again broken into three parts and in the case of Jesus' response there is a further breakdown of his threefold response into three segments each. Interestingly, in Matthew, while there are the same three centers of action as in Mark (the woman's act, the others' comments—in Matthew identified as the disciples, and the response by Jesus), in the cases of the anointing and the censure the three parts of each center of action is reduced to two (Matthew does not mention the breaking of the alabaster bottle nor the comment that "some" censured her). The same pattern continues in Jesus' response. In Matthew, although there are three parts to his response, in each individual part there are only two segments, rather than the threefold pattern in Mark (Matthew does not have "leave her," "whenever you wish you are able to do good to them," and "she has done what she could"). In several cases the Markan phrases which Matthew does not have play a role in the dramatized irony between the inner and outer stories in Mark (the use of the term εὖ in Mark 14:7 and the reference to the woman doing what she could, ἔσχεν 14:8, both of which are involved as *Leitwörten* in the Markan narrative).

understanding of the phenomena occurring in Mark as compared to Matthew and Luke we will now examine more closely two of the intercalations which occur in one or both of the parallel Synoptic Gospels, Mark 5:21-43 (parallel to Matt 9:18-26 and Luke 8:40-56) and Mark 14:53-72 (parallel to Matt 26:57-75).

### Mark 5:21-43 and 14:53-72 and Parallels

In order to understand the comparison between Mark and the other Synoptic Gospels in these passages it is vital to recognize that Markan intercalation is not merely a matter of story arrangement but also of story plot. The dramatized ironies which intercalation sets up are communications between the implied author and the implied reader. In Mark 5:21-43 the dramatized irony of the intercalation centers on the life and death situation of Jairus' daughter and the healing of the woman with the hemorrhage. The irony is that the little girl dies even as Jesus is healing (rather, being a passive agent of healing!) the woman. The irony is sharpened by the fact that the delay on the way to Jairus' house is caused by the Great Healer apparently not knowing who has been healed and spending much time looking for that person. This irony is epitomized in the juncture between the two stories in Mark 5:34-35. While Jesus is *yet speaking* the words of peace to the woman, "Daughter (θυγάτηρ) your faith has healed (σῴζω) you, go in peace and be well from your illness," the reporters come from Jairus' house and inform him, "Your daughter (θυγάτηρ) has died. Why yet trouble the teacher?" The juxtaposition of the term "daughter" (θυγάτηρ) used for both the woman and the little girl, in conjunction with the clashing concepts of life/healing and death, drives home the irony. The lengthy delay in the woman's story (her healing, which is instantaneous, is referred to no less than nine times[22]) serves the story-telling purpose of producing the irony in which healing causes death, one "daughter" finds health in his presence, the other comes to death in his absence.

The Matthean intercalation of this event is vastly different than the Markan story in a number of ways. First, the little girl has already died in Matthew. This fact has a tremendous effect on the way the story proceeds. The anxiety and suspense over whether Jesus will reach the child in time is absent, as is the lengthy delay in the woman's story. Second, Matthew lacks many of the *Leitwörter* crossovers of the Markan story. These include the word σῴζω (cf. Mark 5:23,28,34 with Matt 9:18 [no use of σῴζω] and 9:21-22, Matthew uses the term in relation to the woman, but not in relation to the little girl), φόβος/φοβέομαι (cf. Mark 5:33,36, no occurrence in Matthew), and πίστις/πιστεύω (cf. Mark 5:34,36 with Matt 9:22 in relation to the woman, no usage in Matthew in terms of the synagogue ruler). Third, Matthew also lacks the settings motif of the Markan story in which Jairus moves towards ever more secret/closed locales and the woman's story moves from secrecy to openness.[23]

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[22] After the actual healing in Mark 5:29 the additional reference/allusions are: (1) woman knows she is healed, 5:29, (2) Jesus knows power has gone out of him, 5:30, (3) Jesus asks, "Who touched me?" 5:30, (4) the disciples ask him, "You see the crowd pressing you and you say, 'Who touched me?'" 5:31, (5) Jesus looks for who did this, 5:32, (6) the woman knows what happened, 5:33, (7) woman tells the truth, 5:33, (8) Jesus says, "Your faith has healed you, go in peace," 5:34, (9) "While he was still speaking," 5:35.

[23] This enters into the Markan secrecy/revelation theme, a theme which does not appear to play such a major role in Matthew. To the above listed differences between Matthew and Mark may be added the interesting datum that Mark has the name Jairus

To all these distinctions between the intercalation in Mark and Matthew may be added a characteristic of the Matthean story which sets it clearly within the typical story patterns of that Gospel. Matthew has none of the ambiguity over the touch of the woman and Jesus' knowledge of it which plays a role in Mark. Indeed, in Matt 9:22 no room is left for any magical ideas about Jesus' healing power, he addresses the woman almost immediately. This arrangement is typical of healing stories in Matthew. Either the person must *personally address Jesus* in appeal for help and/or the *Master addresses* the invalid with the healing word.[24]

Numerous story patterns, therefore, suggest that Matthew did not use the Markan story of Jairus and the woman, but what about the Lukan parallel? Luke 8:40-56 is closer to Mark 5:21-43 than is the Matthean account. In the Lukan intercalation the little girl has not died but, just as in the Markan story, is near death (cf. the imperfect tense of ἀποθνήσκω, Luke 8:42). Hence the question of suspense about Jesus reaching the child in time is maintained. Again, as in the Markan story, the delay in healing the woman results in the child's death. Numerous such connections exist between the Markan and Lukan stories, yet with fascinating variations in storytelling method. What is absent from the Lukan story is the stress on the close connection between the little girl and the woman.[25] Furthermore, the movement into greater secrecy in the Jairus story, which is prominent in Mark, is less evident in Luke.[26] The Lukan story is quite close to the Markan, but told with some variation. What is significant in the case of Luke, however, is what we noted above: this is the only Markan intercalation which occurs in the text of Luke.

Turning to the story of the denial by Peter and the trial of Jesus, the Markan story occurs at 14:53-72. The dramatized irony is set up between Peter in the outer story and Jesus in the inner story. This intercalation contains perhaps the

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whereas Matthew does not. Rudolph Bultmann contends that names in Synoptic apophthegms are secondary (Rudolph Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition*, trans. John Marsh, rev. ed. [New York: Harper & Row, 1963], 68), but he skirts around the obvious problem for Markan priority in the present text by citing the absence of the name "Jairus" in the Markan text in D (Bultmann, 215)! With the notoriety of D this seems very slim evidence for the absence of the name in Mark, particularly in light of the importance of its inclusion in terms of the comparison of the *named* synagogue ruler with the *unnamed* woman (the same pattern of *named* and *unnamed* occurs again in the intercalation in Mark 14:1-11, Judas, one of the Twelve, and the unnamed woman).

[24] Cf. for instance the story of the Canaanite woman in Matt 15:21-28 with the parallel account in Mark 7:24-30. The Matthean account emphasizes the pleading of the woman for help (note especially Matt 15:22,25 without parallel in Mark 7).

[25] The stress on naming and renaming the little girl in the Markan story (five names are used for her, θυγάτριον Mark 5:23, θηγάτηρ 5:35, παιδίον 5:39, ταλιθα 5:41, and κομάσιον 5:41;) does not occur in the Lukan story where the child is named only two times (θηγάτηρ Luke 8:42 and παῖς 8:51,54). The Markan story with its multiple names for the child (all diminutives except for θηγάτηρ) thereby lays stress upon her case and calls attention to her age (which emphasizes the connection to the woman of the inner story). Furthermore, although the bond between the two females is maintained in Luke via the use of θηγάτηρ for both (Luke 8:48-49), the parallel between the child and the woman with the reference to "twelve years" in Mark 5:25 and 5:42 is weaker in Luke (cf. the use of ὡς ἐτῶν δώδεκα in Luke 8:42 with reference to the child as compared to ἀπὸ ἐτῶν δώδεκα in 8:43 for the woman).

[26] In Mark Jesus stops the crowd from following him, expels the mourners from Jairus' house, and enters the private room where the child is lying (Mark 5:37,40). In Luke, Jesus stops the crowd outside the house but does not expel the mourners nor enter a private room for the miracle of raising the child (Luke 8:51-54).

sharpest irony of any of the intercalations. The irony is that the denial by Peter is actually a proof of the prophetic messiahship of Jesus. By denying his Lord, Peter actually proves that Jesus is Messiah. The irony is centered in the mocking by those who strike Jesus when they call out "Prophesy!" (Mark 14:65). Their intention is to discredit the messianic claims of Jesus,[27] but ironically one of his prophecies does immediately come to pass when Peter fulfills the prophecy of Mark 14:30.[28] Peter's remembrance of this prophecy in 14:72 serves as a story marker directing the reader to see the connection between the fulfillment of prophecy in 14:66-72 and the call for prophecy in 14:65.

The usual discussion over priority in relation to this passage in Mark and its parallels in Matthew 26:57-75 and Luke 22:54-71 lays great emphasis on the longest minor agreement between Matthew and Luke, the phrase "Who is the one who struck you?" (Matt 26:68, Luke 22:64). I will illustrate below that the significance of that phrase extends beyond its merely being a "minor" agreement.

Luke does not intercalate the trial and the denial passages. In fact, in Luke the denial precedes the trial. In Matthew, however, the order is similar to that found in Mark, the trial is intercalated within the denial story concerning Peter. As noted above, the central irony of the Markan intercalation is that Peter's denial proves Jesus' messiahship via the fulfillment of the prophecy of 14:30. It is precisely this irony which both Matthew and Luke lack. Furthermore, even as the Markan irony finds its focus in the mocking cry of those who strike Jesus and cry out "Prophesy!" even so, it is the difference from this Markan single word derision in Matthew and Luke which illustrates that they do not contain the Markan irony at this point.

However, there are other indications in the differences between the Synoptic Gospels in these stories which drive home the same point. We noted above the way in which Mark's account of the trial and denial lays a special emphasis on the prophetic messiahship of Jesus. Within the trial Jesus words, besides "I am" in 14:62, are all in the future tense. Furthermore, Peter's denial proves Jesus' prophetic messiahship when he fulfills one of Jesus' *prophecies*. Not only do Matthew and Luke lack the ironic note of the Markan intercalation, they also lack the Markan stress on *future orientation* in the words of Jesus.

In the Matthean parallel to Mark 14:58 (Matt 26:61) the witnesses state, "This one said, 'I am able to destroy the temple of God and during three days found another.'" This lacks the future tense and eschatological orientation of Mark 14:58, "We heard him saying, 'I will destroy this handmade temple and during three days found another without hands.'" Furthermore, in the crucial

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[27] Note that in the trial scene in Mark every statement made by Jesus or ascribed to him (save the dramatic "I am" of 14:62) is a prophecy (14:58,62). This fact, combined with the stress laid on Jesus' prophetic office in the outer story, illustrates that one of the central concepts of messiahship emphasized in this intercalation is the prophetic office.

[28] A number of authors recognize the ironic sense of this intercalation. See Donald Juel, *Messiah and Temple: The Trial of Jesus in the Gospel of Mark*, ed. Howard C. Kee and Douglas A. Knight, Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series, no. 31 (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1977), 55; Augustine Stock, *Call to Discipleship: A Literary Study of Mark's Gospel*, Good News Studies, vol. 1 (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1982), 43-44; Mary Ann Tolbert, *Sowing the Gospel: Mark's World in Literary-Historical Perspective* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 278; Frank J. Matera, *Passion Narratives and Gospel Theologies: Interpreting the Synoptics through Their Passion Stories*, ed. Lawrence Boadt, Theological Inquiries, Studies in Contemporary Biblical and Theological Problems (New York: Paulist Press, 1986), 33; and Jerry Alan Camery-Hoggatt, "Word Plays: Evidence of Dramatic Irony in the Gospel of Mark," Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1985, 7-8.

Christological confession in Matt 26:64 not only is Jesus' affirmation less forceful ("You have said," as compared to "I am" in Mark 14:62) but the Matthean temporal modifier on the futuristic statement places it as beginning *from the present*, "From now on [ἀπ' ἄρτι] you will see the Son of Man seated at the right hand of power and coming on the clouds of heaven." In Mark the orientation is, again, all future, "I am, and you will see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of power and coming with the clouds of heaven."

In Luke is a similar pattern as that found in Matthew. Luke does not refer to the threat against the temple in his report of the trial of Jesus before the religious leaders. The words of Jesus before the Sanhedrin carry a mournful note of frustration on the part of Jesus that the leaders will never believe, "If I tell you, you will never believe, and if I ask you, you will never answer" (Luke 22:67-68). Then Luke reports Jesus' words as, "But from now on [ἀπὸ τοὺ νὺν δὲ ] the Son of Man will be seated at the right hand of the power of God" (Luke 22:68). Luke thus contains a pattern similar to that of Matthew when compared to Mark, less emphasis on the future orientation of the remarks of Jesus in the trial.

All of this is consistent with the thesis that in Mark there is a distinct emphasis on the *prophetic* messiahship of Jesus, an emphasis apparent in both the future orientation of Jesus' remarks in the trial and in the way the dramatized irony of the intercalation (Peter fulfilling one of our Lord's prophecies) illustrates that Jesus is truly the *prophetic Messiah*. Matthew and Luke, on the other hand, contain neither the dramatized irony nor the special emphasis on the future orientation of Jesus' words. They both fail to accent the prophetic nature of Jesus' messiahship to the impressive extent that Mark does. Assuming Markan priority, it seems rather serendipitous that both Matthew and Luke would agree, against Mark, in not only departing from the wording of 14:65 (wording which serves as a focus of the dramatized irony in Mark), but also moving away from the future orientation of Jesus' words in the Markan trial scene. Thus the agreement of Matthew and Luke against Mark appears to be not only a minor agreement in wording, but one which extends to a thematic concern. This is not to suggest that Mark's emphasis is somehow in opposition to the concerns of Matthew and Luke. Both Matthew and Luke accept the prophetic nature of Jesus' activity (cf. Matt 12:57, 14:5, 21:11, 21:46; Luke 4:24, 7:16, 7:36-50, 13:33, 24:19; cf. Acts 3:22-23, 7:37), though Luke seems to have a greater emphasis on this than Matthew. If Jesus stands as prophet in Matthew and Luke, what reason would they have for leaving out the prophetic emphasis of the Markan trial and denial stories? These data appear, therefore, to strengthen the argument that the "minor agreement" in the mocking words, "Prophesy, who is it that struck you?" is actually an important indication that Matthew and Luke did not have Mark before them as a primary source.[29]

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[29] The unusual circumstance in the Matthean account in which no blindfolding of Jesus is noted (Matt 26:67-68) is an area of discussion (see Frans Neirynck, "Τίς Ἐστιν Ὁ Παίσας Σε: Mt 26,68/Lk 22,64 (diff. Mk 14,65)," *Ephemerides Theological Lovanienses* 63 (1987): 5-47, and the literature he cites). Neirynck concludes with a rather unlikely explanation, "Mt 26,68 would then be the *exceptional* case where an assimilation of Matthew to Luke has pervaded *all* textual witnesses." (Neirynck, 47, emphasis supplied). This approach appears less than acceptable to me. A narrative analysis approach to the data accepts the most likely text, as constructed by textual criticism, as the starting place for investigation and as making sense within itself as a story. From this viewpoint there are several reasonable ways to explain the Matthean text. Neirynck lists several (see Neirynck, 39-40) including the spittle in Jesus' face preventing his seeing clearly, or the challenge to Jesus being to give the names of the mockers. Neirynck rejects these as

We may summarize our findings in conclusion. Intercalation is a planned, storytelling device utilized by the second Evangelist to produce dramatized irony between major characters and their actions in the stories so sandwiched. This Markan storytelling device, with its special emphasis in dramatized irony, appears rarely, and without the same sharpness of focus in Matthew and Luke. Luke contains only one of the Markan intercalations, and in that case (the story of Jairus and the woman with the hemorrhage) several important components of the Markan irony are less distinct.

In the case of Matthew, three of the Markan intercalations appear, but in two of the cases the dramatized irony is absent. In the third case the dramatized irony is blunted or absent. Thus in the case of Matthew, Markan intercalation appears to be poorly displayed, if at all.

The ramifications of these findings for the Synoptic Problem are obvious. The Two Document Hypothesis contends that Matthew and Luke utilized Mark as a primary source. A lack of the appearance of Markan intercalation with its specialized function in either of these Gospels, without an adequate explanation for its absence, produces strain on the adequacy of the Two Document Hypothesis as a solution to the Synoptic Problem.

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inventiveness (Neirynck, 40-41). However, another "inventive" solution which is in accord with the story and its allusion to Isa 50:6 (see Neirynck, 31, 36-38) provides a cutting sense to the mocking: The mockers first spit in Jesus' face. Isa 50:6 states that the Servant of the Lord would not hide his face from mocking and spitting. But if Jesus turns his face when spit upon (a natural reaction) the mockers might construe this as a "proof" that he is not Messiah (he contravenes Isa 50:6). Then, while he is not looking, they strike him and call for prophecy. When he fails to respond they have a second "proof" that he is not Messiah. Thus the cruelty of the mocking does not only reside in the physical actions carried out against the defenseless Jesus, but in the mean-spirited mockery of his messianic claims.

# The Language of Community: Metaphors, Systems of Convictions, Ethnic, and Gender Issues in Luke 10:25-37 and 10:38-42

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What we care about, we talk about and we write about. The words, phrases, metaphors we employ say much about who we are, our concerns, our values, the world in which we live. Scholarship has demonstrated that every significant human movement—social, political, economic, religious—develops its own special language that aids in orienting people to see the world, institutions, themselves, and others in particular ways.

With this background I began to ponder the notion of the LANGUAGE OF COMMUNITY (henceforth rendered as LOC), particularly in relation to the texts we call the New Testament. These texts provide a glimpse of the *language* of early Christian communities, a language that demonstrates alienation and partnership, challenge and confrontation, vision and memory, a language that speaks about the community life and faith life of diverse groups. The LOC is discovered in *how* a community speaks to itself and others, *how* a community names its experiences as a community of faith, and in *how* its stories are told. The LOC is also found in the tension created between tradition and experience, the ideal and the reality, between one system of convictions and another. Before looking to the stories these communities told and preserved we might ask: What kinds of characters do we find? Can the reader distinguish stereotypic characterization that is rooted in first century cultural stereotypes from characterization molded to narrative or rhetorical designs? What metaphors motivate the narrative and engage the reader? Does the language reveal the convictional systems that undergird the community and serve to initiate friction and conflict?

Such a detailed study of the canonical Christian texts would be illustrative, but too large for the purposes of this paper. Instead, I would like to reflect on a few of the issues mentioned above, using them as building blocks to explicate the two narratives found in Luke 10:25-42. These two texts serve to illustrate the revelatory nature of the LOC, demonstrating that what a community cares about, is concerned with, it talks/writes about. From the start it is important to be reminded that ancient texts are often more prescriptive than descriptive. However, "narrative" prescription is built on description, and such description can be quite revealing.

## Language

The ancients were interested in the persuasive capacity of language, the order inherent in a well-crafted text/oration, and the aesthetic pleasure provided by a melodious phrase. Rhetoric and literature were accountable to basic, critical requirements: to educate, to entertain, and to please.[1]

Contemporary critics bring scientific methods to bear on the study of language and the process of communication. The work of the scholarly community demonstrates that language is more than simply a non-material tool, it is an expression of life and reality.[2] It is because of language that people/cultures learn to see things in certain ways, learn to envision themselves and others.[3] Language can alter world views; it does more than simply report. As Bernard Lee says, language is never "just words. It is a way of being in the world."[4] Few things shape the experience of reality more potently than does language, for, as Lee notes, it is "the house we live in as human beings."[5] Cultural linguists tell us that if we hear something enough, if we see the language symbolically represented in print or video enough times, we begin to believe the words, the symbols, the pictures, even though the premise behind the words and signs might be flawed, or erroneous.[6]

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[1] Aristotle, *Poetics*, in *Critical Theory Since Plato*, ed. by H. Adams (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), 47-66; *The "Art" of Rhetoric*, trans. by J. H. Freese, LCL (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Longinus, *On the Sublime*, in *Critical Theory Since Plato*, ed. by H. Adams (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), 76-92; Cicero, *De Oratore*, trans. by E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, LCL (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942); Horace, *The Art of Poetry*, trans. by H. R. Fairclough, LCL (Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press, 1966); Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On the Arrangement of Words*, trans. by S. Usher, LCL (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974); Seneca, *17 Letters*, trans. and commentary by C. D. N. Costa (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1988); Tacitus, "Dialogue on Orators," in *Dialogus, Agricola, Germania*, trans. by W. Peterson and M. Hutton, LCL (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1925); Plutarch, "On the Study of Poetry," in *Moralia*, trans. by F.C. Babbitt, LCL (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).

[2] Roland Barthes, *The Pleasure of the Text*, trans. by R. Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975); Basil Bernstein, *Class, Codes, and Control. Theoretical Studies towards a Sociology of Language*, vol. 1, 2d rev. ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974); Roland Champagne, "A Grammar of the Languages of Culture: Literary Theory and Yury M. Lotman's Semiotics," *New Literary History* 9 (1977-78): 205-210; Jonathan Culler, *Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975); *The Pursuit of Signs* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981); Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. by G.C. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in *The Structuralist Controversy*, ed. by R. Macksey and E. Donato (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); Joshua A. Fishman, *Readings in the Sociology of Language* (The Hague: Mouton, 1970); A. J. Greimas, *Semantique Structurale* (Paris: Larousse, 1966); Terence Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); W. Ong, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (London: Methuen, 1982; V. Propp, *Morphology of the Folktale*, 2d ed. (Bloomington: Indiana Research Center in Anthropology, 1958); F. de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959).

[3] See *Cleaning up Sexist Language*, rev. ed. (Chicago: 8th Day Center for Justice, 1986), 2-3.

[4] Lee and Cowan, *Dangerous Memories* (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1986), 81.

[5] Ibid., 62.

[6] Though the next section of this paper speaks specifically to the use and role of metaphor in language, Wayne C. Booth offers some thoughts that speak directly to the

Joan Chittister notes that it is possible to gauge what is important in a society by looking at its language[7]: Eskimos have 18 words for snow, Greeks have 9 words for death, North Americans have over 400 words for cars! Language never merely describes the facts of the world, but always contributes to the collective construction of what the facts are.[8] The study of language, then, can reveal the way in which language fashions worldviews.[9] Since all human perception and understanding occurs within the symbolic medium of language, language is like a lens that focuses and shapes experience. Words connote whatever people think when they use them.[10] Therefore, the language a community uses (as well as what it does not use) reveals much about that particular people, their view of the world, and their cultural, political, moral, and religious presuppositions.

## Metaphor

> So readily did interest in metaphor obtrude itself upon even the earliest philosophical and grammatical analyses of language that one can say that the study of metaphor begins with the study of language itself. Amongst Greek grammarians of the classical period, *metaphora* ... was recognized as a means by which language was both ornamented and extended.[11]

Once the property of literary critics, it is now generally understood that the metaphor is far from a simple, decorative feature of narrative, or figure of speech. It is primarily a mode of language use—it is linguistic. Metaphor is intrinsic to the use of language. Ricoeur has noted that metaphor organizes our view of reality, and he argues that human thought begins in metaphor.[12] Metaphors give information that cannot be given any other way, and if one tries to paraphrase a metaphor, "what is lost is more than just a certain effect."[13] In attempts to explain a metaphor, the metaphor vanishes, and permanently loses its power (literal and evocative). Donald Davidson uses a metaphor to speak about the operation of a metaphor,

> Metaphor is the dreamwork of language and, like all dreamwork, its interpretation reflects as much on the interpreter as on the originator. The

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issues in this section of the paper. "For the first time in history, a society finds itself offering immense rewards to a vast number of hired metaphorists, hired to make metaphors that will accomplish a predetermined end regardless of what they say about our character or do to it." See "Metaphor as Rhetoric," in *On Metaphor*, ed. by S. Sacks (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 67.

7 Joan Chittister, "'Brotherly' Love in Today's Church," in *Women, Ministry and the Church* (New York: Paulist Press, 1983), 12.

8 Lee and Cowan, *Dangerous Memories*, 114-16.

9 Weller Embler, *Metaphor and Meaning* (Deland, FL: Everett/Edwards, Inc., 1966), 134.

10 Joan Chittister, "Healing Language," in *Women, Ministry and the Church* (New York: Paulist Press, 1983), 21.

11 J. M. Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 1.

12 Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981) and "Specificity of Religious Language," *Semeia* 4 (1975):1-145.

13 Carol Newsom, "A Maker of Metaphors: Ezekiel's Oracles against Tyre," in *Interpreting the Prophets*, ed. by J. L. Mays and P. J. Achtemeier (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 189.

> interpretation of dreams requires collaboration between a dreamer and a waker, even if they be the same person; and the act of interpretation is itself a work of the imagination. So too understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavor as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules.[14]

Davidson's example points to an essential factor in the study and use of metaphor—metaphor is a collaborative effort, both the author and the reader/hearer participate in making meaning. Metaphor (expounded or suggested) does not allow the reader to be passive; Davidson's example requires the reader to reconstitute the meanings of *metaphor*, *dreamwork*, and *language* into a single, extended, new meaning. The use of metaphor demands and assumes "the interplay of inventive construction and inventive construal."[15]

Milan Kundera, in his popular novel, *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, warns the reader that "...metaphors are dangerous. Metaphors are not to be trifled with. A single metaphor can give birth..."[16] Later in the book he reflects on how one metaphor can give birth to principal characters, even the novel itself. This understanding of metaphor is a common one, often represented in philosophical and theological writing as a *root metaphor*.[17]

A root metaphor is a central, fundamental motif that roots a character, a whole narrative, even a way of life. Once the metaphor is established, the narrative spins on the power of that root metaphor,[18] and the metaphor acts as a filter through which the components of the narrative are viewed. These metaphors make worlds of meaning and determine much about how communities see themselves and others. For example, citizens in the United States often point to statements like, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" and "rugged individualism," as metaphors describing their expectations of what life ought to provide someone living in the U.S. Root metaphors, then, can determine what is expected of life, project how things ought to be, and are used to evaluate reality in comparison to prescribed expectations and oughts.

Often, a work will contain opposing root metaphors creating a healthy narrative tension that engages the reader/hearer. This appears to be the case with the biblical texts.[19] The tension created by root metaphors often permeates the entire

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14 "What Metaphors Mean," in *On Metaphor*, ed. by S. Sacks (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 29.

15 Ibid., 29.

16 Milan Kundera, *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, trans. by M. H. Heim (New York: Perennial Library, Harper & Row, 1984), 11.

Max Black, relying heavily on I. A. Richards' studies, was the first to speak of metaphors as "dangerous." See M. Black, *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 25-47.

17 See Wayne C. Booth, "Metaphor as Rhetoric," 64, and Stephen Pepper, *World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942). Pepper argues that the great philosophies depend on one of four root metaphors: formism, mechanism, organicism, contextualism. They are "great" because they have survived the criticism of rival metaphors.

18 Lee and Cowan, *Dangerous Memories*, 4.

19 In reference to religious texts David Tracy notes, "In a particular religion root metaphors form a cluster or network in which certain sustained metaphors describe the enigma and the promise of the human situation and prescribe certain remedies for that

work. These metaphors sometimes function as the underlying mythos of the text and require the creative collaboration between the text (inventive authorial construction) and the reader (inventive construal). Root metaphors are operative in the biblical texts. They are part of the "structure" of the LOC, providing the reader a gaze into the life of a community, and requiring the participation of the reader and the author in discerning a particular LOC.

### Systems of Convictions

Today, people often confuse *ideas* with *convictions*.[20] People have lots of ideas, some of which they pursue. However, ideas do not have power. Convictions, on the other hand, do have power.[21] If a conviction is real, and not just an idea, people are willing to change, even to die for it. Convictions, then, are not simply beliefs held, they are at the root of the way people live their lives, the view of reality they support. Periods of change, trauma, conflict, and tension can serve to reveal and clarify personal convictions. The convictions we hold constitute a *system of convictions*.[22]

The discussion above has assumed that convictions are a personal matter. However, institutions, corporations, faith communities, couples, families, etc., can and do work within a convictional system. Convictions and convictional systems can and do change, often due to a profound and/or traumatic experience. Biblical scholars frequently point to the trauma felt in both Jewish and Christian communities with the destruction of the second Temple by the Romans in 70 CE. The decades following the destruction resulted in institutional/community changes in convictional systems within the Jewish community—the priesthood and sacrificial cult perished in the destruction calling for a radical change in convictions about proper worship, relationship with God, election, service within the community, etc. Among Christian writers Paul's writings and Acts powerfully attest to the impact of a personal experience and the resulting change.

The semiotician, Daniel Patte, in his commentary on Paul's letters, has demonstrated that one of the dynamics at work in the Pauline communities is a *clash* of convictional systems.[23] Moments of tension in communities of faith frequently involve such friction. Patte, using the letter to Galatia as an example, sketches the clash of convictional systems in terms of different kinds of faith, and his examples provide a good illustration of how ancient texts may be examined using such a model.

An important point that is frequently overlooked in communities (and in Patte's discussion) that experience a clash of convictional systems is that the opposition created by two different "revelations" is often reduced to a competi-

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situation." See "Metaphor and Religion: The Test Case of Christian Texts," in *On Metaphor*, ed. S. Sacks (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 89.

[20] "Conviction is closely associated with faith and believing, while idea is associated with knowledge and thinking." See D. Patte, *Paul's Faith and the Power of the Gospel: A Structural Introduction to the Pauline Letters* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), 11.

[21] "To begin with they impose themselves upon us. We do not generate them, or at least we do not do so by means of logical arguments." "...convictions motivate, orient, and thus structure all the believers' activities, their behavior, their way of thinking, their way of speaking or writing." Ibid., 12-13.

[22] Ibid., 21.

[23] Ibid., 39-52.

tion between "right" and "wrong." The use of this model of delineating systems of convictions is only helpful if it is used to illustrate and explain differing positions. If this model is used as a weapon to prove "right vs. wrong," alienation and division result. What the model does offer, though, is a recognition that convictions are built on root metaphors that sustain a world of meaning. Just as making meaning of a metaphor is a collaborative effort between author and reader, inhabiting and sustaining a world of meaning is a collaboration between root metaphors and systems of conviction. The root metaphor is enacted through fidelity to a corresponding convictional system.

The clash of convictional systems in communities results most often from sincere attempts at fidelity, at integrating new revelations, at redefining root metaphors, not from malicious motivations. Patte's model is a unique tool for facilitating the recognition of and discussion about differences in communities, personal relationships, etc. When the model is used as a tool that illustrates and explains differing positions, rather than as a vehicle of judgment, it can be effective in encouraging dialogue and aiding understanding.

## Luke 10:25-42

Is it possible that the study of language, metaphors, root metaphors, and systems of conviction can inform a reading of Luke's gospel? The reader is permitted to arrive at this examination of Luke with his/her "hermeneutics of suspicion" intact. However, the choice of the two Lukan texts—10:25-37, the "Good Samaritan" and 10:38-42, "Visiting Mary and Martha"—as test cases for my theory about the LOC is not a random choice: (1) both texts have a long history of interpretation and use within the Christian community; (2) both texts are particular to Luke's gospel; and (3) the texts are placed together, one after the other, in the midst of the so called travel narrative of the gospel. Luke's narrative skills in this section of the gospel are apparent, particularly when the reader understands that "stories are not innocent and ... storytelling not only derives significance from situation but also has the power to change human situation. The change can be reinforcement..., or it can produce a reversal..."[24]

### *The Good Samaritan*

In 9:22 Luke reports in the "first" passion prediction that Jesus will be rejected by the Jewish authorities. A close look at the intervening narratives (9:23-10:24) reveals that Luke has packed this section of the gospel with contentious episodes, episodes that speak of rejection (9:22,53; 10:10,16), a faithless generation (9:41), non-understanding (9:45), concealment (9:45), fear (9:45), arguments (9:46), rebuke (9:55), woe (10:13), power/subjection (10:19-20), reversals (10:21-24), and legal justification (10:25-29). The immediate context, then, of the good Samaritan story prepares the reader for further contentious subjects.

Some commentators choose to separate vv. 25-29, the discussion between Jesus and the Lawyer, from the Samaritan story that follows.[25] However, when this section is studied in terms of narrative analysis, the exchange between the

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[24] R. Chambers, *Story and Situation: Narrative Seduction and the Power of Fiction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 7.

[25] Joseph Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke X-XXIV*, Anchor Bible (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1985), 879-82; I. Howard Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 440-44.

Lawyer and Jesus (vv. 25-29) serves to set the stage for the story of the Samaritan that follows and is integral to understanding the parable; from the reader's point of view the two episodes ought not be separated.

Structurally, vv. 25-29 parallel Luke 18:18-23, where the same question, with the same appellation inaugurates the exchange, "(Good) Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?"[26]

Luke's choice of the *question and answer motif* in 10:25 serves to restrict the discussion to issues of legalism. At the same time this approach allows Luke to define and describe the character of the Lawyer while orchestrating the scene for the parable to come, setting-up the reader with a concluding, decisive question and answer (10:36-37). On the surface, questions and answers might seem a simplistic narrative strategy, but in Luke's hands it is a sophisticated, complex, and instructive maneuver. *Questions*, then, serve as the operating principle, an evocative metaphor for insight into the *language* of the Lukan community.

The text begins with a set-up (v.25)—for the reader and for the Lukan Jesus. The reader is immediately aware that Jesus is set-up by the use of the phrase, "lawyer ... put him to the test" (v. 25).[27] Jesus' response to the question is a question, deflecting the legal assault. The Lawyer easily answers his own question with the "orthodox" answer. So far Luke's legal and narrative games are transparent to the reader. Since the Lawyer initially addressed Jesus as "Teacher" (an authority figure) Luke reports Jesus' approval of the "orthodox" (Torah) answer, adding the phrase "do this, and you will live" (v. 28). The character of the Lawyer is further defined in a second round question with the phrase "But he, desiring to justify himself" (v. 29).[28] With this definition of the Lawyer, Luke provides the reader with a clue of the role religious leaders play in both controversy (discursive) and parable texts, "The real evidence that self-righteousness is the [religious] leader's root character trait in Luke lies in the recognition that it is this quality that determines their role in the story."[29]

The second question, "And who is my neighbor?" (v. 29) cannot be answered specifically or directly by quoting Torah, so the reader understands that the second question is actually the "test" question. The reader begins to realize he/she has been set-up, too. The second round question of the Lawyer provides Luke with the opportunity to unveil Jesus the story-teller. Such strategy is an effective way for Jesus to deflect the Lawyer's question for the second time, and for Luke to provide an answer/alternative position to the legalistic discussion, while involving the reader/hearer in an enjoyable and provocative story.

The story, rather simple and straight forward, consists of a journey, a mugging, a rescue, with four participants (characters): a traveller who is mugged, a Priest, a Levite, and a Samaritan. While none of the characters are fully developed (the Samaritan comes the closest to being a "round," three-dimensional

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26 Robert Tannehill suggests that this situation is part of a Lukan type-scene. He argues that Luke establishes four type-scenes in which Jewish leaders participate. See *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts*, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 171-72.

27 Jesus is "put to the test" only two other places in the gospel: 4:2 by the devil and 11:16, 29 by members of the crowd whom Jesus calls "an evil generation." See Tannehill, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts*, 179.

Powell argues that the religious leaders work as a "character group" in Luke—the Lawyer is included in this group. See M. A. Powell, "The Religious Leaders in Luke: A Literary-Critical Study," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 109 (1990):94.

28 16:15; 18:10-12,14; 20:20

29 Powell, "The Religious Leaders in Luke," 97.

character; the traveller has no identity except that of "victim"), Luke has given sufficient description to three of the characters by naming them with "labels" that would have provoked certain prejudices on the part of the reader. In the course of the story the Priest and the Levite (respected, honored positions within the culture and cultic Judaism) choose not to sully themselves with the victim, instead they "passed by on the other side" (vv. 31,32). If the victim were dead, or his beating resulted in lacerations, they would have been rendered ritually unclean if they touched him. Instead, they opt for the cleanliness (legalism) required for ritual duties over aid to the victim. The Samaritan (hated, ostracized, considered a pagan) shows "compassion [mercy]" (v. 34) to the victim. Luke devotes but two lines to the actions of the Priest and the Levite, two lines that are strikingly similar. He allots twice as much space to the description of what the Samaritan does to help the victim.

Luke's story of questions has become a parable of reversals![30] The Samaritan, who demonstrates "compassion/mercy," a quality often associated with God in the Tanak, supplants the stereotypic "good guys."[31]

The final revelation/reversal of the story is Jesus' question to the Lawyer. For the first time in the narrative Jesus is the questioner. The reader is quickly alerted to the fact that Jesus' question, "Which of these three, do you think, proved neighbor to the man who fell among the robbers?" (v. 36), is substantially different from the question asked by the Lawyer. Luke turns the tables on the reader and on the Lawyer; the dramatic force of the narrative demands that the Lawyer's question be recast with a question closer to the attitudes that drove the parable. Luke's narrative strategy requires that the Lawyer answer Jesus' question. It is no accident, then, that the Lawyer's response is ethnically ambiguous, "The one who showed mercy on him." (v. 37) Luke indicates that it would be inconceivable, in a Jewish milieu, to utter the terms "Samaritan" and "mercy" in reference to one another.

In the end, Luke asserts that Jesus will not be put to the test, rather he requires of the inquisitor that which Jesus could not be compelled to give, an answer that serves as a personal, ethnic, religious, cultural, and moral indictment. The last line of the story takes the reader back to the legal discussion of v. 28. Jesus exhorts the Lawyer to do what he has said with his own voice, "show mercy." Just as Jesus affirmed the Lawyer on his "orthodox" answer to his own question (v.28), Jesus affirms the Lawyer's final answer with the challenge, "Go and do likewise."

The language of this text is no less contentious than that found in the previous chapter of the gospel. If this text is at all indicative of Luke's community, then the LOC illustrated here betrays a number of disputed issues within the Lukan community:

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[30] The technique of reversal is a favorite tool for Luke. From the opening chapters of the gospel the reader is party to amazing reversals of expectations/presuppositions: old women bear children, young women are impregnated by the Holy Spirit, Jesus is born into a simple family, Mary's song of praise speaks of reversing the fortunes of the poor and the dispossessed, Jesus' initial preaching speaks of reversing the social order, etc. In fact, the entire gospel can be viewed as a parable of reversal.

[31] There is no explicit mention of God in the parable, nor is there the phrase common to parables, "The reign of God is like..." Instead Luke uses the characters of the Lawyer, Priest, Levite, and Samaritan to speak implicitly of ethnic-cultural-religious issues and God-like actions.

(1) *Contrasts*: Luke compares action with inaction: the violence of the crime against the traveller is contrasted with the inaction of the religious figures, and their inaction is further contrasted with the care, compassion, and generosity of the Samaritan. Luke contrasts legalism with compassion/mercy.

(2) *Metaphors*: The motif of the question appears to be an operating metaphor in the narrative, a metaphor that requires a response from the reader as much as from the Lawyer in the text. The reader is challenged to enter into the story by way of the Lawyer's second question and interact with the reversals and revelations of the parable. The reader is also invited to answer Jesus' concluding question.

In emphasizing the role of the reader/hearer Scott observes that "the world [i.e., horizon of meaning] of the hearer is questioned by the world of the parable."[32] He concluded that the reader is left to decide among three scenarios: (1) to identify with the Samaritan; (2) to identify with the victim (to "get into the ditch"); or (3) to withdraw from the parable world.[33]

A study of this text from the perspective of the Mediterranean values of honor and shame also shows the motif of the question as an operating metaphor. The technique demonstrates that the Lawyer's question "is no innocent request for information, but a challenge..."[34] In a culture where questions challenge, Jesus' response of a question to a question establishes his honor. In fact, a careful study of the text indicates that the Lawyer asks Jesus two questions (10:25,29), neither of which Jesus answers directly. In like manner, Jesus asks the Lawyer three questions (10:26[2x],36), all of which the Lawyer answers. In a verbal joust of questions, the Lukan Jesus twice maintains his honor, while the Lawyer is shamed.

From the perspectives of cultural anthropology and literary criticism (reader-response) the metaphor of the question controls the development of the narrative world, in particular, Lukan characterization.[35] Not only does the Lukan Jesus maintain honor in the face of a double challenge, but this Jesus stands as a reliable character, one who can be trusted, who expresses the point of view of God.[36]

(3) *Ethnicity and characterization*: Luke's narrative world provides the rules within which his story operates—a world that includes the introduction of stereotypical characterization. In 9:51-56 Luke introduced Samaritans into his story. They were portrayed as inhospitable, confirming conventional Jewish perceptions. However, succeeding narratives (10:30-37; 17:11-19; Acts 8:4-25) serve to replace the initial rules, and introduce elements of suspense, change, and conflict.

The entire Samaritan parable is grounded in the root metaphor of Samaritan compassion/mercy. The metaphor requires the reader to realign reality, to relin-

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32 B. B. Scott, *Jesus, Symbol Maker for the Kingdom* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), 31.

33 Ibid., 31.

34 B. J. Malina and J. H. Neyrey, "Honor and Shame in Luke-Acts: Pivotal Values of the Mediterranean World," in *The Social World of Luke-Acts: Models for Interpretation*, ed. by J. H. Neyrey (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1991), 51.

35 Gowler notes that "characters in ancient literature are virtually incomprehensible without a clear understanding of the cultural processes which influence the text." See D. B. Gowler, "Characterization in Luke: A Socio-Narratological Approach," *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 19:2 (1989):54.

36 Powell, "The Religious Leaders in Luke," 97, 101.

quish old worldviews, and presuppositions grounded in the dualism of right and wrong, clean and unclean, idolater and believer. In the end, Samaritan compassion/mercy supplants Lawyer legalism just as it had supplanted Priest and Levite legalism. The root metaphor of compassion/mercy transforms ethnic-cultural-religious stereotypes, eliminating old presuppositions for a new worldview: the honor/respect associated with the roles of Lawyer, Priest, Levite has been tarnished and discredited in the light of steadfast legalism, and the hatred, enemy status associated with the Samaritan has been transformed by God-like actions of compassion/mercy.

Samaritan is an ethnic marker, not an economic marker for Luke, demonstrated by the use of and interest in Samaritans in both the gospel and Acts. The first encounter with Samaritans, strategically placed at the beginning of the travel narrative (9:51-56), seductively panders on Jewish/Samaritan xenophobia. The picture of the Samaritans as inhospitable "because he set his face toward Jerusalem" confirms both Jewish and Samaritan prejudices of one another. However, the traditional picture of ethnic-cultural-religious prejudice is short-lived. Within the contours of Jesus' ministry, things are not always what they "were"—the story world of Luke evolves as a world upside-down. Luke's LOC demonstrates that the old ways/beliefs the Lawyer sought to preserve/manage are judged too narrow, to prejudicial.[37]

The description of the Samaritan in the parable is not that of one "disadvantaged" or "oppressed." To Luke's readers the Samaritan is a hated foreigner, but a foreigner not suffering from economic impoverishment. Within the story world the Samaritan has the money, as well as the compassion, to underwrite the expenses of the injured traveller. Not only has the stereotypic depiction of "Samaritan," described and implied in 9:51-56 been shattered, but the character the reader was prepared to ignore, neglect, and despise, is transformed through action as one whose economic status is solid and whose God-like compassion transcends ethnic-cultural-religious barriers.

Frequently, the reverse implications of the Samaritan/victim relationship in this story are neglected. Just as Luke turns the tables on the reader by shattering stereotypic characterization of the Samaritan as hated enemy, Luke does the same with the victim. The under-developed character of the victim is three times "brutalized" in the story: first, he is mugged; second, he is ignored by the Priest and the Levite; third, he is rescued by an enemy (the implication is that the victim is a Jew). While the story explicitly deals with the incident by placing the character of the Samaritan in relief, the story, though implied, from the victim's view is just as startling. His rescuer is one of enemy status. Dramatically, the victim's vulnerability to the robbers is quickly replaced by abandonment by religious leaders (Priest and Levite), ultimately leaving him vulnerable to an enemy Samaritan. Triple jeopardy for the victim results in a reversal of expectations, as well as characterization developed within unexpected parameters. The fact that commentators routinely speak to Luke's revolutionary portrayal of the Samaritan, and ignore the other characters speaks more to how we have come to understand Samaritan-Jewish relations in the first century CE. However, I suggest that Luke's depiction of the religious leaders in a mode of self-justification and legalism provides Luke with the opportunity to challenge readers on a

[37] For the "management style" of the religious leaders in Luke see Powell, "The Religious Leaders in Luke," 101.

yet different level—the Priest and Levite treat the robbery victim in the same way Jews treat Samaritans—ignored and neglected.

Luke's characters in this two-part story develop along simple, understated lines. In fact, "The most obvious and superficial way to render characters is in terms of external details."[38] Every character in Luke's story, except the victim, is defined in terms of externals: Lawyer, Jesus (Teacher), Priest, Levite, and Samaritan. The external details are ethnic-cultural-religious markers that determine social function and role, exposing Luke's sleight-of-hand in developing his characters.

(4) *Systems of convictions*: There appear to be conflicting systems of convictions at work in this narrative. It seems reasonable to speak of a scripture-centered convictional system for the lawyer and the figures of the Priest and Levite, a system in which fidelity to the prescriptions of the Law transcends other obligations. The Samaritan represents a system of convictions that we might call God-centered, since the compassion/mercy and selflessness of the Samaritan simulates qualities associated with God in the traditional sources.

(5) *Culture lock*: Letty Russell describes partnership as "a new focus of relationship in which there is continuing commitment and common struggle in interaction with a wider community context."[39] Luke's characters—Lawyer, Priest, Levite, and Samaritan—illustrate that the habitual ways of relating to people (traditional, ethnic-cultural-religious stereotypes) and understanding what is going on no longer work because people and reality have changed.

Luke's narrative strikes at "culture lock,"[40] the fear of change, the fear of the loss of ethnic-cultural-religious attitudes and values. It attempts to break a system of convictions that is closed—a system that Luke views as safe, regulated, small—to move beyond established limits of concern to include the sinner, the poor, the enemy.[41] If what a community talks about is what it cares about, then this parable is prescriptive of the transformation required of Luke's community. Luke's Samaritan compassion/mercy envisions a community that cultivates partnership with an enlarged world, rooted in a compassionate and merciful God, open to reversals and revelation.

*Visiting Mary and Martha*

It has been said that Luke, alone among the Synoptics, brings an inclusive worldview to his framework of the gospel—*all* manner of people interact with Jesus. One of his favorite strategies is to follow a story of a man (men) with a story of a woman (women) or vice versa. This section of the gospel is an example of that technique. The story of four men (six, if Jesus and the Lawyer are counted) is followed by a vignette of two women, Martha and Mary, and Jesus.

The story of these women is one that feminist scholars initially looked to as an exemplar of a more inclusive biblical vision of women, only to discover that the

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38 T. M. Leitch, *What Stories Are: Narrative Theory and Interpretation* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986), 154.

39 *The Future of Partnership* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1979), 18. In another work she notes, "Partnership is an authority of freedom that uses people's need for solidarity and care to empower them through a relationship of mutuality." See *Household of Freedom: Authority in Feminist Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1987), 92.

40 Russell, The Future of Partnership, 102.

41 Tannehill, The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts, 180.

text supports androcentric presuppositions and patriarchal interests[42]—the account portrays women as "listening to his teaching (word)" (*ēkouen ton logon autou*, v. 39) and "serving" (*diakonian, diakonein*, v. 40).[43] Traditional scholarship provides at least three different understandings of the text: (1) the abstractionist interpretation reduces the women to theological principles or types, i.e. justification of works and justification of faith, this world and the world to come (Augustine), or the active and the contemplative life in this world (Origen), etc.;[44] (2-A) the polarization interpretation supports a "good woman vs. bad woman" polemic;[45] (2-B) the apologetic feminist interpretation, also a polarization model, celebrates Mary's role as a rabbinical student or disciple, seated at the feet of Jesus the rabbi.[46] This interpretation, however, pits the role of Jewish women over against that of Christian women, the housewife over against the disciple. The apologetic feminist interpretation is as flawed as the first two examples. In all three interpretations, the story is understood only in terms of dualities, pitting one woman against another, one religion against another, one ideology against another; and (3) the interpretive principle argues, following R. Akiba, "Every section of scripture is explained by the one that stands next to it." (*Sifre on Num.* 131). Using this principle, the text is understood in terms of the Torah prescriptions that introduce the Samaritan story. Scholars have repeatedly argued that if 10:25-37 is about the second great commandment, "love your neighbor," then the story of Martha and Mary is about the first great commandment, "love God."[47]

Increasingly, readers have difficulty with this familial episode. Not only does the text offer a picture of patriarchal structures and competing roles, but it leaves

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42 Elizabeth Schussler Fiorenza's recent article on Luke 10:38-42, is illustrative of a position that refuses to white-wash what has been perceived to be a "woman's" text in order to save it as a non-patriarchal example of biblical writing. On the contrary, Fiorenza understands the Martha and Mary story as a patriarchal text because it "reinforces the societal and ecclesiastical polarization of women." See "A Feminist Critical Interpretation for Liberation: Martha and Mary: Lk. 10:38-42," *Religion and Intellectual Life* 3 (1986), 33.

43 Fiorenza notes, "Since the text does not directly refer to a meal or specifically to "serving at table" but has the more general expressions *diakonian, diakonein*, the...reading cannot be justified by reference to a meal. Moreover, the climactic word of Jesus does not mention *diakonia* or *diakonein* but reproaches Martha because she is anxious and troubled about many things." Ibid., 25.

Later in the article she adds that the term *diakonia* and *diakonein*, in Luke's time, had already become "technical terms for ecclesial leadership. ...In early Christian usage *diakonia* refers to eucharistic table service in the house church, but is not restricted to it since it also included the proclamation of the word."

She also notes the parallels between the Martha and Mary text and Acts 6:1-6, "Just as Martha complains that Mary leaves (*katalipein*) the *diakonein* to her in order to listen to the word (*ton logon*) of the *Kyrios*, so the twelve apostles maintain that they cannot leave (*katalipein*) the word (*ton logon*) of God in order to serve (*diakonein*) at tables...", 30.

44 Ibid., 26-27.

45 Ibid., 27.

46 "Mary is a disciple of Jesus dedicated to listening to his word. Unlike any Jewish Rabbi, Jesus accepts women as disciples studying the Torah but rejects the role of housewife as women's proper role." Ibid., 28.

47 Charles Talbert, *Reading Luke: A Literary and Theological Commentary on the Third Gospel* (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 125; Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke*, 450-51; Fitzmyer, The Gospel According to Luke X-XXIV, 892.

the reader suspended in a story world in which Luke often accompanies "mention of women by a reference to some negative aspect of their character."[48]

As the account opens the travel narrative continues and Jesus enters a village. Alone, he enters a house, and is received as a guest (v. 38). Luke consistently refers to Jesus as *kurios*[49] in this text, a curious alteration because the two women are given proper names. Luke introduces the reader to small town family life, focusing on two sisters: "a woman named Martha received him as a guest," "she had a sister called Mary, who sat at the Lord's (*kuriou*) feet and listened to his teaching."[50] Unlike John's gospel, where the sisters are also mentioned in relation to family life, in Luke, Martha and Mary "are known only in terms of the interior of their house where Jesus is their guest."[51] Mary's introduction comes *only* in relation to her sister Martha. In v. 40 Luke reintroduces Martha, adding details about her, "Martha was distracted with much serving (*diakonian*)." The text already hints at friction—the story is told through Martha, Mary assumes the posture of subordination, and Martha is distracted.

The remaining verses come as something of a surprise to the reader. Martha's vexation with Mary is directed toward the Kurios (Lord), the guest, "...and she went to him and said, 'Lord, do you not care that my sister has left me to serve alone? Tell her to help me.'" (v. 40) Social convention would dictate that family squabbles be suspended in the presence of a guest, however Luke sets aside such conventions to focus on the conflict that now includes the Kurios. From the beginning of this short story Martha has enjoyed an egalitarian relationship with the guest, but in appealing to the Kurios for help she trades an egalitarian relationship for a dependency relationship.[52]

On one level the reader might be tempted to read this story as an example of sibling rivalry which includes the customary request to the parent for justice. But in v. 40, Martha, the independent, out-spoken woman who argues for her interest,[53] relinquishes that role, and does not speak again in the story. Martha had the first word, but the Kurios will have the last. Like her sister Mary, after v. 40 Martha no longer has a voice in the story.

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48 E.g., 1:7, Elizabeth is barren; 1:34, Mary is unmarried; 2:36, Anna is a widow; 3:19, Herodias; 4:26, a widow of Zarephath; 4:38, Simon's ill mother-in-law; 7:13, a widow with a dead son; 7:37, woman who was a sinner; 8:2-3, women healed and exorcised (Mary Magdalene); 10:38-42, Mary and Martha; 11:27, blessing of an unnamed woman; 13:11, woman with an eighteen year infirmity; 17:32, Lot's wife; 18:3, a widow; 21:2, a poor widow; 23:27, weeping women; 24:10, Mary Magdalene, Joanna, and Mary deliver the message of the resurrection, are not believed.

"This is a literary device used throughout the gospel of Luke to present women as both weak and sinful. Luke also describes the role of the women as providing for Jesus and the twelve materially. This is likewise a Lukan device, found in a number of passages, to restrict the ministry of women to one of providing financial aid, omitting any reference to women exercising a ministry of proclamation." E. M. Tetlow, *Women and Ministry in the New Testament* (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 103.

49 "That Luke 10:38-42 is generated by and addressed to a situation in the life of the early church rather than in the life of Jesus is linguistically signaled by the title *kyrios*." Fiorenza, *A Feminist Critical Interpretation for Liberation*, 29-30.

50 Fiorenza rightly notes, "It is usually overlooked that Mary's discipleship does only include listening but not proclamation." Ibid., 29.

51 Malina and Neyrey, "Honor and Shame in Luke-Acts," 62.

52 Fiorenza, "A Feminist Critical Interpretation for Liberation," 29.

53 Martha is the only sister who speaks, Mary remains silent throughout the narrative.

The "Lord's" response to Martha (vv. 41-42), "affirms" both women and offers Martha a riddle. The Kyrios affirms that Martha is anxious and troubled, and offers a riddle about "one thing necessary."[54] However, just as Mary was introduced in relation to Martha, she is affirmed through her sister. Abruptly, the story ends, and the reader is left to ponder the riddle, the conflict, and Mary's silence.

After a first reading of this text, it looks as though Luke has framed the story of two women in terms of social convention, positioning one sister against the other to make a point—Martha, the welcoming homemaker is absorbed with "serving," a socially acceptable occupation for a woman in that culture, and a position common to women in Luke's gospel (cf. 4:39; 8:3). Mary is presented as a "learner," an occupation restricted to men in the culture. Is Martha's vexation with Mary a result of a struggle with social conventions? On one level, it is. It deals with what is possible and acceptable in a given social world. If so, what is Luke's point? Does it challenge or reinforce social conventions about women?[55]

In light of this first reading, what can be said about this text? On the one hand, the text yields information in terms of cultural anthropology and literary design. On the other hand, the text (Luke's LOC) remains difficult, puzzling, and disappointing.

(1) *Patterns, speech, silence*: The language of the text is at once simple and enigmatic. Things are not necessarily what they seem. With short, compact phrases Luke introduces the three characters, and presents the conflict. Unlike the Samaritan story in which every character is named in terms of ethnic-cultural-religious titles, Luke chooses to use proper names for the women characters and a title for Jesus.

Amazingly, almost one-half of the narrative is composed of direct address that is prescriptive rather than descriptive. In both cases of direct address, Martha's and the "Lord's," there is an appeal that is designed to bring about a change of circumstances. Martha wants the "Lord's help and the "Lord" wants Martha's understanding.

As noted in the Samaritan story, questions often function as a narrative challenge in a cultural world governed by values of honor and shame. In this text, though, Martha's question functions not as a challenge to Jesus' honor, as much as it serves to introduce her directive to Jesus (v. 40). Jesus' response ignores both the question and Martha's request. Once again, Jesus' response takes the narrative in a new direction—in the contest with the Lawyer, Jesus tells a story and has the last word, in the exchange with Martha, Jesus' retort also concludes the episode. What does Jesus' response mean? Is it an affirmation of both women, or is it patronizing language from an authority figure aimed to end the conversation?

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[54] This text is not only enigmatic, the textual tradition offers six variant readings. For a review of the textual tradition see Talbert, *Reading Luke*, 125-26; Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke*, 452-53.

[55] Malina and Neyrey argue that the home—private, domestic space—is exactly the place women are most often found in Luke (1:24; 1:40-43; 4:38-39; 8:49-52; 10:38-42; 15:8-10). "The expected place of Mary ... is with Martha in the women's part of that household, the kitchen; she is not expected in the dining area, and so her presence there requires a special explanation. Jesus' remark to Martha serves to vindicate Mary's exceptional presence in space not expected of her; the story consciously upsets the native perception of how things ought to be." See, "Honor and Shame in Luke-Acts," 62.

Lost in all of this is the fact that Mary's language is that of "position." She is the focus of both direct address exchanges; she is talked about, but never to; unlike Martha, Mary never speaks for her own interests. Mary, the woman without a voice is the woman whose narrative description puts her at odds with gender-cultural-religious conventions. Luke's choice of silence for her renders her character and her "position" defenseless and powerless in a world of "speech." Mary is not unlike the voiceless victim of the Samaritan story. Her position renders her a victim. Even though scholarship has long argued that Mary, sitting at the Kyrios' feet, is representative of discipleship, she is never given voice. In Luke's story world, be it the gospel or Acts, discipleship always leads to proclamation. Mary sits (learns) but is never given the voice of proclamation.

(2) *Metaphors*: One of the reasons this text has been such a mystery for scholars is that there seem to be opposing metaphors at work in the narrative. On the one hand there is the metaphor of speech and action that, in speaking for its own position, brings conflict to the fore. This is a metaphor that the reader can actively interact with since it is explicit. On the other hand there is the metaphor of silence and listening that imposes its own restraints on the reader.

Rimmon-Kenan notes that "Narrative texts keep implicitly promising the reader the great prize of understanding—later."[56] However, in this short narrative, the prize could remain unclaimed. Unlike the Samaritan story, where the opposing metaphors of legalism and compassion/mercy demanded that the reader make a choice, a choice carefully guided by Luke's narrative design, in the story of Martha and Mary the reader is left to wrestle with opposing positions and opposing models; in favoring one there is the risk of abandoning the other.

(3) *Systems of convictions*: Just as there seem to be opposing metaphors at work in this text, there are opposing systems of convictions. One system of convictions supports the "serving/speech" model, the other the "listening/silence" model. Both convictional systems are sustainable in a faith community as long as one is not seen as subservient to the other, but as equal parts of the whole.

(4) *Gender and stereotypes*: Unlike the Samaritan story where there was a rejection of ethnic-cultural-religious stereotypes, and a re-visioning of patterns of partnership in the community of faith, the reader of this text is given a text without a proper/adequate resolution and is left to ponder the state of the Lukan community, given the dense and paradoxical rhetoric of this story. Without the narrative vehicle of the parable, Luke's brave challenges to stereotypes stand empty and disappointing. Just as the Samaritan text is about ethnicity, the Martha-Mary text is about gender.

## Conclusions

Communities, like individuals, often become what they understand themselves to be. The reader of this section of Luke witnesses two different stories that are part of the larger "language" of the Lukan community. Should it be so inconceivable that Luke's understanding of the kerygma, can on the one hand forcefully and effectively call for the eradication of certain ethnic-cultural-religious stereotypes such as racism and classism, and on the other hand be so puzzled and paralyzed when it comes to gender stereotypes and sexism? Clearly, any discussion of "isms" arises from twentieth century interests. However, the

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56 Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, *Narrative Fiction* (London: Methuen, 1983), 125.

language of Luke's text indicates that Luke (the community) felt free to use/create Jesus stories to challenge the "culture lock" of a worldview narrowed by fear and prejudice. It also demonstrates that Luke's LANGUAGE OF COMMUNITY is a metaphoric world in process. It is a community struggling with and caught in the tension between "revelation" and "tradition," a community without adequate responses to some basic problems that plague it.

# ΠΙΣΤΙΣ and Pauline Christology: What Is at Stake?

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Were there a Purgatory—though those of us who live and work in Paul's theological world have reason to suppose there is not—sinful scholars would surely be assigned the purifying ordeal of reading their own dissertations. Those who had especially many sins to atone for would be given the task of reworking their dissertations (perhaps, Sisyphus-like, ever anew) to conform to the wisdom conferred by experience. For my many sins, the Pauline Theology Group has given me a foretaste of purgatorial fire by asking me to revisit the question of how to interpret Paul's notoriously enigmatic expression πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

The discussion has moved forward significantly in the ten years since I completed my book *The Faith of Jesus Christ*,[1] and there have been several important new contributions to the debate.[2] Many interpreters of Paul have become convinced that the genitive in πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ should be understood to be subjective,[3] but others, such as J. D. G. Dunn, remain unconvinced, preferring

[1] R. B. Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ: An Investigation of the Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1-4:11 (SBLDS 56; Chico: Scholars, 1983). The dissertation was completed in 1981.

[2] Especially noteworthy are D. M. Hay, "Pistis as 'Ground for Faith' in Hellenized Judaism and Paul," *JBL* 108 (1989) 461-76; M. D. Hooker, "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ," *NTS* 35 (1989) 321-42 [her 1988 SNTS Presidential Address]; L. E. Keck, "'Jesus' in Romans," JBL 108 (1989) 443-60; and a series of important articles by S. K. Williams: "Again *Pistis Christou*," *CBQ* 49 (1987) 431-47; "Justification and the Spirit in Galatians," *JSNT* 29 (1987); "Promise in Galatians: A Reading of Paul's Reading of Scripture," *JBL* 107 (1988) 709-20; and "The Hearing of Faith: ΑΚΟΗ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΣ in Galatians 3," *NTS* 35 (1989) 82-93.

[3] Without presuming to offer a comprehensive bibliographical survey, I note the following supporters of this view who have taken a position on the question since 1981 (for earlier literature, see Hays, *Faith of Jesus Christ*, 139-91, and George Howard, "On the 'Faith of Christ,'" *HTR* 60 [1967] 459-65; idem, "The Faith of Christ," *ExpTim* 85 [1974] 212-15): B. Byrne, Reckoning with Romans (Wilmington, DE: Glazier, 1986) 79-80; D. Campbell, "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ: A New Solution," (paper read in SBL Pauline Epistles Section, 1990); C. B. Cousar, *A Theology of the Cross: The Death of Jesus in the Pauline Letters* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990) 39-40; T. L. Donaldson, "The 'Curse of the Law' and the Inclusion of the Gentiles: Galatians 3.13-14," *NTS* 32 (1986) 94-112; L. Gaston, Paul and the Torah (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), especially p. 12; B. R. Gaventa, "The Singularity of the Gospel: A Reading of Galatians," *SBLSP* (1988) 17-26; G. Howard, *Paul: Crisis in Galatia*, 2nd ed. (SNTSMS 35; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); L. T. Johnson, "Romans 3:21-26 and the Faith of Jesus," *CBQ* 44 (1982) 77-90; R. N. Longenecker, *Galatians* (Word Biblical Commentary; Dallas: Word,

instead the objective genitive interpretation: that πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ refers to "faith in Jesus Christ," the Christian's act of "faith directed toward Christ as the object."[4]

Indeed, at the 1988 meeting of the Pauline Theology Group, Prof. Dunn, observing the pronounced shift in North American scholarship towards the "faith of Jesus Christ" position, compared this movement to the headlong rush of the Gerasene swine into the sea. In response, I likened him to the Gerasene swineherds who begged Jesus to go away and leave them alone. (Clearly, the *kairos* for judgment was at hand.) The steering committee of this group decided to ask Prof. Dunn and me to elucidate our disagreement in a manner somewhat more exegetical and somewhat less dependent on typological interpretation of Mark 5. Hence, the present essay.

## I. Framing the Question

Upon rereading *The Faith of Jesus Christ* ten years later, I remain unrepentant concerning the central theses of my earlier work:[5] Paul's theology must be understood as the explication and defense of a gospel whose fundamental character is *narrative*. The gospel story depicts Jesus as the divinely commissioned protagonist who gives himself up to death on a cross in order to liberate humanity from bondage (Gal 1:4, 2:20, 3:13-14, 4:4-7). His death, in obedience to the will of God, is simultaneously a loving act of faithfulness (πίστις) to God and the decisive manifestation of God's faithfulness to his covenant promise to Abraham. Paul's uses of πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ and other similar phrases should be understood as summary allusions to this story,[6] referring to Jesus' fidelity in carrying out this mission. Consequently, the emphasis in Paul's theology lies less on the question of how we should dispose ourselves towards God than on the

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1990) 87-88, 93-94, 145; J. L. Martyn, "Events in Galatia: Modified Covenantal Nomism versus God's Invasion of the Cosmos in the Singular Gospel: Response to Dunn and Gaventa," in J. Bassler (ed.) *Pauline Theology*, Volume 1 (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991); M. L. Soards, "Assessing Paul's 'Faith' Talk in Galatians," (paper read in SBL Pauline Epistles Section, 1989; forthcoming in JAAR); S. K. Stowers, "Ἐκ πίστεως and διὰ τῆς πίστεως in Romans 3:30," *JBL* 108 (1989) 665-74; B. Witherington III, "The Influence of Galatians on Hebrews," *NTS* 36 (1990); also the articles of Hooker, Keck, and Williams, (see n. 2 above). The NRSV has now given "the faith of Jesus Christ" a place in the footnotes as an alternative translation.

[4] Dunn, *Romans 1-8*, (Word Biblical Commentary; Dallas: Word, 1988) 178. Others continuing to assert the "traditional" (since Luther) objective genitive interpretation include J. Barclay, *Obeying the Truth: A Study of Paul's Ethics in Galatians* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988); F. F. Bruce, *Commentary on Galatians* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982; C. H. Cosgrove, *The Cross and the Spirit: A Study in the Argument and Theology of Galatians* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1988); R. Y. K. Fung, The Epistle to the Galatians (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988); G. W. Hansen, *Abraham in Galatians* (JSNTSup 29; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989); A. Hultgren, "The Pistis Christou Formulations in Paul," *NovT* 22 (1980) 248-63; W. Johnson, "The Paradigm of Abraham in Galatians 3:6-9," *TrinJ* 8 NS (1987) 179-99; S. Westerholm, *Israel's Law and the Church's Faith* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988); Of course, all the older standard commentaries on Romans and Galatians represent the objective genitive interpretation.

[5] I am, however, somewhat repentant about the methodological overkill of the piece. Some of the methodological preliminaries I would now gladly consign to the flames.

[6] In the terminology of the dissertation, following Northrop Frye, the summarizing phrase encapsulates the *dianoia* of the story: its overall sense, in contrast to its *mythos* (plot line).

question of how God has acted in Christ to effect our deliverance. Indeed, this last sentence is a tolerable summary of the message of Paul's letter to the Galatians.

I must, in all candor, confess some puzzlement that these theses can be regarded as controversial. Nevertheless, many learned readers of Paul disagree vigorously with some or all of these claims. How is the disagreement to be resolved? Should my earlier arguments be revised, supplemented, or improved? What is at stake in the debate?

While my trip into the purgatorial flames of retrospection has not caused me to recant my basic position, it has indeed led me to see some ways in which my arguments were incomplete or poorly formulated. The ongoing discussion of Pauline theology—within this group and elsewhere—has brought several matters into clearer focus since the writing of *The Faith of Jesus Christ*, and I have learned a number of things from specific critiques of my work. With the wisdom of hindsight, I see six areas in which my presentation of the evidence requires refinement and elaboration. They are as follows: (1) The cultural/semantic background of Paul's πίστις language. (2) The contingent circumstances of the letters to the Galatians and to the Romans; the analysis of the πίστις Χριστοῦ question must explain how this language functions within Paul's response to the politically sensitive Jew/Gentile issues that elicited these letters. (3) Christological passages in the letters that, without explicitly using πίστις language, clarify Paul's conception of the significance of Jesus' death. (4) The apocalyptic character of Paul's thought. (5) Intertextual echoing of the OT as a generative factor in Paul's theology. (6) Paul's insistence that the gospel constitutes the fulfillment of God's covenant promises to Israel.[7]

When our question is located within the framework of these broader considerations, it becomes possible to give a more complete and satisfying account of the meaning of πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ in Pauline theology. In the present essay, I do not attempt a systematic discussion of the above six topics (to do so would produce another book at least as long as the dissertation); instead, I offer a programmatic sketch of the way in which I now believe the question should be approached, considering the handful of πίστις Χριστοῦ passages in a way that is attentive to these factors. I shall concentrate primarily on Romans, for three simple reasons: (1) the Pauline Theology Group is moving towards the study of Romans over the next two years; (2) I dealt with Romans only glancingly in *Faith of Jesus Christ*; and (3) Romans gives us the best chance of placing the contested phrase in its proper theological context.

Little is to be gained by rehearsing the familiar arguments about syntax. I stand by my earlier judgment that the balance of grammatical evidence strongly favors the subjective genitive interpretation and that the arguments for an objective genitive are relatively weak.[8] Such arguments are, however, finally inconclusive. The objective genitive is a possible construal, and it is certainly possible to find passages where Paul does apparently use the verb πιστεύειν with Χριστὸν

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[7] See the important essays by N. T. Wright, *The Climax of the Covenant* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1991).

[8] See *Faith of Jesus Christ*, 164. For detailed evidence, see Howard's early essays on the topic (n. 3, above). The recent exchange between Hultgren ("*Pistis Christou* Formulations") and Williams ("Again *Pistis Christou*," ) demonstrates again how firmly the lexical and syntactical arguments weigh in favor of the subjective genitive.

Ἰησοῦν as its object (Gal 2:16).[9] Our interpretative decision about the meaning of Paul's phrase, therefore, is inevitably going to be governed by larger judgments about the shape and logic of Paul's thought concerning faith, Christ, and salvation. What is required is an attempt to understand how πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ functions within the construction of Paul's arguments. The following survey, then, is offered not as a definitive exegesis of the pertinent passages but as a "reading," seeking to show how the subjective genitive makes sense out of the texts.

## II. Πίστις Χριστοῦ in Romans

For methodological reasons, the investigation should begin with Paul's Letter to the Romans.[10] Because Paul had not founded the Roman church(es?) and had not previously taught there, his letter must set forth a relatively self-explanatory exposition of the gospel. Though he presupposes that the Romans do know a number of things about Jesus and the gospel[11]—he is, after all, writing to Roman Christians to whom he can say ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν καταγγέλεται ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ (Rom 1:8)—he cannot rely upon the signifying power of the compressed, allusive formulations that he employs in Galatians to remind his readers of his own earlier preaching. Thus, we have a better chance of grasping Paul's πίστις language if we "take our seat in the Roman congregation," as J. Louis Martyn might recommend, and listen to the way in which the discussion unfolds.

**A. Faith-obedience (1:5).** In Rom 1:5, we encounter the thematic phrase ὑπακοὴ πίστεως, which is certainly to be understood as an epexegetical construction virtually equating the two nouns. Paul has received his apostleship from Jesus Christ "to bring about faith-obedience among all the Gentiles." Thus, from the letter's first sentence we find obedience and faith closely correlated. We also find that ὑπακοὴ πὶστεως evidently describes a particular response to the proclaimed gospel. This supposition is confirmed by Paul's thanksgiving in 1:8 that "your faith," (i.e., the faith of the Roman Christians) is widely known. Similarly, in 1:12, where Paul hopes that "we may be mutually encouraged by each other's faith," Paul thinks of πίστις, whatever its precise nuance, as an attribute or disposition characterizing the members of the church. Similar usages are to be found in 11:20, 14:1, and throughout chapter 4 (re: Abraham).

**B. From faith for faith (1:17).** The next reference to πίστις, a crucial one for our purposes, appears in Paul's programmatic formulation of the gospel (1:16-17), where it is anchored by his citation of Hab 2:4. The fundamental assertion comes first: the gospel is "the power of God for salvation to everyone who believes (πάντι τῷ πιστεύοντι), to the Jew first and also to the Greek." Paul here articulates four key motifs: (a) the gospel as God's saving power, (b) the importance of human response in faith, (c) the priority of Israel in God's saving design, and (d) the inclusion of the Gentiles. Following in v 17 is the warrant for the

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[9] This has always been the strongest evidence in favor of the objective genitive interpretation. See now, however, Williams' very provocative discussion of this passage ("Again *Pistis Christou*," 442-44).

[10] In *Faith of Jesus Christ*, I deliberately undertook to discuss Galatians because it seemed the more difficult case (cf. p. 170). Here I pursue a different tack.

[11] See the discussion in Keck, "'Jesus' in Romans," for a reconstruction of what Paul assumes they do know.

claims of the previous verse: the righteousness of God is being revealed ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, καθὼς γέγραπται· ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται.

For the purposes of our present discussion, I do not need to argue the case that the ἐκ πίστεως in 1:17a refers to God's faithfulness eschatologicially revealed in the gospel, so that the phrase ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν means "from (God's) faithfulness for (our) faith." Dunn has already marshalled compelling arguments for this interpretation.[12] God's πίστις is his covenant-faithfulness (cf. 3:3), which endures and overcomes all human unfaithfulness. When Paul affirms that the righteousness of God is revealed ἐκ πίστεως, he is pointing to the source of the revelation. The phrase "from faith for faith" then becomes a rhetorically effective slogan to summarize the gospel message of a salvation that originates in God's power and is received trustingly by the beneficiaries of that power. As J. Haussleiter remarked exactly a century ago, the Greek πίστις does not require the writer or reader to make the distinction between "Treue" and "Glaube": both ideas are contained in the single term.[13] The difficulty of appreciating this semantic nuance contributes to the confusion surrounding the whole discussion of the meaning of πίστις in Paul. (A similar reciprocal interplay of divine and human πίστις is found also, e.g., in Philo, De Abr. 273: ὅς τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν πίστεως ἀγάμενος τὸν ἄνδρα πίστιν ἀντιδίδωσιν αὐτῷ, τὴν δι' ὅρκου βεβαίωσιν ὧς ὑπέσχετο δωρεῶν. Here, however, Abraham's faith seems to elicit the divine πίστις rather than, as in Paul, vice-versa.)

**C. The function of the Habakkuk citation.** It should be stressed that Rom 1:17 provides decisive evidence that Paul's use of the peculiar locution ἐκ πίστεως is derived from Hab 2:4. When Paul first introduces the phrase, he explicitly cites the text to show the Romans where it comes from. In a paper presented in last year's Pauline Epistles section, Douglas Campbell pointed out that ἐκ πίστεως occurs in Paul's letters *only* in Romans and Galatians, that is, only in the two letters where he quotes Hab 2:4.[14] This observation supports my earlier suggestion that ἐκ πίστεως is an exegetical catchphrase that alludes to the Habbakuk text. Once the phrase is established within the theological vocabulary of a particular letter, it can be used in contexts that have nothing to do with the exegesis of Habakkuk (e.g., Rom 14:23), but it surely originates in Paul's reading of the prophetic passage.

Equally crucial, and certainly more controversial, is the suggestion that Paul understands Hab 2:4 as a messianic prophecy now brought to fulfillment through the death and resurrection of Jesus.[15] This is one interpretative proposal in *Faith of Jesus Christ* that has encountered much skepticism, even from critics who otherwise found the book's argument persuasive. It seems to me, however, that in Romans 1 we find a number of factors that encourage us to give this messianic hypothesis a serious hearing.

Paul's quotation of Hab 2:4 in Rom 1:17 supports his assertion that the righteousness of God is revealed in the gospel (taking the antecedent of αὐτῷ to be τὸ εὐαγγέλιον in 1:16). How, we should ask ourselves, is the righteousness of God revealed in the gospel? In the opening of the letter, Paul declares that the

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[12] Romans 1-8, 44.

[13] J. Haussleiter, "Der Glaube Jesu Christi und der christliche Glaube," *NKZ* 2 (1891) 136.

[14] "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ," (see n. 3 above).

[15] This position is also defended by Campbell, "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ," on the basis of contextual considerations.

εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ was "prepromised (προεπηγγείλατο) through his prophets in holy writings concerning his Son, ... Jesus Christ our Lord" (1:1-4).[16] Thus, when we find a prophetic holy writing (Hab 2:4) quoted as the epigraph to Paul's exposition of the gospel, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Paul regards this text as a prefiguration of God's Son. If so, then Jesus Christ would be the means of the revelation of God's righteousness ἐκ πίστεως (see below on Rom 3:21-26).

This interpretation would be particularly attractive if it could be shown (1) that Hab 2:4 was already understood in first-century Judaism as a messianic prophecy and/or (2) that ὁ δίκαιος was an established epithet for the eschatological deliverer.

(1) The first of these proposals was defended in *Faith of Jesus Christ* (pp. 151-56); to my arguments there should be added the observations of August Strobel, *Untersuchungen zum eschatologischen Verzögerungsproblem auf Grund der spätjudisch-urchristlichen Geschichte von Habakuk 2,2ff*,[17] and now also D.-A. Koch, "Der Text von Hab 2.4b in der Septuaginta und im Neuen Testament,"[18] both of whom accept the position, already taken by T. W. Manson, C. H. Dodd, and A. T. Hanson, that the LXX has rendered the text of Hab 2:2-4 in a way that shows unmistakable signs of a messianic interpretation.

(2) The second proposal, that ὁ δίκαιος is a common messianic title, seems to me to be beyond dispute. In addition to the clear NT evidence (Acts 3:14, 7:52, 22:14, 1 Pet 3:18 [echoing Isa 53:11], and 1 John 2:1—I leave aside the disputed Pauline passages), we have evidence in the Similitudes of Enoch (see 1 Enoch 38:2, 53:6; cf also 39:6, 46:3, 48:2, 62:5ff) of a figure called the Righteous One who appears at the scene of eschatological judgment as a revealer and executor of divine justice. Since I have gathered these texts and discussed their exegesis in an essay elsewhere,[19] I will not repeat my arguments here. An intriguing additional piece of evidence is to be found in Ecclesiastes Rabbah on Eccl 3:9 ("What gain has the worker from his toil?"):

> Solomon said: Since there are times for all things, what advantage has the labourer in his work and the upright man in his uprightness?...R. Isaac b. R. Marion said: *But the righteous shall live by his faith* (Hab. II, 4) means that even the Righteous One who lives for ever lives from His faith.[20]

This text, of course, is to be dated much later than Romans, and its interpretation is certainly open to dispute. Still, it is interesting because it appears to demonstrate a rabbinic exegetical tradition in which Hab 2:4 is understood as a

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[16] Most commentators prefer to connect the phrase περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ (v 3) directly back to εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ (v 1). This is a highly artificial interpretation, apparently influenced by the fact that Paul, unlike Matthew and John, does not usually argue that Jesus is the fulfillment of OT prophecy. But this objection fails to reckon with the fact that Paul is probably employing traditional language here. In any case, no hearer of the text of Rom 1:1-4, read aloud, would fail to connect περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ with the immediately preceding phrase ἐν γραφαῖς ἁγίαις.

[17] (NovTSup, 2; Leiden: Brill, 1961) especially pp. 47-56.

[18] *ZNW* 76 (1985) 73 n.25.

[19] "'The Righteous One' as Eschatological Deliverer: A Case Study in Paul's Apocalyptic Hermeneutics," in J. Marcus and M. L. Soards (eds.) *Apocalyptic and the New Testament: Essays in Honor of J. Louis Martyn* (JSNTSup 24; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1988), 191-215.

[20] *Midrash Rabbah* VIII, trans. A. Cohen (London: Soncino, 1939), 83. I am indebted to my student Yong Hwan Kim for this reference.

reference to the Messiah[21] and in which the Messiah's faith (=steadfast uprightness?) is held up as a response to the question of whether there is any advantage in work or uprightness (cf. Rom 3:1).

These arguments are not conclusive, but they do suggest that a messianic interpretation of Hab 2:4 is both historically possible and contextually meaningful in Rom 1:17. It remains to be seen whether the development of Paul's argument will sustain the hypothesis that God's righteousness is somehow revealed through the πίστις of the Righteous One, Jesus Messiah.

**D. The faith of Jesus Christ manifests God's righteousness (3:21-26).** In Rom 1:18-3:20 Paul depicts, in stark contrast to the righteousness of God, the ungodliness and unrighteousness of God's human creatures. Gentile and Jew alike, they have failed to glorify God. With or without the Law, they have turned away into rebellion and delusion. The whole world stands under the wrath of God, subject to God's righteous judgment. In the midst of this devastating indictment of human unrighteousness, Paul pauses to reflect plaintively on the situation of God's chosen people (3:1-20), those who were supposed to be "a priestly kingdom and a holy nation" (Exod 19:6). Tragically, despite the privileges with which they were entrusted (3:2: ἐπιστεύθησαν—note the continuing wordplay), they too have fallen under the power of sin (3:9), as Israel's own Scriptures forcefully attest (3:10-20).

All of this ineluctably forces the critical question that surfaces in 3:3: "Will their faithlessness (ἀπιστία) nullify the faithfulness of God (τὴν πίστιν τοῦ θεοῦ)?" Will God's election of a people turn out to be fruitless? Of course, Paul's question (introduced by μὴ) demands a negative answer. The faithfulness of God—his resolute adherence to his covenant—demands that he be true even if everyone be false. In 3:3-8, Paul emphatically rejects the notion that God's faithfulness can be thwarted, and he asserts three apparently synonymous attributes of God: ἡ πίστις τοῦ θεοῦ, θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη and ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ θεοῦ (3:3,5,7).[22] He does not yet, however, explain how God is to prevail over human unrighteousness. Is it merely through the act of pronouncing condemnation, as 3:9-20 might suggest?

The answer at last comes in Rom 3:21-26. How does God's πίστις/δικαιοσύνη prevail? The righteousness of God has been made manifest (note the perfect tense πεφανέρωται) διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, whom God put forward to demonstrate his own righteousness. This notoriously dense passage contains dozens of exegetical difficulties, but I propose for discussion the following interpretation. God has solved the problem of human unrighteousness and Israel's unfaithfulness by putting forward as a sacrifice the one perfectly faithful human being, Jesus. Though others rebelled and refused to give glory to God, he remained faithful. His death is an act of πίστις: human πίστις—the counterweight to Israel's ἀπιστία—because it is an act of perfect obedience through which many will be made righteous vicariously (5:19), and divine πίστις because it affirms God's unbreakable love: "God proves his love for us in that while we still were sinners Christ died for us" (5:8). (Here we might want to give serious consideration to David Hay's suggestion that πίστις can mean "pledge" or "objective basis for faith": "Jesus is a pledge or assurance from God that makes

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21 Unless the Righteous One here is a reference to God? This would be a very strange reading of the text.

22 See the analysis of this passage in R. B. Hays, "Psalm 143 and the Logic of Romans 3," *JBL* 99 (1980) 107-15.

human faith possible."[23]) Christ's death is—mysteriously—an act of divine love and faithkeeping (cf. 15:8).

The pivotal point in this discussion is the meaning of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. As long as interpreters maintained the notion that this phrase signified a status of righteousness imputed by God to believers, it was possible to make sense of Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ in 3:22 as an objective genitive: the status of righteousness is conferred through the believer's faith in Jesus Christ. (This reading leaves the phrase εἰς πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας as a peculiar redundancy and renders the choice of the verb πεφανέρωται puzzling, but I let these issues pass for now.) However, it should be beyond dispute that the "righteousness" in question in 3:21-22 is God's own righteousness (subjective genitive), just as in 3:3-7 and 3:25-26.[24] Paul is framing an argument concerning theodicy, insisting that God's way of dealing with humanity through the gospel is a manifestation of his justice, not an arbitrary dissolution of his promises to Israel. Romans 3 is a defense of God's justice.[25] Once that point becomes clear, the objective genitive interpretation of πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ becomes virtually unintelligible. What would it mean to say that God's justice has been made manifest through our act of believing in Jesus Christ? This, if it means anything at all, verges on blasphemous absorption in our own religious subjectivity. God's eschatological justice can only have been shown forth by an act of God: Paul's claim is that the death of Jesus is just such an apocalyptic event.

In light of these observations, it is still not easy to decide whether the difficult διὰ (τῆς) πίστεως in 3:25 refers to God's faithfulness (probably not directly), Christ's faithfulness in accepting death on the cross (the likeliest option),[26] or the faith whereby hearers of the gospel receive the atoning benefits of Christ's death (since δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is, after all, manifested εἰς πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας [3:23]). If Paul means the last of these three possibilities, he certainly has not made himself very clear. The emphasis of the whole passage is on God's action in putting forward Jesus Messiah who enacts the faith-obedience that Israel failed to render, who thereby glorifies God as faithless human creatures had failed to do and constitutes, through his resurrection, the beginning of a new humanity (cf. Chaps. 5 and 6),[27] whom God has "predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son" (8:29). Because this manifestation of God's saving righteousness has taken place χωρὶς νόμου, through Christ's action, the new humanity includes Jews

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[23] Hay, "*Pistis* as 'Ground for Faith,'" 472. I differ from Hay's proposal because it seems to me to accord insufficient attention to the way in which Rom 3:1-8 functions to define πίστις θεοῦ as God's covenant-faithfulness. Still, it makes far better sense of Rom 3:22 than does the objective genitive interpetation. One problem with Hay's article is that he fails to give sufficient weight to his own observation that "In the LXX, which uses *pistis* fifty-seven times, the "evidence" sense is generally absent" (462). Given the importance of the LXX in constituting Paul's theological vocabulary, this fact deserves more attention, especially since in Romans and Galatians Paul seems to be grounding his discussion of faith in Genesis and Habakkuk.

[24] Cf. Hays, "Psalm 143." I would now contend—on the basis of OT sources of the language—that δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ means God's covenant faithfulness. See my forthcoming article on "Justification" in the *Anchor Bible Dictionary*.

[25] For a fuller exposition of this interpretation, see R. B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989) 36-54.

[26] I am persuaded on this point by S. K. Williams, *Jesus' Death as Saving Event* (HDR 2; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1975) 41-51.

[27] The discussions of Keck, Hooker, and Wright, though differing in emphasis from one another, are particularly alert to these themes.

and Gentiles without distinction. Nonetheless, the faithfulness of Jesus is also at the same time the manifestation of God's covenant-faithfulness (here again, the wordplay on πίστις is important) to Israel, as Paul will argue in Romans 9-11 and 15:8-9.

The paragraph concludes in 3:26 with the affirmation that God's act of putting forth Jesus Christ was undertaken "so that [God] himself might be just precisely by justifying[28] the one who shares the faith of Jesus." I continue to resist the temptation of reading, with D L Ψ 33 614 et al., δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦν (="by justifying Jesus ἐκ πίστεως"). This manuscript tradition shows that a significant number of interpreters in the church later found no difficulty with the idea that Jesus was justified by faith, but the meaning of Paul's expression (reading τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ) is better illuminated by the parallel expression in Rom 4:16: τῷ ἐκ πίστεως Ἀβραάμ ("to the one who shares the faith of Abraham," or perhaps—if one wants to emphasize the force of ἐκ—"to the one whose source of being is the faith of Abraham;" cf. the contrasting τῷ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου). The parallelism between 3:26 and 4:16 is a fatal embarassment for all interpreters who seek to treat Ἰησοῦ as an objective genitive.

**E. The Faith of Abraham (4:1-25).** One argument frequently urged against understanding πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ as "faith of Jesus Christ" is that when Paul wants to offer a "model" of faith, he points not to Jesus (as does the Letter to the Hebrews—see especially Heb 12:2), but to Abraham. This argument, however, neglects the contextual argumentative purpose of Paul's appeals to the figure of Abraham.

In the case of Galatians, Paul does not pick Abraham out of the air as an example. We should probably accept the suggestions of C. K. Barrett[29] and J. Louis Martyn[30] that Abraham was introduced into the Galatian discussion by Paul's opponents, the Jewish-Christian "Teachers" who were urging the Galatians to receive circumcision as Abraham did. Paul, seizing the opportunity afforded by Gen 15:6, offers a subversive counterreading of the Abraham story that seeks to enlist Abraham against the Teachers (see especially Gal 4:21).

In the case of Romans 4, Paul brings Abraham into the argument neither because he is looking for models of faith, nor because he is seeking in some general way to explain how justification takes place. Rather, he appeals to Abraham in defense of the claim that his gospel does not nullify the Law (Rom 3:31). The structure of the argument positively requires him to produce evidence *from Scripture* that will demonstrate the continuity between Torah and gospel. To cite kerygmatic traditions about Jesus here would not serve his purpose at all. His argument requires a *scriptural* warrant for the claim that God will justify Jews and Gentiles alike ἐκ πίστεως/διὰ τῆς πίστεως (3:30).[31] Consequently, the fact that

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[28] I take the καὶ to be epexegetical.

[29] "The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar in the Argument of Galatians," in J. Friedrich et al. (eds.) *Rechtfertigung: Festschrift für Ernst Käsemann* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1976 and Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976) 1-16.

[30] "A Law-Observant Mission to Gentiles: The Background of Galatians," *SJT* 38 (1985) 307-24.

[31] Against Stowers ("Ἐκ πίστεως and διὰ τῆς πίστεως"), I continue to regard these expressions as synonymous. To posit a distinction here would be to undo the whole point of Paul's argument, which is to insist that "there is no distinction," that Jews and Gentiles are now related to God on precisely the same terms through the grace of Jesus Christ.

he points to Abraham rather than Jesus as a paradigm for faith proves nothing one way or the other about the meaning of πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Abraham appears in Paul's exposition because his story provides an analogically provocative set of Biblical images that Paul can use to reinforce his gospel story.

Indeed, much critical discussion of Paul's use of the Abraham story—and here I include my own analysis of Galatians 3 in *Faith of Jesus Christ*—goes subtly astray by failing to appreciate that Paul is working backwards from his gospel into a typological/literary interpretation of the OT text. Abraham is of interest to Paul not as a "historical" figure but as a metaphorical figure in Paul's symbolic world. He is theologically valuable to Paul because his story prefigures certain aspects of the gospel that Paul preaches.[32] So, for example, Paul claims that Abraham received circumcision after faith was reckoned to him as righteousness (Gen 15:6), not before, in order that he might be the symbolic father figure both of Gentile believers and of circumcised believers (Rom 4:9-12). Likewise, Paul writes that Gen 15:6 was "written not for [Abraham's] sake alone, but for ours also, to whom it is going to be reckoned, to those who place their trust in the one who raised Jesus our Lord from the dead" (Rom 4:23-24). Abraham typologically prefigures Christian believers, whose faith—note carefully—is said to be directed not toward Jesus but toward the God who raised Jesus.

**F. Adam and Christ (5:12-21).** The final crucial passage in Romans for assessing the meaning of Paul's references to the "faith of Jesus Christ" is the typological contrast between Adam and Christ in Rom 5:12-21. Adam is "a type of the coming one" [i.e., Jesus][33] in that he is the progenitor, the typological embodiment, the ἀρχηγός (to borrow a term from Hebrews) of a people. His sin carries vicarious consequences (condemnation) for all who are "in" him. Jesus Christ, on the the other hand, by his act of righteousness (δικαίωμα, 5:18), his obedience (ὑπακοή, 5:19), effects justification for all who are "in" him. Of course, the act of obedience in view here is Christ's death (5:6-11). The passage does not use the word πίστις, but in light of the virtual synonymity established in 1:5 between πίστις and ὑπακοή, it is difficult to suppose that this terminological difference is particularly significant.[34] Luke Johnson's cogent argument that Rom 5:15-21 is the plain explication of "the faith of Jesus" in Rom 3:21-26 has never been seriously countered.[35] In any case, Romans 5 shows unmistakably that Paul regards Jesus' death as an act of obedience that carries the destiny of many; furthermore, Romans 6 goes on to contend that his death is not merely vicarious but that through baptism we have entered a union with Christ in such a way that his death and resurrection define a pattern for our obedience as well. If—as I have been contending—πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is a summary description of Christ's faithful death, then those who are "conformed to the image of God's Son" (8:29),

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32 A similar point could be made about Adam in Romans 5, Moses in 2 Corinthians 3, etc.

33 Note the way in which Paul here applies the messianic epithet ὁ μελλῶν to Jesus Christ without explanation or comment; the usage is analogous to his equally casual use of ὁ δίκαιος. In both cases, he expects the reader to recognize the epithet as a term of reference to the Messiah.

34 *Contra* Cosgrove, *Cross and Spirit*, 55-56; idem, "Justification in Paul: A Linguistic and Theological Reflection," *JBL* 106 (1987) 665 n.32.

35 Johnson "Romans 3:21-26," 87-89. See also R. Longenecker, "The Obedience of Christ in the Theology of the Early Church," in R. Banks (ed.), *Reconciliation and Hope* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 142-52; Keck, "'Jesus' in Romans," 457.

crying as he did "Abba, Father" (8:14) will also share in his πίστις, being conformed to it. That is surely the sense of the expression τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ (3:26).

One of the liabilities of the traditional interpretation of justification through believing in Jesus, as Schweitzer perceptively noted, is its inability to explain how Romans 5-8 are related to Romans 1-4. E. P. Sanders reemphasized this point, of course, in *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*. Whereas Schweitzer and Sanders both attributed the disjunction to a lack of internal systematic coherence in Romans, I would suggest that the difficulty lies in the "objective genitive" misinterpretation—hence, more in Luther than in Paul. A great strength of the subjective genitive construal is that it allows us to read Romans 1-8 as a theologically coherent discussion in which Paul's christology and soteriology are correlated in such a way that "justification by faith" and "participation in Christ" are virtually synonymous. As Morna Hooker formulates it, "Justification is a matter of participation; so, too, is believing: ... even the believer's initial response—his faith—is a sharing in the obedient, faithful response of Christ himself."[36] Of course, this suggestion would have to be worked out much more fully than is possible here.[37] In any case, the foregoing sketch at least begins to demonstrate how the "faith of Jesus Christ" construal helps us to make sense out of the letter to the Romans as a whole. After surveying the evidence, Leander Keck concludes that "...in every case, construing πίστις Ἰησοῦ as the fidelity of Jesus not only removes unwarranted awkwardness from Paul's statements but clarifies the key point—the role of Jesus in salvation."[38]

## II. Other Texts: Some Observations.

Besides the passages in Romans, some form of the πίστις Χριστοῦ formulation occurs in Gal 2:16, 2:20, 3:22, in Phil 3:9, and—for what it may be worth—in Eph 3:12. Space limitation precludes a full discussion of these passages here. I have already written rather extensively on Galatians, and we already have in print other excellent discussions of the material. On Phil 3:9, see Hooker, "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ," 331-33. On the Galatians passages, see especially Sam Williams' very fine article, "Again *Pistis Christou*."[39] For the record, let it be said that I agree with Williams that there is a remarkable convergence of our conclusions, despite our different approaches and some differences in detail. In several respects, I regard his work as an improvement on mine, especially with regard to his treatments of Gal 2:16 and 3:23-25. (I do still hope, however, to convince him that Paul understands Hab 2:4 as a messianic prophecy.) For the purposes of discussion I would like to highlight a couple of points where Williams' analysis seems particularly helpful, before adding a few thetic remarks of my own (along with one significant retraction of my earlier position) concerning these texts.

**A. Williams' exposition of Pistis Christou in Galatians.** Rather than conceding that ἡμεῖς εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν (Gal 2:16) designates Christ as the

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[36] Hooker, "ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ," 341. Concerning the relation between justification and participation, see my preliminary musings in *Faith of Jesus Christ*, 250-54.

[37] Another important part of the interpretative task would be to show how my interpretation of πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ fits—or fails to fit—the discussion of Christ, faith, and Israel in Rom 9:30-10:21. But that is a project for another day.

[38] L. Keck, "'Jesus' in Romans," 454.

[39] *CBQ* 49 (1987) 431-47.

"object" of faith—as exegetes on both sides of this question have almost always done—Williams notes the parallel expression εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε (Gal 3:27) and proposes that εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν should be understood, in the same way, as "transfer terminology."

> Just as Paul can say that one comes to be "in Christ" by being baptized into Christ, so he can say that one *believes* into Christ. In this second expression, too, *eis* implies movement, change, the transfer from one order of existence into another. Thus, to "believe into Christ" is the *means* by which one comes to be "in Christ." That means is adopting the life-stance, *pistis*, which marked Christ's own relationship to God, the life-stance of which he is the eschatological exemplar. To adopt this stance is to trust and obey Him who raised Jesus from the dead, to believe *like* Christ, and thereby to stand *with* Christ in that domain, that power field, created through his death and resurrection.[40]

The value of this interpretation is evident in the good sense it enables Williams to make out of Gal 3:23-25, where πίστις is said to be something that "has come" and can be "revealed." Williams explains as follows: "Faith comes in that Christ, the single *sperma* of Abraham, actualizes and exemplifies faith. In his trusting obedience, his complete reliance on God as trustworthy and true, Christ *reveals* faith." Consequently, "Christian faith is Christ-faith, that relationship to God which Christ exemplified, that life-stance which he actualized and which, because he lived and died, now characterizes the personal existence of everyone who lives in him. Christ is not the 'object' of such faith, however, but rather its supreme exemplar—indeed, its creator."[41]

Williams would concede, I think, that his explanations of the passages are broadly paraphrastic, intended to "unpack" the connotative freight of Paul's metaphorical language.[42] One might translate ἡμεῖς εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν in a less theologically loaded way, such as "we have placed our trust in Christ Jesus." It seems to me, nonetheless, that Williams proposals have considerable heuristic power. Among other things, this approach helps to account for the way in which Paul's frequent appeals to the pattern of Christ's death and resurrection function in Pauline ethics.

I would want, however, to engage Williams in discussion at several points. First of all, his way of describing πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ leans heavily towards what he calls a "minimal reading" of Paul's metaphorical language of participation in Christ, with the result that he downplays the vicarious elements of Paul's story of salvation. I would prefer to speak less of Jesus as "exemplar" and somewhat more of Jesus as the σπέρμα whose apocalyptic destiny of death and resurrection reshapes the destiny of those who are now "in" him. (Note, for instance the remarkable claim of Gal 2:19b-20a: "I have been crucified with Christ; it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me." Or again, Gal 6:14-15: "...the world has been crucified to me and I to the world. For neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is anything—but new creation!" One hardly does justice to this sort of language by speaking of Christ as an exemplar of faith.) This is, I think, a matter of emphasis rather than a substantive disagree-

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40 Ibid.," 443.

41 Ibid., 438, 446.

42 See Williams' useful comments on the metaphorical character of Paul's language (ibid., 439).

ment with Williams. Secondly, I would emphasize more firmly than Williams does that Paul's πίστις language is thematically intertwined with his exegesis of OT texts (especially Hab 2:4 and Gen 15:6) and with the affirmation of God's faithfulness to his covenant promises. But these are, again, points for ongoing discussion between interpreters who are in substantial agreement.

**B. A Retraction.** In *Faith of Jesus Christ*, I argued that Galatians 3 "depicts Abraham not as an exemplary paradigm for faith but as a representative figure in and through whom others are blessed."[43] This now seems to me to be an overly precise and rationalistic distinction; it may have a certain heuristic usefulness, but it posits a dichotomy where I suspect Paul saw none. I still hold that Gal 3:8-9 presents Abraham as a representative figure "in" whom the word of Scripture blesses those who are his children. But those who are his children stand in this relationship to him precisely insofar as they share his orientation towards God in faith (3:6-7). If we accept (for the sake of argument) Williams' reading of πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, it becomes clear at once that there is a sense in which Abraham is the prefiguration both of Christ and of those who are in Christ. Christ is Abraham's σπέρμα (3:16), and those who are Christ's are τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ σπέρμα (3:29). Abraham is the Biblical type to whom the promise was given, Christ the eschatological antitype through whom the promise becomes effectual for those who are "children of promise" (4:28), Abraham's sons (3:7).

This way of putting the matter resolves my concern about the fact that Abraham's theocentric faith is not properly analogous to christocentric Christian faith. In fact, on this understanding, *both* Abraham and Jesus are paradigms for Christian faith and Christian faith itself is—properly understood—theocentric. If the analogies still do not work out in a neatly systematic fashion, that is because Paul's use of the Abraham story remains metaphorical in character. Abraham is a metaphor for the truth now disclosed in the faith of Jesus Christ.[44]

**C. Observations on Gal 2:20 and 3:22.** I would reiterate for the Group's attention a few exegetical points that must be addressed in any decision about the interpretation of πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. For the sake of brevity I will formulate these as thesis statements.

**Gal 2:20—**

(1) The syntax of the sentence poses a difficulty for the objective genitive interpretation. The definite article τῇ sets the whole phrase to the end of the sentence (τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ ... ὑπὲρ ἐμου) in apposition to πίστει. If Paul intended to designate "the Son of God" as the object of the verbal idea in the noun πίστει, he certainly chose a very odd way to do it.

(2) The aorist participles modifying τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ serve to specify the meaning of "the faith of the Son of God." Keck comments, "if Paul is writing about the Son's πίστις, then the christological clause exegetes this πίστις as

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43 *Faith of Jesus Christ*, 205-06.

44 I hasten to head off protests by insisting that metaphor is constitutive of all thought and that to describe an assertion as "metaphorical" is not to denigrate its seriousness or truth. See, e.g., G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). I also take note of the paper presented in the Pauline Epistles Section in 1990 by S. Kraftchick, "Paul as Strong Poet: Metaphor, Irony, and Redescription in Pauline Theology."

Christ's self-giving."[45] The purpose of the sentence as a whole is to emphasize Christ's agency in shaping Paul's life.

(3) The syntactical parallelism between this sentence and Rom 5:15 should be carefully observed.[46]

**Gal 3:22—**

(1) The RSV made hash of this sentence by translating ἐκ as "to." The NRSV offers some improvement, but the sense of the passage is significantly clarified if we read the phrase ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ as a modifer of δοθῇ and translate, "...so that what was promised might be given through the faithfulness of Jesus Christ to those who believe."

(2) This kerygmatic pattern, beginning from Christ's πίστις as source of salvation and moving to the human response of πίστις in return, corresponds precisely to the interpretation given above of Rom 1:17 (ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν) and Rom 3:22 (διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας). It also corresponds to the sequence of exposition in Gal 2:16, where the affirmation that a person is justified only διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ precedes the account of the answering response, καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν.

In sum, though the evidence of Galatians, taken by itself, is less compelling than the evidence of Romans, it appears that Paul's allusive formulations in Galatians are intended to recall his preaching to them about a Jesus who was "publicly exhibited as crucified" (Gal 3:1) in obedience to the will of the the Father (1:4, 4:4) in order to set free those who had been slaves (4:3-7, 5:1) and to bring them, in unity with him, into the blessing that had been promised to the children of Abraham (3:13-14, 29). Jesus' act of giving himself up to death is precisely the act of burden-bearing to which Paul refers when he speaks of "the πίστις of the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me."

## III. What Is at Stake?

What difference does it make whose faith is meant in Paul's compressed πίστις formulations? Clearly, we keep having the argument not only because the evidence is sufficiently ambiguous to sustain vigorous disagreement but also because there are serious theological issues at stake here. It may be useful to articulate precisely what we take these issues to be, so that we can see what we are really arguing about. In conclusion, I offer a sketch of the theological questions that I see as critical consequences of the present debate.

**A. The relation between Christology and soteriology in Pauline theology.** One of the driving motivations of my work on the πίστις Χριστοῦ question has been the desire to understand *how* the death of Jesus can be understood to be the source of salvation. In the standard Lutheran-Reformation accounts of justification by faith, there was always a puzzling arbitrariness, a lack of "inner connexion between Christology and the doctrine of justification."[47] I still cannot, I am sorry to say, offer a satisfactory elucidation of this mystery. George Lindbeck reminds me that it is not without reason that the church has never formally dogmatized any particular theory of the atonement. It does seem to me, however,

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45 Keck, "'Jesus' in Romans," 455.

46 See Hays, *Faith of Jesus Christ*, 168.

47 G. Ebeling, *Word and Faith* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1963), 203. A larger section of this passage is quoted as an epigraph to Chapter IV in *Faith of Jesus Christ*.

that the approach I have taken to πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ offers a more promising approach to the problem than does the now-traditional "objective genitive" exegesis. Williams puts the point aptly: "Christians are justified by that faith which derives its very character from [Jesus'] self-giving obedience, that faith which was first his and has now become theirs."[48] That is what it means to say that the righteousness of God is revealed from faith for faith.

**B. The humanity of Jesus.** Some opposition to the subjective genitive interpretation may be rooted in an implicitly docetic Christology. If Jesus was a real human being, it is hardly scandalous or inappropriate to speak of his faith/fidelity towards God. Did Paul think of the Jesus who died on the cross as a human being? Formulas such as Gal 4:4-5, Rom 1:3-4, and Phil 2:6-8 suggest that he did.

**C. Experiential-expressive vs. "narrative" theology.** The besetting danger of the "objective genitive" interpretation, with its emphasis on the salvific efficacy of individual faith, is its tendency to reduce the gospel to an account of individual religious experience, or even to turn faith into a bizarre sort of work, in which Christians jump through the entranceway of salvation by cultivating the right sort of spiritual disposition. (Luther no doubt stirs and curses in his tomb whenever his seed commit this theological blunder). The narrative account of salvation as won ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν through the faithfulness of Jesus attempts to preclude this theological misstep, emphasizing not only the *extra nos* of salvation but also its public, corporate character. Bultmannians past and present fret, of course, that this emphasis on the narrative character of the gospel will objectify the word and render it inert.

**D. The cruciform character of Christian obedience.** The particular interpretation of "the faith of Jesus Christ" that I have promulgated has the effect of stressing the pattern of correspondence between Jesus and the believing community: those who are in Christ are called to live the same sort of faith-obedience that he revealed. From a theological point of view, this has the distinct advantage of explaining how Pauline ethics is christologically grounded (Philippians, not discussed in this essay, is a lovely illustration of the point); from a practical point of view, this has the distinct disadvantage of summoning us to live lives of costly self-sacrificial burden-bearing.[49]

**E. The righteousness of God as covenant-faithfulness.** A theological judgment on this issue is not strictly tied to one's exegetical decision about πίστις Χριστοῦ, but I would suggest that there is some positive correlation between the subjective genitive construal and an affirmation of the centrality of Israel/covenant themes in Paul's theology. The key is to see how the defense of God's faithfulness to Israel in Romans 3:3 is tied to the affirmation that the righteousness of God has been manifested through the faithfulness of Jesus Christ. This is an issue that will certainly require some unpacking in the group: Dunn, with whom I am in agreement about the covenant-faithfulness motif, rejects the "faith of Christ" interpretation. Martyn, on the other hand, who emphatically disagrees with Dunn's account of Paul as a covenant theologian,[50] agrees with

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[48] Williams, "Again *Pistis Christou*," 444.

[49] For a more extensive discussion, see R. B. Hays, "Christology and Ethics in Galatians: The Law of Christ," *CBQ* 49 (1987) 268-90.

[50] "Events in Galatia," in Bassler (ed.) *Pauline Theology*, Volume 1 (see n. 3, above).

me about πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Either these motifs are not related in the way I have proposed, or somebody is not thinking straight. Can we sort this out?

So we go to Kansas City to debate, to carry on our critical and constructive work. The fire will test what sort of work each has done.

# Once More, ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ

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## 1. Introduction

The revitalisation of the old debate on the meaning of the Pauline phrase πίστις Χριστοῦ, and particularly as a transatlantic debate, has been one of the most stimulating features of the renewed interest in Pauline theology. The earlier phase was largely an in-house German debate, though W. H. P. Hatch was a prominent contributor.[1] The view that it meant 'faith in Christ' (objective genitive) was the dominant opinion. But among advocates of the subjective genitive ('faith of Christ') was G. Kittel.[2] And notable variations included J. Haußleiter's genitivus auctoris (faith effected by Christ), A. Deissmann's genitivus mysticus (faith experienced in mystical communion with Christ), E. Wißmann's genitivus confessionis (confessing faith, acceptance of the Christian message), and O. Schmitz's 'characterizing genitive' ('Christ-faith').[3]

The opening blast of a new round of debate was sounded in Britain in the 1950s, initially by A. G. Hebert, on the basis of the Hebrew equivalent of πίστις—אֱמוּנָה = 'faithfulness' (hence the 'faithfulness of Christ'),[4] followed by T. F. Torrance,[5] responded to by C. F. D. Moule,[6] and squelched by J. Barr.[7] But the cudgels were taken up again on behalf of a subjective genitive reading in the 1960s, particularly on the north American side of the Atlantic, initially by R. N. Longenecker, G. M. Taylor and G. Howard,[8] and with a substantial wave of

[1] W. H. P. Hatch, *The Pauline Idea of Faith in its Relation to Jewish and Hellenistic Religion* (Harvard Theological Studies, 1917).

[2] Most recently H. W. Schmidt, *Der Brief des Paulus an die Römer* (THKNT 6; Berlin: Evangelische, 1963) 66.

[3] See the brief review of the debate in K. Kertelge, *'Rechtfertigung' bei Paulus* (NtA 3; Münster: Aschendorff, 1967, ²1971) 162-6; also R. B. Hays, *The Faith of Jesus Christ* (SBLDS 56; Chico: Scholars, 1983) 158-62.

[4] A. G. Hebert, '"Faithfulness" and "Faith,"' *Theology* 58 (1955) 373-9.

[5] T. F. Torrance, 'One Aspect of the Biblical Conception of Faith,' *ExpT* 68 (1956-57) 111-4, 221-2.

[6] C. F. D. Moule, 'The Biblical Conception of "Faith,"' *ExpT* 68 (1956-57) 157, 222.

[7] J. Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (Oxford University, 1961) 187-205.

[8] R. N. Longenecker, *Paul, Apostle of Liberty* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964) 149-52; G. M. Taylor, 'The Function of πίστις Χριστοῦ in Galatians,' *JBL* 85 (1966) 58-76; G. Howard, 'On the "Faith of Christ,"' *HTR* 60 (1967) 459-65; note also M. Barth, 'The Faith of the Messiah,' *Heythrop Journal* 10 (1969) 363-70, with further bibliography 364-5 n.2; D. W. B. Robinson, '"Faith of Jesus Christ"—A New Testament Debate,' *Reformed Theological Review* 29 (1970) 71-81.

support in the 1980s,[9] which has swept the interpretation back across the Atlantic.[10]

It would be natural at this point to note and review the main arguments in favour of the renewedly popular 'faith(fulness) of Christ' interpretation. But that is another's brief. Mine is to restate the case for the objective genitive interpretation—'faith in Christ'—though in so doing I will naturally have to address at least the principal arguments brought in favour of a subjective genitive reading. To this task I therefore turn. But first a reminder of the basic data.

As is well known, the phrase itself appears seven times in three of the Pauline letters:

πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ—Rom. 3.22; Gal. 3.22;
πίστις Ἰησοῦ—Rom. 3.26;
πίστις Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ—Gal. 2.16;
πίστις Χριστοῦ—Gal. 2.16; Phil. 3.9;
πίστις τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ—Gal. 2.20.

We should mention also Eph. 3.12—'. . . Christ Jesus our Lord, in whom we have boldness and access in confidence διὰ τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ.

We will proceed by looking first at the form of the phrase itself. And since there is some danger of treating it in too isolated a fashion, we will then look at the way the phrase functions within the context and flow of the argument of each of the three undisputed Pauline letters in which the phrase (πίστις plus genitive referring to Christ) occurs. We will take the letters in their most likely chronological sequence—Galatians, Romans, Philippians. As a shorthand I will use πίστις Χριστοῦ throughout when referring as a whole to the five variations listed above.

## 2. The form of the phrase

There are three grammatical or formal points which should be clarified and put in their proper perspective at the beginning.

**2.1 The force of the genitive construction.** There is, of course, something seductively attractive about taking the phrase in its most literal English translation—'the faith of Christ.' But here the seeming univocal meaning of the English genitive in no way reflects the inherent ambiguity of the Greek when the phrase is taken on its own. If lingering doubts remain we need simply recall various related instances. (1) The parallel phrase, ἡ γνῶσις Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, is used in close proximity to one of the seven occurrences of our phrase (Phil. 3.8-9). No one

[9] S. K. Williams, 'The "Righteousness of God" in Romans,' *JBL* 99 (1980) 272-8; also 'Again *Pistis Christou*,' *CBQ* 49 (1987) 431-47; L. T. Johnson, 'Romans 3.21-26 and the Faith of Jesus,' *CBQ* 44 (1982) 77-90; Hays, *Faith* chap. 4; S. K. Stowers, 'Ἐκ πίστεως and διὰ τῆς πίστεως in Romans 3.30,' *JBL* 108 (1989) 665-74; K. E. Keck, '"Jesus" in Romans,' *JBL* 108 (1989) 443-60, here 452-7; R. N. Longenecker, *Galatians* (WBC 41; Dallas: Word, 1990) 87-8; otherwise D. M. Hay, 'Pistis as "Ground for Faith" in Hellenized Judaism and Paul,' *JBL* 108 (1989) 461-76, here 473-5. The issue came to the fore in the Pauline Theology Group at the SBL meeting in 1988 but was postponed for full discussion to the 1991 meeting.

[10] M. D. Hooker, 'Πίστις Χριστοῦ,' *NTS* 35 (1989) 321-42, the Presidential Address delivered in Cambridge at the 1989 SNTS meeting, reprinted in *From Adam to Christ. Essays on Paul* (Cambridge University, 1990) 165-86; G. N. Davies, *Faith and Obedience in Romans. A Study of Romans 1-4* (JSNTS 39; Sheffield: JSOT, 1990) 106-10.

would think to take 'the knowledge of Christ Jesus' as any other than an objective genitive. In this case the English form allows the objective force which seems to be excluded from 'the faith of Christ.' Similarly with ζῆλος θεοῦ in Rom. 10.2, which clearly means 'zeal *for* God.'[11] (2) In Mark 11.22 we read ἔχετε πίστιν θεοῦ, which can hardly be taken in the sense, 'Hold the faith of God,' and must mean 'Have faith *in* God.' Here again, despite the attractiveness of a literal English rendering, no one would think to take the 'faith of God' as anything other than an objective genitive;[12] compare also Acts 3.16, ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ, 'by faith in his name,' and 2 Thess. 2.13, ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος καὶ πίστει ἀληθείας, 'by sanctification of the Spirit and faith in the truth.'

We must therefore not be misled by the inflexibility of the literal English translation of our phrase, the 'faith of Christ.' And no one I assume would wish to argue on this basis.[13] There is, then, presumably, no dispute that the syntactical relation of the two words, πίστις and Χριστοῦ, tells us nothing to resolve our disagreement.

**2.2 The absence of the definite article.** What is the significance of the lack of the definite article in the phrase—πίστις Χριστοῦ, rather than ἡ πίστις Χριστοῦ.[14] I have in mind here the observation of E. D. Burton that when πίστις is accompanied by a subjective genitive 'the article is . . . almost invariably present.'[15] The point is weakened since the great bulk of the phrases cited by Burton speak of 'your faith.'[16] But we should note three cases which may give Burton's point force for us. (1) James 2.1—ἔχετε τὴν πίστιν τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν. In this classic example of Jewish Christian paraenesis (James), it is very plausible to read the phrase as a subjective genitive—'you hold the faith which our Lord Jesus Christ himself displayed.'[17] (2) Rev. 2.13—'you do not deny my faith (οὐκ ἠρνήσω τὴν πίστιν μου),' says the exalted Christ. (3) Rev. 14.12—'those who keep the com-

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[11] C. F. D. Moule, *An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek* (Cambridge University, 1953) 40.

[12] Hays, *Faith* 164, rightly notes that Mark 11.22 clearly establishes that πίστις plus objective genitive is NT, first generation Christian usage. LSJ's failure to note any instance of πίστις plus objective genitive (Robinson 71-2) is of no consequence, since from the beginning Christianity developed its own distinctive 'faith' vocabulary—πιστεύειν ἐπί/εἰς. The question, then, is whether and in what way πίστις plus genitive reflects that development. Hays is somewhat disingenuous when he argues that πίστις plus genitive meaning 'faith in' cannot be demonstrated in the Pauline corpus (*Faith* 164), since 'faith in Christ' is the only form in which we might expect to find this distinctive Christian usage in Paul, and that is the very phrase which is at issue. More serious for Hays' case is the absence of a verbal equivalent to his understanding of πίστις Χριστοῦ, i.e. 'Christ believed'; see further §3.3 below.

[13] For further examples of the objective genitive see J. H. Moulton, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek*, Vol. III by N. Turner (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1963) 211-2.

[14] The lack of a second definite article, τοῦ Χριστοῦ, can be adequately explained by the fact that Χριστός by this stage, in Greek speaking Christianity, regularly functioned as a proper name.

[15] E. D. Burton, *Galatians* (ICC; Edinburgh; T. & T. Clark, 1921) 482. The point is taken up by A. J. Hultgren, 'The *Pistis Christou* Formulation in Paul,' *NovT* 22 (1980) 248-63, here 253, though with a less cautious formulation ('invariably present').

[16] This is the basis of the main critique of Hultgren by Williams, 'Again' 432-3.

[17] It may be argued that ἔχετε is more naturally translated, 'you hold on to your (own) faith in our Lord' (cf. 2.18), and that the definite article refers back to the previously mentioned 'faith' (1.3, 6). On the other hand, our third example (Rev. 14.12) speaks of 'those who keep . . . the faith of Jesus,' where 'keeping' is closely parallel to 'holding.'

mandments and the faith of Jesus (τὴν πίστιν Ἰησοῦ).' In each case we need to remind ourselves that the faithfulness of Christ (ὁ πιστός) is a particular theme of the seer (Rev. 1.5; 3.14; 19.11), as, it would appear, of the more characteristically Jewish Christian documents in the NT (Heb. 2.17; 3.2; 12.2).[18] So once again it is very likely that in each case the genitive is, if anything, subjective.

We should also simply mention Rom. 3.3, τὴν πίστιν τοῦ θεοῦ, 'the faithfulness of God,' a clear example of the definite article with the subjective genitive. And perhaps we should include Col. 2.12, διὰ τῆς πίστεως τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦ θεοῦ, which Hebert translates 'through the faithfulness of the working of God.'[19]

It would appear, then, that Burton's observation has some force. (a) The genitive phrase, 'the faith of Christ' *was* used within earliest Christian circles in reference to 'the faith(fulness) of Christ' (subjective genitive). But in the three arguably most clear examples which we have, the phrase takes the form, '*the* faith of Christ,' where quite properly and naturally the definite article denotes the particular faith(fulness) referred to—that of Christ. Just as in the regular usage which Burton noted—'the faith, that is, of you.' (b) In contrast, it is probably more significant than at first appears that *all* the phrases which come into dispute in Paul *lack* the definite article. The fact that it is *all* the disputed cases does suggest that we are confronted by a regular pattern of speech, where the lack of the definite article is in itself almost sufficient to indicate that what is in view is *faith* (that is, faith as exercised by believers in general), rather than *the faith* (that is, the particular faith of Jesus himself).[20]

There are, however, two exceptions to the above patterns. One is Eph. 3.12, cited above. Here it may be significant, even decisive, that the definite article *is* used—διὰ τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ. Should we therefore translate, 'through the faith of him,' that is, through Christ's faithfulness?[21] If so, it would simply confirm that Burton's observation is sound and that the definite article was the accepted way of indicating that the genitive was subjective in force. But in that case it may be all the more significant that the undisputed, or earlier (if you prefer) Pauline usage is so consistently anarthrous—a recognized way of signalling that the accompanying genitive is objective.

The other exception is potentially more disruptive of the pattern which seems thus far to have emerged. In Rom. 4.16 Paul speaks clearly of 'the faith of Abraham,' where the Greek is again anarthrous—'the one who is ἐκ πίστεως Ἀβραάμ. Here is a key example which indicates that Burton was right to qualify his conclusion: the definite article 'almost invariably' denotes the subjective genitive.[22] Whether it merely weakens the force of Burton's point ('almost invariably'), however, or disrupts it entirely, remains unclear. A factor of substantive importance in this case (Rom. 4.16) is bound to be the fact that the phrase ἐκ

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18 This consideration has to be weighed against Hays, *Faith* 187 n.113, who follows Robinson in regarding the genitives of these texts as 'broadly adjectival,' denoting 'the (Christian) faith.'

19 Hebert 377.

20 Whether it is also significant that the clearest references to Christ's faithfulness come in the more characteristically Jewish writings of the NT (James, Hebrews and the Apocalypse of John), and that, in contrast, the anarthrous Pauline phrase comes in passages where Paul is in contentious dialogue with Jewish Christian views, is a point to which we will have to return.

21 So particularly M. Barth, *Ephesians* (AB 34; New York: Doubleday, 1974) 347.

22 The issue does not hang on the genitive construction (see §2.1), as Keck 456 unwisely argues, but on the significance of the absence of the definite article.

πίστεως is a major *leit-motiv* in Romans.[23] It must be judged quite likely that Paul unconsciously slipped into (or maintained) the anarthrous use, because in his train of thought in this letter that was his principal prepositional phrase for 'justifying faith.'[24] It may well be, therefore, that Rom. 4.16 should be regarded as a genuine exception (for understandable reasons) to what otherwise was an almost invariable rule within earliest Christian speech.

**2.3 Equivalent phrases.** Finally, we need to clarify the possible significance of potentially synonymous phrases. The deutero-Paulines seem to have developed the formula, 'faith *in* Christ Jesus (πίστις [anarthrous] ἡ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ)' (1 Tim. 3.13; 2 Tim. 1.13; 3.15). An earlier version of it is Eph. 1.15—'your faith in the Lord Jesus (τὴν καθ' ὑμᾶς πίστιν ἐν τῷ κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ)—the definite article in this case required, of course, to indicate the particular faith (καθ' ὑμᾶς) in view. This could be significant, since it might indicate that a different phrase was current to denote 'faith in Christ,' and thus suggest that by 'faith of Christ' Paul must have meant something else (Christ's faith). The difficulty of course is precisely that all the instances of the 'in' phrase belong to the deutero-Pauline corpus and thus provide no evidence of Paul's own usage or of usage current at the time of Paul.[25] The deutero-Pauline usage therefore gives us no assistance in resolving the force of the genitive constructions in Paul.[26]

Much the same is true of the further variation: Col. 2.5—'the firmness of your faith in Christ (τῆς εἰς Χριστὸν πίστεως ὑμῶν).' The problem is that ἡ εἰς Χριστὸν πίστις is a hapax legomenon in Paul, and though the verbal equivalent is used in the undisputed Paulines (Rom. 10.14?; Gal. 2.16; Phil. 1.29), the issue of the Pauline authorship of Colossians muddies the discussion and makes it difficult to place much weight on the Col. 2.5 usage either way.[27]

The only other variation is Philem. 5—τὴν πίστιν, ἣν ἔχεις πρὸς τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν. But it is difficult to know how much weight to put on this isolated example.

All we can say, then, is that the deutero-Paulines developed a way of speaking of 'faith in Christ' which Paul had not used. The absence of such usage from the undisputed Paulines, with the exception of Philem. 5, may, however, suggest that Paul did not need to use such forms because he had his own form—πίστις

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[23] Rom. 1.17 (twice); 3.26, 30; 4.16 (twice); 5.1; 9.30, 32; 10.6; 14.23 (twice).

[24] The alternative, διὰ πίστεως, appears only four times, and all in the one section of the argument—Rom. 3.22, 25, 30, 31.

[25] The apparently close parallel of Gal. 3.26 is almost certainly to be taken as sequential rather than as integrated prepositional phrases -'for you all are sons of God, through faith, in Christ Jesus,' rather than in the deutero-Pauline sense, 'through faith in Christ Jesus' (πάντες γὰρ υἱοὶ θεοῦ ἐστε διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ); so most, e.g. H. Schlier, *Der Brief an die Galater* (KEK; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, $^{4}$1965) 171 and Hays, *Faith* 169-70. Similarly with the phrasing in Rom. 3.25—ἱλαστήριον διὰ (τῆς) πίστεως ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι—'an atonement, through faith, in his blood'; διὰ (τῆς) πίστεως is usually taken now as a Pauline insertion into a pre-Pauline formula (see e.g. the bibliography and discussion reviewed in my *Romans* [WBC 38; Dallas: Word, 1988] 161-4). It may indeed be the case that a casual reading of these texts was what gave rise to the deutero-Pauline use. See further below nn. 41 and 62.

[26] The double variation from standard Pauline usage, in Eph. 1.15 and 3.12, is typical of the slight distance from Pauline thought which convinces most scholars that Ephesians stems from the circle of Paul's (immediate) associates, after his death, than from Paul himself.

[27] Elsewhere in the NT it occurs only in Acts 20.21, 24.24 and 26.18 (cf. 1 Pet. 1.21).

Χριστοῦ.[28] If faith was such an important motif for Paul, the absences of such phrases leaves the proponents of the subjective genitive with a somewhat surprising conclusion: *either* πίστις Χριστοῦ is Paul's way of speaking of 'faith in Christ,' *or* Paul, for some yet to be explained reason, seems to have *avoided* speaking of 'faith in Christ.'

**2.4** In short, not too much significance can be read out of the form of the phrase; though the lack of the definite article does seem to give some support to the inference that whoever's the faith in view in the Pauline phrase, πίστις Χριστοῦ, it would *not* be understood in earliest Christian circles as 'the faith of Christ'; and the relative absence from the undisputed Paulines of other phrases denoting 'faith in Christ' may indicate that πίστις Χριστοῦ filled that function for Paul.

### 3. Galatians

**3.1** If I understand the arguments in favour of the subjective genitive reading of πίστις Χριστοῦ aright, there are two principal grounds for taking it as a reference to 'the faith of Christ' in Galatians. Here and in the following section I refer particularly to the treatments of Hays and Hooker, the two most recent and thoroughgoing expositions of the view.[29] (1) In three of the four occurrences in Galatians there is reference also to the act of believing, using the verb πιστεύειν (Gal. 2.16; 3.22); 'another reference to the faith of believers would be redundant in a sentence which already refers to those who believe.'[30] (2) The parallel with Abraham which dominates Gal. 3.6-9 strongly suggests that πίστις Χριστοῦ is intended as a parallel to the reference to Abraham's faith. Hays develops the point in terms of a representative-christology—'. . . Jesus Christ, like Abraham, is justified ἐκ πίστεως and . . . we, as a consequence, are justified *in* him.'[31] For Hooker the logic of Paul's argument is clear. The talk is of a sonship of Abraham understood in terms of sharing Abraham's faith. The logic indicates that *the* son of Abraham, Christ (Gal. 3.16), also had faith, and that for others to share in that sonship they must share in the faith of the one true seed. This, she maintains, is the force of Gal. 3.22: that the promise made to Abraham on the basis of faith is now fulfilled on the basis of Jesus Christ's faith.

**3.2** Hays' argument is in danger of overkill. On the surface it seems that he merely wishes to deny that the other references in Gal. 3 point to Christ as the object of faith. In 3.2 and 5, πίστις denotes the Christian faith.[32] In 3.6-9 οἱ ἐκ πίστεως probably has the connotation, 'those who are given life on the basis of

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[28] Hultgren 254. Williams, 'Again' 433-5, surprisingly argues that Paul does not see Christ as the object of faith; but see the two preceding paragraphs, and Williams' attempt to turn πιστεύειν εἰς Χριστον to his own account (442-3). See also below n. 58 below.

[29] Hays, *Faith* 164-70; Hooker 170-5. See also particularly Barth, 'Faith of Messiah' 367-8 and Williams, 'Again.'

[30] Hooker 173. So also, e.g., Williams, 'Righteousness' 273-4; Keck 454, though I am puzzled at Keck's claim that 'faith in *Christ*' (my emphasis) 'separates Christ from justification, which now depends solely on human believing.'

[31] Hays, *Faith* 165-6; he argues back from Eph. 3.12, without raising the issue of the significance of the definite article (see §2.2 above).

[32] Hays, *Faith* 143-9. Cf. 1.23.

(Christ's) faith.'[33] In 3.11, ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται (Hab. 2.4), the reference is once again to Christ's faith,[34] the implication being (though Hays does not spell it out clearly) that this conclusion carries with it the ἐκ πίστεως of 3.12 and the διὰ τῆς πίστεως of 3.14.[35] In 3.23, 25 the 'coming of the faith' is virtually identified with the coming of Christ himself,[36] with the consequence that the ἐκ πίστεως of 3.24 (as also 5.5) is best understood as referring, once again to 'the faith (that is, of Jesus Christ).'[37]

Thus, almost without realising it, we find that every reference to πίστις in the body of Galatians has been swept up into the defence of the subjective genitive. On Hays' logic even 3.2, 5 and 5.6 would most obviously be taken as a reference to Christ's faith: 'the message of faith,' that is, of Christ's faith (3.2, 5; also 1.23); 'faith working through love,' that is, Christ's faithfulness coming to effect through his (or God's) love (5.6).[38] More to the point, on Hays' thesis we have no clear reference to the 'faith' of believers. There are two such references using the equivalent verb (2.16 and 3.22). But Hays leaves us with no noun counterpart, no noun to denote the Galatians' act of believing. Hays' thesis hoovers up every relevant reference to 'faith' in Galatians in order to defend the subjective genitive reading of 2.16, 20 and 3.22.[39] This is nothing short of astonishing. It now appears that a text (Galatians), which has provided such a powerful charter of 'justifying faith' for Christian self-understanding, *nowhere* clearly speaks of that 'faith.'[40]

Two questions cannot be avoided. (1) If 'faith' as a reference to *Christ's* faith filled such an overwhelmingly prominent role in Galatians, why does it appear at best fleetingly elsewhere?[41] On Hays' thesis Paul could speak of it as something

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33 Hays, *Faith* 200-2.

34 Hays, *Faith* 150-7.

35 Hays, *Faith* 206-12.

36 Cf. 3.26 (Hays, *Faith* 169-70).

37 Hays, *Faith* 228-32.

38 'Through love' is occasionally taken as referring to God's love (G. S. Duncan, *The Epistle to the Galatians* [Moffatt; London: Hodder, 1934] 157-8), despite the obvious elaboration in 5.13-14 of the thought in 5.6.

39 Only 5.22, where πίστις is normally taken as denoting 'trustworthiness' rather than 'faith,' would be exempt.

40 To argue that the phrase includes reference both to Christ's faith and to faith in Christ (so particularly Williams, 'Righteousness' 276-8; 'Again' 437, 443-6) is surely to overload it; to be meaningful to his readers such a phrase would have to be unpacked by Paul not only in terms of Christians believing (which he does) but also in terms of Christ believing (which he does not).

41 'Nowhere does the apostle speak plainly of Jesus as believing, trusting, or displaying *pistis* as "faithfulness"' (Hay 474). So far as Romans is concerned, Hays limits his case to Rom. 3.21-26 (*Faith* 170-4). If Rom. 3.25 includes a pre-Pauline formulation, of which διὰ τῆς πίστεως was an integral part (so particularly S. K. Williams, *Jesus' Death as Saving Event* [Missoula: Scholars, 1975] 41-51; though see above n.25), it could be argued that πιστις there (in the pre-Pauline formula) referred to the well-known concept of Christ's faith (but see below n. 64); though once again the thesis assumes an established and widespread usage which surpisingly (if so established and widespread) is otherwise hardly attested. And at the level of *Paul's* use of the formula, the echo of the διὰ τῆς πίστεως in 3.30 and 31 hardly encourages the suggestion that Paul referred the πίστις in any case to *Jesus'* faith (despite Stowers; see below n. 61), since the 'faith' in question is clearly the medium by which justification comes to the believer, as in the case of Abraham (Rom. 4). We should perhaps note that Hays does *not* take the 'faith' references in 3.30-31 as referring to Christ's faith in his '"Have we found Abraham to be our forefather according to the flesh?" A Reconsideration of Rom. 4.1,' *NovT* 27 (1985) 76-98.

well known, which would require no explanation when first mentioned in what is at least potentially ambiguous phrasing (2.16), an understanding of the Christian message which could be summed up simply in the word 'faith,' that is, the faith of Christ (1.23; 3.2, 5, 23, 25). But where is the other evidence from outside the Pauline corpus that this was a recognized and central theme of early Christian preaching and self-understanding?[42] Where in the Gospel tradition, by means of which the first Christians maintained the memory of Christ's ministry, is there any emphasis on 'the faith of Christ'? The fact that Hays' thesis makes Galatians stand out as so exceptional within the wide sweep of earliest Christianity must surely sound a warning note; the thesis is in danger of self-condemnation by *reductio ad absurdum*.

(2) Too little asked is the further question: What does 'the faith of Christ' mean? To what does it refer? The answer is hardly clear.[43] The ministry of Jesus as a whole? The death of Christ in particular? The continuing ministry of the exalted Christ in heaven? Neither the first nor the last of these are prominent themes in Paul. And while a reference to the death of Christ would fit well within Paul's theology, it is not clear how that would explain the διά forms of the phrase in 2.16 and 3.14, 26. What would Paul mean by saying 'through Christ's faithfulness' in his life and/or on the cross? A more likely expression of the point would be διὰ plus accusative ('on account of'), equivalent to ἐκ plus the genitive ('on the basis of'), rather than διὰ plus genitive ('through' the medium of). It is true that Paul has a concept of the death of Christ as in some sense an ongoing event, if that is the right way to put it (cf. 2.19; 6.14), but he never expresses it in a διά formula. And if the reference is to the exalted Christ, then we would expect Paul to speak of Christ directly, rather than of his faith: thus in 6.14, δι' οὗ referring to Christ ('through whom'), as also in Rom. 1.5 and 5.11.

I therefore find myself quite unconvinced by Hays' thesis.

**3.3** Hooker does not try to be so ambitious, limiting the thrust of her exposition to the key reference 3.22 in context. For her the pressure to read 3.22 as a reference to Christ's faith grows out of the argument of 3.15ff. that Christ is the one true seed of Abraham. For her the logic is that Christ must therefore have shared Abraham's faith, have believed as Abraham believed. But is this Paul's logic? I think not.

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[42] The verses reviewed in §2.2 (James 2.1 apart) do not provide strong evidence for first generation Christian usage. Hooker178-9 suggests that the πίστις of 2 Cor. 4.13 refers to Christ's faith. But a reference back to Christ's death and resurrection under that motif would be surprising here. (1) The 'belief' is more naturally linked to the immediately associated Psalm quotation, 'I believed'; elsewhere it is Paul's custom to quote scripture *after* an assertion, to back up that assertion. (2) The fuller phrase is 'the same Spirit of faith' and is more naturally referred to the Spirit inspiring (or the spirit inspired to write) the words of the psalm. (3) The belief in the first clause is presumably the believing of the last clause; 'the same spirit/Spirit' is the inspiring Spirit (inspired spirit) which brings belief to speech and witness. See further e.g. V. P. Furnish, *2 Corinthians* (AB 32A; New York: Doubleday, 1984) 257-8.

[43] Williams, 'Again,' illustrates the vagueness of the phrase as used in the current debate. At 444 he takes it to refer to 'Christ's own openness to God,' 'the mode of personal existence which Christ pioneered' (thus unconsciously slipping into the language and motifs of Hebrews rather than of Paul). But in commenting on Gal. 2.19-20 he takes 'the faith of the Son of God' as defined by the relative clauses, 'who loved me and gave himself for me' (445). And later on he defines it as 'that relationship to God which Christ exemplified, that life stance which he actualized' (446)—but is this Paul?

Had it been so, Paul must surely have brought it out more clearly, that is, by saying directly that Christ believed as Abraham believed. Had that indeed been Paul's point, that Christ as Abraham's seed believed as Abraham believed, he could have said so quite straightforwardly. In 3.26 in particular: rather than the potentially confusing 'You are all sons of God through faith in Christ Jesus,' Paul could have said so much more clearly, 'You are all sons of God in Christ Jesus who believed.' The lack of a verbal equivalent to the noun phrase, 'the faith of Christ,' is as weakening to Hooker's case as is the loss of a noun equivalent to the act of 'justifying faith' (πιστεύειν) in Hays' case.[44]

More to the point, Paul's logic is manifestly different from that which Hooker follows. Paul's problem was to demonstrate that *non*-Jews could be counted Abraham's children. His answer was in terms of Gentiles believing as Abraham believed; they were his children because they shared his faith—'sons of' = sharing the same characteristic attitude and status before God (3.7).[45] But Jesus as a Jew did not require this special concession. And as Messiah he could be regarded as the 'seed' of Abraham in a pre-eminent sense. Paul signals this difference in status between Christ and Christians by defining Christ's relation to Abraham solely in terms of the word 'seed'; as 'son' Christ is only to be understood as 'God's son' (1.16; 2.20; 4.4, 6).

The logic of Paul's argument is that Christians are Abraham's children by a *twofold* action—by sharing in Abraham's faith (3.7), and by being 'in Christ' (3.28-29). The climax of the argument in 3.26ff. is quite clear: 'you are all sons/children of God, (1) through faith, (2) in Christ Jesus.'[46] The first phrase (1) sums up the line of argument in the first half of the chapter, the first half of the two-fold action (3.1-14). The second phrase (2) sums up the force of the argument in the second half of the chapter (3.15ff). 'Sons of Abraham' *through faith* are also 'seed of Abraham' *in Christ* (3.28-29).

Hooker has thus merged the two strands of Paul's argument and her thesis arises from the resulting confusion.[47] It does *not* follow that because Christ was Abraham's seed therefore he shared Abraham's faith. By allowing that the οἱ ἐκ πίστεως of 3.6-9 refers to believers who share Abraham's faith,[48] Hooker has weakened her case regarding 3.22. For ἐκ πίστεως referring to Gentiles' faith, like that of Abraham in 3.6-9, probably has the same reference in 3.22: now that the promise has been fulfilled, the faith which 'justified' in 3.6-9 can be defined more accurately as 'faith in Jesus Christ' (the promised seed). In fact, as Hays seems to have appreciated, for the subjective genitive thesis to carry weight in regard to 3.22 it really does need to draw in all the other πίστις references with it. But that pushes us back into the *reductio ad absurdum* argument already exposed.

**3.4** In pointed contrast to both Hays and Hooker, I would have to say that on the more natural reading, the text does speak precisely and consistently of 'justifying faith,' including the disputed πίστις Χριστοῦ passages.

a) In Gal. 2.16 the antithesis between 'works of the law' and πίστις Χριστοῦ is central, and is most naturally understood as Paul's way of posing the alterna-

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44 See also above n.12.

45 'Son of' as denoting share in a particular characteristic or quality would be familiar particularly to those familiar with semitic thought (BDB, בן 8), but it was also a Greek idiom (BAGD, υἱος 1cδ).

46 See above n. 25.

47 Williams, 'Again' 437-47, is open to the same criticism.

48 Hooker 170-1.

tives on the human side on the basis of which, ἐκ, (according to the opposing Christian views) one might hope to be justified.[49] To speak of the redundancy of expression (one verb phrase, two noun phrases) is to miss the point. This is Paul's first clear statement on this theme so central to his own understanding. We should not be surprised, then, if he repeats himself in two synonymous formulations for the sake of emphasis and clarity. We can fairly translate: '. . . knowing that a person is not justified by works of the law but only through faith in Jesus Christ,[50] we too *have* believed in Christ Jesus, *precisely* in order that we might be justified by faith in Christ, and *not* by works of the law . . . .'

b) In Gal. 2.20 the πίστις τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ form is defined by the relative clauses, 'who loved me and gave himself for me.' But these are versions of the standard pistis-formula (confessional formula);[51] that is, they are most naturally understood as describing confessional faith, rather than the act of Christ's faithfulness.

c) In 3.2 and 5 ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως is best understood as 'hearing with faith' or 'the hearing which is faith,'[52] on the parallel not least with ὑπακοὴ πίστεως (Rom. 1.5).[53]

d) The implication of 2.16 (synonymous formulations repeated for emphasis) is borne out in 3.6-9 where again it is most obvious to see the verbal and noun phrases used interchangeably.

3.6—Abraham believed (ἐπίστευσεν) God, and it was reckoned to him for righteousness (εἰς δικαιοσύνην).

3.8—God justifies (δικαιοῖ) the Gentiles by faith (ἐκ πίστεως).

The parallel is straightforward: God justifies on the basis of faith, whether the faith of Abraham or that of Gentiles. Abraham provides the pattern of faith. Those who express the same faith (3.6, 9) thus share in the same blessing (justification), are blessed with Abraham, the man of πίστις (3.9), and thus are truly his sons (3.7).[54] In contrast, to argue that the references here could only be understood in the light of the subsequent portrayal of Christ as alone the 'seed' of Abraham (3.16) would mean that the crucial argument of 3.6-9 was likely to be lost on the Galatian audiences.

e) Likewise in 3.14—'. . . in order that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith.' Here too it is most natural to take the phrase διὰ τῆς πίστεως as a reference to the medium on the human side through, or to which (cf.

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[49] Cf. B. L. Martin, *Christ and the Law in Paul* (NovTSupp 62; Leiden: Brill, 1989) 116. The choice of the hitherto unusual phrase πίστις Χριστοῦ may be simply explained by the rhetorical desire to have a simple two word antithesis to ἔργα νόμου. The unusual parallel between πνεῦμα δουλείας and πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας in Rom. 8.15 is probably to be explained in the same way.

[50] The argument here is not dependent on my understanding of the flow of thought between 2.15 and 16; see my 'The New Perspective on Paul,' *Jesus, Paul and the Law* (London: SPCK/Louisville: Westminster, 1990) 204 n.25, 208-9, 212.

[51] W. Kramer, *Christ, Lord, Son of God* (London: SCM, 1966) 118 (§26b).

[52] See now S. Williams, 'The Hearing of Faith: ΑΚΟΗ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΣ in Galatians 3,' *NTS* 35 (1989) 82-93.

[53] Martin 118.

[54] See above n. 45.

3.2) the Spirit was given.[55] Had Paul wished to specify the divine medium through which the Spirit was given we would have expected something like 'through whom,'[56] that is, through Christ himself. A reference to Christ's faith is much less natural.

f) In 3.22 once again it is at least as plausible to take the double reference to faith/believing as Paul's way of reinforcing the importance of his argument—'in order that the promise which is by faith in Jesus Christ might be given (precisely) to those who believe.' Apart from anything else, the reading is quite natural grammatically (§2.2) and avoids the problems posed by the sudden injection of thought of Jesus' faith already noted (§3.3).

g) Proponents of 'the faith of Christ' interpretation seem to forget that Paul *has* a way of speaking of the divine source, medium, resource by means of which his saving power comes to effect. It is the word which in traditional Christian theology has always stood as the counterpart on the divine side to the human exercise of faith—'grace.' 1.6—God 'who called you in the grace of Christ'; 1.15—God 'who called me through his grace'; 2.21—'I do not annul the grace of God'; 5.4—'you have fallen away from grace.' The most natural reading throughout Galatians is summarized in the classic formulation—justified by grace through faith.

**3.5** The irony of the subjective genitive reading of πίστις Χριστοῦ, therefore, is that in order to sustain it, other unqualified references to 'faith' have to be taken as echoing or pointing forward to that meaning, '(Christ's) faith.' Which leaves Paul's teaching on how Gentile and Jew receive the blessing of divine acceptance with a very large and unexplained hole in it. Conversely, if even a few of these intermediate references are taken as referring to human faith, the act of believing, the noun version of the verb phrase, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain that the particular πίστις Χριστοῦ references point to something different.

## 4. Romans

**4.1** Here the arguments are if anything more straightforward and focus on the double use of the phrase in 3.22 and 26.[57] (1) Again there is the problem of redundancy in 3.22—διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας. (2) There seems to be a close parallel between πίστις Ἰησοῦ and πίστις Ἀβραάμ (3.26; 4.16). (3) Hays notes also the parallel with πίστις θεοῦ (3.3). (4) And Hooker presses the parallel between Christ and Adam; 'if men and women are faithless, we may expect Christ to be faithful.'[58]

**4.2** (1) On the problem of redundancy the matter is simply resolved. 'Why would Paul need to add εἰς πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας?' asks Hays. Precisely in

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[55] The usual view, including now Williams, 'ΑΚΟΗ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΣ' 88, arguing against Hays.

[56] See above §3.2(2).

[57] On 3.25 see above n.41 and below §4.4.

[58] Hays, *Faith* 170-2; Hooker 168-70. Hays also rightly notes that Romans is thoroughly theocentric, but draws the dubious conclusion that Christ is never unambiguously presented as an object of faith (as Williams, 'Again,' above n. 28); this is surely to treat 9.33 and 10.11, 14 in too cavalier a fashion. Similarly the difficulty of making sense of the idea of God's righteousness being revealed through faith (in Jesus Christ) is greatly exaggerated in view of 1.17.

order to emphasize the πάντας, is the obvious answer: 'the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ to *all* who believe.' Students of Romans will not need to be reminded that this 'all' is a thematic word in the letter, being used again and again, often with varying degrees of redundancy, and precisely as a means of emphasis (see particularly 1.5, 16; 2.10; 4.11, 16; 10.4, 11-13). The usage in 3.22 is simply part of a sustained motif.[59]

**4.3** (2) The failure to be clear on whether Paul meant the 'faith of Christ' or the 'faithfulness of Christ' is a good deal more critical than has been appreciated by the proponents of the subjective genitive thesis. For in fact just such a distinction seems to have been crucial to Paul's exposition of Abraham's faith in chap. 4. The point which has been wholly ignored in the debate thus far is that Paul was in effect attacking the traditional Jewish understanding of Abraham which saw him as the archetype of *faithfulness*. As passages like Sir. 44.19-21 and 1 Macc. 2.52 (not to mention James 2.21-23) clearly show, Abraham was held up in Jewish piety as one of the supreme examples of 'faithfulness' under trial, in his willingness to offer up Isaac. More to the point for Paul, as the same passages also show, Gen. 15.6 was typically interpreted in Jewish circles by reference to Abraham's faithfulness thus displayed.[60]

Paul's response was twofold. First to insist that Gen. 15.6 had to be understood prior to and independent of the later accounts both of Abraham's circumcision (4.9-15), and, by implication, of Abraham's offering of Isaac. And second, in consequence, to argue that Abraham's πίστις meant his faith, his naked trust in God's promise (4.16-22), and therefore *not* his 'faithfulness'. We must see then, that for Paul's πίστις Χριστου to be understood of Christ's faithfulness would be to play into the hands of his Jewish-Christian opponents: Abraham's faith (= faithfulness) was a prototype of Jesus' faithfulness and so could continue to serve as a model of Jewish-Christian covenant faithfulness. In sharp contrast Paul insists that Abraham was a model of *faith* = trust. But where then does that leave the parallel between 3.26 and 4.16? Did Paul intend to present Christ as an example of that same sheer naked trust? To what would he be referring, since a reference to Christ's faithfulness to death (the more natural parallel if parallel was sought) seems to be excluded? And why again does Paul fail to bring out the parallel more clearly? In point of fact he ends his exposition of Abraham's faith in the way that makes most sense of the objective genitive reading: 'faith was reckoned for righteousness to Abraham on our account also, to those who believe (as did Abraham—4.17) in him who raised Jesus our Lord from the dead' (4.22-24). What is in view throughout is faith in the life-giving power of God (manifested in the conception of Isaac, and in the resurrection of Christ), not faithfulness (either of Abraham or of Christ).[61]

We may pursue the point a little further. For if Paul's intention had been to parallel Abraham's faith and Christ's, we would have expected a rather fuller and rather different treatment of Abraham, focusing precisely on Abraham's faith(fulness) in offering of Isaac and paralleling it to Christ's faith(fulness) in

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[59] Keck 456 conveniently misses out the πάντας τοὺς in his quotation of 3.22.

[60] See further my *Romans* 200-1.

[61] This also undermines Stowers' attempt to take the ἐκ πίστεως and διὰ πίστεως of Rom. 3.30, 31 as references to Christ's faithfulness: 'the heroic merit of Jesus was the means by which God provided an expiation' (670); 'because of Abraham's faithfulness God established a covenant of righteousness for all his descendants' (673). But this interpretation cuts right against the grain of Rom. 4.

offering himself on the cross. Now there is a generally recognized allusion to the offering of Isaac: in 8.32—'he who did not spare his own son . . . .'[62] The difference is that the parallel is between *God* and Abraham, not between Jesus and Abraham. This underlines the conclusion just drawn, that the point of chap.4's exposition is to demonstrate what 'justifying faith' is, to draw a parallel between Abraham's faith and the faith of all who believe in God's life-giving power, not to draw a parallel between Christ and Abraham.

**4.4** (3) The reference to God is a reminder that Paul *has* a concept in Romans of what we might call simply 'divine faith.' Indeed, it is one of the major themes of the letter, often underestimated in significance because talk of 'God's faith' is explicit as such only at 3.3. What is too easily missed is the fact that for a Jew like Paul talk of 'the truth of God' carried the same connotation, since אֱמוּנָה and אֱמֶת could be translated equally by ἀλήθεια or πίστις. Hence the theme is actually very prominent in 3.3-7, a passage which is a railway junction for most of Paul's main lines of thought in the letter, and in the climax of 15.8.[63] In my judgment it is also present in the ἐκ πίστεως of 1.17, possibly in the διὰ (τῆς) πίστεως of 3.25,[64] and implicit in the quotation of 15.11,[65] as well as underlying the whole thrust of chaps. 9-11. What is noticeable in all this theme is the variety of ways in which Paul refers to it and draws it in.

Of course it is arguable that πίστις Χριστοῦ is an equivalent reference to the faithfulness of Christ. But in contrast to the anarthrous πίστις Χριστοῦ, it is noticeable that the reference in 3.3 has the definite article (τὴν πίστιν τοῦ θεοῦ), in line with the 'almost invariable' practice noted above (§2.2). And if, *ex hypothesi*, the faithfulness of Christ is so important for Paul, why then is it referred to only in the two grammatically ambiguous phrases in 3.22 and 26, in contrast to the far richer theme of God's faithfulness? Why no reference to Christ as πιστός, as he has to God elsewhere too (1 Cor. 1.9; 10.13; 2 Cor. 1.18; 1 Thess. 5.24)?[66] We could push the argument still further. To understand πίστις Χριστοῦ as referring to *Christ's* faithfulness would not only weaken the emphasis on human faith (like that of Abraham) but also confuse and even divert attention from the emphasis on *God's* faithfulness. What Paul is calling for throughout Romans is for faith in God's faithfulness, faith like that of Abraham, faith in the one who now embodies in eschatological fulness that faithfulness, *God's* faithfulness, not Christ's.[67]

**4.5** (4) Finally as to the parallel between Christ and Adam (Hooker).[68] Perhaps all we need to note here is what Paul does *not* say. According to Hooker's

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62 See e.g. my *Romans* 501 and those cited there.

63 Δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (3.5) overlaps with but is not synonymous with ἡ πίστις τοῦ θεοῦ and ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ θεοῦ (3.3, 7): the first phrase is the more general, embracing God's relationship as Creator to the world as a whole (3.5-6), hence its characteristic anarthrous form; whereas the last two phrases refer specifically to God's covenant faithfulness, hence the definite article.

64 This is more likely than a reference to the faithfulness of Christ, since what is being described is the action of God; but see above nn. 25 and 41.

65 See my *Romans* on each passage.

66 2 Thess. 3.3 and 2 Tim. 2.13 are the only exceptions in the Pauline corpus.

67 The same is true of 2 Cor. 1.17-22—a reference to *God's* faithfulness, not Christ's (*pace* Hooker 177-8), though we might speak of God's faithfulness incarnated in Christ (as Torrance 114, elaborating Hebert 375-6).

68 So also particularly Barth, 'Faith' 366-7.

statement of the subjective genitive thesis, the logic is simply crying out for Paul to make the precise antithesis which Hooker herself makes—between Adam's faithlessness and Christ's faithfulness. But Paul does not make it.[69] The sequence of antitheses in 5.15ff. was the ideal point at which to make clear beyond doubt that he was thinking of Christ as the prototype of faith. What would have been more natural, on Hooker's thesis, than that Paul should add to the antitheses between παράπτωμα and χάρισμα, between Adam's παρακοή and Christ's ὑπακοή, the further antithesis between Adam's ἀπιστία and Christ's πίστις? But he fails to do so. Does this not suggest that Hooker's logic has once again diverged from Paul's? The parallel/contrast between Adam and Christ is rich and resonant, but it evidently did *not* include the thought of Christ undoing Adam's faithlessness by means of his own faith in God.[70]

**4.6** For all these reasons I find myself being pushed strongly to the conclusion that the subjective genitive reading of πίστις Χριστοῦ in Romans is simply an example of mistaken exegesis.

## 5. Philippians

The one remaining example, in Phil. 3.9, can be treated briefly. Hooker's arguments are simply the application of considerations we have already encountered. (1) The redundancy of two mentions of faith—'not having my own righteousness which is ἐκ νόμου, but that which is διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ, the righteousness ἐκ θεοῦ ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει.'[71] (2) The parallel with Adam. In 3.7-8 Paul speaks of the reversal of values which marked his conversion. Hooker finds in the threefold use of ἡγέομαι ('I considered loss/rubbish') an echo of Christ's *kenosis* in 2.6-7 (ἡγήσατο), and suggests that the pattern of interchange between Christ and the believer, which she finds elsewhere in Paul, reappears here in another version. Christ's *kenosis* provides a model for Paul's own experience. This suggests that the διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ 'ought to refer to the obedient self-surrender of Christ, that is, to his faithfulness.'[72]

The parallel with Adam at this point, however, is rather remote, and the argument ignores the distinctiveness of the section in which the phrase occurs—3.2-16. For the more immediate context is dominated by the same issues which have featured so strongly in the earlier passages. How is it that God reckons righteousness to humans? Is it because they are Jews, circumcised, of the race of Israel (3.4-5), live fully 'within the law' (3.6)? That was Paul's old view and status. It is that which he had reacted against. And once again the contrast he poses is in terms of faith—the righteousness which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness which is from God to that faith.

Three considerations strongly support this reading. (1) The repetition of both 'righteousness' and 'faith'; Paul was evidently concerned to emphasize a point here. Once again it is a matter of emphasis rather than of redundancy. (2) The lack of the definite article with the first reference to 'faith' (διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ)

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[69] Despite Johnson 88-9.

[70] Perhaps indicative of the state of the question is Hooker's expostulation, 'If Paul does not use this idea, then he ought to!' (168). Since in Rom. 5.14-21 Paul resisted that inviting 'ought' the implication is rather that he did *not* wish to speak of Christ's faith, even in one of the two most explicit Adam/Christ parallels.

[71] So also Keck 455-6.

[72] Hooker 175-7.

once again probably tells against the reading 'the faith of Christ' and indicates an objective genitive, 'faith in Christ.' (3) Conversely, it is also to be noted that the second reference to faith is *not* anarthrous—ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει. This must mean that Paul was referring to the same faith both times—'the faith,' that is, the faith just mentioned. His Greek would be scarcely intelligible if he meant the first πίστις to refer to Christ's faith and the second πίστις to 'justifying faith.' Once again, then, the subjective genitive reading overshoots the mark. In order to sustain the claim that the first reference is to Christ's faith, the second must be so interpreted as well; *both* of the crucial references must be referred to Christ's self-surrender on the cross. And at the crucial point in the brief polemic we find the same hole as before; the vital means by which the righteousness actually comes to the individual is left unexplained.

In short, here too a subjective genitive reading of the text begins to look more and more like a forced reading rather than the most natural reading of the text.

## 6. Conclusion

I should make it clear that the *theology* of the subjective genitive reading is powerful, important and attractive. For anyone who wishes to take the humanness of Jesus with full seriousness 'the faith of Jesus' strikes a strong and resonant chord. Moreover, as a theological motif, it seems to me wholly compatible with Paul's theology. As Hooker has noted, it follows naturally when we bring together the thought of God in Christ and the thought of God's faithfulness. It is an attractive variant on the Adam motif of Christ's obedience. None of this, however, is to the particular point at dispute. That focuses on the meaning Paul intended when he dictated the phrase πίστις Χριστοῦ. And on this point I remain wholly convinced that Paul intended his audiences to hear that phrase in the sense 'faith in Christ.'

This conclusion is based on the three major findings of the above discussion. (1) There are good grammatical grounds for affirming the objective genitive reading and denying the subjective genitive reading of πίστις Χριστοῦ. (2) The traditional 'faith in Christ' makes consistently good sense of the line of thought in each case, with repetition serving to reinforce the claim being made. Whereas, insistence on reading πίστις Χριστοῦ as a subjective genitive runs the risk of throwing other, clear lines of Paul's argument in some confusion. (3) Outside the phrase in dispute there is nothing that can be called a clear reference to Christ's faith (as such). At this point the agency of Christ in Paul is consistently described in other ways ('in/through/to Christ'), but nowhere else in terms of Christ's own faith or faithfulness. A thesis built solely on a disputed phrase is usually likely to be wrong.

In consequence I find myself rather puzzled as to why the subjective genitive interpretation is being pushed with such fervour. In line with the above findings, the simplest and most coherent exegesis of the disputed phrase is surely to conclude that Paul did *not* intend to be understood as speaking of Christ's faith, but only of 'faith in Christ.'

# Pseudepigrapha in Syriac Literature

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The corpus of texts relating to Old Testament figures and themes, many of which are not part of established canons of established religious groups, written or preserved Syriac is the subject of this investigation.[1] These texts have generally been categorized as "pseudepigrapha" despite the infelicities of that term and the etymological inaccuracies of applying it indiscriminately to a complex collection of texts which differ in the nature of their ascription, date, genre, content, origin and purpose.[2] Because of the preoccupation of generations of scholars with biblical and doctrinal texts, with the only usefulness of these texts considered to be their potential for illuminating Second-Temple Judaism and/or Christian origins, the deceptively simplistic appearing anonymous or pseudonymous texts relating to biblical figures have not been given extensive attention although, as shall be noted, there are some hopeful signs.

The standard handbooks of Syriac literature give but little attention to the presentation of pseudepigrapha in Syriac. Wright and Baumstark mention the existence of the materials; Ortiz de Urbina ignored them altogether.[3] The most complete listing remains that of Duval, although Charlesworth's *The Pseudepigrapha and Modern Research* is helpful and more up to date.[4] Other essential contributions toward cataloguing this material have been made by Rost and, especially, Denis although neither has focused specifically on Syriac texts.[5] The

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[1] Abbreviations supplementary to *JBL* 107(1988) 579-596: *OTP* = J. H. Charlesworth, ed. *Old Testament Pseudepigrapha* (2 vols.; Garden City: Doubleday, 1983-1985); *Peshitta* = *The Old Testament in Syriac According to the Peshitta Version* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972- ); *Peshitta List* = *List of Old Testament Manuscripts* edited by the Peshitta Institute, Leiden University (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961); *PS* = *Patrologia Syriaca* (3 vols.; Paris: Firmin Didot, 1894-1926); *ROC* = *Revue de l'orient chrétien.*

[2] See the discussion of the term "pseudepigrapha" by Michael E. Stone, "Categorization and Classification of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha," *AbrN* 24(1986) 167-177.

[3] William Wright, *A Short History of Syriac Literature* (London: A. & C. Black, 1894); Anton Baumstark, *Geschichte der syrischen Literatur* (Bonn: A. Marcus und E. Webers, 1922); Ignatius Ortiz de Urbina, *Patrologia Syriaca* (2nd ed.; Rome: Pont. Inst. Orientale, 1965).

[4] Rubens Duval, *Anciennes littératures chrétiennes, II: La littérature Syriaque* (Bibliothéque de l'enseignement de l'histoire ecclésiastique; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1907), 79-86; J. H. Charlesworth, assisted by P. Dykers and M. J. H. Charlesworth, *The Pseudepigraph and Modern Research, With a Supplement* (Septuagint and Cognate Studies 7; n.p.: Scholars Press for the Society of Biblical Literature, 1981).

[5] L. Rost, *Einleitung in die altestamentlichen Apocryphen und Pseudepigraphen einschliesslich der grossen Qumran-Handschriften* (Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer, 1971); A.-

large collections of pseudepigraphical texts have not been thorough or consistent in including reference to, or analysis of, Syriac language materials.[6]

The goals of this essay are threefold. Firstly, it presents reflections upon methodological considerations relating to analyzing the corpus of relevant texts extant in Syriac. It also provides an *initial* listing of these texts, aware that other likely candidates for inclusion remain unstudied, perhaps undiscovered, in Syriac manuscripts as well as in Armenian, Georgian, Arabic and perhaps Ethiopic manuscripts which preserve materials which, in whole or in part, may have been translated from Syriac. There are also large collections of biblical commentaries, homiletical literature and other popular culture texts which remain generally unexamined and which are crucial for documenting and understanding the development and transmission of pseudepigraphic texts and themes.

Thirdly, two case studies have been chosen to provide suggestions as to the transmission of pseudepigraphic texts in Syriac literature. These, the *Cave of Treasures* and the *Apocalypse of Adam*, are chosen with no intended implication that they are normative examples. It is far too early in the study of the pseudepigrapha in Syriac to make such claims, if indeed, they can ever be made. Their influence will be traced in the relevant biblical commentary material, with allusion to published homilies. It is understood that the question of influence is also being treated in a *provisional* and exploratory manner. The entire essay should be read as a *Forschungsbericht* rather than as an effort to provide a definitive statement.

## Methodological Issues

The most serious methodological issue involves providing parameters to delimit the corpus of texts classified as pseudepigrapha.[7] The term itself is of no assistance. Classification according to origin is fraught with difficulties.[8] It is frequently impossible to ascertain if a certain text was composed by a Jewish writer between 300 BCE and 300 CE, although it is certain that, in their present form, many of our text were redacted by Christian adherents. It is less certain that many of the texts could not have been written by a Christian writer on the basis of oral or written tradition, or merely with the canonical Genesis narrative at hand or in mind. The issue of source(s) is, in some ways, even more complex for indigenous Syriac compositions.

Therefore, texts are included in the list below which, while developing Old Testament biblical figures and themes, also possess one or more of the following characteristics: (1) transmission as authoritative texts; (2) citation as authoritative

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M. Denis, *Introduction aux pseudépigraphes grecs d'ancien testament* (Studia in Veteris Testamenti Pseudepigrapha, 1; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970).

[6] R. H. Charles, ed. *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913); *OTP*.

[7] S. P. Brock, review of *OTP*, *JJS* 35(1984) 201: "The very large differences between the various collections in the number of texts included at once point to a fundamental problem: what constitutes an "Old Testament Pseudepigraphon" and can there be said to be a meaningful corpus of literature constituted by such "Old Testament Pseudepigrapha." Cf. W. Speyer, *Die literarische Falschung im heidnischen und christlichen Altertum* (HAW 1.2; Munich: C. H. Beck, 1971) and Charlesworth, *Pseudepigrapha and Modern Research* 17-25.

[8] Robert Kraft, "Christian Transmission of Greek Jewish Scriptures," *Paganisme, Judaïsme, Christianisme: Mélanges offerts á Marcel Simon* (Paris: de Boccard, 1978) 207-226.

texts; (3) exhibition of archaizing characteristics; (4) possession of the potential to be read as providing supplementary data to the biblical narratives; and/or (5) betray an intention of authors or transmitters that they should be read as supplementary to the biblical narratives. Cultural and linguistic origins are mentioned, if a case or cases can be made regarding a specific text, but these are not used in categorizing the texts or as criteria for inclusion in the list. Dating of the Syriac translations is not frequently attempted here. Neither is there an effort to establish precise dates for apparently indigenous Syriac material, respecting the fact that the documents are deliberately not time specific apart from borrowed or adapted biblical chronology. An earlier draft of this essay attempted a classification by genre similar to that proposed by Stone.[9] However, in this presentation that strategy has been discarded in favor of a simple list. The establishment of genre defined categories presented too many anomalies.

Another problem relates to the allowable functions of the document(s) under investigation.[10] The vast majority of literature about pseudepigraphical documents relates them, generally negatively, to the canonical biblical texts, although occasionally a scholar will argue that a tradition preserved in the pseudepigraphical text predates that found in the canonical text. Likewise, the traditional distinctions between apocryphal and pseudepigraphical, which are based on ideological distinctions, are of no scholarly value except as they illumine the context in which a text was created or used. Not unlike the manner in which hagiographical texts have been used by historians almost exclusively as confirmatory of chronicles, this material has frequently been judged on its fidelity to the established biblical text, often with accusations of syncretism or paganism. This is highly inappropriate in both cases. The texts need to be allowed to have their own cultural structures. Each is the product of a creative individual or community which developed, for various reasons, the narratives. These circulated widely and often influenced how canonical texts were understood. More attention must be devoted to the function of these as folk literature in the various communities in which they were transmitted and emended.

Allusion has been made to the pseudepigraphic material extant in other Middle Eastern languages, specifically Armenian, Georgian, Arabic, and Ethiopic which have relationships with the Syriac corpus. The only group of materials which has received extensive attention is the Armenian collection, this due primarily to the disciplined and indefatigable efforts of Michael Stone.[11] Another contribution to the understanding of the Armenian Adam tradition has been made by Lipscomb.[12] In Armenian language pseudepigraphic materials, one is

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9 Michael E. Stone, ed., *Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period* (CRINT 2; Assen: Gorcum; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984).

10 W. Speyer, *Die literarische Falschung*, passim.

11 Among Stone's publications are: *Armenian Apocrypha Relating to the Patriarchs and Prophets, edited with Introductions, Translations and Commentary* (Publications of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Section of Humanities; Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1982); *The Penitence of Adam* (CSCO 429-430, Arm. 13-14; Louvain: Peeters, 1981); *The Armenian Version of IV Ezra* (University of Pennsylvania Armenian Texts and Studies, 1; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1979); *Signs of the Judgement, Onomastica Sacra and the Generations from Adam* (University of Pennsylvania Armenian Texts and Studies, 3; Chico: Scholars Press, 1981). See especially, Michael Stone, "New Discoveries Relating to the Armenian Adam Books," *JSP* 5(1989) 101-109.

12 William Lowndes Lipscomb, *The Armenian Apocryphal Adam Literature* (University of Pennsylvania Armenian Texts and Studies, 8; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990).

beginning to arrive at clarity of textual identity and transmission, and one is approaching the point where a corpus may be definable. However, there is much work to be done.[13]

The situation is much less developed in Arabic language texts where there are extensive materials, and few critical editions of texts. Because Arabic translations occurred in various regions and in different periods, there are complex interconnected sets of textual relationships and versions related to the Greek, Syriac, Georgian, Armenian, Ethiopic and Coptic traditions of transmission.[14] Georgian pseudepigraphical texts received initial attention by Tarchnisvili.[15] Ethiopic texts have been mentioned by Harden and Cerulli, but the task of identifying the materials listed in the recently published catalogues is yet to be done.[16] Coptic materials are accessible through the catalogues of the various collections of manuscripts, but no systematic analysis of the pseudepigraphic materials or effort to define the corpus or relevant materials has been published. Syriac pseudepigraphic texts must eventually be examined in light of the other linguistic traditions of transmission.

## Syriac Pseudepigraphical Texts

The list below is quite restrictive, given the definition proposed above. It is limited primarily to published texts. It does not seek to be exhaustive with regard to unpublished texts, nor does it include all texts attributed to biblical characters (for example, the Maccabees, Solomon, Ezra, Adam and Moses) nor does it include the numerous anonymous or pseudepigraphic wisdom texts.[17] Such a catalogue would supersede reasonable space limitations for this essay. Also, the documents listed by Rost as "apocrypha" have, only for reasons of space limitations and more common knowledge of their existence in Syriac, not been discussed, although they are listed below.[18] The documents listed below are, in the author's estimation, those for which a reasonable claim of pseudepigraphical status can be made. Other suggestions and indications of *lacuna* will be appreciated.

*Adam, Testament of.* This document, which has often been confused with portions of the *Cave of Treasures*,[19] is part of the large corpus of Adam narratives extant in all early Christian cultural units. The Syriac tradition, which Robinson

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13 See the "catalogues" of G. Zarbbhanalian, *Patmut'iwn Hay Hin Dprut'ean d-zg* (Venice: Mxit'arean Tparan, 1932); and H. S. Anasyan, *Haykakan Matenagitut'yun V-XVII dd* (Erevan: Academy of Sciences, 1970).

14 Georg Graf, *Geschichte der christlichen arabischen Literatur* (Studi e testi 118; Città del Vaticano: Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, 1944) 199-224.

15 M. Tarchnisvili, *Geschichte der kirchlichen Georgischen Literatur* (Studi e testi 185; Cittá del Vaticano: Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, 1955) passim.

16 J. M. Harden, *An Introduction to Ethiopic Christian Literature* (London: S.P.C.K., 1926) 37-50; Enrico Cerulli *La letteratura etiopica* (3rd ed.; Le letterature del mondo; Firenze: Sansoni, Milano: Academia, 1968) passim; cf. Edward Ullendorf, *Ethiopia and the Bible* (The Schweich Lectures of the British Academy, 1967; London: Published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press, 1968).

17 For example, S. P. Brock, "A Piece of Wisdom Literature in Syriac," *JSS* 13(1968) 212-217.

18 Rost, *Einleitung* 38-73.

19 G. J. Reinick, "Das Problem des Ursprungs des Testaments Adams," *Symposium Syriacum 1972* (OCA 197; Rome: Pont. Institum Orientalium Studiorum, 1974) 387-399.

argued to be the original language of this text, preserves three distinct recensions of the *Testament of Adam*, divided among eight manuscript witnesses.[20]

*Ahiqar*. This narrative, probably of Aramaic provenance dates from at least the fifth century BCE. The Syriac is the most complete of the various versions. On the basis of two East Syrian manuscripts, B. L. Add. 7200 and Cambridge Syriac 2020, portions of the text were edited by Harris.[21] An edition of Berlin Sachau 162 was done by Nau in 1914.[22] Other manuscripts were then found and these were edited by Nau.[23]

*Bahira, Legend of*.[24] The *Legend of Bahira* is a text of Christian origin with archaizing tendencies which appears to be a compilation of three distinct literary units. The editor of both the Syriac and Arabic versions, followed by Duval, dates the composition of the first and third portions to the late eleventh or early twelfth century. The second portion, they consider "much older."[25] It is doubtful whether, under strict definitions, this text should be included in a list of pseudepigrapha. However it is possibly not much later than some of the materials included below, such as the *Treatise of Shem* or *Cave of Treasures*. Duval's inclusion of the material in his list also influences its inclusion here.

*Baruch*.[26]

*2 Baruch*. The primary witness to this text in its complete form is the Syriac version which is completely preserved only in the Syriac Manuscript *Bibliotheca Ambrosiana B. 21 Inf.* fols. 257a-265b. It was first edited by Ceriani and more recently by Dedering.[27] A thorough study of the manuscript, the context of the document and its theological *Tendenzen*, which served to initiate extensive discussion of *2 Baruch*, was proffered by Bogaert, along with a French translation.[28] An Arabic version, which apparently derives from the Syriac, was

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20 S. E. Robinson, *The Testament of Adam, An Examination of the Syriac and Greek Traditions* (SBLDS 52; Chico: Scholars Press, 1982). Robinson, *Testament*, presents an edition and English translation of the three recensions. See also, *idem*, "The Testament of Adam: An Updated Arbeitsbericht," *JSP* 5(1989) 95-100. An earlier edition was published by Kmosko, "Testamentum Patris Nostri Adam," *PS* 2.1306-1360.

21 F. C. Conybeare, J. R. Harris and A. S. Lewis, *The Story of Ahikar from the Aramaic, Syriac, Arabic, Armenian, Ethiopic, Old Turkish, Greek and Slavonic Versions* (2nd ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913). The Syriac was translated by F. Nau, *Histoire et sagesse d'Ahikar l'Assyrien (fils d'Anaël, neveu de Tobie); Traduction des versions syriaques* (Paris: Letouzey, 1909). Cf. Denis, *Introduction* 202, 206.

22 F. Nau, Préceptes anonymes et histoire d'Ahiqar," *ROC* 19(1914) 209-214, and *idem*, "Histoire et sagesse d'Ahiqar," *ROC* 21(1918-1919) 148-160.

23 F. Nau, "Documents relatifs à Ahiqar," *ROC* 21(1918-1919) 274-307, 356-400.

24 Duval, *Introduction* 86.

25 R. Gottheil, *A Christian Bahira Legend* (New York: n.p., 1903); Duval, *Introduction* 86.

26 Rost, *Einleitung* 50-53; *Peshitta List* 100.

27 A. M. Ceriani, ed., *Monumenta sacra et profana* (Milan: Bibliotheca Ambrosiana, 1871) 5.2.113-180; S. Dedering, ed., "Apocalypse of Baruch," *Peshitta* Part 4, fasc. 3 (1973) 1-50.

28 P. M. Bogaert, *L'Apocalypse de Baruch; Introduction, traduction du syriaque et commentaire* (SC 144, 145; Paris: Ed. du Cerf, 1969). Cf. reviews by A. de Halleux, *Mus* 82 (1969) 523-526; and J. Gribomont, *RHE* 66(1971) 556-561. For recent bibliography, see Denis, *Introduction* 182-186 and Charlesworth, *Pseudepigrapha and Modern Research* 84-86, 275.

described by van Koningsveld.[29] It has been published by a team of Dutch scholars.[30]

*Baruch, Letters of.*[31]

*Cave of Treasures.* The *Cave of Treasures* has been included in most lists of pseudepigrapha, despite the probability that it was composed, or at least finally redacted, between the late fourth and late sixth centuries CE, probably in northern Mesopotamia. This is probably due to the complex literary relationships of the Adam and Moses narratives and the mistaken scholarly tradition that this material and the *Testament of Adam* were not distinguished in the manuscript tradition.[32] The first critical edition was by Bezold, supplemented by an English translation by Budge of another Syriac manuscript (B. L. Add. 25,875), both of which have been supplanted by the edition of Su-Min Ri.[33] Su-Min Ri identified two distinct recensions witnessed by 19 manuscripts (seven others identified by manuscripts catalogues of Middle Eastern repositories were inaccessible or are lost). This text, its sources and influence will be discussed below. A related text, the thirteenth century *Book of the Bee* edited with an English translation by Budge, also preserves ancient materials and has relationships both to the Adam and Moses narratives as well as to the *Cave of Treasures.*[34]

An Arabic version, edited by M. D. Gibson,[35] which was translated from the Syriac, and an Ethiopic version dependent on the Arabic are extant.[36]

*Daniel* and additions including *Susanna, The Prayer of Ananias, Bel and the Dragon.*[37]

*Daniel, Apocalypse of.* Preserved only in Syriac, this text has been edited and studied in a still unpublished University of Hamburg dissertation.[38]

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[29] P. Sj. van Koningsveld, "An Arabic Manuscript of the Apocalypse of Baruch," *JSJ* 6(1975) 205-207.

[30] F. Leemhuis, A. F. J. Klijn and G. J. H. van Gelder, eds. *The Arabic Text of the Apocalypse of Baruch, edited and translated with a parallel translation of the Syriac text* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986).

[31] *Peshitta List* 99.

[32] Duval, *Littérature Syriaque* 81-82; Denis, *Introduction* 8-10; Charlesworth, *Pseudepigrapha and Modern Research* 91-92.

[33] C. Bezold, *Die Schatzhöhle* (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich, 1888); E. A. W. Budge, *The Book of the Cave of Treasures* (London: Religious Tract Society, 1927); Su-Min Ri, *La Caverne des Trésors, Les deux recensions syriaques* (CSCO 486-487; Syr. 207-208; Louvain: E. Peeters, 1987).

[34] E. A. W. Budge, *The Book of the Bee* (Anecdota Oxoniensia, Semitic Series 1.2; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1886).

[35] M. D. Gibson, *Apocrypha Arabica, Kitāb al-Magāll, or Book of the Rolls, One of the Books of Clement* (Studia Sinaitica 8; London: C. J. Clay, 1901). This was reprinted, translated into Italian and annotated by A. Battista and B. Bagatti, *La Caverna dei Tesori* (Studium Biblicum Franciscanum, Collectio Minor, 26; Jerusalem: Franciscan Publishing House, 1980).

[36] Denis, *Introduction* 9.

[37] Rost, *Einleitung* 64-69; *Peshitta List* 102-104, 105-106; T. Sprey, *et al.* eds., "Daniel and Bel and the Dragon," *Peshitta* Part 3, fasc. 4 (1980); A. G. Kallarakkal, *The Peshitto Version of Daniel, A Comparison with the Massoretic Text, the Septuagint and Theodotion* (Diss. Hamburg, 1973).

[38] H. Schmoldt, *Die Schrift 'von jungen Daniel' und 'Daniels letzte Vision'* (Diss. Hamburg, 1972). I have been unable to obtain a copy of this dissertation. See however the reference in S. Brock, "Jewish Traditions in Syriac Sources," *JJS* 30(1979) 224 n. 48.

*Enoch, Apocalypse of.* A text bearing this title apparently was extant in Syriac as indicated by a reference in the *Chronicle* of Michael the Syrian who calls it "a book of lies."[39] It appears to have been used as a prophecy concerning rule and succession in the Umayyad dynasty of the eighty century. There is no way of knowing, unless manuscript evidence is discovered, whether or not this text had any relationship to the texts extant in Ethiopic, Greek, Armenian, Slavonic and Hebrew.

*1 (3) Ezra.*[40]

*4 Ezra.* Despite affirmations that the Syriac version is (along with the Latin) the "most important" and despite the work being described as "one of the most brilliant and original of the apocryphal compositions,"[41] the Syriac version has received little scholarly attention. It was first published by Ceriani on the basis of the manuscript *Bibliotheca Ambrosiana B. 21 Inf.*, fols. 267a-276b, and translated into English by Box.[42] It has been reedited by Bidawid as part of the Leiden Peshitta edition project who supplemented the Ambrosian manuscript with three fragments found in West Syrian lectionaries.[43]

*Ezra, Apocalypse of.*[44] Written or at least revised after the Arab conquests of northern Mesopotamia, this apocalypse is also entitled "Vision of Ezra," "The Question of Ezra the Scribe while in the Desert with his Disciple Karpos," and "The Prayer of Ezra" in the manuscript tradition. This text, which appears to draw upon *4 Ezra* as well as the canonical Daniel and the Apocalypse of John, mentions the expansion of Islam. It was first published by Baethgen on the basis of the Berlin manuscript, *Sachau 131* and then by Chabot on the basis of the Paris manuscript, *B.N. 326.*[45] Other manuscripts include *Leeds 4, Vat. Syr. 164, Mingana 11* and *Mingana 567.*[46]

*Ezra, Book of.* Cambridge University Library Syriac manuscript 629 (folios 116r-117r) contains an alchemy text, documented in the manuscript as "from the Book of Ezra, the Learned Scribe,"[47] This fragment has not otherwise been preserved. It is certainly a medieval production, although it may be based in Hellenistic or other northern Mesopotamian traditions.

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[39] J.-B. Chabot, *Chronique de Michel le Syrien* (Paris: Ernst Leroux, 1899-1910) 4.465a (text); 2.507b (trans.).

[40] Rost, *Einleitung* 71-73; *Peshitta List* 111; W. Baars and J. C. H. Lebram, "1 (3) Esdras," *Peshitta* Part 4, fasc. 6 (1972)

[41] Charlesworth, *Pseudepigrapha and Modern Research* 111; Cf. Duval, *Littérature* 80, and Denis, *Introduction* 197.

[42] A. M. Ceriani, *Monumenta Sacra et Profana* 5.1.45-108. G. H. Box, *The Apocalypse of Ezra (II Esdras III-IV), translated from the Syriac* (Translations of Early Documents 1.8; London: S.P.C.K., 1917.)

[43] R. J. Bidawid, "4 Esdras" *Peshitta*, Part 4, fasc. 3(1973) 1-50.

[44] Noted in Duval, *Littérature* 84-85, and Denis, *Introduction* 94. Cf. Charlesworth, *Pseudepigrapha and Modern Research* 111.

[45] F. Baethgen, "Beschreibung der syrischen Handschrift "Sachau 131" auf der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin," *ZAW* 6(1886) 200-204 [text], 204-210 [trans.]; J.-B. Chabot, "L'Apocalypse d'Esdras, touchant le Royaume des Arabes," *RevSém* 2(1894) 242-250 [text], 333-346 [trans.].

[46] R. Y. Ebied, "Some Syriac Manuscripts from the Collection of Sir E. A. Wallis Budge," *Syriac Symposium IV* (OCA 197; Rome: Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1974) 525. Cf. Duval, *Littérature* 81-82.

[47] M. Berthelot avec la collaboration de R. Duval, *L'Alchemie Syriaque (Histoire des Sciences. La Chimie au moyen âge;* Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1893) 2.294-295.

*James and Jambre, Penitence of.* This pseudepigraphon, widely known during the early Christian centuries, is extant only in a series of Greek fragments and a single Syriac text, *The Testament of Ephrem.*[48] However some Syriac witnesses to the *Testament of Ephrem* follow the Greek by excluding the narrative which recounts the struggle of Moses with the magicians (for example, B. L. Add. 14,582).

*Jeremiah, Letters of.*[49]

*Jesus Sirach, Wisdom of.* ( = *Ecclesiasticus*)[50]

*Joseph and Asenath.*[51] The Syriac version of this Greek narrative recounts the relationship between the biblical patriarch Joseph and the daughter of a pagan Egyptian priest who converts to marry Joseph, both of whom suffer at the hands of their enemies. The Syriac is preserved in the *Ecclesiastical History* of Zachary the Rhetor.[52] The two Syriac manuscripts preserve a translation attributed to Moses of Aggel (*circa* 569 CE).[53] Burchard examined the entire manuscript tradition (Greek, Syriac, Armenian, Latin, Ethiopic, Paleo-Slavic, Roumanian, Modern Greek) and ascertained three manuscript families. Both Syriac manuscripts fit into the second group, "b."[54]

*Jubilees, Book of.* Often called *Parva Genesis, Book of the Division* [Qumran] or *Leptē Genesis* [Detailed Genesis], this text was written in Hebrew. The angel reveals to Moses a haggadic targum of the canonical *Genesis* and *Exodus.* Only two fragments are preserved in Syriac. The first is in a fragment of the *Panarion* of Epiphanius [*CPG* 3745], edited by Ceriani.[55] The more substantial fragment was preserved in an anonymous chronicle which goes up to 1234 CE. Credit for identifying this text goes to Tisserant who discovered it in the edition of Rahmani, but which is available in the edition of Chabot.[56] The *Book of Jubilees,* as

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[48] Denis, *Introduction* 146-149. The pseudonymous Ephremian text is found in J. S. Assemani, *Sancti Ephraem syri opera* (Rome: Propaganda Fide, 1743) 2.405E-408E, but in a better edition by R. Duval, *Le Testament de Saint Ephrem* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale 1901) 38-44 [text], 69-74 [trans.].

[49] Rost, *Einleitung* 53-54; *Peshitta List* 99.

[50] Rost, *Einleitung* 47-50; *Peshitta List* 107-108; M. D. Nelson, *The Syriac Version of the Wisdom of Ben Sira Compared to the Greek and Hebrew Materials* (SBLDS 107; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988).

[51] Duval, Littérature 83; Denis, *Introduction* 40-48, esp. 43; Charlesworth, *Pseudepigrapha and Modern Research* 137-140.

[52] J. P. N. Land, ed. *Anecdota syriaca* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1870) 3.18-46; E. W. Brooks, ed. *Historia ecclesiastica Zachariae Rhetori vulgo adscripta* (CSCO 83-84; Syr. 38-39; Louvain: Impr. Orientaliste, 1919) 21-55 [text], 4-39 [trans.].

[53] Denis, *Introduction* 43; Land, *Anecdota* 18.

[54] C. Burchard, *Untersuchungen zu Joseph und Aseneth* (WUNT 8; Tübingen: Mohr, 1965). See also, *idem,* "Joseph et Aséneth, Questions actuelles," *La Littérature Juive entre Tenach et Mischna, Quelques problémes* (ed. W. C. van Unnik; RechBib 9; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974) 77-100.

[55] Ceriani, *Monumenta sacra et profana* (1863) 2.2.ix-x = K. Holl, ed. *Epiphanius II: Panarion* (GCS 31; Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich, 1922) 76 line 25-77 line 1.

[56] I. E. Rahmani, *Chronicon civile et ecclesiasticum anonymi auctoris* (Charfet: n.p., 1904), see, E. Tisserant, "Fragments syriaques du Livre des Jubilés," *RB* 30(1921), 55-86, 206-232 = *Recueil Cardinal Eugéne Tisserant: "Ab Oriente et Occidente"* (ed. S. Pop, *et al.*; Louvain: Centre international de dialectologie générale, 1955) 25-87; J.-B. Chabot, *Anonymi auctoris Chronicon ad A.C. 1234 pertinens* (CSCO 82, 109; Syr. 37, 56; Louvain: Imprimerie Orientalist, 1917, 1937).

with other pseudepigraphical literature, has a complex relationship with subsequent Syriac literature. [57]

*Judith*.[58]

*1 Maccabees*.[59]

*2 Maccabees*.[60]

*3 Maccabees*. This, originally Greek, narrative about Ptolomy IV Philopater set in the context of a triumphant Jewish nationalism, was edited in Greek.[61] A Syriac version is extant with at least 19 manuscript witnesses. It was transmitted in the Syriac Peshitta tradition.[62]

*4 Maccabees*. Extolling the value of reason controlling the passions, this widely ranging diatribe narrative, originally written in Greek,[63] was also transmitted in the Syriac Peshitta version of the Old Testament. It was first edited (published posthumously) by Bensly.[64] It has at least 10 manuscript witnesses.[65]

*5 Maccabees*. The Arabic text known as *5 Maccabees* circulated in Syriac (Arabic) Christian communities as evidenced by the numerous *Karšūnī* (Arabic written in Syriac characters) manuscript witnesses listed by Graf and repeated by Charlesworth.[66] No Syriac manuscripts have been identified. The text designated *5 Maccabees* in the Peshitta manuscript *Bibliotheca Ambrosiana B. 21 Inf.* has been identified as an extract from the sixth book of Josephus, *Wars*.[67]

*Manasseh, Prayer of*. In Syriac as in Greek there are three separate structures of textual transmission, perhaps reflecting different textual traditions of this short text. In Greek it appears in Septuagint manuscripts after the fifth century as well as in the *Apostolic Constitutions* and *Didascalia Apostolorum*.[68] It is also in Greek liturgical manuscripts. In Syriac it is found in seven Peshitta manuscripts (the earliest being from the ninth century), nine manuscripts of the *Didascalia Apostolorum*, and in ten Melchite horologion manuscripts where the prayer is contained in the Great Compline for Easter.[69]

*Menander, Sentences*.[70] The collection of sayings attributed to Menander, probably intended as an allusion to the Greek author from the 3rd century BCE, is

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57 S. Brock, "Abraham and the Ravens: A Syriac Counterpart to Jubilees 11-12 and its Implications," *JSJ* 9(1978) 135-152.

58 Rost *Einleitung* 38-41; *Peshitta List* 106-107.

59 Rost, *Einleitung* 55-58; *Peshitta List* 109.

60 Rost, *Einleitung* 58-61; *Peshitta List* 110.

61 R. Hanhart, ed. *Maccabaeorum Liber III* (Septuaginta 9.3; Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 1960). See also, R. Hanhart, *Zum Text des 2. und 3. Makkabäerbuches* (Mitteilungen des Septuaginta Unternehmens der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, 7; Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 1961).

62 *Peshitta List* 110.

63 Edited by A. Rahlfs, "Machabaeorum IV," *Septuaginta* (Stuttgart: Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1935) 1.1157-84.

64 *The Fourth Book of Maccabees and Kindred Documents in Syriac*, first edited on manuscript authority by R. L. Bensly with an introduction and translations by W. E. Barnes (Cambridge: University Press, 1895).

65 *Peshitta List* 110.

66 *Peshitta List* 110.

67 Graf, *Geschichte* 1.223; Charlesworth, *Pseudepigrapha and Modern Research* 153-156.

68 Denis, *Introduction* 177-181.

69 W. Baars and H. Schneider, "Prayer of Manassah," *Peshitta* Part 4, fasc. 6 (1972) ii-vi.

70 Charlesworth, *Pseudepigrapha and Modern Research* 158-159, 296; T. Baarda, "The Sentences of the Syriac Menander," *OTP* 2.583-590.

preserved in two forms: a more extensive form (B.L. Add. 14,658) and an epitome (B.L. 14,614). The former served as the basis for the editions of Land, the latter was edited by Sachau.[71]

The understanding of this as an authentic Menander text has faded. Some have come to understand it as a pseudepigraphon of Jewish origin.[72] However, its complex and subtle relationships with Jewish, Christian and classical Greek literature provides an excellent case study of the difficulties inherent in isolating a stream of ideological influence in the context of hellenistic culture, with or without the complications of theories of redaction. It is doubtful whether, according to most definitions of pseudepigrapha it should be included in the corpus of such texts. This text and others like it may require further nuancing of the term pseudepigraphon. Baarda has provided a modern English translation of both the longer text and the epitome, prefaced by a helpful introduction to these issues.[73]

*Moses, Colloquy on Mount Sinai.*[74] This text was published by Hall on the basis of a modern (late 19th century) transcription, which apparently he commissioned, of an Urmia manuscript.[75] Hall notes a number of *Karšūnī* manuscripts, but he did not attempt to collate these. I have attempted, without success to locate this manuscript. It may be in the Harvard University (Houghton Library) collection or at Union Theological Seminary, but Hall's manuscripts were widely dispersed and available catalogues of the collections too impressionistic to verify or eliminate the possibility. The text, which Hall did not attempt to date, does reflect ancient traditions, and may be of Jewish origin. However, there are no internal criteria for dating.

*Patriarchs, Testament of the Twelve.*[76] Recently reedited in its Greek version, there are Armenian and Slavonic versions as well as portions of this pseudepigraphon which were found among the Dead Sea Scrolls.[77] It would appear that a Syriac version, the extent of which cannot be judged, did exist. A fragment was identified in a London manuscript, *B. L. Add. 17,193* by Wright.[78]

*Prophets, Lives of the.*[79] The Syriac version of this text, also referred to as *Deaths of the Prophets, Triumphs of the Prophets* and *Pseudo-Epiphanius*, is preserved in two recensions. The first is transmitted in the *Chronicle* of Michael the Syrian, published by Chabot with a French translation, and in the volume by Solomon of

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71 J. P. N. Land, *Anecdota Syriaca*, 1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1862) 1.64-73. Corrections to this edition were published by a number of scholars (see bibliography in Baarda, *Sentences* 583-590). E. Sachau, *Inedita Syriaca; Eine Sammlung syrischer Übersetzungen von Schriften griechischen Profanliteratur* (Vienna: K. K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1870) 80-81.

72 Especially important is the essay of W. Frankenburg, "Die Schrift des Menander (Land, Anecd. Syr. I, 64ff.) ein Produkt der jüdischen Spruchweisheit," *ZAW* 15(1895) 226-277.

73 Baarda, *Sentences* 591-606.

74 Duval, *Littérature* 83.

75 I. H. Hall, "The Colloquy of Moses on Mount Sinai," *Hebraica* 7(1891) 161-177.

76 Denis, *Introduction* 49-59, esp. 53.

77 M. de Jonge, *Testamenta XII Patriarchum, Edited According to Cambridge University Library Ms Ff 1.24 fol. 203a-262b* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1964) x-xi discusses the Dead Sea Scroll fragments.

78 W. Wright, *Catalogue of Syriac Manuscripts in the British Museum* (London: British Museum, 1872) 2.997 fragment 80.

79 Duval, *Littérature* 83-84; Denis, *Introduction* 88; Charlesworth, *Pseudepigrapha and Modern Research* 175-177, 199.

Basra, *Book of the Bee*, edited and translated by Budge.[80] The second, attributed to Epiphanius of Cyprus, is found in several Syriac manuscripts: *Leeds Syriac 4*, *Sachau 131*, *Mingana Syriac 767*, *Union Theological Seminary Syriac 16*, and the British Museum (now Library) manuscripts used by Nestle for his edition.[81] Hall published a translation of this recension on the basis of the Union Theological Seminary Manuscript.[82]

*Psalms, Apocryphal, attributed to David.*[83] There are five of these Psalms, preserved in Syriac but originally written in Hebrew, which have been transmitted as an addendum to the canonical Psalms in the Syriac psalters, although that transmission often finds the five Psalms combined into three. Three (Psa 151, 154, 155) have prototypes in the Qumran psalter (11Q Psa). The transmission is described by Baars in the preface to his critical edition.[84]

The *editio princips* was provided by Wright.[85] An edition reflecting a wider manuscript base was done by Mingana.[86] These elicited little scholarly attention until the discovery of the Dead Sea manuscript. Since that time numerous studies have been published. Another English translation, by Charlesworth and Sanders, is available.[87]

*Queen of Sheba, Questions to Solomon.* A collection of twelve questions directed by the Queen of Sheba to Solomon (cf. I Kings 10:1) followed by a question posed by Solomon for the Queen, this text is preserved in Syriac (and a dependent Armenian tradition). The Syriac is probably from a Greek original. There is some question as to the inclusion of this text in a list of pseudepigrapha since the Syriac/Armenian questions are significantly different from those preserved in Jewish sources, although Brock suggests that Questions 8-12 may be of Jewish origin. Brock edited the Syriac text on the basis of three West Syrian manuscripts (*Cambridge Add. 2012*, *Mingana Syr. 480* and *Harvard Syr. 99*), with collation of two Armenian versions, providing an English translation and introduction.[88]

*Shem, Book of.* Preserved in only one 15th century manuscript (*John Rylands Syriac 44*, folios 81v-83v), this text was first edited by Mingana.[89] It was more

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[80] Chabot, ed., *Chronique de Michel le Syrien* 4.38-44; E. A. W. Budge, ed. *The Book of the Bee*.

[81] "Vitae Prophetarum (E tribus codicibus Musei Britannici)," *Syriac Grammar with Bibliography, Chrestomathy and Glossary* (Porta Liguarum Orientalium 5; Berlin H. Reuther, 1889) pw-qla.

[82] I. H. Hall, "The Lives of the Prophets," *Journal of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis* 7(June 1887) 28-38.

[83] Duval, *Littérature* 79-80; Denis, *Introduction* 66-67; Charlesworth, *Pseudepigrapha and Modern Research* 202-209, 304; P. W. Skehan, "Again the Syriac Apocryphal Psalms," *CBQ* 38(1976) 143-158.

[84] W. Baars, ed. "Apocryphal Psalms," *Peshitta* Part 4, fasc. 6 (1972) i-ix, 1-12 (edition); see also the discussion in Skehan, *Again*.

[85] W. Wright, "Some Apocryphal Psalms in Syriac," *Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology* 9(1887) 257-266.

[86] A. Mingana, "Some Uncanonical Psalms," *Woodbrooke Studies* (Cambridge: Heffer, 1927) 1.288-292.

[87] J. H. Charlesworth and J. A. Sanders, "More Psalms of David," *OTP* 2.609-624.

[88] S. Brock, "The Queen of Sheba's Questions to Solomon, A Syriac Version," *Mus* 92(1979) 331-345.

[89] A. Mingana, "Some Early Judaeo-Christian Documents in the John Rylands University Library: Syriac Texts," *BJRL* 4(1917-1918) 59-118; published apart as *Some Early Judaeo-Christian Documents in the John Rylands University Library: Syriac Texts* (Manchester: University of Manchester, 1917) 30-52 [text], 24-29 [trans.].

recently discussed by Charlesworth who has supplied two English translations.[90] The historical data marshalled to defend a dating of 100 CE can, with fewer anomalies, support a later date. There are no identified citations in Syriac literature, and nothing argues against it being a late Syriac composition.

*Solomon, Odes of.* The *editio princips* of the Syriac *Odes of Solomon* was published by Harris (1909), and reedited, after the discovery of additional manuscript material, in collaboration with Mingana.[91] These editions initiated a discussion regarding the date, theology, original language, provenance, and ideological context which has not arrived at consensus. One of the most interesting and potentially fruitful suggestions is by Drijvers who has suggested that the extant Syriac recension contains anti-Marcionite elements.[92] A detailed record of the entire debate can be found in the annotated bibliography of Lattke.[93] Another English translation of the *Odes*, with a reedition of the Syriac text was proffered by Charlesworth.[94] More recently, the edition of Lattke, with its careful attention to the other language traditions in which the *Odes* have been preserved, has provided a base for renewed discussion of the critical issues. The usefulness of Lattke's edition is augmented no small amount by the accompanying complete concordance to all versions.[95]

*Solomon, Psalms of.*[96] These materials, probably of Jewish origin but with Christian emendations, are preserved in eleven Greek and in five Syriac manuscripts. Two of the Syriac manuscripts (*John Rylands Syriac 9*, and *London, B.*

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[90] J. H. Charlesworth, "Rylands Syriac Ms. 44 and a New Addition to the Pseudepigrapha: The treatise of Shem, Discussed and Translated," *BJRL* 60(1977-1978) 376-403 [cf. the review of S. Brock, *The Society for Old Testament Book List* (1979) 125-126 who points out relationships to Greek texts and notes other related Syriac texts]; *idem*, "Treatise of Shem," *OTP* 2.474-480 [Note: the introduction is nearly verbatim from Charlesworth's *BJRL* article noted above; cf. Charlesworth, *Pseudepigrapha and Modern Research* 182-184].

[91] J. R. Harris, *The Odes and Psalms of Solomon, now first published in the Syriac version* (Cambridge: University Press, 1909); J. R. Harris and A. Mingana, *The Odes and Psalms of Solomon, Re-edited for the Governors of the John Rylands Library* (2 vols.; Manchester: The University Press; London, New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1916, 1920).

[92] H. J. W. Drijvers, "Die Oden Salomos und die Polemik mit den Markioniten im syrischen Christentum," *Symposium Syriacum 1976* (OCA 205; Rome: Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1978) 39-55. This together with related essays are reprinted in *idem, East of Antioch, Studies in Early Syriac Christianity* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984).

[93] M. Lattke, *Die Oden Salomos in ihrer Bedeutung für Neues Testament und Gnosis*, Band 3: *Forschungsgeschichtliche Bibliographie 1799-1984 mit kritischen Anmerkungen, mit einem Beitrag von Majella Franzmann, A Study of the Odes of Solomon with Reference to French Scholarship 1909-1980* (OBO 25.3; Freiburg; Universitätsverlag; Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 1986); Cf. Charlesworth, *Pseudepigrapha and Modern Research* 189-194, 301-303, who does not cite the work of Lattke.

[94] J. H. Charlesworth, *The Odes of Solomon, Edited with Translation and Notes* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).

[95] M. Lattke, *Die Oden Solomos in ihrer Bedeutung für Neues Testament und Gnosis*, Band Ia: *Der syrische Text der Edition in Estrangelā. Faksimile des griechischen Papyrus Bodmer XI* (OBO 25.1a; Freiburg: Universitätsverlag; Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 1980) and the concordance: *idem, Die Oden Solomos in ihrer Bedeutung für Neues Testament und Gnosis*, Band 2: *Vollständige Wortkonkordanz zur handschriftlichen, griechischen, koptischen, lateinischen und syrischen Überlieferung der Oden Salomos* (OBO 25.2; Freiburg: Universitätsverlag; Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 1979).

[96] Denis, *Introduction* 60-69; Charlesworth, *Pseudepigrapha and Modern Research* 195-197, 303-304.

*L. Add. 14.538*) contain significant overlapping portions of the *Psalms of Solomon* collection. The other three manuscripts contain only fragments of individual *Psalms of Solomon*, two of which (*Cambridge University Syr. 2012* and *Birmingham, Mingana Syriac 331*) contain *Pss. Sol.* 16:6-13.

*B. L. Add. 17.134* preserves *Pss. Sol.* 3:1-6.

The honor of producing the *editio princips* of the Syriac *Psalms of Solomon* goes to Harris (1909) who collaborated with Mingana in a reedition after the discovery of additional manuscript material.[97] The *Psalms of Solomon* have been more recently edited by Baars.[98]

A thorough study of the Syriac version has been proffered by Trafton.[99] He concludes that the Syriac was *probably* translated from the Hebrew instead of from the Greek, although, as he points out, the evidence can be read the other way. Even after such a careful study, the evidence produces no certain basis for a conclusion regarding the linguistic provenance of the Syriac version. The possibility of an Aramaic *Vorlage* is not considered. Trafton also produced an edition, apparently by cutting and pasting photocopies of the manuscripts, but there is no indication of method. The same is true of the Greek text. There is also no indication as to the differences between his edition and that of R. B. Wright to which he had access.[100]

*Solomon, Wisdom of.*[101]

*Tobit.*[102]

*Zosimus, History of.*[103] This text is also known as the *History of the Sons of Jonadab, Son of Rechab, History of the Rechabites, Testament (or Apocalypse) of Zosimus* and the title more recently proposed by Charlesworth, *The History of the Blessed Ones, the Sons of Rechab*, on the basis of the heading in one of the Syriac manuscript witnesses, B. L. Add. 12,174.[104] It has complex relationships with early Christian literature, including the *Book of Eldad and Modad.*[105]

The Syriac version was edited by Nau in a series of articles.[106] There are also Armenian, Georgian and Ethiopic versions as well as the Christian Arabic

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97 J. R. Harris, *The Odes and Psalms of Solomon, now first published in the Syriac version* (Cambridge: University Press, 1909); J. R. Harris and A. Mingana, *The Odes and Psalms of Solomon, Re-edited for the Governors of the John Rylands Library* (2 vols.; Manchester: The University Press; London, New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1916, 1920).

98 W. Baars, ed., "Psalms of Solomon," *Peshitta* Part 4, fasc. 6 (1972) i-vi, 1-27.

99 Joseph L. Trafton, *The Syriac Version of the Psalms of Solomon, A Critical Evaluation* (SBLSCS 11; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1985).

100 Trafton, *Syriac Version* xv.

101 Rost, *Einleitung* 41-44; *Peshitta List* 93-94; See especially, J. A. Emerton, *The Peshitta of the Wisdom of Solomon* (SPB 2; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959) as well as the suggestion of W. Baars, "Ein neugefundenes Bruchstück aus der syrischen Bibelrevision des Jakob von Edessa," *VT* 18(1968) 548-554.

102 Rost, *Einleitung* 44-47; *Peshitta List* 111; J. C. H. Lebram, "Tobit," *Peshitta*, Part 4, fasc. 6 (1972).

103 Duval, *Littérature* 86; Denis, *Introduction* 142-145, esp. 144; Charlesworth, *Pseudepigrapha and Modern Research* 223-228.

104 Charlesworth, *Psuedepigrapha and Modern Research* 238.

105 Denis, *Introduction* 144.

106 F. Nau, "La Légende inedite des fils de Jonadab, fils de Réchab, et les îles Fortunées," *RevSém* 6(1898) 263-266, 7(1899) 54-75, 136-146.

version. Charlesworth, who edited the Greek text has promised an edition of the Syriac and Ethiopic texts, which to my knowledge has not yet appeared.[107]

### Issues of Authority and Function

Any analysis of the role of pseudepigraphical texts in Syriac literature, whether delineating the influence of a particular text or tracing the transmission of an idea or interpretative solution, is fraught with numerous difficulties. Firstly, it is helpful to know, but not always easy to ascertain, the date of the translation of the text into Syriac and the language from which it was translated. It is made all the more problematic because many texts were translated more than once into Syriac. Secondly, many popular culture texts, often anonymous and undatable (homilies, lectionaries, catena), remain unexamined and unedited. Thirdly, many texts have been lost, even well known and popular texts.[108] Fourthly, Syriac Christianity was never a hermetically sealed cultural unit. This is particularly problematic after the ninth or tenth centuries when Christian Arabic versions began to achieve prominence, many of these preserved in *Karšūnī* manuscripts which are less than easy to decipher. With these caveats, a few general remarks will be made and then some case studies examined in more detail.

The texts listed above which circulated as a part of the Peshitta manuscript tradition were translated into Syriac as early as the fourth century, perhaps even earlier. In this category one finds well attested textual traditions for: *Letters of Jeremiah, Letters of Baruch, 1 Baruch, Daniel, Bel and the Dragon, Susanna, Judith, Ecclesiasticus, 1 Maccabees, 2 Maccabees, 3 Maccabees, 4 Maccabees, Tobit,* and the *Prayer of the Manassah.* These writings were cited as authoritative biblical texts, with delimiters not unlike the more popular texts (e.g. Pentateuch, Psalms, Isaiah, Gospels). They were only cited less frequently. However, frequency of citation is not indicative of "canonical status," it is merely that the less frequently cited texts did not deal with issues that became intensely debated as did, for example, Genesis. The same ambiguities are seen in the production of biblical commentaries. Thus, it was not until the twelfth century that Syriac commentaries were written on the materials classified as "Wisdom Literature," a situation not unlike that in the western churches.[109] These commentaries by Dionysius bar Salibi are short, most less than five or six manuscript folios, and deal more with lexical and primary level ambiguities than with serious theological issues.[110] It was a response to this literature not unlike that found in the Greek and Latin

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107 J. H. Charlesworth, ed., *The History of the Rechabites* Vol. 1: *The Greek Recension* (SBLTT 17; Pseudepigrapha Series 10; Chico: Scholars Press, 1982).

108 See for example, the discussion of S. Brock, "A Fragment of Enoch in Syriac," *JTS* 19(1968) 626-631. Brock suggests ["Jewish Traditions in Syriac Sources," *JJS* 30(1979) 224] that "the Enoch literature was popular with the Manichaeans." This fact alone could have led to the disappearance of *1 Enoch* from Syriac, if it indeed was translated into Syriac, while allowing it to function in Ethiopic, far removed from Orthodox-Manichaean ideological controversies. It would appear that *1 Enoch* (or similar text) was known to Barhebraeus who alludes to the work in the opening lines of the *Chronography,* ed. budge, 3 [text], 3 [trans.].

109 S. Leanza, "Sapienziali (libri)," *Dizionario patristico e di antichitá cristiane* (Casale Monferrato: Marietti, 1984) 2.3081-3096.

110 Still unedited, these texts are preserved in numerous manuscripts. See: A. Vööbus, "Neue Funde für die handschriftliche Uberlieferung der alttestamentlichen Kommentare des *Dionysios bar Salībī*," *ZAW* 84(1972) 246-249.

traditions. There were no compelling theological reasons to compose and transcribe commentaries on this material.

Less well attested are *Odes of Solomon*, *Psalms of Solomon*, and the *Apocryphal Psalms*. The *Apocalypse of Baruch* and *4 Ezra* are preserved only in one manuscript, Milan *Bibliotheca Ambrosiana B. 21 Inferiore*, of the sixth or seventh century. The other texts discussed above tended to circulate, or so it would appear, in separate structures of transmission, although some such as *Ahikar*, *Joseph and Asenath*, and the *History of Zosimus* achieved widespread popularity, not only in Syriac language regions but throughout the Middle East and the Caucausus.

However, manuscript numbers and geographical diversity are not fail-safe evidence of relative influence. For example, the *Apocalypse of Baruch* and *4 Ezra* were translated, either in whole or in part, quite early, and were quite widely known. Ephrem (c. 306-373) appears to allude to these two texts as do other authors. They, however, survived antiquity in only one manuscript. The transmission processes were uneven. Some of the pseudepigrapha were translated or retranslated by Jacob of Edessa (663-708) as part of his effort to rationalize Syriac biblical translations and authority. His efforts included texts such as the *History of Zosimus* and the *Wisdom of Solomon* as well as revisions of canonical texts.[111] *Joseph and Asenath* was translated by the sixth century writer Moses of Aggel from a Greek manuscript found in Aleppo and was incorporated into the *Ecclesiastical History* of Ps. Zacharias Rhetor.[112] The *Prayer of Manassah* was translated twice. The first version was incorporated into the *Didascalia Apostolorum* and the second version (either a revision or retranslation) became part of the Greek Horologion translated in Melkite circles, probably during the tenth century.[113]

From a later period come the Syriac translations of the Apocryphal Psalms. It is highly probably that these were not known in Syriac before the eighth century when a collection of psalms were discovered near Jericho, a provenance not surprising given the direct relationship with more recently discovered Qumran material.[114] These however, being popular through their inclusion in the liturgical texts of Elijah of Anbar.[115] Now let us examine two texts, *Cave of Treasures* and *Testament of Adam*, looking at their authority and influence. These, as noted above, were not chosen for representational qualities, but because they pose starkly the problems of analyzing the diachronic and synchronic structures of pseudepigraphic texts.

*The Cave of Treasures*. The publication history of this text has been described above. The *Cave of Treasures* is a narration of the biblical traditions composed in Syriac. It recounts the biblical history from the creation to the birth of Jesus, followed in Syriac (but not in the earliest Arabic manuscript) by an interpretative essay on those same events addressed as an apology to a certain Namosaya. It probably achieved its present form during the sixth century, although Götze argued, plausibly, that an *Urschrift* dates back at least as early as the fourth century, perhaps combining documents dating to the second or third cen-

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111 W. Baars, "Ein neugefundes Bruchstück aus der syrischen Bibelrevision des Jakob von Edessa," *VT* 18(1968) 548-554.

112 Land, *Anecdota* 18; Duval, *Littérature* 83.

113 *Peshitta List* 112 and preface to the edition in *Peshitta*, see above.

114 O. Braun, "Ein Briefe des Katholikos Timotheos I über biblische Studien des 9. Jahrhunderts," *OrChr* 1(1901) 299-313.

115 *Peshitta List* 113; preface to the edition in *Peshitta*, see above.

turies.[116] Su-Min Ri argued for a third century date, suggesting that certain sections added by later editors.[117] Although it preserves Jewish traditions, it is, in its present forms, a Christian text, with its central focus being the Adam/Christ motif.[118]

The authorship of the *Cave of Treasures* is generally attributed in the manuscript tradition to Ephrem of Syria (c. 306-373).[119] This tradition, although rejected by all Ephrem scholars, held wide currency throughout the medieval period and when it is cited it is normally attributed to Ephrem, except by Dionysius bar Salibi who often cites it anonymously in a yet unpublished Genesis Commentary.[120] The attribution illustrates the difficulties of tracing traditions of influence. Ephrem reflects traditions contained in the present redaction of the *Cave of Treasures*, but the differences in language and perspective are sufficient to discount Ephremian authorship.

However, the relationships are there. For example, Ephrem's *Commentary on Genesis* lauds Noah as the model of chastity who did not have intercourse with his wife for 500 years.[121] The same idea is found in the *Cave of Treasures*.[122] However, to argue that the one is the source of the other is difficult, given the analogous traditions documented in Jewish sources.[123] Also, the Ephremian *Commentary on Genesis* identifies the "sons of God" with the ascetic mountain dwelling "Sethites," an identification also made in Ephrem's *Hymns on the Nativity* and *Hymns on Paradise*.[124] The *Cave of Treasures* likewise understands "sons of God" to connote "Sethites" and also portrays them as ascetic mountain dwellers who descended the mountain of Paradise to the daughters of Cain.[125]

While there are many such agreements,[126] there are significant differences. For example, the Peshitta of *Gen.* 1:2 uses an ambiguous term signifying both

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116 A. Götze, *Die Schatzhöhle, Uberlieferung und Quelle* (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philo.-Hist. Klasse; 4; Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1922) 91 *et passim.*

117 Su-Min Ri, *Caverne* (CSCO 487, Syr. 208) xxii-xxiii.

118 A. Vogl, "Adam-Messias in der Schatzhöhle," *OKS* 28(1979) 183-185. N.B.: The two versions now extant show different levels and traditions of redaction.

119 Cfr. the suggestion of G. J. Reinink, "Der Verfassername {Modios} der syrischen Schatzhöhle und die Apokalypse des Pseudo-Methodios," *OrChr* 67(1983) 46-64.

120 This may have been the decision of a copyist rather than of the author. A critical edition is in preparation.

121 R. M. Tonneau, ed., *Sancti Ephraem Syri in Genesim et in Exodum commentarii* (CSCOI 152-153, Syr. 71-72; Louvain: Sécretariat du CorpusSCO, 1955) 55 [text].

122 Su-Min Ri, *Caverne* 14.2.

123 L. Ginzberg, *Legends of the Jews* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1909-1938) 1.159 *et passim.*

124 Tonneau, ed., *Sancti Ephrem...in Genesium* 56-57 [text]; E. Beck, ed., *Des Heiligen Ephraem Hymnen de Vativitate (Epiphania)*, (CSCO 186-187, Syr. 82-83: Louvain: Secrétariat du CorpusSCO, 1959) 1.48; E. Beck, *Des Heiligen Ephraem des Syrers Hymnen de Paradiso und contra Julianum* (CSCO 174-175, Syr. 78-79; Louvain: Secrétariat du CorpusSCO, 1957) 1.11.

125 Su-Min Ri, *Caverne* 15.1-8.

126 See also S. Brock's discussion of traditions regarding Cain and Abel ["Jewish Traditions in Syriac Sources," *JJS* 30(1979) 227-228] as well as Moses ["Some Syriac Legends Concerning Moses," *JJS* 33(1983) 237-255], and G. A. Anderson, "The Cosmic Mountain; Eden and its Early Interpreters in Syriac Christianity," *Genesis 1-3 in the History of Exegesis: Intrigue in the Garden* (ed. G. A. Robbins; Studies in Women and

"cover" and "brood" to describe the relationship of the Spirit and the waters. The *Cave of Treasures* indicates a quasi sexual relationship with the waters, that in brooding over them, the Spirit (of God) made them fertile and productive.[127] Ephrem knew this tradition but, because of his aversion to any sexual understanding of the creation (contra Manichaeism), he expressly rejected this interpretation in favor of an interpretation of "wind blowing."[128] The tradition remained part of the exegetical legacy of Syriac Christianity, but was not generally regarded as the preferred understanding.[129] However, the disapproval of Ephrem did not eradicate this interpretation from the Syriac exegetical corpus.

After Ephrem, the influence of the *Cave of Treasures* is seen in three genre: biblical commentaries, chronicles and the *Apocalypse of Methodius*. The relationships with biblical commentaries are primarily limited to the West Syrian exegetical tradition, probably because of the overwhelming influence of Theodore of Mopsuestia in East Syrian exegesis. The shared interpretations begin in the West Syrian tradition with interpretations held in common with the Pseudo-Ephremian texts of the Severian exegetical catena.[130] The most extensive relationship is with the *Commentary on Genesis* by Dionysius bar Salibi (d. 1171). Here the *Cave of Treasures* is cited, often without attribution, but occasionally as attributed to Ephrem. In the East Syrian tradition, there was retention of certain exegetical options found also in the *Cave of Treasures*. It is uncertain, for the most part, whether these are direct influences or merely accidental retention of analogous traditions.

Among the Syriac chronicles influenced by the *Cave of Treasures* are the eighth century text attributed to Dionysius of Tellmahre.[131] Here along with other elements, the *Cave of Treasures* is the primary source upon which the primeval biblical history is based. The same is true of the 13th century chronicle, *Chronicon anonymum ad annum 1234*.[132] Here the quotations are extensive and often verbatim, supplying the restatement, with greater specificity than *Genesis*, of the earlier biblical narrative. The *Cave of Treasures* was also used by the 13th century volume, the *Book of the Bee* composed by Salomon of Basra (see above). Many of these same exegetical traditions are included in the *Chronography* of

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Religion 27; Lewiston, Queenston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1988) 187-224. Cf. suggestions of B. Bagatti, "Apocrifi Adamitici," *Augustinianum* 23(1983) 213-225.

127 Su-Min Ri, *Caverne* 1.4-7. While the Eastern version is more explicit, the Western version is to be read in the same manner.

128 Ephrem, *CGen* 11 [text], 7 [trans.].

129 For a survey of this text in Greek literature, see, K. Smoronski, "'Et spiritus Die ferebatur super aquas:' Inquisitum historico-exegetica in interpretationem textus Gen. 1, 2," *Bib* 6(1925) 140-156, 275-293, 361-395. An interesting but incomplete survey of Syriac sources is available in A. Guillaumont, "Genése 1, 1-2 selon les commentateurs syriaques," *In Principio, Interprétations des premiers versets de la Genése* (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1971) 115-132.

130 A detailed investigation of some of these correspondences and their relationship to other Syriac exegetical texts is forthcoming.

131 J.-B. Chabot, ed., *Chronicon Anonymum Pseudo-Dionysianum vulgo dictum* (CSCO 91, Syr. 43; Louvain: Imprimerie Orientaliste, 1953) 4-17 [text]; (CSCO 121, Syr. 66; Louvain: Imprimerie Orientaliste, 1953) 1-11 [trans.].

132 Chabot, ed., *Chronicon ad annum Christi 1234 pertinens* 32-53 *et passim* [text], 22-39 *et passim* [trans.].

Barhebraeus.[133] The *Chronicle* of Michael the Syrian also betrays knowledge of the *Cave of Treasures*, or reflects the author's use of analogous sources.[134]

The *Cave of Treasures* was used by the seventh century Syriac Christian author of the pseudonymous text, the *Apocalypse of Methodius*.[135] Brock suggests that through a Greek and eventual Latin translation, this Syriac composition, the *Apocalypse of Methodius* became influential in Western Europe.[136]

The *Cave of Treasures* is therefore a part of a complex literary structure. Certainly part of its authority was due to its attribution to Ephrem in the self-standing manuscript tradition. However, chronicles and commentaries cited it as an authority in its own right, not always finding it necessary, or perhaps not even desirable to attribute the data borrowed to Ephrem. Certainly the most clear line of influence is in the West Syrian chronicle tradition, but its interpretative options remained influential in the West Syrian exegetical commentary tradition and were not unknown to the East Syrian commentators upon the biblical texts. The author of the archaizing interpretative *Cave of Treasures* narrative of the Old Testament history achieved a literary success!

*The Testament of Adam*. The three recensions of the *Testament of Adam* reveal a composite work. The first version contains the *Horarium* (a text identifying worship structures to each of the hours of the night and day) and the *Prophecy* which purports to be Seth's account of the benediction of his father Adam.[137] The second recension adds the *Hierarchy* which describes the "heavenly powers," including angels, archangels, archons, authorities, powers, dominions, thrones, seraphim and cherubim.[138] The third recension, like the first, omits the text of the *Hierarchy*, but presents a text significantly different from the first recension for both the *Horarium* and the *Prophecy*.[139]

The influence of this pseudepigraphon would appear to have been limited primarily to the corpus of pseudepigraphical literature despite the fact that the existence of a *Testament of Adam* is well attested. The earliest description of the text is in a frequently quoted passage found in the Syriac version of the *Transitus Mariae*, a document which probably dates from the late fourth or fifth century CE.[140] It is argued that the *Testament of Adam* was brought to attention by the Magi and that it was the prototype of all Testaments, the second claim as unlikely as the first given the structure of the genre. However, the assumption of the author of the pericope cited above from the *Transitus Mariae* is that the *Testament of Adam* is an authentic composition of Adam and Seth, as assumption shared by the Byzantine writers, George Syncellus, who alluded to the document

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133 E. A. W. Budge, ed., *The Chronography of Gregory Abū 'l-Faraj 1225-1286, The Son of Aaron, the Hebrew Physician commonly known as Bar Hebraeus* (London: Oxford University Press, 1931) 1.2-13 [trans.], 2.3-14 [text].

134 J.-B. Chabot, *Chronique de Michel le Syrien, passim.*

135 *CPG* 6634; Cf. Su-Min Ri, *Caverne* xviii.

136 S. Brock, "Jewish Traditions in Syriac Sources," *JJS* 3(1979) 228.

137 Robinson, *Testament* 52-67.

138 Robinson, *Testament* 68-85.

139 Robinson, *Testament* 86-101.

140 A. S. Lewis, *Apocrypha Syriaca* (Studia Siniatica, 11; London: C. J. Clay & Sons, 1902) 41. This is quoted in Robinson, *Testament* 12-13 [note that footnotes 47 and 48 are reversed]. 149-150.

but did not cite it, and George Cedrenus, who knew and cited the *Horarium*.[141] There are also parallels, albeit tenuous, between the *Horarium* of the *Testament of Adam* and the *Testament of Abraham* as well as the *Vision of Paul*.[142]

The *Prophecy* also has parallels with numerous texts, including the *Cave of Treasures*.[143] The author of the *Cave of Treasures* narrates a discussion between God and Adam after the expulsion from Paradise. The contrite Adam is told of the advent of "my son" and informed about the salvific significance of that event. It is highly probable that the *Prophecy* of the *Testament of Adam*, or a no longer extant text with significant similarities, was the source of this passage of the *Cave of Treasures*. Kmosko also identified parallels, probably dependent on the *Testament of Adam*, in the *Historia apocrypha virginis*[144] and the Gospel Commentary (Mt. 2) of *Išoʾdad* of Merv.[145] Similar traditions about the visit of the Magi are also contained in the *Book of the Bee* by Salomon of Basra.[146]

The *Hierarchy* text of the *Testament of Adam* has more interesting connections. It is part of the larger corpus of hellenistic efforts to describe the structure of the cosmos. The texts range from that of Paul (Rom. 8:38-39) to the anonymous text attributed to the Holy Hierotheos and those of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite.[147] Citations may yet be found among the corpus of Evagrian literature or in materials emanating from contexts where those texts had currency. It is possible that the *Hierarchy* of the *Testament of Adam*, if it can dated early, served as a source for Pseudo-Dionysius. It is probable that there is a literary relationship between the *Cave of Treasures* and the *Hierarchy* for similar lists of cosmological structures is cited.[148] The *Hierarchy* appears to have been a direct source for Salomon of Basra's *Book of the Bee*.[149] While the statements about cosmic structures are more oblique, a similar cosmology sustains the homilies of Narsai on the Creation.[150]

A potentially significant avenue of research might be to examine the functional characteristics of the *Testament of Adam*. One of the ways in which the text may have functioned was as a liturgical text. The *Horarium* is not unlike those

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141 G. Dindorf, *George Syncellus et Nicephorus Ep.* (CSHB; Bonn: Weber, 1829) 1.18; I. Bekker, *George Cedrenus* (CSHB; Bonn: Webber, 1828) 1.17-18 [translated in Robinson, *Testament* 13, 128-129.

142 M. R. James, *The Testament of Abraham* (Texts; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1892) 2.108 line 17, 121; C. Tischendorf, ed., *Apocalypses Apocryphae Mosis, Esdrae, Pauli, Johannis, item Mariae dormitio* (Leipzig: H. Mendelssohn, 1866) Apoc. Pauli 7; cited in Kmosko, *PS* 2.1311.

143 Su-Min Ri, *Caverne*, 5.1-16; cf. Kmosko, *PS* 2.1313.

144 Kmosko, *PS* 2.1314-1315, citing W. Wright, *Contributions to the Apocryphal Literature of the New Testament* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1865).

145 Kmosko, *PS* 2.1315.

146 Budge, *Book of the Bee* Chap. 18.

147 F. S. Marsh, *The Book of the Holy Hierotheos* (Text and Translation Society, 7; London: Text and Translation Society, 1927); *PG* 3.

148 Su-Min Ri, *Caverne*, 1.3: "angels, archangels, thrones and dominions, principalities and powers, cherubim and seraphim, all the orders and armies . . . were created the first day.

149 Budge, ed., *Book of the Bee* 9-11.

150 P. Gignoux, ed., *Homélies de Narsaï sur la Création, Edition Critique du texte syriaque, introduction et traduction francaise* (PO 34.3-4; Turnhout, Paris: Brepols, 1968) 638-6749 et passim.

prevalent throughout the Christian tradition.[151] Likewise, there is a creedal structure which introduces *Prophecy* and a christological statement which follows.[152] It is this very passage which is cited in the *Transitus Mariae* as discussed above, and which has parallels in the *Apocalypse of Elijah*.[153]

Whatever the function of this text or the stimuli to its transmission and revision, the text appears to have functioned as an authoritative text, viewed as being from the biblical Adam and Seth, and to have been used as part of the larger corpus of popular culture texts (witness the preservation of these materials in magical manuscripts) relating to biblical figures. As part of a loosely defined corpus of popular literature, it is to be anticipated that the ideas circulated broadly, probably even independently of the *Testament of Adam*.

## Conclusion

The multi-faceted and non-ideological definition of pseudepigrapha with no limitation as to linguistic or cultural provenance proposed above has allowed the development of a tentative list comprising 41 texts extant (or formerly extant) in Syriac. Certainly there are many more candidates for inclusion, and some will prefer to delete texts from the list as constituted. It does, however, point out the distinct differences between texts transmitted with the canon and those transmitted apart as far as number and quality of manuscripts is concerned. The difference is much less great, however, if one looks at the use of the texts. Although the pseudepigrapha were not normally included in liturgical texts, specifically lectionaries, the larger part of canonical texts were also excluded. Certainly non-canonical texts were understood and cited as having authority equal with the canonical texts in specific trajectories of transmission. And, more importantly, the canonical narratives of crucial texts, such as Genesis, were understood and interpreted in light of the supplementary texts which provided data missing in the canonical texts as well as interpretative suggestions. The *Cave of Treasures* and *Testament of Adam* illustrate these particulars and pose other problems. How for example does one establish criteria for ascertaining patterns of influence of individual texts when there is so much interactivity within the parameters of the larger literary tradition? Can the influence of a text, other than in direct quotation ever be reasonably established? The definitional problem facing scholars of pseudepigrapha in Syriac (and other Middle Eastern languages) is significant. Both the *Cave of Treasure* and *Testament of Adam* were probably written in Syriac, but obviously retain traditions from Second Temple Judaism. Are the later compositions, or an imbedded redactional level, to be understood as pseudepigraphical (according to standard handbook definitions of the term); and how are these to be used as historical and literary documents. We are fortunate to have good editions of both texts. The historical, literary and ideological issues will be harder to solve. Carefully defined diachronic studies of themes and data (e.g. personal

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151 O. Holtzmann, "Die Täglichen Gebetsstunden im Judentum und Christentum," *ZNW* 12(1911) 90-107; J. M. Hanssens, *Aux origines de la priére liturgique. Nature et genése de l'office des Matines* (Analecta gregoriana 57; Rome: Gregorian University, 1952); J. Casper, "La priére des heures canoniales dan les rites orientaux," *La Maison-Die* 21(1951) 82-109.

152 Robinson, *Testament* 3.1; 2.4.

153 A. Pietersma, S. T. Comstock and H. W. Attridge, *The Apocalypse of Elijah: Based on Pap. Chester Beatty 2018* (SBLTTS, Pseudepigrapha Series, 7; Chico: Scholars Press, 1981) 33.1-3.

and place names) through Syriac literature are needed. There is also a need to review older editions of these texts, and where desirable, reedit. Other texts are still waiting for a critical edition, a situation of especially pressing concern for those texts which fall outside the parameters of the Peshitta edition project.

# The Flood According to Enoch in Early Christian Literature

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Both in early Judaism and early Christianity Genesis 6-9 has been frequently used for theological purposes.[1] That goes for the actual story of the Flood, but probably even more for the introduction, the so-called "Fall of the Angels." Jewish theology in the Hellenistic age must have felt the lack of information in the Old Testament regarding the world of heavenly beings. The emperor Julian, in his attack on Christianity,[2] mentions this explicitly as a notorious shortcoming in the books of Moses. There must have been others before him.[3] No wonder therefore that Jewish and Christian theologians are drawn towards the only verses that seem to say at least something on this subject: Genesis 6,1-4.

Our first witness for this particular interest is 1 Enoch (the "Ethiopic Book of Enoch"). I shall not dwell on the textual history of this book.[4] However, I collated two unedited early Ethiopic manuscripts[5] and you may be interested to know that I found (so far) *one* instance where one of these manuscripts, in a unique reading, confirms the Aramaic text.[6] The Aramaic fragments, edited by Milik[7] are not immediately relevant to the parts of 1 Enoch which deal with Genesis 6-9.

The influence of Genesis 6-9 is noticeable in several places in the New Testament. I refer to the negative connotations of the word "generation" (*genea*)

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1 The history of the exegesis of the Flood story has been researched extensively by J. P. Lewis, *A Study of the Interpretation of Noah and the Flood in Jewish and Christian Literature* (Leiden: Brill, 1968).

2 *Against the Galilaeans* 49d/e (in the Loeb-edition by W. C. Wright, vol. III, p. 332). See also 96c/e and 99d.

3 Julian took most of his arguments from Porphyrius, who used Celsus and others. Cf. Origen, *Contra Celsum* VI,49.

4 Establishing my own texts I used the Greek fragments edited by R.H. Charles, *The Ethiopic Version of the Book of Enoch* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1906) and C. Bonner, *The Last Chapters of Enoch in Greek* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1937; repr. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), the Ethiopic text edited by Charles (as above), with the extra data from the *apparatus* of M. Knibb, *The Ethiopic Book of Enoch*, I (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978).

5 Both from HMML: EMML 1786 and EMML 2080, from the 15th and the 14th (13th?) century respectively.

6 In 1 Enoch 91,13, part of the "Apocalypse of Weeks," EMML 2080 reads "possessions" (*newāyāta*) for "houses" (*abyāta*), thus confirming Aramaic *nikhsin*.

7 J.T. Milik, *The Books of Enoch* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976).

in Matthew 11,16 which might well be caused by an expression common in rabbinic Hebrew: "generation of the Flood" (*dōr hammabbul*).[8]

Matthew 24,37-39 and Luke 17,26-30, the latter combining the Flood with the catastrophe of Sodom,[9] use the Flood as a prefiguration of the last Judgement. This looks very much like 1 Enoch 93,4, where in an eschatological context the Flood is described as "the first end," prefiguring—one may assume—a last end.

The combination "generation of the Flood" with "the men of Sodom" occurs frequently in the Midrash and seems to be known already to several authors of the New Testament (Jude 6-7, 2Pet. 2,5-6). Even outside Judaism and Christianity the generation which perished in the Flood is accused of the vices which the Bible ascribes to the generation of the Flood and the men of Sodom.[10]

The influence of 1 Enoch on the New Testament however is most tangible in the Epistles of Peter and Jude. The latter even quotes from the Book of Enoch and obviously reckons it (or at least the part he quotes from) among the genuine prophecies (Jude 14). The Peter and Jude epistles must have originated in a community which was well acquainted with Jewish Enoch traditions such as passed down in 1 Enoch. Let me give a few examples.

According to 1 Pet. 3,19 Christ "went and preached to the spirits in custody (*phulakē*)." Most commentators[11] agree that these spirits are the ones referred to in 1 Enoch 6-10. In 1 Enoch 10,4 the archangel Raphael is to bind the evil spirit Azazel hand and foot[12] and throw him into the darkness, in a hole in the desert, where he is to stay for the time being. His companions are also bound and put away "under the hills of the earth" for 70 generations (10,12). The actual word *phulakē* does not occur here, but the idea of punitive detention is irrefutable.[13] It is confirmed by related, probably dependent texts like Jub. 5,6/10 and Jude 6.

What did Christ "preach" to these spirits? Here I would disagree with many commentators, who assume that Christ preached to them the gospel of redemption.[14] 1 Enoch 10 is quite explicit. Azazel is to be moved from his place of custody to the "hell of fire on the great day of Judgement" (10,6). His companions, after 70 generations in the dark, will be moved to "the pit of fire and torture and the prison" (not *phulakē*, but *desmōtērion*) where they are to be locked up for ever (10,13). The judgement clearly goes in two phases: detention immediately after the crime and final punishment at the day of Judgement. Jubilees 5,6-10 shows the same pattern.[15]

Is it not much more likely therefore that 1 Peter, obviously familiar with these parts of the Book of Enoch, sees Christ go to the place of detention, to announce

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[8] The expression does not occur in 1 Enoch, but 106,13 refers to these people as the "generation of Jared." That is the generation in which the angels "descended" (Hebr. *yārad*) from their superterrestrial abode to mix with de daughters of men. The word *genea* is also used by (Pseudo-) Lucian, *De Dea Syria* 12.

[9] Matthew also seems to know this parallel. Cf. Mt. 11,16 / 23.

[10] A good example is (Pseudo-)Lucian, *De Dea Syria*, 12f.

[11] Earlier commentators assume that these spirits are the "souls separated from the bodies" (Calvin). In view of 1 Enoch that has become an untenable position. See also the article on *kērussō* by Friedrich in *ThWbNT* III, p. 706.

[12] The same expression a.o. in Mt. 22,13. Cf. also Plato, *Rep.* 615e/616a.

[13] The word does occur however in a similar context in Apoc. 20,7. Aramaic (and Hebrew) ʾSR, "to bind," "to chain," also means "to imprison."

[14] Some commentators, e.g. J. N. D. Kelly (Black's N.T. *Commentaries*, 1969) and Bo Reicke (*Anchor Bible*, 1964), keep their options open.

[15] See also 2Pet. 2,4/12 and for the final day of judgement on the spirits Matt. 8,29.

to the spirits that finally the day of reckoning has come? This fits in very well with the context. 1 Peter uses *euaggelizesthai* when he refers to the "good tiding"; here he uses *kērussein*, which may also refer to bad news.[16] We should not be misled by the conciliatory tone of vs. 18 or by 4,6. These texts refer to mankind, not to the evil spirits. They had their opportunity, before the Flood, but they spoiled it once and for all.

That takes us to the next theme: God's patience (*makrothumia*) with sinners. It is expressed by 1 Pet. 3,20 "when God's patience waited in the days of Noah." A very common theme indeed in Jewish and Christian literature of the period! An early reference is probably En 10,9 where God tells Gabriel to warn the generation of the Flood that there is for them no more "length of days (*makrotēs hēmerōn*)," which implies that at one stage there was "length of days" for them. Elsewhere[17] I have argued that God's patience (Hebr.: *orèkh appayim*, "length of wrath") and God's granting of "length of days" (Hebr. *orèkh yāmim*) are two sides of the same coin. The idea of God's "patience" before He punishes also appears in 1 Enoch 93,4. It says that the period before the flood was the time in which "judgement and righteousness was patient."[18]

Jewish apologetics have been keen to emphasize the merciful character of the God of Israel. He never punishes without giving an opportunity for repentence. If necessary He delays the execution. We find this feature very explicitly in Philo as well as in the early rabbinic writings.[19] Sometimes it has been connected with the idea that Noah preached to the generation of the Flood, calling for repentence. Josephus is very explicit (*Ant.* I,74), but it is also presupposed in 2 Pet. 2,5 ("Noah the preacher of righteousness") and traditional in Jewish and Christian exegesis to this day.[20] The Targum Neofiti on Gen. 6,3 and other rabbinic sources explain the period of 120 years as the appointed time for repentence. Jerome, obviously dependent on rabbinic sources, agrees with this opinion.[21] The argument is basically apologetic, directed against those who scorn God's severity.

Both the existence of "Sons of God" and the story of their intercourse with the daughters of men, mentioned in Gen. 6,1-4, caused some problems in the Hellenistic age. In the first place this text seemed to contradict monotheism, which was the jewel in the crown of Jewish theology. In the second place: how could spiritual beings like angels impregnate beings of flesh and blood? The Stoics rejected the possibility that incorporeal entities could have any efficacy on

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16 *Euaggelizesthai* in 1Pet. 1,12/25 and 4,6. *Kērussein* in Rom. 2,21 and Apoc. 5,2. The basic content is the announcement of Christ's victory. Good news for the oppressed is bad news for the oppressor.

17 R. Zuurmond. "The Judgement of Cain in Early Jewish Tradition" (in Dutch with a summary in English), *ACEBT*, No. 3 (1982), pp. 107-16.

18 Ethiopic *t'gś* often translates *makrothumein*. See A. Dillmann, *Lexicon*, col. 1015.

19 Philo, *Oaest. in Gen.* I,89. In rabbinic literature a.o. in P. Aboth V,2 and Mechilta d'Rabbi Ismael on Ex. 15,6 (Horovitz/Rabin p. 133), in connection with "the generation of the Flood" and "the men of Sodom." The Targums and the Midrash on these texts provide many more examples.

20 In antiquity I mention Theophilus of Antioch, *Ad Autolycum* III,19, who with a fanciful etymology derives it from the name of Deukalion. See also the Sibylline Oracles I,128f., 150-98. It should be noted that the idea of God being slow to anger also existed in pagan philosophy. Plutarch wrote a whole treatise on the subject: *On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance* (*Moralia* 548-68).

21 In his *Hebraicae Ouaestiones in Genesim* on Gen. 6,6.

corporeal entities, assuming for that very reason that god consisted of some kind of matter.[22]

These problems were to be solved in two ways. Replacing "sons of God" by "angels" monotheism was saved, since angels are only servants (obedient or disobedient) of God. This solution was adopted by the Books of Enoch (Enoch 6,2) and Jubilees (5,1). We also find it in some manuscripts and Versions of the Septuagint on Genesis 6,2/4 and with Philo, Josephus and many Christian commentators. Later Jewish exegesis, from Pseudo-Philo on,[23] interpreted "sons of God" as "mighty men," "rulers" or "judges." Eventually that seemed the safer solution. In *Bereshit Rabba* 26,5 Rabbi Shimeon ben Yochai (middle of the second century, if the attribution is historically reliable) curses everyone who interprets the "Sons of God" as heavenly beings. One might suspect some anti-Christian bias here, since his Christian contemporaries Justin and Athenagoras persisted in the earlier opinion.[24]

The problem that a divine being could not father a child on an earthly woman, could be solved by assuming that the "angels" temporarily transformed themselves into human beings. Philo has this explanation, for which he actually uses the Greek word *metamorphōsis*.[25] The question of intercourse between humans and angels also appears in 2 Pet. 2,10 and Jude 7. The authors of these texts are less sophisticated than Philo. They accept the possibility but reject it on moral grounds. That is very close to the position of 1 Enoch.

Earlier exegesis assumed that "to go after flesh" (or "different flesh" as Jude puts it) hinted at homosexuality.

That is clearly wrong. According to the context both authors have in mind the sexual relationship between human beings and superterrestrial beings. 2 Peter refers to Genesis 6,1-4, Jude, taking his lead from the Generation of the Flood, refers to Genesis 19 (vs. 5), the attempted rape of the guests of Lot by the Men of Sodom. There is a parallel in the Testament of Naphtali (3,4f.): "Do not become like Sodom, which upset the order of nature, like the Watchers[26] upset the order of their nature, whom the Lord cursed at the Flood."

The above examples show how dependent some parts of the New Testament are on the Pseudepigrapha. Very much the same goes for second century Christianity. I mentioned earlier Athenagoras' *Legatio*,[27] providing a vivid description of "The Fall of the Angels" in terms of 1 Enoch. The *Legatio* is meant as an Apology of Christianity to the emperor Marcus Aurelius and his co-emperor Commodus. Athenagoras compares the court in heaven with the court in Rome. The emperor must have had some experience with corrupt governors.[28] So did God; follows the story of the heavenly officials, who fell, literally and metaphorically, because of lust (*epithumia*; the emperor being a Stoic knows what that means...) for the girls. The difference with 1 Enoch is that Athenagoras has a much more pessimistic outlook on life. The element of "binding" (also in its mag-

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[22] See A.A. Long & D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenist Philosophers* (Cambridge: U.P., 1987), I,272-74 & II,269-71.

[23] It is the most likely interpretation of *filii Dei* in *LAB* 3,1. See also the Targums.

[24] Justin, *Apology I*,5 and *II*,5; Athenagoras, *Legatio* 24,5f.

[25] *Quaest.* I,92. The Greek fragments have been edited by F. Petit (Paris: du Cerf, 1978. Oeuvres de Philon 33).

[26] "Watchers" is 1 Enoch's terms for the Fallen Angels in 1 Enoch 6-16.

[27] Chapters 24,3—25,1.

[28] For the content cf. 2Pet. 2:10 "despising authority."

ical sense of "rendering harmless") is lacking; the Prince over Matter is still freely around, organizing the world in defiance of the goodness of God. It sounds rather like the ("gnostic"??) doctrine of the "two powers" which in the eyes of the Rabbis is the ultimate heresy.[29]

A well-known example of early Christian use of 1 Enoch may be found in Tertullian, who accepted 1 Enoch as a true prophecy and quotes him more than once. With explicit reference to 1 Enoch 8,1 he pours out his scorn over women and in particular their make-up....[30]

Alexandrian exegesis of the Flood story, both Jewish (Philo) and Christian (Clemens, Origen) does not seem to be strongly influenced by 1 Enoch. As a matter of fact Philo, commenting on the problematic etymology of Noah's name[31] is rather sceptical on the prophecies of the "fathers of the holy ones."[32] It is hard to say with certainty, but this might well refer to pseudepigraphical books like 1 Enoch. The theme of the Fallen Angels is upheld, on the basis of the Septuagint, but there is in Alexandrian exegesis no reference to their "binding" or to their ultimate punishment. In Philo's writings the emphasis completely shifts to the mystical meaning of the dimensions of the ark. Clemens and Origen are clearly dependent on Philo. For these platonists an ontological basis provided by numbers is a much safer ground than exegetical speculations on the destiny of the angels.

Pseudo-Philo's *Book of Biblical Antiquities* (*LAB*)[33] stands in between the earlier Pseudepigrapha and rabbinic literature. There is no reference to the "Fall of the Angels." In the case of the "sons of God" it is the earliest known text to explain them as human beings. The difficult Hebrew word *yādon*, which the Septuagint translates with the verb *katamenein* ("remain"), is rendered with "to judge" as if from the Hebrew verb *din*; a solution we also find in rabbinic literature and in the Targums. The rabbinic tradition according to which the ark was built of "cedarwood" also finds its earliest witness in PseudoPhilo.[34]

The appearance of cedar where the Hebrew has the hapax *gofèr* and the Septuagint translates with *tetragōnos* (square) is baffling. It is possible that the special qualities of wood which was also used for the building of the Jerusalem temple (1 Kings 5-6), influenced this tradition. According to Ezekiel (27,5) ships were sometimes made of cedarwood. In all these cases however the Hebrew uses the word *èrèz*,[35] whereas rabbinic Hebrew in describing the ark uses the Greek loanword *qadrinon*. I therefore suggest that Hebrew *qadrinon* is a corruption of latin *quadratus*, which is the normal translation of *tetragōnos* in the Old Latin Versions.[36] This may seem far-fetched, but it becomes more likely when one

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29 *šetē rešuyot*. Cf. bBer. 33b and Ber.R. I,7 (Theodor-Albeck P-4).

30 *Adv. Marc.* 5,8. *De cultu fem.* 1,2; 2,10. *De virg. vel* 7. See also *Idol.* 4, with allusions to 1 Enoch 8 and a literal quotation from 1 Enoch 99. 1 Jn. 2:16 "lust of the eyes" could also be an allusion to Gen. 6,2 / 1 Enoch 6,2.

31 *Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesim*, I,87. The seemingly incorrect etymology by Lamech in Gen. 5,29 was noted by the Rabbis as well; see Ber. R. 25,2.

32 By this term he apparently refers to the pre-Noah generations.

33 The Latin text has been edited by G. Kisch (1949) and by D. J. Harrington (1976).

34 *LAB* 3,4 "*ligna cedrina*."

35 The Septuagint translates with *kedrinos* or *kedros*. It remains possible that the *LAB* and the Rabbis took their lead from this translation, but it is not very likely.

36 Not only in Gen. 6,7 but a.o. also in 1 Macc. 10,11.

looks in the *critical apparatus* of Bereshit Rabba 31,8 and finds readings like *qadrinon*, *qadros* and *qatros*.[37]

It is interesting to see how Jewish and Christian exegetes treat the pagan parallel to the Flood story: the myth of Deukalion and Pyrrha. It is known from several sources, among which Plato's account in the *Timaeos* (21e – 23d) is one of the most familiar.[38] The word "Flood" (*kataklusmos*), chosen by the translators of the Septuagint is probably borrowed from Plato.[39] Philo, Justin and the Pseudo-Clementines rather easily identify Noah and Deukalion.[40] It should be noted however that an occasional identification not always carries much doctrinal value. Theophilus of Antioch apparently identifies Noah and Deukalion in one place (*Autol.* II,30), but a few chapters later dismisses Deukalion in a condescending way to the realm of phantasy (ibid. III,18). The identification may have a purely didactic purpose and little to do with syncretism.

A similar argument applies to the "giants." Already the Septuagint translated the Hebrew words *nefilim* and *gibborim* (Gen. 6,4) both with *gigantes*. That could be interpreted—and was probably meant—as an allusion to the Greek myth of the "giants" and their battle with the gods. From the first century onward this connection, although formally recognized, has been rejected on theological grounds by Jewish and by Christian exegetes.[41] Rabbinic exegesis does not even mention the similarity. The Septuagint explains the *gibborim* as *nefilim* = *gigantes*, the rabbis do just the reverse and interpret the *nefilim* as *gibborim* = warriors.[42]

Doubtless syncretistic however are the gnostic accounts of the Flood.[43] In gnostic literature "Moses" is sometimes corrected on the basis of the Deukalion myth.[44] The Apocryphon of John denounces the story of the ark. Noah saved himself and all other true gnostics (not just his family) in a luminous cloud. The context is anti-Jewish: heavy commandments, serious sins and fear (of God) are

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37 J. Theodor and Ch. Albeck, *Bereschit Rabba*, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem: Wahrmann, 1965), I,281. Kraus *Lehnwörter* (1898) does not mention *qadrinon*. Although the Palestinian Rabbis probably knew little or no Latin, there were in the first century (and earlier) many Jews in the diaspora who could speak Latin. However, I did not (yet) find another case of the Latin translation providing the interpretation of a difficult word in the Hebrew bible. Greek words have been used for that purpose. An interesting example provides Theophilus of Antioch (*Ad Autol.* III,19) conveying a tradition, obviously based on etymology, that "Noah" was a "eunuch." This may explain the rabbinic tradition that Noah, on leaving the ark, was mutilated at the genitals by a lion. (Ber.R. 30,6 & 36,4.) It also accounts for the fact that Noah had no sons after the Flood.

38 Other sources: Plato (*Nomoi* III,676ff.), Ovidius (*Metamorphoses* I,244-348) and (Pseudo-) Lucian (*De Dea Syria* 12).

39 *Laws* III,677a/682b, *Tim.* 22a/25c, *Critias* 111a. The "ark" as such does not occur in Plato's account. For Deukalion's boat the Greeks used *larnax*, not *kibōtos*, the Septuagint's equivalent for Hebrew *tēbhāh*. E.g. (Ps.-)Lucianus, *De Dea Syria* 12 and frequently in Theophilus of Antioch, *Ad Autolycum* III,18f.; all considerably later than the Septuagint.

40 Philo: *Praem.* 23. Justin: *Apol.* II,7. Pseudo-Clem. *Hom.* 2,16 & *Rec.* 8,50.

41 Philo, *Quaest.* I,92. Athenagoras, *Leg.* 24,6. Josephus, *Ant.* I,73 is ambivalent.

42 See Targum Neofiti on Gen. 6,4.

43 Gnostic accounts in the *Apocalypse of Adam* V,5,69ff., the *Hypostasis of the Archons* II,4,92ff., the (hardly gnostic) *Concept of our Great Power* VI,4,38f. and the *Apocryphon of John* II,1,28ff. I used J.M. Robinson's translation, *The Nag Hammadi Library*, 3rd ed., Leiden etc.: Brill, 1988. (Since the third edition unfortunately has no index, I had to fall back on the index of the first edition.)

44 Celsus (*apud* Origenes, *Contra Celsum* IV,ll & 41) similarly accuses the Jews of poorly disguised plagiarism.

ascribed to the evil Superpower and his henchmen, that is in their theology: to the God of the Old Testament.

Rabbinic exegesis never mentions the Book of Enoch or, for that matter, any other of the Pseudepigrapha. Earlier we found Rabbi Simeon ben Yochai strongly denouncing the interpretation of "Sons of God" as heavenly beings (Ber. R. 26,5). The Rabbis distance themselves also from the idea that the "giants" (Gen. 6,4) were demigods, as clearly implied by 1 Enoch 7,2 and 9,8f. They perceive them as huge men and great warriors, for which they appropriately quote Num. 13,33.

Since rabbinic sources are almost completely silent about Christianity (a very eloquent silence...) one often has to read between the lines. As such one might point to the diminishing esteem for Noah. Noah is highly praised in the pseudepigrapha. Later rabbinic sources lose all interest, not unlikely on the rebound of the honour Noah as a pre-Jewish Righteous Person receives in Christianity.[45]

Nevertheless, rabbinic exegesis is not completely free from Hellenistic influence. As regards the ark one may refer to the interpretation of the Hebrew word *ṣohar* in Gen. 6,16. Its precise meaning is controversial. The Septuagint translates "combining" (*episunagōn*), which seems to refer to Noah combining the stated measures of the ark, but—with a slight textual variant and some manuscripts of the Old Latin version[46]—could also refer to the conical shape of the ark. Some Jewish exegetes derive *ṣohar* from *ṣohorayim*, midday.[47] One step ahead is done by those who interpret *ṣohar* as a "shining gem."[48] That reminds us of other shining stones, such as the one in the head of the statue of the goddess Hera according to (Pseudo-) Lucian's *De Dea Syria* 32.[49]

In some manuscripts of the *Pirqe de Rabbi Eliezer* it is said that this stone shines "by its power" (*bigeburato*), an expression which is usually reserved for the divine power. It looks very much like the "philosophers' stone" which encapsulates the essence of the divine power. The role of the shining stone is to indicate the actual presence of God in the ark, not unlike the shining cloud in the gnostic accounts of the Flood Story.

These however are late developments. Neither 1 Enoch nor the New Testament is particularly interested in the details of the design of the ark, in clear opposition to Philo, the Christian Fathers and—in a different way—the Rabbis.

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45 The argument is about the phrase "righteous in his generation" (Gen. 6,9). Philo notices a depreciating undertone (*Abr.* 36-39), but does not stress it. Some Rabbis however do. Cf. Ber. R. 30,9 and 26,2. See also J. C. Vanderkam, "The Righteousness of Noah," in *Ideal Figures in Ancient Judaism*, ed. G. W. E. Nickelsburg (Scholars Press, 1980).

46 Read the accusative with OL "collectam."

47 A.o. Aquila (*mesēmbrinon*) and Rabbi Yohanan (third century) in b.Sanh. 108b. The verb ṢHR occurs a few times in rabbinic Hebrew and Aramaic, meaning "be clear," "shine." By way of *al tiqri* it could be connected with ZHR = "shine."

48 R. Levi (third century) in Ber. R. 31,11. See also Sefer Gematriaot, On Gems, published in J. Trachtenberg, *Jewish Magic and Superstition* (New York: Atheneum, 1984; repr. of the 1939 ed.), p. 265.

49 This statue stands in the great temple of Hierapolis (*Mabbūg*), the city of Deukalion (*De Dea Syria* 12-13, 28). One wonders if there is a connection.

# The Minor Agreements of Matthew and Luke Against Mark and the Two Gospel Hypothesis A Study of These Agreements in Their Compositional Contexts

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## Introduction

From the perspective of the Two Gospel Hypothesis, much of the previous discussion of the so-called minor agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark has been inadequate for four reasons.

First, in defense of Markan priority, attempts have been made to reduce the number of the minor agreements by appealing to variant readings within the manuscript tradition and textual emendation. It should be clear that such manipulation of the texts of the gospels could either increase or decrease the number of minor agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark depending upon the text critical principles one applied and the source theory one presupposed in doing text criticism.

Second, the minor agreements have been divided into categories for discussion. A principle of "divide and conquer" has reigned. But as A. M. Farrer has noted, the smaller the number of instances within any particular category, the larger the number of categories required, assuming that the number of minor agreements is constant. And that is a subsidiary problem—an objective quantification of the number of minor agreements.

Third, insufficient attention has been paid to the so-called "negative agreements," that is, the minor agreements of Matthew and Luke in omitting material from Mark.

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[1] This paper was produced in close collaboration with David B. Peabody, and in consultation with other members of the Two Gospel Research Group: David Dungan, Dom Bernard Orchard, Allan McNicol and Philip Shuler. At points this paper will draw upon my previously published work as well as Peabody's. This will be indicated by block indenting. I have worked closely with individual members of this team over long periods of time, especially as we got ready for the Symposium de Interrelatione Evangeliorum held in Jerusalem 7-23 April 1984. Here I wish to acknowledge the contributions of each of these persons to this paper.

Fourth and finally, insufficient attention has been paid to networks of agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark both within pericope units and throughout the gospels as complete literary units.

The purpose of this paper is to lift the discussion of the minor agreements to a higher exegetical level where they are studied not simply within the compositional contexts of separable pericopes, which has been done before on a selective basis, but within their larger compositional contexts. Those larger contexts are the compositional histories of Matthew, Luke and Mark in that order.

We begin by demonstrating that "πάλιν used retrospectively uniting two or more separated pericopes" is a literary characteristic of the author or composer of the narrative framework of the canonical text of the gospel of Mark.

Its absence from all parallel texts of Matthew and Luke is explained by the hypothesis that Mark, in composing his text out of Matthew and Luke, has originated this retrospective feature of synoptic composition. It is then noted that all agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark, both positive agreements and negative agreements of which "πάλιν used retrospectively uniting two or more pericopes" is a prime example, can be explained as due, in the first instance, to Luke copying from Matthew, and then, Mark making changes in the text to which Matthew and Luke provide concurrent testimony.

Mark's changes fall within the limits of the compositional freedom of an author and are basically of three types: (1) the freedom to add, (2) the freedom to omit, and (3) the freedom to substitute. All of the so-called minor agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark fall into one or another of these three categories. They are most simply explained as due to the compositional activity of the Evangelist, Mark, who freely recomposes his highly original version of the common story he finds in the gospels of Matthew and Luke. That story orginated with Matthew and was adapted and modified by Luke for his readers.

## PART ONE

### Historical Survey of Research on Mark's Use of πάλιν[2]

**1. J. J. Griesbach (1811).** The use of the linguistic characteristics of the author of Mark in the service of text criticism.

In 1811, while discussing the text critical question of whether Mark's text at Mark 8:1 should read παμπόλλου, in accord with the majority of manuscripts known at that time, or πάλιν πολλοῦ, in accord with some others, J. J. Griesbach used at least two arguments.

First, he appealed to Latin translations of Mark 8:1 where *iterum* appeared as one of the Latin words used to translate the disputed words in the Greek text. Griesbach seems to have thought that *iterum* was a more appropriate translation of the Greek word, πάλιν, than it would be a part of the Greek word, παμπόλλου.

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[2] This survey of research is selective and focuses on the importance of πάλιν in Mark. One survey of the history of the discussion of the Minor Agreements, beginning with the work of C. G. Wilke, has been provided by Frans Neirynck, in collaboration with Theo Hansen and Frans Van Segbroeck, *The Minor Agreements of Matthew and Luke Against Mark. With a Cumulative List*, BETL 37 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974): 11-48. Another may be found in David Laird Dungan, "Mark—The Abridgement of Matthew and Luke," in *Jesus and Man's Hope* ed. David G. Buttrick, A Perspective Book, 2 volumes (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 1970): I/51-97, esp. 56-60, 71-83.

Second, Griesbach applied a long established canon of textual criticism, namely, that "a reading which most conforms to the style and scope of an author is to be preferred."[3] Here, Griesbach first had to argue that πάλιν conformed to the style of the author of Mark. This he did by appealing to the high frequency of one usage of πάλιν throughout the Markan gospel. Although Griesbach did not distinguish uses of πάλιν in Mark, he did argue that the author of Mark frequently used πάλιν iteratively and retrospectively to unite at least two separated, but similarly narrated, pericopes. Griesbach appealed to eight examples of this usage in Mark [Mark 2:1 (cf.1:21); 2:13 (cf. 1:16); 3:1 (cf. 1:21); 3:20 (cf. 3:7); 4:1 (cf. 3:7); 5:21 (cf. 5:1); 8:13 (cf. 8:10), and 10:1 (cf. 9:14)] to which he wished to add a ninth [Mark 8:1 (cf. 6:34)]. Other examples could be added to Griesbach's list, but he clearly and correctly regarded his list to be sufficient to make his point, even without being exhaustive.

Griesbach concluded that the reading, πάλιν πολλοῦ, was to be preferred to παμπόλλου at Mark 8:1, not only because it was more appropriately translated by the Latin word *iterum* (which may witness to a second century Greek text using πάλιν), but also because the reading πάλιν πολλοῦ conformed more with the style of the author of Mark, as that could be established by the frequency of occurrence of usages within the text of Mark. Griesbach's text may be translated as follows:

> Is it not much more probable that the Latin [translations], and equally also the rest of the esteemed interpreters [who wrote in Latin], have expressed a Greek πάλιν more faithfully by this *iterum*? Why? Because πάλιν seems to suggest the style of Mark himself. For our man [Mark] is accustomed to repeat this very [word] πάλιν frequently, when he is about to pass on traditions that are similar to those he narrated previously. This is something that can be shown by numerous examples. See, for instance, chapter 2:1 together with 1:21; chapter 2:13 together with 1:16; chapter 3:1 together with 1:21; chapter 3:20 together with 3:7; chapter 4:1 together with 3:7; chapter 5:21 together with 5:1; chapter 8:13 together with 8:10; chapter 10:1 together with 9:14, and so forth. . . Does it not seem likely to you that the Evangelist [Mark] has added πάλιν in our place also [Mark 8:1] , in accord with his literary style, by which he sent readers off to another narrative which is very similar to ours, which he wrote down a little earlier in chapter 6:34-44?[4]

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[3] Support for this statement may be found in David B. Peabody, "Chapters in the History of the Linguistic Argument for Solving the Synoptic Problem. The Nineteenth Century in Context" in *Jesus, The Gospels, and the Church. Essays in Honor of William R. Farmer* ed. E. P. Sanders (Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 1987): 47-68, esp. 47-57; also compare David Barrett Peabody, *Mark as Composer,* New Gospel Studies 1 (Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 1987): 126-30, 133-35, 167-68, 173-75; Also see Appendix A to this paper.

[4] Johann J. Griesbach, *Commentarius Criticus in Textum Graecum Novi Testamenti,* Particula 2 (Jena: J. C. G. Goepferdt, 1811): 127. "Nonne multo probabilius est, latinum aeque ac caeteros interpretes mox laudatos isto *iterum* [of the Latin versions of Mark 8:1] fideliter expressisse graecum πάλιν? Quid? Quod πάλιν Marci ipsius stilum sapere videtur. Solet enim Noster, similia iis quae antea narraverat traditurus, hocce πάλιν frequentitare; id quod permultis exemplis doceri potest. Vide sis cap. 2,1. coll. 1,21. cap. 2,13. coll. 1,16. cap. 3,1. coll. 1,21. cap. 3,20. coll. vf. 7. cap. 4,1. coll. 3.7. cap. 5,21. coll. vf. 1. cap. 8,13. coll. vf. 10. cap. 10,1. coll. 9,14 rel. . . nonne probabile tibi videbitur, nostro quoque loco Evangelistam pro suo more adposuisse πάλιν quo lectores ad aliam

Griesbach seems to have been one of the first scholars to suggest that "πάλιν used retrospectively uniting two or more separated pericopes" narrated in similar language was one feature of the author of Mark's compositional style.

**2. C. H. Turner (1924-1928)**[5] – The study of the linguistic characteristics of Mark to explain away anomalies for the theory of Markan priority, specifically the so-called "minor agreements" of Matthew and Luke against Mark.

C. H. Turner accepted a long standing critical judgement among students of the synoptics that πάλιν was a linguistic characteristic of the author of Mark.[6] Turner also either observed or sought to respond to the observations of others that Mark's πάλιν was almost always absent from the parallel texts of Matthew

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ablegaret narrationem nostrae longe simillimam, quam paullo superius cap. 6.34-44 literis consignaverat." Cf. Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, 133-35.

[5] C. H. Turner," Marcan Usage. Notes, Critical and Exegetical, on the Second Gospel," JThS 25 (1924): 377-86; 26 (1925): 12-20, 145-56, 225-40, 337-46; 27 (1926): 58-62; 28 (1927): 9-30, 349-62; 29 (1928): 275-89, 346-61.

[6] In addition to Griesbach see:

(1) Johann Daniel Schulze, "Über den schriftstellerischen Charakter und Werth des Evangelisten Marcus: Ein Beitrag zur Special hermeneutik des N. T" in *Analekten für das Studium der exegetischen und systematischen Theologie.* ed. Karl August Gottlieb Keil and Heinrich Gottlieb Tzschirner. 4 Vols. (Leipzig: J. A. Barth. "Erster Abschnitt," II, 2 (1814): 104-151; "Zweiter Abschnitt: Erster Hälfte," II, 3 (1815): 69-132; "Zweiter Abschnitt: Zweiter Hälfte," III, 1 (1816): 88-127. See especially "10. Zusätze, welche den Zusammenhang andeuten," in "Erster Abschnitt," pp. 130-132;

> 8:1. 'παλιν' bei 'παμπολλου οχλου οντος' etc. welches sich in mehreren Handschriften findet—-weiset auf 6, 31 zurück.
> (Erster Abschnitt, p. 131)
>
> Auch Paulus nimmt dieses παλιν durch die Bemerkung in Schutz, daß Marcus Winke und Beziehungen dieser Art zu geben liebe, S[ehen]. II. Th[eil]. S[eite] 395.
> (Erster Abschnitt, p. 131 n. 40)
>
> 15,12 ist "παλιν" hinzugesetzt, mit Rücksicht auf das, was V. 9. erzählt worden. Diese Besonnenheit vermißt man in Matth. 27, 21. vergl. mit V. 17.
> (Erster Abschnitt, p. 132)
>
> Schulze also lists πάλιν among the "Lieblingsausdrücke des Marcus, (Zweiter Abschnitt: Zweiter Hälfte," pp. 110-114).
>
> παλιν kommt sehr oft vor.
> (Zweiter Abschnitt: Zweiter Hälfte," p. 113).

(2) Karl August Credner [*Einleitung in das Neue Testament* (Halle: Waisenhaus, 1836):103] also notes:

> . . . beobachtet Markus im Allgemeine dieselbe Anordunung wie Matthäus und Lukas, und reiht das Einzelne meist nur mit καί oder einem rückweisenden πάλιν an einander. Vergleiche. . . mit rückweisendem πάλιν 2, 1. 13; 3, 1. 20; 4, 1; 5, 21; 7, 31; 8, 13. 25; 10, 1 (zwei Mal). 24. 32; 11, 27; 12, 4. 5; 14, 39. 40. 61. 69. 70 (zwei Mal); 15, 4. 12. 13.

(3) Samuel Davidson [*An Introduction to the Study of the New Testament.* Third edition revised and improved. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1894): 121] says:

> 22. The sentences [in Mark] are loosely connected by καί or πάλιν, as καὶ ἔλεγεν, καὶ ἐξῆλθεν, καὶ εἰσῆλθεν, καὶ εἰσῆλθε πάλιν, κ. τ. λ.;

The first edition of Davidson was published in 1868 and the second edition in 1882.

(4)C. H. Turner's analysis of πάλιν within the Synoptic Tradition may be found in "Markan Usage: Notes, Critical and Exegetical, on the Second Gospel," JTS 29 (1928): 283-87.

and Luke. Turner seems to have believed that this evidence represented only one of several *sets* of minor agreements in omission of Matthew and Luke against Mark that stood in the way of the acceptance of Markan priority in the first quarter of the twentieth century. His comments are quoted *in extenso* below.

Turner says that his studies of various literary phenomena within the text of Mark are pursued as contributions to text criticism and exegesis of Mark and to the early twentieth century discussion of the minor agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark. These conclusions about Turner's concerns are drawn from the quotations from his series of articles on Marcan style in the *Journal of Theological Studies* to be cited in this section of this paper dealing with his work. Turner introduces his first article on Markan style in 1924 with the following words.

> Dr. Hort, in the great *Introduction* to his edition of the Greek Testament, lays down as fundamental the principle that 'Knowledge of documents should precede final judgement upon readings' (§ 38), using capitals in the text and italics in the table of contents to call special attention to the importance of the words. I want to enter a similar plea for what I conceive to be an even more important principle, namely that 'Knowledge of an author's usage should precede final judgment' alike as to readings, as to exegesis, and— in this case— as to the mutual relations of the Synoptic Gospels. The studies that follow are intended to be a contribution to the textual criticism and the exegesis of St Mark, and also to the better understanding of that department of the Synoptic problem which is concerned with the agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark. So long as it is supposed that there is a residuum of agreements between Matthew and Luke against Mark in matter taken from Mark— apart, that is from passages found also in Q— which cannot be explained without assuming literary contact either of Matthew and Luke with one another or of both with some other document than our extant Mark, so long will research into the Synoptic question be hampered and final solution delayed. We can only see things in their true proportions if we consider the evidence over a wide field, and not only the agreements but the disagreements of the two later Synoptists in the handling of their common material. 'Use large maps' is a piece of advice that applies to other people besides politicians.
>
> I propose therefore to treat in succession various characteristic Marcan usages, isolating each usage and examining it over the whole field of the Gospel. So and so only shall we be able to establish our inductions on a secure basis. And I cannot help thinking that the method proves itself to be unexpectedly fruitful in results.[7]

Turner's introduction to his discussion of πάλιν in Mark, published in 1928, reads as follows.

> πάλιν (Mark 27 times, Matthew 16 times, Luke thrice, John 43 times).
>
> The mere enumeration of these numbers creates at once the suspicion that the preponderant use of the word in Mark and John, coupled with its practical absence from Luke, must be due *either* to the Aramaic background of the thought of the second and fourth evangelist, *or* to some

[7] Turner, "Marcan Usage" JThS 25 (1924): 377-78.

> characteristic of the Κοινή instinctively repugnant to the other two and especially to Luke. I do not propose here to choose between these two alternatives (they are not indeed mutually exclusive), but I confine myself to the investigation of the meaning or meanings of the word in Mark and of the procedure of the other two Synoptists when they found the word before them. But the caution must be given *in limine* that since Mark most commonly uses πάλιν in cases of transition—as we should put it, at the beginning of a paragraph—and since it is just these introductory phrases which Matthew and Luke habitually drop in copying Mark, the proportion of cases where there is no actual parallelism between the three is much smaller than the numbers at first sight suggest. In fact out of the twenty-seven instances in Mark, there are only nineteen where Matthew is strictly parallel, and for Luke, only nine. Even so, the results are startling enough: Matthew retains πάλιν five times—twice with some modification—Luke retains it once.[8]

After discussing each and every usage of πάλιν in Mark and the evidence from the texts of Matthew and/or Luke, when these evangelists parallel Mark, Turner concludes his 1928 discussion of πάλιν in Mark with these words,

> What are the results of this perhaps over long and over detailed inquiry? Primarily, I think, that πάλιν is in Mark a very light and unemphatic particle: and secondly that the original sense of 'back' seems clear in certain connexions [*sic*], e. g. **6** [5:21], **17** [11:3], and possible in **8** [7:31], **14** [10:10], **16** [10:32], **18** [11:27]. The vehement dislike of Luke for the word I should suppose to be due exactly to his Hellenic sense of the importance of definiteness and precision in the use of particles. In the first five

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8 Turner, "Marcan Usage," JThS 29 (1928): 283. Note Turner's rhetoric here. He notes that "Matthew and Luke habitually drop" Mark's "introductory phrases" that contain πάλιν. In order to explain how Matthew and Luke could have agreed in this procedure, he suggests that Mark's use of πάλιν may represent "some characteric of the Κοινή instinctively repugnant to the other two [Evangelists, Matthew and Luke] and especially to Luke." He also suggests that the number of such agreements is "much smaller than the numbers at first sight suggest." By our count, there are eight "minor agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark in the omission of "πάλιν Used Retrospectively Uniting Two or More Separated Pericopes." See the parallels to Mark 2:1-2, 2:13-14, 3:1, 3:20-21, 4:1-3, 5:21, 10:32, and 11:27. See also the quite separate phenomenon of the common omission of "πάλιν Used Retrospectively Uniting Two Verses Within a Pericope" at Mark 8:25 (where Matthew and Luke agree in omitting the entire story from Mark 8:22-26), Mark 10:24, 14:69, 70b. Every one of the five instances that Turner notes of Matthew "retaining," (less prejudicially, "sharing") Mark's πάλιν belong to this *second* category, i. e., "πάλιν Used Retrospectively Uniting Two Verses *Within* a Pericope" (See Mark 10:24/Matt 19:24; Mark 12:4/Matt 21:36; Mark 14:39/Matt 26:42, πάλιν ἐκ δευτέρου; Mark 14:40/Matt 26:43 and Mark 14:70a/Matt 26:72.)

The same is true of Luke. The only time Luke "retains" Mark's πάλιν is the one example of "πάλιν Used Retrospectively Uniting Two Verses Within a Pericope" (Mark 15:12/Luke 23:20).

Neither Matthew nor Luke share either the one occurrence in Mark of "πάλιν Used to Mean 'Back'" (Mark 11:3) or the one occurrence in Mark of "πάλιν used Prospectively" (Mark 15:13). Matthew and Luke's agreements in omission of 3 different usages of πάλιν in Mark only heightens the problem for Markan priority.

instances of the list just given πάλιν is really almost otiose as used by Mark.[9]

Turner attempts to explain the general absence of the Markan πάλιν (27 occurrences) from the parallel texts of Matthew and Luke as the result of accidental agreements by Matthew and Luke when they independently edited their common source, Mark. Turner claims that his study leads to the conclusion that πάλιν in Mark is "a very light and unemphatic particle" the usage of which is sometimes "almost otiose" in Mark.[10] His implicit conclusion would be that the student of the synoptic gospels should not be surprised that two superior authors, like Matthew and Luke, when independently editing their text of Mark, would happen to agree in omitting this "very light and unemphatic particle" which, as used by Mark, is sometimes "almost otiose."

**3. Frans Neirynck (1974).**[11] – Mark's Use of πάλιν as one set of minor agreements in omission by Matthew and Luke.

As one of his contributions to the Seminar on the Synoptic Problem within the Studiorum Novi Testamenti Societas that met during the 1970s, Professor Frans Neirynck published the most comprehensive collection of the minor agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark to appear in the literature.

Neirynck displays these "minor agreements" within limited synoptic literary contexts in the great bulk of this book.[12] Following these synoptic displays, Neirynck provides comprehensive lists of thirty-four vocabulary items, grammatical/and or syntactical features that appear with particular frequency in Mark, together with comparative material from Matthew and Luke.[13]

If one presupposes the Two-Document Hypothesis, these lists represent sets of literary features of Mark's text that Matthew and Luke frequently agree in changing within, or omitting from, their literary contexts parallel to Mark. In comprehensively displaying every occurrence of a particular literary feature of

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[9] Ibid, 287. Again, note Turner's rhetoric in this conclusion. Specifically, he refers to Mark's usage of πάλιν as "light and unemphatic" and "otiose." He concludes that Luke has a "vehement dislike. . .for the word." Such language prepares his readers to believe that Matthew and Luke, as better Greek stylists, could have accidentally agreed in omitting this word from Mark on so many occasions.

Further, Turner argues for translating πάλιν as "back" in six contexts. Of Turner's six potential examples, only the use of πάλιν at 11:3 clearly means "back." By reducing the number of times that πάλιν is translated "again," Turner is able to reduce the number of contexts that would be related through πάλιν in Mark and reduces the impact that Matthew and Luke's concurrent omissions of these interrelated contexts might have on his readers.

[10] Turner, "Marcan Usage, " JThS 29 (1928): 283-7.

[11] Frans Neirynck, ed., in collaboration with Theo Hansen and Frans van Segbroeck, *The Minor Agreements of Matthew and Luke Against Mark with a Cumulative List, BETL* 37 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974) 330pp., Notes on πάλιν may be found on pp. 276-77. See also, by the same author, "Les accords mineurs et la rédaction des Evangiles, L'épisode du paralytique (Mt IX, 1-8/Lc V, 17-26, par. Mc II, 1-2)." *EThL* 50 (1974): 215-30; "Deuteromarcus et les accords Matthieu-Luc." *EThL* 56 (1980): 397-408; "The Matthew-Luke Agreements in Mt 14, 13-14/Lk 9, 10-11 (par. Mk 6,30-34.) The Two-Source Theory Beyond the Impasse." *EThL* 60 (1984): 25-44; "Minor Agreements Matthew-Luke in the Transfiguration Story," in *Orientierung an Jesus: Zur Theologie der Synoptiker: für Josef Schmid* , ed. P. Hoffmann, et al., (Freiburg: Herder, 1973): 253-66.

[12] Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, 49-195.

[13] Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, 199-288.

Mark, Neirynck also shows where and how the parallels in Matthew and Luke may agree or disagree with Mark.

But Neirynck does not limit his attention to the Gospel of Mark and its parallels. He also displays all occurrences of the same literary feature within the texts of Matthew and/or Luke, noting where Mark is absent or different and all of the unique occurrences of this same literary feature within the texts of Matthew and Luke when these occur.

One of the literary features that Neirynck chooses to include in this collection is a comprehensive listing of all of the occurrences of πάλιν within the Synoptic Tradition.[14] Neirynck does not explicitly distinguish among various usages of πάλιν within the Synoptic Gospels, but his listings would allow one to make such distinctions, at least in the case of Mark. Neirynck's list includes potential previous referents for πάλιν in Mark, but he does not distinguish between potentially retrospective usages that would link together two or more separated pericopes in Mark and those that would link together two or more verses within a pericope.

**4. David Peabody (1983/1987).** Mark's uses of πάλιν in composing the Gospel.

In 1983, David Barrett Peabody completed his doctoral dissertation at Southern Methodist University entitled "The Redactional Features of the Author of Mark: A Method Focusing on Recurrent Phraseology and Its Application."[15] A revised form of the dissertation was published in 1987 under the title, *Mark as Composer.*[16]

All told, Mark uses the Greek word πάλιν 28 times within his gospel. But Peabody argues in both forms of his work that Mark uses πάλιν in at least three ways and one of these ways may be further subdivided into two usages. Peabody argues that the three usages of πάλιν in Mark are: (1) πάλιν used to mean "back"; (2) πάλιν used prospectively and (3) πάλιν used retrospectively.

He divides this third use of πάλιν into two subcategories: 3a: "πάλιν Used Retrospectively Uniting Two Verses within a Pericope" and 3b "πάλιν Used Retrospectively Uniting Two or More Separated Pericopes."

Peabody argues that there is but one example each within the text of Mark of "πάλιν used to mean "back" (Mark 11:3) and "πάλιν used prospectively " (Mark 15:13). He argues that there are 11 examples of usage 3a: "πάλιν Used Retrospectively Uniting Two Verses within a Pericope" (Mark 8:25, 10:24, 12:4, 14:39, 14:40, 16:61, 14:69, 14:70a, 14:70b, 15:4 and 15:12) and 15 examples of usage 3b "πάλιν Used Retrospectively Uniting Two or More Separated Pericopes" (Mark 2:1, 2:13, 3:1, 3:20, 4:1, 5:21, 7:14, 7:31, 8:1, 8:13, 10:1bis, 10:10, 10:32, and 11:27). this last usage, 3b: "πάλιν Used Retrospectively Uniting Two or More Separated Pericopes," can be demonstrated to provide a certain compositional structure for a large part of the Markan gospel and, therefore, has the highest probability of coming from the hand of the author. The 15 examples of this last compositional usage of πάλιν all serve to structure major sections of the gospel, including, at least, Mark 1:16-4:2; 4:35-5:43; 6:34-8:26; 9:35-10:12, and 10:32-13:1.

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[14] Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, 276-277.

[15] David Barrett Peabody, *The Redactional Features of the Author of Mark: A Method Focusing on Recurrent Phraseology and Its Application*, Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Methodist University, 1983 (photocopy, Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1984).

[16] David Barrett Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, New Gospel Studies 1 (Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 1987)

**5. David Peabody (1989)** The network of passages in Mark containing "πάλιν used retrospectively uniting two or more separated pericopes;" the omission of this Markan compositional network from the parallel passages in Matthew and Luke, and the import of these facts for the Synoptic Problem.

In an oral presentation made at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature convened at Anaheim, California, Peabody demonstrated that not one of the 15 examples of "πάλιν Used Retrospectively Uniting Two or More Separated Pericopes" ever appears in the parallel text of either Matthew or Luke. The substance of his argument follows here.

After reiterating the argument made in his book about the several usages of πάλιν in Mark, Peabody demonstrated that "πάλιν used retrospectively uniting two or more separated pericopes" provided the basic building block for the structure of the gospel of Mark at least from Mark 1:16 through chapter 13. It is highly probable that this literary feature was provided by the author/composer of Mark.

There are at least eight, and perhaps ten, triple tradition contexts where neither Matthew nor Luke share this Markan usage of πάλιν: (1) Mark 2:1-2/Matt 9:1/Luke 5:17a; (2) Mark 2:13-14/Matt 9:9/Luke 5:27; (3) Mark 3:1/Matt 12:9-10a/Luke 6:6, [cf. Luke 14:1-2]; (4) Mark 3:20-23a cf. Matt 12:21-24 cf. Luke 11:14-15; (5) Mark 4:1-3/Matt 13:1-3/Luke 8:4-5a; (6) Mark 5:21/Matt 9:18/Luke 8:40; (7) Mark 10:32/Matt 20:17/Luke 18:31; (8) Mark 11:27/Matt 21:23/Luke 20:1 and perhaps also (9) Mark 8:13-15/Matt 16:4b-6 cf. Luke 11:29-12:1 and (10) Mark 10:9-11/Matt 19:6b, 9/cf. Luke 16:18.

In addition, Matthew always "omits" this usage of πάλιν in contexts parallel to Mark, where Luke is absent. There are four such contexts(Mark 7:14/Matt 15:10; Mark 7:31-32/Matt 15:29-30; Mark 8:1-2/Matt 15:32; Mark 10:1bis/Matt 19:1-2 [cf. Luke 9:51 and 17:11?]). The two further contexts, Mark 8:13 and 10:10 should be included here, if not in the previous category.

On the presupposition of the Two Source Hypothesis, this evidence suggests that both Matthew and Luke, in independently editing Mark, *accidentally agreed in omitting every one of the 15 instances of what may well be the most striking compositional feature of their source.* Such evidence is seriously anomalous for the Two Source Hypothesis. By contrast, the evidence would be easily explained if Mark had added this characteristic compositional feature to the conflated text he created from his major sources, Matthew and Luke.

## PART TWO

### The πάλιν Network in Mark and the Synoptic Problem

What follows is a detailed examination of the parallels in Matthew and Luke wherever "πάλιν Used Retrospectively Uniting Two or More Separated Pericopes" appears in Mark. We will take up these parallel contexts in the sequence in which they appear in Mark. This sequence would be essentially the same if we took these parallel contexts up in the Matthean sequence; there is only one exception, Matt 9:18/Mark 5:21.

**1. a. Mark 2:1-2/Matt 9:1/Luke 5:17a. – Synopsis**
(cf. Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, ¶ 14, p. 67)

| Matthew 9:1 | Mark 2:1-2 | Luke 5:17a |
|---|---|---|
| Καὶ ἐμβὰς εἰς πλοῖον διεπέρασεν, | | |
| καὶ ἦλθεν | Καὶ εἰσελθὼν πάλιν | Καὶ ἐγένετο |
| εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν πόλιν. | εἰς Καφαρναοὺμ δι' ἡμερῶν ἠκούσθη ὅτι ἐν οἴκῳ ἐστίν. καὶ συνήχθησαν πολλοί. ὥστε μηκέτι χωρεῖν μηδὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν θύραν, | ἐν μιᾷ τῶν ἡμερῶν |
| | καὶ ἐλάλει αὐτοῖς τὸν λόγον. | καὶ αὐτὸς ἦν διδάσκων, |

**1. b. Mark 2:1-2/Matt 9:1/Luke 5:17a. – Discussion.** πάλιν appears in Mark for the first time at Mark 2:1 where it *refers back* to Jesus entering Capernaum for the first time, 25 verses earlier, at Mark 1:21. There Mark says, "And after he went into Capernaum again after [a few] days it was heard that he was in a house. And many persons were gathered together so that there was no longer room, not even the [places?] before the door, and he was speaking the word to them." The context at Matthew 9:1 is quite different, "And embarking in a boat he crossed over and came into his own city." So also Luke (5:17), "And it happened on one of the days that even he himself was teaching." Mark shares καί + an aorist of ἔρχομαι or its compound + εἰς with Matthew and καί + ἡμερῶν + καί with Luke. Where the agreements with Matthew stop, the agreements with Luke begin. Generally, Matthew and Luke agree against Mark in not sharing most of this entire Markan context with Mark. This includes the fact that neither Matthew nor Luke include πάλιν in their texts parallel to Mark here.

Tables of literary characteristics of Mark noted by Peabody that overlap with this usage of πάλιν in Mark 2:1—

Table 27 Καί + a Verb of Motion + εἰς Καφαρναούμ to Introduce a Pericope
Table 54 καί + Aorist of ἔρχομαι or its Compounds + εἰς + Name of Place + καί
Table 71 A form of ἀκούω + ὅτι + [Ἰησοῦς] ἐστίν
Table 42 οἶκος/οἰκία Used to Set the Stage for the Subsequent Pericope
Table 48 Καί + a Form of συνάγω + πρός
Table 47 καί + [ἐπι]συνάγω + πρὸς τὴν θύραν
Table 68 ὥστε μη[κέτι] + Infinitive To Describe the Curtailment of Normal Human Activity Which Results from Jesus' Presence or Action
Table 36 ὥστε + Infinitive
Table 69 ὁ λόγος Used Absolutely. See especially the first three entries.

| | |
|---|---|
| 2:2 . . . , καὶ | ἐλάλει αὐτοῖς τὸν λόγον. |
| 4:33 Καὶ τοιαύταις παραβολαῖς πολλαῖς | ἐλάλει αὐτοῖς τὸν λόγον, |
| 8:32 . . . · καὶ παρρησίᾳ | τὸν λόγον ἐλάλει. |

Perhaps, compare also:

Table 72 καί + Compound Verb of Motion with σύν + "crowds" + ὥστε μη[κέτι] + Infinitive + μηδε

This constitutes a comprehensive set of facts that provides compelling literary evidence that Mark 2:1-2 is a Markan composition. The composer of this text is the composer of the gospel as a whole. He may be using sources, but, in this passage, he has phrased the text in his own characteristic style.

On the Markan hypothesis, Matthew and Luke, using a twenty-six word text of Mark have managed to agree with one another in only a single word, i. e., the use of καί.

From ἡμερῶν to Mark's final use of καί, there is an uninterrupted major agreement in omission of Matthew and Luke against Mark consisting of sixteen words. These agreements are, for the most part, words frequently used by Matthew and Luke elsewhere in their gospels. There is no *prima facie* conceptual or literary reason for either Matthew or Luke, let alone both together, to avoid *all* usage of this extended set of consecutive words and phrases in the text of their putative source.

This major omission, when combined with their "so-called" minor agreement in omission of "πάλιν Used Retrospectively," constitutes a serious anomaly for the Two Source Hypothesis. But the data are readily explained if Mark is using Matthew and Luke. As an author, Mark has the freedom to compose his own original text. "And after entering again into Capernaum" is Mark's equivalent of Matthew's "and he came into his own city." He has simply omitted any reference to "Jesus entering into a boat," something absent from (unconfirmed in?) his text of Luke.

Mark's "And he was speaking to them the word" is his equivalent of Luke's "And he himself was teaching." So, on this view, Mark has freely combined elements from Matthew and Luke in an imaginative recomposition of the story, giving the narrative his own distinctive stamp, utilizing language and conceptions that are characteristic of his literary style and unique to his way of visually describing Jesus' dynamic effect upon the crowds.

**2. a. Mark 2:13-14/Matt 9:9/Luke 5:27 – Synopsis.**
(cf. Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, ¶ 15, p. 70-71)

| Matthew 9:9 | Mark 2:13-14 | Luke 5:27 |
|---|---|---|
| | Καὶ | Καὶ |
| | | μετὰ ταῦτα |
| | ἐξῆλθεν | ἐξῆλθεν, |
| | πάλιν | |
| | παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν· | |
| | καὶ πᾶς ὁ ὄχλος | |
| | ἤρχετο πρὸς αὐτόν, | |
| | καὶ ἐδίδασκεν αὐτούς. | |
| Καὶ παράγων | Καὶ παράγων | καὶ |
| ὁ Ἰησοῦς | | |
| ἐκεῖθεν | | |
| εἶδεν | εἶδεν | ἐθεάσατο |
| ἄνθρωπον | | τελώνην |
| | | ὀνόματι |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| καθήμενον | | |
| ἐπὶ τὸ τελώνιον, | | |
| Μαθθαῖον | Λευῖν | Λευῖν |
| | τὸν τοῦ Ἁλφαίου | |
| λεγόμενον, | | |
| | καθήμενον | καθήμενον |
| | ἐπὶ τὸ τελώνιον | επί τὸ τελώνιον, |
| καὶ λέγει αὐτῷ· | καὶ λέγει αὐτῷ· | καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ· |

**2. b. Mark 2:13-14/Matt 9:9/Luke 5:27 – Discussion.** πάλιν appears in Mark for the second time at Mark 2:13-14 where it *refers back* to Jesus going out by the sea the first time at Mark 1:16. There Jesus called two sons of Jonah; Peter and Andrew, and two sons of Zebedee; James and John. Here, at Mark 2:13, Jesus issues his third call to discipleship to Levi [James?] as he sits at the tax desk. Here, Mark begins by agreeing with Luke on the words καί and ἐξῆλθεν. Then, Mark agrees with Matthew on the words Καὶ παράγων + εἶδεν, only to return to verbatim agreement with Luke on six of the concluding seven words, Λευῖν. . . καθήμενον ἐπὶ τὸ τελώνιον καὶ . . .αὐτῷ. In these closing words Mark agrees with Matthew's historic present, λέγει, against Luke's aorist. The historic present conforms better to the style of Mark.

Matthew and Luke agree against Mark in not sharing the words πάλιν παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν· καὶ πᾶς ὁ ὄχλος ἤρχετο πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐδίδασκεν αὐτούς + τὸν τοῦ Ἁλφαίου in their contexts parallel to Mark. This includes the fact, of course, that neither Matthew nor Luke record πάλιν in their texts parallel to Mark here.

Tables of literary characteristics of Mark noted by Peabody that overlap with this usage of πάλιν in Mark 2:13—

Table 15 παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν
Table 85 καὶ πᾶς ὁ ὄχλος
Table 84 καὶ ἐδίδασκεν αὐτούς
Table 16 Call Stories
Table 20 Name + Article + Indication of Family Relationship
Table 86 τὸν τοῦ Ἁλφαίου
Table K[17]

Here the pattern of agreements between the three accounts is most easily explained if Mark is combining the texts of Matthew and Luke. It is striking that *every word and phrase* in Mark that does not stand in verbatim agreement with either Matthew or Luke or both is characteristic of Mark, and that *none* of the words and phrases in Mark that are paralleled in the other gospels is characteristic of Mark. What other explanation is there for this consistent pattern of positive and negative correlations than that Mark has freely recomposed the loosely parallel texts of Matthew and Luke and, in doing so, he has used many of his own characteristic words and phrases. That is, what is not characteristic of Mark can be explained as having been taken over from Matthew and Luke. The rest is from Mark. There is nothing left over. To reverse the explanation would be to say that Matthew and Luke have managed to omit only what is characteristic of

[17] Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, 157.

Mark, each independently taking from Mark only what is not characteristic of Mark. That defies all expectations of how authors compose. How could two authors independently using the same source manage to accomplish such a nice piece of meaningless literary discrimination, even if for some reason that is what they wanted to do?

If a literary critic wanted compelling literary evidence that would serve to falsify the Markan hypothesis, what kind of literary evidence is there that would outweigh this evidence? Not to accept this kind of literary evidence is to opt out of the discipline of literary criticism as it is practiced in all fields of literature.

**3.a. Mark 3:1/Matt 12:9-10a/Luke 6:6 (Luke 14:1-2?) -Synopsis.**
(cf. Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, ¶ 18b, p. 78)

| Matthew 12:9-10a | Mark 3:1 | Luke 6:6 |
|---|---|---|
| Καὶ μεταβὰς ἐκεῖθεν | Καὶ | Ἐγένετο δὲ |
| | | ἐν ἑτέρῳ σαββάτῳ |
| ἦλθεν | εἰσῆλθεν πάλιν | τῷ εἰσελθεῖν αὐτὸν |
| εἰς τὴν συναγώγην αὐτῶν. | εἰς συναγωγήν, | εἰς τὴν συναγωγὴν |
| | | καὶ διδάσκειν· |
| καὶ ἰδοὺ | καὶ ἦν ἐκεῖ | καὶ ἦν |
| ἄνθρωπος | ἄνθρωπος | ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖ |
| | ἐξηραμμένην | |
| χεῖρα ἔχων | ἔχων τὴν χεῖρα. | καὶ ἡ χεὶρ αὐτοῦ ἡ δεξία |
| ξηράν. | | ἦν ξηρά. |

**3.b. Mark 3:1/Matt 12:9-10a/Luke 6:6 (Luke 14:1-2?) – Discussion.** At 3:1 Mark records that Jesus went into a synagogue again, *referring back* to the fact that Jesus went into a synagogue previously at Mark 1:21. The πάλιν at Mark 3:1 refers back to the second half of Mark 1:21 where Jesus is said to have entered a synagogue for the first time in the gospel and the πάλιν at Mark 2:1 refers back to the first half of Mark 1:21 where Jesus is said to have entered Capernaum for the first time in the gospel. At Mark 3:1, Mark agrees with Matthew's introductory καί + the aorist indicative, [εἰσ]ἦλθεν, but with Luke's choice of the compound verb, εἰσέρχεσθαι. Mark shares εἰς συναγωγήν with both Matthew and Luke but disagrees with both by not sharing the definite article with them. Matthew and Luke agree against Mark in not sharing πάλιν with Mark in their texts parallel to Mark here.

Tables of literary characteristics of Mark noted by Peabody that overlap with this usage of πάλιν in Mark 3:1—

Table 28 καί + a Form of ἔρχομαι or its Compounds + εἰς + Accusative of συναγωγή

Table 54 καί + Aorist of ἔρχομαι or its Compounds + εἰς + Name of Place + καί

Compare Table B[18]

Once again the text of Mark is reduced to what is parallel to either Matthew or Luke or both plus what is characteristic of Mark. There is nothing left over that requires any other explanation than that given to explain the previous passage. By itself, this text of Mark is too short to be decisive. But, if we place it alongside the previous text, we see that it expands the pattern identified in the last passage discussed and serves to strengthen the arguments made in that discussion.

**4. a. Mark 3:20-23a/Matt 12:21-24/Luke 11:14-15 – Synopsis.**
(cf. Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, ¶ 21, p. 82)

| Matthew 12:21-24 | Mark 3:20-23a | Luke 11:14-15 |
|---|---|---|
| καὶ τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ<br>ἔθνη ἐλπιοῦσιν. | | |
| | Καὶ ἔρχεται<br>εἰς οἶκον·<br>καὶ συνέρχεται<br>πάλιν<br>ὁ [ὁ] ὄχλος,<br>ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι αὐτοὺς<br>μηδὲ ἄρτον φαγεῖν.<br>καὶ ἀκούσαντες<br>οἱ παρ' αὐτοῦ<br>ἐξῆλθον<br>κρατῆσαι αὐτόν,<br>ἔλεγον γὰρ<br>ὅτι ἐξέστη.<br>καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς<br>οἱ ἀπὸ Ἱεροσολύμων<br>καταβάντες<br>ἔλεγον<br>ὅτι | |
| Τότε προσηνέχθη αὐτῷ<br>δαιμονιζόμενος<br>τυφλὸς καὶ<br>κωφός·<br>καὶ<br>ἐθεράπευσεν<br>αὐτόν,<br>ὥστε τὸν κωφὸν λαλεῖν<br>καὶ βλέπειν.<br>καὶ ἐξίσταντο<br>πάντες οἱ ὄχλοι<br><br>καὶ ἔλεγον,<br>Μήτι οὗτός ἐστιν<br>ὁ υἱὸς Δαυίδ;<br>οἱ δὲ Φαρισαῖοι | | Καὶ ἦν ἐκβάλλων<br>δαιμόνιον,<br>[καὶ αὐτὸ ἦν]<br>κωφόν.<br>ἐγένετο δὲ<br>τοῦ δαιμονίου<br>ἐξελθόντος<br>ἐλάλησεν ὁ κωφός.<br><br>καὶ ἐθαύμασαν<br>οἱ ὄχλοι·<br>τινὲς δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν<br>εἶπον, |

[18] Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, 149.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| ἀκούσαντες | | |
| εἶπον, | | |
| Οὗτος οὐκ ἐκβάλλει | | |
| τὰ δαιμόνια | | |
| εἰ μὴ | | |
| ἐν τῷ Βεελζεβοὺλ | Βεελζεβοὺλ ἔχει, | Ἐν βεελζεβοὺλ |
| | καὶ ὅτι | |
| | ἐν τῷ | τῷ |
| ἄρχοντι | ἄρχοντι | ἄρχοντι |
| τῶν δαιμονίων. | τῶν δαιμονίων | τῶν δαιμονίων |
| | ἐκβάλλει | ἐκβάλλει |
| | τὰ δαιμόνια. | τὰ δαιμόνια· |
| | καὶ προσκαλεσάμενος | |
| | αὐτοὺς | |
| | ἐν παραβολαῖς | |
| | ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς, | |

**4. b. Mark 3:20-23a/Matt 12:21-24/Luke 11:14-15 – Discussion.** Neither Matthew nor Luke have any verbal parallels to Mark 3:20-21 although both share with Mark the Beelzebul controversy.[19] Mark and Matthew have this controversy in the same relative order of events (Matt 12:22-32/Mark 3:20-29), but Luke has it in another literary context (Luke 11:14-22, cf. Luke 12:10). Naturally, neither Matthew nor Luke share πάλιν with Mark in their texts parallel to Mark here.

Tables of literary characteristics of Mark noted by Peabody that overlap with this usage of πάλιν in Mark 3:20—

Table 106 καί + ἔρχεται/ἔρχονται + εἰς + Name of Place + καί

Table 42 οἶκος/οἰκία Used to Set the Stage for the Subsequent Pericope

Table 72 καί + Compound Verb of Motion with σύν + "crowds" + ὥστε μη[κέτι] + Infinitive + μηδέ

Table 105 "Crowds" + Negative + φαγεῖν The Motif of Not Being Able to Eat Because of the Crowd

Table 36 ὥστε + Infinitive

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[19] In 1971, O. Lamar Cope suggested that the highly structured Matthean form of the Beelzebul controversy could be seen to be preserved in fragmentary form in the parallel texts of both Luke and Mark. See Lamar Cope, "The Beelzebul Controversy, Mk. 3:19-30 and Parallels: A Model Problem in Source Analysis," SBLASP, 2 Volumes (1971): I/251-56. Compare his redaction critical analysis of chapter 12 of Matthew and the implications of his work for source criticism in the published form of his doctoral dissertation completed in 1971 at Union Theological Seminary, *Matthew. A Scribe Trained for the kingdom of Heaven*, CBQMS 5 (Washington, DC: The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1976): 32-52. Cope's argument assumes the validity of one of Earnest DeWitt Burton's six canons of literary criticism for determining the secondary character of one narrative to another. The applicable canon in this case would be number 3 in Burton's list, namely, "the clear omission from one document of matter which was in the other, the omission of which destroys the connection." See Earnest DeWitt Burton, *Some Principles of Literary Criticism and Their Applicaton to the Synoptic Problem* (Chicago: Universtiy of Chicago Press, 1904): esp. p. 198. See also the discussion of Burton's and other appropriate canons of criticism that may be used in helping to solve the synoptic problem in W. R. Farmer, *The Synoptic Problem: A Critical Analysis* (New York: Macmillan, 1964; reprinted with corrections Dillsboro, NC: Western North Carolina Press [Macon GA: Mercer University Press], 1976): 227-232.

Table 68 ὥστε μη[κέτι] + Infinitive To Describe the Curtailment of Normal Human Activity Which Results from Jesus' Presence or Action

Table 59 Article + Preposition + the Appropriate Objective Form of αὐτός To Describe the Companions of Jesus

The import of this passage is limited to what it has in common with the preceding πάλιν passages, namely all these πάλιν retrospective passages, which are *prima facie* compositional passages, exhibit other traces of the hand of the person who has composed the whole of the Gospel of Mark, which supports the view that πάλιν retrospective is from the hand of the person who composed Mark.

On the Two Source Hypothesis Matthew and Luke have accidentally agreed in their editing of Mark to omit precisely those passages that most reflect the hand of the author of Mark. On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, Mark has added transitional passages to his conflated text of Matthew and Luke that reflect his compositional hand.

The Beelzebul controversy (Matt 12: 22-32/Mark 3:22-29/Luke 11:14-23 and 12:10) is one of a number of synoptic contexts that contain so many "minor agreements" of Matthew and Luke against Mark that Canon B. H. Streeter once proposed to explain these anomalies for his source theory by hypothecating "St. Mark's Knowledge and Use of Q."[20] The contexts he used in making this argument included (1) John the Baptist's preaching, Matt 3:7-12/Mark 1:7-8/Luke 3:7-9, 16-17; (2) the Temptation, Matt 4:1-11/Mark 1:12-13/Luke 4:1-13; (3) the Beelzebul controversy, Matt 12:22-32/Mark 3:22-30/Luke 9:14-23; (4) a collection of sayings at Mark 4:21-25/cf. Matt 5:15/Luke 9:33; Matt 10:26f/Luke 12:2f; Matt 7:2/Luke 6:38/cf. Matt 6:33b/Luke 12:31b; Matt 25:29/Luke 19:26; (5) The Parables of the Mustard Seed and the Leaven; Matt 13:31-32/Mark 4:30-32/Luke 13:18-19; (6) Matt 10:1-14/Mark 6:7-11/Luke 9:1-5, cf. Luke 10:1-12; (7) Matt 18:6-9/Mark 9:42-50/cf. Luke 17:1-2, 14:34 cf. Matt 5:13; and (8) Matt 23:1-36/Mark 12:38-40/cf. Luke 9:39-52.

Having been convinced of Mark's knowledge of Q by these eight contexts, Streeter added eight more to support his view: (1) Mark 12:28ff/Matt 22:34ff/Luke 10:25ff. (2) Mark 8:12 and parallels, cf. Matt 12:39/Luke 11:29; (3) Mark 8:34 and parallels, cf. Matt 10:38/Luke 14:27; (4) Mark 8:38 and parallels, cf. Matt 10:33/Luke 12:9; (5) Mark 10:11-12 and parallels, cf. Matt 5:32/Luke 16:18; (6) Mark 10:31 and parallels, cf. Matt 20:16/Luke 13:30; (7) Mark 10:43-44 and parallels, cf. Mark 9:35, cf. Matt 23:11/Luke 22:26; (8) Mark 11:23 and parallels, cf. Matt 17:20/Luke 17:6. Streeter wanted to separate the Synoptic Apocalypse off and treat it as a special case, but it clearly belongs to this list. These lists could be expanded considerably to include matter from the Passion Narrative.

Thirteen years after the publication of his article on "St. Mark's Knowledge and Use of Q," Streeter recanted and argued only for an "Overlapping of Q and Mark" in just five of these passages—John the Baptist's Preaching, the Baptism and Temptation, the Beelzebul Controversy, the Parables of the Mustard Seed and Leaven, and the Mission Charge. This subsequent change in Streeter's thinking represents a turn toward less critical scholarship. Streeter well realized

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[20] B. H. Streeter, "St. Mark's Knowledge and Use of Q," in *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem* ed. W. Sanday (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1911): 166-183. Compare his altered views on some of the same synoptic contexts in "The Overlapping of Q and Mark" in B. H. Streeter, *The Four Gospels. A Study of Origins* (New York: Macmillan, 1925):186-191.

the danger of "allowing" Mark to become so similar to Q and therefore adopted a simple, less scholarly position. It is ironic that Streeter's position has been canonized in its less adequate form. Perhaps I may spell out some of the dangers he could have foreseen:

(a) If these "overlaps" between Mark and "Q" are permitted to become more numerous and more extensive, a whole series of "major agreements against Mark" (Simpson) become very apparent, threatening to undermine the very priority of the Gospel of Mark in favor of the priority of "Q."

(b) The precise distinction between the text of the Gospel of Mark and the text of Q becomes very difficult to maintain as they begin to resemble each other more and more. Q turns into a cousin of Mark, a gospel-like source that is, in many key passages, more original.

When all of the Minor Agreements against Mark are considered together, canonical Mark is split into two versions: one called Ur-Markus and one called Deutero-Markus. *When we add to these lists all of the Q-Mark overlaps*, the source designated "Mark" finds itself with yet a third component called "Q-where-it-overlaps-with-Mark." Streeter (and others, such as Simpson in particular) clearly realized what would happen when the Minor Agreements were brought into conjunction with all of the Q-Mark Overlap passages: the Two Source Hypothesis becomes completely uncontrollable and lapses into mere arbitrariness, because it has finally become obvious that no one can say with any precision what "the priority of Mark" means.

**5. a. Mark 4:1-3/Matt 13:1-3/Luke 8:4-5a – Synopsis.**
(cf. Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, ¶ 24, p. 87)

| Matthew13:1-3 | Mark 4:1-3 | Luke 8:4-5a |
|---|---|---|
| Ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ | | |
| | Καὶ πάλιν | |
| ἐξελθὼν ὁ Ἰησοῦς τῆς οἰκίας ἐκάθητο | ἤρξατο διδάσκειν | |
| παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν· | παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν. | |
| καὶ συνήχθησαν | καὶ συνάγεται | Συνιόντος δὲ |
| πρὸς αὐτὸν | πρὸς αὐτὸν | |
| ὄχλοι πολλοί, | ὄχλος πλεῖστος | ὄχλου πολλοῦ καὶ τῶν κατὰ πόλιν ἐπιπορευομένων πρὸς αὐτὸν |
| ὥστε αὐτὸν | ὥστε αὐτὸν | |
| εἰς πλοῖον | εἰς πλοῖον | |
| ἐμβάντα | ἐμβάντα | |
| καθῆσθαι, | καθῆσθαι ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, | |
| καὶ πᾶς ὁ ὄχλος | καὶ πᾶς ὁ ὄχλος πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν | |
| ἐπὶ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν εἱστήκει. | ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἦσαν. | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | καὶ ἐδίδασκεν αὐτοῦς | |
| | ἐν παραβολαῖς | |
| | πολλά, | |
| καὶ ἐλάλησεν αὐτοῖς | καὶ ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς | εἶπεν |
| | ἐν τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ· | |
| πολλὰ | | |
| ἐν παραβολαῖς | | διὰ παραβολῆς· |
| λέγων· | | |
| | ἀκούετε. | |
| ἰδοὺ ἐξῆλθεν | ἰδοὺ ἐξῆλθεν | ἐξῆλθεν |
| ὁ σπείρων | ὁ σπείρων | ὁ σπείρων |
| τοῦ σπείρειν | σπεῖραι | τοῦ σπεῖραι |
| | | τὸν σπόρον αὐτοῦ· |

**5. b. Mark 4:1-3/Matt 13:1-3/Luke 8:4-5a – Discussion.** At 4:1, Mark records that Jesus "began to teach by the sea again" *referring back* to 2:13 where he "taught by the sea" for the first time in Mark and to 1:16 where he was "by the sea" for the first time. There is one verbal agreement of Mark with Luke that Mark does not also share with Matthew, namely the use of the aorist infinitive σπεῖραι against Matthew's present infinitive. But here Matthew and Luke also agree against Mark in the use of the genitive of the articular infinitive to express purpose against Mark's use of the infinitive alone. On the other hand, there are many verbal agreements of Mark with Matthew that are not found in Luke. But, Matthew and Luke agree against Mark in not sharing the following with Mark in their parallel contexts, Καὶ πάλιν ἤρξατο διδάσκειν + ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ + πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν + [ἐπὶ] τῆς γῆς ἦσαν. καὶ ἐδίδασκεν αὐτούς + ἐν τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ· ἀκούετε. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that neither Matthew nor Luke share Mark's πάλιν in their texts parallel to Mark here.

Tables of literary characteristics of Mark noted by Peabody that overlap with this usage of πάλιν in Mark 4:1-3—

Table 111 καὶ ἤρξατο διδάσκειν

Table 67 ἤρξατο/ἤρξαντο + Infinitive

Table 15 παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν

Table 48 Καί + a Form of συνάγω + πρός

Table 63 Καί + Historic Present of Verb of Motion + πρός αὐτόν [=Ἰησοῦν]

Table 112 ὄχλος + πολύς

Table 36 ὥστε + Infinitive

Table 113 εἰς τὸ πλοῖον

Table 96 πλοῖον/πλοιάριον + a Form of ὄχλος + a Form of αὐτός [=Jesus] The Motif of a Boat Being Readied or Used to Protect Jesus From the Crowd

Table 114 ἐμβαίνω + εἰς τὸ πλοῖον

Table 17 ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ

Table 85 καὶ πᾶς ὁ ὄχλος

Table 95 πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν

Table 82 ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς

Table 115 καὶ ἐδίδασκεν καὶ ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς

Table 84 καὶ ἐδίδασκεν αὐτούς

Table 116 καί + 3rd Singular Past Tense of διδάσκω + καί + 3rd Singular Imperfect of Verb of Saying

Table 108 καί + ἐν παραβολαῖς + Verb of Speaking + αὐτοῖς

Table 89 καὶ ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς as a Linking and/or Introductory Formula

Table 117 καί + ἔλεγεν + ἐν τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ + 2nd Person Plural Present Imperative

cf. Table 118 The Parable of the Sower and Its Interpretation

cf. Table 121 βλέπετε Imperative to Mean "Watch" or "Beware"

In Mark 4:1-2, the theme of Jesus' teaching is emphasized by the thrice repeated similar language, καὶ πάλιν ἤρξατο διδάσκειν, καὶ ἐδίδασκεν αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ. Neither Matthew nor Luke make any mention of this Markan emphasis on teaching in their parallels to Mark 4:1 or to Mark 2:13, which is the previous referent for the πάλιν at Mark 4:1. Compare the discussion of Mark 10:1 and parallels below. On the Two Source Hypothesis, the agreement of Matthew and Luke to avoid the most important theme of this Markan context from their texts parallel to Mark 4:1-2 and 2:13 is difficult to explain as the accidental agreement of two independent editors of Mark. This is especially so in view of the fact that both Matthew and Luke are keenly interested in Jesus' teaching.

On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, the evidence represents a Markan reworking of his sources to emphasize a theme that characterizes redactional passages throughout the gospel of Mark. It was evidence like this that led Helmut Koester to posit that canonical Mark was redacted after the Evangelists, Matthew and Luke, had made use of one or more earlier versions of Mark. In Koester's view, among other things, a "teaching motif" was added to the gospel of Mark after it had been used by the Evangelists, Matthew and Luke. On the Griesbach Hypothesis, this motif represents the contribution of the author of Mark to the conflated text he created from his major sources, Matthew and Luke.[21]

**6. a. Mark 5:21/Matt 9:18/Luke 8:40 – Synopsis.**
(cf. Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, ¶ 33, p. 101)

| Matthew 9:18a-b | Mark 5:21-23a-b | Luke 8:40-41 |
|---|---|---|
| Ταῦτα<br>αὐτοῦ λαλοῦντος | Καὶ διαπεράσαντος<br>τοῦ Ἰησοῦ | Ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑποστρέφειν<br>τὸν Ἰησοῦν |
| αὐτοῖς, | | |
| | ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ<br>πάλιν<br>εἰς τὸ πέραν<br>συνήχθη | ἀπεδέξατο |
| | ὄχλος πολὺς | ὁ ὄχλος |

21 See Koester's "History and Development of Mark's Gospel (From Mark to *Secret Mark* and "Canonical Mark)," in *Colloquy on New Testament Studies. A Time for Reappraisal and Fresh Approaches* ed. Bruce C. Corley (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1983): 35-57, esp. 44-47 on Mark's usages of διδάσκειν, διδαχή. Compare David Peabody's response from a Griesbach perspective in the same volume, 87-132, esp. 120-125 on διδάσκειν/διδαχή in Mark.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | ἐπ' αὐτόν, | αὐτὸν· |
| | καὶ ἦν | ἦσαν γὰρ |
| | παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν. | |
| | | πάντες |
| | | προσδοκῶντες αὐτόν. |
| | καὶ | καὶ |
| ἰδοὺ | | ἰδοὺ |
| | ἔρχεται | ἦλθεν |
| ἄρχων | | ἀνὴρ |
| εἷς | εἷς | |
| προσελθὼν | | |
| | τῶν ἀρχισυναγώγων, | |
| | ὀνόματι | ὧ ὄνομα |
| | Ἰάϊρος, | Ἰάϊρος, |
| | | καὶ οὗτος |
| | | ἄρχων |
| | | τῆς συναγωγῆς |
| | | ὑπῆρχεν· |
| | καὶ ἰδὼν αὐτὸν | καὶ |
| προσεκύνει | πίπτει | πεσὼν |
| | πρὸς τοὺς πόδας | παρὰ τοὺς πόδας |
| αὐτῷ | αὐτοῦ, | Ἰησοῦ |
| | καὶ παρακαλεῖ αὐτὸν | παρεκάλει αὐτὸν |
| | πολλὰ | |
| λέγων | λέγων | |
| | | εἰσελθεῖν |
| | | εἰς τὸν οἶκον αὐτοῦ, |

**6. b. Mark 5:21/Matt 9:18/Luke 8:40 – Discussion.** At Mark 5:21 Mark records that "when Jesus crossed to the other side in the boat again a great crowd was gathered to him and he was by the sea." The πάλιν at Mark 5:21 may refer back to 5:1 and 4:35 where Jesus crossed "to the other side" previously within this miracle story unit (Mark 4:35-6:6a). Only a few verbal agreements may be noted between Mark 5:21 and Luke 8:40 in this context. Both use the name Jesus, but in different constructions, Mark in the genitive absolute, Luke in an infinitive construction. Both refer to the crowd (ὄχλος) and both later use αὐτόν, referring to Jesus, but in Mark αὐτόν is the object of a preposition and in Luke it is a direct object. Both also use an imperfect of εἰμί, but in Mark it is a singular referring to Jesus and in Luke it is a plural referring to "many" (πάντες). There are no other agreements between Mark 5:21 and either other gospel. This includes the fact that neither Matthew nor Luke share πάλιν with Mark in their parallel contexts.

Tables of literary characteristics of Mark noted by Peabody that overlap with this usage of πάλιν in Mark 5:21—

cf. Table 48 Καί + a Form of συνάγω + πρός (Some MSS of Mark 5:21 read πρός rather than ἐπί)

Table 134 καί + a Participle of διαπεράω To Introduce a Section

Table 26 ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ

Table 123 εἰς τὸ πέραν

Table 112 ὄχλος + πολύς

Table 15 παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν
Table 135 Healing Stories

There is no evidence that Mark has made use of the text of Matthew in introducing the story of the healing of Jairus' daughter. The agreements between Mark and Luke against Matthew are consistent with a literary relationship between these two gospels in this story. The presence of six phrases in Mark which are characteristic of Mark, no trace of which are found in Luke, is more consistent with a hypothesis envisioning Mark's use of Luke than the reverse.

**7. a. Mark 7:14/Matthew 15:10/Luke No Parallel – Synopsis.**
(cf. Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, ¶ 41, p. 116)

| Matthew 15:10 | Mark 7:14 | Luke |
|---|---|---|
| | | Very Minimal Parallels in Luke to Mark 6:44-8:26/ Matthew 14:22-16:12. |
| καὶ προσκαλεσάμενος | καὶ προσκαλεσάμενος πάλιν | |
| τὸν ὄχλον | τὸν ὄχλον | |
| εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· | ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς· | |
| ἀκούετε | ἀκούσατέ μου πάντες | |
| καὶ συνίετε· | καὶ σύνετε. | |

**7. b. Mark 7:14/Matthew 15:10/Luke No Parallel – Discussion.** The πάλιν at Mark 7:14 probably refers back to Mark 3:20, 23 where language very similar to Mark 7:14 may be found and where Jesus earlier "summoned a crowd and was speaking to them." There is no parallel context to Mark 7:17 in Luke here. Since Luke has only miniscule parallels with either Mark or Matthew in the context, Matt 14:22-16:12/Mark 6:44-8:26, virtually the only possibility for shared wording in this long context is between Mark and Matthew. These comments apply also to contexts parallel to the next three uses of πάλιν in Mark; Mark 7:31-32, Mark 8:1, and 8:13 as well as the present context, Mark 7:14. In this context a number of literary features are shared by Mark and Matthew, including καὶ προσκαλεσάμενος τὸν ὄχλον + a third person singular past tense of a verb of saying + αὐτοῖς + a second person plural imperative of ἀκούω + καί + a second person plural imperative of συνιῆμι. But note that even in these very similar passages, Matthew does not share Mark's use of πάλιν here.

Tables of literary characteristics of Mark noted by Peabody that overlap with this usage of πάλιν in Mark 7:14—

Table 107 Καὶ προσκαλεσάμενος τὸν ὄχλον/τοὺς μαθητάς/αὐτούς + 3rd Singular of λέγω + αὐτοῖς
Table 89 καὶ ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς as a Linking and/or Introductory Formula
cf. Table 121 βλέπετε Imperative to Mean "Watch" or "Beware"

**8. a. Mark 7:31-32/Matthew 15:29-30/Luke No Parallel – Synopsis.**
(cf. Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, ¶ 43, p. 116)

| Matthew 15:29-30 | Mark 7:31-32 | Luke |
|---|---|---|
| | | Minimal Parallels in Luke to Mark 6:44-8:26/ Mt 14:22-16:12. |
| Καὶ μεταβὰς ἐκεῖθεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς | Καὶ | |
| | πάλιν<br>ἐξελθὼν<br>ἐκ τῶν ὁρίων Τύρου | |
| ἦλθεν | ἦλθεν<br>διὰ Σιδῶνος | |
| παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν<br>τῆς Γαλιλαίας, | εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν<br>τῆς Γαλιλαίας<br>ἀνὰ μέσον<br>τῶν ὁρίων Δεκαπόλεως. | |
| καὶ ἀναβὰς<br>εἰς τὸ ὄρος<br>ἐκάθητο ἐκεῖ. | | |
| καὶ προσῆλθον αὐτῷ<br>ὄχλοι πολλοὶ<br>ἔχοντες μεθ' ἑαυτῶν<br>χωλούς, κυλλούς,<br>τυφλούς, | καὶ φέρουσιν αὐτῷ | |
| κωφοὺς καὶ<br>ἑτέρους πολλούς,<br>καὶ ἔρριψαν αὐτοὺς<br>παρὰ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ· | κωφὸν καὶ μογιλάλον,<br>καὶ παρακαλοῦσιν αὐτὸν ἵνα | |
| καὶ ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτούς, | ἐπιθῇ αὐτῷ τὴν χεῖρα. | |

**8. b. Mark 7:31-32/Matthew 15:29-30/Luke No Parallel – Discussion.** The πάλιν at Mark 7:31 probably refers back to Mark 7:24 when Jesus "went away into the regions of Tyre." As in the previous context, Matthew and Mark again share a number of features in Mark 7:31/Matt 15:29. These include Καί + ἦλθεν + τὴν θάλασσαν τῆς Γαλιλαίας + καί + αὐτῷ + an accusative of κῶφος. However, in this context, too, where certain linguistic parallels may be noted, Matthew again does not share Mark's use of πάλιν.

Tables of literary characteristics of Mark noted by Peabody that overlap with this usage of πάλιν in Mark 7:31-32—

| | |
|---|---|
| Table 227 | 3rd Person of [ἐξ]ἔρχομαι + εἰς + Name of Place + καί + Genitive Absolute Using Verb of Motion and αὐτός + ἀπό + Name of City |
| Table 172 | A Conjunction + a Form of a Compound of ἔρχομαι + A Preposition + τὰ ὅρια Τύρου as Object |
| Table 54 | καί + Aorist of ἔρχομαι or Its Compounds + εἰς + Name of Place + καί |

cf. Table 9 καί + ἦλθεν + εἰς + τὴν Γαλιλαίαν + κηρύσσων

cf. Table 10 εἰς τὴν Γαλιλαίαν

cf. Table 15 παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν

Table 135 Healing Stories

Table 138 Healing Stories

Table 64 καί + a Form of παρακαλέω + αὐτόν + ἵνα

Table 139 ἐπιτίθημι + Accusative of ἡ χείρ as a Healing Method

Most of Mark 7:31-32 exhibits literary usages characteristic of Mark. So this text presents no difficulties for the view that Mark was composed with Matthew in view. On the other hand, by itself, this passage offers no clear evidence of Mark's dependence on Matthew. The crucial point is that, on the Two-Document Hypothesis, once again we have Matthew, as in all others cases, omitting πάλιν Used Retrospectively when Matthew could have used it because he has the previous referent where Jesus went into the regions of Tyre (Matt 15:21 cf. Mark 7:24).

**9. a. Mark 8:1-2a/Matthew 15:32/Luke No Parallel – Synopsis.**
(cf. Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, ¶ 44, p. 117)

| Matthew 15:32 | Mark 8:1-2a | Luke |
|---|---|---|
| | | Very Minimal Parallels in Luke to Mark 6:44-8:26/ Matthew 14:22-16:12. |
| | Ἐν ἐκείναις ταῖς ἡμέραις<br>πάλιν<br>πολλοῦ ὄχλου ὄντος<br>καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων<br>τί φάγωσιν, | |
| Ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς<br>προσκαλεσάμενος<br>τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ<br>εἶπεν·<br>Σπλαγχνίζομαι<br>ἐπὶ τὸν ὄχλον, ὅτι | προσκαλεσάμενος<br>τοὺς μαθητὰς<br>λέγει αὐτοῖς·<br>Σπλαγχνίζομαι<br>ἐπὶ τὸν ὄχλον ὅτι | |

**9. b. Mark 8:1-2a/Matthew 15:32/Luke No Parallel – Discussion.** As noted already in 1811 by Griesbach, the πάλιν at Mark 8:1 may refer back to Mark 6:34 where a crowd gathered just prior to the first of two feeding stories in Mark (Mark 6:34-44, cf. Mark 8:1-9). Again in this context, Mark 8:1/Mt 15:32, Mark and Matthew share a number of words, namely, προσκαλεσάμενος τοὺς μαθητάς + a third singular of λέγω + σπλαγχνίζομαι ἐπὶ τὸν ὄχλον ὅτι. But like the two previous contexts, Matthew again does not share Mark's use of πάλιν.

Tables of literary characteristics of Mark noted by Peabody that overlap with this usage of πάλιν in Mark 8:1—

Table 161 Feeding Stories

Table 4 ἐν ἐκείναις ταῖς ἡμέραις

Table 177 Genitive Absolute Using a Participle of εἰμί

Table 112 ὄχλος + πολύς

Table 107 Καὶ παροσκαλεσάμενος τὸν ὄχλον/τοὺς μαθητάς/αὐτούς + 3rd singular of λέγω + αὐτοῖς

Once again, most of the text of Mark 8:1 exhibits usages characteristic of Mark. The fact that the whole of the text of Matthew from ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς to εἶπεν is characteristic of Matthew is evidence for Mark's dependence on Matthew.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Matt 10:1 | προσκαλεσάμενος τοὺς δώδεκα | μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ |
| Matt 15:32 ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς | προσκαλεσάμενος τοὺς | μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ εἶπεν |
| Matt 20:25 ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς | προσκαλεσάμενος αὐτοὺς | εἶπεν[22] |

This evidence, taken together with the evidence of Markan characteristics in Mark's text supports the view that Mark has composed Mark 8:1-2 with Matthew 15:32 in view.

**10. a. Mark 8:13-15/Matthew 16:4b-6/Luke No Parallel – Synopsis.**
(cf. Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, ¶ 45, p. 117, ¶ 45, p. 118, ¶ 46, p. 118)

| Matthew 16:4b-6 | Mark 8:13-15 | Luke |
|---|---|---|
| | | Minimal Parallels to Mk 4-8:26/Matt 14:22-16:12 |
| καὶ καταλιπὼν αὐτοὺς | καὶ ἀφεὶς αὐτοὺς | |
| | πάλιν | |
| | ἐμβὰς | |
| ἀπῆλθεν. | ἀπῆλθεν | |
| Καὶ ἐλθόντες | | |
| οἱ μαθηταὶ | | |
| εἰς τὸ πέραν | εἰς τὸ πέραν. | |
| ἐπελάθοντο | Καὶ ἐπελάθοντο | |
| ἄρτους λαβεῖν. | λαβεῖν ἄρτους, | |
| | καὶ εἰ μὴ | |
| | ἕνα ἄρτον οὐκ εἶχον | |
| | μεθ' ἑαυτῶν | |
| | ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ. | |
| ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς | καὶ | |
| εἶπεν αὐτοῖς, | διεστέλλετο αὐτοῖς λέγων, | |
| Ὁρᾶτε καὶ | Ὁρᾶτε, | |
| προσέχετε | βλέπετε | |
| ἀπὸ τῆς ζύμης | ἀπὸ τῆς ζύμης | |
| τῶν Φαρισαίων | τῶν Φαρισαίων | |
| καὶ Σαδδουκαίων. | καὶ | |
| | τῆς ζύμης Ἡρῳδου. | |

**10. b. Mark 8:13-15/Matthew 16:4b-6/Luke No Parallel – Discussion.** The πάλιν at Mark 8:13 refers back to Mark 8:10 where Jesus "embarked in a boat and came

[22] See Dennis Gordon Tevis, *An Analysis of Words and Phrases Characteristic of the Gospel of Matthew*, Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Methodist University, 1982 (photocopy, Ann Arbor MI: University Microfilms International, 1984): Table 103.

into" Dalmanutia. In this context Mark shares with Matthew καί + αὐτούς + ἀπῆλθεν + εἰς τὸ πέραν + Καί + ἐπελάθοντο + λαβεῖν + ἄρτους + αὐτοῖς + ὅρατε + a verb meaning "Beware" + ἀπὸ τῆς ζυμῆς τῶν Φαρισαίων καί. Again, in this context filled with other types of verbal agreements, Matthew does not share Mark's use of πάλιν.

Tables of literary characteristics of Mark noted by Peabody that overlap with this usage of πάλιν in Mark 8:13—

| | |
|---|---|
| Table 135 | Healing Stories |
| Table 179 | καί + ἐμβάς + [εἰς τὸ πλοῖον] + [ἀπ]ῆλθεν εἰς + Article |
| Table 165 | καί + a Form of ἐμβαίνω + [εἰς τὸ πλοῖον] + a Verb of Motion + εἰς τὸ πέραν |
| Table 19 | καί + Participle of ἀφίημι + Object + Aorist |
| cf. Table 113 | εἰς τὸ πλοῖον |
| cf. Table 114 | ἐμβαίνω + εἰς τὸ πλοῖον |
| Table 53 | ἀπέρχομαι + εἰς |
| Table 54 | καί + Aorist of ἔρχομαι or its Compounds + εἰς + Name of Place + καί |
| Table 123 | εἰς τὸ πέραν |
| Table 26 | ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ[23] |
| cf. Table 147 | καί + 3rd Singular of διαστέλλω + αὐτοῖς + ἵνα + Negative |
| Table 121 | βλέπετε Imperative to Mean "Watch" or "Beware" |

Mark 8:13-15 exhibits significant Markan characteristics and presents no difficulties for the view that it is the result of Mark's recomposition of Matthew 16:4b-6. On the view that Mark has used Matthew, he has added πάλιν Used Retrospectively.

**11 & 12. a. Mark 10:1/Matthew 19:1-2/Luke No Parallel Context – Synopsis.**
(cf. Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, ¶ 59, p. 133)

| Matthew 19:1-2 | Mark 10:1 | Luke - No Parallel; Context cf. Luke 9:51 and 17:11 |
|---|---|---|
| Καὶ ἐγένετο<br>ὅτε ἐτέλεσεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς<br>τοὺς λόγους τούτους,<br>μετῆρεν<br>ἀπὸ τῆς Γαλιλαίας<br>καὶ | | |
| ἦλθεν<br>εἰς τὰ ὅρια τῆς Ἰουδαίας | Καὶ ἐκεῖθεν<br>ἀναστὰς<br>ἔρχεται<br>εἰς τὰ ὅρια τῆς Ἰουδαίας<br>καὶ | |
| πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου.<br>καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ | πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου,<br>καὶ συμπορεύονται<br>πάλιν | |

[23] Table 26 in Peabody, [*Mark as Composer*, p. 42] should be corrected to include the appearance of the phrase ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ at Mark 8:14 in addition to the verses displayed there, Mark 1:19, 1:20, 4:36, 5:21, 6:32.

| | |
|---|---|
| ὄχλοι πολλοί, | ὄχλοι |
| | πρὸς αὐτόν, |
| καὶ | καὶ |
| | ὡς εἰώθει |
| | πάλιν |
| ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτοὺς | ἐδίδασκεν αὐτούς. |
| ἐκεῖ. | |

**11 & 12. b. Mark 10:1/Matthew 19:1-2/Luke No Parallel Context – Discussion.** Peabody notes:

> This verse is distinctive in Mark because of the double use of πάλιν in 10:1b and again in 10:1c. The first πάλιν refers to the fact that "crowds came to Jesus again" and the second refers to the fact that "he taught them again, as was his custom."
>
> The gathering of the crowds to Jesus has already been seen to be a frequent motif within πάλιν passages and their previous referents (see Table I).
>
> It may be noted here that the verbs which are utilized within the text of Mark to depict this motif tend to vary, ἔρχομαι, συνέρχομαι, συνάγω (compare Tables 48 and 63 with Table I). Still another different verb appears at 10:1, συνπορεύομαι. This verb does not appear elsewhere in the text of Mark and it only appears three other times in the NT, all in Luke (Luke 7:11, 14:25, 24:15). Therefore, one cannot appeal to earlier occurrences of this verb in seeking a previous referent or previous referents for this πάλιν in Mark 10:1b. A review of the Greek text of Mark reveals that those literary contexts prior to Mark 10:1 which share the most features with Mark 10:1b are all contained within Table I (but cf. Mark 5:15, 5:24, 6:55, 9:15, and 9:25).
>
> Two of these earlier literary contexts (2:13, 4:1-2) combine the motif of crowds coming to Jesus (the referent of the πάλιν at Mark 10:1b) with the subsequent words, καὶ ἐδίδασκεν αὐτούς (the referent of the πάλιν in Mark 10:1c). (see Table K). It seems virtually certain that Mark 2:13 and Mark 4:1-2 are meant to serve as two of the previous referents for the double use of πάλιν within Mark 10:1.
>
> The linguistic similarities and identities among these verses (Mark 2:13, 4:1-2, and 10:1) also make it probable that the same hand is responsible for all three of these literary contexts. If Mark 10:1 reflects the same hand as Mark 2:13 and 4:1-2, then Mark 10:1 is probably also from the hand of the same author who contributed Mark 1:45, 2:1-2, 3:7-10, 3:20, and 5:21 (compare Tables K and I which both include Mark 2:13 and 4:1-2). Mark 10:1 may also be from the same hand which contributed ἐδίδασκεν at Mark 1:21 (compare Tables 84 and K).
>
> Mark 10:1, like all of these other verses (1:21, 1:45, 2:1-2, 2:13, 3:7-10, 3:20, 4:1-2, and 5:21) functions compositionally in Mark. Mark 10:1 functions as a transition from a collection of teachings of Jesus (9:35-50) which are set "in a house" "in Capernaum" (see Tables 42 and 27), to the controversy with the Pharisees over the question of Divorce (Mark 10:2-9). Mark 10:1 is not intrinsic to this accompanying material and the verse depicts Jesus' ministry in a general and summary way, following a pattern which has appeared within the text of Mark on two previous occasions (2:13 and

4:1-2). This pattern includes the gathering of the crowd to Jesus and his teaching them. Mark 10:1 says that this pattern was customary for Jesus (ὡς εἰώθει). The reader of Mark's gospel, having already encountered Mark 2:13, Mark 4:1 and other literary contexts similar to them, like those displayed in Table I, would readily accept the parenthetical comment, ὡς εἰώθει, now present within Mark 10:1 as a well established fact within Mark's gospel. Jesus did customarily teach the crowd when it came to him. But this type of comment might represent a later scribal gloss to the original of Mark. Some scribe, noticing the recurrent patterns within the text of Mark at 2:13, 4:1-2, and 10:1, could have added this note at 10:1.

But the comment could also be the contribution of that author who established the pattern in the first place. The phrase ὡς εἰώθει does not appear elsewhere in Mark or elsewhere in the NT and even the word εἰώθει is rare in the NT (Matt 27:15, Mark 10:1 Luke 4:16, and Acts 17:2). Since this literary feature of Mark's text does not recur within Mark it cannot be considered a "redactional feature" of the text of Mark within the limits of the method adopted here.

But whoever may have contributed these words at Mark 10:1, it is probable that that author was aware of the earlier recurrent patterns in Mark 2:13 and 4:1-2 and wished to call attention to them. The phrase functions redactionally as a comment upon the accompanying material no matter who the author responsible may have been. It is an appropriate comment which contributes to the unified picture of Jesus' ministry in Mark 1:45-5:21 and again at Mark 10:1 (see Table I and K). It is not unlikely that the comment was contributed by the author of the gospel in spite of its singular occurrence within the text of Mark. It is conceptionally if not linguistically united to the hand of the author.[24]

Having moved beyond "Luke's great omission," the possibilities for both Matthean and Lukan parallels to Mark return. But at Mark 10:1/Matt 19:1-2, there is no parallel Lukan context. Here Matthew shares with Mark καί + a third singular of ἔρχομαι + εἰς τὰ ὅρια τῆς Ἰουδαίας + πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου καί + ὄχλοι + καί + αὐτούς, but Matthew does not share either of Mark's *two* uses of πάλιν.

Tables of literary characteristics of Mark noted by Peabody that overlap with this usage of πάλιν in Mark 10:1—

Table 93 Καί + τῆς Ἰουδαίας + καὶ πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου + "Crowds" + 3rd Person of Verb of Motion + πρὸς αὐτόν [= Ἰησοῦν] Table 106 καί + ἔρχεται/ἔρχονται + εἰς + Name of Place + καί

Table 171 A Compound + ἐκεῖθεν + ἀναστάς + 3rd Singular of [ἀπ]έρχομαι + εἰς τὰ ὅρια + Genitive of Place + καί

Table 63 καί + Historic Present of Verb of Motion + πρὸς αὐτόν [= Ἰησοῦν]

Table 84 καὶ ἐδίδασκεν αὐτούς

The whole of Mark 10:1 exhibits compositional and literary features that are characteristic of the composer of Mark. From καί to πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου, from καί to πρὸς αὐτόν, and from καί to ἐδίδασκεν αὐτούς, we have three successive syntactical units which exhaust the content of Mark 10:1. Not a single phrase or even a single word intervenes between these syntactical units. This long compound sentence is one continuous compositional creation of Mark.

[24] Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, 137-139.

Mark 10:1 contains the only occurrence of the plural ὄχλοι in the text of Mark. It appears in Mark only in this passage. The same usage appears in the parallel text of Matthew where there is evidence of copying (Matt 19:2). The expressions, πᾶς ὁ ὄχλος[25] or ὄχλος πόλυς[26] are more characteristic of the text of Mark.

The plural, by contrast, appears frequently within the text of Matthew and is part of a longer redactional formula traceable to the hand of the author of Matthew:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Matt 4:25 | καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ | ὄχλοι | πολλοί |
| Matt 19:2 | καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ | ὄχλοι | πολλοί |
| Matt 8:1 | ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ | ὄχλοι | πολλοί |
| [Matt 12:15] | καὶ ἠκολούθησαν αὐτῷ | [[ὄχλοι]] | πολλοι[27] |

The presence of the plural ὄχλοι in the Gospel of Matthew is due to a preference on the part of the author of Matthew while its presence in the Gospel of Mark may readily be accounted for by copying.

That the verbatim agreement between Matthew and Mark in this passage is due to Mark's dependence upon Matthew is clear from the following compositional considerations.

> The summary of the beginning of Jesus' ministry in Galilee in Matt. 4:12-25 may be analyzed as follows: In 4:12-16, the evangelist introduces a fulfillment of prophecy quotation with his stylized formula (v. 14). Verses 12-13 are clearly from his hand. It is important to grasp the line of reasoning that led the evangelist to select this passage from Isaiah (9:1-2). The prophet was speaking about the day of salvation. The evangelist understood the prophet to have intended to speak about Jesus as the instrumental agent of God's saving activity. Through Jesus the people who sat in darkness have seen a great light. The evangelist knew that this was true, and he knew that this light had come to Gentiles as well. Therefore this passage, in which the prophet spoke of salvation coming to "Galilee of the Gentiles," was taken over by the evangelist as the structural backbone or organizing principle governing the theological and geographical framework of Jesus' prepassion ministry.
>
> Jesus had a ministry in Galilee. There is no question (cf. Matt. 11:20-24) about that. In the Gospel of Matthew, however, there is a theologically motivated focus to this Galilean ministry. Here Jesus goes about "*all* Galilee" (4:23). Stories about his work around the Sea of Galilee, in the regions of Caesarea Philippi and of Tyre and Sidon, underscore the extent to which Jesus' ministry reached out to and beyond the land of Zebulun and of Naphtali. Without a doubt, Jesus worked in Capernaum (cf. Matt. 11:23). This Gospel clearly implies that he left Nazareth to go and dwell in Capernaum *in order to fulfill* the word of the prophet Isaiah. The evangelist wants the reader to understand that Capernaum, which is by the Sea of Galilee, fulfilled the word of the prophet—that the people sitting in darkness in the land of Zebulun and Naphtali by *the way of the sea* have seen a

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25 Peabody, *Mark as Composer,* Table 85, page 62.

26 Peabody, *Mark as Composer,* Table 12, page 71.

27 Dennis Gordon Tevis, *An Analysis of Words and Phrases Characteristic of the Gospel of Matthew* , Ph. D. dissertation, Southern Methodist University, 1982 (photocopy, Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1984): Table 4.

great light. This requires that one understand "by the way of the sea" to refer to the shores of the Sea of Galilee and not, as Isaiah meant, to the shores of the Mediterranean.

The evangelist clearly intends this identification with the Sea of Galilee. Furthermore, after completing the ministry in Galilee proper and before this prophecy could be completely fulfilled, people sitting in darkness "across the Jordan," that is, in the land east of the Jordan River . . . , had to see the light of salvation. Therefore, in this Gospel it was necessary for Jesus to go into the region *across the Jordan* (19:1) and for people there also to be healed in great numbers, before he proceeded to Jerusalem for the climax of his work. That the geographical framework of this section of Matthew's Gospel (that is, 19:1-20:16) is motivated primarily if not solely by the literary-theological considerations suggested by this analysis, is confirmed by the absence of any reference to location in the tradition it uses.

This means that the major geographical movements outlined in the redactional framework of this Gospel (as given in 4:18, 23; 13:1; 15:29; and 19:1) are motivated primarily by theological rather than historical considerations. For this reason it should not be surprising that attempts to base historical reconstructions of the life and message of Jesus upon the historical reliability of this framework and chronology have ended in failure. The Gospel of Mark presupposes this same geographical outline without giving the fulfillment passage from Isaiah, which provides the basis. To reverse the relationship, making Matthew dependent upon Mark, requires one to believe in a redactional procedure without precedent. According to this view, Matthew has perceived that Mark's geographical outline originated in a unique interpretation of Isa. 9:1-2. Matthew has decided to supply the passage and to elaborate upon it in 4:12-14 by offering, through an equally unique exegesis, a theological motivation for Jesus' leaving Nazareth and dwelling in Capernaum.

Because these redactional passages clarify the way in which the evangelist conceives the ministry of Jesus and reveal his skill in organizing his material, it will be helpful if we bring together these particular passages and view them in sequence and as a whole.

"As he walked by the sea of Galilee. . . " (4:18)

"And he went about all Galilee, teaching in their synagogues and preaching the gospel of the kingdom, and healing. . . " (4:23).

"That same day Jesus went out of the house and sat beside the sea. And great crowds gathered about him, so that he got into a boat and sat there; and the whole crowd stood on the beach. And he told them many things in parables. . ." (13:1-3a).

"And Jesus went on from there and passed along the sea of Galilee. And he went up into the hills and sat down there. And great crowds came to him, bringing with them the lame, the maimed, the blind, the dumb, and many others, and they put them at his feet, and he healed them. . . . " (15:29-30).

"As they were gathering in Galilee, Jesus said to them, 'The Son of man is to be delivered into the hands of men, and they will kill him, and he will be raised on the third day.' And they were greatly distressed" (17:22-23).

"Now when Jesus had finished these sayings, he went away from Galilee and entered the region of Judea beyond the Jordan; and large crowds followed him, and he healed them. . . ." (19:1-2).

It is important to realize that all of these passages are redactional and that the evangelist is their author. They represent an idealized conception of Jesus' ministry.

What the evangelist knows about the actual Jesus, that is, Jesus of Nazareth, is what has come to him in the developed tradition handed down in the churches. This is a rich tradition of great variety, including historical, mythological, and legendary materials. The one major ingredient that is lacking is a conceptional outline for his narrative, an overall framework by which the diverse materials at his disposal can be unified into an intelligible whole. This is what the evangelist has provided. In making this contribution, he has drawn upon not only his classical Jewish literary heritage, but also upon contemporary Hellenistic literary models.[28]

Moreover, the presence of the phrase πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου in Mark 10:1, which has its origin in Isaiah's prophecy quoted in Matthew 4:12-16 at exactly that point in Mark's text where this phrase also occurs in the parallel text of Matthew 19:1-2, constitutes telling evidence of Mark's compositional dependence upon Matthew. For, in Matthew, this phrase plays an essential role in the compositonal development of the theological and geographical outline of Jesus' pre-Jerusalem ministry. In Mark it is a phrase that hangs in mid-air with no theological or fulfillment of prophecy significance at all. The phrase is a vestigial remain of the compositional framework of Matthew that shows up in the text of Mark inadvertently through Mark's compositional use of the text of Matthew.[29]

**13. a. Mark 10:9-11/Matthew 19:6b,9/cf. Luke 16:18 – Synopsis.**
(cf. Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, ¶ 59, p. 133)

| Matthew 19:6b, 9 | Mark 10:9-11 | cf. Luke 16:18 |
|---|---|---|
| ὃ οὖν ὁ θεὸς | ὃ οὖν ὁ θεὸς | |
| συνέζευξεν, | συνέζευξεν, | |
| ἄνθρωπος | ἄνθρωπος | |
| μὴ χωριζέτω. | μὴ χωριζέτω. | |
| | καὶ εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν | |
| | πάλιν | |
| | οἱ μαθηταὶ | |
| | περὶ τούτου | |
| | ἐπηρώτων αὐτόν. | |
| λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι | καὶ λέγει αὐτοῖς· | |
| ὃς ἂν ἀπολύσῃ | ὃς ἂν ἀπολύσῃ | Πᾶς ὁ ἀπολύων |
| τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ | τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ | τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ |
| μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ | | |
| καὶ γαμήσῃ ἄλλην, | καὶ γαμήσῃ ἄλλην, | καὶ γαμῶν ἑτέραν |

28 William R. Farmer, *Jesus and the Gospel. Tradition, Scripture, and Canon* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982): 138-140.

29 For the criterion followed in reaching this conclusion, see Farmer, *The Synoptic Problem*, pages 227-232. Compare the discussion of Matthew 15:10/Mark 7:14 above.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| μοιχᾶται | μοιχᾶται ἐπ' αὐτήν· | μοιχεύει, |
| | καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὴ | καὶ ὁ |
| | ἀπολύσασα | ἀπολελυμένην |
| | τὸν ἄνδρα αὐτῆς | ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς |
| | γαμήσῃ ἄλλον, | γαμῶν |
| | μοιχᾶται. | μοιχεύει. |

**13. b. Mark 10:9-11/Matthew 19:6b,9/cf. Luke 16:18 – Discussion.** There are no verbal parallels in either Matthew or Luke to any of the words in Mark 10:10, including Mark's use of πάλιν, although Matthew does share Jesus' more extensive teaching on divorce with Mark (Mark 10:1-12/Matthew 19:1-9[12]; cf. Matt 5:32 and Luke 16:18) where this verse in Mark appears.

Tables of literary characteristics of Mark noted by Peabody that overlap with this usage of πάλιν in Mark 10:10—

Table 42 οἶκος/οἰκία Used to Set the Stage for the Subsequent Pericope

As Peabody observes:

> The fourteenth occurrence of πάλιν within the text of Mark appears at Mark 10:10. The πάλιν refers back to the fact that "Jesus was in the house again" and perhaps also to the fact that "the disciples were questioning him."
>
> Inasmuch as Mark 9:33 reflects the "Jesus. . . in the house" motif and it stands in the closest narrative proximity to Mark 10:10, it may serve as at least one of the previous referents for the πάλιν which appears at Mark 10:10 (see Table L).
>
> But there are more significant possibilities. Mark 10:1 introduces Jesus' Public Teaching on Divorce before the crowd (10:2-9). Mark 10:10 functions as a transition from this public teaching to Jesus' private instruction to his disciples in a house when they were questioning him (Mark 10:11-12).
>
> The public teaching on divorce is introduced by Mark 10:1, the immediately preceding πάλιν passage within the gospel of Mark. Mark 10:1 and 10:10 may be seen to relate to one another in much the same way as do Mark 7:14 and 7:17, Mark 4:1-2 and 4:10, and Mark 9:14 and 9:28.
>
> As Mark 10:1 functions to introduce Jesus' public teaching before the crowd on Divorce and 10:10 functions as a transition from this public teaching on Divorce to Jesus' private instruction to his questioning disciples in a house, so Mark 7:14 (another πάλιν passage like 10:1) introduces Jesus' public teaching on Defilement before the crowd and 7:17 functions as a transition from this public teaching on Defilement to Jesus' private instruction to his questioning disciples in a house.
>
> In a similar manner, Mark 4:1-2 (still another πάλιν passage like 7:14 and 10:1) functions to introduce Jesus' public teaching before the crowd on the Parable of the Sower and Mark 4:10 functions as a transition from this public teaching on the parable of the Sower to Jesus' private instruction to his questioning disciples.
>
> Further, Mark 9:14 functions to introduce Jesus' public Healing of a Possessed Boy before the crowd and Mark 9:28 functions as a transition

from this public healing to Jesus' private instruction to questioning disciples in a house.[30]

There are only a few words within these transitional verses; Mark 4:10, 7:17 or 9:28; in the parallel texts of either Matthew or Luke.

| Matthew 13:10 | Mark 4:10 | Luke 8:9 |
|---|---|---|
| Καὶ | Καὶ ὅτε ἐγένετο κατὰ μόνας, | |
| προσελθόντες | | |
| | ἠρώτων αὐτὸν οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν | Ἐπηρώτων δὲ αυτὸν |
| οἱ μαθηταὶ εἶπαν αὐτῷ | σὺν τοῖς δώδεκα | οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ |
| διὰ τί ἐν παραβολαῖς λαλεῖς αὐτοῖς; | τὰς παραβολάς | τίς αὕτη εἴη ἡ παραβολή; |

Following the logion, "Let him hear, who has ears [to hear]," which all three evangelists record [Matt 13:9/Mark 4:9/Luke 8:8], the theory of parables is introduced by transitional material [Matt 13:10/Mark 4:10/Luke 8:9].

On the Two Source Hypothesis, within this section of the Parable Chapter, Matthew and Luke agree against Mark in the following ways:

(1) Both Matthew and Luke omit ὅτε ἐγένετο κατὰ μόνας [Mark 4:10]

(2) Both Matthew and Luke change Mark's οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν σὺν τοῖς δώδεκα [Mark 4:10 cf. Mark 7:17, 9:28, and 10:10] to οἱ μαθηταὶ [αὐτοῦ].

(3) Both Matthew and Luke add a question and answer framework around the theory of parables which framework finds no parallel in Mark

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Matt 13:10 | διὰ τὶ | ἐν παραβολαῖς λαλεῖς αὐτοῖς; |
| Matt 13:13 | διὰ τοῦτο | ἐν παραβολαῖς αὐτοῖς λαλῶ. |
| Luke 8:9 | τὶς αὕτη εἴη ἡ παραβολή; | |
| Luke 8:1 | Ἔστιν δὲ αὕτη | ἡ παραβολή. |

This kind of agreement of Matthew and Luke against Mark can be found at least one other time within the Synoptic Tradition, at Matt 18:1-4/Luke 9:46-48/cf. Mark 9:33-34.

Matthew introduces the literary unit immediately following his unique story of the Temple Tax (Matt 17:24-27) with a vague situation indicator and a question on the lips of the disciples, "In that hour the disciples came to Jesus saying, 'Who then is greatest in the Kingdom of the Heavens?'" (Matt 18:1).

In Matt 18:4, Jesus provides an answer to this question, in wording similar to the original question. The question and answer focus not simply on "Who is the greatest?" but more specifically on "Who is greatest in the kingdom of the Heavens? This question and answer structure provides an *inclusio* around the opening pericope of Matthew 18 (Matt 18:1-4).

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Matt 18:1 | Τὶς ἄρα μείζων ἐστιν | ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν; |
| Matt 18:4 | οὗτος | ἐστιν ὁ μείζων ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν. |

30 Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, 139-140.

A similar question and answer structure characterizes the parallel to Matthew 18:1-4 in Luke 9:46-48

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Luke 9:46 | τὸ τὶς ἂν εἴη | μείζων αὐτῶν; |
| Luke 9:48 | οὗτος ἐστιν | μέγας. |

In Matthew, the disciples openly question Jesus about "Who is the greatest in the Kingdom of the Heavens?" In Luke, the disciples seem to question one another rather than Jesus directly about this matter. But Luke seems to imply that the dialogue was not open, but only "in the hearts" of the disciples. Jesus, in Luke, then discerns this dialogue in the hearts of his disciples.

In Mark, the disciples do not question Jesus at all. Rather, Jesus questions the disciples and the question is about why they were dialoguing "in the way." The theme is then repeated in the narrative, but no answer to the question in similar language as in Matthew and Luke is present in Mark.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Mark 9:33 | . . . ἐπηρώτα αὐτούς· | τί ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ διελογίζεσθε; |
| Mark 9:34 | πρὸς ἀλλήλους γὰρ διελέχθησαν | ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ τίς μείζων. |

The statement that the disciples had been dialoguing about "Who is greater?" is retrospective in the gospel of Mark, but Mark does not provide an earlier literary context within his gospel when this dialogue took place. Could Mark's statement be retrospective to a literary context in his [earlier?] source material [Matthew 18:1/Luke 9:47]?

Of Mark 4:10-12, Rudolf Bultmann has said:

> In my view, Mk. 4:10-12 is an editorial formulation of Mark (see p. 199) concealing the transition which in Mark's source had led on from the similitude of the Sower to its interpretation. There is a question in v. 10 concerned with the telling of parables in general, and vv. 11f. constitutes the answer. But v. 13 presupposes that the question has been concerned with the parable that has just been told. So the question in the source must have read very much as Lk. 8:9. In v. 10 we find the original questioners as the subject, οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν, to which Mark has added σὺν τοῖς δώδεκα; and of course ὅτε ἐγένετο κατὰ μόνας also derives from Mark.[31]

| Matthew 15:15-16 | Mark 7:17-18b | Luke – No Parallel |
|---|---|---|
| | Καὶ ὅτε εἰσῆλθεν<br>εἰς οἶκον<br>ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄχλου | |
| Ἀποκριθεὶς δὲ | | |
| | ἐπηρώτων αὐτὸν | |
| ὁ Πέτρος | οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ | |
| εἶπεν αὐτῷ | | |
| φράσον ἡμῖν | | |
| τὴν παραβολὴν ταύτην. | τὴν παραβολήν. | |
| ὁ δὲ εἶπεν· | καὶ λέγει αὐτοῖς· | |
| ἀκμὴν καὶ ὑμεῖς | οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς | |
| ἀσύνετοί ἐστε; | ἀσύνετοί ἐστε; | |

[31] Rudolf Bultmann, *History of the Synoptic Tradition*, revised edition, trans. John Marsh (New York: Harper & Row, 1963): 325 n1.

| Matthew 17:19-20a | Mark 9:28 | Luke – No Parallel |
|---|---|---|
| Τότε προσελθόντες | Καὶ εἰσελθόντος αὐτοῦ | |
| | εἰς οἶκον | |
| οἱ μαθηταὶ | οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ | |
| τῷ Ἰησοῦ | | |
| κατ' ἰδίαν | κατ' ἰδίαν | |
| εἶπον· | ἐπηρώτων αὐτόν· | |
| διὰ τί | ὅτι | |
| ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἠδυνήθημεν | ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἠδυνήθημεν | |
| ἐκβαλεῖν αὐτό; | ἐκβαλεῖν αὐτό; | |
| ὁ δὲ λέγει αὐτοῖς· | καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· | |
| | τοῦτο τὸ γένος | |
| | ἐν οὐδενί δύναται | |
| | ἐξελθεῖν | |
| | εἰ μὴ | |
| | ἐν προσευχῇ. | |
| διὰ τὴν ὀλιγοπιστίαν ὑμῶν | | |
| ἀμὴν γὰρ λέγω ὑμῖν, | | |
| ἐὰν ἔχητε πίστιν | | |
| ὡς κόκκον σινάπεως | | |
| ἐρεῖτε | | |
| τῷ ὄρει τούτῳ· | | |
| μετάβα ἔνθεν | | |
| ἐκεῖ, | | |
| καὶ μεταβήσεται, | | |
| καὶ οὐδὲν | | |
| ἀδυνατήσει ὑμῖν. | | |

Rudolf Bultmann recognized the secondary nature of these four verses in Mark (Mark 4:10, 7:17, 9:28, and 10:10) and viewed them as compositions of the author of Mark. To these four verses, Bultmann added 13:3, to make a collection of five verses from the author of Mark that reflected the common theme of "questioning disciples."

In outlining his position on the Markan nature of these verses, Bultmann wrote:

> Other sayings were not so easy to make use of; for them *some situation had to be found in the life of Jesus* where they could severally be given a fixed time and place. . . . this method of creating a situation for the speech material is observable even in Mark,. . .independent scenes are created which are of course in part but supplements to given apophthegms. . . . [Mark] 9:35 is not clear: καὶ καθίσας ἐφώνησεν τοὺς δώδεκα, where the motif of calling to him has been superseded by another introductory motif.
>
> This last instance belongs to a group of sayings peculiar to Mark, of instruction to the disciples, which attach to apophthegms and other stories, or are given quite independent formulation. In part they consist of logia, in part of other speech material, namely esoteric instructions.
>
> Such incidents are sometimes introduced by *questions put by the disciples:*

4:10-13: καὶ ὅτε ἐγένετο κατὰ μόνας, ἠρώτων αὐτὸν. . . τὰς παραβολάς (see p. 325, n. 1).

7:17-23, after the saying about purity: καὶ ὅτε εἰσῆλθεν εἰς οἶκον. . . ἐπηρώτων αὐτὸν οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ. . .

9:28f., after the healing of the epileptic boy: καὶ εἰσελθόντος αὐτοῦ εἰς οἶκον οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐπηρώτων αὐτόν. . .

10:12-12, after the controversy about divorce: καὶ εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν πάλιν οἱ μαθηταὶ περὶ τούτου ἐπηρώτων αὐτόν. . .

13:3ff.: καὶ καθημένου αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ὄρος τῶν ἐλαιῶν. . . ἐπηρώτα αὐτὸν κατ' ἰδίαν Πέτρος. . .[32]

Bultmann says that "[i]n all these cases we are dealing with *Mark's (or his predecessors') editorial work. . .* "[33] Advocates of the Two Gospel Hypothesis would agree that all six of these verses (Mark 4:10, 7:17, 9:28, 9:35, 10:10 and 13:3) are from the author of Mark.[34] But advocates of the Two Gospel Hypothesis would not agree with Bultmann's presupposition of the validity of the Two Source Theory.[35] In fact, Bultmann's own evidence here seems to be anomalous for his source theory.

Although Bultmann calls these verses "peculiar to Mark," he does not explain, on his presupposition of the Two Source Theory, why and how Matthew and Luke have come to agree in omitting almost every word of this recurrent type of material that is characteristic of the author of Mark from their accounts parallel to Mark.

On the Two Source Theory, the agreement of Matthew and Luke in omitting this layer of the author of Mark's material from their texts parallel to Mark is an agreement of some proportion. It does not seem likely to be explained by any source theory that posits both the priority of Mark and the independence of Matthew and Luke in utilizing Mark.

On the Two Gospel Hypothesis, this evidence from the Synoptic Tradition is easily explained. It is the addition and the contribution of the author of Mark to the conflated text he has produced from his sources, Matthew and Luke. It does not appear in either the gospel of Matthew or the gospel of Luke because they were written prior to the gospel of Mark and did not have access to the work of the author of that gospel.

**14. a. Mark 10:32/Matthew 20:17/Luke 18:31 – Synopsis.**
(cf. Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, ¶ 64, pp. 139-40)

| Matthew 20:17 | Mark 10:32 | Luke 18:31 |
|---|---|---|
| Μέλλων δὲ | Ἦσαν δὲ | |
| | ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ | |
| ἀναβαίνειν | ἀναβαίνοντες | |
| Ἰησοῦς | | |

32 Bultmann, *Synoptic Tradition*, 330.

33 Bultmann, *Synoptic Tradition*, 332.

34 Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, Table M on page 158, Table 120 on page 75, Table K on page 157, Table 89 on page 64, Table 112 on page 71, Table 204 on page 101, and the discussion on pages 139-141.

35 Bultmann, *Synoptic Tradition*, 321, "I presuppose only the so-called two-source theory."

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| εἰς Ἰεροσόλυμα | εἰς Ἰεροσόλυμα, | |
| | καὶ ἦν προάγων αὐτοὺς | |
| | ὁ Ἰησοῦς, | |
| | καὶ ἐθαμβοῦντο, | |
| | οἱ δὲ ἀκολουθοῦντες | |
| | ἐφοβοῦντο. | |
| παρέλαβεν | καὶ παραλαβὼν | Παραλαβὼν δὲ |
| | πάλιν | |
| τοὺς δώδεκα | τοὺς δώδεκα | τοὺς δώδεκα |
| κατ' ἰδίαν, | | |
| καὶ | | |
| ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ | | |
| εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· | | ἤρξατο αὐτοῖς λέγειν |
| | εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς· | |
| | τὰ μέλλοντα αὐτῷ | |
| | συμβαίνειν, ὅτι | |

**14. b. Mark 10:32/Matthew 20:17/Luke 18:31 – Discussion.**

Peabody notes:

> The sixteenth occurrence of πάλιν in Mark appears at Mark 10:32. The opening words of this verse might be translated, "And [Jesus], taking aside the twelve again, began to tell them the things which were about to happen to him. . . ." These words function as an introductory statement for the Third Passion Prediction. The three Passion Prediction Passages (8:31, 9:30-32, 10:32-34) contain a number of verbal identities and similarities which may indicate that one or both of the other two Passion Prediction passages are intended to be the previous referents for the retrospective use of πάλιν which appears at Mark 10:32 (see Table 184).
>
> It may be noted, however, that this introduction to the Third Passion Prediction makes reference to Jesus taking aside "the twelve" again (οἱ δώδεκα) while it is "the disciples of Jesus" (οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ) to whom Jesus speaks in Passion Predictions 1 and 2 not "the twelve." "Οἱ δώδεκα used Absolutely to Describe the Inner Core of the Disciples" is a frequently recurring feature of the text of Mark's gospel (see Table 102). One of the occurrences of this literary feature of the text of Mark (9:35) stands in closer narrative proximity to Mark 10:32, where this same usage is found, than either of the other two Passion Prediction passages (8:31, 9:30-32, and cf. Table 207).
>
> The teaching content which follows the introductory statement at 10:32 in which πάλιν is found is more closely related to the teaching content of Mark 8:31 and 9:30-32 than it is to the teaching content following Mark 9:35 (cf. Tables 184 and 208). But the actual wording of the introductory statement in which the πάλιν is found at Mark 10:32 is more closely related to 9:35 than it is either to Mark 8:31 or to Mark 9:31.
>
> In addition, the πάλιν at Mark 10:32 refers to the "summoning" (παραλαμβάνω) of "the twelve." No "summoning" is present either in Mark 8:31 or 9:31. But at Mark 9:35 Jesus is said to have "called" (φωνέω) "the twelve" at that time even as he was "taking them aside again" at Mark

10:32. It seems probable that the previous referent for the πάλιν at Mark 10:32 is Mark 9:35.[36]

Mark 9:35, like all of the appearances of πάλιν within the text of Mark discussed above, finds no parallel either in the text of Matthew or in the text of Mark, a point noted already by Bultmann.[37]

Now again both Matthew and Luke have parallel contexts to Mark. Here, Mark shares with Matthew, the postpositive δέ + ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ + a form of ἀναβαίνω + εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα + Ἰησοῦς + a form of παραλαμβάνω + τοὺς δώδεκα + a form of λέγω + αὐτοῖς. Mark shares with Luke παραλαβὼν + τοὺς δώδεκα + a form of λέγω + a plural of αὐτός. Mark shares four features in this context with both Matthew and Luke, a form of παραλαμβάνω + τοὺς δώδεκα + a form of λέγω + a plural of αὐτός, but neither Matthew nor Luke shares Mark's use of πάλιν in this context.

Tables of literary characteristics of Mark noted by Peabody that overlap with this usage of πάλιν in Mark 10:32—

Table 221 Verb of Motion + εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα

Table 184 Passion Prediction Passages

Table 178 ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ

Table 222 Conjunction + οἱ ἀκολουθοῦντες

Table 207 καί + A Verb of Summoning + τοὺς δώδεκα + 3rd Singular of λέγω + αὐτοῖς

Table 102 οἱ δώδεκα Used Absolutely to Describe the Inner Core of the Disciples

Table 67 ἤρξατο/ἤρξαντο + Infinitive

Peabody comments:

> Here on the Markan Hypothesis, Matthew has followed the text of Mark 10. 32-34 rather closely. The major difference is the omission of the characteristic Markan notation that 'Jesus was walking ahead of them; and they were amazed, and those who followed were afraid.' The note of fear on the part of Jesus' followers has already been struck by Mark at the end of his second passion prediction and will be strongly reinforced in 16.8.
>
> Matthew then omits the characteristic Markan construction of πάλιν used retrospectively. He then takes Mark's reference to 'The Twelve' used absolutely as it is by Paul (1 Cor 15:5), with a reference to the twelve disciples of Jesus understood, and specifies that the twelve were μαθητάς. Then for Mark's dramatic but syntactically complex 'he began to tell them what was about to happen to him,' involving the rather unusual use of two infinitives in a single compound phrase, Matthew specifies that he took the twelve disciples aside, and then somewhat prosaically he says that 'on the way he said to them' utilizing the same aorist (εἶπεν) construction he used at the same point in the previous (second) passion prediction. . . .
>
> Luke on the other hand, has nicely epitomized Mark 10:32-33. . . In the process he has, like Matthew, avoided the complex syntactical construc-

36 Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, 143-144.

37 Bultmann, *Synoptic Tradition*, 330.

tion of Mark in 10:32b and substituted the more simple aorist with the accusative construction: εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτούς. . . .

Of all the agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark in this third passion prediction passage, the independent omission by both Matthew and Luke of the Markan πάλιν used retrospectively would appear to be of special significance. This linguistic usage has been shown to be an important sign of the compositional hand of the author of Mark, and there is no particular reason for either Matthew or Luke, let alone both, independently and at the same time, to omit its quite appropriate usage in this place.[38]

**15. a. Mark 11:27/Matthew 21:23/Luke 20:1 – Synopsis.**
(cf. Neirynck, *Minor Agreements*, ¶ 73, p. 148)

| Matthew 21:23 | Mark 11:27 | Luke 20:1 |
|---|---|---|
| Καὶ ἐλθόντος | Καὶ ἔρχονται | Καὶ ἐγένετο |
| | | ἐν μιᾷ τῶν ἡμερῶν |
| αὐτοῦ | | διδάσκοντος αὐτοῦ |
| | | τὸν λαὸν |
| | πάλιν | |
| | εἰς Ἰεροσόλυμα. καὶ | |
| εἰς τὸ ἱερόν, | ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ | ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ |
| | περιπατοῦντος αὐτοῦ | καὶ εὐαγγελιζομένου |
| προσῆλθον αὐτῷ | ἔρχονται πρὸς αὐτὸν | ἐπέστησαν |
| διδάσκοντι | | |
| οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς | οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς | οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς |
| | καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς | καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς |
| καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι | καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι, | σὺν τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις, |
| τοῦ λαοῦ | | |
| | καὶ ἔλεγον | καὶ εἶπαν |
| λέγοντες· | | λέγοντες |
| | αὐτῷ· | πρὸς αὐτόν· |

**15. b. Mark 11:27/Matthew 21:23/Luke 20:1 – Discussion.** The last appearance of "πάλιν used retrospectively uniting two or more separated pericopes" in Mark is Mark 11:27.

It is interesting to note that the immediately previous retrospective use of πάλιν in Mark appears at Mark 10:32, which is the same literary context in which the first appearance of the phrase εἰς Ἰεροσόλυμα within the text of Mark is to be found. It is this phrase, εἰς Ἰεροσόλυμα, to which the πάλιν at Mark 11:27 refers explicitly. Mark 11:27 is the last occurrence of πάλιν used retrospectively uniting two or more separated pericopes within the text of Mark.[39]

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[38] William R. Farmer, "The Passion Prediction Passages and the Synoptic Problem: A Test Case," *New Testament Studies* 36/4 (October, 1990):558-570. The quotations are selected from pages 563 and 564 .

[39] Peabody, *Mark as Composer*, 146.

Tables of literary characteristics of Mark noted by Peabody that overlap with this usage of πάλιν in Mark 1:27—

Table 106 καί + ἔρχεται/ἔρχονται + εἰς + Name of Place + καί

Table 182 Καὶ ἔρχονται εἰς + Name of City + καί To Introduce a Section of the Gospel

Table 221 Verb of Motion + εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα

Table 63 καί + Historic Present of Verb of Motion + πρὸς αὐτόν [=Ἰησοῦν]

Table 187 οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι

Again, both Matthew and Luke share parallel contexts with Mark and, again, both share a number of words and phrases with Mark here. Mark shares with Matthew, καί + a form of ἔρχομαι + a genitive absolute construction using αὐτός= Jesus as a subject + a form of τὸ ἱερόν + a verb of "going" + a form of αὐτός used as an object + οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς + καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι + a form of λέγω. Mark shares with Luke Καί + ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ + a genitive absolute construction using αὐτός= Jesus as a subject + οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς + a form of οἱ πρεσβύτεροι + καί + a third singular past tense of λέγω + a form of αὐτός. Mark shares several elements with both Matthew and Luke in this context, καί + a genitive absolute construction with αὐτός = Jesus as subject + a form of τὸ ἱερόν + οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς + a form of οἱ πρεσβύτεροι + a form of λέγω. In this context, Matthew and Luke positively agree against Mark in introducing these verses with a genitive absolute construction with αὐτός = Jesus as the subject, the use of a present participle of διδάσκω to describe Jesus' activity, the use of a form of ὁ λαός, and the use of the present participle, λέγοντες, to conclude. Matthew and Luke also agree against Mark by not sharing Mark's use of πάλιν εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα. καί + περιπατούντος.

Here most of Mark 11:27 can be explained as Markan composition on the basis of extensive evidence of Markan characteristics in the text of Mark from καὶ ἔρχονται down to οἱ πρεσβύτεροι.

The omission by Luke of πάλιν used retrospectively in Mark can be explained by the compositional fact that Luke does not have Jesus go out of Jerusalem once he enters it.

But this is not the case with Matthew. He has Jesus go back out and reenter the city. So there is no compositional reason for Matthew to omit Mark's retrospective use of πάλιν in his case. He could have used it with good effect.

## Part Three. Other Networks in Mark

*The Structure of Matthew in Mark.*

Mark 10:1, which is unique to Mark in containing two occurrences of "πάλιν Used Retrospectively Uniting Two or More Separated Pericopes," has been demonstrated to be secondary to the parallel passage in Matthew 19:1-2. This verse in Matthew (19:1-2) is but one out of a set of three compositional passages within the text of Matthew (Matt 4:12-16, 4:23-25, 19:1-2)that provide a theologically motivated geographical framework for that gospel.

The phrase, "across the Jordan," (πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου) appears for the first time in Matthew in a quotation from Isaiah 9:1-2/Matt 4:15-16. The quotation immediately follows one of the fulfillment of prophecy formulas so characteristic

of the text of Matthew (Matt 4:14), ἵνα πληρωθῇ τὸ ῥηθὲν διὰ Ἡσαΐου τοῦ προφήτου λέγοντο"[40]

In the most immediate context, this prophecy functions to explain Jesus' withdrawal into "Galilee" (Matt 4:12 cf. 4:15), and his move to Capernaum, "by the sea" (Matt 4:13 cf. 4:15) which is in the "regions of Zebulun and Napthali" (Matt 4:14 cf. 4:15).

But there is a larger compositional motive for Matthew introducing this quotation from Isaiah 9:1-2 at the very beginning of Jesus public ministry as that is described in Matthew. The quotation implies that Jesus must perform his ministry not only in Galilee, Jerusalem and Judea, but also "across the Jordan."

Matthew uses this phrase, "across the Jordan" in two major compositional passages (Matt 4:23-25 and 19:1-2). In the first (Matt 4:25), Matthew indicates that crowds from "Galilee and the Decapolis and Jerusalem and Judea and across the Jordan (πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου)" followed Jesus. His ministry begins among those from Galilee of the Gentiles.

Later in Matthew's gospel (Matt 19:1) Jesus returns "from Galilee and came into the regions of Judea across the Jordan (πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου)." The pregnant geographical reference is marked in Matthew by the phrase, πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου, that the author of Matthew derives from the programmatic quotation from Isaiah 9:1-2 with which Jesus' public ministry begins in Matthew (Matt 4:12-16).

Mark includes in his gospel the two later references to πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου (Mark 3:8/Matt 4:25 and Mark 10:1/Matt 19:1) but has no parallel whatsoever to the quotation from Isaiah 9:1-2/Matt 4:14-16 that provides the rationale for these later references. Mark has fragmentarily preserved a major compositional feature of the gospel of Matthew. The presence of πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου in the Gospel of Matthew is due to the author of Matthew while its presence in the Gospel of Mark may readily be accounted for by copying.

It is highly unlikely that Matthew would have noticed the two scattered references to "across the Jordan" in Mark (3:8 and 10:1), used them in expanded redactional contexts of his own (Matt 4:23-25 and 19:1-2) and then, prior to both of these, provided a Scriptural quotation to give them significance (Matt 4:12-17 cf. Isa 9:1-2) that he did not find in his source.

*The Passion Prediction Passages.*

Mark 10:32/Matt 20:17/Luke 18:31 introduce one of the Passion Prediction Passages in the Synoptic Gospels. As such, these verses are linked to a network of passages that appear to provide another kind of structural framework for each of the synoptic gospels. This network of passages would include all of the passion prediction passages (Matt 16:21-23/Mark 8:31-33/Luke 9:22; Matt 17:22-23/Mark 9:30-32/Luke 9:43b-45; Matt 20:17-19/Mark 10:32-34/Luke 8:31-34) and, therefore, much of the material in the closing chapters of each gospel. In a recent and comprehensive literary analysis of the three parallel passion prediction passages within the Synoptic Gospels the following conclusions were drawn:

> We have taken a set of well-known passages in the Synoptic tradition—the passion prediction passages—and we have shown that, without

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[40] See Dennis Gordon Tevis, *An Analysis of Words and Phrases Characteristic of the Gospel of Matthew*, Ph. D. dissertation, Southern Methodist University, 1982 (photocopy, Ann Arbor MI: University Microfilms International, 1984, microfilm, 1985): Table 17: τὸ ῥηθὲν (ὁ ῥηθεὶς) + διὰ + (prophet's name) + τοῦ προφήτου Matt [26:56], 21:4, 1:22, 2:15, 2:23, 13:35, 2:17, 27:9, 4:14, 8:17, 12:17, 3:3, 24:15

any difficulty, it is possible to understand how Luke may have modified the text of Matthew and how Mark may have utilized the work of both his predecessors in composing his textually rich and compelling version of the Gospel. We have explained the smallest details, down to the omission of articles, and we have shown how the Markan versions can be derived in all the passion prediction passages from the parallel texts of Matthew and Luke. With regard to this set of passages, there is simply no mystery to the compositional procedures that the evangelists have evidently followed in producing their respective synoptic texts, assuming that these texts were produced in the sequence Matthew, Luke, and Mark, and that each of the later evangelists had available the work of his predecessor or predecessors as the case might be.

But we have done more than this. We have shown that in the case of each of the three passion prediction passages there are compositional difficulties standing in the way of fully accepting the theory that Matthew and Luke have independently copied Mark.

Finally, we have drawn attention to the fact that when viewed together as a set, the passion prediction passages offer convincing disproof of the Marcan Hypothesis, since on that hypothesis one would expect that if Matthew and Luke independently copied Mark, there would result versions of Mark where there would be a pattern of random overlapping in their agreement with their *Vorlage*. Since this does not happen in any of the three passion predictions, it follows that, according to this test, they apparently did not independently copy Mark, and one must look elsewhere for an explanation of their synoptic relationship. Since the comparative pattern of agreement between Mark and the other two that does obtain is readily explained by the third evangelist's having the freedom to follow now one and then the other of his sources, a hypothesis which places Mark third is to be preferred in explaining the data in this set of passages.[41]

## Conclusions

We conclude and summarize with five points.

(1) In discussing Matthew and Luke's set of seven or eight agreements in omission of Mark's "πάλιν Used Retrospectively Uniting Two or More Separated Pericopes" within triple tradition contexts (Mark 2:1-2, 2:13, 3:1, [3:20], 4:1-3, 5:21, 10:32, 11:27 and parallels) we have provided strong literary evidence for concluding that it is unlikely that Matthew and Luke have independently edited Mark in those passages and that it is more likely that Mark has composed his text using Matthew and Luke as sources.

(2) All of the passages in Mark where "πάλιν Used Retrospectively Uniting Two or More Separated Pericopes" appears, both triple tradition contexts noted in (1) above and double tradition contexts (Mark 7:14, 7:31-32, 8:1, 8:13, 10:1, 10:10 and parallels), have been readily explained on the basis of the Two Gospel

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[41] William R. Farmer, "The Passion Prediction Passages and the Synoptic Problem: A Test Case," *New Testament Studies* 36/4 (October, 1990):558-570. The quotation is from page 566.

Hypothesis. In none of these passages can the Two Source Hypothesis be seen to better explain the data and in most of them, that hypothesis is clearly inferior to the explanation provided by the Two Gospel Hypothesis.

(3) The consistent omission by Matthew and Luke of Mark's most impressive compositional feature, "πάλιν Used Retrospectively Uniting Two or More Separated Pericopes," has been linked together here with the consistent omission by Matthew and Luke of a second compositional feature of Mark's text, the motif of "Jesus, after first providing public instruction or healing, withdrawing from the crowd, usually into a house, where he is questioned by his disciples on the same theme" (See Mark 4:10, 7:17, 9:28, 10:10 and parallels).

(4) Mark 10:1, which is unique to Mark in containing two occurrences of "πάλιν Used Retrospectively Uniting Two or More Separated Periocopes," has been demonstrated to be secondary to the parallel passage in Matthew 19:1-2. This verse in Matthew (19:1-2) is but one of a set of three compositional passages within the text of Matthew that provide a theologically motivated geographical framework for that gospel. Mark's text, in sharing only fragments of that framework with Matthew, "destroys the connection" maintained in Matthew and, thereby, demonstates Mark's secondary character relative to Matthew.

(5) Finally, one of the πάλιν retrospective passages (Mark 10:32) introduces one of three passion prediction passages in Mark. When all of the passion prediction passages within the synoptic tradition are carefully examined, they, too, support the view that Mark was composed from a conflated text of Matthew and Luke.

## Appendix A

The text critical canon that gives preference to "the reading that most conforms with the style of the author" already appears in a *scholium* to the *Iliad* K (10).408, as it is preserved in the tenth century codex, Venetus 454A. In that *scholium*, it is implied that the criterion was used already by one Aristarchus whom classical scholars associate with the great library at Alexandria during the second century BCE.[42]

Among text critics of the Greek classics, this criterion was utilized to distinguish the style of the original author from that of later manuscript copyists.

Some eighteenth century text critics of the Greek New Testament, prior to Griesbach, also utilized this criterion in this way. See, for instance, J. J. Wetstein's *Prolegomena* which he first published anonymously in 1730, but later claimed and included in his critical edition of the Greek New Testament of 1751-1752:

> A reading most conformable of all with the style of each author, other things being equal, is to be preferred. [43]

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[42] See Peabody, "Appendix," in *Mark as Composer*, 173-75.

[43] Wetstein outlines nineteen text critical principles for establishing the text of the New Testament. Johann Jacob Wetstein,' 'Η Καινὴ Διαθήκη. *Novum Testamentum Graecum*. 2 Vols. (Amsterdam, 1751-52; photomechanical reprint, Graz, Austria, 1962): Compare the entire section, "Animadversiones et cautiones ad examen Variarum Lectionum NT necessariae [Necessary observations and cautions for testing various NT readings]," II:851-874. His Principle XI (Vol. II, p. 864) reads as follows: "*Lectio cum stylo cujusque scriptoris maxime omnium consentiens, caeteris paribus, praeferenda est.*" The italics are Wetstein's.

Christoph Gotthelf Gersdorf, who had never once been in possession of the work of Wetstein, is nevertheless aware of the principle.[44] He cites it as it was articulated by Ch. Dn. Beck: the "highest law of criticism:"

> That reading is to be taught as more probable which restores the very hand of the author and that reading is natural and genuine from which every remaining variant is to be understood to have arisen.[45]

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44 "Noch aber war ich nicht einmal im Besitze des Wetstein, und so mancher anderen unentbehrlichen Varianten Sammlung. . ." Christoph Gotthelf Gersdorf, *Beiträge zur Sprach-Characteristik der Schriftsteller des Neuen Testaments.* Erster Theil (Leipzig: Weidmannishcn Buchhandlung, 1816): Vorrede, vii.

45 "summa lex criseos: ea lectio, quam referre ipsam auctoris manum, probabiliter docetur, et ex qua reliquam varietatem omnem existisse intellegitur, genuina est et vera," Ch. Dn. Beck, *Monogrammata hermeneutices librorum,* N. F. P. I. Hermeneuticae (a. critica) N. T. universa (Leipzig, 1803) as cited by Gersdorf, *Sprach-Characteristik,* "Einleitung," 25.

# The Beatitudes, Salt and Light in Matthew and Luke

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It is interesting to note that in the general approaches to Gospel studies, while the Jewishness of Jesus has readily been acknowledged, there has been little emphasis on the Jewish background for understanding the message of the Gospels, apart from its general history and forays into apocalyptic or rabbinic literature. Even with the Gospel of Matthew, which is regarded as the most Jewish of the Gospels and whose author is often described as a Jewish Christian, in most cases little more than a study of its OT formula quotations, or a look at the Hebrew background to particular words/phrases/concepts is undertaken. This is particularly evident in the study of the beatitudes and the sayings on salt and light, where we find such a variety of interpretations. In those cases where scholars have taken the Jewish nature of the Gospel of Matthew seriously, it has usually been to look for parallels in rabbinic literature. While it is appropriate to use rabbinic studies as background to this Gospel, to impose rabbinic modes of thinking on the author is suspect in the light of its strong anti-Pharisaic emphasis. Rabbinic tradition is only one of the various Jewish traditions operable at the time of Jesus.

This paper presupposes that Jesus came out of the prophetic-apocalyptic tradition as proposed by Paul Hanson[1]—a minority group carrying on the traditions of Isaiah 40-66. It is proposed that the Gospel of Matthew, and more specifically here the beatitudes and the sayings on salt and light, should be understood against this background.

### The Beatitudes in Recent Scholarship

Recent scholars[2] see three or four stages in the development of the Matthean beatitudes, and in doing so have not progressed much further than B.H.

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1 Paul D. Hanson, *The Dawn of the Apocalyptic* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, c. 1975).

2 E.g. Robert A. Guelich, "The Matthean Beatitudes: 'Entrance-Requirements' or Eschatological Blessings?" *JBL* 95 (1976), 426-431; idem, *The Sermon on the Mount: A Foundation for Understanding* (Waco, Texas: Word Books, c. 1982), pp.112-117; Georg Strecker, *The Sermon on the Mount: An Exegetical Commentary* (Transl. by O. C. Dean Jr. Nashville: Abingdon Press, c. 1988), pp. 29-30; Ulrich Luz, *Matthew 1-7: A Commentary* (Transl. by Wilhelm C. Linss. Minneapolis: Augsburg, c. 1989), pp. 226-229; W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison Jr, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to Saint Matthew*, Vol. I (Matt. 1-7) (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, c. 1988), pp. 429-431, 434-442.

Streeter's opinion as expressed in his *The Four Gospels* in 1924.[3] Stage #1 is usually the transmission in Q of three beatitudes (Mt. 5:3,6,4//Lk. 6:20-21) which were probably genuine sayings of Jesus spoken essentually in the form found in Luke's Gospel.[4] In stage #2 a fourth beatitude was added in Q (Mt. 5:11-12//Lk. 6:22-23) which developed in the early Christian community when experiencing persecution.[5] In stage #3, Q developed according to different traditions. In $Q^{Mt}$ verse 5 was added[6] and also verses 7-9,[7] while $Q^{Lk}$ added the four woes (Luke 6:24-26).[8] Luz argues that it was at this stage in the oral transmission of $Q^{Mt}$ that the beatitudes were specifically formulated in the light of Isaiah 61:1-3 and various psalms, whereas Guelich had contended that it was Matthew who deliberately brought the beatitudes which he received into line with the promises of Isaiah 61.[9] Stage #4 saw Matthew and Luke editing their different versions of Q. Matthew added a beatitude of his own (v. 10), added his favourite word *dikaiosynē* to verse 6, and changed the *basileia tou theou* to *basileia tōn ouranōn* in verse 3.[10] Guelich contends that the Matthean redaction was more extensive than that—Matthew added "in spirit" in 5:3, changed "weepers" to "mourners" in 5:4, added "and thirst" as well as "for righteousness" in 5:6; he then added 5:10 to reflect the situation of his community and bring all the beatitudes together into a unified whole, thus subdividing them into two groups, each concluding with *dikaiosynē*.[11]

However, the jury is still out on a number of issues. Not only are there differences of opinion as to the extent of the Matthean redactions, but also in regard to the reasons for the supposed redactions. For instance, Strecker, assuming that 5:7-9 were added prior to Matthew as ethical beatitudes, asserts that Matthew's purpose was to impress "an ethical intention even on the originally paracletic beatitudes."[12] Similarly, H. D. Betz has argued that in the beatitudes "conditions of an ethical sort are laid down for admission into paradise. Matthew 5:3 has wiped out the entire apocalyptic framework."[13] These,

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[3] Burnett Hillman Streeter, *The Four Gospels: A Study of Origins* (London: MacMillan, c. 1924), pp. 250-253.

[4] So Luz, p. 227; Davies & Allison, p.435; Strecker at least traces them to Q, p. 29; Guelich also adds to this first stage Mt. 5:11-12//Lk. 6:22-23 in an original form going back to Jesus which can no longer be identified, *Sermon*, p. 112.

[5] Luz, p.228; Strecker, p. 30; Davies & Allison, p. 435, see these verses added as a transition to the section on love of enemies (Lk. 6:27-38, 39-49) which was added at the same time to Q essentially in its Lukan form.

[6] Various reasons are given for this, e.g., Guelich argues that it was added as a synonymous parallelism with 5:3 in order to protect the *ptōchoi* from being misconstrued in a strictly socio-economic sense, Sermon, p. 114; Davies & Allison agree with this, pp. 435-436. Luz believes it was added because of the *p*-alliterations, p. 228. According to Strecker, p. 30, it was added to join the triads (vv. 3,4,6 and vv. 7-9) into a system of seven.

[7] According to Guelich, *Sermon*, pp. 114-115, these beatitudes were added to summarize the $Q^{Lk}$ sermon tradition so that v. 7 summarizes Lk. 6:36-42; v. 8—Lk. 6:43-45; and v. 9—Lk. 6:27-35.

[8] According to Davies & Allison, p. 435.

[9] Luz, p. 228; Guelich, *Sermon*, pp. 115-117.

[10] So Strecker, p. 30; Luz, pp. 226-227; Davies & Allison, p. 436.

[11] Guelich, *Sermon*, 115-117; also in "The Matthean Beatitudes," p.431.

[12] Strecker, p. 30.

[13] Hans Dieter Betz, *Essays on the Sermon on the Mount* (Transl. by L. L. Welborn; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, c. 1985), p. 34.

of course, are simply the echoes of the common assumption of the Two-source Hypothesis that Matthew expanded on his sources guided by his paedagogical purpose. Yet Guelich, arguing out of that same Hypothesis, can claim that Matthew has made the beatitudes into eschatological blessings: "Any format or content which might point to an ethical or even a Wisdom rather than an eschatological reading of these Beatitudes should be properly assigned to a pre-Matthean *Sitz im Leben*." For Guelich the beatitudes express the fulfilment of Isaiah 61 in the person and proclamation of Jesus.[14]

Another issue is the order of the second and third beatitudes common to both Mt and Lk. Guelich has argued that Mt altered the order found in Q in order to emphasize the relationship of 5:3 & 4 to Isaiah 61:1-2,[15] while Dupont contended that Luke made the alteration because he associated hunger with poverty.[16] Davies & Allison disagree with Guelich because they see the influence of Isaiah 61 as coming earlier than Matthew and find it difficult to accept Dupont's argument that Luke's order is secondary, so they leave the question unanswered.[17]

Also unresolved is the question whether "those who mourn" (*penthountes*), Mt. 5:4) or "those who weep" (*klaiontes*, Lk. 6:21b) is the more original. Guelich holds that Matthew deliberately changed the verb to *pentheō* in order to fit in with Isaiah 61:2.[18] However, this does not explain how *pentheō* then got into the third Lukan woe (Lk. 6:25b) where it indicates that those who laugh now shall "mourn (*penthēsete*) and weep (*klausete*)." For this reason Davies & Allison believe that the verb may already have been in Q and that neither Matthew nor Luke have preserved the actual wording.[19]

No decision has been reached as to whether the use of the third person by Matthew or the second person by Luke is the original form. The third person is common in most makarisms, but Luke's beatitudes are actually a hybrid—the third person is used in the protasis but the second person in the apodosis. This could easily be understood as indicating the secondary character of the Lukan beatitudes as Luke sought to make them more relevant to his readers.[20] The same can be said for Luke's "now" (*nyn*).

Unresolved also is the question why Matthew would have added verse 10. It does not add anything new to verses 11 & 12. Davies & Allison hazard the guess that it was invented in order to bring the total number of beatitudes to multiples of three—seen as a favourite Matthean number.[21] But others have argued that the Evangelist added it to create two stanzas of four makarisms (vv.3-6 and 7-10) each ending with "righteousness" (*dikaiosynē*), and tieing them all together by repeating the apodosis of the first beatitude (v. 3).[22] But why, then, does he leave

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14 Guelich, "The Matthean Beatitudes," pp. 432-433. See also his Sermon, p. 111. Davies & Allison, pp. 439-440, agree with this eschatological emphasis and develop a number of substantial arguments beyond Guelich.

15 "The Matthean Beatitudes," p. 427.

16 Jacques Dupont, *Les Beatitudes: Le Probleme litteraire—Le deux versions du Sermon sur la montagne et des Beatitudes* (Bruges: Abbaye de Saint-Andre, c. 1958), pp. 271-272.

17 Davies & Allison, p. 436.

18 Guelich, *Sermon*, p. 100. Cf. also Luz, p. 235.

19 Davies & Allison, p. 447.

20 See the discussion by Luz, p. 227, and Davies & Allison, pp. 445-446.

21 Davies & Allison, pp. 430-431.

22 So Guelich, *Sermon*, p. 93.

the final beatitude out of the inclusion, and why did he not simply delete one of what he received in the tradition and make it a symbolic seven? Even the argument that Matthew had to have added this beatitude because it contains his favourite words—*diōkō* and *dikaiosynē*—is suspect. *Diōkō* is found 6 times in Matthew, not at all in Mark, and only 3 times in Luke. But 4 of these 6 are in the Sermon on the (5:10,11,12,44) and even the other 2 are also found on the lips of Jesus (10:23; 23:34). The same is true of *dikaiosynē*— found 7 times in Matthew, not at all in Mark and only once in Luke (1:75). Of Matthew's 7, 5 are in the Sermon on the Mount (5:6,10,20; 6:1,33) and the other 2 in sayings of Jesus in relation to John the Baptist (3:15; 21:32). Neither word is found in Matthew apart from dominical sayings. That may very well suggest that verse 10 is an original saying of Jesus.

Davies & Allison have argued that Matthew 5:7,8,9 were formed in the tradition on the basis of Luke 6:36,45,35 respectively. They see this not only as "weighty evidence" for the Q source but also as "a most weighty objection to the Griesbach hypothesis."[23] However, putting aside presuppositions, could it not be argued more readily that Luke has drawn together Mt. 5:5 and 48 into Lk. 6:36; Mt 6:19-21 and 7:16-20 into Lk. 6:43-45; and Mt. 5:43-48 is generalized in Lk. 6:32-35, which has nothing to do with v.9 at all? If we look at the *sequence* here and consider that Luke is "de-Judaizing" the sayings for Gentile readers, it is more likely that Luke is really deendent on Matthew.

The influence of Isaiah 61 on the Matthean beatitudes proves to be a nemesis for the Two-source Hypothesis. The influence has already been recognized, but how far back does that influence go? As we have noted, some have been the influence of Isaiah 61 as something imposed on the beatitudes by Matthew, others have seen it as a development in the pre-Matthean community. But Davies & Allison have been compelled to go further—they come to the conclusion that Jesus himself must have formulated the core beatitudes (5:3,4,6) with Isaiah 61:1-3 in mind because it was the essence of his proclamation (Mt. 11:5//Lk.7:22; Lk. 4:18-19), and that there is no evidence that Matthew has done anything substantial to accentuate the connexion between Isaiah 61 and Mt. 5:3-12.[24] That raises the question whether we should not, therefore, be investigating that influence further as to its significance in the life and ministry of Jesus. Since this influence is brought out more clearly in Matthew, does that not mean that, after all, we should be looking to Matthew's Gospel as the ultimate source for the original sayings of Jesus? It must be admitted that dedication to the Two-Source Hypothesis has clouded the study of the integral nature of the OT content in Matthew's Gospel on the argument that Matthew actually "re-Judaized" his sources to make them more compatible to his Jewish-Christian readers.

Taking our cue from the acknowledged influence of Isaiah 61 in the beatitudes, we should be alerted to finding deeper understanding from Isaiah 40-66, since the influence could not have been merely superficial. This is particularly so when we consider that it was Deutero-Isaiah who really revived the idea of the Kingdom of God and spoke of announcing the Good News of that Kingdom—the very heart of the message of Jesus according to the First Gospel. In order to comprehend fully the significance of the beatitudes, it is necessary to be thoroughly acquainted with Isaiah 40-66, because this was the people's heritage and the expression of their hope.

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[23] Davies & Allison, p. 435.

[24] Ibid., pp. 438-439.

**Matthew's Introduction to the Sermon on the Mount**

The focus and purpose of Jesus' early activity is set down in a summary statement by Matthew in 4:23, a verse which is repeated in 9:35 to close off this first phase of activity. Three participles are used to describe this phase—*didaskōn*, *kerussōn*, and *therapeuōn*—teaching, proclaiming, healing.

In Matthew's Gospel, "teaching," *didaskōn*, is primarily the action of Jesus, and he teaches "as one having authority and not as the scribes." (7:29) It is only at the completion of his earthly ministry that Jesus passes this authority on to the disciples (28:19,20). Commentators generally see no difference between "teaching" and "proclaiming" in this Gospel.[25] Nevertheless, when Jesus sent the Twelve out to announce the coming of the Kingdom, he gave them authority to "proclaim" and to "heal" but not to teach (10:1,7,8,27).

"Proclaiming," *kerussōn*, is found 9 times in Matthew, but only 4 of these refer to Jesus's activity, 2 to the disciples, once to John the Baptist, and the other two are in the passive form. However, the important point in Matthew is that the object of the proclaiming is always the Kingdom of Heaven or the Good News of the Kingdom (3:1; 4:17; 4:23; 9:35; 10:7,27; 11:1; 24:14; 26:13). Whereas in Mark, and to a lesser extent in Luke, it is more general, also including preaching repentance and forgiveness (Mk.6:12; Lk. 24:47), or the proclamations of those who have been healed by Jesus (Mk. 1:45; 5:20; 7:36; Lk.8:39). The word *euangelion*, too, is used in a more general sense in Mark. While for Matthew the Good News is of the Kingdom of Heaven (4:23; 9:35; 24:14; 26:13), for Mark it is the Good News of Jesus Christ (1:1), of God (1:14,15), or simply the Good News where it appears to be a general term for the whole mission and message of Jesus (8:35; 10:29; 13:10; 14:9; [16:15]). Luke does not use the word in his Gospel, but he does use the verb *euangelizesthai* ten times. At least three of these specifically identify the Kingdom of God as the object of the verb (4:43, cf. v.18; 8:1; 16:16) while it is implied in others (e.g. 9:6). Two refer to the announcing of good news at a birth (1:19; 2:10). Clearly, the most precise uses of both *kerussōn* and *euangelion* are found in Matthew.

The third expression, *therapeuōn*, has the general meaning of "being in attendance," hence "healing." It is more inclusive than *iasthai*, "to heal, cure," a favourite of Luke.[26] "Healing" clearly has a close relationship with "proclaiming" in Matthew's Gospel as can be seen from the content of the material included between 4:23 and 9:35, from Jesus' response to John's disciples in 11:4-6, and from the sending out of the Twelve to proclaim the Kingdom of Heaven and to heal in 10:7,8.

We find the background for these three expressions in Isaiah 40-66. "Proclaiming the Good News of the Kingdom" (*kerussōn to euangelion tēs basileias*) is the Isaianic expression of the announcement of the coming deliverance from exile and the restoration of the Kingdom of God. The initial announcement is made in Isaiah 40:9 (cf. also 41:27):

> Get up to a high mountain, herald of Good News to Zion;
> Lift up your voice with strength, herald of Good News

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25 Although they see Matthew's use of *didaskein* as betraying his interest in interpretation of the law and ethical proclamation; see Luz, pp. 205-207; Davies & Allison, pp. 413-414.

26 Lk uses it 13x, Mt 3x, Mk once. *Therapeuein* is used 15x by Mt, 5x by Mk, 13x by Lk.

to Jerusalem, lift it up, fear not;
say to the cities of Judah, "Behold, your God!"

This is the first announcement that God himself is returning to Zion to reign, for "the Lord Yahweh comes with might, and his arm rules for him," and "he will feed his flock like a shepherd"(Is. 40:10,11). "Shepherd" is a common OT term for a king. Later on, in anticipation of the watchmen in Zion seeing the exiles returning led by Yahweh, the prophet, borrowing some phrases from Nahum (2:1 [E1:15]), utters again (Is. 52:7):

How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him
who brings Good News,
who announces peace, who brings really Good News,
who announces salvation, who says to Zion, "Your God reigns!"

However, while Cyrus did allow the exiles to return to Jerusalem in 538 BC after his takeover in Babylon, those who returned at that time were confronted with all kinds of opposition, hostility, and division. While in one sense they had been delivered from exile, the trees of the fields were not exactly clapping their hands as Deutero-Isaiah had predicted (Is. 55:12), nor was there yet any evidence that the Kingdom of God had come. It was in these circumstances that Trito-Isaiah (chaps. 56-66) sought to reassure the faithful and reaffirmed the promises of his predecessor (Is. 61:1):

The spirit of the Lord Yahweh is upon me,
because Yahweh has anointed me to bring Good News to the afflicted. . . .

The "bringing Good News" in all these passages is the translation of the Hebrew *baśar*, a technical term used for announcing Good News of victory (1 Sam.31:9; 2 Sam. 1:20; 4:10,17; 18:19-31; 1 Kg. 1:42; Ps. 68:12; Nahum 2:1 [E=1:15]), of the birth of a child (Jer. 20:15), or of the accession of a king to his throne, as in our passages (Is. 40:9; 21:27; 52:7; 60:6; 61:1). It is this term which Matthew translates as *kerykssōn to euangelion*.

It is important to recognize that it is Yahweh whose accession to the throne is being hailed as Good News. Throughout Deutero-Isaiah Yahweh is addressed as King of Jacob/Israel (40:9-11; 41:21; 43:15; 44:6; 52:7). Unlike the restoration plan of Ezekiel which called for a Davidic prince (Ezek. 34:23-24; 45:10-46:15), there is no earthly monarch in Deutero-Isaiah's program of restoration—this is a return to the original covenant community which existed prior to the monarchy when Yahweh was their suzerain king and the people of Israel as a unit was Yahweh's servant, a kingdom of priests, a holy nation (Ex. 19:6). The "covenant forever" (*berît ôlam*, Is. 55:3) which had been made with David (2 Sam. 7:13-16; Ps. 89:33-37) is actually transferred to the people. They are now to be Yahweh's servant forever, to carry on the witness to Yahweh's power once exhibited by David (Is. 44:6-8; 55:3-5; cf. Ps. 18:43-44).[27] This transfer is taken seriously by Trito-Isaiah, and that is why, speaking on behalf of faithful Israel, he can say "Yahweh has anointed (*mašaḥ*) me" (Is. 61:1) as David was (1 Sam.16:13; 2 Sam.23:1-5) and the everlasting covenant is reaffirmed (Is. 61:8). This has important implications for

[27] See Ralph Klein, *Israel in Exile: A Theological Interpretation* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, c. 1979), p. 117; Joachim Becker, *Messianic Expectation in the Old Testament* (Transl. by David E. Green; Philadelpia: Fortress Press, c. 1980), p. 69; A. S. Herbert, *The Book of the Prophet Isaiah: Chapters 40-66* (Cambridge: University Press, c. 1975), pp. 122-124.

understanding Matthew's Christology and the message conveyed in the pericopes under study.

In the Ancient Near East the announcing of Good News at the accession of a king generally took the form of promising an ideal reign wherein the situation of all those who had suffered exile, imprisonment, economic deprivation, etc would be reversed.[28] In the Isaianic tradition examples of this can already be seen in Isaiah 9:1-7 and 11:1-9, and is carried on in Isaiah 29:18-21 where it promises that "in that day" the deaf will hear, the blind will see, the afflicted and poor (*ʿanawim, ʾebyonim*) can rejoice in Yahweh. This is further expanded in II and III Isaiah and is related to their situation of seeking deliverance from exile and from injustice (35:5-7; 41:17-20; 42:7,18-22; 61:1-3). It is to these passages that Jesus refers in his answer to the disciples of John the Baptist (Mt. 11:5). The Good News of the Kingdom of God, therefore, is that it brings restoration and healing. This was the promise in Isaiah 57:18-19:

> I have seen his ways, but I will *heal* him,
> I will lead him and requite him with comfort, . . .
> Peace, peace, to the far and to the near, says Yahweh;
> and I will *heal* him.

"Healing," therefore, was an integral part of the proclamation of Good News. Hence its importance in Matthew's Gospel.[29]

The "teaching" aspect in Deutero-Isaiah was to be part of the function of servant Israel. For Yahweh has put his Spirit upon him so that he will bring forth justice (*mišpat*) to the nations, until he has faithfully established it in the earth, "and the coastlands wait for his teaching"(*letoratô*; Is. 42:1-4; cf. 61:1-3). Israel's mission is now defined as being a "people-covenant" (*berîṯ-ʿam*), a light to the nations, a witness to Yahweh's glory (Is. 42:6; 43:10,12; 44:8; 49:6,8; 55:4). So it is through them that Yahweh is pleased, "for the sake of his righteousness, to extend the teaching (*torah*) and make it glorious" (Is. 42:21). Those who know righteousness have Yahweh's teaching in their hearts, as Jeremiah had promised (Is. 51:7; cf. Jer. 31:31-34), and so will be the means for sharing God's teaching and justice with all peoples (Is. 51:4-5,16; 55:10-11). With the return from exile and the conflicts that followed, this great purpose for Israel was never really carried out. But now Jesus comes to call Israel to fulfil her purpose. This is the "teaching" with which Jesus comes and which he passes on to those who become faithful Israel (Mt. 28:20).

The Sermon on the Mount is introduced with the statement that Jesus "went up onto the mountain"(Mt. 5:1). Much has been made of the similarity of these words, *anebē eis to oros* with the action of Moses at Mt Sinai (Ex. 19:3,12; 24:15,18; 34:1,2,4). This has led to various comparisons with Moses as Lawgiver—some seeing Jesus as a New Moses, some see him giving a New Law. But yet there has been some hesitation in seeing Jesus primarily in this light.[30] The allusions to Mt Sinai may indeed be relevant. When Deutero-Isaiah cried to the herald of Good News to "get up to a high mountain" (LXX: *ep' oros hypselon anabēthi*) to announce

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[28] See, for example, the heralding of "Joy at the Accession of Ramses IV," in James Pritchard, *ANET*, pp. 378-379. Also Jacques Dupont, *Les Beatitudes, II* (Paris: Gabalda et Cie, c. 1969), pp. 60-61.

[29] It is interesting that the LXX uses *iasthai* in Is. 57:18,19. It uses *therapeuein* only once in Isaiah—in 54:17—where it translates *ʿebed*.

[30] See Davies & Allison, pp. 421-424; Luz, p. 224; Guelich, *Sermon*, pp. 51-52.

to the people "Behold, your God!" (Is. 40:9), this was in a sense a renewal of that covenant relationship made originally at Mt Sinai. The proclamation which Jesus makes in his Sermon fulfils the words of Isaiah 40:9—he is restoring the covenant relationship originally established through Moses on Mt Sinai.

*The Beatitudes: "Happy" or "Blessed"?*

*Makarios* is the LXX translation for *ʾašrē*, "happy, blessed," which is found predominantly in Wisdom literature—of the 44 times it is found in the OT, 26 are in the Psalms and 8 in Proverbs. For this reason the beatitudes are mostly seen as deriving from a Wisdom context with ethical intent, even though the genre may have been transformed by eschatological concerns.[31] In every case *ʾašrē* refers to human beings and never to God, and does not have the solemn connotation of the *barûk* ("blessed") sayings, which come out of a covenantal context where they are often in contrast to the *ʾarûr* ("cursed") sayings (e.g. Deut.27-28). The LXX usually translates *barûk* with *eulogētos* or *eulogēmenos*. However, the LXX does not always give an accurate indication of the meaning of NT words as we can see in the example of the first and third beatitudes in Matthew. There it is obvious that the Hebrew word behind both *ptōchoi* and *praeis* is *ʿanawim* (Is. 61:1 and Ps. 37:11). Consider also that the kind of blessing the *ʿanawim* received in Psalm 37 was *barûk* as verse 22 clearly affirms.

The *barûk* formula is more widely distributed throughout the OT and is found 60 times, 27 of them referring to God and 33 to humankind. It is mostly in the Psalms (15x) that it is used of God. But even there in two places (Pss. 115:15, 118:26) it is also used of those who are blessed by God. Psalm 115 emphasizes the reciprocal nature of the *barûk* saying, whereby the people are blessed by Yahweh (*barak*, 5x in vv.12,13,15), and they in turn bless (*barak*) Yahweh (v.18). Besides this, the noun *berakah* is used 8 times in the Psilms[32] and in each case it is a blessing bestowed on people. Furthermore, of the 55 verbal forms of *barak* in the Psalms apart from the Qal participle, 27 refer to people, 27 to God and one to the earth being blessed (65:11). This should put to rest Meier's recent claim that it is only God who is declared "blessed" with the cry of *barûk* in Israel's liturgy.[33]

Eduard Schweizer has pointed out that in later literature there is some evidence of mixed patterns where the *ʾašrē* and *barûk* formulas are used indiscriminately.[34] Most of his references are to intertestamental literature, but he does mentions Psalm 128 where the verb *ʾašar* is used in verses 1 & 2, and *barûk* in verses 4 & 5 with no real difference in meaning. One could also add Psalm 112:1-2. Another example of a mixed pattern is found in the saying in Psalm 1:1,3. There the *ʾašrē* formula is used, as it is also in an allusion to that Psalm in Isaiah 32:20. But the same saying in Jeremiah 17:7,8 has *barûk*.[35]

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[31] See Strecker, pp. 30, 31; Luz, p. 228; Guelich, *Sermon*, pp. 63-66; Davies & Allison, pp. 431-434; John P. Meier, "Matthew 5:3-12," *Interpretation*, 44/3 (July, 1990), 281-282.

[32] Pss. 3:9; 21:4,7; 24:5; 37:26; 109:17; 129:8; 133:3.

[33] Meier, p. 281.

[34] Eduard Schweizer, "Formgeschichlicher zu den Seligpreisungen Jesu," NTS 19 (1972-73), 121-126. See also W. Zimmerli, "Die Seligpreisungen der Bergpredigt und das Alta Testament," in *Donum Gentilicum: New Testament Studies in Honour of David Daube* (Edited by E. Bammel, et al. Oxford: Clarendon Press, c. 1978), pp. 8-26.

[35] Cf also Is. 44:3,4 where *berakah* is used in a reminiscence of Ps. 1. Similarly, Is. 30:18, where *ʾašrê* is used, may be an allusion to the Aaronic blessing in Num. 6:24-27 where the verb *barak* is found twice.

It is evident, therefore, that we are neither restricted to an *ʾašrē* formula nor consequently to an ethical content for the beatitudes on the basis of the word *makarios*. It may very well have been the translation of *barûk* or at least have carried the theological meaning of that word.[36]

The basic intent of the *barûk* saying is the invocation of the covenant promises on the recipient. When the worshippers in the Psalms call Yahweh blessed, they are expressing their own faithfulness to Yahweh and the hope that through such faithfulness his name will be glorified before the nations. Reciprocally, when Yahweh blesses the people, it is to call upon them all the blessings of his covenant promises. So the covenant promises to Abraham were that he and his descendants will be blessed by increase and prosperity and will be a blessing to others (Gen. 12:2,3; 18:18; 22:17,18; 24:14). This idea is also carried over in relation to the Sinai Covenant in Deuteronomy where blessing is again the result of Yahweh's covenant faithfulness to his people (7:12-13; 15:4-18; 16:10,15; 30:15-19).

This is all reflected in references to blessings in Isaiah 40-66. While Deutero-Isaiah alludes to the covenants with Noah and at Sinai, it is to the covenant with "Abraham your father" that he refers as evidence of God's blessing and its fulfilment (Is. 51:2). So also Yahweh will put his blessing on their descendants (Is. 44:3). In reaffirming the covenant promises of restoration, Trito-Isaiah begins with an *ʾašrē* saying (56:2):

> Keep justice (*mišpat*), and do righteousness (*ṣedaqah*),
> for see my salvation will come, and *my* righteousness be revealed.
> Blessed (*ʾašrē*) is the person who does this....

Later on he continues the promise that as a result of Yahweh's everlasting covenant with them,

> Their descendants shall be known among the nations
> and their offspring in the midst of the peoples;
> all who see them shall acknowledge them,
> that they are a people whom Yahweh has *blessed* (*bērak*, 61:9).

However, as these disciples of Deutero-Isaiah now see themselves as a persecuted minority of the faithful, they turn to Yahweh as their only Father for "Abraham does not know us, and Israel does not acknowledge us" (Is. 63:16; 64:8). It is thus the faithful minority who will now receive the covenant blessings and inherit the land as Yahweh's chosen, as his true servants (65:8-9). Those who have not faithfully sought Yahweh and answered his call now come under the covenant curse (65:1-7, 11-16). This is stated clearly in a series of blessings and curses, which must have had their influence on the formation of the beatitudes (65:13-16), finishing with the words: So that he who is blessed in the land shall be blessed by the God of faithfulness (*ʾemet*).[37]
So, Trito-Isaiah promises, it is the descendants of the faithful remnant who will finally inherit the land and prosper in it "for they shall be the offspring of the *blessed* (*barûk* of Yahweh" (65:23). In the light of this, the beatitudes at the beginning of the Sermon on the Mount/Plain become the proclamation of the

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36 Zimmerli prefers to believe that Jesus used the *ʾašrê* formula injecting it with deeper meaning, since in contemporary use *barûk* was reserved for blessing God, p. 12.

37 Although the verb is hithpael, the passive gives the intended meaning here better than the reflexive.

fulfilment of all these promises, the blessings of the everlasting covenant spelled out!

*Matthew 5:3*

*hoi ptōchoi tō pneumati*: This is quite obviously a semitism. In Greek it is awkward and not really comprehensible, and no self-respecting Greek editor would have added the *tō pneumati* to *hoi ptōchoi*. Matthew must have received it that way or simply translated literally from his Aramaic source. The LXX actually used *ptōchos* to translate *ʿani* 38 times, *ʿanaw* 4 times, *ʾebyon* 11 times, *dal* 20 times, and *raš* 9 times. Of these, only *raš* is a purely socio-economic term and is properly translated by *ptōchos*, "poor man, beggar." The others come out of a covenant context and so bear nuances of meaning that created difficulties for the LXX translators. Thus, for instance, of the 75 uses of *ʿani*, it is also translated by *penēs* 14 times, *tapeinos* 8 times, *praus* 5 times, besides 10 other words or phrases. Of the 20 times *ʿanaw* is used, *penēs* also translates it 3 times, *tapeinos* 5 times, and *praus* 8 times. The context in the beatitudes makes it clear that the Hebrew word behind *ptōchos* in this case is *ʿanaw* (from Is. 61:1). *ʿani* and *ʿanaw* actually derive from the same root-verb, *ʿanah* meaning "to be bowed down, to be afflicted." No distinction can be maintained between these two until later as there was some confusion over the *yodh* and *waw*, and in some cases they were used interchangeably. It was only in the rabbinic period that distinctions came to be made. The primary meaning of these words is not "one who is a beggar" but "one who is afflicted, oppressed." The *ʿani*/*ʿanaw* is always one who has been wrongfully treated according to the covenant relationship, and so has been reduced to wretchedness, powerlessness and even poverty. As a victim of covenant transgressions, the *ʿani*/*ʿanaw* cries out to Yahweh for justice, for in his covenant with his people Yahweh has promised to uphold the cause of the righteous. So the prophets, beginning with Amos, warned of the coming judgment on those who were unfaithful to the covenant and thus oppressed their neighbor (e.g. Amos 2:6-7; Is. 3:14-15; 10:1-2). So the *ʿani*/*ʿanaw* was often depicted as the "righteous" over against the *rašaʿ*, the covenant breaker, and in Zephaniah was even coupled with the idea of a holy remnant (Zeph. 2:3,7; 3:12,13).

In Deutero-Isaiah, through deportation and exile, the whole people of Israel have become the afflicted and oppressed, despised and rejected by the nations. They have been crying to Yahweh for justice and deliverance, and he now answers their cry (Is. 41:17):

> The afflicted and dispossessed (*ʿaniyyim weʾebyonim*) seek water, and there is none, their tongue is parched with thirst. I, Yahweh, answer them, I, the God of Israel, will not forsake them.

All of nature can now break forth in singing because Yahweh "will have compassion on his afflicted" (*ʿaniyyim*, 49:13). Jerusalem, often standing for the exiles, is addressed as "you who are afflicted (*ʿaniyyah*), storm-tossed and not comforted" (51:21; 54:11). As the servant of Yahweh, Israel has been seen as "stricken, smitten by God, and afflicted" (*meʿunneh*, 53:4), as one who was oppressed and afflicted (*naʿaneh*, 53:7), yet opened not his mouth. Yet all the humiliation and suffering of the exile has been for the people of Israel a necessary process of being refined "in the furnace of affliction" (*ʿoni*, 48:10) to prepare them for the task of carrying out their God-given purpose.

While II Isaiah used this motif of all the exiles, III Isaiah preferred to use it only of those faithful to Yahweh. It is to them that the prophet, speaking on

behalf of Servant Israel, announces that he has been anointed "to bring good news to the afflicted" (*ʿanawim*, 61:1). This is paralleled with "to bind up the broken-hearted (*lenišberê-lēb*)," a phrase often used in the Psalms (Cf. Pss. 34:19; 51:19; 69:21; 147:3). This parallel is very close to the combination in 66:2 where Yahweh states: "This is the person to whom I will look, to the afflicted (*ʿani*), and to the smitten in spirit (*nekah-ruaḥ*) who trembles at my word." This is a reference to the Suffering Servant of Isaiah 53:4 (who is "smitten [*mukkeh*] of God and afflicted [*meʿunneh*]") but now limited to those who are faithful to Yahweh's word. This connection to Isaiah 53 becomes even clear when we relate this to 57:15 where Yahweh was depicted as saying: "I dwell in the high and holy place, and also with him who is crushed and lowly in spirit (*dakkaʾ ušephal-ruaḥ*), to revive the spirit of the lowly (*ruaḥ šephalim*), and to revive the heart of the crushed (*lēb nidkaʾim*). In Isaiah 53:5,10, it is Servant Israel who is crushed, as is also the case in the exilic psalms (e.g. 44:20; 51:10,19). These phrases, afflicted, broken/crushed/lowly in heart/spirit, commonly expressed the dependent relationship of the faithful to God as they waitsd for his deliverance—as is exemplified also in psalms like 34:19: "Yahweh is near the broken-hearted (*lenišbare-lēb*) and saves the crushed in spirit (*dakkeʾ -ruaḥ*)."

All these terms for the faithful are brought together into one in this beatitude—they are the *ʿanawe-ruaḥ*, the "afflicted in spirit,"[38] those waiting for the fulfilment of the reign of God as promised in Deutero-Isaiah. This is the proclamation of the Good News: The Kingdom of God has come and it is theirs! The focus of this beatitude is not poverty but the reign of God's steadfast love and justice and the vindication of the faithful as promised in Isaiah 40-66. This is no ethical demand which must be carried out as an entrance requirement for the Kingdom of God.[39] That is made clear once again later on in the Sermon (Mt. 7:7-12. Cf. Is. 65:1).The phrase, *ʿanawe-ruaḥ*, is not unusual. It is found already in Qumran literature—in 1QH 14:3 and in 1QM 14:7 in a context filled with allusions to Isaiah 35:3 and 50:6. The *hoi ptōchoi tō pneumati* is simply the literal translation of this semitic concept which may very well have been uttered by Jesus.

Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that the Lukan version of this beatitude can be regarded as original. There are a number of reasons for this: (1) To him the *tō pneumati* would not have made much sense and would have been unsuitable for a Gentile audience and so he eliminated it. (2) While Luke gives evidence of a desire to emphasize contrasts between the rich and the poor (e.g. 12:13-21; 14:7-14; 16:19-31), the context still requires a deeper religious meaning.[40] (3) Luke is concerned to present the teachings of Jesus in a way that will be relevant in a non-Jewish context.

*Matthew 5:4*

*hoi penthountes. . . paraklēthēsontai*: This beatitude comes directly out of the hope expressed in Isaiah 40-66.

During the time leading up to the exile, the prophet Jeremiah often depicted drought in the land as the grass withering and the earth mourning over the people of Judah and Israel who had broken their covenant with Yahweh (Jer.

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38 David Flusser is probably correct in seeing this phrase as a contraction of the phrase in Is. 66:2. See his "Blessed are the Poor in Spirit . . .", *IEJ*, 10 (1960), 5.

39 Against Strecker, pp. 33-34.

40 See Davies & Allison, p. 444.

4:28; 12:4,11; 14:2; 23:10). But God would not forsake his people forever, and eventually their mourning would turn into joy (Jer. 31:13). Deutero-Isaiah picked up this motif after his people has suffered years of exile and began his proclamation of their deliverance by God with the words: "Comfort, comfort my people, says your God. Speak to the heart of Jerusalem and cry to her that her time of service is ended." (Is. 40:1,2) He then announced the coming of the Kingdom of God (40:9,10). This message of comfort remained throughout his proclamation as he continued to encourage his fellow exiles to hope in God. He called on heaven and earth to rejoice and on the mountains to sing for "Yahweh has comforted his people, and will have compassion on his afflicted" (49:13). Just as God had kept his promises to Abraham and Sarah so he would fulfil his promises to his exiled people: "For Yahweh will comfort Zion, he will comfort all her waste places and will make her wilderness like Eden . . ." (51:3). Constantly, Deutero-Isaiah had to remind them not to fear men who wither like grass but to put their trust in their eternal God. For he will restore his Kingdom, and his ransomed will return to Zion, for Yahweh says: "I, I am he who comforts you" (51:12). Announcing once again to Jerusalem the Good News of the coming reign of God, calling on her watchmen to keep their eyes open for the return of Yahweh to Zion, the prophet again urged the people: "Break forth together into singing, you waste places of Jerusalem; for Yahweh has comforted his people, he has redeemed Jerusalem!"(52:9)

Later, when the first exiles did return to Jerusalem, they returned only to find conflict and tension, and, treated with distrust and suspicion by the people living there, they became a persecuted minority. The reign of God had not yet begun and the people were not comforted. Trito-Isaiah saw the reason why—it was because of the iniquity and covetousness of Israel. Nevertheless, the promise had been made, and God would still keep his word: "I have seen his [Israel's] ways, but I will heal him; I will lead him and requite him with comfort, creating for his mourners the fruit of the lips" (Is. 57:18). III Isaiah encouraged the faithful to look to the future "for Yahweh will be your everlasting light, and your days of mourning shall be ended" (60:20). So in reaffirming the proclamation of Good News to the afflicted, he repeated the promise "to comfort all who mourn; to grant to those who mourn in Zion—to give them a garland instead of ashes, the oil of gladness instead of mourning. . ."(61:1,2). In spite of this reassurance, the faithful minority seemed to be losing out and so were becoming despondent. The prophet had to remind them that a child is not born without its mother going through a period of pregnancy and labor. The conception of the Kingdom would be brought to its full term, and then those who mourn over Jerusalem would be satisfied at her comforting breasts (66:7-11). To those waiting for the comfort of Israel, Yahweh promised: "As one whom his mother comforts, so I will comfort you; you shall be comforted in Jerusalem" (66:13). Luke could still speak of one "who was waiting for the comfort (*paraklēsis*) of Israel" at the time of Jesus' birth (Lk. 2:25).

All these hopes and the proclamation of their impending fulfilment is summed up in this one short phrase, "Blessed are those who mourn, for they shall be comforted." Using different terminology, this second beatitude really says the same as the first—that the Kingdom of God, long awaited, has come. "Mourning" here is still over the affliction and oppression they experience and

the lack of God's rule being evident in their society. This can hardly be attributed to the ethicizing tendency of Matthew.[41]

Luke has "Blessed are those who weep (*klaiontes*) now, for you shall laugh" (Lk. 6:21b). Most commentators now regard his *klaiontes* as redactional and Matthew's version the more original.[42] The reasons are (1) that in his corresponding woe Luke has both "mourn" and "weep" (*penthēsete kai klausete*), a good indication that "mourn" was in his source. The same can probably be said for Matthew's *paraklēthēsontai*. Luke has included this concept in his first woe, "Woe to you who are rich, for you have received your comfort" (*paraklēsin*, Lk. 6:24). (2) Isaiah 61:1-3 must have been of utmost significance to Jesus' message since it is the basis of his sermon in Luke 4:16-30, the focus of his answer to John the Baptist (Mt. 11:2-6), and the evidence in these beatitudes—to which Matthew proves more faithful. Once again, Luke apparently wants to make the beatitude more relevant for a non-Jewish audience.

*Matthew 5:5*

Too much time has been spent by commentators discussing the meaning of the Greek word, *praus* as "meek," "powerless," "humble," "kind."[43] The fact is that this beatitude is practically a quotation of Psalm 37:11, where *praeis* is the translation of *ʿanawim*, "afflicted ones," combined with the sentiment of v. 22 where it says "those blessed (*meborākāw*) by Yahweh shall possess the land."

The possession of the land became a real concern for the returning disciples of Deutero-Isaiah. The exiles had assumed that they would be able to repossess the land which their fathers had left behind when they were deported. The priestly law codes had sought to legislate that with the concept of the jubilee year (Lev. 25:8-17; cf. Is. 61:2,4). The program of restoration in Ezekiel 48 reflected that. Deutero-Isaiah had offered Yahweh's promise: "I have kept you and given you as a people-covenant to establish the land, to apportion the inheritances (*naḥalōt*) which have been made desolate" (Is. 49:8). However, on their return to Jerusalem they found that the inhabitants who had taken over the land had no intention of giving up their claims and had even made the arduous journey to Babylon to secure their position with Cyrus (57:9-10). In these circumstances, Trito-Isaiah came with a series of promises from Yahweh to the faithful that

> He who takes refuge in me shall inherit the land,
> and shall take possession of my holy mountain.
> And it shall be said,
> "Build up, build up, prepare the way,
> remove every obstruction from my people's way." (57:13-14)
> Your people shall all be righteous;
> they shall possess the land forever. (60:21)
> . . . In their land they shall possess a double portion. (61:7)

The faithful appealed to Yahweh to restore their inheritance to them and make his name known before their adversaries (63:16-64:2). Yahweh responded with covenant curses on the evildoers (65:13-16) and the promise of future blessing for

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41 As Luz, p. 235, and Strecker, p. 35 still hold to.

42 Strecker, p. 34; Davies & Allison, pp. 447-448; C. M. Tuckett, "The Beatitudes: A Source-Critical Study. With a Reply by M. D. Goulder," *NovT* 25 (1983), 199.

43 See Luz, p. 236; Davies & Allison, p. 449; Strecker, pp. 35-36; See also Gordon Pratt Baker, "The Constant Meek," Interpretation, 7 (1953), 34-41.

the faithful that they would finally inherit his holy mountain (65:8-9). He would, indeed, create "new heavens and a new earth" in which they would eventually live in peace and prosperity in accordance with the promises of Isaiah 11:6-9 (65:17-25).

Over generations of continued domination by foreign powers, Psalm 37 incorporated all these hopes of the faithful in its many allusions to Isaiah 40-66. Not only is the possession of land mentioned 6 times (Ps. 37:3,9,11,18,29,34), but those who will possess it are described in terms found in Isaiah 40-66. They will feed in faithfulness while the wrongdoers will wither away like the green grass (Ps. 37:2-3; cf. Is. 40:6-8,11; 49:9); Yahweh will bring forth their righteousness as the light and their justice as the noonday (Ps. 37:6; cf. Is. 58:8-10; 42:6; 49:6; 51:4; 60:1-3,19-20); they are those "who wait for Yahweh" (Ps. 37:9,34; cf. Is. 40:31; 49:23)[44]; they are "the afflicted" who will delight in abundant peace (Ps. 37:4,11; cf. Is. 58:14; 61:1-4,7); they are blessed by Yahweh (Ps. 37:22; cf. Is. 61:7-9); they are the "righteous" (Ps. 37:29; cf. Is. 60:21) in whose heart is God's instruction (Ps. 37:30,31; cf. Is. 51:7,16); and they take refuge in Yahweh (Ps. 37:40; cf. Is. 57:13); the wicked will simply disappear (Ps. 37:10,35,36; cf. Is. 41:11-12). Psalm 37 has become the expression of this aspect of the promise of restoration, and as such forms an integral part of the blessings as proclamation of the Kingdom.

Luke does not have this beatitude, and for this reason it is often assumed that it was added by Matthew or was developed in the pre-Matthean tradition. However, the concern over possession of land would have been meaningless to Luke's gentile audience, and also to Luke's own concern about possessions (cf. Luke 12:32-34; Acts 4:32-37).

*Matthew 5:6*

It has generally been understood that Matthew has added "and thirst after righteousness" to Q which was faithfully rendered in Luke 6:21a.[45] That this so-called addition creates awkward Greek does not argue for redaction[46] but rather for a literal translation of an original source which contained the whole statement. Background for such a statement can easily be seen in Isaiah 40-66.

In Deutero-Isaiah, the image of those who hunger and thirst being satisfied is used to illustrate the plight of the exiles and their consequent restoration. So the promise to the exiles is that "when they seek water, and their is none, and their tongue is parched with thirst" Yahweh would answer them, he would not forsake them (41:17). Such an image is followed by a picture of the renewal of creation (41:18-20). A similar promise is given in 44:1-5 where "I will pour water on the thirsty land, and streams on dry ground" is synonymous with "I will pour my Spirit upon your descendants, and my blessing on your offspring. They shall spring up like grass amid waters . . ." When they return God will protect then from thirst as he did at the beginning of their history through Moses (48:21). So "they shall not hunger or thirst . . . for he who has compassion on them will lead them and guide them by springs of water" (49:10). It is because of this that all creation can sing for joy "for Yahweh has comforted his people and will have compassion on his afflicted" (49:13; cf. Mt. 5:3,4). All this leads up in a rising crescendo to the call to come and celebrate the restoration of the Kingdom in II

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[44] Expressed in the Gospels with *prosdechesthai*—Lk. 2:25; 12:36; 23:51//Mk. 15:43; and *prosdokan*—Mt. 11:3//Lk.7:19,20; Mt. 24:50//Lk.12:46.

[45] So Strecker, pp. 36-37; Luz, p. 237; Davies & Allison, p. 451.

[46] So Davies & Allison, p. 451.

Isaiah's final chapter, 55:1-2: "Ho, everyone who thirsts, come to the waters; and he who has no money, come buy and eat! . . ." At this celebration the "everlasting covenant" which had been made with David (II Sam. 7:14; Ps. 89) is transferred to the people (55:3-5).

This theme, although considerably dampened, is continued in III Isaiah. Dealing with the failure of the restoration of Jerusalem, the prophet warned the people that keeping fasts while at the same time practising greed and selfishness would not bring about the promised restoration but compassion would: "If you pour yourself out for the hungry and satisfy the soul of the afflicted, then . . . Yahweh will guide you continually, and *satisfy your* soul with things that dazzle" (58:10-11). That which will dazzle them is not only their own renewal, but the rebuilding of their ruins (vv. 11b,12). But finally the line will be drawn between the faithful and the unfaithful and while Yahweh's servants would eat and drink, the wicked would remain hungry and thirsty (65:13). Then the faithful, "all you who mourn over her," will be able to rejoice over Jerusalem and "be satisfied with her comforting breasts." (66:10,11; cf. vv. 12-14). Until that happened, the faithful would continue to "hunger and thirst after righteousness."

The meaning of *dikaiosynē*, "righteousness"(which almost all see as a Matthean redaction) in this beatitude has caused much discussion over its meaning. Most scholars understand it as referring to right conduct in human behavior, while some see it as a gift of God to which the faithful aspire, or as a combination of both.[47] We turn again to Isaiah 40-66 for the answer, for there the term plays a very prominent role.[48]

In Deutero-Isaiah, "righteousness" is more often an attribute of Yahweh. Thus Yahweh takes the initiative for Israel's deliverance and acts in righteousness (*beṣedeq*) when he arouses Cyrus to carry out his special task of delivering the exiles (45:13; 41:2), just as he calls his servant Israel in righteousness (*beṣedeq*) and takes him by the hand and keeps him for his special purpose (42:6; 41:10). It is "for the sake of his righteousness" (*ṣidqō*) that Yahweh will extend his instruction to the nations through Israel (42:21). His word is the dynamic action of his covenant faithfulness—he "speaks righteousness" (*ṣedeq*). Even the nations will learn that there is no God beside Yahweh, "a righteous God and Savior" (45:21), from whose mouth "has gone forth righteousness (*ṣedaqah*), a word which shall not return" (45:23). Thus they learn that even those who had previously rejected him will say: "Only in Yahweh are righteousnesses (*ṣedaqōth*) and strength" (45:24), as they witness Yahweh's deliverance of his people. Without Yahweh's initiative in restoring the covenant relationship the exiles may worship their God but "not in faithfulness nor in righteousness" (48:1). If they had responded to Yahweh's commandments, their righteousness would have been like the waves of the sea (48:18),and they would not have suffered exile. It is now necessary for

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47 The literature on this subject is extensive, but see particularly Benno Przybylski, *Righteousness in Matthew and His World of Thought* (Cambridge: University Press, c. 1980), pp. 96-98; David Hill, *Greek Words and Hebrew Meanings: Studies in the Semantics of Soteriological Terms* (Cambridge: University Press, c. 1967), pp. 127-130; Strecker, pp. 37-38; Luz, pp. 237-238; Davies & Allison, pp. 452-453, all see it as referring to human behavior. John P. Meier, *Law and History in Matthew's Gospel: A Redactional Study of Mt. 5:17-48* (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, c. 1976), pp. 78-79 sees it as God's gift. Guelich, Sermon, pp. 84-87 sees it incorporating both.

48 In Is. 40-55, *ṣedeq* is found 10x, *ṣedaqah* 11x, *ṣaddiq* 4x, and *ṣadaq* in Qal and Hiphil 5x. In Is. 56-66 we find *ṣedeq* 7x, *ṣedaqah* 13x, *ṣaddiq* 3x.

them to experience Yahweh's righteousness in order to be able to respond in righteousness to him. Therefore Yahweh's proclamation is (45:8):

> Shower, O heavens, from above
> and let the skies rain down righteousness (*ṣedeq*),
> let the earth open, let salvation bear fruit
> that righteousness (*ṣedaqah*) may spring up also.

So Yahweh's response to stubborn Israel, to those "who are far from righteousness" is: "I bring near *my* righteousness and my salvation does not tarry" (46:12,13). Those who seek Yahweh's righteousness (51:1) are assured that it is coming speedily (51:5), and it will be forever (51:6). Those who experience it will have his instruction in their hearts (51:7) and will be able to carry out their God-given purpose to be a people-covenant, a light to the nations (42:6; 49:6,8) because he who causes them to be righteous is always near (50:8), or, as the so-called Fourth Servant Song puts it, "by his knowledge shall the righteous one, my servant, cause many to be righteous, and their iniquities he shall bear" (53:11). It is significant in this context that while Deutero-Isaiah used both the masculine and feminine forms of God (*ṣedeq, ṣedaqah*), he used only the feminine form of Israel. The prophet apparently used *ṣedeq* for the initiative and *ṣedaqah* for the response. Israel's righteousness can only come as a response to Yahweh's.

It is clear from this interplay of divine and human righteousness that to interpret the word as "right conduct" is inadequate. "Righteousness" is a relational term often associated with "faithfulness," "steadfast love," "compassion," "justice," and "salvation." It is better, therefore, to translate it as "faithfulness to the covenant relationship"—both human and divine.[49]

As the returned exiles waited for the fulfilment of the promises of restoration, Trito-Isaiah continued to encourage them to remain faithful to the covenant relationship: "Thus says Yahweh, 'Maintain justice and do righteousness, for soon my salvation will come and *my* righteousness be revealed" (56:1). Righteousness is the mark of the faithful community, the Righteous One (57:1,2). But even those faithful to Yahweh get caught up in the conflict that ensues, so that their deeds of righteousness are like a polluted garment, and they are dragged down by their wrongdoing (64:5[E6]). They are powerless to bring about their own salvation. So it is Yahweh himself who will graciously act according to his own righteousness (59:16,17) to vindicate his people before their oppressors (63:1). In the restoration the the people shall all be righteous and shall possess the land forever (60:17,21). As the shoot of God's planting (60:21), they will become "oaks of righteousness" (61:3). Through them Yahweh will cause righteousness to spring forth before all the nations (61:11).

From this it is clear that "those who hunger and thirst for *the* righteousness" are seeking the fulfilment of God's covenant faithfulness, the restoration of the Kingdom of God. And, as Deutero-Isaiah had said, "they shall be satisfied." The beatitude expresses the same dependence of the faithful upon God's grace, and the same proclamation of its fulfilment, as in the first three. The emphasis in this first strophe of 4 beatitudes is on God's righteousness. The second strophe also ends with "righteousness," but there it is the human response to God's. In fact,

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[49] See my "Righteousness as Relationship," *Festschrift: A Tribute to Dr. William Hordern* (edited by Walter Freitag. Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Press, c. 1985), pp. 125-137.

this responsiveness is a characteristic of those blessed in all 4 beatitudes of the second strophe.

Luke's "Blessed are those who hunger now, for you shall be satisfied" (*chortasthēsesthe*, 6:21a), must be seen as a simplified rendition of the one he found in Matthew. He has used the verb *chortazein* here as Matthew has, a verb often used in the LXX to translate *śabaᶜ*, "satisfy" in the OT. Yet in his corresponding woe he has *hoi empeplēsmenoi*, "those who are filled." This verb, *empiplēmi*, was also used in the LXX to translate *śabaᶜ* —as indeed it was in Isaiah 58:10,11; 66:11. Does this indicate that Luke had two different versions in front of him, or that he was also working from an Aramaic/Hebrew version? Whatever the case may be, Luke has developed his blessing and corresponding woe to emphasize the socio-economic aspect. He would find his justification for this readily in Isaiah 65:13-16. A difficult word like *dikaiosynē*, loaded as it was with theological meaning, would not have served his interests since it led in a different direction. (Luke only uses the word once, and that is in Zechariah's speech, 1:75)

*Matthew 5:7*

The clue to the Hebrew behind *eleēmones* is probably to be found in the use of *eleos* in Matthew 9:13 and 12:7 which quote Hosea 6:6. There *eleos* translates *ḥesed*, "steadfast love." Hosea's concern at the time of the disintegration of the Northern Kingdom was with Israel's lack of covenant faithfulness. His lament in Hosea 4:1 was: "There is no faithfulness (*ʾemet*), no steadfast love (*ḥesed*), no knowledge of God in the land," only the breaking of all the commandments of the covenant relationship. Yet, like a faithful loving husband, Yahweh was ready to draw Israel back into a loving relationship with him "with righteousness, justice, steadfast love, and with compassion" (Hos. 2:2 [19E]). But there had to be a response. The people had ploughed iniquity and reaped injustice. Instead, Hosea exhorted them to sow righteousness and reap the result of steadfast love, so that Yahweh might rain down his righteousness upon them (10:12). Micah had a similar message: "What does Yahweh require of you but to do justice, to love practising steadfast love, and to walk humbly with your God" (6:8).

During the exile, Deutero-Isaiah's message emphasized Yahweh's saving, redeeming steadfast love and compassion, and it became a constant expression of the hope for deliverance in both II and III Isaiah (49:10,13,15; 54:7,8,10; 55:3,7; 60:10; 63:7). Their hope was secure because Gos in his covenant faithfulness is always there with his mercy, best exemplified in Isaiah 54:10: "The mountains may depart and the hills be removed but my steadfast love shall not depart from you and my covenant of peace shall not be removed, says Yahweh who has compassion on you."

In this beatitude both the human and divine elements of *ḥesed*, emphasized in the prophets, are brought together into a proper relationship. *Ḥesed* is a term expressing the covenant relationship in action. The faithful who seek Yahweh's steadfast love in the Kingdom are those who practise it (cf. Is. 57:1; Ps. 37:28). This relational concept is central to Jesus' teaching about living in the Kingdom in Matthew's Gospel (cf. 9:13; 12:7; 23:23; 18:21-35; 25:31-46).[50]. Yet in this beatitude, "the merciful" is only descriptive; the emphasis is on the proclamation that the faithful "shall obtain mercy." Luke does not have this beatitude but has incorporated the concept in Luke 6:36.

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[50] In agreement with Davies & Allison, pp. 454-455.

*Matthew 5:8*

This clearly draws on the language of Psalm 24 where it says that "he who has clean hands and a pure heart" (*barē-lebab*, v. 4) "will receive blessing (*berakah*) from Yahweh and righteousness from the God of his salvation." (v.5). This expression brings together and summarizes those references to the faithful from II and III Isaiah as the "fearful of heart" (Is. 35:4), "the people in whose heart is my instruction" (51:7), the "crushed" in heart whom God revives and with whom he dwells (57:15), the "broken-hearted" whom he heals (61:1), and who shall "sing for gladness of heart" (65:14).

They are blessed because they shall "see the glory (*kabōd*) of Yahweh, the majesty of our God" (35:2). They will see God for the Good News is announced to them, "Behold, your God!" (40:9) and they will "see the return of Yahweh to Zion" (52:8). For they have been promised: "The brilliant presence (*kabōd*) of Yahweh has risen upon you" (60:1,2), you shall see and be radiant, your heart shall thrill and be exultant" (60:5; cf. 66:14,18). To be ushered into the Kingdom is to "see" God, for it is to be in a trusting relationship with him. When Israel broke the covenant relationship, it was commonly said that God's face was "hidden" from them, as, for instance, in Isaiah: "In overflowing wrath I hid my face from you, but with steadfast love I will have compassion on you, says Yahweh, your Redeemer." (cf. also 57:17; 59:2; 64:6). Once again, the beatitude is a summary of the promise to those who are waiting for the Kingdom, it is the proclamation that the Kingdom is theirs.

*Matthew 5:9*

This beatitude draws on another aspect of the promise of the Kingdom. It will bring peace, *šalōm*. This will mean that all will live peaceably together in the covenant relationship without conflict, oppression, or injustice under God's gracious rule. If Israel had lived according to the covenant stipulations then her peace and righteousness would have flourished and there would never have been any exile (Is. 48:18). The one who announces the coming of the Kingdom is the one who proclaims peace and salvation (52:7), for God's covenant of peace and his steadfast love are forever (54:10). Soon their sons would be taught by Yahweh and there would be abundant peace and righteousness (54:13). Peace will be the mark of their return (55:12). Trito-Isaiah continues this theme but sharply distinguishes between the faithful and those who have broken faith with Yahweh. For the righteous there will be "peace, peace, to the far and to the near" but no peace for the wicked (57:19,21; cf. 48:22). The latter are described as those who work iniquity, do violence, shed innocent blood, and do not know the way of peace (59:5,8). But eventually, they will be no more and peace and righteousness will reign forever (60:17). This same message is repeated in Psalm 37. There the afflicted who possess the land will "take delight in abundant peace" (v.11), for there is a future for the "man of peace," but not for the wicked (vv.37,38).

*Hoi eirēnopoioi* is found only this once in Biblical literature and functions as a synonym for "the righteous," those faithful to the covenant relationship, and who seek the peace of the reign of God. Peace and righteousness are often used as synonyms (cf. 48:18; 54:13; 60:17; Ps. 37:37,39).

To be called "sons of God" is an acknowledgement of their membership in that covenant relationship. As such the title was used of Israel (Deut. 14:1; Hos. 2:1 [1:10]; 11:1), and of Israel's monarch (II Sam. 7:14; Ps. 2:7; 89:26,27). But its use

took on special meaning in Isaiah 40-66. Deutero-Isaiah constantly played on the theme that God had formed Israel in the womb (43:1,21; 44:2,21,24; 46:3-4; 48:1; 49:1,5,14-15), that God was both father and mother to them (45:10-11; 46:3-4), and that on the basis of this intimate kinship he redeems them (cf. Lev. 25:48-49). So Yahweh addresses Israel: "Fear not, for I have redeemed you; I have called you by name, you are mine . . . for you are precious in my eyes, and honored, and I love you" (43:1,4), and then calls on them to return from among the nations as his "sons and daughters" (43:6). The same is found in Trito-Isaiah who asserts that Yahweh rather than Abraham or Israel is their real Father (63:16; 64:8). Matthew's seventh beatitude is the proclamation that all of this comes to fruition in God's reign which has now come.

*Matthew 5:10-12*

Oppression and persecution of the righteous is a predominant theme throughout the OT, particularly in the Psalms and the prophetic literature. "Salvation" in the OT always meant deliverance of the righteous from the hands of the *rašaᶜ*, the "wicked one." The time of the exile only increased that sense of persecution. In Deutero-Isaiah, Israel as a whole was regarded as the persecuted one, the suffering servant. The promised deliverance from exile also included the assurance that Israel's enemies would be confounded, and would perish (41:11). The exiles are described as "a people robbed and plundered" who are "trapped in holes and hidden in prisons," and who "have become a prey with none to rescue, a spoil with none to say, 'Restore!'" (42:22) They constantly suffer shame and humiliation (50:6), and live in fear of the oppressor (51:7,13), but deliverance is coming: "He who is bowed down shall be speedily released." (51:14). Isaiah 53, which is really a poetic description of Israel's exile and its divine purpose, is a whole commentary on "those who are persecuted for the sake of righteousness."

With the return of some of the exiles, the theme of persecution changes in Trito-Isaiah—the faithful become those persecuted by their own people who seek to gain at the expense of others. The prophet laments that "the righteous one perishes and no-one takes it to heart, men of steadfast love are taken away, while no-one understands" (57:1); "justice is turned back and righteousness stands afar off . . . faith is lacking, and he who departs from evil makes himself a prey" (59:14-15). But Yahweh promises those who are "crushed and afflicted in spirit" (57:15; 66:2) that they will see those put to shame who are "your brethren who hate you and cast your name out for my name's sake" (66:5).

This vindication finds its proclamation of fulfilment in this eighth beatitude. The "persecuted" are the same as the "afflicted in spirit" in the first beatitude, and both finish with the same apodosis, "Theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven." This 'inclusio' brings all the blessings together as one. The only difference is that the last four beatitudes illustrate more the active stance of the faithful, while the first four show more the dependent relationship on God. But in each case, the emphasis is on the apodosis because that is where the Good News of the Kingdom lies. These beatitudes are not "a series of uncompromising demands,"[51] but simply proclamation of the Good News.

This proclamation of Good News rises to a crescendo with the eighth beatitude being directed to the audience and expanded in verse 11 into what is almost a quotation from Isaiah 51:7b, combined with Isaiah 66:5. "Rejoice and be glad" in verse 12 picks up the constant refrain found throughout the Book of

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[51] So Luz, p. 243.

Isaiah expressing the "joy and gladness" of living in the covenant relationship under God's rule or its restoration (Is. 9:2; 16:10; 22:13; 24:11; 25:9; 29:19; 35:1,2,10; 41:6; 49:13; 51:3,11; 55:12; 56:7; 60:15; 61:3,7,10; 62:5; 64:4; 65:13,18,19; 66:5,10,14).

"For your reward is great in heaven." The word *misthos*, found 9 times in sayings of Jesus in Matthew's Gospel (3x in Lk, once in Mk), picks up the theme of "reward and recompense" (*śakar* and *pe'ullāh*) in Isaiah 40-66. The words often have the meaning of "wages," but in prophetic literature come to mean the largesse graciously measured out by the suzerain to his servants. In Isaiah 40-66 this largesse is salvation, redemption, the establishing of an everlasting covenant (40:10; 49:9; 61:8; 62:11,12; cf. Jer. 31:16; Ezek. 29:19-20). It is part of the proclamation of the restoration, as in Isaiah 62:11: "Behold, your salvation comes, behold, his reward is with him and his recompense before him." In this sense *misthos* is to be understood as the culmination of the blessings of the Kingdom announced in all the beatitudes. So it is not simply to be understood as "the heavenly reward beyond this world,"[52] but as the rule of God breaking into their lives here and now.

The reference to the "prophets before you" may indicate an emphasis on the prophetic heritage over against the Zadokite priestly tradition which was represented in different ways by the Sadducees and Pharisees. Persecution and oppression had probably been the lot of this minority who relied on the prophetic tradition all along. There is no need to look for any particular event in the life of the early Christian community to justify this theme of persecution. Nor is there any need to look to this community as the author of 5:10. The theme of persecution is part of the whole proclamation of deliverance.

Luke's version (6:22,23) bears all the marks of concern for his Gentile audience. Conscious of the Jewish attitude towards Gentiles at that time, he draws on concepts in the tradition which go back to Isaiah 56:3 (foreigners *excluded* from Yahweh's people) and 66:5 ("cast you out for my name's sake"), and points the beatitude in their direction. His "so their fathers did to the prophets" effectively neutralizes the relationship which the original audience would have had with the prophets, and which is expressed in the Matthean version. Luke's woes bear every mark of being secondary in this context and may have been developed on the basis of Isaiah 65:13-16.

### Matthew 5:13-16: Salt and Light

Directing the proclamation of the beatitudes to the audience (vv. 11,12) also had the purpose of leading into the sayings on salt and light, hence "*you* are the salt of the earth," "*you* are the light of the world." The audience is here addressed as those to whom the Kingdom belongs. There is, therefore, an integral relationship between the beatitudes and these sayings which describe what Kingdom members are to be. In spite of this, these sayings are almost universally regarded as originally independent sayings, words of Jesus which were preserved in other contexts and with different meanings.[53]

However, considering that the beatitudes express so strongly the proclamation of the Kingdom as promised in Isaiah 40-66, one would expect that these

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[52] So Strecker, p. 46.

[53] David Hill, *The Gospel of Matthew* (Grand Rapids: Wm B. Eerdmans, c. 1972, 1981), pp. 114-115; Strecker, p. 48; Luz, pp. 247-248; Davies & Allison, pp. 470-471; Guelich, *Sermon*, pp. 119-120.

two sayings would be directly connected to those promises. One of the most striking promises in Deutero-Isaiah is that of the real purpose of Servant Israel, stated in Isaiah 42:6: "I am Yahweh, I have called you in righteousness . . . I have given you as a people-covenant (*librit ʿam*), a light to the nations." Later on, it is said that up to this time Israel has been like a sharp sword in its sheath or like a polished arrow in its quiver, prepared by its maker and waiting for the time for it to be used, to fulfil its real purpose (Is. 49:1-4). But with the restoration of the Kingdom, Israel's purpose will be brought to fruition. Once again the purpose is reiterated. For Yahweh, it is not enough simply to use the exiles to restore the nation of Israel: "I give you as a light to the nations, that my salvation may reach to the ends of the earth. . . . I have kept you and given you as a people-covenant. . . . "(49:6,8). They are addressed as "the people in whose heart is Yahweh's instruction" (51:7). It is as such that they are called to be a living covenant, a people who through demonstration of their covenant faithfulness will draw all people into a bonded relationship with their only God and Father (45:20-22). Israel's situation in the world will thus be totally changed (49:7).

In the Gospels the term "covenant" (apart from a reference in Lk. 1:72) is only found in Matthew 26:28 and parallels, where Jesus gives a dramatic demonstration of this "people-covenant" idea. However, it should be remembered that in Ezekiel's temple ordinances for the time of restoration (43:24) the priests were instructed that for offerings presented to God they were always to sprinkle them with salt before offering them up as burnt offerings to Yahweh. So the priestly law gave the instruction (Lev. 2:13; cf. Num. 18:19): "You shall not let the *salt of the covenant* with your God be lacking from your offerings; with all your offerings you shall offer salt." Because salt was used as a preservative, "covenant of salt" came to be the term used for a perpetual covenant. Thus the Chronicler has Abijah claim that the covenant Yahweh made with David and his sons in regard to the kingship was such a covenant of salt (2 Chr. 13:5). So when Kingdom members are told "you are the salt of the earth," they were to be that permanent living people-covenant which would draw others together into a living relationship with God. Paul seemed to have cashed in on this idea in Romans 12:1-2.

The saying on salt thus fits hand-and-glove with the beatitudes, and the opening phrase "you are the salt of the earth" is vital to that connection. The fact that neither Luke nor Mark have that opening phrase discredits neither its authenticity nor its original connection to the beatitudes. Luke inserts the saying in a context dealing with counting the cost of discipleship before joining up. Specifically, it meant being ready to renounce all one's possessions in order to be a disciple (Lk. 14:25-35). Once again, Luke apparently has in mind the situation of the Jerusalem community recorded in Acts 4:32-5:11, which may at the time Luke was writing the Gospel have begun to disintegrate. Luke then tacks on this saying about salt because it deals with discipleship. But he shortens the opening to "salt is good" because "you are the salt of the earth" would have been inappropriate in this context. He uses the saying to point out unless discipleship is carried through fully in renouncing one's possessions, it is good for nothing. Of course, the saying as it stands in Luke is meaningless unless the hearer knows that it originally referred to discipleship. So Luke adds at the end: "He who has ears to hear, let him hear" as a kind of "You know what I mean."

Mark's version (9:49-50), containing Luke's "salt is good" rather than the Matthean opening, is placed into a context of judgment and warning of the fires of gehenna to which he connects it with the phrase: "For everyone will be salted

with fire." This may be an allusion to a burnt offering being salted (as in Lev. 2:13). His concluding statement, "Have salt in yourselves, and be at peace with one another," may suggest a familiarity with the Matthean opening. In itself the Markan saying is confusing. Both the Markan and Lukan sayings really need the saying as it is in Matthew in order to interpret them satisfactorily.

"You are the light of the world" (v.14) clearly fulfils the other purpose stated in Isaiah 42:6 and 49:6, to be "a light to the nations." The theme of bringing light to people who dwell in darkness derives from Isaiah 9:1,2 and is frequently found throughout Isaiah 40-66 (42:6,7,16; 49:6; 51:4; 48:8,10; 59:9). These sayings come to a climax in Isaiah 60:1-3 with its reassurance of the return to his people of Yahweh's *kabod*, that brilliant presence. which would be reflected in his faithful people. For it is only after the *kabod* of Yahweh has risen upon them that they can "arise, shine" and then "nations shall come to your light, and kings to the brightness of your rising." It is because Yahweh will be their everlasting light (60:19,20) that their days of mourning will be ended and they will reflect the glory of Yahweh as they demonstrate righteousness, which will be witnessed by kings and nations (62:2). With the announcement of the Kingdom. the Kingdom members are now to be that light of the world. The reference to "a city set on a hill cannot be hid" ( only found in Mt) simply brings into play the fact that in Isaiah 40-66 Jerusalem is often used as another term for faithful Israel. Thus in Isaiah 40:2 the prophet is called to speak to the heart of Jerusalem when the exiles are clearly in mind (cf. also 40:9; 51:17; 52:1-2,9; 62:1-12; 64:9; 65:18,19; 66:10-13). In fact, Isaiah 60-62, the reaffirmation of Deutero-Isaiah's promises, is addressed specifically to Jerusalem in terms of its faithful people. While verse 14 speaks of the corporate witness of the faithful, verse 15 emphasizes the individual responsibility as a lamp "which gives light to all in the house." The interplay of the corporate and personal nature of the witness has always been important in the understanding of the covenant relationship.

Verse 16 emphasizes that the purpose of that witness is to give glory to the Heavenly Father. Restored Israel was called to be the witness before the nations of Yahweh's power and glory (Is. 43:10,12; 44:8; 55:4). Soon creation would burst forth with singing because "Yahweh has redeemed Jacob, and will be *glorified* in Israel" (44:23). In making that proclamation of Israel's purpose to be a people-covenant, a light to the nations, Yahweh addressed Israel as: "You are my servant, Israel, in whom I will be glorified" (49:3). The promise of restoration in 60:21 makes the same point: "Your people shall all be righteous, the shoot of my planting, the work of my hands that I might be glorified." That shoot will grow up into "oaks of righteousness, the planting of Yahweh, that he may be glorified" (61:3). It is Yahweh's brilliant presence (*kabōd*) which has risen upon them which they are to reflect before people (60:1-3) so that nations shall come and experience Yahweh's *kabōd*. From them shall go forth others who shall declare the *kabōd* of Yahweh to the far ends of the earth (66:18-23). This is what is being referred to in Matthew 5:16. It is an integral part of faithful Israel's purpose in the restoration to be a people-covenant, a light to the nations that God might be glorified through their covenant faithfulness. It is that covenant faithfulness which is then described in the rest of the Sermon.

Matthew's version of the saying on light with its call to witness gives us a more complete picture than we find in Luke or Mark. The language in Matthew's version is regarded as more original.[54] Luke has two versions of the saying—in

[54] See Hill, *Matthew*, p. 116; Davies & Allison, pp. 476, 477.

Luke 8:16 and 11:33. In the latter he retains Matthew's *hypo ton modion*, "under a bushel," but in the former he changes it to covering the light with a "vessel" (*skeuei*) and then adds "or puts it under a bed" (*hypokatō klinēs*), an unlikely version in the Jewish context. In both cases, Matthew's "give light to all in the house" is changed to "that those who enter may see the light." Both of these appear to be modifications made to accommodate his Gentile audience. In Luke 8 the saying follows the parable of the sowing of seed which deals with the hearing and reception of the word. Luke is thinking of this from the point of view of a Gentile receiving the word. So also with the light—his concern is more for receiving it than being it. The same is true of his second version of the saying (11:33), where it is put into the context of the sign of Jonah (11:29-32) and the eye as the lamp of the body (11:33-36). The emphasis once again is on its reception, not on proclamation as in Matthew. Mark seems to follow Luke 8. His version also follows the parable of the seed, has Luke's "under a bed," and follows Luke's subsequent verses (Mk. 4:22,25=Lk. 8:17-18). But he inserts a verse from the saying on judging in between (v. 24=Mt. 7:2; Lk. 6:38) which he simply relates to reception of the word in a way it was never intended in Matthew or Luke.

This clearly shows how sayings coming out of an original Jewish context were changed in order to fit in with a Gentile perspective. Matthew's version is quite evidently the more original because it reflects that Jewish heritage so clearly. So to answer Davies & Allison's query as to why Mark and Luke have no parallels to Matthew's vv. 13a, 14a and 16,[55] the answer is clear: they did not fit in with the Gentile perspective.

## Conclusion

The close correlation between the message of Isaiah 40-66 and the opening verses of the Sermon on the Mount indicate that 1) Jesus' intention was to proclaim the coming of the Kingdom of God as the final fulfilment of the hopes of the exiles for return and restoration. A few of those hopes had been fulfilled in externals after the initial return. But the real, ideal, spiritual intention of those promises would never come to fruition until people understood what it really meant to be under God's rule. That is what Jesus came to proclaim. The many allusions to Isaiah 40-66 in the various discourses of Jesus, particularly in the Gospel of Matthew, further illustrates this intention. 2) Matthew's Gospel has been faithful in presenting that intention in its Jewish context. It is probably the Greek version of an original Hebrew/Aramaic Gospel which it has followed faithfully. 3) Luke and Mark have sought to make the message of Jesus relevant to their Gentile audience. Consequently, some of the sayings found in Matthew have been omitted while others have been changed. In making these changes, Luke has been influenced also by his concern to uphold the ideals of the original Christian community in Jerusalem, which he has recorded with approval in Acts 4:32-5:11, and which had led to such quick growth and outreach into the Gentile world. 4) That Matthew "re-Judaized" his sources does not sit well with the facts. The depth of influence of Isaiah 40-66 in the material we have studied rules that out, and the fact that allusions to Isaiah 40-66 is still retained to a lesser degree in the other Gospels does also. To attribute so much to Matthew belies the fact that Jesus came out of a Jewish context, and spoke in that context out of the prophetic tradition to Jewish people. The Gospels need to be reinterpreted in relation to

[55] See Davies & Allison, p. 471.

their Jewish context from the perspective of the prophetic tradition as opposed to the Zadokite priestly tradition represented by the Pharisees and Sadducees.